InsunaNCE CoNsuMER CouNSEl's CoruprN
Tnr¿ Co¡qsrrT'UTIONAL Arr,rCr< ON MONTAn¡l's ANrr-SteCKING STATU'I"I]
ßY PROIII:.çsOR GREG MUNIIO
\)Tithout doubt, the most signiFrcant and frustrating obstruction to
securing adequate insurance compensation for consumers right now is the
stahrtory prohibition against "stacking" of auto insurance coverâgcs.
Legislative amendments to MCÂ
Section 33-23-203 in 1.997 wete intendecl to absolutely block any stacking of insurance benefits in motor
vehicle liability policies. Because the
amendments so severely cut potential
limits of recovery for auto accident
victims, plainuffs' counsel have been
pressing arguments in state district
courts seeking to avoid the anti-stacking statute's effect ot to attack the
statìrte itself. In at lcast Lwo instances,
stacking cases were settled aftet decision by district judges and before
appeal.
In thc Summer 1999 issue of
'fria/ Trend¡,I wrote an article en"'Stacking" in Montana in
1999,'that traced the history of the
titled,
stacking issue in Montana and discussed the legal import of the 1997
amendments. In the Spting 2002
issue,
in a column entitled, 'The
Case Against Montana's AntiStacking Statute,'I collected and
featured a number of atguments that
were being pressed atound the state
in favor of stacking and challenging
the anti-stacking statute.
Fortuitously, the stacking issue
has now arived at the Montana Supreme Court in the case of lførdy u.
Prcges síue Sþæíahy Inmrmce
Comp øny. MTLA member l(ent
Duckworth of Ronan tepresents Ned
Hardy who suffered a broken neck iu
auto accident on December 26,2000.
Hardy v/as a passenger in a car dtiven
by his wrfe, which was struck by a
vehicle negligently ddven by Gaty
Marr. Hardy settled with Matr's liabil-
Pecn 26
íty canier for its $50,000 liability limit
2) Given that the Montana
$50,000 limits of Uuderinsured Motörist covetage on each of his three
vehicles under the policy and for the
separate Medical Pay coverage limits
on each. Hardy had paid separate
premiums for each vehicle ancl fot
each coverage.
Progtessive refused to stack the
coverages for the three vehicles and
also asserted that no UIM coverage
was available based on its testtictive
definition of an "underinsured mo-
torist" and on an offset provision
that, together with the deFtnition,
enttely defeated l{ardy's UIM covetage. Progressive asserted that anti-
stacking provisions of Ptogressive's
policy and the Montana anti-stacking
statute, MC,A. Section 33-23-203,
prohibited the stacking of the cover-
With regzrd to the UIM covetage, Progtessive's policy restrictively
requites that an "underinsured motorist" have limits of liability less
than the limits of the insured's UIM
coverâge (as opposed to less than the
limits of the UIM insured's damages).
Finall¡ the pohcy provided that any
liability limits tecoveted be subtracted
from any UIM coverage available
thereby making it certain that the
insured could never recover the limits
of UIM shown on the declarations
ages.
page.
I(ent Duckworth sued Progressive in the Fedetal Disttict Court in
Missoula and secured Judge Molloy's
cettiltcation of the followrng thtee
questions to the Montana SuPreme
Coutt:
1) Is the offset provision in
Ptogtessive's policy void in
Montana as against pubhc
policy?
Su-
preme Court has determined
that underinsutalrce coverage
is petsonal and pottable, is it
and ther-r pressed claims against his
own insurcr, Progressive, fot the
against public policy in Montanâ to chargc separate prcmi-
ums for underinsurance for
sepârate vehicles on the same
policy if insureds can only
collect once on that policy?
3) Are insurance pol-icies such as
lhe one in question hete
against public pohcy in Montana when they include ptovisions that defcat coverage for
which the insurer has received
valuable considetat-ion?
I(ent f)uckworth invited MTLA
to join in the effort and, because of
the importance of thc questions
involved, the MTLA -A,micus Committee successfully periuoned the
court to enter the case. I(ent wrote â
fine brief arguing the fallacy in allow-
ing a statute conttolling stacking of
motor vehicle coverâges to apply to
personal and portable covetages lìke
UIM and Med Pay. He also attacked
the "illusory" coverage caused by the
IJIM dehnition and offset ptovisions.
