Centre for Studies in Democratisation
CSD
Students' Working Paper Series
Analysis of Western Democracy Promotion
Strategies
Amy McGlinchy
A.H.McGlinchy@Warwick.ac.uk
Working Paper n. 2/ 2011
Centre for Studies in Democratisation
Department of Politics and International Studies
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/csd/
The Centre for Studies in Democratisation (CSD) was established at
the University of Warwick in 1992 in response to a growing interest
in the study of democracy at a theoretical and empirical level.
Democratisation has become a central political theme and features
now prominently on the foreign policy agenda of western countries.
Members of CSD are seeking to understand why, how and when
democracies emerge, sustain or collapse. They also investigate the
reasons why democratisation can sometimes be problematic.
Do not hesitate to contact us for more information!
Renske Doorenspleet (Director):
Renske.Doorenspleet@warwick.ac.uk
Or visit our website:
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/csd/
Abstract
TIn this essay it is argued that US and European strategies for promoting
democracy abroad have altered from the period during the Cold War up to
the present day. This is done by first looking at the changing underlying
motivations for wanting to promote democracy abroad and how these can
affect democracy promotion strategies. US strategies for democracy
promotion abroad have ranged from diplomacy and assistance, to sanctions
and coercive force. This essay argues that although US democracy
promotion strategies have recently taken a back seat in order to regain
credibility, the US now needs to take more political risks by using the
leverage that it has on powerful autocrats to promote democracy abroad.
Europe will mainly refer to the European Union (EU), and the analysis of its
democracy promotion strategies in its near abroad. Although EU
conditionality through the enlargement process was successful during the
1990s, this essay argues that it has now largely come to an end. The EU
needs to find a balance between democracy promotion and the foreign
policy goals of its member states in order to develop effective strategies for
promoting democracy abroad.
Analysis of Western Democracy Promotion Strategies
Amy McGlinchy
INTRODUCTION
In order to critically compare US and European strategies for promoting
democracy abroad, firstly a definition and explanation of strategy and
democracy will be given. This essay will then assess the different underlying
motivations for US democracy promotion, before looking at US strategy and
how it has changed, from the period of the Cold War, to the balance of hard
and soft line strategies that have been involved in the ‘war on terror’.
Following this, European strategies will be explored, mainly from the
perspective of the European Union (EU), with its integration and
conditionality strategies as well as its more broad-based development
approach. US and European strategies will then be compared by exploring
their similarities and differences, before finally looking at ways of
improving US and European strategies for promoting democracy abroad,
both individually and more generally. This essay will conclude that there are
areas where the US and Europe can learn from each other, and both need to
separate and balance foreign policy agendas and democracy promotion in
order to allow for a more clear, focused and specific strategy of promoting
democracy abroad. With the current uprisings in North Africa and the
Middle East, this could be an important time for democracy promotion
strategies in the US and Europe. However, the limitations of democracy
promotion abroad also need to be recognised.
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Strategy and Democracy
In this essay democracy refers to liberal democracy as this is mainly what
the international democracy promotion industry is promoting (Burnell 2005:
362). Barkawi and Laffey define liberal democracy as:
...an instrumental ensemble consisting of competitive multiparty elections, a
representative legislature, a broad franchise among citizens who share a
bundle of liberal civil and political rights – including the right to own private
property – and a market economy in which most investment decisions rest in
private hands. (Barkawi and Laffey 2001: 13)
Strategy is defined as “...an outline of how to achieve goals... to use
reasoning about means-ends relationships...” (Burnell 2005: 364). It should
assess risk in order to discover what should and should not be done, and
cannot be properly understood until the underlying motivations are
uncovered. Burnell specifies three broad democracy promotion strategies;
institutional modelling, addressing underlying power relations, and
supporting democratic values and principles (Burnell 2005: 281). These can
be broken down into positive strategies such as democracy assistance,
reward, incentive, diplomacy, and positive conditionality, and negative
strategies of coercive force, military aid, political and economic
conditionality, and sanctions. Varying amounts of these strategies can be
seen in the following account of US and European democracy promotion
abroad.
US strategies of democracy promotion
Firstly the underlying motivations of US democracy promotion need to be
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explored. Burnell notes five different motivations, although they are not
entirely distinct from one another (Burnell 2000: 45-47):
(1)Wanting to advance democracy for its own sake because it promotes
American values: This is the idealist agenda which was first associated with
Woodrow Wilson (1913-21) and the notion that the US is ‘born to lead’.
