Naval
Postgraduate
School
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
SEA-4
Expeditionary Warfare Force Protection
T
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04 December 03
Outline
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Introduction
Methodology
Problem Definition
Design & Analysis
Modeling
Conclusion
2
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Introduction
Methodology
Problem Definition
LCDR Higgs
Design & Analysis
Modeling
Conclusion
3
SEA-4 Team
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 LCDR Ron Higgs, USN, 1510
 LCDR Greg Parkins, USN, 1130
 LCDR Eric Higgins, USN, 1510
 LT Chris Wells, USN, 1110
 LT Vince Tionquiao, USN, 1600
4
What We Did
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering








Used a systems engineering approach to solve a complex
multidisciplinary problem
Took a big picture, overarching look at protecting the Sea Base
Analyzed future threats to the Sea Base
Performed deterministic analysis of sensor and weapon systems
Generated alternative conceptual designs intended to protect the
Sea Base
Used modeling and simulation to assess the performance of the
alternative systems
Identified the most effective system of systems conceptual
solution to provide force protection for the Sea Base
Provided a foundation of data, tools, and methodologies for more
detailed studies
5
Disclaimer
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 This study was an academic exercise used to
complete Master’s Thesis requirements for the
Systems Engineering and Analysis Curriculum
 Results not endorsed by USN or USMC
 All information was obtained from open sources
 We were not trying to:
– Generate operational requirements
– Create doctrine
– Generate specifications for actual systems
6
Force Protection
Survivability Design Factors
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
UAV
Sensor
SensorArchitecture
Architecture
••Point
Point
••Distributed
Distributed
Aerostat
Aerostat
UUV
50 km
50 km
UAV
Above the
Water
10 km
text
36 km
740 km
Weapons
WeaponsArchitecture
Architecture
••Point
Point
••Distributed
Distributed
300 m
370 km
OBJ B
UUV
100 km
Below the
Water
COA B
OBJ A
Force
ForceComposition
Composition
••CRUDES-based
CRUDES-based
••LCS-based
LCS-based
Weapons
WeaponsType
Type
••Current
Current
••Conceptual
Conceptual
7
Path to Proposed Force
Protection Architecture
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
PR
Systems Engineering and Management Process
Cult
ural
Problem
Definition
Descriptive
Scenario
O
Techno
lo
Design &
Analysis
Eco
Value System
Design
ic
Decision
Making
Alternative
Scoring
Normative
Scenario
Desired End State:
What should be?
Decision
Implementation
Planning for
Action
Execution
al
litic
Po
nom
Modeling &
Analysis
Engineering
Design Problem
Needs
Analysis
gical
C
ES
S
Alternatives
Generation
l
ica
tor
His
Current Status:
What is?
Environment
Mo
Eth ral /
ica
l
Assessment &
Control
<---- Assessment & Feedback --------
A
PR
O
BL
EM
SC
Interceptor-1 vs. ASCM-3
N
R
(Point Weapons / Point Sensor Architecture)
Range (km)
30
DTGI
A
(0 sec Reaction Delay)
20
10
0
0
LY
10
20
Threat
Max D etection Range
Max Intercept Range
SI
S
30
Min Intercept Range
S hot 1
S hot 2
40
T ime (se c)
TTGI
System Delay Reaction Delay
1 Successful Intercept
M
O
D
180
EL
160
140
# of Launches
40
EN
A
120
100
80
60
40
R
IO
OBJ B
ES
U
LT
COA B
OBJ A
ExWar ShipInterceptor Launches
20
S
0
CRUDES/
Current
CRUDES/
Conceptual
LCS/ Current
LCS/
Conceptual
8
Extensive Modeling Efforts to
Analyze Design Alternatives
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
EX
I n te r c e p to r - 1 v s . A S C M - 3
( P o in t W e a p o n s / P o in t S e n s o r A r c h ite c tu r e )
C
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
Sensor
Alternate Force
Force
Weapon
Weapons
Architecture
Composition
Architecture
D
( 0 s e c R e a c tio n D e la y )
40
Range (km)
30
DTGI
20
10
EL
0
Modeling Tool Assessment
JANUS
Ease of use
(time risk)
Analysis
Database
Cost
State I
State II
State III
Support
September 2003
JTLS
NSS
0
10
20
™
EX
30
ES
IG
Distributed
S ho t 2
Point
40
COA B
1 S u c c e s s fu l In te r c e p t
TE
COA A
M i n In te r c e p t R a n g e
S ho t 1
T im e ( s e c )
EINSTEIN EXTEND EXCEL
SS
ES
S
M a x D e te c ti o n R a n g e
M a x In te r c e p t R a n g e
TTGI
S y s t e m D e la y R e a c t io n D e la y
A
T hre a t
N
Distributed
N
D
™
Current
1
Conceptual
2
Current
3
Point
N
Conceptual
4
Current
5
Conceptual
6
Current
7
Conceptual
8
SS
9
Integrated Interdisciplinary
Team
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Force Protection
Architecture
Sensor/Weapon Architectures
Force Composition
Weapon Types
• Overall Integration – Problem Definition, Modeling and Analysis
• Requirements Generation – LCS Attributes
SEA-4
TSSE
• LCS Design – SEA SWAT
NPS Theses
TDSI Supporting Studies
• LCS Thesis – Stealth, Distributed Fires, Helo/UCAV Control
• SSGN Study – Battle Space Preparation
• MSSE Study – Layered Defense, Hardkill & Softkill Weapons
• Physics Team – Cooperative Radar Network, Distributed Sensors
• OR Team – Number and Placement of Assets, Distributed Defenders
• IA Team – Identification of IW threats to the Sea Base
• ME Team – Distributed Sensors, Battle Space Preparation
• ECE Team – Distributed Sensor Network Details
10
Where We Started:
SEI-3 Study
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Foundation for SEA-4 Study
 Developed a sea based conceptual architecture
to accomplish the Expeditionary Warfare
mission in the 2015-2020 timeframe using the
operational tenet of OMFTS
 Focused on logistics and the elimination of the
“iron mountain”
 Force protection for the Sea Base identified for
further research
11
SEA-4 Tasking
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Official Project Guidance


