A Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication
A Work in Progress
COMPLETING THE DEVOLUTION REVOLUTION IN CANADA’S NORTH
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer
Iqaliut Legislature Building, Nunavut
Dog Sled Racing, Yellowknife
APRIL 2014
Whitehorse, Yukon
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories
True North in Canadian Public Policy
Board of Directors
Advisory Council
CHAIR
Rob Wildeboer
Executive Chairman, Martinrea International Inc.,
Vaughan
VICE CHAIR
Jacquelyn Thayer Scott
Past President and Professor, Cape Breton University,
Sydney
MANAGING DIRECTOR
Brian Lee Crowley
Former Clifford Clark Visiting Economist
at Finance Canada
Purdy Crawford
Former CEO, Imasco, Counsel at Osler Hoskins
Jim Dinning
Former Treasurer of Alberta
Don Drummond
Economics Advisor to the TD Bank, Matthews Fellow
in Global Policy and Distinguished Visiting Scholar at
the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University
Brian Flemming
International lawyer, writer and policy advisor
Robert Fulford
Former editor of Saturday Night magazine, columnist
with the National Post, Toronto
Calvin Helin
Aboriginal author and entrepreneur, Vancouver
Hon. Jim Peterson
Former federal cabinet minister, Partner at
Fasken Martineau, Toronto
Maurice B. Tobin
The Tobin Foundation, Washington DC
SECRETARY
Lincoln Caylor
Partner, Bennett Jones LLP, Toronto
TREASURER
Martin MacKinnon
CFO, Co-Founder & Chief Financial Officer,
b4checkin, Halifax
DIRECTORS
John Beck
Chairman and CEO, Aecon Construction Ltd.,
Toronto
Pierre Casgrain
Director and Corporate Secretary of Casgrain
& Company Limited, Montreal
Erin Chutter
President and CEO of Global Cobalt Corp., Vancouver
Navjeet (Bob) Dhillon
President and CEO, Mainstreet Equity Corp., Calgary
Keith Gillam
President and CEO, Envirogreen Materials Corp.,
Scottsdale
Wayne Gudbranson
CEO, Branham Group Inc., Ottawa
Stanley Hartt
Counsel, Norton Rose Fulbright, Toronto
Peter John Nicholson
Former President, Canadian Council of Academies,
Ottawa
Research Advisory Board
Janet Ajzenstat
Professor Emeritus of Politics, McMaster University
Brian Ferguson
Professor, health care economics, University of
Guelph
Jack Granatstein
Historian and former head of the Canadian
War Museum
Patrick James
Professor, University of Southern California
Rainer Knopff
Professor of Politics, University of Calgary
Larry Martin
George Morris Centre, University of Guelph
Christopher Sands
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington DC
William Watson
Associate Professor of Economics, McGill University
For more information visit: www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca
Iqaluit, Nunavut
Table of Contents
Executive Summary............................................ 2
The Details of Devolution ............................... 16
Sommaire........................................................... 3
The Northern Political Challenges .................. 17
Introduction ...................................................... 4
Financing Devolution ...................................... 17
PART 1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF NORTHERN
GOVERNANCE.................................................... 6
The Governance Challenge ............................. 19
The Governance of Canada’s Colonies ............. 6
The Security Challenge ................................... 29
The North Fights Back....................................... 9
Resource Revenues and the
Continuing Challenges of Devolution ............ 31
Aboriginal Rights and Land Claims.................. 10
The Prosperity Challenge ................................ 24
PART 2 DEVOLUTION ..................................... 11
Conclusion: The Unfinished
Revolution in the Unfinished Nation............... 32
What is Devolution? ........................................ 11
About the Authors............................................ 34
The Devolution Revolution.............................. 12
References........................................................ 35
PART 3 DEVOLUTION IN ACTION .................. 16
Endnotes.......................................................... 37
The authors of this document have worked independently and are solely responsible for the
views presented here. The opinions are not necessarily those of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute,
its Directors or Supporters.
Photo Credits: Table of Contents: Northern Pics, Front Cover Yellowknife: Government of the Northwest Territories,
Front Cover Legislature Building Nunavut: Ansgar Walk
Executive Summary
C
anada is an incomplete nation. Vast parts of the country, mostly in the North, lack the services,
equality of opportunity, and political authority necessary to effect positive change. While a
great deal remains to be done, the process of devolution in the Yukon, Northwest Territories,
and Nunavut has started to address some of the great inequities in the Canadian federation, providing
a foundation for long-term regional empowerment and political change. Canada is a better nation
for having found the means of sharing power with Aboriginal people and northerners generally. The
devolution process has not been without challenges but the initiative has transformed the North
without creating major conflicts.
Canada is not alone in seeking ways to improve conditions on the periphery. Devolution, the transfer
of government power, authority, and resources from the national government to sub-national
governments, has been occurring on a global scale. National governments have sought to improve
efficiency and responsiveness in service delivery and program development by decentralizing
government offices to regions or, as in the case of the territorial North in Canada, transferring
government responsibilities to regional governments.
The northern devolution process has been underway since the early 1970s and has accelerated in recent
years, highlighted by the creation of Nunavut and the 2013 agreement on resource management with
the Government of the Northwest Territories. When combined with the signing of modern treaties
across much of the North and the expansion of Aboriginal self-government, devolution is an integral
part of an extensive process of regional empowerment and local control. The process has been
surprisingly smooth and without controversy, despite the complex financial, human resource, and
other issues that have to be addressed when transferring authority to another jurisdiction. Problems
remain, however, particularly in terms of capacity of northern governments to absorb the rapid
transitions, disagreements about the appropriate levels of funding for devolved responsibilities, and
the complex challenges of delivering government services in the Far North. The unique situation in
Nunavut, an Inuit-dominated jurisdiction, is improving, but considerable work remains to be done.
On balance, the devolution of federal responsibilities to the territorial governments, while still a
work in progress, has been an impressive achievement. With growing (but incomplete) control over
natural resources in the Northwest Territories and the Yukon, the territorial governments are gaining
much greater authority over development, economic planning, and community improvement
strategies. The federal government has not walked away from the North and continues to pursue an
active agenda focusing on sovereignty and resource development, as well as the continually evolving
relationships with Aboriginal people. Devolution is also occurring at a time of almost unprecedented
external interest in northern resources, fuelling an exploration and development boom that holds the
potential for greater personal and regional prosperity, connected to increased Aboriginal engagement
with an influence over the pace and nature of economic change.
Well over a century after Confederation, Canada has finally taken significant steps toward bringing the
North into the country. Canada’s colonies demanded greater attention and political autonomy and,
after a long struggle, the process of regional empowerment has started. There are already signs of
positive outcomes associated with regional autonomy and indications, as northern capacity improves,
of substantial changes in the offing. The devolution process, while impressive on its own merits, is a
crucial stage in Canadian nation-building and a key sign that the country has started to come to terms
with its obligations and opportunities in the Far North.
2 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
Sommaire
L
e Canada est une nation encore à définir. Dans de vastes parties du pays, la plupart situées dans
le nord, l’absence de services, d’accès égaux aux possibilités et d’autorité politique fait obstacle
à l’implantation de changements positifs. Bien que le travail qui reste à faire soit énorme, le processus de transfert des responsabilités vers le Yukon, les Territoires du Nord-Ouest et le Nunavut permet de commencer à corriger certaines grandes inégalités au sein de la fédération canadienne, en jetant
les bases d’une autonomisation régionale et d’un changement politique à long terme. Le Canada est
un pays meilleur pour avoir mis en place les moyens de partager l’exercice du pouvoir avec les peuples
autochtones et les habitants du nord en général. Le transfert des responsabilités vers le Nord ne s’opère
pas sans difficulté, mais l’initiative réussit à le transformer sans créer de conflits majeurs.
Le Canada n’est pas seul à chercher des moyens d’améliorer le sort des régions éloignées. Partout
dans le monde, les gouvernements nationaux ont délégué ou transféré leurs pouvoirs, leur autorité
et leurs ressources aux gouvernements infranationaux. Les gouvernements nationaux s’efforçaient
ainsi d’améliorer l’efficacité et la souplesse de leurs services et de leurs projets de programmes en
décentralisant leurs bureaux vers les régions, ou, comme dans le cas du Nord territorial au Canada,
en transférant les responsabilités gouvernementales aux instances régionales de gouvernement.
Le transfert des responsabilités aux gouvernements du Nord se poursuit depuis le début des années
1970 et s’est accéléré ces dernières années, notamment grâce à la création du Nunavut et à la signature de l’entente de 2013 avec le gouvernement des Territoires du Nord-Ouest sur la gestion des
ressources. Conjugué aux traités modernes conclus avec la plupart des partenaires dans le Nord et à
l’expansion de l’autonomie gouvernementale autochtone, ce transfert est une partie intégrante d’un
vaste processus d’autonomisation régionale et de contrôle local. Ce processus a été étonnamment
harmonieux et à l’abri des controverses, malgré la complexité des enjeux financiers, humains et de
divers ordres habituellement soulevés lors d’un transfert de responsabilité entre paliers de gouvernement. Des difficultés subsistent cependant, notamment en ce qui a trait à la capacité d’adaptation
des gouvernements du Nord aux transitions rapides, aux mésententes sur l’octroi de financement
approprié pour les responsabilités déléguées et aux défis complexes à relever pour fournir des services gouvernementaux dans Le Grand Nord. La situation unique du Nunavut, un territoire habité en
grande partie par les Inuit, s’améliore, mais beaucoup reste à faire.
Dans l’ensemble, le transfert toujours en cours des responsabilités fédérales aux gouvernements
territoriaux est une réussite impressionnante. Tout en accroissant leur contrôle (encore partiel) sur
les ressources naturelles dans les Territoires du Nord-Ouest et au Yukon, les gouvernements territoriaux se trouvent à exercer une influence grandissante sur le développement, la planification
économique et les stratégies d’amélioration du milieu. Le gouvernement fédéral n’a pas abandonné
le Nord pour autant, car il continue de mettre de l’avant un ordre du jour dynamique qui est axé sur
la souveraineté et la mise en valeur des ressources et qui tient compte de ses relations en constante
évolution avec les peuples autochtones. Le transfert des responsabilités survient également alors que
l’engouement quasi exceptionnel de l’extérieur à l’égard des ressources du Nord pourrait entraîner
un essor de l’exploration et de la mise en valeur en mesure d’assurer une très grande prospérité à la
région et à ses habitants, au moment même où l’engagement des Autochtones s’accroît de pair avec
leur influence sur le rythme et la nature des changements économiques.
Bien plus de cent ans après la Confédération, le Canada a enfin pris des mesures importantes en vue
d’intégrer les régions du nord au reste du pays. Ces « colonies » canadiennes ont réclamé une plus
grande attention ainsi que l’autonomie politique, et, après une longue lutte, le processus d’autonomisation régionale a commencé. Des signes de résultats positifs en découlent déjà et certains permettent d’entrevoir des changements importants dans la foulée des augmentations de capacité dans
le Nord. Le processus de décentralisation, tout en étant remarquable pour ses mérites propres, est
une étape cruciale dans la construction de la nation canadienne – et témoigne du début de réconciliation du pays avec ses obligations et les possibilités à saisir dans Le Grand Nord.
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 3
Introduction
A
rctic issues have recently captured attetion of the media, governments, and people around
the world due to the rush for resources, global warming, Indigenous rights, and questions of
Arctic sovereignty. Less understood, but with profound implications for all of the above, over
the past four decades, the Canadian North has experienced a profound political revolution.
In June 2013, the Government of Canada formally signed an agreement with the Government of the
Northwest Territories to transfer authority over natural resource from the federal government to the
territorial government as of 1 April 2014 (Canada et al, 2013). The previous month, in May 2014,
Nunavut celebrated the 20th anniversary of the signing of the agreement that created it. The event
passed almost unnoticed outside the North. Both of these events are but two of a number of landmark
achievements over the past 35 years by Canada’s territorial governments to gain greater regional control over natural resources and more broadly acquire the kind of political and financial autonomy enjoyed by their provincial counterparts. They are part of a broad political transformation that includes a
re-configuration of the relationship with the Government of Canada and Aboriginal peoples.
Most Southern Canadians take regional self-government for granted; few realize that constitutional
rights to make decisions over education, health care, and natural resources through their provincial
governments are not fully enjoyed by their fellow citizens living in Canada’s three territories, nor
are the rights of the territorial governments constitutionally protected. As late as 1967, there was no
legislature in the Northwest Territories, with key decisions made in Ottawa. The Yukon had a representative assembly, but meaningful power rested with the appointed Commissioner. Starting in the
1970s, northern protest and changing national policies led to significant transfers of authority to,
initially, the Yukon and Northwest Territories and, later, to all three territories in Canada’s Arctic, a
region, with the exception of the Yukon, that had little experience with legislative and bureaucratic
governance institutions (Cameron and White 1995). Indeed, many Northern residents only settled
in permanent communities after the Second World War. In comparative context, only a few areas in
the world have experienced the intensity of peaceful political and administrative change that has
occurred in the Canadian North. In less than 40 years, the Territorial North has made a transition
from being “favoured colonies” toward being regional, self-governing jurisdictions acquiring many
province-like powers.
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the manner in which Canada launched into this unprecedented and rapid burst of regional empowerment in the North. Comparable developments
in Western Canada started with the incorporation of Rupert’s Land into the new Dominion of Canada in 1870 (Canadian Geographic
2014), the gradual expansion of governance
Devolution is the transfer of
powers of the regions over the next 35 years,
authority from a central to a regional
the slow territorial expansion of Manitoba, the
acquisition of provincial status for Alberta and
(or local level) government.
Saskatchewan in 1905, the transition of constitutional authority for natural resources in 1930
from the federal government to the provinces,
and participation in the patriation of the Canadian constitution in 1982.1 By contrast, little has changed politically for roughly a century in the Canadian North (Coates 1985). Throughout this process, the Government of Canada had maintained
control of northern resources and resource use in particular and public affairs more generally.
Over the past four decades, Canada’s North has experienced nothing less than a ‘devolution revolution.’ Devolution is the transfer of authority from a central public government to a regional (or local
4 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
level) public government. Understanding the devolution revolution in the Canadian North is vitally
important for several reasons. First, external drivers – particularly climate change, which has the potential to open Arctic waters and create global demand for energy, mineral, and biological resources
located in the North – have drawn international attention to Arctic region. This means how the territorial North is governed matters as the world is on the doorstep of the Canadian North in ways that
simply were not the case a decade ago. Second, the recognition of the legal and political rights of
Aboriginal peoples in Canada has had enormous consequences for governance for over 40 percent
of Canada’s land mass (Natural Resources Canada 2013). The federal government is no longer the
only or the most important level of government to the First Nations, Métis, Inuit, and non-Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian North. Third, the natural resources that have been identified in the
Canadian North have potentially enormous consequences for Canada’s economic and fiscal future.
Good governance creates investment certainty. Good regulatory processes are essential for industry
to thrive and the environment to be properly stewarded. Appropriate governance changes will also
mean that the territories are better able to develop and capture their own source of revenues, lessening fiscal dependence on the rest of Canada.
The pressure on the North and from the North has intensified over the past 20 years. Arctic matters
have catapulted from a political afterthought in the 1980s to the front of the line in national and international policy debates of the 21st century (Légaré 2009). There is a real possibility – and a real need
– over the next few years to fundamentally reform Canadian policy toward the territorial North and to
strengthen governance in the North in order to promote northern economic prosperity and security.
Whatever the motivation, the transformation
of government was also predicated in no small
part on the belief that political reform would
lead to marked improvements in economic and
social outcomes for Northern residents. Canadians, through the Government of Canada, have
invested heavily in the Far North. The territories, particularly Nunavut, are very heavily subsidized societies, dominated by government in
many social, political, and economic respects.
Northern prosperity and security
require fundamental policy reform.
This report examines the central issues related to the devolution of political authority – autonomy,
integration, responsibility, accountability, and capacity – to the Yukon, Northwest Territories and
Nunavut, and considers how this accelerated transfer will promote northern visions of self-reliance
and regional control. In undertaking this examination, this report recognizes that devolution is not a
process unique to the Canadian North, but rather is part of a broader global trend.
The main questions arising at this juncture are straightforward:
• H
ow has devolution transformed governance in the territorial North? Through these governance
changes, is Canada’s position in the North – its sovereignty and security – stronger than it was 30
or 40 years ago?
• W
hat are the current shortcomings and challenges associated with devolution in the territories?
What are the strengths of current arrangements?
• H
as devolution contributed to the completion of confederation, particularly in terms of improving
quality of life in the territorial North?
In a comparative context, devolution in northern Canada has been a reasonable success. While processes in northern Scandinavia and Greenland have achieved better results, the northern Canadian
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 5
challenge was probably greater, particularly in terms of the socio-economic, historical, and logistical
realities facing Aboriginal people in the region. Sustained commitment from the national government
and the regional response to empowerment processes has established a strong foundation for longterm political and administrative change.
PART 1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF NORTHERN GOVERNANCE
The Governance of Canada’s Colonies
C
anada stands alone among the circumpolar nations of the world in its arms-length relation
ship with the Far North. While the Arctic holds a prominent place in the literary, artistic, and
ceremonial culture of the country, Canadians have never really embraced the North in a meaningful way. Efforts to settle the sub-Arctic and Arctic foundered repeatedly over the years. National
interest in the Far North ebbed and flowed largely on the basis of external threats to Canada’s loosely
held sovereignty over the region and the prospects of a northern resource boom. The government
responded to the early gold mining activity along the Yukon River in the mid-1890s and, by good
chance, had the North West Mounted Police in place before the great Klondike stampede descended
on the region after 1897 (RCMP 2002). Conversely, Canada stood largely in the background
when the Americans “invaded” the area during
the Second World War as the US raced to build
Canada stands alone among the
military facilities to prepare for a possible Japanese attack. After the war, Canadians believed
circumpolar nations in its arms-length
that there was also little choice but to accept a
relationship with the Far North.
large American presence during the Cold War, as
Canada lacked the resources to mount a major
defensive effort against Soviet threats (Coates
and Morrison 2005; Coates and Morrison 1992;
Grant 2010; Grant 1994; Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrison, and Poelzer 2007).
The northern territories evolved through a series of short-term political decisions, rather than from a
long-term strategy for northern development and political incorporation (see map 1).
The Northwest Territories, created in 1870 after the Canadian purchase of Rupert’s land from the Hudson’s Bay Company, initially covered the area from Labrador (save for the coastal area) to the Yukon
and from the Canada-US boundary west of Ontario and east of British Columbia to the Arctic Ocean,
with a small portion carved out for Manitoba (Canadian Geographic 2014). A decade later, a further
deal with Great Britain saw Canada accept dominion over the Arctic Islands, then under threat from
foreign interests (Zaslow 1981). The Yukon, then engulfed in the world-famous Klondike Gold Rush,
was removed from the Northwest Territories in 1898 when Ottawa discovered that the Northwest Territories’ government, based in Regina, was casting covetous eyes on Klondike liquor revenues.
The Government of Canada continued to carve up the Northwest Territories in a series of stages, removing what would become northern Ontario, Northern Quebec, Labrador, northern Manitoba, the
provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba, and northern British Columbia. The Northwest Territories,
6 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
MAP 1 Political Boundaries in Canada, 1870 and 1882
Source: Canadian Encyclopedia Online.
once covering the vast majority of the country had, by 1905, been whittled down to a ‘mere’ third
of the total landmass, stretching from the 60th parallel to the top of Ellesmere Island and from Baffin
Island to the Yukon border (see map 2).
While the boundaries were settled by the early years of the 20th century, discussions nonetheless
continued about redrawing territorial borders (Zaslow 1971; Zaslow 1988; McKitterick 1939). In
the 1930s, serious thought was given to amalgamating British Columbia and the Yukon and, less
urgently, Alberta and the Mackenzie River Valley. The former plan came close to fruition, failing only
when the Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie King realized that territorial funding for
a Roman Catholic school in Dawson City set a
precedent in the region that might, if the merger
proceeded, unleash worrisome French-English,
Catholic-Protestant tensions. The proposal died
The governance of the Far North
(Stuart 1983).
was largely an afterthought
until the 1960s.
The governance of the Far North was largely an
afterthought until the 1960s. Government and a
political system were, after all, reserved for settled societies, not for regions dominated numerically by Aboriginal people or, as in the Yukon during the Gold Rush, by a tidal wave of short-term, largely foreign miners. The government established
the Territorial Council in the Yukon during the Gold Rush primarily as a result of US agitation for
greater democracy in the region. But the Council almost disappeared after the collapse of the regional economy during the First World War (Coates and Morrison 2005). Throughout, however, the
Commissioner (Gold Commissioner and Controller after the war), a political appointee of the Government of Canada reporting to the Minister responsible for the North, maintained full authority in
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 7
MAP 2 The Arctic North of Canada
North Pole
Pôle nord
ARCTI C OCEAN
OCÉAN ARCTI QUE
CANADA
*
Ellesmere
Island

