娀 Academy of Management Journal
2014, Vol. 57, No. 3, 615–623.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2014.4003
FROM THE EDITORS
CLIMATE CHANGE AND MANAGEMENT
passed, leading to much larger climate changes and
impacts.
How can changes of such magnitude not be important for a wide range of organizations in the
private, public, and non-profit sectors? Perhaps it is
just the mismatch between the timescales of business and that of the climate that has made it difficult to grasp what climate change means for
organizations in the future. Or, perhaps it is the
uncertainty that surrounds any projections of our
future climate—an uncertainty arising from the
complexity of the climate system itself, as well as
from our social, political, and economic choices.
Climate change is so pervasive that its causes and
consequences show up at every level of analysis of
interest to organizational scholars. This can be
taken as an opportunity, as it enables scholars to
consider the topic at every scale—from how individuals evaluate their environmental issue advocacy (Sonenshein, DeCelles, & Dutton, 2014), to
how the staging of international climate conferences shapes (in)action on the issue over time
(Schüßler, Rüling, & Wittneben, 2014).
As climate impacts become more apparent over
the next few decades, they will impinge on the
structure and functioning of our value chains and
industries, the resilience of organizations, individual work patterns and practices, and the social
orders and broader governance systems upon which
organizations rely. In other words, climate change
and responses to it will fundamentally reshape
many of the phenomena, interactions, and relationships that are of central concern to management
scholars. In this editorial, we offer a brief primer on
the science and implications of climate change,
before exploring some avenues for research and
engagement on these essential issues.
Editor’s note: This editorial is part of a series
written by editors and co-authored with a senior executive, thought leader, or scholar from
a different field, to explore new content areas
and grand challenges with the goal of expanding the scope, interestingness, and relevance of
the work presented in the Academy of Management Journal. The principle is to use the editorial
notes as “stage setters” to open up fresh, new
areas of inquiry for management research. GG
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges we
confront in the 21st century. On current trends, by the
end of the century, the warming effect of our greenhouse gas emissions will have taken us far away from
pre-industrial climatic conditions. In fact, our climate
will be as different from pre-industrial conditions as
it was when the Earth emerged from the last ice age
some 20,000 years ago. In other words, just over
200 years of human and industrial activity will have
wrought fundamental change to our climate system.
The rise of organizations and industrialized production has set us on this path, yet organizations are
equally critical to mitigating and adapting to climate
change. Understanding the science and policy of climate change, and the ways in which the associated
issues are shaped by and shape the subjects of our
attention, is therefore of great importance to management scholars.
Climate change is already manifest in changes to
growing seasons, water resources, ocean acidification, and coastal flooding. The Earth’s global mean
surface temperature has risen by 0.85°C since the
late 19th century, and is as likely as not to exceed a
4°C rise, relative to the period 1850 –1900, by the
century’s end. The corresponding rise in temperature over tropical continents would be larger, and
the warming over northern, high-latitude continents some two to three times greater (IPCC, 2013).
Such changes would have far-reaching—though, as
yet, still only partially understood— effects on atmospheric circulation, precipitation levels, and extreme weather, impacting just about every aspect of
our lives. It is possible that thresholds (“tipping
points”) in the climate system, such as the release
of methane from melting permafrost, will be
A GLIMPSE INTO THE SCIENCE OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
In its 4.5 billion-year history, the Earth has gone
through dramatic changes, with periods when the
poles were ice-free and others when ice sheets
reached the tropics (Pierrehumbert, 2010). Even in
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FIGURE 1
Variations of Deuterium (␦D) in Antarctic Ice, a Proxy for Local Temperature, and the Atmospheric
Concentrations of the greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and Nitrous Oxide (N2O) in
Air Trapped within the Ice Cores and from Recent Atmospheric Measurements. Data Cover 650,000 Years;
Shaded Vertical Bands Indicate Current and Previous Interglacial Warm Periods. (Adapted from
Figure 6.3, IPCC, 2007.)
the Ice Age of the past million years, there have
been changes over a hundred thousand years from
interglacial to glacial periods in which the ice
sheets advanced over North America and northwest Europe, and back again to an interglacial period as at present. However, human societies have
evolved in the last 10,000 years in an unusually
stable climate. Certainly there has been variability,
particularly on a regional scale, but, at the global
scale, we have developed—indeed, thrived— during a temporal island of climatic stability.