Develop a system of systems conceptual solution to provide force
protection for the Sea Base and its transport assets while performing
forced entry and STOM operations in support of the Ground Combat
Element of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Address protection of the ships of the Sea Base while at sea in the
operating area
– Protection of the airborne transport assets moving between the Sea Base and
the objective
– Protection of the surface assets moving between the Sea Base and the beach


Not required to address protection of the Sea Base assets while in port
Task does not include addressing the protection of the land force itself or
land transport from the beach to the objective
12
Limitations
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Resources
 Classification
 Experience
 Constraints
 Cost Analysis
13
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Introduction
Methodology
Problem Definition
LCDR Higgs
Design & Analysis
Modeling
Conclusion
14
Methodology
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Systems Engineering and Management Process
l
tura
Cul
al
ric
o
t
His
Descriptive
Scenario
Current Status:
What is?
Problem
Definition
Needs
Analysis
Value System
Design
l it i
Po
l
ca
Environment
Design &
Analysis
Techn
olog
Alternatives
Generation
ical
Eco
nom
ic
Modeling &
Analysis
Engineering
Design Problem
Decision
Making
Alternative
Scoring
Normative
Scenario
Desired End State:
What should be?
Decision
Implementation
Planning for
Action
Execution
Assessment &
Control
Mo
Eth ral /
ica
l
<---- Assessment & Feedback -------15
Systems Engineering and Management
Process (SEMP) Summary
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 SEMP is a framework for approaching
problems from a systems perspective
 SEMP pairs creative thinking with analytical
skills
 Systems engineering design and management
is an iterative process
– Phases of SEMP, and steps within the phases are
repeated as necessary
 SEMP may have to be tailored to fit the needs
of the project
16
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Introduction
Methodology
Problem Definition
LCDR Parkins
Design & Analysis
Modeling
Conclusion
17
Effective Need
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can
be applied at the decisive time and place.
Conserving the force’s fighting potential is
achieved through maximizing survivability by
minimizing susceptibility and vulnerability.
18
Scope and Bound the Problem
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Identify issues
 Make assumptions
 Break out the tool bag
– Functional Analysis
– Futures Analysis
– Value System Design
 Generate requirements
19
Primitive Need
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Protect the Sea Base while at sea in the
operating area
 Protect the airborne transport assets from
the Sea Base to the objective
 Protect the surface transport assets from
the Sea Base to the beach or port
20
Issues
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering







What is force protection?
What is a Sea Base?
What makes up a Sea Base?
Where does the Sea Base operate?
Is the Sea Base supported by other assets?
What is Ship To Objective Maneuver?
What constraints does this study fall under?
21
Assumptions
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering









Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) operations occur in the 2015-2020
timeframe.
MEB size Marine Air Ground Task Force composition and sustainment
requirements remain constant between the present and 2015-2020.
The USMC adopts Ship To Objective Maneuver doctrine.
SEI-3’s conceptual expeditionary warfare architecture is operationally
available in 2015-2020.
All current USN and USMC legacy platforms will remain operational
through 2015-2020.
All proposed USN and USMC acquisitions of new aircraft and land
vehicles will be operationally available in 2015-2020.
MEB forces may be projected as far as 200 nm inland. The ships of the
Sea Base may be as far as 200 nm offshore, but not to exceed 275 nm from
Sea Base to objective.
A Carrier Strike Group is available for battle space preparation.
Expeditionary warfare force protection is modeled and analyzed in the
SEA-4 Sea Base defined region only.
22
Force Protection
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile action
against the Sea Base
 These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential
so it can be applied at the decisive time and place
 These actions enable effective employment of the
joint force while degrading opportunities for the
enemy
 Force protection does not include actions to defeat
the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or
disease
Adapted from the DOD Dictionary
23
Sea Base
(Defined by SEI-3)
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
OBJECTIVE
CONUS
OFFSHORE
BASES
FORWARD
DEPLOYED
FORCES
ASSEMBLY
AREA
LAUNCHING
AREA
Sea Base
24
Sea Base
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Amphibious Force
(MEB)
Force Protection Assets
Combat Forces
NESG
(MEU)
ExWar
Ship
Air
Assets
LRHLAC (3)
MV-22 (14)
AH-1Z (4)
UH-1Y (4)
JSF (6)
ExWar
Ship
NESG
(MEU)
ExWar
Ship
ExWar
Ship
Combat Support Forces
NESG
(MEU)
ExWar
Ship
ExWar
Logistics Ship
ExWar
Logistics Ship
ExWar
Logistics Ship
ExWar
Ship
Surface
Assets
AAAV (18)
HLCAC (3)
LCU(R) (2)
25
SEI-3 ExWar Ship and
Long Range Heavy Lift Aircraft
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
L o n g R a n g e H e a v y L ift A irc ra ft M is s io n P r o file
100 nm
200 nm
+ 0 .4 h r fu e l re s e r v e
0 .5 h r h o ld in g e a c h w a y


Combat variant
Logistics variant
• DWL: 990 ft
• Displacement: 86,000 LT
• Draft: 42’
• Flight deck : 770’ x 300’
• Max speed: 30 Kts
• Well deck for 3 HLCACs
0 .4 h r o n d e c k a t o b je c tiv e
1 m in H O G E S L S td D a y e a c h w a y
O b je c tiv e
•
•
•
•
•
•
Combat radius: 300 nm
Payload: 37,500 lb
Speed: 200+ kts
Shipboard compatible
Spot factor 1.5 x CH-53E
Internal / external load
capability
• 15 min cargo off-load
26
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering





