CAB 195/8
Cabinet Minutes
C.M.(50)27th Meeting – C.M.(51)22nd
Meeting
1st May 1950
C.M. 27(50)
1.
London Dock Strike.
[Enter B., and H.G.
G.A.I.
Men have returned to work. All docks operatg.
Trouble: Shaw Savile dispute. Hope another outbreak can be avoided.
Believe agreemt. can be reached on the firm’s scheme.
C.E.
Never get clean settlement in dock strikes.
Official Cttee recommendns read out. Importance of getting this ques.
referred to Minister of Labour. Risk of “lock out”.
i) Shd repns be made to Shaw Savile.
ii) Troops shd. be held available at current level.
iii) Statement tht. troops aren’t retained as instrument to force
agreemt. with Shaw Savile.
G.A.I.
Gould has seen Shaw Savile since. They will take legal course, one
way or another, to avoid further trouble. Firm and stevedores union
likely to be brght. together today.
Accept ii) above. Expect troops can be sent away tomorrow.
Reject iii). (Agreed).
C.E.
Another Shaw Savile ship is in trouble this a.m. For dockers allocated
to it were found not to have their books.
A.B.
We must not use troops to enforce Shaw Savile scheme.
G.A.I.
We shan’t : Shaw Savile have promised to handle this thro’ constitl.
procedure.
H.D.
Enquiry into docks. Hope it’s wide enough to cover all possible causes
for trouble in docks.
G.A.I.
We need full enquiry.
B.
I shd. be associated with it.
P.M.
I will consider with Ministers concerned, how best to press enquiries
into this.
2.
B.
Transport. London Passenger Transport Charges Scheme.
My experience has convinced me that S.I.M. Cttee were right in
excludg. me from fixing of charges – even laying down principles. I
shd. not put views to Tribunal on behalf of other Dpts. – and seem to
be spkg. contrary to my own Tr. Commn.
Para (3) shows tht. plenty of people will be puttg. workmen’s fares and
school-children’s fares to the Tribunal.
2
R.S.C.
In earlier days – Rlway Rates Tribunal – M/T. were there to advise or
help and gave advice: tho’ avoiding any attitude re particular fares.
Service fares were fixed by contract, not by fares.
Service Dpts. shd. not therefore be represented. Arrange as before by
special contract.
Official of M/T. shd. attend as amicus curias. Nothing more.
J.
Agree. Official shd. not behave as advocate.
H.M.
Accept memo.
Why does scheme yield net increase of revenue of £3 m.?
B.
Budget will cost them £1½ m. Shows wisdom of having a margin.
P.M.
Now and hereafter Tribunal’s decision will be final. W’out Ministerial
decn. Will be Parly trouble some day. In constituting Tribunal, as
vacancies arise, M/T. shd. keep consumer interest in mind. And shd.
M/T. advise Chairman to see tht. critics get a full hearing?
(Agreed.)
Putting this out of Govt’s. power : organising Govt.’s defeat.
We nationalise rlways: then raise freight rates: then allow workmen’s
fares to be abolished.
A.B.
R.S.C.
Doesn’t follow tht. Tribunal will agree to their abolition.
A.B.
But, if they do, no-one will relieve us of responsibility.
And M/T. says tht. it’s inexpedient even to make repns to Tribunal.
What redress has Ldn. worker?
P.M.
What alternative? Do you want fares determined by H/Commons?
Most unwise.
E.Sh.
I agree. But para. 6 of Appendix: revenue increase of £3 m. Those
who benefit fr. redns won’t complain : only those who suffer fr.
increases. And who will be blamed? M/T. surely. He cd. at least
object to this budgeting for surplus.
This is a serious political issue. Supporters concerned v. rising costs,
generally.
J.G.
Workmen’s fares : p 4. One change – relatg. to shift working – is
specially objectionable. Genl. movemt. twds. shift working: eg
Morgan plant.
B.
This discn shows how diff. our posn wd. be if we had assumed
responsibility for these ques. No workmen’s fares on buses in Ldn.
Moreover, many fewer people now go to work early enough to get
cheap fares. And earn more money than clericals, who come to work
even later.
3
R.S.C.
If we have a view on workmen’s fares, our proper course wd. be to
legislate requiring a rate for workmen’s fares.
H.M.
Anomalies of workmen’s fares. Also prs. out of date – humiliating to
workmen.
The argument of M/H. = natd indies shd. all be on G.P.O. model.
R.S.C.
? Let Commn know Govt. will watch workmen’s’ fares and if
x/ necessary wd. introduce legisn on it. Then Commn might w’draw this
proposal.
H.M.
Blank w’drawal wd. upset whole scheme.
H.D.
Don’t assume Tribunal won’t force concessions on basis of repns.
The hint suggd by R.S.C. might be put rather tentatively.
A.B.
Support x/.
P.M.
Workmen’s fares are archaic survival. Needs overhaul.
Agreed : Approve proposals in memo.
x/. may be done privately and discreetly.
[Exit H.G. and B.
3.
The Church and the Education Act, 1944.
G.T.
Churches’ complaint is tht. they are being asked to commit themselves
to unascertainable sums at unknown future dates.
If under s.73. they complete our form they are giving blank cheque.
I propose a sliding scale – firmer assurances if early repairs requd.
Proof of ability to pay 100% of their contn – for immedte bldg. cases.
For 10 yrs. ahead 50%. Beyond that 25%.
Satisfied tht. this is intra vires and reasonable.
Otherwise, prepd to offer amendment.
P.M.
You can’t on Supply Day.
H.M.
You can say you are prepd to consider possibility.
R.S.C.
If this is to be put fwd. in H/C. it shd. be agreed first with Opposn.
Otherwise, it will be taken as 1st bid in an auction.
E.Sh.
Opposn back benchers will bid for publicity in R.C. Press. Our people
shd. be advised to rebut those bids.
A.B.
Avoid appearg. to make concessions to pressure from R.A.B.
H.M.
Prs. announce in reply to P.Q. before the debate. Esp. if it were decent
to give it to Labour Member.
4
G.T.
There is one down for Thursday.
R.S.C.
And include statement tht. you wd. be ready to legislate if need be.
(For you can’t talk about that in the subsequent debate.)
P.M.
Let us consider draft answer on Thursday.
1.
G.A.I.
Shaw Savile have basis for discn this p.m. with Stevedores Union.
Their plan : work Waipawa with Stevedore’s gang and 2 others with
dockers.
Failg. agreemt. this p.m., firm will follow procedure.
v. satisfactory.
4.
G.A.I.
London Dock Strike (contd.)
I.L.O. Conference, 1949.
Convention No. 94.
Resolution No. 84.
Convention No.98.
Ratify. Agreed.
As in memo – i.e. with reservation. Agreed.
We endorsed for G.B. only because N. Ireland
cdn’t ratify. Art. 4. v. important to us. Terms so
drawn tht. it blesses neither splinter unions nor
closed shop. Agreed.
Vocational Guidance. “as far as practicable” suffices to cover our
position. Agreed.
T.W.
How many other countries ratify these?
H.M.
Cab. might be told next time.
T.W.
Fish Convention – several countries won’t ratify and others won’t
enforce until all have ratified.
Memo. approved.
M/L. to submit memo. on extent of ratifn of I.L.O. resolns.
5
4th May 1950
C.M.28(50)
1.
H.M.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W., N.B.
Business for next week.
9/5. Burma. W.S.C. insists on debate, and may divide. Awkward
because Burman P.M. will be visiting U.K. Cd. R.S.C. spk to A.E. and
R.A.B? Yes.
Shdn’t P.M. (or R.S.C.) speak as well as K.Y. Agreed: P.M. to reply,
if W.S.C. speaks, or to follow him immediately. Debate to finish by 7
p.m. so that P.M. can speak at public dinner. Or : move Burma
motion to Wednesday.
12/5. Private Members’ Motions.
J.
Coal Industry Regs. Prayer in H/L. Compensn for loss of prospects.
Alleged tht. Rgs. don’t give effect to pledges given on Bill.
N.B.
Doubt if they will divide v. this: for if they defeat Regs. they will
deprive everyone of compensation.
A.B.
Too much compensn is being paid to salaried classes in socd industries.
Our supporters are enraged. No compensn under N.H. Service Acts.
E.Sh.
Cabinet approved the Bills.
2.
Mining Subsidence Bill.
N.B.
Mainwaring spoke v. Bill because did not meet needs of Rhonnda. No
support in debate. But was to gang up with Emlyn Thomas. Have
discussed with them – believe they won’t persevere with opposition.
H.M.
Can’t handle this Bill w’out united Labour support. Shd. have to
remove it (withdraw it).
Claim is tht. retrospective date shd. go back beyond 1947 to ? 1941.
A.B.
Can’t concede this now, for support of all loyal miners has bn.
obtained.
3.
G.T.
Att Gen.
Churches and Education Act.
[Exit N.B., W.W.
Enter Att.Gen.
Opposn don’t favour legn. I shall not therefore mention it. In reply to
P.Q. I shall refer only to adminve arrangemts.
Only consulted last night and have had no chance for more than snap
opinion. Staty duty on l.e.a.’s to see tht. schools are in fit condn: have
6
they discretion to p’pone? On School form 18, Minister has duty to
check estimate of expendre requd to conform with standard, and wthr.
managers will be able to meet it, as it arises. No sanction for announcg.
a 50%-25% requiremt: and unwise to say publicly tht. he works on this
basis. For in law he must satisfy himself that managers will have
resources, not that they have any propn of what is required.
C.E.
Was always recognised in framing Bill tht. you can rely on R.C.’s
being able to get the money more than C. of E. The C. of E. accepted
compromise : the R.C.’s never did.
G.T.
We have worked on principle suggd in 2nd half of Att.G’s. statement.
His 1st diffy. won’t arise because progress of l.e.a.’s will be settled by
bldg. p’mme.
Percentages are only indication of what is likely to satisfy Minister.
I haven’t published them.
J.
Avoid indicatg. precise qualifns in your speech. Say: the kind of thing
you will look to – in exercise of adminve duty.
Agreed : Proceed administratively as proposed.
4.
South West Africa : Proceedings before International Court.
[Enter K.Y.
J.G.
Hearing fixed on 16/5. Must inform by 6/5 wthr. we intend to
intervene orally.
Danger for us is tht. Court may express views applicable to all
dependent territories.
Anti-colonial Powers wd. like to see Art. 11 of Charter so applied as to
make it impossible for us to grant self-govt. to a dependent territory
w’out prior discn and approved by U.N. who wd. be disposed to argue
tht. independence with reservations v. defence and f. policy (as in
Malta) isn’t real independence at all.