The Earth’s climate depends fundamentally on the
difference between the amount of solar energy flowing into the Earth minus the amount of energy leaving
in the form of infrared radiation. In equilibrium, the
infrared (heat) radiation emitted from the Earth exactly balances the absorbed solar energy. If there were
no atmosphere, this would happen when the Earth’s
surface was at an average temperature of ⫺18°C, assuming that the same proportion of solar radiation is
reflected. Fortunately, the water vapor and other
greenhouse gases within the atmosphere trap some
infrared radiation emitted from the Earth’s surface,
warming the atmosphere until a new energy balance
is achieved. The analogy of a “greenhouse” is used to
label this effect. The natural greenhouse effect increases the Earth’s surface temperature by some 33°C,
making the planet habitable.
The atmospheric concentration of major greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane has
changed, and continues to change over time, with a
strong effect on the Earth’s energy balance. These
changes have been due both to natural processes and,
more recently and dramatically, the explosion in human activity. The burning of fossil fuels and changes
in land use contribute particularly, but not exclusively,1 to increases in concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane to levels unseen in at least the last
1
The “Summary for Policy Makers” produced by
Working Group I as part of the Fifth Assessment Report
(AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
gives more details (IPCC, 2013).
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Howard-Grenville, Buckle, Hoskins, and George
800,000 years (see Figure 1, which indicates the sharp
upturn in greenhouse gas concentrations on the righthand side). Increased levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases enhance the trapping of the infrared radiation emitted by the Earth and therefore produce
extra warming, with the rate of warming determined
by the absorption of heat by the oceans. While the
effects of natural climate variability will still play a
major role in our weather over the next few decades,
the trend from human-induced climate change will
increasingly assert itself through the century and take
us into climatically uncharted territory. As a recent
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
report warned, the increasing magnitudes of warming
exacerbate the likelihood of severe, pervasive, and
irreversible impacts (IPCC, 2014a).
Whereas the science of climate change reflects longer time horizons, the effects of climate change are
already being felt. Most reported impacts so far are
due to warming and/or changes in precipitation patterns, with emerging evidence of the impacts of ocean
acidification. We are seeing change in species’ ranges
and seasonal activities and changes to hydrological
systems, affecting water resources and quality. Negative impacts of climate change on crop yields have
been more common than positive impacts. The
World Meteorological Organization (WMO, 2014) reports that 13 of the 14 warmest years on record have
all occurred in the 21st century (the exception is the
strong El Nino year, 1998). The European “mega heat
waves” in 2003 and 2010 caused thousands of deaths
and large-scale crop losses (Barriopedro, Fischer,
Luterbacher, Trigo, & García-Herrera, 2011). Such
events are expected to become more frequent, while
the increasing intensity of rainfall and rising sea levels will heighten risks from flooding.
THE POLICY OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Current efforts to limit the risks of climate change
take place under the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its associated Kyoto Protocol. In addition to the usual problems of collective action and free-riders that make
effective international climate action difficult, the
UNFCCC also built in a sharp distinction between
the responsibilities and roles of developed and developing countries,2 which now has to be reinter-
2
The UNFCCC emphasized “common but differentiated responsibilities,” whereby developed economies
were to take the lead in combating climate change.