Sea Basing…backbone of Ship
To Objective Maneuver
(STOM).
"From the Sea"
"Forward…From the Sea"
"Operational Maneuver from the
Sea"
"STOM"
– Exploit traditional maneuver and
naval warfare
– Leverage technical superiority,
speed, mobility, communications,
navigation, and fire-power
27
STOM Phases
(Defined by SEA-4)
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Phase I
– Staging/Build-up (Operating Area)
 Phase II
– Ship-to-Shore Movement (seaborne assets)
– Ship-to-Objective Movement (airborne
assets)
 Phase III
– Sustainment
28
Functional Analysis
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Complete Expeditionary Warfare Mission
Conduct
Expeditionary Operations
Force
Protection
C4ISR
Strategic
Sustainment
PSurvival
PHit
PKill|Hit
Survivability
Susceptibility
Prevent
Air
Surface
Subsurface
Defeat
Air
Surface
Subsurface
Vulnerability
Withstand
Above Water
On Water
Below Water
29
Futures Analysis
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Aircraft/UAV
Ballistic Missiles
Small Boats
Unguided Munitions
Submarines
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles
(Shore, Ship, Sub and Air-Launched)
“Double-Digit”
SAMs
(Fixed and Mobile)
Unconventional
Vessels
Mines
30
Which Threats Do We Choose?
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Air Warfare

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)

Aircraft (sea based or air assets)

Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Ballistic Missile

Space-based laser

Low Slow Flyer
Information Warfare

Computer Network Attack (CNA)

Electronic Attack (EA)

Chaff / Flares

Sensor Overload

Psyops/Deception

Computer Viruses
Surface Warfare

Ships and Fast Patrol Boats

Small Boats (wave rider, jet ski)

Unconventional ships

Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV)
Over Land Threats

Surface to Air Missiles (SAM)

Small Arms

Anti-Air Artillery (AAA)

Rockets

Mortars
Undersea Warfare

Submarine (diesel, nuclear, mini-sub)

Mines

Divers

Mammals

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs)
Miscellaneous

Land Based Gunfire

CBR-N

Land Mines for Craft Landing Zones (CLZ)
31
Threat Trends
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Technical
–
–
–
–
Faster
Smaller
Advanced materials
Higher explosive
yield
– Lighter
– Low observable
– Smarter
 Non-technical
– Cheap
– Tactics
– Proliferation
2008
2020
32
Most Significant Threats
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering





Phase I
Phase II
Phase III
(Staging / Build-up)
(Assault)
(Sustainment)
ASCM
Small Boats
Unconventional
Vessels
Submarines
Mines





Small Boats
Mines
SAMs
ASCM
Aircraft/UAV





ASCM
Mines
Unconventional
Vessels
SAMs
Unguided
Munitions
33
Threat Summary
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Unclassified
 Generic
 Universal
 Capabilities
based
34
Scenario:
2016 South China Sea
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering








PRC invests profits from its booming
economy in military
PRC claims hegemony over entire
SCS region
PRC reinforces presence on Spratly
Islands
PRC / Philippine naval encounter
PRC invades Kepulalian Natuna and
quarantines Palawan
U.S. / ASEAN attempt FON
operations in Sulu Sea
PRC invades Palawan
U.S. tasked with restoring regional
stability and expelling PRC from
Palawan
35
Value System Design
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Survivability
Susceptibility
(0.75)
Defeat Attacks
(0.75)
Prevent Attacks
(0.25)
Vulnerability
(0.25)
Withstand Attacks
(1.0)
36
Capabilities Needed
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering





Deploy
Detect
Defeat
Prevent
Withstand
Deploy Sensor
Defeat
Detect Threat
No
No
Yes
Withstand
Prevent
No
37
Early Requirements Generation
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

Overarching
– Self-defense for ExWar ships
• Defense against ASCMs
• Defense against small-boat attack
• Defense against submarine/UUV attack
–
–
–
–

Robust organic MCM capability
Capability to ID and defend against unconventional attacks
Highly survivable transport aircraft and landing craft
Provide protection for transports from the Sea Base to the objectives
TSSE LCS
–
–
–
–
Operate in deep to very shallow water
Direct, support, and/or embark aircraft conducting USW
Capability to deploy unmanned vehicles
Etc.
38
Effective Need
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can
be applied at the decisive time and place.
Conserving the force’s fighting potential is
achieved through maximizing survivability by
minimizing susceptibility and vulnerability.
39
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Introduction
Methodology
Problem Definition
LT Wells
Design & Analysis
Modeling
Conclusion
40
Design & Analysis
Key Findings
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

Distributed sensor network offers increased force survivability
– Greater reaction times
– More engagement opportunities

Point weapons vs. short-notice threats require
– Greater weapons speeds
– Reduced minimum ranges
– Maximum ranges that are at least equal to maximum detection range

