The House of Lords in 2006:
Negotiating a
Stronger Second Chamber
By Meg Russell and Maria Sciara
January 2007
ISBN: 1 903 903 51 2
Published by The Constitution Unit
Department of Political Science
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2
Contents
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………….
4
Summary of Key Points………………………….…………….……………………….
5
Introduction....................................................................................................................................
7
Allegations of ‘cash for peerages’ ................................................................................................
7
Compositional changes..................................................................................................................
9
Reform…………………………………………….…………………………………...
10
Wrestling with the conventions……………………..............................................................
12
Reform in action: the Lord Speaker…………………………….………...........................
13
The Legislative Evidence…….....................................................................................................
14
Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................
17
List of Tables and Appendices
Table 1: Composition of the House of Lords, 1 January 2007……......................................
9
Table 2: Arrivals and departures from the House, 1999-2006................................................
10
Table 3: Number of bills per Parliament where the House of Lords has insisted on
its amendments 1974-2..............................................................................................
12
Table 4: Government defeats in the House of Lords, 2006……………...……………...
15
Appendix A: New members of the House of Lords in 2006……………….......................
19
Appendix B: Deaths and retirements in 2006............................................................................
21
Appendix C: Government defeats in the House of Lords in 2006........................................
22
3
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council, grant no. RES-000-230597. We are grateful to the ESRC for their support. We are also grateful to the many peers,
parliamentary staff and others who have supported and co-operated with the project.
Full details of the project and its publications can be found at:
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/parliament/house-of-lords.html
The text of this briefing (minus appendices) is due to appear shortly as a chapter in The Palgrave
Review of British Politics, 2006 edited by Michael Rush and Philip Giddings (Basingstoke:
Palgrave). We are grateful to the publishers for their permission to publish it in this form.
4
Summary of Key Points
•
The House of Lords, and prospects for its reform, were much in the news in 2006. No real
progress was made with reform, although the chamber continued to develop gradually.
•
The biggest story related to the allegations of ‘cash for peerages’, when it was discovered that
several figures had loaned money to the parties and subsequently been recommended for seats
in the upper house. After their names were rejected by the Appointments Commission this
sparked a police investigation, and an inquiry by a House of Commons select committee which
recommended reform of the appointment process. Although these developments had potential
to damage the Lords the greater damage seemed to be sustained by the parties.
•
The chamber continued to grow during the year, in a way that seems unsustainable. The year
ended with over 750 entitled to sit and vote, as appointments outstrip deaths and retirements.
The Northern Ireland DUP won seats in the House for the first time.
•
The ‘cash for peerages’ affair renewed interest in Lords reform, as did jostling for position in
the (still unofficial) race to be Labour’s next leader and deputy leader. New Leader of the
House of Commons Jack Straw took over responsibility for Lords reform policy, and a white
paper was promised which was expected to recommend a 50% elected, 50% appointed House.
However, no paper had been published by the end of the year, perhaps in part because of the
criticism that these proposals attracted when leaked to the press.
•
The year saw the establishment of the parliamentary Joint Committee on Conventions, looking
at the conventions governing the relationship between the Commons and the Lords. The
committee took much interesting evidence, but offered little comfort to the government. It
suggested that conventions cannot be rigid, and are likely to continue to change if the
composition of the chamber is further reformed. It also demonstrated that the government’s
proposal to limit the time bills spend in the Lords would breach current practice, and the
government distanced itself from this proposal.
•
Real reform arrived in terms of the election of the first Lord Speaker, to take over as presiding
officer of the chamber from the Lord Chancellor. Baroness Hayman was elected to the
position in June. It was agreed that the chamber will continue to be largely ‘self regulating’, and
the Lord Speaker has far more limited power than her House of Commons counterpart.
•
There were 52 government defeats in the chamber over the year, and the peers won some
major concessions. One feature which is becoming clearer is the ability for the Lords and
Commons to act in partnership – rather than opposition – to achieve legislative change. This
was seen this year over the Identity Cards Bill, the Police and Justice Bill, and particularly the
Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, where MPs backed a Lords amendment and defeated the
government in the House of Commons.
•
Overall, evidence continues to point to a stronger second chamber, gaining confidence
following the reforms of 1999. This does not necessarily threaten the House of Commons, but
has the potential to strengthen parliament as a whole with respect to the executive. The
government had hoped that establishment of the Joint Committee on Conventions would
result in the powers of the chamber being curbed, but the chamber’s progress looks difficult to
stop. It also seems more difficult than ever to agree a way forward on major reform.
5
6
Introduction
Since 1999, when the majority of hereditary peers were removed from the House of Lords, there
has been a feeling that Britain’s second chamber is increasing in confidence and strength. This
belief particularly pervades the political community, and is also beginning to be discussed by
scholars. 1 While continuing to be unelected the chamber now primarily comprises members
appointed on their merits, rather than by accident of birth. It is also far more politically balanced
than it was before 1999. This has given it a greater sense of legitimacy – although its unelected
nature means this continues to be questioned.2 Between the chamber’s reform and the end of 2006
it had inflicted over 350 defeats on the Blair government. The greater confidence of the Lords
leads some politicians to conclude that it has been dangerously strengthened and that any new
reform should be targeted at reigning it back. But for others the priority is to democratise the
chamber and give it an even more legitimate role in the policy process.
Various events fuelled debates about the legitimacy, strength and reform of the Lords during 2006.
One was allegations early in the year that money given to the Labour and Conservative parties had
been exchanged for peerages and thus seats in the upper house. This threatened to taint not only
the parties but also Parliament, and helped revive calls for Lords reform. Such calls also received a
boost from jostling for position by Labour figures anticipating the succession to Tony Blair.
However, while this may have provided comfort to those wanting to democratise the Lords, there
were also contrary moves. A new joint committee was established to consider the conventions
governing the Lords – the clear motivation being government views that increasingly confident
peers are stretching the boundaries of existing convention, and that something must be done to
stop it. And although a new reform package was promised, this was delayed, and no action
ultimately taken.
While debates about reform raged amongst the political and media classes to little effect, events in
the Lords showed further gradual change. The chamber continued to grow, ending the year with
almost 750 members entitled to sit. The centuries-old tradition of the Lord Chancellor acting as
presiding officer ended and peers elected their first Lord Speaker. The number of government
defeats was again high, with significant concessions made on key bills, and growing signs of the
Commons and the Lords acting in partnership to extract concessions from the executive.
Although small and piecemeal, these real life events may reflect trends which prove to be of more
lasting significance than any rhetoric about reform. Slowly, the Lords is finding a new place in
British politics, and becoming a more influential and more mainstream institution.