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preted in the light of the subsequent transformation
of the global economy. The Copenhagen Accord in
2009 was a breakthrough in this regard, with developing economies (e.g., China and India) making
national commitments to reduce their emissions
intensity (not, as yet, their absolute emissions) in
the period up to 2020 alongside pledges to reduce
the level of emissions in major developed economies, including the United States. For the period
beyond 2020, governments agreed, at the 2011 Durban climate summit, to draw up the blueprint for a
fresh, universal agreement “with legal force” that
should be agreed at the Paris summit in 2015. However, progress has so far been slow and political
traction limited. Whatever finally emerges will be
firmly rooted in the post-Copenhagen world, where
national emission-reduction pledges beyond 2020
are carefully calibrated on those offered by others.
Whether this will deliver the scale of emissions
reductions required by the policy targets currently
under discussion remains to be seen.
There is already widespread action at a national
and sub-national level, albeit at an early stage in
many countries. In 2012, 67% of global greenhouse
gas emissions were subject to national legislation or
strategies, compared to 45% in 2007 (IPCC, 2014b).
Potentially the world’s largest carbon market,
China, launched seven pilot emissions trading
schemes at a provincial and municipal level in
2013. The United Kingdom has in place a comprehensive framework of legally binding, rolling carbon budgets to meet its commitment in law to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% in
2050 from 1990 levels.
In contrast, a number of countries face significant
domestic political constraints. For example, the
U.S. President’s climate change action plan—to deliver a 17% emissions reduction by 2020 on 2005
levels— has to be delivered through existing regulatory powers, following the failure of efforts to
establish a federal emissions trading scheme. In the
European Union, a combination of structural economic problems and concerns over the competitiveness of energy-intensive business and energy
costs for household consumers has raised questions
about whether it is willing to continue taking a lead
on tackling climate change.
In the absence of determined, international mitigation action, new leaders and initiatives have
emerged, and no doubt will continue to do so in
response to increasing risks and new opportunities.
For example, members of the C40 group of global
megacities are already acting locally and collabora-
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tively. Global firms such as Unilever are taking a
visible role in addressing a range of sustainability
issues, including climate change. Instead of single
carbon price guiding actions, organizations are now
facing an increasingly complex operating environment, with hard-to-understand implications for
their future strategy, location, and profitability. The
sheer proliferation of initiatives at different geographic, societal, and governmental levels with
varying regulatory frameworks is one of the pressures leading some organizations to push for comprehensive national- and regional-level climate
policy. The policy uncertainty may, in many cases,
be of greater concern than uncertainties over future
climate projections.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONS
AND MANAGEMENT
So, what should we do? We need to adapt to the
changes already in train by building in resilience to
all aspects of economic and social activity, and by
learning how to cope with unprecedented levels of
uncertainty and a rapid pace of change. We also
need urgently to find a way to limit the risks
through substantial and sustained mitigation action
that will reduce emissions radically— by 35–75%
globally by 2050 from 1990 levels—if we are to
limit warming to the 2°C target that is the current
focus of international negotiations. Private, public,
and not-for-profit organizations will need to engage
a suite of approaches under the broad banners of
adaptation and mitigation to cope with the implications of climate change.
We highlight four broad implications of climate
change to illustrate how this issue poses pressing
and important questions for management and organizational scholars. These are neither exhaustive
nor exclusive, but are meant to illustrate a wide
range of questions ripe for study, across the typical
levels of analysis and within the range of methodologies that management scholars employ.
First, climate change will reshape value chains,
including supply networks, production arrangements, and the provision of energy and water. Management scholars can study how governance, coordination, and risk-mitigation arrangements can
anticipate and respond. Second, while it is almost a
cliché to speak of the unprecedented change today’s organizations face, the types of change to
which they must respond due to climate change are
truly without precedent. Such changes demand
new approaches to decision making, forecasting/
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planning, and organizational adaptation. Third, climate change will alter how we live and work. Cities
will need to become far more resource efficient,
and individual patterns of mobility will no doubt
shift. For organizational scholars, these changes
prompt a rethink of how managers and employees
interact, motivate, and engage one another, and
identify with their employing organizations. Finally, climate change will have far-reaching impacts on fragile human populations, while forcing
difficult choices upon affluent societies. Governments will face the challenges of mustering citizen
support for fundamental changes in energy, transportation, and infrastructure, regulating large-scale
carbon sequestration projects, and, perhaps, managing climate migrants. Organizational scholars can
study how business, society, and public entities
mobilize for and navigate these challenges.