Distributed conceptual weapons offer increased available
reaction times
– Higher weapon speed
– Increased maximum ranges
41
Alternatives Generation
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Goal: Generate viable alternatives to
increase force survivability
 Survivability Subfunctions
– Deploy
– Detect
– Defeat
– Prevent
– Withstand
42
Alternatives Generation
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
D e tec t
D e fe at
Prevent
W it h s t a n d
D e p lo y
R adar
M is s ile
C h a ff
A rm o r
S h ip
L id a r
G un
F la r e
R e a c tiv e A rm o r
A irc ra ft
IR
L aser
D eco ys
R e f le c t i v e A r m o r
UAV
EO
M ic ro w a v e
M aneu ver
R e d u n d a n t V ita l
S y s te m s
A e ro sta t
UV
A c o u s tic
E le c tro n ic C o u n te r m e a s u r e s
Q u a li t y C o n s t r u c t i o n
S a t e l li t e
S A R / IS A R
IR C o u n t e r m e a s u r e s
S u b m a rin e
H yp e r sp e c tra l
A c o u s tic C o u n te r m e a s u r e s
UUV
S onar
S ig n a tu re M a n a g e m e n t
S h o re
S e is m ic
M o r p h o lo g ic a l C h a r t
43
Threat Model Assumptions:
Approximating Threat Shapes
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
SONAR
RADAR / LIDAR / IR
Mine / Torpedo / Submarine
90o
0o
Surface to Air Missile /
Anti-ship Cruise Missile
90o
0o
Aircraft
Small Boat
90o
0o
Small Boat
90o
0o
0o
90o
44
Threat Model Assumptions:
Example Effects of Assumptions
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
RCS vs Target Angle (ASCM-1)
Radiant Exitance (M) vs Ambient Temp (ASCM-1)
120
sm
100
80
3 GHz
60
20 GHz
40
20
0
0
20
40
60
80
W/sm-micrometer
140
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
8-12 micrometers
3-5 micrometers
0
100
50
100
150
Degrees F
Degrees
Total RCS = (pr2r)(cosQ) + (2prl2r/l)(sinQ)
M = (2pc2h/ l5)(1/e(hc/lkT)-1)
Target Strength vs Target Angle (Mine-2)
Degrees
d Bsm
0
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
20
40
60
80
100
TS = 10log((r2rcosQ/4) + (2prl2/ 4pl)(rsinQ))
1 kHz
25 khZ
56 kHz
45
Analytical Sensor Models
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

Analyzed inherent trade-offs between targets’ reflectivities and
emissivities using radar, lidar, and IR sensors for SUW and AW
threats (ρ + ε = 1)
Used active and passive sonar models for USW and SUW
threats
 Examined threat cross sections and resulting detection ranges
from various target angles
 Based on results:

– Greater target cross section = Greater detection range
– Sensor horizon limits performance
– Environment strongly affects lidar and passive sonar

Excel results indicated benefits of elevated sensor network
46
Analytical Search Models
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Active Sensors: Random Search Theory
PD(total) = (1-e(-nwvt/A))( 1-(1- PD (1))N)
 Passive Sensors: ROC detection probability
based on CNR
PD(total) = ( 1-(1- PD (1))N)
n = number of platforms
w = dwell area or volume
v = PRF
t = search time
A = area or volume to be searched
N = nwvt/A
PD (1) = ROC detection probability based on CNR
47
Search Analysis: Point Sensor
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Point Sensor Configuration
r
r'
R = Radius of the area concerned
r = Sensor distance from force center
r' = Radius of sensor coverage
= Notional high value unit
R
Where r << R
48
Search Analysis:
Distributed Sensor
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Distributed Sensor Configuration
r'
r
R
R = Radius of the area concerned
r = Sensor distance from force center
r' = Radius of sensor coverage
= Notional high value unit
Where r
R
49
Analytical Search Model
Findings
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Distributed sensor network offers benefits
of extended detection ranges and greater
reaction times
 Distributed sensor network requires more
platforms
 Low-level (surface-based) and elevated
(airborne) sensors are complementary
50
Analytical Search Models:
Mines
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Search for mines is different from the




other threats considered (a weapon that
waits)
Higher frequencies required for detection
Relatively poor detection ranges for higher
frequency sonars
May face high reverberation limitations
Deepwater mine hunting will be very time
consuming or platform intensive work
51
Sensor & Search Trade-Offs
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Goals: 1) Minimize number of search platforms
2) Minimize search time
3) Maximize Probability of Detection
 Findings: Based on
random search model, for
a given sensor and a given
area or volume, two of the
goals can be met at the
expense of the third.
Search Platforms
(n)
Time
(t)
Probability of
Detection
(Pd)
52
Engagement Analysis:
Point Weapons
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Point Weapon Configuration
r
r'
R = Radius of the area concerned
r = Weapon distance from force center
r' = Weapon range
= Notional high value unit
R
Where r << R
53
Engagement Analysis:
Distributed Weapons
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Distributed Weapon Configuration
r'
r
R
R = Radius of the area concerned
r = Weapon distance from force center
r' = Weapon range
= Notional high value unit
Where r
R
54
Engagement Model
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
I n te r c e p to r- 1 v s . A S C M - 3
( P o in t W e a p o n s - P o in t S e n s o r A r c h ite c tu r e )
(0 s e c R e a c tio n D e la y )
Range (km)
40
DTGI
30
T h re a t
M a x D e te c ti o n R a n g e
20
M a x In te r c e p t R a n g e
M i n In te r c e p t R a n g e
S ho t 1
10
S ho t 2
0
0
10
20
30
40
T im e ( s e c )
TTGI
S y s t e m D e la y R e a c t io n D e la y
1 S u c c e s s fu l In te rc e p t
55
Greater Weapon Speed = Higher Pk
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
# Interceptions vs. Reaction D elay
P k vs. # Interceptors
(Point W eapon-Point Sensor A rchitecture)
3
Pk
# Interceptors
4
INT-1 (825 m /s )
INT- 2 (1650 m /s )
FEL (c)
2
1
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.5 Pk int
0.8 Pk int
0.9 Pk int
0
1
2
3
4
5
# Interceptors
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
Reaction Delay (sec)
M ore R eaction Tim e = M ore Engagem ent O pportunities
More Engagement Opportunities = Higher Probability of Kill
Pk=1-(1-Pkint)# interceptors
 Greater weapon speed = More available reaction time
 More available reaction time = More engagements
 More engagements = Higher Pk
56
Distributed Sensors = Higher Pk
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
# Interceptions vs. Reaction Delay
(Point Weapon-Point Sensor Architecture)
# Interceptions vs. Reaction Delay
(Point Weapon-Distributed Sensor Architecture)
4
3
INT-1 (825 m/s)
2
INT- 2 (1650 m/s)
FEL (c)
1
# Interceptors
# Interceptors
4
3
INT-1 (825 m/s)
INT-2 (1650 m/s)
FEL (c)
2
1
0
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
5
10
15
20
Reaction Delay (sec)
Reaction Delay (sec)
More Reaction Time = More Engagement Opportunities
Distributed Sensor = More Reaction Time = More Engagement Opportunities
 Distributed Sensor = More available reaction time
 More available reaction time = More engagements
 More engagements = Higher Pk
57
Dist Weapons-Dist Sensors Pk
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
P k v s . R e a c tio n D e la y
(D is trib u te d W e a p o n -D is trib u te d S e n s o r A rc h ite c tu re )
(Pkint=0.8)
1
0 .8
In t 3 ( 1 3 2 0 m / s )
0 .4
In t 4 ( 1 9 8 0 m / s )
PK
0 .6
0 .2
0
0
20
40
60
80
R e a c t io n D e la y ( s e c )
 Pk=1-(1-Pkint)# interceptors
 Longer range, higher speed weapons offer
increased available reaction times
58
Design & Analysis
Key Findings
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