Allegations of ‘cash for peerages’
The biggest Lords-related news story during 2006 was a negative one which ran most of the year,
centring on allegations of ‘cash for peerages’. A list of proposed appointees was leaked to the
press in November 2005, with rumours suggesting that the House of Lords Appointments
See M. Russell and M. Sciara, ‘The House of Lords in 2005: A More Representative and Assertive Chamber?’ in M.
Rush and P. Giddings (eds.), The Palgrave Review of British Politics 2005 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 12236; P. Cowley, ‘Making Parliament Matter?’, in P. Dunleavy, R. Heffernan, P. Cowley, and C. Hay (eds.), Developments in
British Politics 8, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
2 For a discussion see M. Russell and M. Sciara, ‘Legitimacy and Bicameral Strength: A Case Study of the House of
Lords’, Paper to 2006 Conference of the Political Studies Association specialist group on Parliaments and Legislatures,
University of Sheffield. Available at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/Parliament/house-oflords.html; A. Kelso, ‘Reforming the House of Lords: Navigating Representation, Democracy and Legitimacy at
Westminster’, Parliamentary Affairs, 59 (2006), 563-81.
1
7
Commission (responsible for vetting the propriety of party nominees, as well as choosing
independent members) was concerned about some of the names. In April, one, Dr Chai Patel,
broke his silence, to demand details of the objections to his nomination. It was already known that
some nominees were major party donors. But Dr Patel revealed that he had funded Labour
through a £1.5m loan, avoiding the need for the party to declare the contribution to the Electoral
Commission. It turned out that three other Labour nominees, and one Conservative nominee, had
similarly made loans to the parties. To make matters worse, Labour Party Treasurer Jack Dromey
revealed that he knew nothing of the transactions in his party. Shortly afterwards, a police
investigation began considering whether the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925, which
forbids the sale of honours, had been breached.
These events did little to boost the image of the House of Lords, though the main damage was
sustained by the parties. Various party advisers and ministers, including the Prime Minister himself,
were questioned by the police, and at one point party fundraiser Lord Levy was arrested. The affair
cast doubt on the appointments process to the Lords, and whether this includes adequate checks –
though ironically it was the new system the government put in place in 2000 which had brought
these difficulties to light. There is little new about allegations of ‘cash for peerages’: the 1925 Act
followed similar allegations on a far larger scale under Lloyd George. What is different now is that
there is Appointments Commission to vet nominations, which seems prepared to question the
Prime Minister’s judgement.
Concern about appointments boosted those campaigning for an elected upper house, though – as
discussed below – little concrete happened. It also raised questions about how the appointments
process could be improved. The Appointments Commission remains non-statutory, its role in
political nominations is limited to advising on the propriety of names put forward by Number 10,
and there are no clear criteria for choosing party nominees. The two largest parties have no system
of internal democracy for selecting their candidates for peerages, though the Liberal Democrats
now involve their party conference and the Greens ballot their members. The Prime Minister
continues to choose the nominees for the governing party, as well as deciding the timing and party
balance of creations.
Questions about the Prime Minister’s patronage powers will not easily go away. They were
examined by the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) which
announced an inquiry into the scrutiny of political honours in March. Although this was almost
immediately put on hold at police request (as public witness sessions could prejudice the criminal
investigation) PASC decided to publish an interim report in July.3 This recommended ‘making it
explicit that nominations to the peerage entail appointment to he legislature rather than the award
of an honour’4, greater transparency within parties over how nominees are chosen, a statutory
basis for the Appointments Commission giving it a clear role and powers, and consultation on the
criteria for future nominees. Such proposals would help boost the integrity (and thus legitimacy) of
the Lords while not fundamentally changing its composition. Unfortunately, this means they were
not readily embraced either by government or most Lords reformers. But if, as looks likely, largescale reform is further delayed, the proposals may yet be returned to.
3
4
Public Administration Select Committee, Fourth Report – Propriety and Honours: Interim Findings, HC 1119, 2005-06.
Ibid, para. 30.
8
Compositional changes
Overall Labour continues – for only the second year – to be the largest party in the Lords. But the
balance of power remains with the Liberal Democrats, Crossbenchers and ‘others’, as shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: Composition of the House of Lords, 1 January 2007
Affiliation
Conservative
Labour
Lib. Dem.
Crossbench†
Bishops
Other‡
Total
Life
Peers
159
207
73
153
0
12
Hereditary
Peers
47
4
5
33
0
2
Serving Law
Lords
0
0
0
12
0
0
618
91**
12
206
211
78
200
26
14
Losses
in 2006
5
4
0
8
1
0
Gains in
2006*
7
8
5
14
2
0
Net
change
+2
+4
+5
+6
+1
0
735
18
36
+18
Bishops
Total
0
0
0
0
26
0
26
Source: Calculated from House of Lords Information Office figures and Hansard.
* Based on dates that members take the oath
** There was one vacancy, due to the death of Lord Mowbray and Stourton in December
†
Including nine Ulster Unionist Party members, three Democratic Unionist Party members and one Plaid
Cymru member, who by convention sit as Crossbenchers.
‡
This group largely comprises members who have left one of the main parties, and it includes the one Green
Party member.
The controversy over appointments resulted in a delay in announcing a new peerage list at the start
of the year. This was finally published in April minus the five names of the original major lenders.
It comprised seven Labour, seven Conservative, five Liberal Democrat and four ‘Crossbench’
names. This latter included, for the first time, three nominees from the Northern Ireland
Democratic Unionist Party, which had long argued for seats, along with former Ulster Unionist
Party leader David Trimble. It remains an anomaly that these political members join the
crossbench group, consisting largely of independents, rather than sitting in their own right. The
one Green member of the Lords (whose existence is one of the lesser known facts about the
British Parliament) chooses to sit under his own party label. There were strong rumours that this
lone representative, now aged 78, was to gain a party colleague in the new round of appointments.
However, if this opportunity was real it was rather spectacularly missed, when the party’s chairman
put his own name forward without permission of its executive. His nomination was withdrawn,
and the party balloted members on a replacement, selecting London Assembly member Jenny
Jones. However, there was no Green name on the final list.
As well as these arrivals there were 13 other entrants to the chamber over the year.5 With only 18
deaths and retirements, the size of the chamber continues to grow, and is now 79 higher than it
was when reform greatly reduced the membership in November 1999. The pattern of gradual
growth since then is shown in Table 2, and does not appear sustainable in the longer term. One
difficulty is that (with the exception of Bishops) members of the Lords cannot retire. 6 This
problem was highlighted in July by Lord Phillips of Sudbury (Lib. Dem.), when he announced his
Seven were independent members announced by the Appointments Commission in May. Other included the new
Archbishop of York, John Sentamu, the retiring Bishop of Oxford, Richard Harries, and Retiring NHS Chief
Executive Nigel Crisp. The latter two were Prime Ministerial nominees and sit as crossbenchers.