MTLA member Randy l3ishop
I endeavored to add atguments
different from l{ent's in the amicus
and
brief. Hence, Randy researched and
wrote the ârgument on stacking that
challenges the vahdrty of the antistacking statute under four provisions
of the Montana Consdrution, and I
wrote the ârguments on the UIM
def,rnition and offset arguments. \We
edited each other's work and honed
the arguments until we convinced
ourselves of theit rmpeccable logrc
and righteousness. Because of the
importance of Randy's constirutional
stacking arguments, they are reprinted
Tnr¡r TnrNos - Atm.mN
2OOz
here in fuil. in next qltârter's column,
I will discuss the issue of the validrty
of Ptogtessive's restrictive definition
of UIM and its offset, which tesult in
"illusoty" coverage. Here then ate the
arguments submitted by amicus
MTL^ challenging the constitutionality of the anti-stacking statute:
hrtnoúrction
Section 33-23-203 MCÂ violates
separation of powets, denies equal
protection, and arbitraitly infringes
upon inalienable rights.
For 30 years, this court has consistently articulated Montana's public
policy prohibiting insurers from placing provisions in insurance policies
that defeat coverage for v¡hich the
insurer has teceived valtrable consideradon. Ruckdascltela. Støte Fønn
Mutual Automohile htsurance Ca
(L997), 285 Mont. 395, 398, 948 P.zd
7 00,7 02. In Dakotø Fìre Insurønce ComÍt øny a. Oíe, 1.998 Ml
Tnrar Tnn¡qos - AurulrN 2OOz
288,nn34 &.35,291' Mont. 486, 499500, 968 P.zd 11261134-35, this
court labored to give effect to the
1991 vetsion of Section 33-23-203. It
was able to do so because crucial
omissions were found within the
tatutoty language. Foteshadovring
the issue hete, this coutt differentiated the 1991 statute from the one
now under consideration, obsetving,
"[u]nlike the 1997 version of the
stâtute, the 1991 vetsion applicable
s
here makes no reference to the num-
ber
of premiums paid." Id.
Now, this court is directlY confronted with legislativc action undoubtedly intended, "as a maÍter of
public polic¡ to pteclude stacking of
uninsured [and underinsured] motorist coverages despite the insured
having paid separate premiums fot
such coverages..! Cf. Oíe, ruPra.The
United States District Court seeks
this court's opinion, upon first impressionl, of the apparent conflict
l¡etween three decade's judicial expression of public policy which requires stacking, and Section
33-23-203 (1.997), which forbids it.
Amicus curiae MILÂ submits
that the reason this coutt has so consistently idenuhed and powetfully
endorsed Montana public policy is
that its roots are deeply rmbedded in
multiple, fundamental constitutional
guarantees and ptotections, each of
which is infringed by Section 33-23203,The off,tce of the Attotney
Genetal has been advised of the
constitutional inhrmity of Section
33-23-203 and of the present proceedings. Its 'Notice
of Intent Not to
Participate'is attached as an Appendix to this brief.
The certified questions raise, but
do not drrectly refer to, these statutory and constitutional issues,
Whether the questions certified to
this court are consideted broadly as
they have been phrased or reformu-
P¡rcn27
488,493,662P.zd 591, 594, thts
court, citing I ¿gi¡latiue Conlrol Ouer
latecl as permittecl by lìulc 44(d),
M.R.App.P., each certifi ed questior-r
must ultimately, and unequivocall¡ be
answered "yes." But, implicit withirr
the certifred questions is a thteshold
issue. Namel¡ is the legislature's
"dictation" of a particular interptetathe language of insurauce
agteements an impennissil¡le invasion
of the power of "determinatio0,"
constitutionally tesetved to the iudiciary? MTLA respectfully submits
tion
of
Jadicial llule-Making A Probhm in
Con¡litaÍional Reui¡ion (/ 958), 107
U.Pa.L.I{ev. 1, 31.-32, adopted the
view that,
"[a]ny stafute which lnoves so
far into this tcalm of judicial
affairs as to dictate to a judgc
how he shail judge or how he
shall comport himself in iudging or which seeks to surround
the act of ludging with hampedng conditions clearlY offends the constitutional
scheme of the sePatation of
powets and will be held in-
that, once again, the unfortunate
ânsv/ef is "yes."
Argument of Amicus Curia MTIÁ'
I.
Section33-23-2O3MC.4.is
Constitutionally Invalid
valid."
'fhis court has consistently halted
1. Section 33-23-203 MC,{' violates separatìon of powers.
improper legislative and executive
a. Judicial Power Is Constitutionally Vested lJxclusivelY In
incursions into the realm of iudicial
pov/er. Judrcial Pou/er cannot be
taken away by legislarive actfoî."