Reshaping Value Chains
Part of any response to climate change will involve a shift in the mix of energy sources that
underpin our economy. Fossil fuels— currently
around 80% of global primary energy demand—
will increasingly be replaced by low-carbon sources.
According to the IPCC, renewable energy accounted for just over half of the new electricity
generating capacity added globally in 2012, led by
growth in wind, hydro, and solar power. Such
shifts might also be accompanied by a more distributed network of energy production and consumption. For example, stand-alone renewable systems
can make a significant difference to the lives of the
1.3 billion people without access to electricity in
developing economies (IPCC, 2014b), particularly
where it is uneconomic or difficult to build centralized grid systems. Regardless of the mix of energy
sources, we will need to become far more efficient
in our energy consumption. The transportation of
products, components, raw materials, and people is
a major consumer of energy, accounting for about
one-quarter of total energy consumption in a developed country. Furthermore, transportation disproportionately relies on fossil fuels, as opposed to
other sources of primary energy. This, and the coming changes in land use and agricultural productivity precipitated by climate change, has already led
some companies to fundamentally rethink their
supply chain, its scale and extent, and their relationships with primary producers. For example,
the U.K. retailer Sainsbury’s has made a series of
“20⫻20” sustainability commitments covering en-
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Howard-Grenville, Buckle, Hoskins, and George
vironmental performance of suppliers as well as
reducing the company’s absolute operational emissions of greenhouse gases by 30% by 2020 relative
to 2005.
As organizations work to improve their energy
efficiency and reduce their carbon footprint, largescale changes are likely in the geography and functioning of production systems. Rather than moving
raw materials and finished goods long distances,
companies may seek to produce closer to the point
of consumption, for example. The currently popular move towards locally grown foods is only one
early manifestation of what could become more
widespread. Technologies such as 3D printing are
making possible the production of quite sophisticated goods and components in customizable,
small batches, close to the points of consumption
or assembly. For example, aircraft manufacturers
Airbus and Boeing are using it to improve the performance of their aircraft and reduce maintenance
and fuel costs. And, companies can exploit the
“waste” or by-product of others’ processes, or use
the recovery of end-of-life products, to replace virgin raw materials in the production of goods. “Industrial symbiosis” and related concepts such as
the “circular economy” encourage organizations to
recover and reuse energy, water, and materials,
mimicking natural ecosystems. The longest-lived
industrial symbiosis is found in Kalundborg, Denmark, where exchanges of excess heat, steam, and
material resources have occurred between organizations since the early 1970s.
Organizational scholars can study how such shifts
in organizational supply networks alter interorganizational relationships, contracting, and risk-mitigation approaches. For example, how might the
sourcing of “waste” material as an input alter traditional supply arrangements? Will boundaries of
the firm, the nature of the firm’s “industry” affiliations, and even organizational identities shift? How
will localized provision of services often provided
at scale by public entities (energy, water) shift the
balance of power in interorganizational relationships, and how will firms be forced to respond if
they can no longer expect high-quality, highly reliable, centralized provision of such resources? Will
organizations adopt new models of engagement with
suppliers to cope with shifts in supply conditions?
Scholars need not think of climate change-induced shifts as impacting only those organizations
that produce or are heavy users of energy. Indeed,
part of the response to the need for radical efficiency increases may be new markets for services.