Alert
Île
d’Ellesmere
North Magnetic Pole
Pôle nord magnétique
www.atlas.gc.ca
a
ln Se
Lincode Lincoln
Mer
KAL AAL LI T NUNAAT
(GRØNLAND)
(Denmark / Danemark)
Axel
Heiberg
I
Melville
Beaufort Sea
’C
M
le
e
rc
Ci iqu
ic rct
ct
Ar le a
rc
Ce
Grise
Fiord

uk
U
SA
/É
-U
d’
A
N
AL
r
St
KA
re
AS
lu
I
Baffin Bay
Banks
Devon I
Baie de Baffin
I Sachs

Resolute
ik
Sd
Harbour
ter
Old
Lancas

isiv
Crow
an
Tuktoyaktuk
Dé

tr
Arctic 
 Pond Inlet

Clyde D oit d
Amundsen
Bay
Inuvik
Ulukhaktok
eD

av
River

is
av
Paulatuk 
Fort
Str
Ba ffin
Victoria N U N A V U T
Gulf
ait is
McPherson 
Isla
nd
Island
NOR THW EST
 Dawson
Qikiqtarjuaq 
Cambridge
Taloyoak
TER R ITOR IES

Bay
Gjoa

Kugluktuk
Île de Baffin
Igloolik
YUKON
Norman Great Bear

Haven
Hall

L
 Pangnirtung
Wells 
Mt


Beach
Logan
Déline  Grand lac
Foxe
r
Repulse
Faro
5959 m
a

a
de l’Ours
Bay
Kug
Basin
TERRITOIRES DU
 Whitehorse

Iqaluit
Cape
R

NORD-OUEST
Wrigley
k
Dorset
ac
B
Coral
Watson

Fort
Harbour
 Kimmirut
CO BRI Lake
Thelon R
Baker Lake
Simpson

H u ds
LO TIS
o nN
Great Behchokò


on S t r D é t d ’ H u d s

MB H
Yellowknife
T- FLD
Slave

IE COL
Fort R
N- &
-B
 Liard Hay L
 Lutselk’e
et L
Rankin Inlet  Chesterfield
RI UM
-L AB
Inlet
TA BI
Fort
Resolution
AB
River

NN A

Whale Cove 
Grand lac des Esclaves
IQ
UE
Arviat

ALB
ERT Fort Smith
QUEB EC Ungava Bay
A
Baie d’Ungava
LEGEND / LÉGENDE
SASK
QUÉB EC
Hudson
Bay
MANITOBA
Territorial capital /
Baie d’Hudson
 Capitale territoriale
N
Sanikiluaq