State ex rel. ßennett û. Bonner
(1950), 123 Mont. 414, 429, 214 P.zd
The Judiciary.
'fhe independence of the iudiciaty is absolute. Montanø Confiilaîion,
Article III, Section /; Article WI, J'ection
/ (1 972). Stated succinctly, "the legislative branch makes the laws, the
executive btanch carries out the laws,
and the judicial branch construes and
interprets the laws." Medln MYers
Reu ocøble Tru s t a. Yelknu storre
county,
2002
l/IT
201.
n2I, 2002 WL
747,755. The mannet in which cases
shall be decided is solely fot the iudicial btanch of government. Coa'te ù.
Ombolt (19S3),203 Mont. 488,492,
662 P.zd 591, 593. See also If ørl.en a.
City of lfelenø(1'984),208 Mont.
45, 49, 676 P.zd 191,793 and
Ingrøb øm a. Cb ømPion lúema''
tì.onøl (1990), 243 Mont. 42,48-49,
793 P.2d 769,772-73.
31.012788.
The hallmatk of iudicial Power
the power to decide and enter iudgments carrying judicial determina-
b. Judicial Power Is Unconst-itutionally,{.bridgcd lìY Sccuon 33-
is
into effect. Seubert a. Seubert,
2000 MT 24L,301. Mont. 382,391,
13 P.3d 365,370-7'1. The free exercise of discretion, reasoning, and
judgment, without obedience to the
authoriry of the executive or legisla-
23-203.
rions
tive branches of government, is the
chatacteristic that diffcrentiates an
independent judiciary ftom a body
that is metely ministedal. See
Cørlsona. Cíty of Bozem.an,2007
r$T 46,1fr[27-29,20 P.3d 792,-/91. rn
Coøte u. Omb olt (1,9 83), 203 Mont.
Pecn 28
Interpteting insurance contracts
is a question
cowt.
S
ee
of
Dagel
law, reserved
to the
a. F a'rmers
f nsur-
ønce Clnou? ofComPømes (1995),
273 Mont. 402, 405,903 P.zd 1'359,
1361. Indeed, it is the legislative
btanch that has declared that a court
must decide the construcdon of "statutes and other writings." See Section
26
- 1.
-20 7, MC A and Wø d's t'tt
St øt e
ort b u.
ol M ont a.n ø (19 9 6), 27 5
lMofi. 287,
296,91'1, P.zd 1'1'65, 11'70.
Despite this constjtutioual and
stâtutory norfiì, Section 33-23-203
cleclares that "th.e limits of iusutancc
covetâge avallal¡le under each patt
of tlre policy mu¡t be deterrnined as
'l'he
follon,¡.. . " (cmphasis adcled).
legislature then goes on to dictate the
precise mânner bY which coverage
provisions must be intetpreted and
applied. See Section 33-23-203 (a) (b)
and (c) MCA. In this manner, Section
33-23-203 provides a "cookbook" for
insurcts intcnt upotr prcvcnting
insureds ftom obtaining the bencf,it
of their UIM batgain. What is temarkable is that this enactment commands this court, and all Montana
courts, to foliow its "recipe" to the
ietter. Making mâtters still worse, the
legislatute demonstrated its wilhngness to grant the insurance industry
power to alter the interpretive mandate, while steadfastly denying it to
the courts, by authorizing insurers to
"speciltcally ptovide othetwise."
Section 33-23-203 (1) MC,A..
Section 33-23-203's directive to
interpret legal instruments in a predetermined mapner exceeds the powers
of the legislature and violates our
Constitution's mandate that, "No
person or persons charged wrth the
exercise of power propedy belonging
to onc branch shall exercise anY
power propedy belonging to either of
the others..." Monlana Con$itation,
Axicle III, Section I (/972).
2. Section
33-23-203 MCA in-
fringes upon inalienable rights
included within our Declâration
of Rights, MonÍana Constituîion,
Artick
n (/ 972).
a.
Section 33-23-203 abddges
fundamental dghts to Pursue
life's necessities and Protect
pfopefty.
The indrvidual's right to Pursue
life's necessities is a fundamental
right encompassing all activities and
opportunities necessâty to the enioy-
Tru¡r Tnnnos - Atm¡l.N 2OOz
ment of this right. Montana Conslittt-
II, .SecÍirtn 3 (1972);
W'adswortlr, vpra,275 Mont. at 299,
rion, Article
911P.zd at
1'1'72.