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The market for certain goods— cars, for example—
may be supplanted by a market for services (mobility) in which new market actors (car-sharing companies, not automobile manufacturers and retailers) will
dominate. To what extent will such changes precipitate new organizational forms, or new types of networks and alliances (e.g., between car-sharing services and providers of electricity)? How will such
changes show up in the ways that firms interact with
consumers and portray the value of their services?
How will information technologies enter into and
become central to the provision of such services?
Organizational Resilience and Adaptation
With climate change comes much more than
shifts in energy production and consumption: it
will require fundamental changes to how we use
the land and water in many regions. Some organizational responses are already discernable. For example, Coca-Cola has committed to “water neutrality” at the local level across its globally distributed
production facilities, aiming by 2020 to return to
communities or nature the amount of water used in
product and production. Cities with considerable
populations near sea level are bolstering their defenses against extreme weather—for example, New
York City’s Public Service Commission is requiring
the electric utility serving the city to upgrade to the
tune of $1 billion to prevent damage from future
flooding.
Many responses to climate change will be
much more difficult to manage, because the information available to organizations may well not
support the kinds of decisions, made on the appropriate time frames, for prudent action. Specific impacts, in specific times and places, will be
hard to predict. High uncertainty in outcomes
will drive high volatility in operating conditions,
challenging current approaches for managing risk
and making decisions.
Ways of organizing that foreground resilience
and responsiveness (Whiteman & Cooper, 2000,
2011), rather than scale or growth, will gain further attention. Organizational scholars have only
infrequently probed the nature of organizational
resilience, sometimes in the face of extreme
events, but more by looking at high-reliability
organizations. There is opportunity to develop
theory on what adaptation and resilience looks
like under the assumption of significant disruption to “business as usual.” Because the climate
is a non-linear system and its specific influences
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at a given time and place are largely unpredictable, proactive adaptability, as opposed to punctuated reactive change, may become a “new normal” for organizations. The limited predictive
capabilities that are developed for climate change
will have to be used with understanding of their
(at best) probabilistic nature.
A second area where climate change will usher
in significant change at the organizational level is
in the development of technologies. A fundamental
alteration in energy provision infrastructure, while
not unprecedented in our history—which has seen
the development of mass electrification, the rise of
the automobile, and, most recently, the near-ubiquitous use of information technology—nonetheless
shifts the playing field for existing and emerging
organizations. Opportunities for entrepreneurship
abound, evidenced in the staggering rise of “clean
tech” companies and funding in recent years (clean
technologies investment worldwide topped $8 billion in 2008, up by a factor of ten from only
six years earlier). Equally important are opportunities for social entrepreneurship to address the challenges faced by the world’s vulnerable societies
while seeking environmentally favorable solutions
for the provision of clean water, clean energy, communications, and mobility infrastructure. One example is TERI’s “Lighting a Billion Lives” initiative
that aims to provide poor Indian households with
solar lanterns, each of which in its life of 10 years
should replace about 500 – 600 liters of kerosene,
mitigating about 1.5 tons of CO2 emissions. The
scheme is operated and managed by a local entrepreneur trained under the initiative who rents the
solar lamps at an affordable rate to households in
un-electrified or poorly electrified villages.
Organizational scholars can rethink our understanding of innovation and technology development and diffusion. Do new constraints posed by
climate change alter current models? How do we
anticipate and manage the uncertainty posed for
organizations as a result of large-scale change in
both the conditions in which organizations must
operate and the underlying technologies available?
Will new forms of partnership arise out of the need
to simultaneously dismantle existing infrastructure
while building new elements? How will public entities, private organizations, and the not-for-profit
sector develop collaborations to address the social,
economic, and environmental needs that arise
through this transition?