6 Though they can go on temporary ‘leave of absence’. The figures in Table 1 exclude the handful who have done so.
5
9
desire to leave the House. He introduced the Life Peerages (Disclaimer) Bill, which would have
allowed a peer to renounce their position, and require the Prime Minister to appoint a replacement
from the same political party. However, it had no chance of becoming law. Full lists of those
entering and departing the chamber during 2006 are given in Appendix A and Appendix B.
Table 2: Arrivals and departures from the House, 1999-2006
1999, Nov onwards
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total at 1 Jan 2007
Total at
start of
period†
669
669
693
712
692
678
707
730
748
Losses
Gains*
Net change
4
18
28
25
28
24
23
18
168
4
42
47
5
14
53
46
36
247
0
+24
+19
-20
-14
+29
+23
+18
+79
Source: Project House of Lords database, derived from Hansard and House of Lords website
Including members on leave of absence (who are excluded from Table 1)
* Based on dates that members take the oath
†
Reform
Labour’s 2005 manifesto had promised three things on reform: the removal of the remaining
hereditary peers, a further free vote on Lords composition (following the inconclusive votes of
2003), and action on the powers of the House. The Blair government had not initially questioned
the chamber’s powers, but in the face of growing Lords activism had started to consider this
necessary. It proposed a review of conventions by a joint committee, and limits on the time bills
could spend in the Lords to 60 sitting days. By the start of 2006 no progress had been made on
any aspect of reform. The ‘cash for peerages’ scandal resulted in a flurry of interest, and there was
much talk of reform, but aside from the review of conventions (discussed separately below) no
further progress had been made the year’s end.
Aside from ‘cash for peerages’, the unofficial contest for a new Labour leader and deputy leader
made many senior figures keen to demonstrate their radicalism by talking up Lords reform. This is
seen as one of Tony Blair’s policy failures, which could be exploited by challengers in his own
party, as well as by David Cameron. As early as April, Peter Hain called for a ‘great reforming bill’
to deal with the House of Lords.7 In November Hilary Benn spoke out for an 80 per cent elected
house.8 Both cabinet ministers declared themselves as deputy leadership candidates. Even Alan
Milburn (who unlike them had voted for an appointed House in 2003) came out for a directly
elected second chamber.9 Gordon Brown, expected to take over from Tony Blair, has long hinted
that he would like to introduce elections to the Lords. However Blair himself suggested in
September that Lords reform remained one of the ‘39 steps’ he wished to complete before leaving
office.10
Appearing on GMTV, 23 April, reported by the Press Association.
The Guardian, 20 November 2006.
9 ‘Milburn Looks to Leadership’ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/uk_politics/5346572.stm>.
10 ‘Blair sets out the 39 steps he hope will secure his legacy’, The Times, 27 September 2006.
7
8
10
Despite this rhetoric, past failures probably taught the government to proceed cautiously. Behindthe-scenes negotiations between the parties, and with Labour backbenchers, were initially led by
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer. When Jack Straw became Leader of the House of Commons
in May he then took over responsibility for Lords reform. Straw was previously sceptical about
elections to the upper house, having voted against all elected options in 2003. However, he
expressed a willingness to compromise, and in a speech in July suggested that a 50/50
elected/appointed mix was likely. In the autumn a leaked paper from the cross-party talks
indicated that this was now the government’s preferred position, and a white paper along these
lines was widely and imminently expected. However, its publication was delayed and it had not
appeared by the end of the year. The Queen’s Speech, rather than promising a bill, merely stated
that the government would ‘work to build a consensus on reform of the House of Lords’ and
would ‘bring forward proposals’.11 Given the political difficulties the delay was not surprising: both
main parties remain split on the issue and complaining about Blair’s inaction is much easier than
devising a widely acceptable solution. In particular the proposal of a 50/50 chamber probably suits
no one, and notably was defeated without a division in the Commons votes in 2003. The leaked
proposals attracted criticism from senior figures in all three parties – some for including too many
elected members, and others for including too few. The delay to the votes (initially promised for
spring) at least saved both main parties from the embarrassment of displaying their splits on the
floor of the House of Commons, as happened on the previous occasion.
A new leader, or even the existing one, may seek to restart Lords reform again in 2007. But the
task is so complex that intentions are not enough. Essentially, the job is to find a compromise that
democratises the chamber without making it any stronger. This appears both logistically and
tactically impossible. The more confident the chamber becomes in blocking government
legislation, the more interest there is on the Labour side in limiting its powers. For many in the
party, Lords reform has always been about ensuring that governments can govern unimpeded,
rather than about adding further democratic checks.12 But with respect to the Lords’ powers the
government was forced during the year to distance itself from its specific manifesto commitment
to limit the chamber’s consideration of bills to 60 days. Evidence by the senior parliamentary
clerks to the Joint Committee on Conventions demonstrated that almost half of bills take more
time in the House than this. 13 Jack Straw told the committee that the government had ‘no
immediate plans to legislate in this way and we wish to await the proposals of this Committee
before making any decisions’. 14 However, he also stated that without agreement over the
conventions it would be ‘extremely difficult to reach agreement on future composition’.15 This
suggested that progress would now be more difficult than ever.
A Times poll in April showed the public also split and confused about Lords reform: 75 per cent
believed that ‘The Lords should remain a mainly appointed house because this gives it a degree of
independence from electoral politics and allows people with a broad range of experience &
expertise to be involved’, while 72 per cent believed that ‘At least half of the members of the
House of Lords should be elected so that the upper chamber of Parliament has democratic
HL Debs., 15 November 2006, c. 3.
See P.Dorey, ‘1949, 1969, 1999: The Labour Party and House of Lords Reform’, Parliamentary Affairs, 59 (2006),
599-620.
13 Joint Committee on Conventions, Conventions of the UK Parliament, Report of Session 2005-06, HL 265-II, November
2006, pp. EV 95-7.
14 Ibid, p. EV 11.
15 Ibid, p. EV 13.
11
12
11
legitimacy’.16 This internally inconsistent set of positions may also sum up the views of the political
class.