(2)Democratic peace theory: This is the realist security notion that liberal
states are less likely to go to war with one another and that consequently
spreading democracy also spreads peace, stability and security. It is useful to
note that no country has benefitted more from the spread of democracy than
the US as its enemies have always been antidemocratic (Fukuyama and
McFaul 2008: 24). The ‘Community of Democracies’ (2000), which was
established during the Clinton administration, can be seen as a way of
spreading democracy by the US, whilst also enhancing its own security
(Whitehead 2010: 32).
(3)A way of continuing Western hegemony and power: In this sense
democracy promotion is an extension of US imperialism. Schweller argues
that peace and stability are not global or universal values and that it may not
always be in US interests to promote them (Schweller 2000: 44).
(4)A way of maintaining useful foreign alliances where democracy
assistance is just a cover to maintain the status quo: This explains why the
US is often selective in its democracy promotion (Whitehead 1996: 255). It
can promote polyarchies so as not to encourage a fundamental change in the
global social order when it suits US interests (Burnell 2000: 44).
(5)Making the world safer for capital, especially transnational capital: This
is the idea that democracy and neoliberalism go hand in hand, thus shrinking
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the role of the state.
Although policies and outcomes do not necessarily comply with real
intentions, it is useful to bear these motivations in mind, as they can assist in
explaining how US strategies have varied during different periods in time.
Cold War strategies
US democracy promotion strategies grew from the Reagan administration
(1981-1989) onwards. Both of its biggest institutions for democracy
promotion were established during this time. These are the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED). NED started a wave of US democracy
assistance in 1984 with an $18 million annual budget (Carothers 1997: 112).
It is a non-profit organisation which makes its own grants and works with
four core institutions (Burnell 2008: 635). USAID has a reputation for
democracy promotion and works with the Secretary of State on matters of
foreign policy. However, its impact is limited because “... under 10 per cent
of all USAID spending, which is less than 1 per cent of the entire federal
government budget, goes on democracy and governance” (Burnell 2008:
634).
The sudden surge in democracy promotion strategies was due to its being a
method of fighting the war of ideas with the Soviet Union. The main US
strategy in the region was to try to influence political outcomes (Robinson
1996: 320). This was done by sending political aid to the Soviet Union to
support solidarity, and was mainly done in Poland through NED. From
1984-1992 NED spent $50.5 million in the former Soviet bloc (Robinson
1996: 323). With the incentive of destabilisation, US political aid was
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effective in stirring political society.
US policy changed dramatically in South Africa from supporting the
apartheid to promoting democracy by imposing limited economic sanctions
in 1985. These were tightened in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act the
following year (Robinson 1996: 327-328). This was mainly motivated by
wanting to integrate the African economy. The US increased pressure on the
apartheid and developed moderate black leaders and organisations in civil
society. NED launched Project South Africa in 1985 to assist these
organisations, and the Assistance for Disadvantaged South Africans funded
housing, economic development and educational programmes, and provided
loans and grants. The goal was to create a black middle and business class
and a community of grassroots community leaders (Robinson 1996: 331).
Another strategy used during the Cold War was diplomacy. This was used by
US officials to weaken dictatorial power. This leverage nudged regimes in a
democratic direction through delicate engagement. This was successful in
Chile, South Korea and The Philippines by pushing to unify the opposition
in Chile, and pressuring the autocrats in South Korea and the Philippines
(Adesnik and McFaul 2006). However, the central drive for democratic
change was the growing strength of local movements, rather than US
democracy promotion strategies.
Post-Cold War strategies
Although pursuing global hegemony was a strong motivation for the US
during the cold war, it became less so after winning the ideological war
against the Soviet Union. US foreign policy changed from backing
authoritarianism to promoting polyarchic political systems, or what
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Robinson described as a change from coercive to consensual means of
domination (Robinson 1996: 318).
Some were of the opinion that there was no need to keep promoting
democracy after the threat of communism had disappeared. However, there
was an initial hype in the 1990s as a new wave of democratization spread
through Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe, and
parts of Africa and Asia via “rapid openings” (Carothers 1997: 119). The US
committed nearly $1 billion a year to support reforms in new independent
states such as Russia and the Ukraine (Hook 1998: 160). USAID had a
largely developmental approach by encouraging political reform in
representative government, human rights, rule of law and diffusion of
democratic values. NED and the Department of State favoured a more
political approach, with NED giving grants to political parties, trade unions
and human rights groups (Carothers 2009: 15).