Other populated places /

Autres lieux habités
Mer de Beaufort
Fl
ck e n z i
Ma
e
International boundary /
Frontière internationale
Territorial boundary /
Limite territoriale
km
Dividing line /
Ligne de séparation
(Canada and/et Kalaallit Nunaat)
300
0
Scale / Échelle
300
© 2006.
ONTARIO
600
900
km
James Bay
Baie James
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Natural Resources Canada.
Sa Majesté la Reine du chef du Canada, Ressources naturelles Canada.
the Yukon. Council served in an advisory capacity. The Northwest Territories had even less input into
government decisions and resource allocations. The legislative capital of the Northwest Territories
remained in Ottawa until 1967; Fort Smith hosted regular meetings of the Northwest Territories’ advisory council and served as the administrative capital from 1911 to 1967, when both functions were
merged in the newly proclaimed capital of Yellowknife (Thomas 1978; Hamilton 1994).
The Yukon and Northwest Territories were truly Canada’s colonies, controlled long distance from
Ottawa, ruled by appointed Commissioners, and without a significant administrative apparatus or
local political process, particularly in the Northwest Territories. The launch of hard rock gold mining
and the related emergence of the gold mining town of Yellowknife in the 1930s brought stability to
the Mackenzie Valley, leading to agitation for political autonomy there and in the Yukon. The Second
World War and the resulting US presence across the Far North jolted Canada from its complacency.
The government moved North in a major way in the 1950s, partly to assert sovereignty over the
8 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
long-neglected territories but also to fulfill an increasingly urgent mandate to equalize social and economic opportunity. The arrival of the welfare state, highlighted by the expansion and empowerment
of the existing Indian and Inuit residential school system, government transfers to individuals, and
the settlement of Indigenous peoples in more permanent communities, ushered in an age of administrative oversight, with the lack of interest of the pre-1950 period replaced by assertive social policy
interventions and major investments in regional infrastructure. John Diefenbaker, Prime Minister
from 1957 to 1963, made northern development and his Roads to Resources program a centrepiece
of national economic strategy, ushering in an unprecedented burst of investment in roads, railways,
airfields, and other northern infrastructure (Novosel). The territories passed very quickly from being
neglected colonies to being “favoured” colonies, particularly in terms of the scale of the government
investment and spending in the region.
The North Fights Back
B
eginning in the mid-1960s, the North chafed under the increasing presence of the Govern
ment of Can-ada and the activities of the small but growing territorial civil service. Represen
tatives on the Territorial Council – elected in the Yukon but a mix of elected and appointed
officials in the Northwest Territories – struggled with the authority of the Commissioner, even as they
generally admired the individuals holding the posts. In the Northwest Territories, the establishment
of Yellowknife as the territorial capital meant that the government was actually just as inaccessible
for the people of the Eastern Arctic as when it had been in Ottawa. That the Inuit struggled to get
attention from the First Nations, Métis, and non-Aboriginal people in the Western part of the territory
only exacerbated the problems. Yukoners had particular difficulty with the Ottawa-centric approach.
Whitehorse had, by the mid-1960s, developed into a modern Canadian city, with political aspirations
to match. That the elected politicians had no control over the territorial budget, functioned in an
advisory capacity only, and lacked the managerial responsibilities of cabinet government made the
political class increasingly outspoken and critical of Ottawa. The most prominent northern politician,
Conservative Member of Parliament Eric Nielsen (serving from 1957 to 1987), was a particularly vocal
critic of federal Liberal policies in the North (Coates and Morrison 2005).
The unsurprising result of the colonial political situation, even though it was regularly burnished
with federal largesse, was territorial pushback. Regional politicians, particularly in the Yukon, became
increasingly outspoken about both government
policies and government structures. Demands
for local autonomy increased steadily, spilling
over mildly into the Northwest Territories. The
The North found its political voice,
Yukon’s Member of Parliament, Eric Nielsen,
supported the local demand for greater regional
ironing out future arguments through
control, joining with others who began to speak
internal debate.
openly about the value of provincial status. The
Liberal government under Pierre Trudeau was
not overly interested in northern questions, beyond working harder on Aboriginal social and
economic development. Political noises from the Far North, inconsequential compared to the gathering storm in Quebec and the rising frustrations of the prairie West, passed unheeded.
The emergence of the autonomy movement was important, nonetheless. The North found its political voice, ironing out future arguments through internal debate.
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 9
Aboriginal Rights and Land Claims
Q
uite apart from territorial autonomy movements, the Aboriginal people of the Canadian
North be-gan to lobby for greater attention to their aspirations. The pressure came from
several sources. Among the Inuit, the impressive and fast-growing Arctic Cooperatives, a
comprehensive network of community-owned retail stores and services, provided a training ground
for political mobilization and regional empowerment. Veterans returning from the Second World
War, particularly Elijah Smith in the Yukon, reacted to their political and socio-economic marginalization when they returned home. Smith and his counterparts started pressing for greater respect for
Aboriginal rights (Francis, Jones, and Smith 2005). A series of court cases, including the 1970 R v.
Drybones case (which identified discrimination against Aboriginal people in liquor laws and in the
Canadian Bill of Rights), ushered in a new era of attention to sustained political and legal bias against
Aboriginal people. Uprisings and protests across North America, and Canadian government support
for ethnic and minority cultural organizations, fuelled greater interest in Aboriginal rights. Indeed,
the Government of Canada’s commitment to
community mobilization, including through the
Company of Young Canadians, helped promote
northern and Indigenous political engagement.
The Aboriginal people of the
territorial North had not signed land
surrender treaties.
The foundation of Indigenous frustration in the
Canadian North was very simple: unlike much
of the country and in seeming violation of the
spirit if not the letter of the Royal Proclamation
of 1763, the Aboriginal people of the territorial
North had not signed land surrender treaties.
(Treaty 11, covering the lower Mackenzie Valley, was signed in 1921 following the discovery of oil at
Norman Wells in the Northwest Territories. The courts later invalidated the treaty, asserting that it
had not been signed properly) (Fumoleau 2002). As resource developments in the North continued
at a frantic pace, with Aboriginal people receiving few jobs and with few community benefits, Indigenous groups were understandably upset about the absence of formal treaties, as apparently required
under British and Canadian laws. Many northerners came to believe that the agitation for Aboriginal
land rights was the work of southern radicals, ignoring the fact that Yukon First Nations had first
placed a formal claim for a treaty before the Government of Canada in the early 20th century.
The Liberal government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, fresh off the forced retreat over the 1969
White Paper on Indian Affairs that had proposed the end of “special” status for Indians in Canada,
initially had little interest in land claims discussions. Their reticence ended in 1973 when the Supreme Court narrowly (on a 3-3-1 vote, with one judge ruling against the Nisga’a on a technicality)
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2010) overturned a challenge by the Nisga’a
of northwest British Columbia related to Ottawa’s refusal to negotiate a claim. The Liberal government, realizing that their legal position was tenuous, opted to commence land claims discussions.
That same year, after the tabling of the first comprehensive land claim in the modern era by the Yukon
Native Brotherhood (later renamed the Council for Yukon First Nations), the Government of Canada accepted the Yukon submission for negotiation. They did so in an atmosphere of considerable
non-Aboriginal distress about the concept of Aboriginal treaty and other rights, particularly in the
Yukon where the YNB claim was greeted with disquiet, if not hostility. Other Indigenous groups in
the Northwest Territories joined in the political mobilization. The era of land claims negotiations in
the Far North had started.
By the mid-1970s, sparked in substantial measure by the high profile Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry chaired by Justice Thomas Berger that recommended a delay in pipeline construction until Ab-
10 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
original people were supportive of the project (Berger 1977), conditions were in place for a multi-site
conflict, with deep emotions, ethnic tensions external pressures related to resource development,
and a distant national government. It is to the
enduring credit of the people and organizations
involved – Indigenous, non-Indigenous, territorial, federal, government, and private sector –
It is to the enduring credit of the
that the increasingly dramatic rhetoric of the late
people involved that the increasingly
1960s and late 1970s led not to confrontation,
dramatic rhetoric of the late 1960s
violence, protest, blockades, and destruction but
and late 1970s led to careful
instead to careful and respectful negotiations.
and respectful negotiations.
From the outset – and it is important to remember that the launch of land claims demands in the
Yukon was met by considerable non-Aboriginal
anger – the process of reconstructing the political and legal arrangements in the Canadian North was collaborative but time-consuming. There were
numerous forces impinging on the North at this time: external resource development expectations,
Aboriginal aspirations, a separate territorial autonomy movement, internal dynamics associated with
Indigenous-newcomer relations, and the transition away from old-style colonial administration. In
other parts of the world, this was a recipe for revolution and civil war. In the Canadian North, these
conditions coalesced to generate one of the most peaceful, comprehensive, and transformative governance revolutions in history.2
PART 2 DEVOLUTION
What is Devolution?
D
evolution involves the transfer of significant government responsibilities from a higher level
of govern-ment (such as the nation state) to a subordinate level of government (such as a
province or a territory, in the Canadian context). It is part of a global process of decentralization of authority, based on the general premise that administrative power should rest as close as
feasible to the people receiving and requiring government services. Decentralization often involves
the transfer of administrative responsibilities
within government, from central to regional offices. Devolution is a different process, involving
the transfer of authority from a national to a sub
-national government, in this case the northern
Authority should rest as close as
territories. The processes of devolution became
feasible to the people receiving and
particularly popular after the apex of the welrequiring government services.
fare state, when national governments started to
download responsibilities to other levels of government in order to restrain expenditures and to
allow local and regional populations to establish
their own political and administrative priorities.
As well, devolution reflects a growing belief in the importance of empowering local and regional
populations, on the expectation that control closer to the affected populations will result in more
appropriate and responsive policies and programs. Finally, devolution seeks to make local/regional
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 11
authorities responsible for the expenditure of public funds devoted to their region, enhancing the
authority of the electorate and reducing tensions between national governments and the regions and
populations under state control.
Canada started on this path of devolution in the territorial North for several reasons:
• the demands of local residents for greater control and autonomy from Ottawa,
• the political and administrative maturation of the territorial political and administrative systems,
• the increasing political and legal power of Aboriginal peoples,
• the national desire to unlock more of the resource potential of the Far North,
• t he emergence of new fiscal arrangements to address the major gaps in northern services and
infrastructure,
• t he growing commitment of the Government of Canada to decentralization and the
empowerment of regional governments, and,
• a general Canadian commitment to equality of political rights.
More controversially, some observers have suggested that devolution affords Ottawa with an opportunity to offload expensive programs, particularly as the territories later claimed that Ottawa did not
transfer sufficient funding to properly support the transferred responsibilities.3
The Devolution Revolution
B
eginning with the launch of land claims negotiations and continuing to the present, the territorial North experienced one of the most profound political transformations in Canadian
history. Consider the major developments that occurred between 1973 and 2013.
Land Claims Negotiations
The start of land claims negotiations in the Yukon in 1973 represented a watershed in the mobilization and engagement of northern Aboriginal people in national public affairs (Yukon Native Brotherhood 1973). At the same time, the precision and intensity of Aboriginal demands for autonomy
struck a real chord with northern non-Aboriginal politicians, whose attention focused on the absence
of territorial political autonomy, the lack of control over land and natural resources, and the general
powerlessness of the territorial governments. Aboriginal agitation sparked broader demands for territorial empowerment in the Yukon, in particular.
Responsible Government
The Yukon gained responsible government (which means that the administrative branch of government is subject to parliamentary or legislative oversight, with the executive seeking and requiring the
support of the legislative branch of government) through the “Epp letter” of 1979 (Epp 9 October).
By way of this letter, the Honourable Jake Epp, Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, instructed
then Yukon Commissioner Ione Christensen, to operate according to the instructions of the duly
elected Yukon Territorial Legislature, acting through the Government Leader and his/her cabinet.
While Commissioner Christensen resigned in protest over the radical change in the authority of her
office (Smyth 1999), the Yukon had finally achieved a significant measure of self-rule, albeit one that
rested upon an easily revocable ministerial letter of instruction. Responsible government was ex-
12 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
tended to the Northwest Territories at the same time, with Minister Epp authorizing the expansion of
the size of the Executive Council (the cabinet) and empowering the elected officials to take a greater
role in the management of territorial affairs.
Nunavut and the Division of the Northwest Territories
By the 1980s, the people of the Eastern Arctic felt under-represented in the Northwest Territories.
The establishment of Yellowknife as the territorial capital left the people of the Keewatin District and
the Arctic islands distant from their government. Tensions built over time, connected to rising Inuit
political aspirations and the evolution of land claims. Following the 1982 plebiscite (which voted 56
percent in favour), the Northwest Territories agreed to division, resulting in the formal establishment
in 1999 of the new territory of Nunavut.4 This jurisdiction was, at the point of its creation, over 85
percent Inuit. Nunavut was presented to the world as a major innovation in Indigenous empowerment. (Denmark was proceeding with a comparable process in Greenland, providing the Inuit of
Greenland with even greater autonomy than that provided in Nunavut.)
Comprehensive Claims
Settlements
Nunavut was presented to the
From a standing start in 1973, the North quickly
world as a major innovation in
tackled the negotiation of land claims. The issue
was particularly intense in the Yukon, where the
Indigenous empowerment.
Government of Yukon made a formal claim for
its own territorial land rights. The election of
the New Democratic Party under Tony Penikett
in 1985 eventually brought the Yukon Territorial
Government together at the table with the Government of Canada and the Council for Yukon First
Nations. Discussions proceeded more quickly in the Northwest Territories, with the Inuvialuit signing an agreement (the “Inuvialuit Final Agreement”) in 1984 (Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Claims
Settlement Act (S.C. 1984, c. 24)). Other agreements followed in due course, with the Council for
Yukon First Nations signing an umbrella final agreement (UFA) covering all 14 First Nations in 1993
(Canada, Council for Yukon Indians, Government of the Yukon 1993).5 The Yukon UFA covered the
entire territory, requiring individual First Nations to negotiate individual claims and self-government
agreements; the UFA came into effect when four First Nations signed onto the accord. The Inuit in
the Eastern Arctic signed their agreement in the 1990s (Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act (S.C.
1992, c. 29)). Not all groups reached final accords. Three First Nations in the Yukon have still not
signed, and the Akaticho Treaty 8, Deh Cho (Dene), and the Northwest Territories Métis of the southern Mackenzie River basin also have not reached a resolution. The signing of modern treaties brought
about major changes in the North: the infusion of hundreds of millions of dollars of capital, the
removal of the Indian Act as a governing document over Indigenous peoples in much of the North,
royalties from future resource developments, new government structures, and enhanced financial
opportunities and responsibilities.
The End of the Provincial Aspirations
Not all of the political transitions were positive. During the extended constitutional wrangling of