Suggd we shd. interview to safeguard that, if it seems likely tht. Court
will make general obsns. Tho’ diffy. to do this w’out seeming to
support S. African view on S.W. Africa. Malan’s policy is disturbing
to Africa – when real risk of black/white conflict.
We therefore considered appearance with watchg. brief – intervening
only if wider issues come up. Not clear tht. we shall be able to do this.
Must be ready to ask leave to intervene, wthr. or not.
On balance i) favour getting leave to intervene but refrain fr. spkg.
unless genl. consns raised.
7
ii) We shall have to make it clear we don’t support
native policy of S. Africa.
G.W.
We voted for reference to Ct. They will be annoyed if we don’t
support them there. We can stand that, however, and shd. determine
this issue by U.K. interests.
Unlikely we can work “watchg. brief” basis. Must be prepd to spk. at
outset.
U.S. have now made submn to Court. This strengthens case for our
intervening. For they raise genl. issue (para. 3 of memo.) and also prs.
3(ii) point. We know these issues will be raised by India.
If we intervene, we might repeat our earlier stand tht. no legal oblign
on Union Govt. to turn mandate into trust territory.
We shd. advise S. Afr. repve on best tactics from their point of view.
And guide them into covering our points.
K.Y.
Evenly balanced. Fear tht. in practice our intervention here will be
repd as support for S. African native policy.
Para. 3(i) is also politically unpopular case to argue. Shall have to face
big adverse votes in U.N. on this – on pol. grounds.
Support memo. on condn our repve spks. with gt. discretion and that we
do our best to deny we are supportg. S. African policy.
Att.G.
V. unlikely President will allow watchg. brief basis. If repd at all, we
shall be expected as Gt. Power to assist court by genl. argument.
Awkward then to avoid supporting S. Africa.
P.M.
I was inclined to stay away.
Have we a locus? Advisory opinion, even if given, will only be a
weapon in pol. argument – not conclusive.
R.S.C.
If we appear, we are more bound by decision. If we don’t, we can
claim tht. this decn doesn’t bind us. Ct. unlikely to sympathise with S.
Afr. and we shall be supportg. bad and losing case. S.W. Africa is
special case : don’t choose to bat on genl. issue on this bad wicket.
G.W.
Ct. might decide this is non self governing territory and decide it on
that basis, not on mandate basis. And we shd. have lost chance to
intervene.
R.S.C.
No need for us to intervene because not a party. Can’t be blamed for
not intervening.
Att.G.
We recommended refce to court. Diff. for us to stay away and then
reject court’s decn.
P.M.
Let us give S. Afr. all advice. But stay away.
J.
What assurance we shall stop them takg. wrong line if we are there.
Better have our hands free to argue later.
8
H.McN.
Political odium if we go. Not much certainty of influencg. decn.
First, being certain, outweighs second, wh. is problematical.
Shd. like someone to examine what Br. repves have said in U.N.
If nothg. said earlier commttg. us, better to stay away.
P.M.
If we intervene, we ask the court to give genl. rulings. If we don’t we
have better chance of arguing later tht. this opinion relates only to
particular case and doesn’t extend necessarily to other territories
differently circumstanced.
K.Y.
Internatl court does tend to wander at large. And genl. practice for a
no. of interested parties to attend. And our practice is to respect its
advisory opinions. V. unusual for us to take the line tht. we don’t feel
bound because we weren’t there.
Att.G.
Let’s stay away. But realise the risks. The rulings are likely to be of
general application.
H.McN.
U.N. have already interpreted Art. 74. And we’ve said we won’t
comply. We shall equally have to refuse to comply with a Court’s
ruling.
Therefore, stay away.
Agreed : stay away.
5.
[Exit Att.Gen.
Housing. Private Licences.
A.B.
Rehearsed earlier proposal. That was ingenious and politically
attractive.
But proved inequitable. Many l.a.’s wdn’t have given any licences.
Test of need for Council houses and own houses isn’t the same.
Local variation in habit of owning and renting. Discretion therefore to
increase proportn above 1 in 5.
Also power to transfer licence from one l.a. area to another.
H.McN.
Tempted to follow. But I announced my 1 in 10 only a month ago.
And I must stand on that for the time.
G.T.
Beware of black market in licences.
[Enter B., N.B., G.S.
& M.W.
6.
R.S.C.
Economical Affairs.
Warning v. over optimism. Seasonal reasons for success in summer.
Our main embarrassmt. at present is large scale of dollar reserves.
Can’t conceal them. With E.C.A. recpts. reserves increased by 141 m.
in April. May lose E.C.A. dollars in 1951.
9
H.W.
Buying goods for stock wd. help. Wd. also help to stop blackmail by
non-dollar suppliers. Wd. have healthy effect on world prices.
A.B.
In consequence of devaluation we are giving goods away to N.
America: we haven’t got back to 1st quarter of ’49.
R.S.C.
Cost £120 m. more to get same quantity of dollar imports.
A.B.
Shan’t we be able soon to revalue?
R.S.C.
Not yet. Quite clear Anglo/Am. attack on sterling is developing.
Winchell article saying further devaluation this summer unless Tory
Govt. returned. Believe this is concerted betwn. Tories and
Republicans.
H.D.
But this time the facts are in our favour. Publicn of facts will influence
Wall St.
G.W.
Canada also concerned. Won’t like our plans v. wheat. If stocking is
remedy, let’s draw as much supplies as we can fr. Canada.
R.S.C.
Agreed – timber etc. We wd. have liked to stop drawg. on Can. credit :
but E.C.A. wd. in that event stop their dollars for our Canad. purchase.
H.W.
C/Living. Apart fr. devaluation, we shd. have got non dollar prices
down last year. If we show we can spend some dollars on supplies we
can frighten them more easily.
H.M.
Internal. Coal. Absenteeism double pre-war.
Ship repairing is worrying. And bldg. too, when tankers built.
Are we ready for slumps – restrictive practices etc.
H.W.
Memo. awaitg. Prod. Cttee. Repairs : report awaited from Admy.
Must shift repairing to developmt. areas. But that
[Exit M.W.
needs new dev. area policy. Can’t solve problem w’in repairing
industry.
R.S.C.
Must know first size of that problem – for this we want rept. from
Admy.
H.McN.
Tanker windfall saved unemplt. up to 15% on Clyde in 6 months’ time.
H.M.
If we don’t get restve practices out of industry you won’t get the fwd.
orders.
E.Sh.
Agree : high costs will wreck the industry. 8.000 t. tramp is costg. 3
times pre-war. Not entirely due to restve practices. Materials?
P.M.
* Expedite prepn of report and its discn by Prodn Cttee. *
10
H.M.
Building Industry. Hope Prodn Cttee. will deal vigorously with this.
R.S.C.
Anglo-Am. report is a good one.
A.B.
My group met Tuesd. Have instituted action. Will report to Cab. later.
Coal mining. I hope Hyndley won’t make more political speeches.
No good preachg. sermons to miners.
N.B.
Don’t like short term prospect. Consumptn increase exceeding prodn
increase.
1.1% increase so far, with 3.3% drop in man power. O.M.S. is 4% .
Absenteeism is .50% better than ’49., in spite of increased illness.
Long term prospect not alarming. We are recruitg. enough labour to
man industry when mechanised.
Need for more washeries – means more capital investment.
Also more houses in right places – to secure transfer of surplus
workers to areas where there are shortages.
Hyndley’s speech – nothing untoward.
H.W.
Absenteeism. Stats. shd. be presented in reln to longer working week.
J.G.
Invol. absenteeism : higher in this quarter in all industries.
P.M.
Perpetual temperate charts for mining industry. Makes us unduly
worried.
N.B.
Open cast. Cd. do much better if we cd. have dollar tractors.
P.M.
Prodn. Cttee.
G.T.
Textiles. Confce last week, workers asked employers to modernise
industry and welcomed re-deployment. First time in History!
[Exit K.Y., B., G.S, N.B.
7.
Nationalisation of Water Supplies.
A.B.
No need to argue merits of natn appd Party policy.
Only ques, is one of method. …….
P.M.
Need for close examn. How will organn work?
A.B.
This is technical matter.
A.
Not wholly – also satisfy local needs.
A.B.
Act of 1944 gives M/H. respons. wh. he can’t repudiate : but too
chummy to secure amalgamns.
11
Organn needed for this purpose wd. be small. Have only to put water
fr. reservoirs to mains. Purely technical service.
A.
No : who says what roads need mains?
A.B.
Water engineers.
A.
No: local demand.
T.W.
Urgent demand in rural areas. But we shd. consider effect of w’drawg.
water respons. fr. l.a.’s – political and psychological. A.B.’s plan is v.
tidy. But gt. l.a.’s will resent loss of services. They already resent loss
of gas and electricity. Not satisfd tht, W’hall control is essential. This
scheme might draw double attack fr. cos. and l.a.’s.
In my own area rates have gone up 1/= because no surplus revenue fr.
gas and electricity.
If we do this, must expect strong l.a. opposn. Wd. have liked to know
views of largest labour boro’s.
C.E.
Qua techn. efficiency only, natd scheme represents maximum
advantage.
But no argument used by A.B. wh. wdn’t apply to natn of highways
services.
To take this away fr. l.a.’s wd. provoke v. gt. opposn.
Prefer to seek means of giving extended jurisdn to municipal
undertakgs.
Even smaller authies will put up big fight. And public opinion is not
moving in favour of such transfer.
Haven’t yet settled extent to wh. control over natd services shd. be
exercised by Parlt.
H.McN.
Scottish circs. different. i) smaller ii) biggest areas draw water fr.
near at hand.
iii) l.a.’s have co-operated well in joint schemes. There are some areas
where improvemt. cd. be secured if I had stronger powers to force
combinns.
No technical case for going further in Scotland.
V. strong political objns to going further.
With use the technical and political factors co-incide.
A.B.
Eg. Norwich. A joint board in Norfolk wd. increase Norwich rates.
But a national organn cd. spread cost of equalisation of rates.
Cab. shdn’t think a Joint Bd. solution wd. be universally popular with
l.a.’s.
And under Natl scheme you can make water available in transit.
G.A.I.
Must be public control on national basis. Must bring big l.a.’s into this.
Pride of l.a.’s in their water projects : plan tours to it
Not impossible to work l.a.’s into national scheme, as servants of
Minister.
12
J.G.
Discn overlooks case for natn scheme in failure to supply rural areas.
Party thght tht. on this a/c some form of national ownership and
control is inevitable. It was part of our rural policy.
The l.a. organn will never get water into rural areas.
Believe l.a.’s will object to this loss less than that of transport, gas and
electricity.
P.M.
This pattern is too uniform.
