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Unmanned Aircraft
Systems for Logistics
Applications
John E. Peters, Somi Seong, Aimee Bower, Harun Dogo,
Aaron L. Martin, Christopher G. Pernin
Prepared for the United States Army
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
ARRO Y O CENT ER
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States
Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Unmanned aircraft systems for logistics applications / John E. Peters ... [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8330-5044-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Drone aircraft. 2. United States. Army—Equipment and supplies.
3. Logistics. I. Peters, John E., 1947UG1242.D7U5655 2012
358.4'483—dc23
2011047888
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Summary
This project evaluated ten potential logistics applications for UAS to
determine whether they are technically feasible, operationally feasible,
and more cost-effective than other options. This study concentrated
on reconnaissance and surveillance tasks to secure logistics convoys
through overwatch with UAS; route reconnaissance looking for hazards that might endanger logistics convoys; and surveillance of pipelines, electrical lines, rivers, supply depots, disaster scenes, and predeployment theater reconnaissance. (A separate study, conducted by
General Dynamics,5 evaluated the use of UAS for emergency and routine resupply tasks.) This study also examined the potential for using
UAS to locate airdropped cargo that misses the drop zone and to retrograde critical unserviceable items expeditiously.
We used a combination of Army data, interviews, and prior
research to compile information for analysis. The research team made
use of Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) and
FusionNet databases to sample the frequency and intensity of enemy
attacks on logistics convoys and assets. We drew on recent research at
RAND for insights into installation and pipeline security, the improvised explosive device (IED) problem, and the optimal employment of
UAS. We interviewed Army personnel recently returned from operational theaters with practical experience in logistics operations, and we
5
General Dynamics, AR 5-5 Study: Future Modular Force Resupply Mission for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS), prepared for Commanding General, Combined Arms Support Command and Department of the Army, G-4, General Dynamics Information Technology, February 24, 2010.
xiii
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Logistics Applications
interviewed civilian contractors tasked with the security of pipelines and
electrical lines in Iraq to understand those tasks more fully. Based upon
the available data and our best efforts to understand current threats, we
made estimates to help us determine which UAS applications are likely
feasible and infeasible, beneficial and not, and cost-effective.
The study looks out to the year 2024 but also discusses how technology changes beyond that could affect the value of UAS. For many
reconnaissance and surveillance tasks, we found that with current
technology and costs, UAS are either not feasible or not cost-effective
options in conditions similar to those experienced in Iraq; however, the
case improves with conditions more like those found in Afghanistan.
In all environments, the relative value of UAS will improve with the
miniaturization and improvement of sensors; the appearance of new,
small, less-expensive UAS; and improved network bandwidth. The relative values of options are highly sensitive to the value that the United
States places on damages from enemy attacks and to the cost structure
of UAS-based solutions for detecting and avoiding enemy action. Thus,
the Army should continue to evaluate its options through the lens of
life-cycle costs for UAS relative to the cost avoidance they provide by
detecting potentially deadly and destructive enemy activities.
Table S.1 summarizes general findings about the feasibility and
benefits of UAS for logistics applications.
The table lists six considerations and their tendencies in terms
of favoring or not favoring UAS-based solutions. The first is cost. As
the systems become cheaper or sensors become smaller, allowing small
UAS to be used for logistics applications, UAS-based solutions are
more favorable. But if the systems remain expensive, UAS-based solutions are not favorable for the challenges confronting logistics units.
Terrain is the second factor. If future Army operations take place
in theaters where complex terrain and long distances render other alternatives for reconnaissance and surveillance infeasible, UAS are a good
solution. If future operations most frequently occur in theaters with
more open terrain and shorter distances that lend themselves to nonUAS solutions, then UAS would be less attractive.
Enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are the third
consideration. Circumstances in which adversaries tend to mass, or
Summary
xv
Table S.1
Factors Influencing UAS-Based Solutions
Consideration
Factors Favoring
UAS-Based Solutions
Factors Not Favoring
UAS-Based Solutions
Cost of UAS
Cheaper (e.g., class II) systems
Expensive (e.g., Predator
derivative) systems
Terrain
Complex, line-of-sight issues;
large scale that renders fixed
cameras, etc., infeasible
Open, open-broken terrain;
relatively small scale that
enables non-UAS solutions
Enemy TTPs
Tendency to mass, linger
near site of interest to them
Short-dwell operations, low
mass, refusal to hold terrain
Value of damage
High costs from enemy
or loss that could
actions
be avoided through
reconnaissance
and surveillance
Low costs resulting from
enemy actions
Weather
Conditions conducive to UAS
flight and sensor operations
Conditions that hinder flight
or sensor operations
Bandwidth
Low bandwidth puts
premium on point-to-point
UAS-operator systems
Abundant bandwidth that
supports robust networks
linger, or otherwise present relatively easily observed behaviors would
favor the employment of UAS. If the enemy minimizes its profile
by conducting hit-and-run, short-dwell attacks, refuses to mass, and
refuses to hold terrain or to become clearly associated with a piece of
terrain, those behaviors are unfavorable for UAS operations.