the late 20th century, questions emerged about the political possibilities of the Far North (Robertson
1985). Regional aspirations peaked in 1976, when Joe Clark, the newly elected leader of the Progressive Conservative opposition, promised to convert the Yukon into a province within his first term
in office (Smyth 1999).6 Yukoners were underwhelmed, in part because of analysis that indicated
the territory would have to increase taxes dramatically to cover the additional costs. Nonetheless,
northerners wanted to keep the option of converting the individual territories into provinces at a
future date. They assumed, as well, that the conversion process would happen, as with the southern
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 13
provinces, following agreement between the Government of Canada and the affected jurisdiction.
(Prime Minister Paul Martin repeated this sentiment as recently as 2004, as reported by CBC News
on November 23, 2004.) The practical prospect of this happening evaporated in the patriation of
the Canadian Constitution in 1982. Under the terms of the Constitution Act (1982), changes in the
Constitution – which would be required to admit a new province – require approval from the House
of Commons, the Senate, and two-thirds of the provincial legislatures representing at least half of the
country’s population. This is an extremely high bar for the attainment of provincial status and was
not required for the establishment of any of the six post-Confederation provinces. The Government
of Yukon, led by Tony Penikett, unsuccessful challenged the Constitution Act (1982) in court, with
the decision effectively locking the territories into permanent colonial status, a substantial breach of
faith and democratic principles with the people of the territorial North (Goldenberg and Penikett 24
July 2013). Importantly, the Yukon was not arguing for provincial status, which the government
agreed was not suitable at the time. Rather, they
sought the right to aspire for provincial status
The six post-Confederation provinces
under comparable terms and regulations that
did not have to meet the current
governed the creation of the other provinces in
extremely high bar for the attainment
Confederation. With the normal path to political
of provincial status.
autonomy effectively eliminated, northern politicians turned their attentions to other approaches
to regional empowerment.
Shifting Federal Powers to the Territories
While provincial status has been rendered largely unattainable, the northern territories were not
denied the opportunity to aspire to province-like status. Preceding the constitutional debates of the
early 1980s, the Government of Canada began devolving responsibilities to the territories. One of
the first transitions involved the transfer of Alaska Highway maintenance to the Government of the
Yukon in 1972 (Yukon District 1972). This arrangement, which involved the shift of several hundred
highway workers and managers, proceeded without controversy. In a quiet and non-confrontational
manner, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories worked with Ottawa to assume control of education and health care, two areas of responsibility that, it was uniformly agreed, were best handled at
the regional level. In each instance, the transfer of responsibility included the shifting of personnel
(or at least salary lines, in those cases where individuals opted to stay with the Government of Canada
rather than shift to the territorial government) and federal funding. In a series of steps that attracted
very little national attention, Ottawa transferred administrative responsibility for a range of federal
duties to the territories, with the Yukon proceeding several years ahead of the Northwest Territories.
Each shift added to the size of the territorial government and, directly, the authority of territorial
politicians. Importantly, these transitions – which involved complicated personnel processes (such as
the matching of pension funds and career tracking), legislative changes, and budgetary arrangements
– were concluded without controversy and without significant protest across the territorial North.
The process worked, in large measure, because the pace was not forced by the Government of Canada and allowed the territorial governments to decide when they were ready to assume additional
responsibilities.
Influence over Lands and Natural Resources
Taking over child welfare or even social housing, while vitally important in their own right, lacks the
symbolic power of influence over natural resources and lands (it is important to note that control, in
this context, does not mean ownership in a fee simple sense). In the resource rich territories, managing public lands, shaping resource development, and securing control over royalty revenues (albeit
under more constraints than for the provinces) is a major advance. The Yukon secured such control
over resources in 2002 (Yukon Act (S.C. 2002, c. 7)); the Government of the Northwest Territories as-
14 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
sumes these responsibilities in 2014 (Canada et al. 2013). This is perhaps one of the most important
stages in the devolution process, providing two of the three territories with effective control over the
most important elements in the territorial economy. This aspect of devolution remains incomplete,
with the territorial governments in the Yukon and Northwest Territories moving quickly to establish
and support the administrative and policy apparatus necessary to manage the land and resources in
their jurisdiction. Nunavut has not yet assumed
control of natural resources and is unlikely to do
so in the near future. Nonetheless, as recently as
August 2013, the Government of Nunavut indiIn the resource rich territories,
cated to Prime Minister Stephen Harper during
control of resource development is a
his annual northern tour that gaining control
over natural resources remained a high territomajor advance.
rial priority. Clearly, even with devolution, the
territories will not be fully “province-like” in
their roles and responsibilities.
Aboriginal Self-Government
While the signing of land claims agreements is politically significant, the creation of self-governing
Aboriginal communities and regions is one of the most important implementations of the spirit and
intent of the settlements. Aboriginal self-government is not an event, not something accomplished in
a single legislative act. Instead, self-government is permitted under the terms of the agreements, at
a time and with an administrative focus determined by the individual Aboriginal governments. Each
community decides if and when it wants to assume specific governmental responsibilities, as outlined
in the settlement accord. When the decision is made to proceed, the Aboriginal group negotiates with
the appropriate government agencies or department to secure the human and financial resources
necessary to exercise the authority. As a consequence of these arrangements and protocols, Aboriginal self-government is a patchwork at present, with some communities exercising multiple responsibilities and others eschewing the assumption of government duties. In addition, the arrangements
vary in terms of overall coverage, with some accommodating service provision for non-Aboriginals.
Over time, Indigenous communities have steadily assumed greater governmental roles, providing
for greater local control and Aboriginal management over crucial community-level services. The generally successful assumption of government responsibilities has given a strongly Indigenous cast to
many services in the territories. It is also, over time, adding significantly to the administrative capacity in the North and among Aboriginal organizations, as hundreds of Indigenous people gain
professional experience and learn to manage the
The creation of self-governing
levers of government. In the medium to longAboriginal communities and regions is
term, the steady increase in Aboriginal political,
one of the most important
policy-making, and administrative expertise will
implementations of the spirit and
help the territorial North assume greater control
over its affairs (Yukon First Nations Self-Governintent of the settlements.
ment Act (S.C. 1994, c. 35); Tlîchô Land Claims
and Self-Government Act (S.C. 2005, c. 1)).
Modernization of Yukon and Northwest Territories
Foundational Legislation
The legislative foundation for the Northern Territories was, until recently, based on a weak foundation. The Yukon Act, first passed in 1898 (S.C. 1898, c. 6), had many anachronistic elements and
lacked key policy elements. One of the most important, and unheralded, transitions in northern
political affairs came with the passages of a redrafted Yukon Act in 2002. Prior that point, responsible
government rested on the “Epp Letter,” a single and retractable document that required the Commis-
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 15
sioner of the Yukon Territory to follow the directives of the duly elected territorial government and
cabinet. The Yukon Act transformed the ministerial order into a permanent component of territorial
governance, removable only through formal and standard legislative procedures. Regularizing the
Yukon’s legislative framework was a crucial point in the entrenchment of devolution in the territorial
North, a clear and strong signal of the unfolding political revolution that passed almost completely
unnoticed south of 60 (Yukon Act (S.C. 2002, c. 7)). The Northwest Territories, similarly, was managed under an often-amended piece of 19th century legislation that was updated as recently as 2014 to
recognize the changes associated with modern treaties and other federal-territorial political arrangements (Yukon Act (S.C. 2002, c. 7)).
Co-Management Regimes
Among the many key elements in the overlapping processes of Aboriginal self-government and devolution, the engagement of Indigenous peoples in governance of natural resources is perhaps the
most significant. Under the new systems implemented in the territories, Aboriginal people have major roles to play in the oversight of natural resource development, heritage preservation, watershed
management, and many other economic, cultural, and environmental regulations. Perhaps the most
significant transition rests with the regulation and oversight of harvesting activities. Hunting, fishing,
and gathering remain vital elements in the economic, social, and cultural life of the territorial North.
Country food is an important part of the northern food supply, just as the harvesting activity itself
is critical to the preservation of language, cultural traditions, and Indigenous worldview. For these
reasons, the ability and capacity to engage Indigenous peoples, cultural values, and Traditional Indigenous Knowledge in the regulation and management of harvesting activity is central to the evolution of governance in the North. The fundamental importance of harvesting to northern Indigenous
peoples has made co-management the litmus test of the effectiveness of devolution, territorial autonomy, and Indigenous-government administrative arrangements (White 2006; White 2008).
PART 3 DEVOLUTION IN ACTION
The Details of Devolution
D
evolution is a complex, multi-faceted constitutional, political, legal, and administrative pro
cess. Key elements range from the decision of the Government of Canada to assign respon
sibility for selecting Aboriginal students for federal grants for post-secondary education to
band-level governments to the legislative establishment of Nunavut and the re-drafting of the Yukon
Act. These agreements represent the most important illustrations, in terms of negotiated accords and
formal arrangements, in northern devolution.
These agreements are complex legal documents, often running to several hundred densely written
pages. The written material obscures as much as it reveals. Behind each accord are thousands of
hours of extended negotiations involving various levels of government, Aboriginal communities and
organizations, and consultations with the public at large. At the Aboriginal level, these agreements
involved extremely difficult decisions about the appropriateness of the settlement, debates about the
16 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
prospects for a better agreement if negotiations continued, and a careful balancing of needs and opportunities. Cumulatively, these documents outline the shape of devolution and decentralization in
northern Canada, providing the legal and political framework for the governance and administration
of northern Canada. A central challenge lies in the transition from negotiations to implementation
(a similar process is underway with land claims
agreements). The spirit and the intent of the negotiated accords are swiftly replaced, in the hands
of civil servants, by the details of the agreements,
Devolution is a complex,
which are highly technical and subject to intermulti-faceted constitutional, political,
pretation. Government officials have no choice
legal, and administrative process.
but to adhere to the written texts, which can often result in sharp disputes between federal and
territorial governments and which can delay the
implementation of agreed upon arrangements.
The Northern Political Challenges
D
evolution and the empowerment of the territorial North is a reality. Major and sweeping
legislative, legal, and political changes have occurred. The expansion of the political role
of Indigenous peoples in the territorial North is nothing short of transformative. In certain
areas, particularly relating to Aboriginal participation in regional politics, resource development, and
the management of renewable resources, the northern territories became globally significantly innovators in their own right. It is with considerable justification, therefore, that politicians and government
officials from other remote and isolated regions and from countries with significant issues relating to
Indigenous affairs pay close attention to developments in the three territories. Northerners are more
in command of their affairs, but with limited financial room to manoeuvre. Indigenous and northern
political and administrative leaders are now extremely active in the management of territorial governance. Furthermore, by the early years of the 21st century, representatives of Indigenous and public
governments worked routinely with counterparts from throughout the Circumpolar world. Indeed,
the level of productive and sustained Circumpolar engagement is likely unmatched in global intra-regional affairs. Even with these achievements, much remains to be done.
Financing Devolution
E
xpanding and improving governance in the territorial North is a costly enterprise. Before 1985,
the Department of Indian Affairs and North Development worked on a program by program
funding model, providing northerners with little certainty and politicizing the annual financial
allocations to the territorial governments.7 The territorial governments were fiscally subservient to
the Government of Canada, an arrangement that limited the political authority and responsibility of
the Yukon and Northwest Territories. Eric Nielsen, Yukon Member of Parliament and Deputy Prime
Minister under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, was instrumental in changing this complex and unreliable financing system.
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 17
Territorial Formula Financing, introduced in the mid-1980s, provided a single annual block grant –
unconditional support for the territorial governments – without the program by program funding requirements and transformed the administrative dynamics of territorial governance. The agreements
are reviewed regularly, currently every five years, providing the territorial governments with a new
level of political freedom and greater accountability to territorial electors. The formulas are complex
and include the need for government funding, adjusted by available own source revenues to arrive
at a final sum. Among all of the elements of devolution, the availability of stable, substantial, formula-based funding best embodies the northern goal of substantial autonomy, fiscal flexibility, and
responsive and responsible territorial government.
The funding thus transferred is substantial (see the charts 1, 2 and 3 for total federal transfers to the
northern territories in the past 34 years).
CHART 1 Total Federal Transfer Payments to the Yukon, 1979–2013
1000
800
600
400
200
2013
2011
2009
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
0
Federal Transfer Payments to Yukon (total)
Data from 1979-1985
includes transfers from
municipal governments
in addition to federal
transfers. Source: Statistics
Canada, Provincial and
territorial revenues,
1965/1966 to 1991/1992;
1986-2010 data from Public
Accounts of the Yukon
Territory 2011-2013.
CHART 2 Federal transfers to the Northwest Territories, 1979-2011
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
NWT 1979-1998
18 |
2013
2011
2009
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
0
1979
200
NWT 1999-2013
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
Data from 1979-1985
includes transfers from
municipal governments
in addition to federal
transfers. Source: Statistics
Canada, Provincial and
territorial revenues,
1965/1966 to 1991/1992;
1986-2010 data from Public
Accounts of the Northwest
Territories; 2011-2013
CHART 3 Federal Transfers to Nunavut, 1999-2014
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
Total Transferred
2013-2014
2012-2013
2011-2012
2010-2011
2009-2010
2008-2009
2007-2008
2006-2007
2005-2006
2004-2005
2003-2004
2002-2003
2001-2002
2000-2001
0
1999-2000
200
1999/2000 – 2004/2005
data from 2005 Nunavut
Economic Outlook;
2005/2006 – 2013/2014
from Department of
Finance Canada.
On its own, devolution is no panacea and could, in fact, lead to additional crises for regional governments. Assuming control of additional administrative responsibilities requires money, in this case
from the federal government that previously managed the programs and services. Territorial funding
has, however, increased alongside devolution, providing the governments of Nunavut, the Northwest
Territories, and the Yukon with the resources needed to manage the new duties. Territorial governments are quick to point out – with good reason in many instances – that the incremental funding
does not cover the full costs of delivery, particularly given the special geographic and human aspects
of the North. The steady increase in overall transfers and per capita transfers illustrates, however, that
devolution brought substantial increased revenues to the territorial governments.
The Governance Challenge
T
he Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut are intriguing political environments, made all
the more so by the intensity of the change in the region. While the accomplishments are real,
serious challenges remain. The political revolution in the Far North is not complete. Indeed,
it remains at a relatively early stage and does not yet hold the assurance of full success. The situations vary across the North. Nunavut faces far