Wrestling with the conventions
Contemporary anxieties about the Lords were neatly encapsulated during 2006 by the
establishment in May of the Joint Committee on Conventions.17 Although the government is
reluctant to admit that the Lords is more legitimate as a result of the 1999 reform, this was a clear
indication of its concern about the chamber‘s growing assertiveness. Not only have recent years
seen high numbers of government defeats in the Lords but also, as evidence to the committee
from the Clerk of the Parliaments showed, there is a tendency to more rounds of ‘ping-pong’
between the two Houses before legislation is agreed. Although comparison over time is difficult,
given the lack of historic data and the different behaviour of the Lords under Conservative
governments, Table 3 shows that the number of times the Lords insisted on its amendments was
particularly high in the 2001-05 Parliament. In 2000, the Lords also rejected a piece of secondary
legislation for the first time since 1968, and further such defeats have been threatened. Just before
this, the Conservative leader in the chamber, Lord Strathclyde, had pronounced previous
conventions ‘dead’ following reform. 18 More recently, the Liberal Democrats have repeatedly
questioned the Salisbury convention that a manifesto bill should not rejected outright by the
Lords.19
Table 3: Number of bills per Parliament where the House of Lords has insisted on its
amendments 1974-2005
Parliament
1974-79
1979-83
1983-87
1987-92
1992-97
1997-2001
2001-05
Total
Number of insistences*
1
2
3
2
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
3
1
0
12
3
0
19
6
1
Total
4
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
1
1
4
17
29
Source: Figures drawn from the Clerk of the Parliament’s evidence to the Joint Committee.20
* i.e. number of times the bill has returned to the Lords and been defeated again, after the initial defeat.
The Joint Committee’s terms of reference required it to consider ‘the practicality of codifying the
key conventions of the relationship between the two houses of Parliament which affect the
consideration of legislation’.21 In particular it was asked to consider the Salisbury convention, and
conventions regarding secondary legislation, the notion that government legislation should be
considered ‘in reasonable time’, and the ‘ping-pong’ process.
Given the constitutional limbo between one reform and the next in which the Lords finds itself (a
situation indeed prevailing for most of the twentieth century), the committee’s work had a certain
See <www.populuslimited.com/pdf/2006_04_04_times.pdf>.
The committee comprised 11 peers and 11 MPs – 11 Labour, six Conservative, three Liberal Democrat and two
crossbench and was chaired by Labour’s Lord Cunningham, a trusted former minister.
18 Speech to the thinktank Politeia, 30 December 1999.
19 See Russell and Sciara, ‘The House of Lords in 2005’, pp. 123-4.
20 HL 265-II, pp. EV 97-8.
21 Joint Committee on Conventions First Special Report, HL 189, 2005-06, para. 2.
16
17
12
surreal quality. It was unclear at times whether Lords’ conventions were being discussed in the past,
present or future tense, and evidence sessions included much reflection on questions such as when
a convention is a convention and whether it is possible for conventions to be codified at all. While
widely accepted conventions (such as the confidence vote applying in the Commons alone) were
barely mentioned, the committee concentrated on matters that were so contentious they seemed
impossible to agree, and could therefore probably no longer be considered conventions.
Aside from providing rich material for scholars of philosophy or law to pore over, the committee’s
work served other useful purposes. The evidence from the clerks provided interesting data, and
the parties were pressed to state their positions. The Liberal Democrats maintained their view that
reform of the chamber has rendered the Salisbury convention obsolete, but also proposed that no
bill (whether in the manifesto or not) should be rejected outright by the Lords.22 In its report in
November the committee concluded that conventions by their nature must remain ‘flexible and
unenforceable’, but suggested that some understandings might be reached between the chambers
by mutual resolution. These could include manifesto bills not being subject to ‘wrecking’
amendments, government legislation being considered by the Lords in ‘reasonable time’ and both
chambers being given notice before considering each other’s amendments.23 Even the terms of
these agreements, however, would remain necessarily ill-defined. The committee also stated, in a
conclusion troubling for the government, that current conventions could not necessarily be
expected to hold if the chamber were reformed in future to include elected members.
Reform in action: the Lord Speaker
Although wholesale Lords reform did not happen, 2006 nevertheless saw real reform of another
kind. In 2003 the government announced its intention to abolish the office of the Lord Chancellor,
who historically acted as presiding officer in the Lords. Although strong opposition to the
proposals resulted in the post of Lord Chancellor being retained, the final settlement – in the
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 – allowed the post to now be held by a member of the Commons.
As the Lords was potentially left with no presiding officer, a select committee was set up to
consider the role and powers of a Speaker for the Lords.
In July 2005, the House agreed a resolution that it should ‘elect its own presiding officer’ and
‘consider further how to implement this resolution with full regard to the House’s tradition of selfregulation’.24 The committee then provided concrete proposals. It concluded that the Lords should
not have a ‘House of Commons type speaker’. 25 To respect the established culture of self
regulation the new Lord Speaker, like the Lord Chancellor, should therefore have no power to, for
example, select amendments, call on peers in debates, or intervene when members speak for too
long or stray from the point. There was some debate over whether the Speaker should take over
the role performed by the Leader of the House (a government minister) of deciding the order of
speakers at question time. Even this was considered a step too far, though the Speaker, rather than
The party’s written evidence to the committee stated that ‘the House should not vote down entire Government Bills
at Second Reading, as to do so would run contrary to its role as a revising chamber’ and ‘the House should not reject
whole Bills at Third Reading either, but we strongly believe that the House must maintain its unfettered right to
amend at Third Reading’. HL 265-II, p. EV 66.
23 Joint Committee on Conventions, Conventions of the UK Parliament, Report of Session 2005-06, HL 265-I, November
2006, pp. 76-9.
24 HL Debs., 673, 12 July 2005, c. 1002.
25 Report of the Committee on the Speakership of the House, The Speakership of the House of Lords, HL 92, 2005-06, para.
8.
22
13
the Leader, will now rule on the admissibility of Private Notice (i.e. urgent) Questions. In addition,
the Lord Speaker will have a role representing the House at home and overseas.
At the Motion for Approval debate in January 2006, Lord Strathclyde, the Conservative Leader in
the House, moved an amendment to combine the Speaker’s position with that of the already
existing Chairman of Committees. This proposal reflected concern about whether two posts (and
two salaries) were justified – however it was dropped due to lack of support. Another amendment
to transfer the Leader’s duties at Question Time to the Speaker was defeated on a free vote, and it
was agreed to proceed on the basis of the committee’s report.
The election of the first Lord Speaker took place at the end of June by secret ballot, using the
alternative vote system, by which candidates are ranked in order of preference and those with
fewest votes eliminated on each round. 26 Each of the nine candidates provided a 75-word
statement describing why they wanted the position. On 4 July it was announced that Baroness
Hayman, who was the clear leader on the first ballot, had defeated Lord Grenfell (a Deputy
Speaker) by 263 votes to 236 in the final round.27 Baroness Hayman is a former Labour minister,
but upon election she announced that she would give up the whip and she now sits as an
unaligned peer.