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Shifts in Work and Life
Climate change, coupled with increasing urbanization, will demand that cities become more resource efficient, which might fundamentally alter
where, and, to some degree, how, individuals live,
work, and move about. Just as telecommuting was a
response to traffic congestion and work–life balance concerns of the 1990s, so will responses to
climate change likely prompt related shifts in how
work is distributed, how employees interact with
one another, and how physical assets are used by
organizations. The efficient use of energy and other
resources may lead to decentralization and de-synchronization of activity (e.g., encouraging employees to work remotely, avoiding transportation, or to
work at “off-peak” hours). At the same time, production of some goods currently shipped long distances may become localized around population
centers, leading to a modified distribution of economic activity. Employees might find their skills
exercised in new patterns of time and space, and
may also find that new skills are in demand—from
“hard” skills to develop technologies and infrastructures to “soft” skills that enable them to communicate and collaborate under new circumstances,
akin to but undoubtedly altered from those required
in the digital age.
These issues are often described as relevant only
to developed economy employees. However, the
vast number of people who live and work in developing nations, where, increasingly, pressures will
be placed on development using clean energy technologies and greater resource efficiency may require a radical rethink of employment practices,
human resource management, coordination of distributed work, and location choices for businesses.
Shifts in organizational choices for production and
consumption are likely to have debilitating effects
on relatively unskilled workforces across the
world. Many trends such as economic growth, urbanization, and demographic transitions in developing countries will have significant effects on the
nature and distribution of employment, but changes
in response to climate change may well exacerbate
some of these.
Organizational scholars are already beginning to
explore how employees value their organization’s
sustainability commitments that broadly address
both environmental and social needs. Forwardlooking organizations may find they are able to
attract, retain, and motivate employees by making
their commitments to “doing good” deeper and
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Howard-Grenville, Buckle, Hoskins, and George
more transparent. As climate change is a ubiquitous issue, touching all employees in their personal
lives (e.g., through rising food prices, due to crop
disruptions, or opportunities to alter transportation
modes), organizations may find considerable resonance and engagement from their employees in
support of efforts to address climate change. Organizational scholars might explore whether motivation, commitment, identification, or pro-social
behaviors are differently manifested when issues
such as climate change are confronted by an organization.
Other questions ripe for study include how
organizational responses to climate change shape
employee and managerial behavior. Do altered
patterns of mobility, co-presence, and communication change collaboration, creativity, or productivity? How do managers lead and motivate
employees under altered conditions? In the developing world, how might climate change alter
work conditions and worker mobility? Will the
inevitable impacts of climate change on health
and disease become a significant factor in how
organizations structure their relationships with
employees, and the types of benefits they are
called on to provide?
Societal Shifts
At the societal level, climate change will usher in
infrastructure changes that anticipate and respond
to changing conditions, as well as less predictable
exposures to extreme events. Each of these will
place burdens on society to adapt and respond. In
the case of infrastructure changes, giving members
of the public voice and addressing community concerns is already regarded as important— but likely
underutilized—for developments such as onshore
wind turbines. Even more challenging questions
will be posed in decades to come. For example,
what are appropriate measures and locations for
geological carbon sequestration, the injection of
CO2 deep into the ground? How should we balance
the demand for land, water, and other resources to
grow crops for fuel versus food? How can we use
“big data” and new communication technologies to
inform, encourage participatory approaches to, and
manage large-scale adaptation? How should the
ownership and governance of such data be structured to best to deliver social and not just private
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value? How do we weigh and allocate responsibility for effects felt far from their sources?3
Extreme events pose further challenges for societies. How should the industrialized world assist
expected “climate migrants” displaced from their
homes and livelihoods by rising sea levels, persistent drought, or devastating storms? Low-lying
Bangladesh, home to more than 155 million people,
is already vulnerable to the effects of increased
intensity of flood, cyclone, and storm surge, and
salinity intrusion. How much worse will the situation be in 2050? Although extreme weather events
and climatic shifts will not discriminate between
richer and poorer nations, those worse off will, in
many cases, be the most vulnerable and least able
to adapt. This will create challenges for mobilizing,
organizing, and coordinating large-scale change.