greater financial, administrative, and socio-economic challenges than does the Yukon, with the
Northwest Territories quickly catching up to the
westernmost jurisdiction. Indeed, the prospect
The political revolution in the
for rapid resource development in the Northwest
Far North is not complete.
Territories means that political change in the territory will likely be strong in the coming years.
The issues facing the smaller, isolated communities are much greater than those confronted by
the three territorial capitals and the larger territorial towns. There are a series of major challenges
facing northern governments that need to be comprehended if the interim nature of the devolution
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 19
transformation is to be understood. When southern folks wonder why the territorial North is not yet
celebrating its accomplishments, it is largely because so much work remains to be done.
Unfinished Business
Devolution has not been fully implemented and the administrative transitions and staffing remain
incomplete. Much as the negotiation of land claims agreements were difficult and time-consuming
tasks, effective implementation is an equal challenge. These complex legal agreements, running
to hundreds of pages, require careful administrative and political attention. The agreements require the establishment and operation of many
Effective implementation is a challenge
different committees, all of which have to be
equal to negotiation.
managed by qualified people. That the Aboriginal signatories to the agreements and those who
have still not signed a final accord are going to
the courts to seek resolution of some of the central issues demonstrates the difficulty involved
in completing land claims agreements. For the Indigenous groups involved, there are major decisions to be made about assuming self-government responsibilities, building local administrations,
and managing the new tasks and duties. Each year seems to add new activities and programs, ranging
for collaborations arising out of the Arctic Council to new climate change initiatives. The north itself
remains very much a work in progress on many fronts, and the administrations in the Yukon, the
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut will be pushed to the limits for years as they continue to implement the many diverse policies and agreements that now govern northern life.
The Scale and Complexity of the Issues
The three northern territories are small places; the Yukon has 36,700 people, the Northwest Territories some 43,500 people, and Nunavut 35,600, for territorial total of only 113,000, or less than
half the population of the medium-sized city of Saskatoon, Saskatchewan (Statistics Canada 2013).
Consider, then, the political and governance challenges before these three territories, which are
responsible for well over half of the land mass of Canada, stretching across four time zones and
reaching some thousands of kilometres from North (the top of Ellesmere Island) to South (Belcher
Islands, well south of the 60th parallel in Hudson Bay) and East (the easterly end of Baffin Island,
which is north of Labrador) to West (the Alaska-Yukon boundary, close to 1000 kilometres west of
Vancouver). Handcuffed by these formidable geographical challenges, and operating with two comparatively small cities, Whitehorse and Yellowknife, and one large town, Iqaluit, the governments of
the three territories have to contend with far more than the management of devolution, land claims,
and related issues. They face enormous southern and international pressure to develop northern
resources, cope with the uncertainties associated with climate change, respond to the many linguistic, cultural, and socio-economic challenges facing Indigenous peoples, manage dozens of tiny and
widely scattered villages (no Nunavut communities have road access and many Northwest Territories
communities have only winter roads, and several, including Old Crow in the Yukon, have no road
access), maintain political and administrative relationships with the federal government and their
provincial counterparts, struggle with the ongoing realities and work through the vicissitudes of a
boom and bust resource economies. No political regimes in the world, with the possible exception
of the still-evolving situation in the former Soviet Union, are required to tackle as many different and
complex issues over such a landscape and with such limited governance resources.
Capacity Issues
The intensity of the governance challenge is complicated by the limits on the North’s ability to manage its affairs. Government succeeds or fails not entirely on the quality of its legislative and political
20 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
framework, but on the ability and integrity of its civil servants. Good governance requires a stable,
skilled, and motivated bureaucracy to develop and implement legislation, monitor and evaluate programs, and otherwise manage the affairs of the state. The northern territories do not suffer from a
want of motivation and effort; regional enthusiasm for the multi-faceted challenges of self-government, land claims implementation, and devolution remains strong. The problem facing government
in the North is that the regional and Aboriginal governments have significant capacity issues. Northern governments have difficulty staffing their civil services, particularly in the smaller and isolated
communities. Staff turnover is high. Promotion
is often rapid, particularly in Nunavut, putting
inexperienced and unprepared people into jobs
for which they are not adequately prepared.
The issues at the territorial level – fairly minor
The northern territories do not suffer
in Whitehorse and Yellowknife, more serious in
from a want of motivation and effort;
Iqaluit and in the smaller regional centres and
the issue is one of capacity.
often critical in the tiny communities – are magnified with Aboriginal governments, where the
lines between administration and politics are
often blurred. The north has many talented and
able civil servants, but the number, diversity, and
intensity of their tasks often overwhelm them. All northern governments recognize the challenges,
and the three northern colleges (aided by southern university partners) are working hard to address the capacity gaps. The reality is that there are too few trained and skilled northerners ready
to assume government positions, and not enough motivated and able outsiders willing and able to
come North. Furthermore, the training programs in place across the country for administrators and
public servants rarely incorporate preparation in the special challenges and opportunities involved
with working in the territorial North. People with the right credentials, therefore, can have difficulty
adjusting to the realities of northern political and administrative life and can lack the cultural and
social understanding to flourish in the territorial civil services. It will take a considerable amount of
time to build an effective, sustainable, and regionally-aware northern bureaucracy, although the rapid
progress made since the 1970s provides reasons for optimism.
Over-Governance in the North
The territorial North is one of the most government-dependent regions on Earth. Federal and territorial government spending is the foundation for the territorial economy; a substantial portion of the
private sector activity in the North involves supplying or serving government departments. Personal
income transfers are crucial to the economy in
many parts of the North. Government employees dominate the territorial capitals and a combination of administrators, teachers, police, and
health care personnel dominate the workforces
The territorial North is one of the
in all northern towns. Stand-alone private sector
most government-dependent regions
activity, often launched with government supon earth.
port, is limited to the mining sector and seasonal
tourism activity. Expressed as a percentage of the
northern economy, workforce, and population,
government-related agencies and organizations
dominate all aspects of the territorial North. This means, in turn, that the territorial North is preoccupied with and by government and that the imperatives of government drive northern public and
public life. To date, private sector activity in the North has been comparatively small and subject to
boom and bust cycles that further reinforce the importance of government in stabilizing and underpinning the economic well-being of the North. Successes and failures of northern administration
have significant implications for the region.
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 21
Under-Governance in the North
Ironically, under-governance is also one of the serious challenges facing the territorial North. Combining the list of responsibilities, political transitions, geographic area, and capacity challenges means
the North experiences regular shortages in terms of the availability of key personnel, the mismatch of
talent/experience and specific duties, rapid turnover of officials, expectations regarding cross-cultural
and linguistic abilities (particularly in Nunavut), and the ever-changing nature of government in the
region. Many of the pressures on territorial governments, particularly from the Government of Canada and those arising from court decisions, put substantial pressure and additional work on northern
authorities. The northern governments, then, find themselves struggling to keep up with legislated
and legal requirements, a situation made more complicated by the expectation that the public government work collaboratively with Indigenous organizations and governments. While the challenges
show up in delays in the delivery or development of government programs, the problems show up
with the pressure on understaffed natural resource units to keep up with the demand for a prompt
turn-around on high-value resource projects. It is a testament to the complications of northern governance that the territories can, at once, be over-governed and under-governed.
Localized Indigenous Governance and Questions of Economies of Scale
The structure of land claims agreements is driving Aboriginal governments, particularly in the Yukon
and Northwest Territories. In both cases, First Nations, Inuit, and Inuvialuit groups have focused on
building local capacity and local governments,
often creating substantial self-government operations for small Indigenous populations. There
is a compelling logic behind this approach. The
North has many distinctive cultural and linguistic
Understaffed and overwhelmed
groups. Expecting these people to work together
northern governments are under
on a regional basis is unrealistic. Furthermore,
pressure to perform.
the Indigenous peoples worked under the paternalistic and often oppressive hand of the Government of Canada for generations, a legacy that left
most Aboriginal northerners bitter. Although the
situation has improved in the last 20 years, there
remains distrust of the Yukon and Northwest territories governments as well. Nunavut, of course,
does not fit in this category, since it is a creation of the Inuit land claim and political negotiation
processes. The result is that, in the Yukon and Northwest Territories, there has been a proliferation
of local, often tiny, Indigenous governments. The Council of Yukon First Nations, which oversaw the
negotiation of the umbrella final agreement, largely stepped aside from the delivery of Aboriginal
government programs. Aboriginal self-government in the North suffers from serious diseconomies
of scale. They often find themselves under-resourced and under-staffed, relative to the governance
responsibilities that they have accepted. The creation of mini-territorial governments is driven by the
desire for political autonomy and local control. The system, however, is expensive, complicated, and
disconnected from the administrative capabilities of comparable communities. The model adopted in
Labrador and northern Quebec, where regional authorities work on behalf of multiple governments,
is administratively efficient and fiscally effective. In time, it is possible that the Indigenous governments will gravitate toward regional administrative structures. For now, however, the imperative is in
the opposite direction, toward a continued existence of small Indigenous governments.
Territorial Fiscal Dependence
At present, and until there are sustained and large-scale resource developments, the territorial governments are extremely dependent on federal funding. The financial transfer agreements for the
North are generous, but only when expressed on a largely irrelevant per capita basis rather than as
an assessment of the resources needed to meet pressing costs. With control of natural resources and
22 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
resource revenue in the hands of the Yukon and Northwest Territories, two of three territories will
have additional own source revenue to offset the costs of territorial government (Hodge, Stauch, and
Taggart 2007). The fiscal benefits of these payments are restricted, however. Revenues are capped and
leave the territories with a smaller share than the funds available to their provincial counterparts. In
the Northwest Territories, a substantial share of the revenue goes to Aboriginal governments. In Nunavut, where the costs of governing are well beyond the capacity of the local population to sustain,
even gaining control over resource revenue is not likely to change the dependency formula. So long
as Ottawa remains open-minded to meeting the real costs of governing the North, the high level of
fiscal dependence will not be a serious problem, save to outside critics who believe that the expenses
of territorial administration are not justified. Should resource revenues spike sharply upward – and
the Government of the Northwest Territories has the best chance either through the commercial development of Beaufort Sea oil and gas or the full exploitation of the large Sahtu oil and gas reserves
– territorial resources might well come closer to matching the cost of government. Territorial authorities are nervous about the assumption that additional revenues will replace federal funding, rather
than allow northern governments to tackle more of the seemingly endless list of needed northern
infrastructure, government projects, and services.
Managing Resource Developments
The news is full of accounts of imminent major resource projects coming on line in the North: diamond mines in Nunavut and the Northwest Territories, the massive Baffinland iron mine on Baffin Island, a series of significant mines around
Baker Lake in Kivalliq, oil, gas, and minerals in
the Mackenzie River valley, and a number of new
mines in the Yukon. Each project generates responses from local businesses eager for new opResource development requires
portunities, Indigenous groups anxious about
an exceptional amount of
traditional harvesting lands and socio-economic
government work.
dislocations close to home, and environmentalists nervous about the despoliation of the pristine northland. Land claims agreements created
structures for local input into the evaluation and
monitoring of resource projects, a power aided
by the “duty to consult and accommodate” provisions set by the Supreme Court of Canada. But these
projects, however attractive in terms of royalty revenues, job creation, and general business opportunity, require an exceptional amount of government work. Highly technical environmental assessments are required, as are socio-economic evaluations. Consultation requirements are considerable,
requiring many hours of meetings and follow-up. Add to these tasks the licences, regulatory changes,
planning activities, and infrastructure needs associated with major projects, plus the services required to support the workforce and their dependants, and the magnitude of the challenge becomes
clear. In all three territories, there are at least a handful of these resource projects at advanced stages
of development simultaneously, all pushed forward by junior mining companies, investors, territorial
and federal politicians, and often, Indigenous groups eager to get the projects off the ground. Managing such pressures is a thankless and difficult task, largely because the government officials are both
required to attend to the law in terms of approval processes and because they are eager to do what is
best for the North. As global investment interest has increased in recent years, so has the pressure on
government to respond quickly, professionally, and appropriately to plans that could bring hundreds
of millions of dollars into the North.
The Politics of Smallness in the North
The North is a demographically small place. People know each other, and their lives often intersect
in many different ways. In small political environments – Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal, northern or
southern – the imperatives of the politics of smallness take effect. In these socially intense environments, most issues go beyond the local and become personal. The politics of smallness can be seen
in particular in the government operations of the Northwest Territories, where in the consensus-
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 23
style political system (without the intermediary role of political parties), personal connections are
highly significant in determining the success or failure of a particular measure. While the politics of
smallness facilitates prompt decision-making, it can encumber important government matters with
personal and local elements. The politics of smallness does not imply ill will on the part of individuals or organizations. Instead, it shows that the webs of connections and personal histories, for better
or worse, shape electoral processes, administrative systems, and decision-making in areas with small
populations.
The Unique Situation in Nunavut
Nunavut has a great deal to commend it. The creation of an Inuit-controlled jurisdiction in the territorial North was a bold, decisive, and impressive innovation. The subsequent political and administrative transformation of Inuit life includes many dramatic and impressive achievements, not the least of
which are the introduction of Inuktitut into Nunavut governance, the evolution of territorial political
life, the implementation of major parts of the Nunavut land claim agreement, and the creation and
operation of Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI), the agency which owns the Inuit’s development
corporations. At the opposite extreme, the new Government of Nunavut faces some serious challenges, including those associated with the expense and dislocations associated with decentralization within the territory, difficulties with the management of public funds, failed regional economic
strategies, difficulties supporting traditional lifestyles, the challenge of reviving Inuit language and
culture, and unresolved challenges with the management of government. Nunavut requires large