On the surface, it appears that little has substantively changed. It has been emphasised that selfregulation, rather than firmly chaired debate, should remain. As the committee noted, many feared
that ‘any change in the role currently performed by the Lord Chancellor would be a “slippery
slope”’ away from these traditions.28 Consequently, the former presiding officer’s responsibilities
have largely been transferred unchanged. However, it is too soon to predict what the medium to
long-term consequences of this reform will be. The position of Lord Speaker has the potential to
be moulded by its occupier, as well as by wider events. Formally, the extent to which she can take
an active role is limited and she remains subservient to the House. However, as peers become
more assertive the role may become a more active one, adding to the cultural changes that have
already affected the chamber since its reform in 1999.
The Legislative Evidence
As data is gathered from the passage of bills over several parliamentary sessions, a picture of a
stronger House of Lords is slowly emerging. The number of government defeats in the chamber
in 2006 is shown in Table 4. In 2005-06, there were 62 defeats, compared with 56 in the similar
long post-election session of 2001-02 and 39 in 1997-9. It is difficult to draw definitive
conclusions from such trends, as each session is different and the political context constantly
changes. Post-2005, the Blair government is less popular, and its majority in the House of
Commons is reduced. Accordingly, one might expect to see the balance tilt from the Lords to the
Commons, in terms of keeping the government in check. However, an interesting pattern of
partnership between the chambers is instead emerging, and became clearer in 2006. This
challenges the popular assumption that the two chambers are in competition and instead shows
that they can unite against the executive, particularly when policy is contested by government
backbench MPs. This is reinforced by the fact that 78 per cent of peers and 75 per cent of Labour
This is the same as the electoral system used in hereditary by-elections. It is a more streamlined system than that
agreed in 2001 for electing the House of Commons Speaker, which requires repeated voting.
27 The other candidates were Lord Boston of Faversham (Crossbench), Lord Elton (Con), Baroness Fookes (Con),
Countess of Mar (Crossbench), Lord Redesdale (Lib Dem), Lord Richard (Lab) and Viscount Ullswater (Con).
28 HL 92, para. 14.
26
14
MPs believe the chamber is more legitimate since its 1999 reform.29 The indications are, therefore,
that this may have significantly boosted the strength of Parliament as a whole.
A kind of partnership had already been demonstrated over the Terrorism Bill in late 2005, when
MPs inflicted their first defeats on the Blair government, over the period for which police could
detain suspected terrorists. Although the bill had not yet been to the second chamber, this could
be seen as a pre-emptive strike by the Commons, knowing that the Lords would certainly have
amended the bill.30 The other main issue of concern to MPs was that of ‘glorification’ of terrorism,
where the government had avoided defeat by one vote.31 Peers voted by a large margin to remove
all references to ‘glorification’; but, following minor concessions by the government, MPs were
persuaded to overturn the Lords amendments. At this stage, the Conservatives in the Lords
dropped their opposition and the ‘glorification’ clause was accepted. Without continued Commons
support peers were not prepared to press the point.
Table 4: Government defeats in the House of Lords, 2006
Calendar
year 2006
Subject
2005-06 session business
Charities Bill
Civil Aviation Bill
Companies Bill
Company Law Reform Bill [HL]
Compensation Bill [HL]
Criminal Defence Service Bill [HL]
Electoral Administration Bill
Equality Bill [HL]
Government of Wales Bill
Identity Cards Bill
National Lottery Bill
NHS Redress Bill [HL]
Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill
Police and Justice Bill
Racial and Religious Hatred Bill
Road Safety Bill [HL]
Terrorism Bill
Violent Crime Reduction Bill
Motions and other business
4
1
5
1
2
6
11
1
2
2
8
4
4
1
2005-06
session total
1
4
1
5
1
1
2
1
6
12
1
2
2
8
1
8
4
1
1
2006-07 session business: no defeats by year end
Total
52
62
Note: [HL] = bills originating in the House of Lords.
29 Surveys of Peers and MPs carried out for the project, in February 2005 and February 2004 respectively. For peers
response rate was 57 per cent (n=374 on this question, including 103 Labour). For MPs the response was 30 per cent
(n= 107 on this question amongst Labour MPs). For further analysis see Russell and Sciara, ‘Legitimacy and Bicameral
Strength’.
30 Particularly in the light of the marathon argument between the government and the Lords on the Prevention of
Terrorism Bill earlier in the year: see Russell and Sciara, ‘The House of Lords in 2005’.
31 See HC Debs, 2 November 2005.
15
On the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill the partnership was more effective. Here the key sticking
point between ministers and Parliament was the definition of ‘incitement’ to religious hatred.32 In
2005, the government faced public campaigns, rebellions in the House of Commons and the
largest Lords defeat of the 2005-06 session. Peers did not seek to remove the clause, but to clarify
that ridicule, insult or abuse would not be sufficient grounds to prove incitement. The
government’s offer of a ‘freedom of expression’ clause did not go far enough to placate either
peers or MPs. When the bill returned to the Commons in February as amended by the Lords, the
Conservative spokesperson, Dominic Grieve, proposed that ‘the Government can have their
legislation . . . in the form that the Lords have wisely altered and it can then go forward’.33 Similarly,
Labour’s Tony Wright suggested that ‘the Lords delivered to us a Bill which, if it did not
completely square the circle, did it as well as it was humanly possible’.34 Such claims are normally
mere debating points, but to everyone’s surprise a majority of MPs agreed. The Commons
inflicted two defeats by voting not to overturn the Lords amendments.35 On this occasion, the two
Houses’ interests remained aligned, and in partnership they achieved their preferred policy
positions.
The Identity Cards Bill, like the Terrorism Bill, demonstrated a less visible partnership, but
nonetheless put the government under significant pressure . Despite its controversial nature, the
bill had a relatively smooth passage through the Commons. In the Lords, the largest points of
contention were the costs of the scheme and the extent of compulsion of the cards. On the latter
point the peers sought to turn the Salisbury convention on its head, by arguing that they, not the
government, were defending the election manifesto.36 This had stated that ID cards would be
introduced ‘initially on a voluntary basis as people renew their passports’, but the bill required all
passport applicants to apply for a card.37 Consequently, there were four rounds of ‘ping-pong’ on
the bill, driven by a coalition of Conservative and Liberal Democrat peers. This continued despite
insufficient support for their position in the House of Commons each time the amendments
returned. The minister, Baroness Scotland, argued that ‘the Government, with the support of the
elected House, will continue to resist them strongly’ should the Lords persist, and they eventually
backed down.38 What went less noticed, however, was that an early Lords defeat, removing the
right for government to make ID cards compulsory for all by means of secondary legislation, was
reluctantly accepted by ministers, without being put to the Commons. Following the problems
over the Terrorism and Racial and Religious Hatred Bills, and given the wording of the manifesto,
the government chose not to take the risk. Again, the prospect of MPs and peers united in
opposition was enough to extract major policy concessions, made easier by lack of media attention
and thus embarrassment to the government.