The US government also promoted democracy by manipulating economic
aid flows through a process of conditionality from 1992-1996. However, it
did not connect economics with democracy. The result was that 89% of US
aid went to recipients whose political status did not change, which suggests
that there was no positive correlation between aid flows and democratization
(Hook 1998: 164). A counterargument could state that the majority of
countries were still in the transition phase at this point, and that therefore
their political status could take a long time to change.
During the mid 1990s, military spending was twenty times that of the
USAID budget. This was because security issues were still at the forefront,
with strategically important countries such as Egypt, Israel, Turkey and
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Russia occupying the majority of US attention (Hook 1998: 171). In the
early 1990s a negative strategy of denying economic support through
sanctions was also used, in countries such as Haiti (September 1991), Kenya
(November 1991), and Peru (April 1992) (Hook 1998: 160).
War on Terror strategies
There have been two main US strategic approaches to fighting the ‘war on
terror’; a hard line and a soft line (Carothers 2005).
Hard line – regime change and coercion
After democratizing Germany and Japan post World War Two, the US
thought they could export democracy at gunpoint, using coercive methods.
They tried again during the cold war, for example in Vietnam, Cambodia and
the Dominican Republic but largely failed (Coyne 2008: 3, 5). The most
recent attempts have been the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan (Oct
2001) and Iraq (March 2003).
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, democracy
promotion became a major foreign policy goal of the US as a means of
exterminating international terrorism. As Burnell notes, “President Bush has
harnessed the promotion of democracy to national security objectives in a
very particular way” (Burnell 2008: 631). He made it seem that democracy
promotion via military intervention was the only way of winning the ‘war on
terror’. The Advance Democracy Act (2005) was created to strengthen the
commitment of the State Department to democracy promotion, and the
growth of democracy abroad became a strategic mission objective of the
CIA (Burnell 2008: 631).
Although the main motivations for invasion were concerned with realist
7
issues of security, stability and oil, the war in Iraq also had the intention of
promoting democracy by destabilizing regimes in Syria and Iran, and
encouraging pro-Western regimes to democratize after seeing a working
democracy in the Arab world (Carothers 2004: 251).
However, Bermeo explains that coercive democratization through military
assistance works at cross-purposes with democracy assistance. Firstly,
military assistance is associated with the Pentagon and democracy assistance
with the State Department, and therefore there is no consensus between the
two (Bermeo 2010: 74). This makes foreign leaders think that if they
cooperate with the Pentagon then they can ignore other US messages
(Carothers 2004: 66). Secondly, and more significantly, statistics show that
democracy assistance is less effective when the US provides larger amounts
of military assistance. This is because:
Military aid programmes everywhere target the coercive apparatus of
recipient states, and because a state’s coercive apparatus inevitably affects
what the recipients of democracy aid can and cannot do, military aid is
bound to interact with democratization projects. (Bermeo 2010: 77)
Where military aid goes to authoritarian states, the coercive apparatus
works against democratizers, and US military aid happens to go
disproportionately to these authoritarian states. Although these findings are
influenced by the fact that incidents are recorded more frequently due to
increased free media, in 2004 military aid dwarfed democracy aid by over
eleven to one, and it appears that this imbalance in spending is “...a long
standing feature of American foreign policy” (Bermeo 2010: 76).
Soft line - diplomatic pressure and democracy assistance
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During the Bush administration there was an increase in the democracy
assistance budget of the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labour
Affairs (Fukuyama and McFaul 2008: 37). The Middle East Partnership
Initiative was established, funding civil society and education programmes.
Bush also created ‘The Roadmap to Peace’ to attempt to solve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict (Hobson 2005: 42).
Carothers explains that the US is torn between befriending autocratic Middle
Eastern rulers and trying to spread democracy to reduce extremism. He calls
it the “split personality” or “uncomfortable dualism” of Bush foreign policy
(Carothers 2004: 64). An example of this what when the war on terror
commenced and the US suddenly changed relations with General Pervez
Musharraf by waving economic sanctions, assembling a $600 million aid
package in 2002, and commencing military cooperation (Carothers 2004:
64). The US is close to autocratic leaders of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan due to its need for military bases there. Although it is also
pushing for reform in the region by stressing the outside support available, it
is arguable that the US can push harder because these countries are eager for
a close security relationship and the US can afford to use its leverage to
persuade and press for change (Carothers 2004: 65).