annual transfers from the Government of Canada and the federal Auditor General has raised serious questions about the effectiveness of these expenditures. The most serious Nunavut challenges
– housing shortages, domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse, widespread unemployment, and
capacity building – have proven intractable, complicating the challenges of governing Nunavut. Put
more simply, Nunavut is lagging at least a decade behind the Yukon and Northwest Territories in
terms of the management of territorial affairs and deeply entrenched socio-economic and cultural
problems make the task of catching up to the other territories extremely difficult. Conditions will
continue to improve, if northerners and the country give the territory time to do so.
The Prosperity Challenge
O
ne of the “promises” of devolution was that regional governance, land claims agreements,
and other developments would usher in an era of economic growth, fuelled in part by lo
cally controlled resource development. The economic situation has changed, in large part
because of the expansion of government services and employment, the advent of self-governing Aboriginal communities, and the resources available through land claims agreements. Measures of community well-being show reasonable improvement in the territories, with territorial settlements doing
markedly better than in the northern provinces (particularly Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan)
(see map 3).
Northern unemployment is low in many districts. Well-educated northerners do well in terms of
employment and income, and the economic measures of well-being, including the Human Development Index, point in positive directions, with significant convergence toward national norms. While
high average earnings mask significant inequalities within the northern workforce and do not account for the high cost of living in the North, the marked improvement in income experienced across
the North is reason for optimism. Moreover, Aboriginal communities and northerners generally are
active participants in regional economic development. In a variety of important ways, the political
transformations of the territorial North have had a significant impact on the economic structures,
processes, and opportunities in the region.
24 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
MAP 3 Well-being in First Nations Communities: The Community Well-being Index, 2006
Beaufort Sea
ALASKA
(U.S.A.)
Canada
CWB Index Score Range, 2006
Yukon
^ Whitehorse
Northwest Territories
1 - 49
Iqaluit
50 - 59
Nunavut
60 - 69
Labrador Sea
70 - 79
Yellowknife
^
Higher scores
indicate a greater
level of well-being.
80 - 100
British Columbia
Newfoundland and Labrador
Hudson Bay
Saskatchewan
Alberta
Manitoba
Quebec
Gulf of St. Lawrence
P.E.I.
PACIFIC
OCEAN
N.B.
Ontario
N.S.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Source: Canada. 2006. Well-Being in First Nations Communities: The Community Well-Being Index 2006. Retrieved from
http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1321883955297/1321884166104.
CHART 4 Nunavut, Average Income, 1999-2010
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Nunavut
Canada
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 25
CHART 5 Northwest Territories Average Income, 1981-2009
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
2004
2003
2005
2007
2009
2003
2005
2007
2009
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
2001
NWT
1989
1987
1985
1983
0
1981
10,000
Canada
CHART 6 Yukon Average Income, 1981-2009
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
Yukon
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
0
1981
10,000
Canada
Socio-Economic Realities
The economic situation in the territorial North is reasonably strong and improving. Average incomes
have increased (see chart 3), as have overall employment rates. Improvements in education and
training are generating long-term changes, particularly in Indigenous engagement with the economy
(Howard, Edge, and Watt 2012).
Conditions in many communities in the Yukon and Northwest Territories have taken significant turns
for the better, with improved housing, better local facilities, and significant business developments.
Nunavut’s socio-economic conditions are shifting more slowly and have proven resistant to both government and private sector intervention. The reality is that there are large numbers of unemployed
and poor northerners, particularly in the Aboriginal population and specifically in the smaller, remote communities. Economic conditions in these villages – in sharp contrast to the capital cities – are
typically extremely difficult, with few prospects for sustained paid employment.
26 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
Preserving Traditional Lifestyles
Northern Indigenous peoples did not see political and economic authority in the territories as a
means of abandoning traditional lifestyles. Indeed, Aboriginal leaders assert that a fundamental goal
of land claims and devolution was to give northern peoples the chance to control their destiny, including harvesting opportunities and traditional cultural values. Generational and lifestyle changes
disrupted traditional activities in communities, resulting in sharp shifts in hunting, fishing, trapping,
and gathering. New mechanisms, including income support arrangements in Nunavut, favourable
legislative regimes, vigorous but failed defence against anti-fur trapping regulations in the European
Union, microloans for harvesters, schools and school programs to provide training for young people,
and recognition of traditional skills, have been used to support land-based activities. These efforts
have been offset by other forces, including ecological shifts associated with climate change and disruptions related to resource access and related industrial activity. Harvesting activities in much of
the territorial North appear to be in sharp decline and there is widespread concern across the North
about the longevity of the vital caribou herds. While threats to traditional lifestyles persist – a function of television and video games as well as resource development activities – the expansion of local
control has given territorial governments the means to support traditional lifestyles.
Aboriginal Development Corporations
Little-known Aboriginal development corporations have demonstrated the potential to revolutionize
the economic system in the Canadian North over the next 20 years. Development corporations are
Aboriginally controlled (directly through an Indigenous government or through an arms-length legal entity) businesses. While a few firms pre-date the settlement of land claims, most arose out of a
combination of modern treaties (as depositories for the multi-million dollar financial settlements),
royalty returns as outlined in the settlements, and financial payments connected to resource projects.
While many of the development corporations are relatively small, particularly those associated with
the individual First Nations in the Yukon, others are substantial. The Inuvialuit Regional Corporation,
set up after the 1984 land claim settlement, has a current value in excess of $500 million (Inuvialuit
Regional Corporation 2012).8 The Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI) is the holding company
created out of the Nunavut agreement, and was
established with the allocation of $1.2 billion as
the Government of Canada’s payment under the
land claim and the potential to add several bilAboriginal development corporations
lion additional dollars in resource revenue in the
9
have the potential to revolutionize
coming two decades. The Gwitch’in community
of Old Crow used a portion of its money to buy
the economic system in the
the Yukon’s regional airline, Air North. The funds
Canadian North.
are invested comprehensively, in both local companies and external securities and investment
instruments. The development corporations improve on the financial well-being of the larger
Indigenous political community. The Yukon development corporations, for example, invest in local
hotels and businesses, heritage projects, new Aboriginal companies, and other ventures. The Indigenous development corporations have become major players in the northern economy, providing
Indigenous governments and beneficiaries with major financial stakes in the North. Indigenous corporations will have the funds necessary to launch significant businesses and/or purchase equity in
other projects, thus establishing Indigenous people as significant participants in northern economic
development. That those Indigenous participants were to hold a 30 percent stake in the proposed
Mackenzie Valley Gas pipeline project is but one indication of the scale and potential impact of Indigenous investment generally. To date, the development corporations are significantly under-appreciated in Canada.
Regional Economic Development Strategies
The territorial North hosts uneven micro-economies, ranging from the government-supported capital
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 27
cities to tiny land-based villages with little access to the wage economy. The Government of Canada,
working through Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, has invested hundreds of millions
over the years in all manner of regional economic development strategies. The Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency (CanNor), operating such programs as Strategic Investments
in Northern Economic Development, encourages economic diversification, entrepreneurship, and
regional planning. The effort is not without successes, including small businesses expansion in the
tourism and resource development sectors and investments in future building initiatives like the Innovation Centre at Yukon College. On balance,
however, the investments have not enjoyed
steady success, in large part because of significant northern economic liabilities. Many of the
pre-conditions for economic success – including
Many of the pre-conditions
an educated and trained work force, investment
for economic success are unevenly
capital, access to markets, critical infrastructure,
available.
and supportive government policies – are unevenly available. The prospects in Whitehorse
and Yellowknife are quite reasonable; opportunities in Resolute Bay and Cape Holman are weak.
In general, then, government regional economic
strategies are operating in difficult circumstances, with limitations and liabilities that interfere with
efforts to create sustainable businesses. In Inuit communities, the Arctic Cooperatives play a vital
role as community-based entrepreneurs. In most instances, and with the important exception of the
Inuit art enterprise, the cooperatives have worked primarily to provide local services such as grocery
and hardware stores, hotels, and restaurants. More recently, the Cooperatives have been helping to
expand commercial fishing operations in the Arctic and they will play a significant role in the evolving
resource economy.
Building Northern Economies from the People Up
Much of the development effort in the Canadian North – most appropriately – focuses on individual
capacity building rather than dramatic business developments. Across much of the North, the Indigenous adult population has deficiencies in formal education and skills training. The residue of the
residential school experience and ethnic marginalization remains in evidence. Problems persist at the
pre-school elementary and secondary levels. Aboriginal graduation rates are comparable to Indigenous performance results across the country, and are weaker in some smaller remote communities.
The localization of education, through the addition of Indigenous language training and cultural
content, has been provided to offset the earlier assimilationist content. The effort, while strongly supported by the adult population, has produced mixed results, at best. The Inuit, in particular, debate
the relative merits of developing Indigenous language and cultural skills as opposed to the abilities
required in the wage economy. To date, the Inuktitut and cultural training has not produced the
anticipated results, but it is very early in the process. Inuit children have not made substantial gains
in Inuk-based learning while remaining significantly deficient in marketable skills including English
and French language abilities. Governments at the federal and territorial levels have invested heavily
in adult basic education, technical and careers training, professional development, and foundational
post-secondary programming. The work has been done primarily by the three territorial colleges –
Yukon College, Nunavut Arctic College, and Aurora College – all of which maintain an extensive network of community-based colleges. The educational and training gap in the territorial North is wide
among the Indigenous population, with a very different pattern among the largely southern-trained
non-Aboriginal population. In many instances, mines, oil and gas companies, and governments could
not find locally qualified individuals available to assume jobs with the companies, even with high
rates of unemployment at the community level. Resource firms, as part of their agreements with Indigenous groups, have made impressive commitments to workplace training and employee upgrading. There is a tendency to focus on the shortcomings and comparatively poor results in northern
Aboriginal education and training without contrasting the contemporary situation with that of a few
28 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
decades ago. The transition has been dramatic. Northern Indigenous peoples support education,
where decades ago they had an internalized hatred of government-run schooling. Nationally, there
is a growing realization that the experience of young, pre-school children (age 0 to 5) needs more
attention, with the goal of improving the life chances of young children living in challenging circumstances. Inside the formal education system, participation and graduation rates are improving,
albeit slower than wished. The same is true of adult basic education and practical training. Northern colleges and schools have been working back from the ends, steadily improving educational
programming for the very young and for mature
learners. Over the next few decades, as the rapidly growing number of young Indigenous college and university graduates work their way
through their schooling and into the workforce
The Government of Canada retains
and parenthood, the nature of northern educaa powerful role in the security of the
tion, training, and workplace preparedness will
Far North.
change. Until that time, and moderating slowly,
northern demands for greater attention to education and training will persist.
The Security Challenge
O
ver the last century, the Government of Canada has maintained a loose, occasionally tenuous
hold on the territorial North. The region was supervised but not really occupied by Cana
dians. More recently, the conjunction
of concern about Arctic boundaries, heightened
awareness of the North’s resource potential, climate change, and Russian resurgence has raised
national concern about Arctic sovereignty and
In other northern countries,
Canada’s ability to defend its interests in the Far
military investments underpin regional
North (Wallace and Dean 2013). As with other
development.
frontier regions, where competing national interests raise political tensions and require national
government attention, the territorial North remains a crucial Canadian zone of engagement
(Shadian 2013; see also: Lajeunesse 2013; Lackenbauer and Shackleton 2013; Rutten 2010).10 Devolution does not involve such government responsibilities as defence and formal international relations, meaning that, even with the rising power of
the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut, the Government of Canada retains a powerful
role.
The Risks of an Incomplete Nation
Compared to other northern nations, particularly Scandinavia, Canada has stopped well short of
completing the process of nation building. Countries like Norway have delivered high quality services, facilities, and regional infrastructure to their northern regions, basically ensuring that national
standards apply to the sparsely populated Arctic regions. Canada’s North has more in common with
Russian Siberia than northern Sweden or Finland, and remains a very incomplete nation. The absence of a northern road system, uneven services like the Internet, health care, and community infrastructure, and distressingly low quality housing and education facilities in many villages have left the
northern territories outside the capital cities far below general Canadian conditions (save for Indige-
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 29
nous settlements in the northern provinces). Northerners understand the differences in basic health
services and housing stock. They feel disadvantaged and distressed by the gaps and by the substantial
differences in lived experiences for the people of the Far North. While the North has been making
significant improvements in recent years, the gap in conditions between the territories and the south
remains a source of irritation and political unease.
Defence Infrastructure as a Foundation for Northern Development
In other northern countries, military investments have been used to underpin regional development.
The philosophically free-enterprise Alaskans rarely acknowledge the long-standing importance of
military spending as the foundation for the high quality of life enjoyed in the region. Across Scandinavia, defence institutions support and upgrade
regional infrastructure, while ensuring longterm government commitment to northern regions. Canada has made little such military commitment, save for the Canadian Forces Northern
The ability to provide for basic needs
Area headquarters in Yellowknife (with a total
is a mark of a country’s commitment to
personnel of slightly more than 400 personnel
its citizens.
and their dependants). Neither the Yukon nor
Nunavut have much more than transient military
facilities or armed personnel in their jurisdictions. Indeed, and in sharp contrast with other
remote regions, the northern territories are almost without substantial defence facilities or capabilities. Canada, in other words, has opted to neither provide substantial forward defence capabilities in the territorial North, nor to use security investments as a means of supporting regional development. Furthermore, the announced government
commitments to northern defence infrastructure and equipment have not materialized, once more
disappointing regional advocates.
Climate Change and the Future of the Far North
The melting of Arctic ice and the opening of Arctic sea lines for possible commercial navigation has
attracted international attention to the territorial North in a way that few other developments have
done. Indeed, such potent images as a polar bear on an ice floe and the shrinking Arctic ice cap