Distributed sensor network offers increased force survivability
– Greater reaction times
– More engagement opportunities

Point weapons vs. short-notice threats require
– Greater weapons speeds
– Reduced minimum ranges
– Maximum ranges that are at least equal to maximum detection range

Distributed conceptual weapons offer increased available
reaction times
– Higher weapon speed
– Increased maximum ranges
59
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Introduction
Methodology
Problem Definition
LT Tionquiao
Design & Analysis
Modeling
Conclusion
60
Supporting Studies Overview
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
OR LCS Thesis
Helo/UCAV control, Stealth
MSSE LCS Thesis Integration of Hardkill / Softkill Weapons
TSSE LCS
Sea SWAT design
OR Team
Defender Employment
IA Team
IW threats to the Sea Base
Physics Team
Cooperative Radar Network
ECE Team
Smart Antennae System
ME Team
Micro-Air Vehicle
OR Study
SSGN and battlespace preparation
61
OR Supporting Study
LCS Force Protection
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

“An Exploratory Analysis of Littoral Combat Ships’ Ability to Protect
Expeditionary Strike Groups”, LT Efimba, OR Thesis

Purpose: Explore LCS ability to defend an ESG in an anti-access scenario against a
high density small boat attack.
– LCS design factors: 1. Helo / UCAVs 2. Stealth 3. Firepower 4. Speed

Methodology: EINSTein (Agent Based Simulation)
– Red Force: 30 High-speed small boat agents
– Blue Force: 3 Amphibs, 0-2 CRUDES, 1-7 LCS
– MOEs: Amphib survivors , and Amphibs damaged

Conclusion:
– LCS should have both capability to control a
helo/UCAV and have a stealthy hull
– Use findings to translate into requirements for
TSSE LCS design
62
MSSE Supporting Study
LCS AAW Self-Defense
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

“MSSE LCS Study” – MSSE Cohort 1, Port Hueneme Division, NSWC
Purpose: Develop a concept for an AAW Self Defense Combat System for LCS

Methodology:

– Threat identification
– Analyses of sensors, sensor integration, C2, weapons, and manning
– Primary MOP, Probability of Raid Annihilation

Conclusion:
– Robust gun system can perform in both AAW and ASUW roles
– Both hardkill and softkill systems in a layered defense
scheme is necessary to achieve the required Pra
– Layered defense concept still viable in littoral environment
63
TSSE Supporting Study
LCS Design: Sea SWAT
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

Two types:
– SUW and AW
– SUW and USW

Length: 400 ft
Beam: 102 ft
Draft: 14 ft
Displacement: 3120 LT
Max Speed: 42 kts
Sustained Speed: 35 kts
Weapons
–
–
–
–
–
Sensors
–
–
–
–
Specifications
–
–
–
–
–
–



Towed array sonar
Multi-Function radar
ASLS
Hull mounted sonar
2 Helos (SH-60)
– 2 Hangars, 1 Spot

Unmanned Vehicles
– Air, surface, underwater
57mm gun
SEA RAM
Harpoon
Evolved Sea Sparrow
Mk 50 Torpedo
64
OR Supporting Study
Defender Employment
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

“Defense of Sea Base”, SI4000 - OR TDSI Team
Purpose: Analysis of number and placement of assets defending high value units

Methodology:

– Analytical Model: 3 Models varying HVUs, Defenders, Targets
– Simulation Model: (EINSTein)
• Red Force: 20 or 40 HSBs or UCAVs
• Blue Force: 1 or 4 LCS, 1 or 3 HVU
– MOE: HVU survivors

Conclusion:
– 10-13 defenders for 360 deg coverage
– Prob of HVU survival unaffected by # of HVU.
– Defenders employ weapons/sensors at max range
65
CS Supporting Study
Information Assurance
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

“Information Assurance Plan for the Protection of the Sea Base Information
Systems”, SI4000 - IA TDSI Team

Purpose: Establish an IA plan to protect and defend Info Systems of the Sea Base.