Thus, the opPortu-
nity ¡¡¡ pursue employment is a fundamental right because earnings and
earning capacíty ". . . provide income
for the tnost basic of üfe's necessities,
such as food, clothing, and shclter. . .,
[and] for rnan¡ if not
912,30 i\..L.Iì.4th 1ó5.
It is uuder-
written, advertised, and sold to securc
lifc's csscnrials: to protect carnings
and eatning capaciry, to access medical and institutional care, and to provide food, shelter, clothing, and
tetirement in the event of catasttophic iniury. Às if these ttuths had
been momentarily forgotten, the 1997
lege and
immunit¡ however, which
the 1997 f,egislatr"rre granted irrevocably t<-r the itrsurance inclustry when
it amended Section 33-23-203 MCA'
Section 33-23-203 provides irrevocable exemption from liability for
contrâctì.ral obligations fot which full
value h¿s been demauded, delivered,
and accepted in the form
ums.
and rnedical insutance,
retirement, and day care.
-lhese rights are
Id.
fundamental because
they are of the nalure
that "without which
other cons titutionally
guaranteed rights would have little
meaning."
Møtter of C.H. (1'984),210
Mont. 784,201, 683 P.zd 931',940,
Inextricably linked with the right to
puïsue life's necessities,
of
t
(1972).
Insurance is
the nethod
of protect-
ing one's property and ability to Putsue life's necessities. Modetn society
recognizes that a lifeume's pursuit of
life's necessities can be wiped out in
an instant by the negligence of another and thât remedies are meaningless absent the means to obtain
compensation. Underinsured and
uninsured motorist insurance is the
sole means
of protecting against
the
irresponsible driver who opts to cüty
nothing more than minimum automobile liability insurance covetage
limits or none at all. Like life insurance,
UIM and UM insurance is Per-
sonal and portable protection.
knnett
u. State
Førrn Mutual Au-
tomobùle Insuraîrce Co. (1993), 267
Mont. 38ó, 389, 862 P.zd 1,1.46, L148
andJ ac ob s on a. I mþIement De ølers MutuøI btsurøtrce Co. (I9 82),
196 Mont. 542,548, ó40 P.2d 908,
Pncn 3O
coverâge, which
it
kncw thc industry had
no intention to Provide.
Article II, Section 31,
bats such legislation.
amendments to Section 33-23-203
delegated to the insutance industty
the unbtidled Power to Prevent
insureds from enjoying the benefits
of their personal insutance bargain'
course, is
the inalienable right to Protect property. Montana Constilation, Arlicle II,
Section
effectively gtanted
insurers liccnse to accept premiums for
petsonal and portable
undetinsuted motorist
Special legislative priv¡lege to charge
moneY for a Product with the full
knowledge that it need not be delivered
is not generally available to those
who do business ¡n Montana'
essentials of modetn
life, including health
Premi-
merìts, the legislature
most,...theitonlY
means to secute othet
of
With these enact-
b. Privileges and immunities.
The legislature is prohibited from
making any irrevocable grant of
special privileges, franchises, or immuniúes. Mortlana Conúilution, Artiile
j1 . A'ftanchise'is in the
nature of a "special ptivilege conferred by the government on an individual which does not belong to the
II,
|'ection
citizens generally." Glodt a. City of
Mis s ouln' (1 948), 1 21 Mont. 178,
783,1.90 P.zd 545,548. An immunitY
is a special exemption from "duties
which the law genetally requires other
citizens to petfotm." Black| I-a'u
Diclionan (revised 4th ed. 1968), at p'
885.
Law requLes citizens and cotPorations to petform their contracts.
Special legrslative privilege to chatge
money for a product with the full
knowledge that it need not be delivered is not generally available to
those who do business in Montana. It
is ptecisely this sort of special pdvi-
3. The legislature's abridgement
of these inalienable dghts works
a denial of equal Protection.
Both the Montan¿ and United
States constitutions state that, "[n]o
person shall l¡e denied the equal protection of the la-çts." Montanø Constitation, Article II, Section 4. "The pdncipal
purpose of the Equal Ptotection
Clause is to cnsure that citizens arc
not the subject of arbiuary and drs-
criminate state action."
Godfrey
a.
Montønø Stete Fûsb ønd' Gøtne
Commíssion (I9BI), 193 Mont
304, 306, 63r' P.zd 1,265,
Breuter ü. Ski-LùJfr,
1.267 ;
Inc.