A.B.
May I submit 2 maps a) national system.
b) Joint Boards.
Also financial incidence of b).
H.M.
Divided views. Other possibilities – eg. leavg. big authies alone.
Equalisation of rates wd. have to wait for some time.
Our hands aren’t tied, on method, by our P’mme. Nor by King’s
Speech. Quoted from each.
A.B. believed he might get legn this session. Scotland doesn’t want
natd system.
A.
Vast topic. Objective: supply in rural areas. V. perplexing.
Can’t grasp A.B.’s plan w’out more informn.
Some natl authy shd. be responsible for collection and responsive to
public needs, accountable for carrying water to rural areas.
But, per contra, authies like Sheffield won’t surrender their gt.
achievemts. w’out a fight. Cd. we not rope them in?
Agreed
{Discussion to be resumed.
{ A.B. will submit maps.
13
8th May 1950
C.M. 29(50)
1.
H.M.
Tourist Accommodation 1951.
[Enter B., M.W., R.R.S.
F/Britain Office v. anxious. Council (incldg. all pol. Parties) feel
alarmed.
Not enough hotels in Ldn. Developmt. held back because investmt.
p’mme. – for some people wd. be willing to build if they could.
Private accommn, incldg. boarding houses, will be tried. Was
successful in F/Edinburgh.
Requisitioned hotels, incldg. Gt. Central.
Service Dpts. asked if accommn available for youngsters.
Deep shelter at Clapham might also be used for young – W.T.A. to
run.
Endorse proposals of B/T.
Catering Wages Bd. – heavy burden on hotel managemt. Cd. enquiry
launched into that be expedited. Some concession, here or elsewhere,
is essential if people are to risk money in hotel business.
Danger of Festival being discredited in advance. Cooks in N. York
have already thght. it necessary to warn clients off.
Want directions in principle to Dpts. to co-operate, unless over-riding
objns in any particular case.
H.W.
Strain on hotels – x/ due mainly to increased U.S. traffic since
devaluation.
Requisitioned hotels – much done in last few months. M/W. v. active.
Believe Rlways Executive cd. be more accommodatg. on Gt. Central.
New bldg. For some yrs. post-war no disposn to build. But in last 2/3
months more signs of readiness to build – because i) x/ above ii) hope
of easement of catering wages. Purchase tax deters : but B/T. and Ty.
considg. easement of this on dollar-earning expre.
Carlton project : satisfied there isn’t a reasonable financial return.
More profitable to build offices. Another Knightsbridge scheme is in
same case. Don’t believe new hotels will be built w’out financial
guarantee.
In 1951 we may have to take direct action to reserve accommn for
dollar tourists : for pressure of U.K. trippers to Ldn. will be v. strong.
Latter must be drained off to boardg. houses, private accommn etc.
Clapham shelter must be kept open.
Suburban hotels (ques. by P.M.) have bn. brought under review.
2 Park St. G.H.F. are lookg. for other premises. If they find them,
handg. this over as annex to luxury hotel in neighbourhood wd. help.
R.R.S.
Tendency to go for offices etc., is due to extra profit from that.
Believe we may have to restrict use on de-requisitioning.
Carlton. B. Smith willing to run it, but won’t put up money.
2 Park St. Cd. be made to pay, for dollar tourists, if we had licence.
Wd. give another 25/40 beds for U.S. tourists
14
Can’t build new hotels in time for Festival.
Clapham – W.O. condn is return at 24 hrs’ notice. Shd. get over that.
J.
Don’t concentrate overmuch on Ldn. Big country houses cd. be
organised.
House nr. Winchester with 21 bedrooms for £6.000.
G.A.I.
Catering Wages enquiry is going as fast as it can. Hold up for a month
at outset because trade not ready with evidence.
B.
Rlway Executive. I told them not to buy property, but to use own.
Got Gt. Central Hotel out of Service Dpts, with gt. diffy. Not
practicable now to turn them out – they have nowhere else to go. We
haven’t even bn. ready to allow them repair central stations wh. wd.
give them more office accommn.
H.D.
I enquired before Election. Agreed no hope for new bldg. Must use
existg. bldgs.
Believe Rlways cd. squeeze up – release St. Pancras hotel.
Hotels cd. reserve more accommn for dollar tourists.
Booking in U.S. Hotels were ready to facilitate this. It wd. help Clubs?
H.W.
Some progress made. Varying answers. Only one Club has agreed to
reserve hotel space – Junior Carlton. Most others have promised
special arrangemts. for honorary [or temporary] membership.
A.B.
Two inhibitions on hotels etc. – i) catering wages ii) licensing laws.
Can’t get Britain to go gay because of (ii). If (ii) were reasonable,
hotels themselves cd. make us go gay.
C.E.
How cd. you alter that in present Parly situation? We went as far as we
could in last Parliament.
F/Britain Cttee want w’drawal of afternoon break. The industry wd.
oppose that.
R.S.C.
Govt. cdn’t embark on hotel industry, wd. need legn and more time
than here to ’57.
Carlton. Only 7 year tenure: and £400.000 requd. Hopeless.
Ready to consider guarantee. But cdn’t provide the money.
Purchase tax – is under considn.
H.W.
There is one project where much of accommn cd. be available by ’51.
Knightsbridge project.
R.S.C.
That can be handled on Investmt P’mme.
H.W.
Not ready by ’51 isn’t final answer. Tourism is continuing dollar
earner. We have 3 or 4 propns 2 by U.S. interests, who don’t want
financial guarantee, only investmt consents.
15
Carlton. Agree not economic for hotel trade. But might pay Govt. in $
to lose £ over this. $600.000 takings likely in 1 season.
Might be sound propn for b/payments.
H.M.
Cdn’t N.Z. take another site?
R.R.S.
That’s v. unlikely.
Knightsbridge. If not yet started, can’t be finished before end ’51.
A.B.
Startg. new hotels in Ldn. will be v. unpopular politically qua housing.
H.M.
But apart fr. F/Britain, there is strong case for dollar earning tourists.
P.M.
Make it clear tht. this comes out of commercial allocn not out of
housing allocation.
B.
In long-term, B.T.C. can make contn. Terminal hotels are paying well.
This is permanent p. war problem – not to be relieved by temporary
expedients. Give B.T.C. allocn under Inv. P’mme. and they will make
big contn.
R.S.C.
No room for more capital investment. Can’t set out on p’mme of hotel
bldg. The Carlton project is the most practical. If we cd. get someone
to do it.
H.M.
Cd. some new hotels be added to investmt p’mme at expense of
commercial and industrial p’mme.
A.B.
At expense in Ldn. of office bldg.
P.M.
Agreed. Subject to no interference with housing, consider allocn under
investmt p’mme to one or two hotels.
H.McN.
Wd. provoke similar demand from Scotland.
Believe quickest way is to squeeze out people like
B.T.C.
H.W.
Cd. M/W. extend his survey to hotel-use for other purposes – to go
beyond Govt. Dpt. use and cover other office use.
H.M.
Conversion of 2 aircraft carriers to give more accommn.
H.W.
Need is for more luxury accommn. Wd. this help?
Ship in Thames wd. be v. attractive.
H.D.
Sewerage stops it.
Agreed: H.W. to focus and report to H.M.
[Exit B. and R.R.S.
16
2.
Tea Ration.
M.W.
As in memo.
R.S.C.
V. bad method of buying. Fix the price but get no guarantee of firm
delivery. Have to pick up other peoples’ leavings. It is really a
support price.
M.W.
Return to tea-market. Am putting in a memo. on this.
Can’t start it w’out a stock.
R.S.C.
And this redn in ration is essential to build up stocks.
H.M.
Endorsed R.S.C.’s point with regard to method of purchase.
Cdn’t C.R.O. make repns to H. Commrs. – ruining tea-trade.
Cdn’t we at Canberra raise ques. of increased tea supplies. and
developmt. of tea prodn in Colonies.
A.V.A.
Short period of notice?
M.W.
Can’t lose another 8 week period.
H.M. &
Others
Effect on local elections. Delay until after that, even at cost of losing
another period.
M.W.
Will consider means of p’poning public announcement until after
elections.
Agreed :
M/F. to submit on Thursday plan for doing this after
elections with least loss of tea.
[Exit M.W. Enter K.Y.
3.
E.B.
Anglo-American Discussions.
Have circd report on officials’ discns up to date.
Can’t foresee what U.S. line may be, when Acheson arrives.
R. has made more progress than we hoped – in propaganda, atomic
energy and China.
U.K. and U.S. views – Atlantic, M/East, F/East.
At same time, risk of conflict betwn. economic and political aspects.
On pol. side, I’m sure our interest lies in co-opn with U.S. The Third
Force hasn’t any force. On defence, all practical consns point to co-opn
with U.S. and Canada.
Germany. 40 m. G. associated with west. Formidable industrial
community, wh. has lost most of agric. backg. and will have to live on
exports. Must bring G. into w. world – with minimum friction with
17
French. Must try to bring her in w’out encouraging rabid nationalism
or spread of communism.
But where is she to stand in fin/econ. field? R.S.C. is concerned.
We are being criticised for hanging back in Europ. co-opn.
Risk of Europe siding with U.S. on this. That problem isn’t yet
resolved. We must isolate sterling problem – get decln tht. sterling will
be supported. And tht. no pressure will be put on us in defence ques.
wh. will undermine our economic posn.
Form of conference. Three parts.
i) Anglo-American, where much
can be said wh. won’t be repeated in ii) or iii).
ii) Anglo-Am-French. Will
review S.E.A. as well as Atlantic and Europ. ques.
iii) N.A.T.O. Council. Some
matters also to be discussed with U.S./Canada/U.K.
Atomic Energy the “Know how”. We have got nothing, since passage
of Macmahon Act. F.O. have considered afresh – and all was ready for
new : satisfactory agreement when Fuchs case occurred. Propose now
to try to re-open that.
S.E.A. and F/East. No reason to believe U.S. have evolved a policy
twds. China. We are therefore at cross purposes. Our recognition has
helped to steady things – sure it was wise. But can’t get decided view
on future developmt. of U.S. policy; and this uncertainty is influencg.
attitude of other Comm. countries.
Japan. No sign yet tht. U.S. are ready to consider Peace Treaty.
Don’t see what we can do to force it – tho’ wd. be to our advantage to
see early Treaty.
Defence. Developmt. of events has led to increased expense and will
lead to more unless we can organise Atl. community. W. Union is too
weak : Europe will press us all the time to do more. Want therefore to
widen it up to Atlantic basis and all contribute acc. to capacity. China ???? under one bloc : must be balanced by more than W. Europe. To
take it as a whole, must “have regard to economies it has to carry” (?)