Methodology:
– Analysis of current Navy IA policy
– Technology forecast of information systems

Conclusion:
– Nine technology recommendations for the Sea Base
– IW aspects identified in initial threat analysis
– Final threat list did not include IW
Future Technology
1. E-Bomb
2. Biometrics
3. Laser Comms
4. Secure Tunnels
5. Intrusion Prevention
6. Intelligent Software Decoy
7. System Redundancy
8. Security through Obscurity
9. Sim Security
66
Physics Supporting Study
CRANK
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

“Cooperative Radar Network (CRANK): Concept Exploration for Defending
the Sea Base”, SI4000 Sensor (Physics) TDSI Team

Purpose: Explore use of bistatic/multistatic radar system to defend Sea Base against
airborne attack

Design: 360 degree coverage, 200 nm range, .01 m2 RCS

Conclusion:
– Transmitter power required is too great
for performance requirements. Use of pulse
compression may reduce
– Use as tripwire sensor network for Sea Base
FP w/ existing monostatic capabilities
67
ECE Supporting Study
Smart Antennae System
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

“Protection of Sea Base”SI4000 - Sensors (ECE) TDSI Team

Purpose: Propose ways to achieve active defense by “out sensing” the enemy

Methodology:
– Threat identification: High density, high speed, low signature
– Analysis of data fusion and wireless sensors to improve classification

Conclusion:
– Smart Antennae System increases range
and reliability of wireless sensors
– Provides insights into distributed sensor
network details.
68
ME (Weapons) Supporting Study
MAV
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

“Exploratory Study of the Operationalization of the Flapping Wing MAV” SI4000 Weapons (ME) TDSI Team

Purpose: Investigate means to “see first, understand first, strike first”. (MLVs, SpecOps,
MAVs)

Methodology:
– Threat identification: Supersonic cruise missiles*, UCAV swarm, torpedoes
– Analysis of defensive systems (FEL / Rail gun, JSF / CSG)

Conclusion:
– Increasing defensive capability decreases logistic
capability
– MAVs ideal. (MLVs face land obstacles
and SpecOps keeps “man in loop”)
– MAV concept: 100s of micro flapping wings deployed
from UAV to find missile launchers under canopy
– Provides insights into a distributed
sensor and the importance of battlespace preparation
69
OR Supporting Study
SSGN
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

“Quantifying SSGN Contributions to a Complex Joint Warfare Environment”,
LCDR Schoch, JCA White Paper

Purpose: Explore increases in force survivability and lethality made possible by
SSGN battlespace preparation.

Methodology: Circulation Model
– MOEs: 1. Additional Missions per Unit 2. Force Multiplying Factor

Conclusion:
– Battlespace preparation reduces enemy
lethality thereby increasing force survivability
– Use of SSGN as a means of battlespace
preparation will be beneficial for ExWar
70
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Introduction
Methodology
Problem Definition
Design & Analysis
LCDR Higgins
LT Tionquiao
Modeling
Conclusion
71
Simulation Key Findings
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

Force Composition
– CRUDES-based force and LCS-based force are roughly equivalent

Sensor / Weapon Architecture
– Distributed Architecture improves survivability
– Distributed Architecture conserves weapons
– Point and Distributed Architectures are roughly equivalent in Phase II
(Assault Phase – close proximity to the threat)

Weapon Type
– Conceptual weapons require distributed sensor architecture to
maximize effectiveness