This had previously been considered by the Lords and rejected twice in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill
in 2001. Consequently the clause was dropped.
33 HC Debs., 442, 31 January 2006, cc. 215-6.
34 Ibid., c. 229.
35 P. Cowley and M. Stuart have documented the politics of these defeats in detail in ‘Rebelliousness in a Westminster
System: Labour MPs under the Blair Government’, Paper prepared for Seventh Workshop of Parliamentarians and
Parliamentary Scholars, Wroxton College, Oxfordshire, 29-30 July 2006.
'36 Some similar arguments took place on the Health Bill where the government whipped its peers to vote for a total
ban on smoking in public places though the manifesto had claimed that a partial ban would be introduced. On this
occasion Lord Stoddart of Swindon complained that ‘Yesterday, [on the Terrorism Bill] we were being told that we
must honour manifesto commitments; today, we are being told to ignore a manifesto commitment. The Government
cannot have it both ways’. (HL Debs., 679, 1 March 2006, c. 324). However, this aroused less opposition from peers
than the Identity Cards Bill, as the tougher measures had been imposed overwhelmingly on the government by MPs.
37 Britain Forward not Back, Labour Party, 2005.
38 HL Debs., 679, 6 March 2006, c. 546.
32
16
Two other defeats towards the end of the session, on the Police and Justice Bill, saw peers achieve
mixed success in extracting policy concessions. One responded to the public controversy
following the extradition of the ‘NatWest three’, with peers opposing the lower threshold of
evidence required to extradite British citizens to the US. However, there proved to be insufficient
support for their position in the Commons, and this opposition was dropped. The peers did win a
major victory, however, over government plans to merge the five criminal justice inspectorates.
Their amendment was moved by Lord Ramsbotham, former Chief Inspector of Prisons
(crossbench), and supported by both the opposition parties, the other 32 crossbenchers voting,
and 11 Labour rebels. It was consequently a large defeat (by 113 votes) and one which looked
difficult to reverse. This led ministers to drop the proposals immediately rather than seeking to
overturn the Lords’ position and facing prolonged ping-pong. It demonstrated the force that
united opposition, and crossbench experts, in the House of Lords can have. A full list of
government defeats in the chamber in 2006 is given in Appendix C.
Conclusion
The events of 2006 continue to suggest that the House of Lords is growing in influence,
enhancing Parliament’s negotiating power with the executive. It is not yet possible to say
definitively that 1999 was a turning point in the development of the second chamber’s role; there
are too many short-term factors at play. In 2006, a key factor was the waning popularity of the
government, stimulating its parliamentary opponents and helping them unite and inflict defeats via
the House of Lords. This might have been the case even without reform, but this is doubtful. In
any case, two things are clear. First, the government itself believes that the House of Lords is
changing, and it is worried about the chamber’s strength. This was shown by the threats to reduce
the time for the consideration of legislation, and the attempt to agree conventions stating that the
chamber should act with restraint. Second, it is increasingly clear that little can easily be done to
weaken the chamber again. Opposition parties are unlikely to consent to formal weakening, except
perhaps where this is coupled with democratisation. But it is widely recognised that introducing
elections would further increase the chamber’s confidence and authority, and thus its de facto
strength. Agreement on more reform thus looks very difficult.
Two wider points can be made, given these developments. First, a chamber does not necessarily
have to be elected in order to be strong – it can be enough to act with a certain level of public and
elite political support. Based on the characteristics of second chambers generally considered by
scholars, little has changed about the House of Lords since 1999 – it remains unelected and has
the same powers as before.39 Indeed, some even argued that the reform would make the chamber
weaker.40 Instead, what we see is that the departure of the hereditaries and, crucially, the new party
balance, have boosted the Lords’ sense of legitimacy and given it more confidence to challenge the
government. This remains even despite allegations of cronyism in Lords appointments. Second, a
stronger upper house does not necessarily mean a weaker lower house – indeed possibly quite the
reverse. Although ministers try to present arguments as Lords versus Commons, the far more
interesting dynamic is that of Parliament versus executive. The existence of the Lords as a serious
longstop has given a greater confidence to MPs to extract concessions from ministers, and the
39 For example Arend Lijphart in his Patterns of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) argues that what
matters are formal powers and the extent to which the two chambers are ‘congruent’ in membership, but that
unelected chambers ‘lack the democratic legitimacy, and hence the real political influence, that popular election
confers’ (p. 206).
40 M. Flinders, ‘Majoritarian Democracy in Britain’, West European Politics, 28 (2005), 62-94. Flinders’ argument, based
on Lijphart, is that the composition of the two chambers is now more similar following the departure of the
hereditaries, and that the Lords must therefore be weaker after reform.
17
greater rebelliousness of the Commons also acts to boost the power of peers. This inter-cameral
partnership, if it continues and grows, could represent a real shift of power within the British
Westminster system.