After i) and ii) above, as we enter iii), we must strive for some decln as
to what we stand for, where we are going, and what we intend to do.
F.O. and U.S. workg. (separately) on this. It will be submitted to Cab.
in due course.
Germany. France want her insulated fr. any contact with Atl.
countries. On econ ques. want her handled thro’ O.E.E.C.
18
We shall have to reconcile this. Auriol’s statement y’day was advance.
His attitude is one wh. G. ought to accept – come in and evolve as part
of Europ. organism.
If G. responds to that, France won’t be able to m’tain intransigent
attitude or insistence on G.’s isolation.
But it’s a fact tht. Italy as well as France are afraid of Germany.
Method of handling discussions.
Want help of Ministers mainly concerned with econ. and defence ques.
in these matters as they come along.
Conclusion. To m’tain our liberty, we must associate with other
nations of the west to ensure we aren’t attacked and to develop sound
international economy.
A.B.
i) Bottom of p. 2. of memo. C.P. 92. Disposn of U.S. and Fr. – surely
it wd. be dangerous for us to give impn we are holding back on this.
ii) Para. 6. Hope it will be made clear we won’t make any
concessions which wd. delay viability by ’52. Can’t accept permanent
dependence on U.S.
E.B.
U.S. are in hysteria. France in fear. Because of R. possession of
atomic bomb. Some Congressmen favour therefore approach to Stalin.
My trouble : what are you going to ask for: You wd. be going in
weakness, not strength. Byrnes’ visit in ’45 was a failure and began
cold war – also lost China. My objective: secure liberty of small
nations and their freedom from aggression. They can be clearly
embodied in a document. If R. showed any willingness to call off cold
war and talk, certainly I wd. negotiate.
But useless to try to negotiate with R. from weakness.
A.B.
Agree. But we cd. lose Election if it became known tht. U.S. and
France favoured this but we wdn’t agree.
[Exit G.A.I.
E.B.
If they made up their minds to that, I wd. have to refer to Cabinet.
A.B.
If status quo of discns as in para. 8 leaked, it wd. be embarrassing to us.
For part of Stalin’s strength is his capacity to fake a peace move.
E.B.
I will watch this qua publicity, and leakage.
A.
Fr. weakness emphasises need to get G. into western orbit in right
frame of mind.
E.B.
If you want them to fight, you must let them trade.
[Exit R.S.C.
H.D.
Endorse memo. on Germany. We must continue to distrust them: but
woo them in C/Europe. Try them out in this secondary setting.
19
Main issue: Atlantic community is preferable to W. Europ.
We must lose no opp. of going over to first rather than second.
Support ii) of A.B. from that point of view.
H.McN.
On i) the line is, if U.S. revert to this, to say we are ready to talk on
agreed Agenda includg. atomic energy. Then U.S. will take a realistic
line.
Put Atlantic community first. For then Fr. can take risks with
Germany.
So long as emphasis is on W. Union alone, she can’t.
P.M.
Third Force no good because no force in it. General agreement with
this view.
20
11th May 1950
C.M. 30(50)
1.
H.M.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W.
Business for next week.
Motion on marketing 12/5. Private Members’ M/F. will speak. and
M/F. and M/Ag. will provide material for Govt. speakers.
R.S.C.
“Unopened return” by Ian Fraser, for 12/5, for informn of all controls
since ’39.
We must give prior notice of our opposn – or it will go fwd.
automatically.
Opposn cd. be justified on grds. of waste of paper and manpower.
Agreed : Ch. Whip to arrange and inform Ian Fraser.
Next week. Private Members’ Motion. First one is on petrol rationing.
2.
European Payments Union.
R.S.C.
Long discn in Paris. Tendency for ganging up v. us on form of
agreemt. Imposs. to us. Fr. liable to “do a Schuman” on this as on
Franco-German iron and steel.
We have worked out scheme satisfy. to us and going long way to meet
Europeans. Was to come to E.P.C. tomorrow. Sitn in Paris today is so
critical tht. we want to put this scheme fwd. at once.
H.W.
Is non-discriminn covered?
R.S.C.
Yes.
R.S.C.
Scheme is so complicated tht. Ministers must trust me tht. this is safe.
H.D.
Can we stand on this? Are we going to be pushed again?
R.S.C.
This = minimum of risk. Protects sterling as much as possible.
Agreed : Proceed as R.S.C. proposes.
3.
Legislation Programme 1950/51 Session.
[Not heard – out of room.]
4.
Public Boards : Political Activities of Peers. [Enter B., N.B., P.
P.M.
As in memo. General agreement.
N.B.
Shd. such a lr. be sent to Citrine?
21
A.
Yes: he is the proximate cause of all this.
P.
Add “defence” as well as “economic or social” in last para. but one of
Annex. To cover Lord Douglas. Agreed.
Memo. approved subject to this amendmt.
[Exit B., N.B., P.
[Enter M.W.
5.
M.W.
Tea Ration.
Must now do this at end/July. Have lost 14 m. lbs.
Wd. like to announce next week – because effect on Ceylon market.
Memo approved.
6.
J.G.
[Exit M.W.
Nigerian Constitution.
No. of minority reports. Includg. one on Lagos: but safeguards devised
which shd. be satisfy. item.
Big developmt. of regional autonomy is envisaged, under this federal
constitutn. Central adminn to be drawn fr. that region’s basis.
Major diffy – divn into 13m. N., 6m. E. 6 m. W. = and N. mainly
Moslem. Three main disagreemts in discns because N. (13 m.).
a)
Regn on central legve Council. N. asked for equality with E. +
W.
Became clear tht. E. and W. wd. stay out on that basis.
Compromise : bi-cameral system, in wh. Upper House wd.
have equal repn of 3 districts while Lower was on basis of nos.
repd. That is being worked out.
b)
Finance. N. wanted per capital distribn Para. 6(b).
Cttee will report on this.
Hope agreemt. may be reached on these ques.
Later informn : N. are formg. organn (influenced by religious leaders)
to protect their interests. Raisg. fund – may send delegn to U.K.
My proposals give best hope of reconciling conflictg. interests.
Shd. I now commend these proposals, subject to settlemt. of outstandg.
points by agreemt: - in exchange of despatches?
I believe this wd. be wise. Want authy to do it.
H.M.
One genl. point. Need to be sure they can work this – suppose J.G. is
satisfied on that.
But later on, they may get more independence. Vital tht. by then they
shd. have body of trained administrators, as well as politicians and
lawyers. cf. I.C.S. and its gt. importance in new Indian republic. How
is this going in Colonies? Is there any policy of “Indianisation”?
22
J.G.
V. important ques. Students fr. W. Africa. Scholars can be influenced
in choice of profession. Others can’t. And I’m afraid too many of
them are qualifying as doctors and lawyers.
Also : not enough traing. for artisan level. Trying now for
apprenticeship schemes. Col. Dev. Corp. are agreed on this.
P.M.
I also have spoken about this with Col. Dev. Corpn.
A.
Is any “guidance” to be given to Milverton?
May I assume C.O. will watch timing of any announcement.
P.M.
What is policy v. Africanisation of adminve services? What stage has it
reached. Let us have a report on this. Agreed.
C.E.
Bring Africans over at more mature age – not students. e.g. African
Police.
Memo approved.
23
15th May 1950
C.M. 31(50)
1.
Canadian Wheat and Flour.
[Enter M.W., K.Y., and H.G.
M.W.
No time for prior Ministerial talks because time of visit advanced.
Our objective: freedom to buy on best terms: help b/payments.
Freedom limited by W. Agreemt. Don’t want it more limited, esp.
when signs of buyers’ market.
See C.R.O. point and wd. like to be kind to Canadians. But if
b/payments permd I wd. sooner spread any concessions over other
Canadian supplies. Salmon and cheese prob. only food supplies.
Don’t do it on wheat.
Don’t want to make any concession on “have regard to” clause. Wd.
prefer para. 14 method.
G.W.
i) Is it so certain tht. market will move our way? Not so sure we shall
succeed in forcing down dollar price. Anyway, don’t like trying to
force collapse of prices for wheat over and above: I.W.A. quantities.
We don’t want wheat prices to fall too low – start slumps and causes ill
will.
ii) Not askg. for kindness to Canadians – only for wise political
judgmt. to get support of Canadian Ministers for expansion of our
imports into Canada.
iii) “Have regard to”. In view of what we said in ’48, we can’t take the
line that there’s nothg. to discuss. We admd then tht. there was some
oblign.
Proposal to buy quantity fr. Canada via U.S. is prob. good way of
liquidatg. the oblign. But start by admittg. tht. there is some.
His tactics wd. risk an early explosion.
There is a case for offering to take even more fr. Canada. – wheat.
Also favour discussg. easements on other supplies (viz., takg. more).
R.S.C.
Start fr. Comm. agreemt. to cut dollar imports to 75%. We can’t
depart unilaterally from that. Until our p’mme for next 6 months is
worked out in a few weeks, don’t know how much more we can take.
Want these discns limited therefore to wheat. Other Comm. countries
are honouring that decision – important to hold it.
Must avoid pledging ourselves to buy wheat we don’t need for human
consumptn. If we buy max. non-dollar wheat we can under I.W.A. we
shall need only 105 m. bushels fr. dollar countries – and none fr. R. or
Argentine. We shd. concentrate that dollar purchase on Canada. Esp.
now tht. no E.C.A. dollar diffy. will arise we shan’t get any for Can.
wheat – we can give flat undertakg. to buy all our dollar wheat fr.
Canada.
24
At what price? Havg. signed I.W.A. after much discn, to stabilise
wheat prices (85% of our wheat betwn. the margins prescribed) ….
Looks as tho’ there will be surplus next year. We shd. offer to buy on
a negotiated price – and will take a/c of Cl. 2(b) to warrant somethg.
more than minimum. That shd. be the area of bargaining – only on
price. Want any concession for “have regard” to be on price. Thus i)
keep this to wheat ii) firm promise of 105 m. iii) bargain on price, to
wipe off Cl.2(b).
M.W.
Canadians won’t like that. Prairie provinces repd by Howe, who will
want to do as much for them as Gardiner wd. have done. But they
must be expectg. a drop.
Other supplies. Even tho’ not raised now, we may soften him later
with these.
A.B.
What is our storage capacity for wheat?
M.W.
At present we have 16 wks supply and find diffy. in finding storage.
A.B.
I.W.A. not satisf. World surplus next year of 500 m. bushels. If some
unsold, producers may cut down sowing. Isn’t this the sort of surplus
for wh. internatl machinery for buying and storing shd. be available?
M.W.