Threats
– Distributed Architecture improves survivability particularly against
USW threats
72
Picking the Correct Tool for
Simulation
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Tools Available
–
–
–
–
–
–
JANUS
JTLS
NSS
EINSTein
EXTEND
Excel
 Final Selection
– EXTEND
– NSS
JANUS
JTLS
NSS
EINSTein
EXTEND
EXCEL
Ease of use
(time risk)
Analysis
Database
Cost
Phase I
Phase II
Phase III
Support
73
Proposed Architectures
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Force Composition:
– COA A (CRUDES-based w/ SSN)
– COA B (LCS-based w/ SSGN)
 Sensor/Weapon Architecture:
– Point
(ship-based)
– Distributed
(UAV/USV/UUV-based)
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
Sensor
Force
Alternate Force
Weapon
Weapons
Composition
Architecture
Architecture
1
Conceptual
2
Current
3
Conceptual
4
Current
5
Conceptual
6
Current
7
Conceptual
8
Point
COA A
 Weapons:
– Current
– Conceptual
Current
Distributed
Point
COA B
Distributed
74
Force Composition
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
COA A
COA B
3 CG
1 CG
3 DDG
1 DDG
3 FFG
12 LCS
1 SSN
1 SSGN
CRUDES-based
LCS-based
75
Point Sensor/Weapon
Architecture
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Point
24 km
Above the
Water
Point
text
48 km
740 km
300 m
370 km
96 km
Below the
Water
76
Distributed Sensor/Weapon
Architecture
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
UAV
Aerostat
Aerostat
UUV
50 km
50 km
UAV
Above the
Water
10 km
text
36 km
740 km
300 m
370 km
UUV
100 km
Below the
Water
77
Weapons
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Weapon
Type
Speed (m/s)
Max Range (km)
Min Range (km)
Interceptor 1
Surface to air missile
825
130
5
Interceptor 3
Air to air missile
1320
56
2
Torpedo 1
Surface or sub-surface
torpedo
20.6
7.3
.1
Interceptor 2
Surface to air missile
1650
370
5
Interceptor 4
Air to air missile
1980
93
2
Free Electron Laser
Directed energy
3x108
10
2
Torpedo 2
Surface or sub-surface
torpedo
25.7
11
.1
Current Weapons
Conceptual Weapons
78
Measure Of Effectiveness
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Survivability of the Sea Base
– % of ExWar ships mission capable
– % of transport aircraft mission capable
– % of transport surface craft mission capable
79
EXTEND Modeling
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 EXTEND Overview: Process based, discrete event
modeling and simulation tool. Provides a macro-view of
sensor, weapon, and threat interactions.
 Design Factors:
– Force Composition: COA A, COA B
– Sensor and Weapon Architecture: Point, Distributed
– Weapons: Current, Conceptual
 MOEs: % of assets mission capable
 Inputs: Sensor and search model calculations.
Characteristics of weapons, platforms, and sensors.
 Outputs: # mission kills, # of mission kills by threat
80
EXTEND Model
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
81
EXTEND Model
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
82
EXTEND Model
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
83
EXTEND Model
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
84
EXTEND Model
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
85
EXTEND Model Results
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
ExWar
LCU(R)
HLCAC
AAAV
LRHLAC
MV-22
Current Weapons
100%
Average Percent of Assets Mission Capable
Point CRUDES
90%
Point LCS
Distributed CRUDES
80%
Distributed LCS
Conceptual Weapons
70%
Point CRUDES
60%
Point LCS
Distributed CRUDES
50%
Distributed LCS
40%
Upper 95% Confidence
Interval
30%
Lower 95% Confidence
Interval
20%
100 Runs
10%
ExWar
LCU(R)
HLCAC
AAAV
LRHLAC
MV-22
86
Distributed Sensors and Weapons
Increase Force Survivability
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
ExWar
LCU(R)
HLCAC
AAAV
LRHLAC
MV-22
Distributed
100%
Current Weapons
Average Percent of Assets Mission Capable
Point CRUDES
90%
Point LCS
Distributed CRUDES
80%
Distributed LCS
Point
Conceptual Weapons
70%
Point CRUDES
60%
Point LCS
Distributed CRUDES
50%
Distributed LCS
40%
Upper 95% Confidence
Interval
30%
Lower 95% Confidence
Interval
20%
100 Runs
10%
ExWar
LCU(R)
HLCAC
AAAV
LRHLAC
MV-22
87
CRUDES-based and LCS-based
Forces Roughly Equivalent
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
ExWar
LCU(R)
HLCAC
AAAV
LRHLAC
MV-22
Distributed CRUDES vs. LCS
Current Weapons
100%
Average Percent of Assets Mission Capable
Point CRUDES
90%
Point LCS
Distributed CRUDES
80%
Distributed LCS
Conceptual Weapons
70%
Point CRUDES
Point LCS
Distributed CRUDES
60%
Distributed LCS
Point CRUDES vs. LCS
50%
40%
Upper 95% Confidence
Interval
30%
Lower 95% Confidence
Interval
20%
100 Runs
10%
ExWar
LCU(R)
HLCAC
AAAV
LRHLAC
MV-22
88
No Significant Difference Between
Current and Conceptual Weapons
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
ExWar
LCU(R)
HLCAC
AAAV
LRHLAC
MV-22
Current Weapons
100%
Average Percent of Assets Mission Capable
Point CRUDES
90%
Point LCS
Distributed CRUDES
80%
Distributed LCS
Conceptual Weapons
70%
Point CRUDES
Point LCS
Distributed CRUDES
60%
Current vs. Conceptual Weapons
50%
Distributed LCS
40%
Upper 95% Confidence
Interval
30%
Lower 95% Confidence
Interval
20%
100 Runs
10%
ExWar
LCU(R)
HLCAC
AAAV
LRHLAC
MV-22
89
Distributed = Increased ExWar Ship
Survivability
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Average Number of Mission Capable ExWar
Distributed
6
Number
5
Upper 95% CI
4
Lower 95% CI
3
Point
2
Average Mission
Capable
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Alternate Force Architecture
100 Runs
CRUDES
7
8
Weapons
Current
Conceptual
LCS
90
SUB/TORP Threat Inflicts
Most Ship Mission Kills
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 ~10% of the threat accounts for
~90% of mission kills
 Distributed architecture mitigates
the shooter
Comparison of TORP and ASCM Threat
12
Number
10
24.13
72
10
8
6
TORPs Launched
Mission Kills due to TORPs
5.33
ASCMs Launched
Mission Kills Due to ASCMs
4
2
0.36
1
0.61
0
Point
Distributed
0.03
COA B
Current Weapons
100 Runs
Sensor / Weapon Architecture
91
EXTEND Key Findings
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

Force Composition
– CRUDES-based and LCS-based protection forces are roughly
equivalent

Sensor / Weapon Architecture
– Distributed Architecture improves survivability of the Sea Base,
particularly against USW threats

Weapon Type
– No significant difference between current and conceptual weapons with
respect to Sea Base survivability
92
NSS Modeling
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
NSS Overview: Object oriented, Monte-Carlo modeling and
simulation tool. Provides a macro-view of force interactions in a
wargame.
 Design Factors:

– COAs: A-CRUDES based, B-LCS based
– Sensor / Weapon Architecture: Point, Distributed
– Weapon Type: Current, Conceptual
MOEs: % assets mission capable
 Inputs: Platform type and characteristics, asset employment,
sensor characteristics
 Outputs: # of assets surviving, # of weapon launches