Aside from strategy, there are many issues with US democracy promotion in
the Middle East (Carothers 2004: 253/254):
(1)Firstly, it is wrong to assume that the democratization progress will
eliminate Islamic terrorism. This is not only because rapid opening can
create more extremist groups, but also because there are still terrorist groups
in established democracies such as Spain, Italy, and Britain.
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(2)There is no obvious democratic trend in the region which differentiates it
from the cases of Latin America and Eastern Europe. However, the current
situation in North Africa and the Middle East now calls this argument into
question.
(3)The US faces credibility issues due to its coercive strategy of promoting
democracy. Some believe that the excuse of terrorism and threats of US
invasion have in fact tightened autocracies (Fukuyama and McFaul 2008:
23). However, it could be said that the Obama administration are dealing
with this by putting much less emphasis on coercive measures of democracy
promotion.
In the US there now seems to be a backlash against democracy promotion,
as is evident by its reluctance to be seen as a prominent actor in the current
crisis in Libya. It is trying to keep a low profile due to its association with
military invasion, conspiracy theories involving the US in the ‘colour
revolutions’, violations of human rights by and within the US, which have
delegitimized it as a democracy promoter (such as Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo Bay), and diminishing US leverage due to the rising powers of
Russia, China and India (Hakan 2009: 98).
European strategies for democracy promotion
The same underlying motives can be seen with Europe regarding democracy
promotion abroad:
(1)There is a commitment to present democracy as a core European value
because it “... shows how to rise above centuries of interstate violence”
(Burnell 2008: 636).
(2)Barkawi and Laffey describe the democratic peace theory as
10
“Eurocentric” because it depends on historical assumptions which place the
state as the central actor (Barkawi and Laffey 2001: 2).
(3)Europe differs to the US in terms of hegemony as its democracy
promotion strategy of decolonization was motivated by making the world
safe for great powers in decline, mainly referring to Britain, France, Belgium
and Holland (Whitehead 1996: 254).
(4)Europe wanted to maintain valuable foreign alliances by creating a strong
block of power through the EU.
(5)A more integrated Europe would make the world safer for transnational
capital as trade would be able to flourish.
Specific European countries – assistance to political parties
Following the Second World War Germany set up party foundations to assist
organisations associated with democracy. Other European countries
followed, such as The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (1992) in
Britain, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (2000), and the
Olof Palme Foundation which is linked to the Democratic Party in Sweden.
These offer considerable practical support for democratic development. In
2004, the German foundations accounted for over three quarters of the
overall budget of political foundations on democracy related work in
Europe, providing $200 million a year in political aid (Youngs 2002: 31).
EU democracy promotion through integration and conditionality:
The EU democracy promotion commitment was made in November 1991
through a Development Council resolution, and was incorporated into the
Maastricht Treaty. During the 1990s Western Europe cooperated with
Eastern Europe through civil society actors, the economic sphere and good
11
governance (Youngs 2002).
The EU system is fundamentally different to membership and democracy
promotion of other International Organisations as it is unique in scope and
depth (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004: 94). This is because it is not limited to
elections but includes respect for human rights, free expression, and rule of
law (Levitsky and Way 2005: 27). Both economic and political
transformations are essential to be considered for EU membership, making
the EU attractive for its security, political and economic benefits. The
incentive for membership is strong as it is the final goal, and this sense of
permanence means that the EU can assist for the long run in consolidating
new democracies. It has extensive formal monitoring through annual reports
of the European Commission and European Parliament, as well as informal
monitoring (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004: 104).
EU integration uses positive conditionality which implements a degree of
pressure without endangering relations, as it allows recipients some
flexibility over how to meet certain conditions. Schimmelfennig et al (2003:
496) explain the system of reinforcement by reward via two types of
rewards:
(1)Technical assistance - Creating market economies during the transition
phase through Tacis, which is aimed at thirteen member countries of the
Community of Independent States and Mongolia, and Phare, which is aimed
at other Central and European countries;
(2)Institutional ties – these can be trade and cooperation agreements,
association agreements, full membership, or increased inclusion to EU
market.