1946/7 : buffer stock scheme was opposed by us. But under I.W.A.
there is provn for both producers and buyers to store in event of
surplus.
We have now had 8 good harvests running. Ought to be a carry over to
prevent our havg. to go to R. for supplies if there is a bad harvest in w.
hemisphere.
U.S. have stored up to capacity.
A.B.
Cd. M/F. summarise, for A.B.’s informn, stage reached in internatl
discn of surplus.
P.M.
Back to Canada. M/F. line was too tough. C.R.O. may be too soft.
R.S.C.’s compromise seems about right. Mustn’t be too rough in
negotiation.
H.M.
Endorse. Concerned about Canada. They were v. generous and helpful
to us when our stock posn was bad. Their econ. posn isn’t v. strong.
Must therefore be careful in our approach. Also our export posn needs
watchg. A pinch of generosity wdn’t be out of place. Shall have some
trouble over this – don’t have undue trouble.
K.Y.
U.S. wd. have no cause for complaint if we bought all our dollar wheat
fr. Canada. Nor (para.14) cd. they object to our going above the price.
Long-term : Canada will be a better commercial friend and more
reliable supplier than eg. Argentine or Australia.
Favour a gentler approach then that proposed by M/F.
25
T.W.
Animal feed. Keep door open. Might pay us better to buy Can. wheat
for animals. Don’t press this now.
Get as much wheat and as little flour, as we can. For wheat offals is
best animal feed.
A.
Support P.M. and H.M.
He will start fr. fact tht. we are comg. down fr. 140 m. to 105 m.
bushels.
Quite imposs. to say nothg. left in “have regard to”.
Will prob. have to go beyond years’ supply, in discns and talk of
storage. For Howe will be concerned about a big Can. surplus.
Start reasonably on price. Don’t rule out any mention of other
supplies, in later stages.
Must make conciliatory approach.
A.B.
Show decn to buy Can. timber means tht. our stocks are about to sink to
level dangerous to housg. p’mme.
Hope there will be no such generosity in these wheat talks tht. there is
no dollar room for more purchases of timber.
H.W.
Dollar expce recently authorised.
H.G.
It was last autumn’s shortage of dollars – thereafter failure to deliver.
H.D.
Wheat. Para.13. Buying thro’ trade. Change of practice.
R.S.C.
Ty. have asked for this to be held up.
H.D.
Good.
J.
Dec. ’48 we clearly admitted tht. somethg. was left under Cl. 2(b).
Bad tactics to deny this.
R.S.C.
I made it clear in ’48 tht. in our view the oblign was extinguished.
They know that. But we will be polite.
H.W.
Will be difficult. Esp. as our dollar balance is improvg. so much.
They will recur to “triangular economy”.
What are we to say about purchases fr. R.?
R.S.C.
We can say tht., for human consumptn we aren’t going to R. market.
Tho’ we might do it for animal feed.
G.W.
App. B. p.15. Drop in wheat consumptn as cpd. with pre war. Is this
the extraction rate? Shd. we not have more wheat and more animal
feed.
H.W.
These are imports – expln is increased home prodn.
26
P.M.
No talk v. other supplies until p’mme known and prs. Cab. authy.
Negotns to be based on R.S.C.’s formula :
tactical approach to be tactful and kind.
2.
[Exit K.Y.
Minimum Prices for Livestock : Livestock Products.
T.W.
x/ Too many eggs: by 1952/53.
P.M.
Really? Or too high a price?
M.W.
Really a ques. of price. We are having to reduce prices in order to sell
off surplus supplies.
R.S.C.
Ques. really is best distn of £400 m. food subsidies. Eggs, beef etc.
Needs more considn from that angle.
T.W.
Back to x/. Propose no quantitative restn but minimum prices to
discourage any excessive prodn of milk or eggs. Suggest 30-35%
lower than current prices. 2/6d. per doz. for eggs.
Other suggns re livestock.
All this based on 50% drop in feeding stuff prices over next few years.
Won’t be easy to negotiate this with farmers.
Wool : trying for 11% below current. We are makg. big profits on
sales - £2 m. this year.
Farmers, if these prices are fixed too low, wdn’t reach targets and wd.
produce more ill-will than food. These proposals are the most we dare
to go.
R.S.C.
App I. last column are percentages of current prices – not minimum
guaranteed for 1951/52. It’s this expectn of future prices that
influences his behaviour. On that basis, these minima are on the high
side. Only a support price. E.g. cattle : same as before.
No justificn for pigs being treated the same. Nor for eggs and milk.
Wool : first time price has bn. guaranteed. In view of high world
prices, wh. will be m’tained, this is too high.
Want all these prices scaled down – by not v. much.
T.W.
Pig price increase. All feed stuffs subsidies removed. And we haven’t
reached ⅔ of pre-war pig populn. Want further encouragemt. to
breeding.
M.W.
Support livestock proposals. Object to milk/eggs proposals.
Eggs : we can’t sell more than a certain amount at a high price.
Can’t reduce price w’out more subsidy. Diff., when working under a
ceiling.
Milk : propose 1/9.
T.W.
Accept.
27
Eggs : “ 2/6 for 1952/53 and ⅔ for 1953/54. For by then that
will be nearer economic price. And we must eventually enable
supplies to be taken up.
A.B.
Examine this again.
E.Sh.
Includg. reference to subsidy.
May have to revise views of subsidy ceiling, or we shall be
“discouraging production”.
H.D.
If you reduce prices to farmers and keep retail price the same, this
reduces the subsidy.
H.M.
Want a child’s guide to all this.
P.M.
Agricultural Dpts.)
M/Food
)
Ty.
)
to consider, officials
first and then report to
Ministers concerned.
If they disagree, further report to Cabt.
A.
Mistake to reduce milk below 2/=. Price for eggs is too high.
P.M.
As above.
Also genl. memo. on retail prices and wthr. they will drop as farmers’
prices are reduced.
3.
Recognition of Staff Associations.
[Enter N.Ed.
Memo. approved, subject to minor change in final para. of statement.
4.
H.McN.
Scottish Affairs.
Scott. Labour group members are now favouring M/State for Scottish
housing.
Covenant deputn. W.S.C. said to be unwilling to receive them. P.M.
also disposed against. In any reply, we must make it clear there is no
ques. of “negotiating” with them.
H.M.
If W.S.C. saw them, politically unwise for P.M. to decline.
They are taken seriously in Scottish Press. Wdn’t it be worthwhile for
P.M. to see them for a moment and hand them onto S/S. for more
detailed discussion.
C.E.
Wd. you then have P.M. receive a Welsh Nat. depn.
28
A.B.
Need for care. Courtesy, but no overt action. Concessions to these
nat. feelings never assuage them – only sharpen appetites.
When we are aiming at integration in Europe, madness to favour
separation in U.K.
Can’t hold W. nationalism if concessions made to Scotland.
Concessions made to Wales have not satisfied W. nationalism.
A.
Commonsense line is to see these people and persuade them of their
folly. Speak to them with brutal frankness.
H.McN.
Can’t be sure how much weight there is behind this.
But believe there is some restlessness.
Might give them undue encouragemt. if P.M. received them.
P.M.
Receivg. them wd. blacken faces of Scott. M.P.s? Wd. it not be better
if I offered to receive deputn of Scott. M.P.s on this subject.
H.McN.
I will take soundings on that point.
H.M.
Committee. Has this bn. agreed with R.S.C.
H.G.
We aren’t against the appointment of the Cttee.
A.B.
Defer announcement of Cttee.
H.G.
Want to see names, first.
H.McN.
Shd. announce before Covenanters are seen.
A.
Don’t think Cttee. is necessary.
P.M.
Bring up supply. memo. (names) on Thursday.
29
18th May 1950
C.M. 32(50)
1.
H.M.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W.
22/5. Bldg. Industry. M/H. to assist M/W. in debate.
24/5. F/E. and S.E.A. debate. F.O. Ministers. C.R.O. watching qua
Sidney Confce.
Whitsun Recess. 26/5 to 13/6.
On 22/5 debate : agreed – bring in reference to Anglo. U.S. Rpt.
Ch.Whip to ensure tht. it is available in Vote Office (if not already so).
2.
Winnipeg.
P.M.
A.E. wants to put P.N. Ques. askg. us to help.
G.W.
We have made offer to send anything practical – telegram.
H.M.
Choke A.E. off : won’t help.
R.S.C.
Fund (M’head Mayor) – most awkward because sendg. money across
exchange. Better send goods, eg blankets.
Mention it to Pearson and House tomorrow. If no answer m’while
from St. Laurent.
[Exit W.W.
3.
National Insurance: Increase of Contributions.
[Enter E.S.
E.S.
L.P. Cttee majority view in favourg. of going ahead. Brought it to Cab.
because of Genl. Election. My view : more pol. diffy. if we brought in
amendg. legn and gave opportunity for discn of state of Fund.
My experience suggests tht. people don’t begin to shout until its actual.
Fund : £347 m. plus £1.000 m. reserve.
R.S.C.
Increased contns are for retirement pensions – cost of wh. will rise v.
steeply. Reserves accruing fr. full emplt. shdn’t be used for mtg. this.
For that wd. be unfair to Clauses. Wd. prejudice Class I chance of
getting higher benefits or lower contns. Interim reviews this March
likely to show there is room for concession to Cl. I. You wd. stop this
if you now decided v. overall increase.
Thus: let law take its course : give special concession later to Cl. I if
shown they deserve it.
A.B.
Contributors are largely the same people. Total fund shd. be available
for total liability. This isn’t insurance : it’s taxation. The extra 2d. will
be used in capital investmt.
Must we print the cards so early?
30
J.G.
Increase is in Act : part of actuarial calculns. Three surprises:i) Cl. II is less: Cl. I greater than estimated. That has improved posn of
Fund.
ii) Benefit claims for sickness have bn. less than assumed.
12½% was assumed.
iii) Unemploymt. much less than the 8½% recommd by Beveridge and
accepted by us. In practice only 1½%.
R.S.C.
£110 m. p.a. in surplus.
J.G.
With Reserve, £1.000 m.
J.G.
I believe we shall have to make earlier rpt. on workg. of Act – not yet
due (1954).
P.M.
How do you meet J.G. argument tht. assumptions were unduly
pessimistic.
R.S.C.
Ques. is wthr. you make concession to all, or to Class I. (who are only
people who pay unemplt. insurance).
J.G.
Class II will have to pay whole of 4d. increase. Imposs. then to
decrease Class I contn.
G.A.I.
People generally think of this as single all purpose Fund.
Mistake to increase contns when T.U.’s know we are makg. profit on
the scheme.
H.M.
Little scope for manoeuvre on timing. Presentn also important.