93
Force Composition in NSS
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
OBJ B
COA A
OBJ A
Palawan Area of
Operations
South China Sea
LZ
Hawk
LPS A
OBJ A
`
LZ
Eagle
Sulu Sea
OBJ B
LPS B
OBJ B
N
25 nm
75 nm
COA B
OBJ A
Sea Echelon
Area (50 x 50 nm)
94
Distributed Architecture in NSS
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
South China Sea
Aerostat Coverage
UAV Perimeter
OBJ A
Sea Echelon Area
N
Sulu Sea
95
Confounding Results Between
Architectures
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
ExWar
LCU(R)
HLCAC
AAAV
LRHLAC
MV-22
Current Weapons
100%
Average Percent of Assets Mission Capable
Point CRUDES
90%
Point LCS
Distributed CRUDES
80%
Distributed LCS
Conceptual Weapons
70%
Point CRUDES
60%
Point LCS
Distributed CRUDES
50%
Distributed LCS
40%
Upper 95% Confidence
Interval
30%
Lower 95% Confidence
Interval
20%
30 Runs
10%
ExWar
LCU(R)
HLCAC
AAAV
LRHLAC
MV-22
96
Distributed Architecture Increases
Survivability Along Threat Axis
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
CG
DDG
FFG
ExWar
COA A Legend
100%
Point / Current
Distributed / Current
Average Percent of Assets Mission Capable
90%
Point / Conceptual
Distributed / Conceptual
80%
OBJ B
70%
OBJ A
60%
Th
Upper 95% Confidence
Interval
re
at
Lower 95% Confidence
Ax
Interval
is
50%
40%
30 Runs
30%
20%
10%
CG
DDG
FFG
ExWar
97
Distributed Architecture Provided The Same Level
of Force Survivability While Conserving Weapons
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Total Interceptor Launches
(Ship Missile, UAV Missile, FEL)
# of Launches
600
500
Point
400
Distributed
300
200
100
0
# of Launches
CRUDES &
Current
180
160
140
120
100
CRUDES &
Conceptual
LCS &
Current
LCS &
Conceptual
ExWar Ship Interceptor Launches
Point
80
60
40
20
0
Distributed
CRUDES /
Current
CRUDES /
Conceptual
LCS / Current
LCS /
Conceptual
98
Higher Threat from Longer Range Distributed is Better
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
LCS
ExWar
100%
200 nm
Phase I Excursion
ExWar Force
Phase I Excursion: Missile Raid
• 800 ASCM-3, 80 ACFT-2
• Alternate Force Architectures 5, 7
• Good Enemy targeting (10 UAVs)
• All landing craft and aircraft remain
onboard
Average Percent of Assets Mission Capable
90%
COA B Legend
80%
Point
Distributed
70%
60%
50%
40%
Upper 95% Confidence
Interval
30%
Lower 95% Confidence
Interval
20%
30 Runs
10%
LCS
ExWar
99
NSS Key Findings
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering

Force Composition
– CRUDES-based force and LCS-based force are roughly equivalent.

Sensor / Weapon Architecture
– Distributed Architecture improves survivability
– Distributed Architecture conserves weapons
– Difficult to distinguish between Point and Distributed Architectures in
Phase II (Assault Phase – close proximity to the threat)

Weapon Type
– Conceptual Weapons require distributed sensor architecture to
maximize effectiveness
100
Assessment of Simulation Tools
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
EXTEND
 Advantages
– Easy to learn
– Easy to model complex
processes in detail
– Visual representations
– Flexible
– COTS
 Disadvantages
– No database
– Difficult to represent every
entity
NSS
 Advantages
– Detailed, flexible database
– Hi-res wargame simulation
– Multiple study replication
capability
– SE management skills learned
by working and coordinating
with NSS modeler.
 Disadvantages
– Requires expertise
– Long processing time
– Limited land, amphibious
operation capability
101
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
Introduction
Methodology
Problem Definition
LCDR Higgs
Design & Analysis
Modeling
Conclusion
102
Force Protection Study
Key Findings
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering


CRUDES-based and LCS-based force compositions are roughly equivalent
Distributed Architecture improves survivability
– Greater reaction times
– More engagement opportunities
– Particularly effective against USW threats




Distributed Architecture conserves weapons
Point and Distributed Architectures are roughly equivalent in Phase II
(Assault Phase – close proximity to the threat)
Conceptual weapons require distributed sensor architecture to maximize
effectiveness
When paired with the distributed architecture, conceptual weapons offer
increased reaction time
– Higher weapon speed
– Increased maximum ranges
103
Recommended Architecture
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
 Distributed Sensors
 Conceptual Weapons
– Aerostat
• High frequency radar (~ 20 GHz)
– UAVs for 360 degree coverage
• High frequency radar (~ 20 GHz)
• 3-5 µm IR
–
–
–
–
FEL (3 x 108 m/s, 10 km)
INT-2 (1650 m/s, 370 km)
INT-4 (1980 m/s, 93 km)
Torpedo 2 (26 m/s, 11 km)
 Force Composition
– LCS-based or CRUDES-based
– Cost analysis needed to aid in
decision making
– UUVs for 360 degree coverage
• Active Sonar (~1 KHz)
UAV
Aerostat
Aerostat
UUV
50 km
50 km
UAV
Above the
Water
10 km
text
36 km
740 km
300 m
370 km
UUV
100 km
Below the
Water
104
Expeditionary Warfare Force Protection
System of Systems Conceptual Solution
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering
UAV
Distributed
DistributedSensors
Sensors
••Greater
Reaction
Greater ReactionTimes
Times
••More
Engagement
More EngagementOpportunities
Opportunities
Aerostat
Aerostat
50 km
UUV
UAV
Above the
Water
50 km
10 km
text
36 km
740 km
Distributed
DistributedWeapons
Weapons
••Shorter
distance
Shorter distanceto
totarget
target
••Complement
to
distributed
Complement to distributedsensors
sensors
300 m
UUV
100 km
370 km
OBJ B
Below the
Water
COA B
OBJ A
Force
ForceComposition
Composition
••12
LCS
12 LCS++11CG
CG++11DDG
DDG≅≅33CG
CG++33DDG
DDG++33FFG
FFG
••Unit
Cost:
1
DDG-51
≅
1.37
TSSE
LCS
Unit Cost: 1 DDG-51 ≅ 1.37 TSSE LCS
Conceptual
ConceptualWeapons
WeaponsPaired
Pairedwith
withDistributed
DistributedSensors
Sensors
••Higher
Weapon
Speeds
Higher Weapon Speeds
••Increased
IncreasedMaximum
MaximumRanges
Ranges
105