FIGURES
2.1. Attacking Fixed Targets: Improved Accuracy Has
Yielded Major Increases in Effectiveness ..........
2.2. Comparative Lethality of Air-Delivered Weapons
Against Moving Armored Columns ..............
2.3. Comparison of Average Loss Rates of USAF
Aircraft ...................................
4.1. Theater Conflict Scenarios Examined.............
4.2. Preferred Force Mix Options: Currently Planned
JASSM Buy ................................
4.3. Preferred Force Mix Options: 9,600 JASSM Buy......
4.4. Fighter Versus Bomber Trades in Stressing
Scenarios: China Versus Korea, Current JASSM
Buy......................................
4.5. Fighter Versus Bomber Trades in Stressing
Scenarios: China Versus Korea, 9,600 JASSMs .......
4.6. Fighter Force Mix Preferences: No Developmental
Weapons..................................
4.7. Fighter Force Mix Preferences: With
Developmental Weapons .....................
4.8. Force Mix Recommendations ..................
4.9. Impact of Cost Growth on Preferences for F-22X
or -E .....................................
4.10. Impact of JSF Cost Growth on JSF Versus F-22
Decision ..................................
4.11. Impact of JSF Cost Growth on JSF Versus F-16C
Block-60 Decision ...........................
4.12. Long-Term USAF Deployment Operations .........
4.13. Basra Breakout Scenario ......................
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38
40
97
107
108
111
112
114
116
118
121
122
123
125
126
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Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century
4.14. The Basra Breakout: Results as a Function of
Defending Force Size ........................
4.15. Map of No-Fly Zone .........................
4.16. No-Fly Zone Force Requirements ...............
4.17. Exclusion Zone Force Requirements .............
4.18. Force Structure Implications of Simultaneous
SSCs .....................................
6.1. Adversary Asymmetric Options and Potential U.S.
CONOPs ..................................
7.1. Why the United States Might Want Nuclear
Weapons in the Contemporary World ............
8.1. Joint-Service TMD Architecture Programs for
Dealing with the TMD Problem .................
8.2. A Broad Range of Potential Air Force TMD
CONOPs ..................................
8.3. Notional ABL Effectiveness Against Saturation
Attack ....................................
8.4. Sensitivity of Combined Prelaunch and Postlaunch
Attack to C4ISR Parameters ....................
8.5. Sensitivity of Postlaunch Attack Operations to
Moving Vehicle Clutter .......................
8.6. The Significant Synergistic Potential of Air Force
TMD CONOPs..............................
8.7. The Effects of Small Improvements in Counterforce
Capabilities................................
8.8. The Strong Effect of Moving Vehicle Clutter on
Overall TMD Effectiveness ....................
8.9. The Sensitivity of ABL Performance Salvo Handling
and Lethality...............................
8.10. Air Force Capabilities for Shaping the Potential
TMD Trajectory ............................
9.1. Notional Missile Threat Rings ..................
9.2. Coverage Available from Five FSLs ...............
9.3. Impact of Adding Aircrew and Tankers on Sorties
and Fuel Use...............................
10.1. General Decision Trade Space by Location.........
10.2. Employment-Driven Analytical Framework ........
10.3. CONUS to SWA Resupply Times and Support
Breakpoint Solutions.........................
10.4. Potential Global ACS Network ..................
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134
135
138
200
243
311
312
315
319
320
321
322
323
325
326
357
368
370
380
382
386
390
Figures
11.1. Players Relevant to an Integrated Air Force Supply
Chain That Includes Contractors ................
11.2. Process Steps for Choosing Competitive Sourcing
Candidates, Running Competitions, and Managing
Relationships with the Winners .................
12.1. Unit-Level Readiness Related Taskings and
Outputs ..................................
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413
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