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Their findings show that “... it is the material bargaining mechanism and the
condition of low domestic political costs that ultimately determine the
success of EU conditionality” (Schimmelfennig et al 2003: 514). Examples
are Turkey and Latvia, where the political costs of complying were relatively
low so they did amend certain policies. The Turkish Parliament passed
legislation in 2002 including abolition of the death penalty and peacetime
and cultural rights for the Kurdish minority, and Latvia reformed their policy
on minority rights. However, Slovakia under the authoritarian government of
Meciar refused to comply with accession negotiations because the political
costs of doing so were high and this became the overriding factor. Although
this shows the limits of EU conditionality, it is worth noting that the reforms
in Turkey and Latvia would not have happened without it, and therefore it
still plays a significant role (Schimmelfennig 2003: 503-514).
However, the role of the EU in promoting democracy in its “near abroad”
was “...no disinterested act” (Burnell 2008: 635). It was important for
Western European security as it allowed the EU to become a more powerful
actor in world affairs. Provisions for coercive measures were made in 1995
whereby relations with third countries could be suspended if they abused
democratic principles. However, these provisions were rarely implemented
(Youngs 2002: 34).
Despite the success of conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU
does not have an obvious strategy for dealing with defective democracies
such as Macedonia or Albania, or countries with no prospect for
membership like the Mediterranean countries of North Africa.
There are also issues with countries still awaiting integration. The risk of a
13
backlash against democracy increases because “... the hardship of
adjustment fails to be matched by the payoff (symbolic or economic) of
accession” (Dimitrova, Pridham 2004: 109). Turkey has been a candidate
since December 1999 and started accession negotiations in October 2005.
However, it is the only candidate without a specific accession date. The EU
can still refuse entry if it feels that it is not ready to take in a new member,
due to the ‘absorbtion capacity’ (Hakan 2009: 99). All of this questions the
legitimacy of EU conditionality, if it treats Turkey differently to other
countries.
There is a lack of uniformity and coordination over whether decisions are
made unanimously or by majority voting, and how much money is spent,
and where (Youngs 2002: 38). There is no complete picture and member
states do not know what other states or the Commission are doing. However,
policies were put in place to try to unify diplomatic pressure through
‘Common Positions’ in the Maastricht treaty and ‘Common Strategies’ in the
Amsterdam treaty, although their effects have been limited (Youngs 2002:
39).
Democracy promotion as part of a larger strategy of development
assistance and foreign policy
The EU promoted democracy through a broad network of diplomatic,
commercial, development assistance and security policy, and mainly focused
on basic rights. Democracy promotion was incorporated into this broader
agenda, especially through the European Initiative for the Promotion of
Democracy and Human Rights which was established in 1994 (Youngs
2002: 30). This broad agenda makes it difficult to measure exact spending
14
on democracy assistance, but the Initiative disburses annual grants of 120
million Euros to around thirty-two countries (Burnell 2008: 635). However,
this is still only one per cent of EU development assistance (Youngs 2002:
31).
Through the European Neighbourhood Policy the EU promotes democracy
in places such as North Africa on the condition that these non-EU countries
commit to political and economic reform. Mediterranean countries are
especially important to the EU in terms of security due to energy resources
and issues of migration. Negotiations began in 1995 when the EuroMediterranean Partnership was established between the 15 EU governments,
and 12 Mediterranean countries. However, the EU only encouraged partial
political liberalization because this was enough to satisfy EU intentions of
moderating Islamist reform and allowing European business to gain easier
access in places such as Egypt, Morocco and Jordan (Youngs 2002: 47, 92).
In 1991 a number of initiatives established a common European foreign and
security policy, and principles were entered into the Maastricht treaty.
However, foreign and security policies were still mainly intergovernmental
and therefore actions such as sanctions on countries acting illiberally were
rarely used (Olsen 2000: 145). In Algeria, following a military coup in 1992
the EU increased its assistance in the country rather than cutting the aid to
the military government (Olsen 2000: 157). In Niger, although the EU
stopped aid flows into the country following a military coup in 1996, France
continued giving aid 3 months later and the EU then followed (Olsen 2000:
162). These examples show how economic and strategic interests of a
particular EU country mean that the EU support matters of security over
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democracy promotion. However, although it has limitations, the EU is still
an important symbol of European values.
Comparison of both US and European strategies for democracy promotion
abroad.