If you take Fund as one, burden of o.a.p. on Ty. is enormous.
I agree it shd. be taken as a whole. But that is argument for bldg. up
reserves v. o.a.p. liability.
Why shd. we be ashamed of big surplus.
P.M.
But you told public tht. contns were based on actuarial estimate of
emplt. You are now seekg. existg. generation because of full emplt. to
pay for future.
G.T.
Conservatism of actuaries.
Falsificn of their estimates makes it v. diff. to increase contns now.
E.S.
These are initial diffies. Assumed contns fr. 16 to 60. Many people
entitled to o.a.p. who have never made that contn.
Over next 20 yrs. initial heavy demand wh. won’t be repeated.
H.D.
No need to discuss now increases comg. in Oct. ’52. Also rpt. on
workg. of scheme before end of year.
31
Premature to reach any decision now.
Needn’t take 7 months to print cards. Even if it did, unnecessary to
show Oct/Dec. contns at higher level. Cd. be over stamped later.
C.E.
Must print cards in compliance with existg. law. Shd. show increased
contns.
If we show anything suggesting law is liable to be altered. We shall
provoke agitation by pressure groups eg. o.a.p., spinsters etc.
Comply with the law: and deal with report when it comes up.
E.S.
Quite wrong and confusing to distribute cards with blanks.
(Generally agreed.)
J.G.
Cards must go out by December. Can we expedite prepn of report?
R.S.C.
Govt. Actuary’s Rpt. – up to 31.3.50. Can’t expect that report before
late autumn.
H.D.
Print cards with lower contn.
H.M.
That wd. imply a decision to reduce contns.
Don’t funk the proposn tht. people can’t have big benefits w’out big
contns.
P.M.
Trouble is tht. we put this fwd. on basis tht. these contns are necessary
to these benefits. And assumptns now disproved.
R.S.C.
Even with £100 m. less charge, Exchequer has to carry over £300 m.
Even that is more than we can bear.
P.M.
Whatever we do, there will be a row when report published.
Why not p’pone increase for a time – introduce one Ch. Bill.
A.
Support that suggn. And then hang on to reserves as now.
H.M.
All this dither is over increase of 2d. a week.
Real problem is to make public understand future liability on
Exchequer. This Fund isn’t insulated from Exchequer.
P.M.
2d. isn’t nothing. – takg. account of all other deductions fr. wages.
A.B.
Don’t take political knocks for such relatively small sums.
Reserves at £1.000 m. And this costs about £16 m.
And, as before, this is no longer insurance. Forced savings ploughed
into capital investment. In lieu of taxation. Is it logical to give income
tax relief and increase these contns.
R.S.C.
But there is a Fund, establd by Act of Parlt. which proceeds on the
mathematical basis.
32
J.G.
General ques. must be settled on report.
Only practical ques. now is what we do with cards.
Agreed we can’t leave them blank.
Can’t print existg. figure w’out implying decn to reduce contn.
Cd. we therefore arrange somethg. about the printing.
G.A.I.
I believe we cd. print in 2 months.
R.S.C.
Print as under existg. law. Over-print, if requd before issue. The overprint cd. be done in 2 months.
P.M.
Decn on genl. ques. must await report.
Expedite prepn of report.
)
) Agreed.
Can in its prepn. Correct old fashioned
assumptns re health, old age etc.,
[Exit E.S.
[Enter E.B.
[Enter H.G., M.W.
4.
M.W.
Points Rationing.
Serious complaints. Somethg. must be done. What?
Inflation of points wd. have intensified mal-distn. And even 16 points
is inflationary amount.
a) Mal-distn of supplies. Wd. take 16 wks. to correct. Even then,
b) Small households – only 16 points.
c) V. rigid system.
“Fair shares” will be better secured now by control of supplies to
retailers – who have interest in fair distn in his desire to keep his regns
for other rationing.
Want authy therefore to withdraw the scheme.
H.W.
Supported w’drawal on last occasion. When that wasn’t agreed I
recommended points inflation. M/F. hasn’t done that.
M.W. has even said in H/C. tht. it wd. be silly to do it.
Agree things are now disorderly. And even more diff. for Cab. now to
take the risk. On balance, however, I favour w’drawal.
M.W.
I examd suggn and decided not to adopt it.
H.W.
Were B/T consulted?
M.W.
Yes : on both occasions.
R.S.C.
Is this a way of getting more sugar?
Cd. we not discover how much demand exceeds supply of these
goods?
33
H.McN.
Inconsistency betwn. 2 pp.
Why can’t retailers’ control put it right now?
If we haven’t enough of these goods, removal of rationg. will sharpen
demand. Support R.S.C.
Wd. have liked experiment in points inflation – even now.
A.V.A.
Offls. in M/F. and in food trade do favour abolition. But branch
managers in Co-op. take opposite view. They don’t want retailers’
favouritism.
T.W.
Irritn at system is greater than irritn at shortages.
Can’t be sure of latter. No doubt about former.
Support M.W.
E.Sh.
Present scheme can’t work. But will abolition involve more sugar to
avoid irritn.
M.W.
Irritn is none v. scheme. It wd. then be v. shortage.
H.W.
I still think it’s right to take risk of w’drawal.
And irritn now increases case for doing so.
H.M.
Savings in adminve costs – in M/F. and food trades.
Irritation in Parlt.
On balance, favour takg. the risk.
G.A.I.
Grumbles from housewives. Support M.W.
M.W.
Sugar. We are going to ask for more anyhow. Will have to settle on
merits, irrespective of m’taining points system or not.
P.M.
Don’t let Govt. continue to take responsibility for somethg. they can’t
control.
H.G.
Don’t say it’s being removed because of abundance.
H.W.
Care to avoid run on shops.
Memo. approved.
H.McN.
G.W.
Broke out again. At least points mean tht. people can’t buy more than
their points total.
We shall be blamed if things go under counter.
A.
They are under counter now.
H.M.
Much speculation. P’ponement will give worst of both worlds.
J.
Favour w’drawal of scheme.
34
P.M.
Explann: can’t run points scheme w’out greater range of goods.
[Exit M.W., R.S.C.
E.B.
5.
Atlantic Council Meeting.
1)
Balanced Collective Forces. Much discn. I favoured it over
whole Atlantic area – to get all countries in war fr. outset, work
to Atlantic Budget, get Ch. and staff of all countries service
minded.
Decided: planners must balance natl forces so tht. they will fit in to
genl. scheme. Has now to be worked out in detail.
2)
Machinery. Will be Council (Ministers) and Deputies : Team
of responsible people to work and co-ordinate.
Agreed U.S. Chairman. H.Q. in Ldn. – tho’ not all mtgs. in Ldn.
3)
Declaration. Officials are now workg. on draft.
4)
O.E.E.C. Future arrangemts. for co-ordn in econ. affairs
after ’52.
Will submit more detailed picture in memo.
Will consult G.W. v. informn to Doms.
A.B.
Are we committg. ourselves to spendg. more on Defence?
E.B.
Not finally. Tho’ we recognise greater defence prepns are requd and
must get it by broadening economic basis.
[Enter N.B.
6.
Gas Industry Wage Claim.
N.B.
V. well negotiated. No publicity. No repercussions. Lovely.
Ques : shd. we accelerate discn on higher paid rates.
A.B.
Can’t we control these Bds? None of our decisions on earlier occasion
have bn. carried into effect.
As paymts. are to be retrospective, no need to slow down discns.
H.M.
Gas Council went too fast and commd themselves – irrespective of
Govt. policy.
Memo. noted.
All Bds. to be notified of genl. line to be taken on wage negotns.
[Exit A.
35
7.
Coal : Summer Prices.
N.B.
Pre-war practice – differential of 5/=. Proposed now : 10/=.
10% of people haven’t space to stock. Some bought eg. for cooking.
A.B.
Prodn Cttee have considered this twice – and no support.
Proposal is unacceptable politically. For it = poor people who can’t
stock shall pay more in winter so as to bribe rich to stock.
Our recommn = broadcast advising summer stocking. If people don’t
do so and we have bad winter, say we shall give available coal then to
those who cdn’t have stocked.
Other remedies. N.C.Ps. were ready to subsidise merchants to stock
(£380.000). But have backed out because of fear of demand for similar
concessions to other consumers.
A.V.A.
Support N.B. Nothing new in this to shock housewife.
A. v. sound scheme. Para. 14. shows how many of “our people”
favour it. The more the contn you can get from N.C.B. the better.
G.A.I.
Southwark 70% of coal delivered is in ½ cwt. lots.
Vast areas of Ldn. where no facilities to stock.
Even new flats have only 2 cwt. space.
P.M.
Compromise? Can’t you somehow except those who have no space.
Register them with merchants?
T.W.
Prodn Cttee weren’t unanimous. Broadcast?
P.M.
All wd. support differential price as incentive to summer stocking.
Can’t you make special plan for those who can’t stock.
G.T.
Limitn of deliveries prevents summer stocking.
N.B.
P.M.’s compromise considered. Prodn Cttee agreed it was
impracticable.
N.C.B. naturally reluctant to subsidise merchants.
[Re-enter A.
Merchant subsidy last year was 4/=. paid by Ty.
H.W.
i) Merchant stocking in certain areas like Ldn. is essential.
ii) But shortage of distribn labour etc.
Use threats. Fear of not getting supplies and priorities.
H.M.
Distribution = summer/winter uneven work. V. uneconomic.
E.Sh.
Age old problem. And change of ownership of distn won’t alter it.
Differential price system has existed for donkey’s years.
Even with that inducement, people won’t buy for summer stocking.
On balance, I support N.B. For no other way of dealing with it.
36
H.G.
Para.16. Approve i) - iii). Defer decn on iv) until we have report on
total supplies.
8.
H.McN.
Scottish Affairs.
W.S.C. will not receive the “Commrs”. 3 Tories nominated to do so.
Presume therefore P.M. shd. not receive.
Agreed : sufficient for H.McN. to receive them.
After Cabinet. H.McN had words with H.M., H.G. and P.G.W. about
Cttee.
Suggn of Royal Commn (G.W.) after discussion discarded.
H.M. and others desired tht. Cttee if it found it practicable to have such
a return, shd. produce one – to avoid 2 separate repts. Pointed out,
however, tht. figures wd. have to be presented on Govt. authy.
Compromise: public offl. return either simultaneously or as annex to
Cttee’s rept.
Agreed: H.McN. to discuss t. yr. with R.S.C. and H.M. and report to
P.M. for final approval.
37
22nd May 1950
C.M. 33(50)
1.
H.M.
[Enter W.W.
Business for week after Recess.
[Exit W.W. Enter Serv. Ministers.
2.