The value of damage or loss that could be avoided through reconnaissance and surveillance may be among the most sensitive of considerations bearing on the utility of UAS. The U.S. experience in recent
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq reflects large swings in the
numbers of incidents and the numbers of IED events over the course
of time. If a future enemy were to surge and sustain attacks inflicting
high costs on U.S. forces, such circumstances favor the use of UAS.
The opposite development would also hold true, and low costs from
enemy action would not favor UAS-based solutions.
The fifth consideration is weather. Conditions that do not challenge aircraft flight parameters (e.g., wind velocity, wind shear, very
cold temperatures) or sensor operating parameters (e.g., minimum safe
xvi
Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Logistics Applications
altitudes, cloud cover, rain, lightning), tend to favor the use of UAS.
If weather is severe enough to interfere with flight operations or sensor
performance, those conditions are unfavorable for UAS-based reconnaissance and surveillance solutions.
The final consideration is bandwidth. If a future theater is austere
and bandwidth is therefore scarce (and perhaps oversubscribed), then
simple, point-to-point, UAS-to-operator systems could prove valuable,
depending upon the other considerations treated in this discussion.
On the other hand, if bandwidth is abundant and supports robust networks, then specific logistics-oriented UAS-based approaches would be
less attractive, and the priority would be on ensuring access to the theater network and the information available from shared assets.
For example, the benefit of UAS will depend in part on how well
other elements of the command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network perform in the future. For instance, if the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) Lieutenant General John Koziol’s 2024 vision of
extremely high-bandwidth networked C4ISR eventuates and the Army
can operate in Afghanistan and future theaters supported by a much
richer, denser C4ISR network, then ownership of UAS for any specific tasks will be less critical because the network will quickly provide
information from all of them in a theater.
The following summarizes our assessments of the potential for
applying UAS to specific logistical missions:
• The likely value of using UAS for convoy overwatch—the practice
of shadowing a convoy with an armed UAS as the convoy proceeds along its route—varies with theater conditions. In conditions similar to those experienced in Iraq, we found this application to be operationally and technically infeasible. In particular,
the short enemy dwell times and long distances limit value. However, conditions similar to those in Afghanistan, where the length
of convoy routes and the difficulty of the terrain render non-UAS
solutions impractical (e.g., the United States could not maintain
mast-mounted cameras for the circumference of the ring road),
are more favorable for the use of UAS.
Summary
xvii
• The promise of using UAS for route surveillance also varies by
theater conditions. Given enemy behavior in Iraq, UAS have a
probability of detecting enemy presence along routes and pipelines of just roughly 11 percent and less near the end of the UAS’s
orbit, when it has to turn around, leading to low UAS value.6
Afghanistan offers different challenges. There, enemy behavior,
which enables longer dwell times near targets, is more favorable
to the use of UAS. Less favorable in Afghanistan are the weather
conditions and terrain (e.g., high winds, rain, and steep ridges
that may break line-of-sight or cause other issues). Technology
might provide some relief, for example, if the Army is able to
deploy long-endurance aerial communications relays to overcome
line-of-sight problems.
• Ascertaining river navigability using light detection and ranging
(LIDAR) aboard a UAS is technically infeasible, although this
assessment could change if LIDAR systems can be successfully
miniaturized and ruggedized to maintain calibration.
• UAS have a cost-effective role in fixed-site security as an integral
part of larger security and surveillance systems typically dominated by radars and fixed cameras.
• UAS could be flown in support of theater reconnaissance prior to
the deployment of Army forces. Doing so raises questions of operations security (OPSEC) because the UAS’s presence, if detected,
might lead the enemy to conclude that U.S. military action is
imminent. UAS do not appear to offer an advantage, though,
over the many Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and National
Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) operations support products
that would be available to answer logisticians’ questions about a
new theater.
• UAS could be valuable for locating cargo that misses a drop zone.
• Retrograde of critical unserviceable items via UAS is feasible but
does not deliver a clear benefit for most items. This is because
reducing the time of evacuation to maintenance does not reduce
6
There is, however, utility in discovering pipeline damage early, and a potential deterrent
effect from having UAS observed operating in the area.
xviii
Unmanned Aircraft Systems for Logistics Applications
the number of spares the Army must buy or reduce the amount
of uncertainty about the availability of spares, key sources of cost
in the supply chain. The extreme vast majority of the retrograde
time for sustainment maintenance to repair reparable spares arises
from the supporting brigade supply support activity back to sustainment maintenance, not the first leg on the battlefield.
After careful examination of common themes found in the UAS
concepts, we have concluded that the fundamental near-term force
protection problem confronting the logistics community is situational
awareness: the ability to understand one’s environment, to detect
threats, and to know one’s own location and the locations of the enemy
and friendly units. Situational awareness has become key to survival
for U.S. Army units, including logistics formations. Logistics units no
longer operate in secure rear areas where enemy threats are minimal;
instead they face the same threats as combat formations once they leave
the safety of a forward operating base’s (FOB’s) perimeter. Logistics
units do not, however, have the same density of command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) equipment as
combat arms units and, as a result, have more difficulty sustaining
robust situational awareness. It is this situational awareness deficit that
some have proposed to overcome with UAS, which do have a role to
play in a network that includes other assets.