have become familiar symbols of global climate change. The climate debate, well summarized in
Inuit leader Sheila Watt-Cloutier’s demand for respect for the “human right to be cold,” has drawn
global attention to the impact of ecological change on the land and people of the Arctic. Nunavut,
in particular, has attracted widespread attention, with intense global interest in the manner in which
human-induced environmental shifts are affecting the human and natural worlds. Canada has made
minimal commitments to Arctic climate change research, although the Canadian High Arctic Research
Station under development for Cambridge Bay, Nunavut will make a contribution. The Government
of Canada’s limited engagement with climate change is matched by an equally limited effort to identify and anticipate the impact of environmental shifts on the people, economy, and infrastructure
in the Territorial North. It needs to be pointed out, somewhat surprisingly, that the climate change
debate is not overly heated in the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut, in part because of
the very tiny contribution that northerners make to climate change – both the source of the problems
and therefore the search for solutions lie elsewhere – and because of the region’s commitment to oil,
gas, and mineral development. Once again, this is an area where the over-stretched territorial governments have nothing close to the human resources they need to make a concerted effort to study and
ameliorate the impact of ecological change on the region.
30 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
Resource Revenues and the
Continuing Challenges of Devolution
D
evolution has not proceeded without
controversy, particularly in the North
west Territories and especially over reThe northern territories are not going
source revenues. In the Northwest Territories,
to get exceptionally wealthy from the
Aboriginal groups have been quite critical of
both the political processes behind devolution,
new accords.
which some see as interfering with Aboriginal
self-government and political systems, and several of the major elements, particularly relating
to resource revenues. The Government of Canada is not proceeding with stepwise devolution of province-like powers to the territories, but rather
has left substantial tethers attached to the new arrangements. Furthermore, the resource revenue
requirements stop well short of meeting initial territorial expectations and requirements. Indeed, the
financial benefits associated with devolution have been more limited than anticipated.
Devolution is not a simple process, as the central question of natural resource revenues demonstrates. The devolution of natural resource management, for example, does not mean that the Northwest Territories will have authority comparable to that of, say, Alberta or British Columbia. The Yukon
agreement, for example, provided a hard cap of $3 million on mineral revenues, which in 2012 was
raised to $6 million for all natural resources revenue (Government of Yukon 2012). In the case of
the Northwest Territories, revenue sharing of offshore oil and gas remains off the table and there
are restrictions on the total allocation to the territory from other resource revenues. The territorial
formula funding arrangements for the Northwest Territories are to be adjusted based on the returns
from resource royalties (an issue that had previously bitterly divided the Government of Canada and
the Government of Nunavut). As a result of these arrangements – the Yukon demanded and received
an improvement of its arrangements following the Northwest Territories deal – the territories secure
some control over natural resources but without the clear fiscal benefits that would accrue to provinces (Speca 2012).
There is another, more recent example of the limits on devolution in the critical area of resource
development. Bill C-15 (which passed the House of Commons in February 2014) has the unwieldy
name of “An Act to replace the Northwest Territories Act to implement certain provisions of the Northwest Territories Lands and Resources Devolution Agreement and to repeal or make amendments to
the Territorial Lands Act, the Northwest Territories Waters Act, the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act, other Acts and certain orders and regulations”.11 The legislation connects the devolution process to changes in environmental regulations and co-management regimes. The legislation
will, in the view of critics, leave the Government of Canada with significant control over northern
economic development and with a pro-development agenda. While the Government of Canada presented Bill C-15 as a major advance in devolution in the Northwest Territories, many Aboriginal leaders disagreed. The Aboriginal response focuses on the sense that the changes in federal legislation
interfere with their authority under land claim agreements. Nunavut is now negotiating control over
resource development and resource revenues, but any subsequent agreement will have to attend to
the framework outlined in the Northwest Territories and Yukon agreements. Put simply, devolution
in the North is far from complete, with major issues remaining to be resolved and with sharply different views of the way forward.
Devolution has failed to capture the public’s imagination. But the details of devolution are very
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 31
important. As the resource discussions and agreements demonstrate, the devolution accords are significant, and provided additional authority to the territories, but not without limitations. The Yukon,
the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut are not going to get exceptionally wealthy from these new
accords; the Government of Canada remains an active player – both as a recipient of revenues from
resource development and as a key participant (more so than in the provinces) in northern resource
revenues – and devolution, although very important, does not completely reverse the structure of
governance in Canada’s North.
Conclusion: The Unfinished
Revolution in the Unfinished Nation
B
y almost any measure, the governance transformation in the Canadian North has been an im
pressive accomplishment. The coordinated retreat of the federal government and the emer
gence of Aboriginal governments, modern treaties, development corporations, more autonomous territories (to say nothing of a new, Indigenous-dominated jurisdiction in Nunavut), and innovative processes for reviewing economic development, managing wildlife, and respecting Indigenous
culture and knowledge systems would, one by one, be significant achievements for small, economically marginalized, and politically powerless jurisdictions. That all of these were all accomplished, at
least through the early stages of implementation, across a vast landmass, with more than two dozen
distinct cultures and linguistic groups, under great external pressure and in front of a largely sceptical national audience is an accomplishment of politics, cross-cultural partnership, and governance of
the highest order. No one close to the processes thinks that the work is done, that all the problems
have been solved, or that new issues have not emerged through the transitions in government. The
critics of Bill C-15 (2014), which devolved control over natural resources to the Government of the
Northwest Territories, argued the legislation altered the land claims settlements and challenged Aboriginal control over development. The debate demonstrates that devolution is neither simple nor
supported uniformly. Despite this minor furor, important in the North but garnering little attention
in the rest of the country, Canadians would do well to stand back from the political fray of the moment and marvel at one of the most impressive experiments and achievements in governance in
modern memory, an achievement that crossed partisan political boundaries, bridged territorial and
federal governments, engaged with the public at
large and the private sector, and put the territorial North on a course largely of its own choosing
and design. For a more comprehensive view of
these subjects, refer to the appendix for inforModern treaties exist at two levels:
mation on recent scholarship in northern goverthe spirit of the accords and the words
nance and devolution.
of the agreements.
Northerners are not given to introspection and
celebration. One of the most startling elements
of the political and governance revolution in the
Canadian North is that it has passed with very
little self-congratulation in the region. Northerners are pragmatic people, eager to deal with the
challenges arriving on their desks each day. As each of these impressive accomplishments unfolded,
they were quickly incorporated into the status quo and became the new foundation for politics and
administration. Ask a northern politician about the state of northern governance and politics, or
the success of land claims, devolution, and territorial autonomy and you will generally get two re-
32 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
sponses: things are moving along fine, and there are an overwhelming and growing number of things
to do, with few resources to do them. Northern governments seem to live on the knife’s edge at all
times, facing many tasks, numerous deadlines, not enough people with the right skills for the jobs
that require urgent attention, and no chance for politicians and civil servants to catch their breath.
The problems are less acute in the Yukon and more substantial in Nunavut. The Far North operates
in a political cauldron dominated by the “politics of smallness,” where all issues, regardless of how
symbolic or grandiose, are offset by the need to address the pressing concerns of neighbours, friends,
and community members.
The northerners are right once again. There is no time for a long rest, however well deserved. The
governance revolution is far from finished. The modern treaties, for example, exist at two levels: the
spirit of the accords and the words of the agreement. The spirit and intent should drive the North,
for no human creation should be deemed immutable. But unless there is conscious and deliberate
attention to building bridges between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, the promises of the
agreements could easily be lost. One can see this across the North, in poorly executed decentralization processes in Nunavut, the struggles with self-government at the level of individual First Nations,
and the difficulty associated with indigenizing the civil service in the territorial North. This is a multifaceted issue, involving Aboriginal governments, territorial administrations, and the Government of
Canada. To manage the challenges properly requires enormous good will, flexibility, and openness
to continued change and innovation. Should the new political, legal, land claims, and constitutional
regimes become ossified – an all too common
outcome in Western democracies – the promise
of the great northern Canadian governance revolution will have been lost.
Completing Confederation is an
The largest challenge is to convince Canadians as
a whole to care about the North. While the Govessential national duty.
ernment of Canada, and particularly Prime Minister Stephen Harper, maintains an assertive Arctic stance, the rhetorical enthusiasm has not yet
been matched by a change in national attitudes.
The current administration has done a fair bit to move the northern agenda forward, albeit largely
in incremental ways and with a focus on resource development. The sums of money are not small.
Providing a few hundred million for housing here, the promise of a multi-billion dollar icebreaker
there, a small but costly research station at Cambridge Bay, and increased funding for territorial governments is expensive, particularly when costs are presented on a per capita basis. Canadians need
to get past this accounting mentality, and focus instead on the requirements and potential of being a
truly northern nation. The country need only look at Greenland or northern Scandinavia to see what
is possible in the Canadian North, and to be embarrassed by our accomplishments to date.
Completing Confederation is an essential national duty. The governance revolution should properly
be seen as a major step in that direction. The territorial North now has the political and administrative tools, and increasingly the financial resources, to manage its affairs in a constructive and locally relevant manner. The country still has work to do. Weaknesses in northern infrastructure, the
absence of a North-focused innovation system, the lack of a concerted effort to build a sustainable
economy in the region, and an inadequate education system for the broader Canadian North speaks
to a fundamental truth about this country. Our ancestors built a nation from coast to coast. It falls to
this generation of political leaders and Canadians to rise to the challenges and opportunities of the
new North, to create a country from coast to coast to coast, one reconstructed through political and
governance reform in over slightly more than a generation. The foundation has been established for
a substantial transformation. It remains to be seen if the country and the region will capitalize on the
opportunity that they created together.
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 33
About the Authors
Ken Coates is the Canada Research
Chair in Regional Innovation at the
Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of
Public Policy, as well as the Director of
the International Centre for Northern
Governance and Development at the
University of Saskatchewan. In 2013
he was named the Macdonald-Laurier
Institute’s Senior Fellow in Aboriginal
and Northern Canadian Issues.
Greg Poelzer is the Founding Director
and Executive Chair of the University of
Saskatchewan International Centre for
Northern Governance and Development
(ICNGD). He is an Associate Professor
of Political Studies and an Associate
Member of the schools of Public Policy
and Environment and Sustainability
at the university. He is widely known
as a builder and innovator who has
success pulling together Aboriginal
organizations, government, and the private sector to develop
innovative approaches to education, research, and capacity
building.
34 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
Note of Appreciation
The authors are particularly grateful for the research assistance of Mr. Stephen Higham
and the comments and advice provided by Dr. Frances Abele (Carleton University) and
Dr. Graham White (University of Toronto).
References
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. 2010. Backgrounder - Aboriginal Title in Canada’s
Courts. Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada.
———. 2013. Grants for the Political Evolution of the Territories, Particularly as it Pertains to Devolution.
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. Available at http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/138626164
5634/1386261896622.
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. “Paths of Economic and Political Development.” Chapter in
Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald A Wittman, 673–692. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Axworthy, Thomas S., Timo Koivurova, and Waliul Hasanat. 2012. The Arctic Council: Its Place in the Future of
Arctic Governance. Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation. Available at
http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/publications/The percent20Arctic percent20Council_FULL_1.pdf.
Azfar, Omar, Satu Kähkönen, and Patrick Meagher. 2000. “Conditions for Effective Decentralized Governance: A
Synthesis of Research Findings.” Working Paper IRIS Center, University of Maryland, College Park MD.
Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. “Decentralization of Governance and Development.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16
(4): 185–205.
Barnett, Camille Cates, Henry P. Minis, and Jerry Van Sant. 1997. Democratic Decentralization. United States
Agency for International Development.
Berger, Thomas R. 1977. Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline
Inquiry. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
Cameron, Kirk and Alastair Campbell. 2009. “The Devolution of Natural Resources and Nunavut’s Constitutional
Status.” Journal of Canadian Studies 43 (2): 198–219, 263.
Cameron, Kirk and Graham White. 1995. Northern Governments in Transition: Political and Constitutional
Development in the Yukon, Nunavut, and the Western Northwest Territories. Montreal: Institute for Research on
Public Policy.
Canada, Council for Yukon Indians, Government of the Yukon. 1993. Umbrella Final Agreement Between the
Government of Canada, the Council for Yukon Indians and the Government of the Yukon. Available at http://
www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/al_ldc_ccl_fagr_ykn_umb_1318604279080_
eng.pdf.
Canada, Northwest Territories, Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, Northwest Territory Métis Nation, Sahtu Secretariat
Incorporated, Gwich’in Tribal Council, Tlîchô Government. [Canada et al.]. 2013. Northwest Territories Lands
and Resources Devolution Agreement. Available at https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-NTH/
STAGING/texte-text/nwt_1385670345276_eng.pdf.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
Canadian Geographic. 2014. “Historical Maps of Canada.” Canadian Geographic Enterprises. Available at http://
www.canadiangeographic.ca/mapping/historical_maps/1867.asp.
CBC Digital Archives. n.d. “Yukon Party Politics.” CBC Archives. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/
politics/provincial-territorial-politics/territorial-battles-yukon-elections-1978-2006/its-party-time.html
CBC News. November 23, 2004. “Northern Territories ‘Eventually’ To Be Given Provincial Status.” CBC News.
Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/northern-territories-eventually-to-be-given-provincialstatus-1.484399.
Coates, Ken S. 1985. Canada’s Colonies: A History of the Yukon and Northwest Territories. Toronto: James Lorimer
& Company.
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 35
Coates, Ken and William R. Morrison. 1992. The Alaska Highway in World War II: The U.S. Army of Occupation in
Canada’s Northwest. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division.
———. 2005. Land of the Midnight Sun: A History of the Yukon. Carleton Library Series. Montreal: McGill-Queens
University Press.
Coates, Ken S. and Judith Powell. 1989. The Modern North: People, Politics and the Rejection of Colonialism.
Toronto: James Lorimer & Company.
Coates, Ken, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, William Morrison, and Greg Poelzer. 2007. Arctic Front: Defending Canada in
the far North. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre.
Cohen, John M. and Stephen B. Peterson. 1996. “Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Decentralization.”
Development Discussion Paper No. 555. Harvard Institute for International Development, Cambridge.