There challenges also hold opportunity to fundamentally rethink risk frameworks and how private
and public entities work to manage and mitigate risk.
Organizational scholars have long studied the
nature of social change, whether triggered by social
movements, technologies, or shifts in societal values. Climate change, with its global yet highly disperse and varied impacts, offers opportunity to
extend this work. What new models of social mobilization and change might be occasioned by efforts to respond to or mitigate climate change? How
might civil society and public and private organizations build resilient communities and economies? To what degree does a response to climate
change demand shifts in cultural or institutional
values or logics, and how will these emerge and
evolve? What role do organizations play in ushering in such changes?
CLOSING THOUGHTS
While the intent of this editorial is to offer some
insight into the science and policy of climate
change, and outline potential implications for organizations and organizational scholars, it is important to recognize that our scholarly community
is already grappling with a number of these questions. Recent journals’ special issues focus explic-
3
For example, a recent study shows that between 12%
and 25% of sulfate pollution in the western United States
originates from production in China for export (Lin et al.,
2014). To an even greater extent, greenhouse gases do not
respect national boundaries.
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itly on climate change and organizations, and the
topic has increasingly moved from the fringe to
the mainstream, including the pages of AMJ, over
the past decade and a half. When the IPCC concludes with high evidence and agreement that
“deep cuts in emissions will require a diverse portfolio of policies, institutions, and technologies as
well as changes in human behavior and consumption patterns” (IPCC, 2014c: 4), this offers an opening for organizational scholars of all interests, and
theoretical and methodological specialties, to engage with this pressing issue. We hope this editorial provides some inspiration on how we might
use our expertise to better understand the challenges climate change poses to organizations, individuals, and societies, and we look forward to welcoming such work in our editorial process.
Jennifer Howard-Grenville
Lundquist College of Business
University of Oregon
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Simon J. Buckle
Grantham Institute for Climate Change
Imperial College London
Lin, J., Pan, D., Davis, S. J., Zhang, Q., He, K., Wang, C.,
et al. 2014. China’s international trade and air pollution in the United States. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111: 1736 –1741.
Brian J. Hoskins
Grantham Institute for Climate Change
Imperial College London
Pierrehumbert, R. T. 2010. Principles of planetary climate. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press.
Gerard George
Imperial College Business School
Imperial College London
Schüßler, E., Rüling, C., & Wittneben, B. 2014. On melting summits: The limitations of field-configuring
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Jennifer Howard-Grenville is associate professor of management at the University of Oregon’s Lundquist College of
2014
Howard-Grenville, Buckle, Hoskins, and George
Business. She is an associate editor of the Academy of
Management Journal, covering the topics of sustainability,
corporate social responsibility, institutional theory, organizational identity, organizational adaptation, and social change.
Simon Buckle is the Policy Director at the Grantham
Institute at Imperial College London. He was Pro-Rector
for International Affairs at Imperial (2011–13) and formerly was a senior British diplomat. He has a doctorate
in theoretical physics, was appointed a Companion of the
Order of St Michael and St George (CMG) in 2007, and is
a Fellow of the Institute of Physics.
Sir Brian Hoskins is the chair of the Grantham Institute
for Climate Change at Imperial College London, and
holds a joint appointment with University of Reading,
where he is professor of meteorology. His international
roles have included being vice-chair of the Joint Scientific Committee for the World Climate Research Program,
623
president of the International Association of Meteorology
and Atmospheric Sciences, and involvement in the 2007
IPCC international climate change assessment. He played
a major part in the 2000 Report by The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution and is currently a member of the UK Committee on Climate Change. He is a
member of the science academies of the United Kingdom,
USA, China, and Europe and has received a number of
awards, including the top prizes of the U.K. and U.S.
meteorological societies. He was knighted in 2007 for his
services to the environment.
Gerry George is professor of innovation and entrepreneurship at Imperial College London and serves as deputy dean of the business school. He is also the editor of
the Academy of Management Journal.