(1988),
234 Monr. I09, 7 62 P.2d 226- "The
equal protection clause guarântees
that sirnilar individuals will be dealt
with in a similar manner bY the gov-
ernment." Butte Community
(Jní.on a. Leutis (1986), 219 Mont.
426,430,712P.zd 1309, 1311. Equal
protection challenges to legislation are
teviewed under one of three diffetent levels
of
scrutinY.
Møtter of
S.L,M. (1997),287 Mont. 23, 32,951'
P.}d1365,1371. Where,
as here, the
legislation in question infringes upon
rights identìfied as fundamental by
Tnrer Tnn¡ns
Aunrux
2OOz
unal¡le to access the itlsurance protection rvhich they purchased flor them-
express inclusion in t\'tticlc II, this
court cmploys thc tnost strirrgctit
standat<J, strict scrutiny' Strict sctutiny
requires the showing oÊ a compelling
staìe interest underþing the discrimr-
selves.
Asirt Døais, examPles make the
,\ssume that A ancl lJ
ooint:
I^
each
oI
cornbined
$300,000
p.r..h^..
^Ufr¡/Ufftf
coverâge. llach then suffers similar severe, totaily chsabling
iniuries whilc ridrng as a passcnger in
a car owned bY another' The onlY
Wadsu;ortlt, saPra
(Jnlon Pøcifíc
an¡J Døais a.
(1991),282 Mont'
Co.
Røitroød
nâtory action.
233, 241, 937 P.zd 27, 3r.
It wouid be futile to attemPt to
that, "covetage ftom one policy' ' '
rnay [not] be added to the coverage
of artother," icssens the discrimiua-
Section 33-23-203 in
*^y. See Section 33-23-203(3)
^ny
MCÂ. Stated bluntl¡ the reasontng
toty impact
of
that undetlies the 1997 amendments
to Scction 33-23-203 is inexplicable
in logic, law, or faitness'
ihe underlYing justihcauon for
demonstrate a comPelling
such an enactment
may reside in insur-
state interest that iustiltes
ance industry con-
discriminatotY imPacts
of
the type mandated bY
Scction 33-23-203.Indeed, the stâtute cannot
even pass muster under
rational basis analYsis'
cerns such as this do
not fusufY disPatate
üeâtment. This court
recognizes that dis-
Ç
Døais, rupra.In Døaùs,
this court sttuck down
S ection 25 -2- 122(2) MCA,
which purPorted to restrlct venue
options available to victims of nonresident corPorations . Dauís, 282
Mont. 243-45,931 P.zd at 32-34'
^t
H enrY u. Sta'te ComPens øtion Insurørrce Fund',1999}.' fJ 126,
294 Mont. 448, 458-59,982P'2d 456,
464 (no tattonal basis fot treating
See also
workers iniuted over ofìe work shift
differently ftom workers iniured over
two u¡ork shifts).
Reasoning identical to that aPplied by this court ín Daals is aproin Døaús,the
þo., b"."rrs. here, as
of the enactrmpact
discriminatory
ment is stunning. Paragraph (1)(a) of
Section 33-23-203 requires this court
to "determine" that the Lmits specihed for the coverage available under
the policy insudng the motor vehicle
in-rolved in the accident constilute the
limrt of available coverage' If no
such policY exists, however, Patagraph (1)þ) of Section 33-23-203
Lundut.t that the courts "determine"
that the "highest hmits of coverage"
constitute the "insutance coverages
available." Thus, based soleiY uPon
whethet the "vehicle involved in the
accident" had covetage, an iniured
person or familY maY be stuck with
ih. lo* Lmits of that vehicle and
]o¡¡:ç 42
cefns ovef the cost
of clairns, but con-
The consumer who insures more
than one automobile' of course'
gets shortchan Ted'
crimination alwaYs
results in lower costs
is
difference is that the car in which A
riding carties $25,000 UIM limits'
whilJthe car catryingB is uninsured'
Putsuant to the legislaLtve rnandate
of Section 33-23-203(1)(a) and (b)'
Montana's courts ate directed to detetmine that A. is Precluded frorn
obtaining the $300,000 benefit of the
coverage Purchased, v¡hile B is not'
Moreover, Pursuant to Section
33-23-203(1)(c), this court is ordered
by the legislature to disregard the
insured's fundamental rights discussed above and discriminate in
those who Purchase UM/
UIM coverage for one vehicle' The
stâtute declares that this sav\'T consumer gets the full benefit of the
is Paicl, one
batgain' One
favor
of
Premium
coverage is obtained' The consumer
who insures more than one automobile, of course, gets shortchanged'
Multiple premiums are paid, but still'
just one coverâge is obtained'
l)iscrimination such as this is
indistinguishable ftom the "one work
shift" versus "two work shifts" dtstinction declared irtaúonal in Henry