E.Sh.
Parliament.
Deserters.
Up before, not qua amnesty – rather on treatment on re-capture.
But raised in Parlt. Further enquiry made. C.O.S. strongly opposed to
amnesty on principle, as is First Lord. Other Ministers and one P.P.O.
think tht. as many are on the run and time elapsed, some leniency
might be allowed. Whole no. is not v. large. But amnesty is to apply
only to non-regular element in total no. Nor is it to apply to any
deserter guilty of any crime of turpitude (? the person of the crime).
7.800 only concerned therefore.
Considered applyg. it only to those desertg. durg. war. Rejected
because nos. who contd to serve post war. Date chosen therefore was
1.1.47. Admit this isn’t logical and will perpetuate some anomalies.
But does it act as deterrent to w’hold amnesty? Evce is tht. it doesn’t.
Consns against.
Arguments evenly balanced. My concln: threat of punishmt. is no
value to Services. Amnesty after 1st war.
P.M.
But no conscriptn in peace after 1st war.
H.
Proposed, under amnesty, to discharge – and not require them to serve
remaing. time.
For us, this is a ques. of principle and discipline.
Nos wd. be small. For ⅓ men servg. regular agreements. Response to
earlier concessions has bn. small. As it was in 1922 – when 170 p.
month arrests fell to 140 p. month surrenders after announcemt. of
amnesty. Small response wd. make breach of principle unwarranted.
A.H.
A.M.P. strongly in favour. Doesn’t think it wd. prejudice discipline.
I agree with that view. 1922 amnesty didn’t prejudice R.A.F.
discipline.
Over last 5 years, large nos. deserted in 1947, 48: but sharp drop in ’49
– to ⅓ of ’48. Our problem is easing off.
P.M.
What will you do 2 yrs. hence if desertions continue?
E.Sh.
Amnesty isn’t to apply to regulars.
P.M.
Are you to say “this is the last time”?
E.Sh.
This is a post-war clean up.
38
H.M.
But extends to Jan. ’47.
E.Sh.
All of those nearly must have begun to serve during war.
A.V.A.
About 200.000 must have bn. called up betwn. 1945 and 1947.
M.St.
Answered adjournment some 12 months ago. May be awkward to
justify change of policy – no danger of circs. Indeed, more diff. to do
this now because of impending service of N.S. men.
P.M.
If some had hung on longer they wd. have avoided penalties they have
served.
A.V.A.
Memo. is illogical.
After 1st war, no peace-time conscriptn. The 3 Dom. countries who
gave amnesty don’t have conscription.
We are now havg. to send conscripts to potential battle areas. What
encouragement to these men to desert.
Opposed to amnesty.
A.B.
Wd. census next year find some of these out?
P.M.
This wd. benefit worst elements – who have misbehaved in war and in
civil life. Cuts at whole roots of our society. Least good citizens are to
benefit. Better men gave themselves up and took their punishment.
J.
Make desertion in war seem less serious than desertion in peace.
Earlier concession makes it worse. You call on people then to come
fwd. and take (lenient) punishment. How can you now offer complete
amnesty to those who hadn’t decency to come forward then.
H.D.
Effect on T.A. Stress view of C.I.G.S.
No. is much smaller than suggested. Many Irish. Don’t compromise
principle for so small a number.
C.E.
Police deny tht. deserters are responsible for high propn of crime.
Differentiatg. betwn. regular and conscript wd. also be undesirable.
E.Sh.
I disagree with C.I.G.S. v. T.A.
Agreed: no change in existg. policy.
3.
N.B.
Summer Prices for Coal.
[Exit Service Ministers
[Enter B., N.B., H.G.
Graduated summer prices. Not always as much as 5/= differential.
5/= is only 3d. a cwt.
Propaganda. Much last year. Yet summer sales were record low.
39
H.W.
This small incentive is unlikely to make much difference.
For whole country is getting short of money: and won’t use it on things
not needed until winter.
E.B.
Supported lower summer prices – essential to efficiency of coal
distribution system.
T.W.
Neither price nor publicity alone will suffice. We must do both.
A.B.
Can’t change behaviour of altering prices.
E.B.
Consumer who stocks in summer is providg. industry with storage.
Not unreasonable to pay somethg. for it.
Makes for smoother turn-round of wagons in winter. Merchants must
not store in wagons.
Insurance tht. those who can’t stock will get supplies in hard winter.
B.
All transport consns favour M/F. & P. proposal.
Must get back to pre-war habits.
P.M.
Rebate to people willing to stock, at their charge.
E.B.
Clean coal is more important than money.
R.S.C.
Trouble when price goes up in November.
H.M.
Choice of politically awkward courses.
If we were sure of breakdown in supplies, we shd. have no hesitn in
acceptg. differential price. Figures on p.1. are serious – getting worse.
Need for full explanation as well, now and in autumn.
Driven, on balance, to favour M/F. & P. proposal.
H.McN.
N.C.B. and merchants have interest in stimulatg. summer sales. But no
case yet for view tht. cost be borne by poor who can’t stock.
E.Sh.
Present this as winter price and summer price. Not as increased price.
Answer to H.McN. : ordinary operation of economics. People who
buy when demand is low can buy more cheaply.
H.McN.
But we have a public responsibility for coal.
G.T.
You must relax restrictns on delivery.
P.M.
That is a corollary. Must allow consumer to buy more of his year’s
requiremts. in summer.
N.B.
Daren’t do that until supply is increased.
H.G.
Combine price diff. with maximum relaxn of restns on deliveries.
40
My diffy. : how much do you expect to achieve? Figures on p.1.
influenced by weather. Also coal wasn’t available for summer sales in
’49 : not more than ½ m. tons. Is that worth all political diffy. of price
differential?
But it’s N.B.’s responsibility : let him do what he wants.
A.
At least a step in right direction. To assume supplies to Londoners in a
hard winter, esp. those who can’t stock. Shortage of coal will hurt far
more than 3d. a cwt.
Proposal approved – on understanding tht. N.C.P.s
will take positive steps to ensure supplies to those
who can’t stock.
Announcemt. needn’t be by Govt. The trade can
handle it.
[Exit B., N.B. & H.G.
4.
Scottish Affairs.
H.McN.
Amended terms of reference. Shd. last para. be included?
H.M.
I proposed this addition. If Cttee find this practicable, there will be
demand for annual return in connn with Budget.
Thght it preferable to allow Cttee to produce the informn (furnished by
Dpts.) once ad hoc, and avoid risk of annual return.
R.S.C.
Diffy. – political decn will be requd, on ques. wthr. return shd. be
made, even if Cttee decided it was practicable.
Suppose they decide it is practicable, with enormous trouble and work
for industry etc. wthr. it is worth while, tho’ practicable, is a political
decision.
H.M.
If Cttee find it practicable, cd. you resist demand for the informn
R.S.C.
You might eg. if it involved much work for firms under (c).
Agreed : Omit para. 2.
A.B.
R.S.C.
If you have such a Cttee to pacify Scottish nationalists, you will have
to do it for Wales also. Propose tht. Cttee be extended at once to cover
Wales.
Scotland is diff. in this respect fr. Wales. Expce eg. is separately
x/ ascertainable because of Scottish Dpts.
There will be pressure. We can meet it by saying tht. if it is found
practicable for Scotland we will consider doing the same for Wales.
41
A.B.
That line of excuse at x/ wd. support claim for 5 yrs. for Wales.
Must have my view on record. I have consistently opposed this sort of
thing in Wales. My opposn to W. nationalism will be undermined by
this.
H.M.
Diffce betwn. AB., and some of our supporters. I and some colleagues
take a middle view. Extreme opposn to nationalism may not be right or
wise.
Agitation in Wales isn’t so great as in Scotland.
H.D.
This wd. be salutary effect on silly nationalism.
Memo. approved.
A.B. dissenting.
42
[Exit R.S.C.
2nd June 1950
C.M. 34(50)
Integration of French and German Coal and Steel Industries.
H.M.
Have seen E.B. with K.Y. – this am.
K.Y.
Many interchanges with French. Starts fr. 25/5 message from E.B. to
Schuman suggest. Franco-G. conversns with U.K. associated. (Started
on Franco-G. basis – tho’ gone away from it now.) That crossed Fr.
askg. agreemt. to communiqué (agreed with G.) involvg. prior
commitment. They had sent same note to other Europ. Govts. We said
we cdn’t come in on this basis. Fr. said we cdn’t participate on diff.
terms. Schuman said we wd. accept addl. sentence puttg. terms in wh.
we wd. participate.
Tel. 176 to Brussels of 25/5. 2nd para. sting. Fr. intend negotns to start
with a Treaty – before details of plan discussed.
Other Govts. have accepted – tho’ some have added reservns which
show tht. their posn is v. like our own.
Tel. 491. of 31/5 was our intended addn to the communiqué.
Does not commit us to more than “a scheme”.
Fr. Ministers decided to reject this. Stressed common commitmt to
common aims. Hence proposal in Annex I. to C.P. 120. – askg. for
reply by 8 pm. tonight: if we can’t accept, they will go ahead with the
others.
C.P. 120. Proposed tht. we shd. issue our own communiqué.
Alternative: might we propose mtg. of Ministers in Paris etc., ….
H.M.
We welcomed Schuman’s initiative – but implied we shd. want to
know more about it. Fr. want acceptance of principle before details are
worked out. Typical of diffce betwn. Continental and British approach
– nothing sinister in this.
“???? to themselves as immed. aim” – same concn : Fr. prob. thinkg. it
gives room to manoeuvre. But Br. publ. opinion wd. think it commd us
to pooling.
“High authy binding Govts” may mean, in practice, binding Parlts.
Also means possibility of closing mines or steel works: v. awkward
politically.
On other hand: if you start, and then w’draw, we shall be accused of
breach of faith.
Fr. are trying to commit us to scheme, details of wh,. neither we nor
they know.
Maybe much in this – on merits. Don’t want reject it hastily.
Saw E.B. – with K.Y. this am. His view (a) we can’t commit their gt.
indies until we know implicns of scheme. Affectg. large nos. of people
and much capital. (b) didn’t like ultimatum of reply by 8 pm. (c)
procedure was unhelpful.
43
Exchange of notes giving rise to misunderstandings. Mtg. of Ministers
in Paris preferred.
Not much between E.B.’s mind and officials’ recommns.
If French decide to go ahead w’out us, we must make our attitude clear
in communiqué.
E.Sh.
For sake of Anglo-Fr. relns we shd. do all we can to compose diffy.
Support E.B. therefore. But if Fr. go ahead, we must present our case
in best poss. light.
Dutch method – wd. exacerbate Anglo-Fr. relns if we went in and
w’drew.