Duffy, Quinn R. 1988. The Road to Nunavut: The Progress of the Eastern Arctic Inuit Since the Second World War.
Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
Epp, Jake. October 9, 1979. Letter to Commissioner Christensen.
Fesler, James W. 1965. “Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization.” The Journal of Politics 27 (3):
536–566.
Francis, R. Douglas, Richard Jones, and Donald B. Smith. 2005. Journeys: A History of Canada. Scarborough, ON:
Nelson College Indigenous.
Fumoleau, Rene. 2002. As Long as This Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and Treaty 11, 1870–1939. Calgary:
|University of Calgary Press.
Goldenberg, Adam and Tony Penikett. July 24, 2013. “A Reminder to Premiers: Confederation Is Still Not
Complete.” The Globe and Mail. Available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/a-reminder-topremiers-confederation-is-still-not-complete/article13387855/.
Government of Yukon. 2012. “Get the Facts on Resource Revenue Arrangements.” Government of Yukon. Available
at http://www.gov.yk.ca/news/get-thefacts_dta.html.
Grant, Shelagh D. 1994. Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936–1950.
UBC Press.
———. 2010. Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America. Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre.
Hamilton, John D. 1994. Arctic Revolution: Social Change in the Northwest Territories, 1935–1994. Toronto:
Dundurn Press.
Hiskey, Jonathan T. 2006. Principals, Agents, and Decentralized Democratic Development: A Conceptual
Framework for Democratic Local Governance. United States Agency for International Development.
Hodge, R. Anthony, James Stauch, and Ingrid Taggart. 2007. Freedom to Choose: Natural Resource Revenues and
the Future of Northern Communities. Toronto: Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation.
Howard, Alison, Jessica Edge, and Douglas Watt. 2012. Understanding the Value,
Challenges, and Opportunities of Engaging Métis, Inuit, and First Nations Workers. The Conference
Board of Canada.
Inuvialuit Regional Corporation. 2012. 2012 Annual Report. Inuvialuit Regional Corporation. Available at http://
www.irc.inuvialuit.com/publications/pdf/IRC%20Annual%20Report%20+%20Financial%20Report%202012.pdf.
Kaufman, Herbert. 1969. “Administrative Decentralization and Political Power.” Public Administration Review
29 (1): 3–15.
Kitikmeot Inuit Association. n.d. “Welcome to Nunavut.” PolarNet. Available at http://www.polarnet.ca/
polarnet/nunavut.htm.
Lackenbauer, Whitney, P. and Ryan Shackleton. 2013. Arctic Peoples and Security – Compendium of Resources.
Toronto, ON: Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation. Available at
Lajeunesse, Adam. 2013. Negotiating Sovereignty: The Past and Present Failure of ‘Security’ as a Bargaining
Chip. Working Papers on Arctic Security No. 5. Toronto, ON: Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, Walter and
Duncan Gordon Foundation. Available at http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/publications/Working%20
Papers%20on%20Arctic%20Security5%20-%20Negotiating%20Sovereignty_0.pdf.
Légaré, André. 2009. “Nunavut, the Unfulfilled Dream: The Arduous Path Towards Socio-economic Autonomy.”
Northern Review 30: 207–240.
Ling, Justin. January 21, 2014. “NWT Devolution Bill Leaves Ottawa with Power to Hold Development Hostage:
Critics.” iPolitics. Available at http://www.ipolitics.ca/2014/01/21/nwt-devolution-bill-leave-ottawa-with-power-tohold-development-hostage-critics/.
McKitterick, T.E.M. 1939. “The Validity of Territorial and Other Claims in Polar Regions.” Journal of Comparative
Legislation and International Law 21(1): 89–97.
Natural Resources Canada. 2013. “Aboriginal Land Claim Boundaries.” Natural Resources Canada. Available at
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/the-north/boundaries/aboriginal-land-claims/10714.
36 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
Northwest Territories Devolution Act, Available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Legisinfo/BillDetails.
aspx?billId=6349930&Mode=1&View=8&Language=E.
Novosel, Tom. n.d. “Resources.” Northern Research Portal. Available at http://scaa.usask.ca/gallery/northern/
content?pg=ex07-3.
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act. S.C. 1993, c. 29.
Oyugi, Walter O. 2000. “Decentralization for Good Governance and Development: The Unending Debate.” Regional
Development Dialogue 21 (1).
R. v. Drybones [1970] S.C.R. 282.
Robertson, Gordon. 1985. Northern Provinces: A Mistaken Goal. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.
Rodden, Jonathan. 2004. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement.”
Comparative Politics.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]. 2002. “Klondike Gold Rush.” Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Available at
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/hist/ori-deb/debuts10-eng.htm.
Rutten, Bjorn. November, 2010. “Security in Canada’s North: Looking beyond Arctic Sovereignty.” National Security
and Public Safety (report). Ottawa, ON: Centre for the North, Conference Board of Canada. Available at http://
www.centreforthenorth.ca/documents/northernreports/reports-2010/11120_securityincanadasnorth_webpdf.
Shadian, Jessica. 2013. “Rethinking Westphalian Sovereignty: The Inuit Circumpolar Council and the Future of
Arctic Governance.” Working Papers on Arctic Security No. 8. Toronto, ON: Munk-Gordon Arctic Security
Program, Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation.
Smyth, Steven. 1999. “Constitutional Development in the Yukon Territory: Perspectives on the ‘Epp Letter.’”
Arctic 52 (1): 71–79.
Speca, Anthony. 2012. “Nunavut, Greenland, and the Politics of Resource Revenues.” Policy Options.
Statistics Canada. 2013. Population by Year, by Province and Territory (Number). CANSIM Table 051-0001.
Stuart, Richard. 1983. “Duff Pattullo and the Yukon Schools Question of 1937.” The Canadian Historical
Review 64: 25–26.
The Yukon Territory Act. S.C. 1898, (v. I-II), c. 6.
Thomas, Lewis. 1978. The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories 1870–97. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Tlîchô Land Claims and Self-Government Act. S.C. 2005, c. 1.
Tommasi, Mariano and Federico Weinschelbaum. 2007. “Centralization vs. Decentralization: A Principal-Agent
Analysis.” Journal of Public Economic Theory 9 (2): 369–389.
Wallace, Ron and Ryan Dean. 2013. A Circumpolar Convergence: Canada, Russia, the Arctic Council and RAIPON.
Working Papers on Arctic Security No. 7. Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation.
Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Claims Settlement Act. S.C. 1984, c. 24.
White, Graham. 2006. “Cultures in Collision: Traditional Knowledge and Euro-Canadian Governance Processes in
Northern Land-Claim Boards.” Arctic 59 (4): 401–415.
———. 2008. “’Not the Almighty’: Evaluating Aboriginal Influence in Northern Land-Claim Boards.” Arctic 61
(4): 71–85.
Yukon Act. S.C. 2002, c. 7.
Yukon District, Department of Public Works. 1972. Northwest Highway System Handover, 1 April, 1972. S.l.:
Canada Public Works.
Yukon First Nations Land Claims Settlement Act. S.C. 1994, c. 34.
Yukon First Nations Self-Government Act. S.C. 1994, c. 35.
Yukon Native Brotherhood. 1973. Together Today For Our Children Tomorrow. Whitehorse: Yukon Native
Brotherhood.
Zaslow, Morris. 1971. The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870–1914. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
———. 1988. The Northward Expansion of Canada, 1914–1967. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
Zaslow, Morris, ed. 1981. A Century of Canada’s Arctic Islands. Ottawa: The Royal Society of Canada.
Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, April 2014
| 37
Endnotes
1 L
ewis Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the Northwest Territories (1978) tells the story to
the 1960s. For the period after that, see Ken Coates and Judith Powell, The Modern North: People, Politics and
the Rejection of Colonialism (1989).
2 T
his point was made, extremely well, by Frances Abele, with particular emphasis on the role of Aboriginal
peoples and governments, and by Graham White.
3 S
ee, for example, Justin Ling’s January 21, 2014 iPolitics article, “NWT Devolution Bill Leaves Ottawa with
Power to Hold Development Hostage: Critics.”
4 F
or the background on this process, see Quinn Duffy, 1988, The Road to Nunavut. See also: Nunavut Land
Claims Agreement Act. S.C. 1993, c. 29.
5 See also: Yukon First Nations Land Claims Settlement Act. S.C. 1994, c. 34.
6 See also: CBC Digital Archives. “Yukon party politics.”
7 F
or details, see Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2013, Grants for the Political Evolution
of the Territories, Particularly as it Pertains to Devolution.
8 h
ttp://www.irc.inuvialuit.com/publications/pdf/IRC percent20Annual percent20Report percent20+
percent20Financial percent20Report percent202012.pdf
9 D
etails of the agreement are summarized at http://www.polarnet.ca/polarnet/nunavut.htm (Kitikmeot Inuit
Association).
10 S
ee also: Lajeunesse, Adam, 2013; Lackenbauer, Whitney, P. and Shackleton, Ryan, 2013; and Rutten, Bjorn,
2010.
11 S
ee: Northwest Territories Devolution Act, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Legisinfo/BillDetails.
aspx?billId=6349930&Mode=1&View=8&Language=E.
38 |
Work in Progress: Completing the Devolution Revolution in Canada’s North
True North in
Canadian Public Policy
Critically Acclaimed,
Award-Winning Institute
The Macdonald-Laurier Institute fills a gap in
Canada’s democratic infrastructure by focusing
our work on the full range of issues that fall
under Ottawa’s jurisdiction.
• The Macdonald-Laurier Institute fills a gap in
Canada’s democratic infrastructure by focusing
our work on the full range of issues that fall
under Ottawa’s jurisdiction.
•One of the top three new think tanks in
the world according to the University of
Pennsylvania.
•Cited by five present and former Canadian Prime
Ministers, as well as by David Cameron, the
British Prime Minister.
•First book, The Canadian Century: Moving out
of America’s Shadow, won the Sir Antony Fisher
International Memorial Award in 2011.
•
Hill Times says Brian Lee Crowley is one of the
100 most influential people in Ottawa.
•The Wall Street Journal, the Economist, the
Globe and Mail, the National Post and many
other leading national and international
publications have quoted the Institute’s work.
Ideas Change the World
Independent and non-partisan, the
Macdonald-Laurier Institute is increasingly
recognized as the thought leader on national
issues in Canada, prodding governments,
opinion leaders and the general public to
accept nothing but the very best public policy
solutions for the challenges Canada faces.
Where You’ve Seen Us
“The study by Brian Lee Crowley and Ken Coates is a
‘home run’. The analysis by Douglas Bland will make many
uncomfortable but it is a wake up call that must be read.”
FORMER CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PAUL MARTIN
ON MLI’S PROJECT ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AND THE
NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMY.
For more information visit: www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca
About the Macdonald-Laurier Institute
What Do We Do?
When you change how people think, you change
what they want and how they act. That is why thought
leadership is essential in every field. At MLI, we strip away
the complexity that makes policy issues unintelligible
and present them in a way that leads to action, to better
quality policy decisions, to more effective government,
and to a more focused pursuit of the national interest of
all Canadians. MLI is the only non-partisan, independent
national public policy think tank based in Ottawa that
focuses on the full range of issues that fall under the
jurisdiction of the federal government.
What Is in a Name?
The Macdonald-Laurier Institute exists not merely to
burnish the splendid legacy of two towering figures
in Canadian history – Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir
Wilfrid Laurier – but to renew that legacy. A Tory and
a Grit, an English speaker and a French speaker – these
two men represent the very best of Canada’s fine political
tradition. As prime minister, each championed the values
that led to Canada assuming her place as one of the
world’s leading democracies.
We will continue to vigorously uphold these values,
the cornerstones of our nation.
Our Issues
The Institute undertakes an
impressive programme of
thought leadership on public
policy. Some of the issues we
have tackled recently include:
•Aboriginal people and the
management of our natural
resources;
•Getting the most out of our
petroleum resources;
•Ensuring students have the
skills employers need;
•Controlling government debt
at all levels;
•The vulnerability of Canada’s
critical infrastructure;
Working for a Better Canada
Good policy doesn’t just happen; it requires good
ideas, hard work, and being in the right place
at the right time. In other words, it requires MLI.
We pride ourselves on independence, and accept no
funding from the government for our research. If you
value our work and if you believe in the possibility
of a better Canada, consider making a tax-deductible
donation. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is a
registered charity.
•Ottawa’s regulation of foreign
investment; and
•How to fix Canadian health
care.
For more information visit: www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca
Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publications
Winner of the
Sir Antony Fisher
International Memorial
Award BEST THINK
TANK BOOK IN 2011, as
awarded by the Atlas
Economic Research
Foundation.
Do you want to be first to hear
about new policy initiatives? Get the
inside scoop on upcoming events?
Visit our website
www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca and
sign up for our newsletter.
The Canadian Century
By Brian Lee Crowley,
Jason Clemens, and Niels Veldhuis
RESEARCH PAPERS
1
3
Aboriginal
Canada and the
Natural Resource
Economy Series
Aboriginal
Canada and the
Natural Resource
Economy Series
A Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication
ThE WAy ouT
NEw
bEgiNNiNgS
Sustaining the
Crude Economy
New thinking about Aboriginal engagement and
energy infrastructure to the West Coast
BRIAN LEE CROWLEY AND KEN COATES
Future prospects for Canada’s global energy competitiveness
Credit Where It’s Due
By Laura Dawson and Stefania Bartucci
How payment cards benefit Canadian merchants
and consumers, and how regulation can harm them
MAY 2013
How Canada’s Natural Resource Wealth Could
Re-shape Relations with Aboriginal People
OCTOBER 2012
KeN CoAteS
ian lee, geoffrey a. manne, Julian morris, and Todd J. Zywicki
MAY 2013
45
40
35
OCTOBER 2013
30
25
20
15
10
5
A MACDONALD-LAURIER INSTITUTE PUBLICATION
0
A MACDoNALD-LAURieR iNStitUte PUBLiCAtioN
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
a macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication
Laura Dawson and Stefania Bartucci – October 2012
MLI#3NorthernGateway05-13PressReady.indd 1
New Beginnings
Ken Coates and Brian Lee
Crowley
MLI#1NewBeginnings04-13PressReady.indd 1
13-04-29 4:53 PM
The Way Out
Brian Lee Crowley and
Ken Coates
MEDICARE’S
MID-LIFE CRISIS
Sustaining the Crude
Economy
Laura Dawson and
Stefania Bartucci
MLISustainingTheCrudeEconomy10-12Print.indd 1
A European Flavour For Medicare
MLIPaymentCardRegulationPressReady10-13.indd 1
Beyond Scandal and Patronage
Debunking the Myths
Learning from experiments in Switzerland and Sweden
Mattias Lundbäck
JANUARY 2013
Credit Where It’s Due
Ian Lee, Geoff Rey A. Manne,
Julian Morris, and
Todd J. Zywicki
2
3
Janice MacKinnon
12-10-22 12:38 PM
MEDICARE’S
MID-LIFE CRISIS
MEDICARE’S
MID-LIFE CRISIS
Health Care Reform From
the Cradle of Medicare
1
13-05-30 9:32 AM
A Broader Perspective of the Canada Health Act
A RATIONALE AND STRATEGY FOR SERIOUS SENATE REFORM
Michael Watts
Brian Lee Crowley
SEPTEMBER 2013
NOvEMBER 2013
A Macdonald-Laurier Institute Series
PL
US
:
A Macdonald-Laurier Institute Series
Pa
re ul
fo Co
rm r
sy ed riga
ste B n
on m, rita on
a in h
ap how nd ’s ow
pr C O so th
oa an sca cia e
ch ad r liz Bla
us a Hje ed ir
er sh rtq m go
fe ou vis ed ver
es ld t ica n
.
l me
nt
A Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication
NOVEMBER 2013
MLIHealthCareReform01-13-PressReady.indd 1
13-02-01 11:47 AM
Health Care Reform From
the Cradle of Medicare
Janice MacKinnon
MLI_CanadaVsSwedenHealthCareSeries3-10-13.indd 1
A Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication
13-11-21 10:19 PM
A European Flavour For
Medicare
Mattias Lundbäck
MLICanadasHealthcareCrisisSeries2-V1.indd 1
13-09-20 10:26 AM
Debunking the Myths
Michael Watts
Beyond Scandal and
Patronage
Brian Lee Crowley
Ian Lee, Geoffrey A. Manne, Julian Morris, and Todd J. Zywicki | October 2013
For more information visit: www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca
13-10-21 9:30 AM
What people are saying
about the MacdonaldLaurier Institute
True North in Canadian Public Policy
CONTACT US: Macdonald-Laurier Institute
8 York Street, Suite 200
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1N 5S6
TELEPHONE: (613) 482-8327
WEBSITE: CONNECT
WITH US:
www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca
Scan this QR code to
get your copy of our
iphone app or to visit
our mobile website
@MLInstitute
www.facebook.com/
MacdonaldLaurierInstitute
www.youtube.com/
MLInstitute
I commend Brian Crowley and the
team at MLI for your laudable work as
one of the leading policy think tanks
in our nation’s capital. The Institute
has distinguished itself as a thoughtful,
empirically-based and non-partisan
contributor to our national public
discourse.
PRIME MINISTER STEPHEN HARPER
As the author Brian Lee Crowley has
set out, there is a strong argument that
the 21st Century could well be the Canadian Century.
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER DAVID CAMERON
In the global think tank world, MLI
has emerged quite suddenly as the
“disruptive” innovator, achieving a
well-deserved profile in mere months
that most of the established players in
the field can only envy. In a medium
where timely, relevant, and provocative commentary defines value, MLI
has already set the bar for think tanks
in Canada.
PETER NICHOLSON, FORMER SENIOR POLICY
ADVISOR TO PRIME MINISTER PAUL MARTIN
I saw your paper on Senate reform
[Beyond Scandal and Patronage] and
liked it very much. It was a remarkable and coherent insight – so lacking
in this partisan and anger-driven,
data-free, ahistorical debate – and
very welcome.
SENATOR HUGH SEGAL, NOVEMBER 25, 2013
Very much enjoyed your presentation
this morning. It was first-rate and an
excellent way of presenting the options
which Canada faces during this period
of “choice”... Best regards and keep up
the good work.
PRESTON MANNING, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
MANNING CENTRE FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY
42Oldest Profession or Oldest Oppression?