18
Appendix A: New members of the House of Lords in 2006
Date took
oath
19
25.01.06
28.03.06
05.06.06
05.06.06
06.06.06
06.06.06
12.06.06
12.06.06
13.06.06
13.06.06
15.06.06
15.06.06
22.06.06
22.06.06
26.06.06
26.06.06
27.06.06
27.06.06
03.07.06
03.07.06
10.07.06
10.07.06
11.07.06
11.07.06
18.07.06
18.07.06
20.07.06
20.07.06
24.07.06
24.07.06
Lords name
Party
Previous name
Archbishop of York
Lord Davidson of Glen Clova
Lord Cotter
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Lord Burnett
Lord Trimble
Lord Lee of Trafford
Lord Marland
Baroness Quin
Lord Morris of Handsworth
Baroness Kingsmill
Baroness Thomas of Winchester
Baroness Verma
Lord Leach of Fairford
Lord Crisp
Lord Teverson
Lord Sheikh
Lord Morrow
Lord Boyd of Duncansby
Baroness Paisley of St George’s
Baroness Ford
Lord Patel of Bradford
Lord Bruce-Lockhart
Lord Low of Dalston
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
Lord Bradley
Lord James of Blackheath
Lord Rowe-Beddoe
Lord Bilimoria
Lord Browne of Belmont
Bishop
Labour
Lib Dem
Conservative
Lib Dem
Crossbench*
Lib Dem
Conservative
Labour
Labour
Labour
Lib Dem
Conservative
Conservative
Crossbench
Lib Dem
Conservative
Crossbench**
Labour
Crossbench**
Labour
Crossbench
Conservative
Crossbench
Labour
Labour
Conservative
Crossbench
Crossbench
Crossbench**
John Sentamu
Neil Davidson
Brian Cotter
John Taylor
John Burnett
David Trimble
John Lee
Jonathan Marland
Joyce Quin
William Morris
Denise Kingsmill
Celia Thomas
Sandip Verma
Charles Leach
Nigel Crisp
Robin Teverson
Mohamed Sheikh
Maurice Morrow
Colin Boyd
Eileen Paisley
Margaret Ford
Kamlesh Patel
Sandy Bruce-Lockhart
Colin Low
Maggie Jones
Keith Bradley
David James
David Rowe-Beddoe
Karan Bilimoria
Wallace Browne
Route
entered
House
B
PM
PH
PH
PH
PH
PH
PH
PH
PH
PH
PH
PH
PH
PM
PH
PH
PH
PH
PH
PH
APC
PH
APC
PH
PH
PH
APC
APC
PH
Notes
Replaced retiring Archbishop of York
Advocate General for Scotland
Retiring Chief Executive of NHS
Date took
Lords name
oath
25.07.06
25.07.06
10.10.06
10.10.06
12.10.06
Baroness Butler-Sloss
Lord Harries of Pentregarth
Lord Dear
Baroness Meacher
Lord Jay of Ewelme
23.10.06 Bishop of Ripon and Leeds
Party
Previous name
Crossbench
Crossbench
Crossbench
Crossbench
Crossbench
Ann Butler-Sloss
Richard Harries
Geoffrey Dear
Molly Meacher
Michael Jay
Route
entered
House
APC
PM
APC
APC
PM
Bishop
John Packer
B
† Key: PH = Political Honours list (April), PM = Prime Minister’s Appointment, APC = Appointments Commission, B = Bishop
* UUP
** DUP
Notes
Retiring Bishop of Oxford
Retiring head of FCO and Diplomatic
Service
Replaced retiring Bishop of Oxford
20
Appendix B: Deaths and retirements in 2006
Death/retired
date
Name
Forename/
name
Party
Type†
05.01.06
08.01.06
21.01.06
27.01.06
06.02.06
14.03.06
21.03.06
07.05.06
02.06.06*
28.06.06
28.06.06
30.08.06
30.08.06
19.10.06
22.11.06
12.12.06
18.12.06
27.12.06
Lord Merlyn-Rees
Lord Stratford
Lord Chan
Lord Mishcon
Lord Brightman
Lord Gray of Contin
Lord Ackner
Lord Simon of Glaisdale
Bishop of Oxford
Baroness Lloyd of Highbury
Lord Rawlinson of Ewell
Lord Monro of Langholm
Lord Cooke of Thorndon
Lord Harris of High Cross
Lord Peyton of Yeovil
Lord Mowbray and Stourton
Lord Carter
Lord Hussey of North Bradley
Merlyn
Tony Banks
Michael
Victor
John
James
Desmond
Jocelyn
Richard Harries
June
Peter
Hector
Robin
Ralph
John
Charles
Denis
Marmaduke
Labour
Labour
Crossbench
Labour
Crossbench
Conservative
Crossbench
Crossbench
Bishop
Crossbench
Conservative
Conservative
Crossbench
Crossbench
Conservative
Conservative
Labour
Crossbench
L
L
L
L
LOA
L
LOA
L
B
L
L
L
L
L
L
HP
L
L
Year
entered
House
1992
2005
2001
1978
1982
1983
1986
1971
1993
1996
1978
1997
1996
1979
1983
1965
1987
1996
† Key: B = Bishop, HP = Hereditary Peer elected by party, L = Life Peer under the Life Peerages Act 1958,
LOA = Lord of Appeal.
* Retired.
21
Appendix C: Government defeats in the House of Lords in 2006
Date of
Division
10.01.06
16.01.06
Bill
Subject
Road Safety Bill [HL]
Identity Cards Bill
To remove provision criminalising ‘careless driving’
To ensure that the same characteristics of security and
reliability for the ascertainment and verification of
registrable facts should apply to the recording and storage
of the registrable facts
16.01.06 Identity Cards Bill
To require that one of the criteria defining the “public
interest” (justifying the national identity register) is to
prevent illegal and fraudulent acts
16.01.06 Identity Cards Bill
To require that the bill cannot come into effect until a
report has been conducted into the costs and benefits of
the scheme
17.01.06 Terrorism Bill
To omit a clause criminalising the “glorification” of
terrorism
17.01.06 Terrorism Bill
To amend government proposals criminalising the
distribution of terrorist publications so that the individual
commits an offence if he/she “directly or indirectly”
encourages acts of terrorism
23.01.06 Identity Cards Bill
To require that an individual “may” not “must” apply to
enter onto the National Register and obtain an ID card
when applying/renewing a passport
23.01.06 Identity Cards Bill
To omit the “Power of Secretary of State to require
Registration” clause from the Bill so that in order to make
the scheme compulsory, primary legislation would need to
be introduced
30.01.06 Identity Cards Bill
To require that the Information Commissioner reports
directly to Parliament rather than the Secretary of State
30/01.06 Identity Cards Bill
To require that the Information Commissioner is
appointed by the crown “on the recommendation of the
Secretary of State” as opposed to the Secretary of State
alone
01.02.06 Terrorism Bill
To require judicial oversight in issuing notices ordering
internet service providers to remove offending material
(“unlawfully terrorism-related”) within 2 days
15.02.06 NHS Redress Bill [HL] To confine redress investigations to “investigation of the
facts of cases and not to consider the issues of liability in
tort”
28.02.06 Terrorism Bill
To remove all references to “glorification” from the Bill
06.03.06 Identity Cards Bill
To insist to require that an individual “may” not “must”
apply to enter onto the National Register and obtain an
ID card when applying/renewing a passport
07.03.06 Compensation Bill [HL] To insert a clause stipulating that “an apology, an offer of
treatment or other redress” will not intrinsically amount
to an admission of negligence or breach of statutory duty
08.03.06 Civil Aviation Bill
To ensure that large aerodrome operators shall (not
“may”) have a duty to monitor noise and to fix charges in
respect of aircraft which exceed noise limits
08.03.06 Civil Aviation Bill
To ensure that night aircraft noise is controlled by a
22
Govt
majority
-6
-62
-53
-81
-126
-100
-44
-58
-6
-17
-1
-1
-4
-61
-13
-13
-40
Date of
Division
Bill
15.03.06
Identity Cards Bill
20.03.06
Identity Cards Bill
28.03.06
Identity Cards Bill
19.04.06
Government of Wales
Bill
National Lottery Bill
24.04.06
09.05.06
Company Law Reform
Bill [HL]
10.05.06
Company Law Reform
Bill [HL]
Company Law Reform
Bill [HL]
10.05.06
17.05.06
Violent Crime
Reduction Bill
23.05.06
Company Law Reform
Bill [HL]
23.05.06
Company Law Reform
Bill [HL]
07.06.06
Electoral
Administration Bill
20.06.06
Electoral
Administration Bill
20.06.06
Police and Justice Bill
Subject
combination of a movements limit and a nivoise quota
system (not just the latter)
To insist for the second time to require that an individual
“may” not “must” apply to enter onto the National
Register and obtain an ID card when applying/renewing a
passport
To insist for the third time to require that an individual
“may” not “must” apply to enter onto the National
Register and obtain an ID card when applying/renewing a
passport but only until 2011
To require that until 2010 anyone applying for a passport
can opt to have their name entered in the register and
obtain an ID card unless they state that they do not wish
to apply
To remove subsections preventing constituency members
from standing in regional lists and vice-versa.