Similarities
Neither the US or Europe are monotholic as there is complex bargaining
amongst parties (Burnell 2005: 363). In the US there is a lack of consensus
between the White House, the State Department, USAID, the Defence
Department, and the intelligence agencies (Carothers 2005: 207). In the EU
there is a lack of consensus between the Commission and Member States,
and between majority and unanimous voting (Youngs 2002). However, at
least Washington policy-makers know the overall picture of American
democracy assistance, allowing them to prioritise and allocate appropriately
through the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labour in the State
Departments, and the Centre for Democracy and Governance in USAID
(Youngs 2002: 32). This is in contrast to the EU where individual states are
often left confused over where money is spent and what other states and the
Commission are doing.
Another similarity is that both the US and Europe support political party
development. The US does this mainly through The National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican
Institute (IRI), and European states do this through the Westminster
Foundation for Democracy (UK), party foundations (Germany), the
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, and the Olof Palme
Foundation (Sweden) (Burnell 2000: 48).
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Both have broad-based integration processes and policies through the EU
enlargement process and the US North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) with Latin America (Levistky and Way 2005: 33). Levitsky and
Way write that “...sustained policies of integration can broaden and deepen
linkage over time, with impressive results in terms of democratization”
(Levitsky and Way 2005: 33). However, EU integration has met with much
more success and is more widely regarded than NAFTA as a process of
integration because the latter “...lack the EU’s encompassing ties and
monitoring and sanctioning capacity” (Levistky and Way 2005: 28).
Another similarity was that by the end of the 1990s both the US and the EU
had similar democracy promotion budgets as the overall EU effort was
around $800 million per year by 1999, and US assistance at the time was
$700 million (Youngs 2002: 31).
Differences
There are far more differences than similarities in US and European
democracy promotion strategies. The main difference is that in Europe the
developmental approach is dominant. This is where democracy is seen as a
process of social and economic modernization and is thus part of a broader
development agenda. This contrasts with the US where the political
approach is dominant. This is a more narrow conception of democracy
focusing on elections and political parties and is therefore institutions based.
This shows that the EU focus is more on democratic potential, whereas the
US is more focused on bringing about specific endpoints. However, in
reality their differences are not so clear cut, as Carothers writes, it is “A
division, not a rift” (Carothers 2009: 18).
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Another difference is that the US is more effective in shaping the process of
transition, whereas the EU has more staying power to assist consolidation
through political and economic integration and permanent membership
(Luckam and White 1996 258). There is an argument that:
Given the pace and depth of the democratic transformation of postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe under EU conditionality,
it would not be wrong to claim that in the last two decades the EU has been a
far more successful democracy promoter than the USA. (Hakan 2009: 98/99)
However, this has only worked for countries that were on their way to
joining the EU. These were not difficult victories because they were ready to
comply with the conditions in return for security and democratic
consolidation. Now that the easier targets have consolidated, EU
conditionality is much more limited.
A further difference between US and European democracy promotion
strategies abroad is that US military aid goes disproportionately to
authoritarian states whereas British, French and German arms sales
generally go to democracies (Bermeo 2010: 79). This shows how the US is
more concerned with security issues as it would rather maintain stability in
authoritarian regimes, than assist with consolidation in new democracies.
There is also a large difference in domestic support for democracy
promotion abroad. In Europe the figure is relatively high at 71 per cent,
whereas US support in comparison is only 37 per cent (Fukuyama and
McFaul 2008: 24).
With regards to the Middle East, European leaders are more willing to
realise that other criteria needs to be met before the terrorism threat will
18
recede, such as a resolution to the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Europe also does
not portray democracy promotion as the main solution in the region, unlike
the US (Burnell 2008: 632).
How to improve democracy promotion strategies: the United States
Although Carothers (2004: 256) describes is at “commendable” that Bush
shook up old way of US diplomacy in the Arab world, the words of Coyne
ring loudly that, “Instead of employing illiberal means to achieve liberal
ends, the focus should shift to liberal means to achieve liberal ends” (Coyne
2008: 29). If the US is going to use coercive measures, then it also has a
responsibility to strengthen its commitment to reconstruction. As well as a
more long term approach, the US also needs to be more consistent, rather
than suddenly increasing or decreasing its interest in a country (Carothers
2004: 71).
The lack of domestic support for the US as a democracy promoter shows the
negative image associated with it, and implies that the US should work on
increasing its legitimacy before deciding on democracy promotion strategies.