and the limited venue resttictions
struck down in Døuùs' '\nd, regardconless of legislative notions to the
trâry, no âmount of written not-icc
and has repeatedly disallowed drscrimination merelY for the sake of
"flrscal health." Henr!, saþra,294
Mont. at 459, 982 P'2d at 464;
Heísler
a. Hùnes
Motor
Co' (1997)'
282Wont. 210,283,937 P'zd 45' 52'
Here, as n Helsler and IIentY,
is no rational teason - let alone the
thete
to
tequired compelling state interest people
situated
why simrlatly
"*pl"in be tteated differentþ so as to
shãuld
depdve one, but not the other, of
either their insurance premlums or
the benefits of thelr personal insurânce coverage Putchased, Paid
and accePted bY the insutet'
fot
4. The legislailre's abridgement
of these inalienable rights violates substanúve due Process'
"No Petson shall be denied of
life, liberry or property without due
of law:"
Montanø Con¡titølion'
(1972)"fhis guar17
Articte II, Section
antee of due Process not onlY imposes standatds of fairness in
process
Ptocedures, but
contains a substantive component'
NewaíIleú- Sta'te DePt' of FømílY
Seruíce s (1gg 4), 267 Mont' 237, 249'
883 P.2d 793, 800' Substantive due
iolr.rrr*"n,al
also
Truer Tnr¡qos - Atmrux 2OOz
legislative grant of special privilege?
Even assuming one finds a waY
to conclude that increased proht for
insutets is a permissible objective, is
process ptevents the state from using
its power to take unreason¿ble, arbitt^ty, or capricious action. 'i--o satisfy
substantive due process concefns, "a
stâtute enacted by the legislatute must
be reasonably telated to a permissible
Iegislative objective."
Plumb
delegation of the power to seil illusory insutance coverâge reasonable or
arÍ>ittary?'Ib ask these questions is to
answer them. Suff,rce it to sa¡ it is
not easy to r¡tionaltze a legislative
strâtegy that authorizes insurers to
charge for covetage they do not intend to ptovide, particulatlY when
one commences the inqurry with the
understanding that insutance conúacts have long been identihed as
u.
Fourtb Judícíøl Dístríc't (1'99 6), 27 9
Mont. 363,372,927 P.2d 1'0L1', 1'01'6,
citing Neutuúlle,8B3 P.2d at 803.
A,t a minimum, it is difficult to
isolate the "permissible legislauve
objective" that underlies legislatron
authorizing the insutance industry to
sell illusoty coverage. If lower insurânce cost for consumers is the goal,
then hov¡ can one argue that legislation that authorizes insuters to charge
multrple premiums fot a single coverage be seen as "reasonably related" to
that end? If, instead, rve assume that
Transamerícø
contracts of adhesion.
Insurance C-omþ øtìY u. Ru/e
(1983), 202Mont. 173,181, 656 P.zd
820, 825 and FitzgerøId u, Aetnø
Insurance ComP ønY (I97 8), 17 6
Mont. 186, 1.91,577 P.zd 370,373.
Since it goes without saYing that
to charge premium undet a contrâct
of adhesion with no intention of
providing coverage is unconscio-
incteased insurance industry profit is
the goal, then the question becomes,
is this a proper legislative obiecrive in
the first instance ot is it instead a
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tIt
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I
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tir*
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actions mote atbitrar¡ inexplicable,
and unreasonable than this are rately
seen. o
1. Neither public policy considerations
nor the validity of Section 33-23-203
(1 997) were considered in Chrístensen
o. MountøttnVest Fa'rm Butectu
Ins urønce ComP anY, 2000 MT 378,
22P.3d 624, or could have been. Therc,
the plaintiff sought to stack liability
coverâges, not personal and portable
UM/UIM
coverages. None
of
the
public policy and constitutional conccrns ccntral to thc prcsent inquiry
were implicated in Cl¡rístens en. The
questions certrfìed by the Flonorable
l)onald W Molloy present these issues
for consideration against the backdrop
of Section 33-23-203 (1997), for the
first time.
1tã
II
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nable, one is left with the starl< tealiz¡tion that the legislative btanch has
granted the insutance industry carte
l¡lanc to sell a ptoduct that, in anY
other circumstânce, would be void
and wholly unenforceable. Legislative
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