To remove the power of the Secretary of State to
“prescribe” how the whole of the 50% of lottery
distribution (going to the Big Lottery Fund) should be
spent
To require all companies trading on a regulated market to
give members the right to receive information such as
annual/interim accounts, notice of meetings and the
ability to exercise a vote on the shares they own
To require that an independent examiner, rather than an
accountant, fulfil the audit requirements
To require that an independent commissioner decides if it
is in the public interest that certain information may be
disclosed
To require that a local authority may not make an order
designating a locality as an alcohol disorder zone if an
action plan is being put into effect
To omit a clause allowing the public disclosure of
information on the exercise of voting rights within a
company
To require that the Freedom of Information Act applies
to the Independent Supervisor, who supervises the
performance of each Auditor General in his/her capacity
as a statutory auditor
To insert a clause requiring a signature and date of birth
(personal identifiers) to be included in all voters’
registration and not only in that of postal voters
To insist on previous amendment to insert a clause
requiring a signature and date of birth (personal
identifiers) to be included in all voters’ registration, but
substituting “chief electoral officer” for “electoral
registration officer”
To insert a clause ensuring that the Secretary of State
cannot merge police forces without the consent of the
relevant police authorities
23
Govt
majority
-35
-36
-28
-19
-2
-7
-22
-6
-4
-6
-22
-23
-9
-68
Date of
Division
27.06.06
27.06.06
27.06.06
28.06.06
28.06.06
11.07.06
11.07.06
13.07.06
13.07.06
13.07.06
13.07.06
09.10.06
10.10.06
10.10.06
25.10.06
Bill
Subject
Government of Wales
Bill
To require that the 4 Assembly members to sit on the
Assembly Commission do not belong to the same
political party
Government of Wales To rename the Audit Committee, the “Accounts
Bill
Committee”
Government of Wales To require that standing orders apportioning members to
Bill
committees and sub-committees, must have regard to
“the balance of political parties represented in the
Assembly”
Civil Aviation Bill
To insist on previous amendment to ensure that large
aerodrome operators shall (not “may”) have a duty to
monitor noise and to fix charges in respect of aircraft
which exceed noise limits
Civil Aviation Bill
To insist on previous amendment to ensure that night
aircraft noise is controlled by a combination of a
movements limit and a nivoise quota system (not just the
latter)
Police and Justice Bill To insert that the ‘forum rules’ (from the 1957 European
Convention on Terrorism) are incorporated: judges shall
not order the extradition of a person if an act was partly
committed in the UK unless in the interests of justice
Police and Justice Bill To remove the US from being granted a lower threshold
of evidence in order to extradite until the Treaty has been
ratified
Government of Wales To remove a subsection allowing the Secretary of State to
Bill
veto the Assembly’s request for a referendum
Northern Ireland
To remove a clause that would allow the acceptance of
(Miscellaneous
political donations from anybody holding Irish citizenship
Provisions) Bill
(outside of Northern Ireland)
Government of Wales To require that Orders in Council can only have
Bill
retrospecive effect where it is “not to the detriment of
those who have either benefited from or acted in reliance
upon the state of the law before the retrospective Order
is made”
Northern Ireland
To insert a clause introducing new scrutiny measures for
(Miscellaneous
Orders in Council: a draft must be laid before each House
Provisions) Bill
of Parliament for approval and may suggest and make
amendments
Police and Justice Bill To remove clauses giving Secretary of State the power to
direct if a police force is failing (given the absence of any
objective judgement of failure)
Police and Justice Bill To delete a clause that reforms conditional cautions to
allow punishments, including fines, to be part of the
conditions
Police and Justice Bill To oppose the merging of the five criminal justice
inspectorates (police, prisons, probation, court services
and Crown Prosecution Services) into one new Justice,
Community Safety and Custody Inspectorate
NHS Redress Bill [HL] To require that investigations under the redress scheme
must be conducted “in accordance with natural justice
24
Govt
majority
-61
-28
-50
-28
-57
-83
-102
-37
-37
-4
-35
-19
-61
-113
-16
Date of
Division
Bill
01.11.06
Road Safety Bill [HL]
01.11.06
Road Safety Bill [HL]
01.11.06
Road Safety Bill [HL]
01.11.06
Police and Justice Bill
01.11.06
Police and Justice Bill
02.11.06
Companies Bill [HL]
Subject
[so] the person overseeing the investigation is
independent of the body … under investigation” and to
insist that it be “confined to the facts”
To insist to remove provision criminalising ‘careless
driving’
To insist to insert a clause requiring the government to
ensure that new heavy goods vehicles should be fitted
with retro-reflective tape but that the government should
make regulations by 31st December 2007
To insist to insert a clause at the beginning of the bill
enabling local authorities to ringfence the spending of
money (received from speeding fines) on local road safety
measures
To insist to insert that the ‘forum rules’ (from the 1957
European Convention on Terrorism) are incorporated:
judges shall not order the extradition of a person if an act
was partly committed in the UK unless in the interests of
justice
To insist to remove the US from being granted a lower
threshold of evidence in order to extradite until the
Treaty has been ratified
To insist that the Freedom of Information Act should
apply to the new oversight bodies created under the bill
25
Govt
majority
-15
-16
-28
-33
-37
-12