Perhaps in order to become credible again, the US should downplay its
democracy promotion agenda in order that people disassociate it with
furthering security interests (Fukuyama and McFaul 2008: 36). President
Obama does seem to be following this approach. However, there is a danger
that his continuing silence indicates a lack of interest in the democracy
promotion agenda. Priority is given to more pressing internal issues, such as
dealing with national debt.
In order to promote a broader democracy promotion agenda and increase
consensus, Fukuyama and McFaul suggest suggests a compelling idea of
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establishing a new Department of international Development which would
incorporate USAID and other departments (Fukuyama and McFaul 2008:
39).
In terms of the Middle East specifically, the US could improve by:
...withdrawing support from undemocratic regimes, taking a much more
impartial position in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and resisting the
temptation to insist upon harsh neoliberal reforms if democratization begins
to occur (Hobson 2005: 51)
The US also needs to take advantage of its leverage with regards to friendly
autocrats, as it did in the past, through persuasive diplomacy (Adesnik and
McFaul 2006: 8). It is a challenging balancing act for the US between
maintaining security interests and implementing democracy promotion
strategies (Bermeo 2010: 83).
How to improve democracy promotion strategies: Europe
Although the success of the EU enlargement process as a democracy
promotion strategy cannot be underestimated, this process is now largely at
an end. The EU now needs to embrace different democracy promotion
strategies, such as can be seen through the European Neighbourhood
Initiative. However, as previously noted, security issues of member states
often undercut democracy promotion strategies in the Mediterranean and
until this changes through increasing transparency and cooperation, there is a
limit to its democratizing potential.
In the EU there appears to be no clear difference between human rights and
democracy agendas. Although putting democracy promotion under the broad
category of ‘development’ encourages long term commitment, perhaps more
20
of an emphasis on democracy itself is needed to encourage clear policy
initiatives in this area. Until this is the case, the EU will have no clear
democracy promotion strategy.
How to improve democracy promotion strategies: general view
Burnell suggests that perhaps greater cooperation is needed between Europe
and the US (Burnell 2005: 363). Although this is unlikely due to different
geopolitical interests, there is room to learn from one another. The US can
learn from the EU model as a legitimate democracy promoter and its role in
democratic consolidation. In return the EU can learn from US strategies in
assisting with a democratic opening or transition.
Neither the US or Europe should go about “...wrapping security goals in the
language of democracy promotion...” (Carothers 2004: 71). Democracy
needs to be seen as a valuable goal in and of itself. Although it is naive to
assume that idealist goals will go before national interest, this is not to say
that they should not still be pursued in their own right. However, in order to
be able to pursue democracy for its own sake, more money needs to be put
into democracy promotion schemes in both the US and the EU.
Finally, as the US has learnt the hard way through Iraq and Afghanistan,
strategy should know when to stop (Burnell 2005: 281). There is a limit to
the ability of international democracy promotion, and by carefully balancing
positive and negative democracy promotion strategies, the US and Europe
can learn where the boundaries are.
As new possibilities for democratization are developing through uprisings in
North Africa and the Middle East, in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia,
this could also be a new opportunity for democracy promotions strategies to
21
develop in the US and EU. It is a chance for both to show that they can
support these possible transitions and consolidations towards democracy by
taking more political risks and not prioritizing their foreign policy agendas.
However, once again the balance between the two will be challenging due to
European security interests in North Africa, and US security interests in the
Middle East.
CONCLUSION
This essay has explored the different democracy promotion strategies
implemented by the US and Europe in foreign countries. After the war of
ideas had been won, and democracy triumphed over communism, a wave of
democracy spread throughout the globe in the 1990s. However, the last
decade has shown the difficulties of promoting democracy abroad, with
coercive measures of the US resulting in a globalized ‘war on terror,’ and
European integration largely coming to an end. This essay has shown how
security issues and matters of foreign policy often take the forefront in the
US and Europe, and how the underlying motive of democracy promotion
strategies needs to be promoting democracy for its own sake, if it is to be
seen as legitimate and coherent. The limit of the influence of external actors
in promoting democracy abroad has been seen in the recent uprisings, where
democratization has come from internal actors. However, this is a new
opportunity for democracy promoters to show that they can legitimately
assist in these possible democratizations. As two leading democracy
promoters, the US and Europe should work to keep democracy promotion as
an important agenda, whilst trying to find the right balance between issues of
both foreign policy and democracy promotion agendas, and cooperative and
22
coercive strategies.
23
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