Pleven told me reason was their concern at developmt. of G. steel
prodn wh. might drive out French. But my hunch is: they are worried
v. defence and its cost are lookg. for a way out.
A strong peace posn wd. enable them to avoid defence prepns.
V. dangerous.
C.O.S. welcomed Schuman plan. If, as result, you cd. get assurance
tht. G. and French wd. join in resistg. aggression, wd. be worth much:
but far fetched. I reject F.O.S. pressure therefore.
Public reaction won’t be bad. Press is good.
Don’t buy this pig while it’s still in the poke.
Fr. draft involves commitmt. We can’t accept w’out knowg. what’s
involved. No. Br. Govt. cd. do this.
x/. in para. 3 of draft communiqué is good horse sense.
Support E.B.’s proposn.
H.McN.
Serious. Will be trouble in U.K. if we part from French on this.
The united Europe faction will complain – we have woo-ed them.
Unusual for us to be faced by French with threat:
[Enter A.V.A.
agree by 8 pm. or we go on w’out you. There may be sinister motion.
May be Fr. think they can evade defence obligns by this. But may be
U.S. are encouraging them: if so, v. serious.
Can’t buy a pig in a poke. But pol. consequences may be v. dangerous.
Support E.B.’s plan.
Look for supportg. arguments. Eg. how can Fr. negotiate with G.
Govt., except with consent of High Commn.
G.A.I.
Domestic consequences. If we pool, less for us: may mean unemplt. in
our indies. Prices. Effects on engineering: exports.
Must know what it means.
G.W.
Comm. contacts makes our posn difft. from that of other Europ.
We shd. be slow to go into this w’out full consultn with them – esp. if
there is ques. of surrendering sovereignty.
[Exit E.Sh.
K.Y.
On McN’s point: Schuman assumed H. Commn consent wd. be needed.
44
W.S.
3 High Commrs authy Monnet to see G. alone. Permission wd. be requd
for any G. action.
A.V.A.
Nervous of public reaction. Dragging our feet.
Contract with steel Feby?
E.Pl.
Preliminary views obtd from them y’day. They don’t think there wd.
be any danger to them if merger w’out them. a) Fr. iron ore fr. N.
Africa: some danger. b) Slump: if union fought trade war with us, they
wd. be strong posn. But don’t fear its competn.
N.C.B. fear they might lose some continental markets – no more.
Full integrn: some advantage to our steel if it were good basis.
D.J.
Support offl. rept. and E.B.’s view.
Worst of Fr. communiqué is binding us to High Authy.
Endorse E.B.’s plan.
H.McN.
If we allow G. to negotiate as equal partners with Fr. etc. on this ques.
occupn is at an end. Restores sovereignty.
E.E.B.
Unthinkable to link this with our scruples. We shd. be accused of
trying to sabotage the whole project – in order to screen our own diffies.
K.Y.
And P.M. welcomed G-Fr. Conversns
At stage of decision, we might take that point. But not as obstacle to
discns betwn. Fr. and Germans.
H.M.
Watch this in wording of communiqué.
K.Y.
What is Paris mtg. of Ministers to discuss?
H.M.
“How are we to handle this ques.”
A.
procedure …. and [the nature of the proposals] wd. be examd.
K.Y.
That means the conference itself.
H.M.
Say “procedure of terms of reference”.
H.M.
Communiqué. Shd. we issue w’out P.M.’s seeing it. Cd. we not hedge
until full Cab. next week. And give background guidance to Press
tonight.
W.S.
1571. fr. W’ton. Stories are slanted in Fr. favour because of absence of
any offl. statement of our view. Our case may go by default.
D.J.
Favour issuing our communiqué at once if Fr. announce decn to go on
alone.
A. and H.McN. agreed.
45
G.W.
Shd. press Fr. not to announce tonight.
Draft communiqué. H.M. and K.Y. to settle text.
K.Y.
Final phrase: intended as red light to U.S. re 3rd Force. Do we want to
do this, if statement is to be friendly. We can tell U.S. privately.
W.S.
Agree – omit.
46
6th June 1950
C.M. 35(50)
1.
Equal Pay : International Labour Conference.
P.M.
Why so late?
G.A.I.
Submn fr. I.L.O. v. late.
P.M.
Was referred to offl. w. party early in April. Wd. have bn. better if
Ministers had seen it in less perfect form earlier.
Diff. for small Cab. to settle.
G.A.I.
Don’t see what other course we can take.
Want to keep ques. in I.L.O. where it will be handled as industrial
issue.
Keep in mind our own policy decln.
Want to nurse it so tht. it comes up next year as Recommn not
Convention.
We cd. then make reservn.
We must take positive line.
On Agenda for 2 yrs. Been steering it. Women’s organns in U.K. who
wd. like a convn support our line of opposg. concept of job content.
Hence “no discrimn ” line.
Must take a/c of diff. methods of wage-fixing in diff. countries.
Discn on position proposed will be better for our prestige and for public
opinion in U.K.
Policy outlined in para. 8.
A.V.A.
I.L. Convns – we enforce and others don’t
P.M.
Even a recommn will give larger impetus to demands. Will certainly be
pressed to apply it to Govt. service.
H.G.
On “as soon as practicable” G.A.I. must emphasise tht. we stand where
we did 2 yrs. ago.
J.
“As soon as economic circs. of the country, in opinion of Govt permit”
would be much safer. Genl. support for this.
E.Sh.
But there are diffies, other than economic. Eg. physiological diffces.
must be taken into a/c.
H.G.
Words like R.S.C.’s quoted on p. 8.
G.T.
Must support M/L. attempt to get discn on these lines.
Remember 1944, when I was at I.L. Confce and resoln passed on Educn
Bill.
We have swallowed all diffies other than definn of what is equal work.
47
L.a.’s stand on point tht. they won’t agree ques. teachers until applies
to Govt. service.
Must try the line recommended by M/L.
E.Sh.
Questionnaire and replies: haven’t seen them: but cdn’t we say there
isn’t enough informn to warrant procdg. Urge collection of more: at
preliminary conference next year. Surely we can dig out diffies fr. the
replies.
K.Y.
Support M/L. plan fr. genl. U.N. policy. Has bn. raised in other U.N.
agencies: we wd. prefer to keep it in I.L.O. If it isn’t being handled
promisingly then, it will be dragged up elsewhere and I.F.T.U. will
explain it.
G.W.
Cd. we swing in social as well as economic context. Can’t discuss
equal pay w’out family allowances. Support E.Sh. – further enquiries
etc. Spin it out.
G.A.I.
Will play R.S.C. line – adding criterion of practicability.
P.M.
Accept principle – subject to social policy and to econ. condns of
country etc.
C.E.
While I support the theory, we have a long way to go before we have
worked out practical appln. In teachg. eg. equal pay wd. drive out male
teachers.
E.Sh.
In practice we are much nearer to it then many countries which are
readier to accept the principle.
P.M.
In spite of pressure groups, doubt if a referendum wd. show a majority
in favour of equal pay.
A.V.A.
Cd. you get a debate on cost – and its inflationary effects – not only in
U.K. but elsewhere.
G.A.I.
Might refer to this in my speech on Director’s report.
Memo. endorsed.
2.
G.A.I.
Industrial Disputes.
In reply to P.M. I have no informn other than what I’ve seen in Press.
Lightermen.
The men have bn. loyal in earlier disputes.
D.L. Bd. have decided to take stronger line v. unoffl. strikes. And
lightermen have come in for 1st taste of this. Doubtful if Bd. were
48
entitled to say men were dismissed. Appeal Bd., tho’ upholdg. decn
recommended re-adminn. And Bd. have re-admitted them.
Quiet reigns in Ldn. Docks.
Festival of Britain.
Comm. aim = delay opening of Exhibition. They can get the men out
and it takes T.U. at least 24 hrs. to get them back.
Also some closed shop trouble – bldg. industry. Believe extension of
this dispute has bn. prevented.
Daily reports indicate restlessness throughout country.
P.M.
Dangerous time – hot weather.
Taxi men ?
G.A.I.
Outside my jurisdn and not employees.
P.M.
Don’t take all your chaps to I.L.O.
And let them keep their eye on this ball.
49
15th June 1950
C.M. 36(50)
1.
H.M.
Parliament.
[Enter Att.G. and W.W.
Business for next week.
Private Members’ Business. 16/6. Resale Price Maintenance.
23/6. Holiday Accommn for families
(cheap).
At Party mtg. Wedy discn on Leasehold. Rpt. has bn. recd. Party
pressure for some action – not known what – but agreed tht.
moratorium be passed pendg. permanent legn. I will have this
examined and put memo. to Cab. and L.P. Cttee.
J.
Authy to press for early printing. Agreed.
Might get interim legn out of report – l.c.m. of agreement betwn.
majority and minority repts.
A.B.
Prefer moratorium. Any Bill wd. take a long time to draft. M’while
give sitting tenant right to go on sitting.
Schuman Plan.
H.M.
Opposn inching. twds. takg. a Supply Day – on Monday week. They
may do it on Motion for redn. If, however, they take supply formally
and put down a Motion it wd. suit me (and us) for we cd. table an
amendment.
Smuts’ Illness.
P.M.
Rule – P.M.’s and Leaders of Parties. But unusual case because Smuts
was member of Imperial War Cabinet. Casey is different – wasn’t a
member of his own Govt. when he was in our War Cabinet.
G.W.
Afraid of repercussions eg. Malan. Wd. a b’cast be better?
H.M.
Leave it to P.M. to judge feeling of H/C.
P.M.
Spoke to W.S.C. – he will favour somethg.
Favour doing it – makg. it clear that Smuts was exceptional qua
member of War Cabinet.
2.
Att. G.
Mr. MacManaway: Report of Select Committee.
i) As he has taken his seat, we cd. say he relies on law and it must take
its course.
ii) Refer to Judicial Cttee for advisory Cttee opinion and indemnity
MacM.
50
iii) Legislate to restrict ineligibility to beneficed clergy in Eng. and
Scotland.
There wd. be criticism – R.C.’s might press for inclusion.
P.M.
I’m told hierarchy wd. not press for it. They don’t allow priests to sit
even on local councils in Eire.
Att.G
I still prefer course (ii) – tho’ Select Cttee rejected it.
P.M.
Diff. to take it now, when Sel. Cttee have turned it down.
R.S.C.
Normal course for a Govt. to take L.O.O.
Att.G.
No: in 1912 they took course (ii).
Att.G.
If Privy Council pronounced against, we cd. indemnify MacM. but not
alter law for future.
H.M.
Wd. like course (i) but Tories may press in debate – amendmt. - free
vote – v. awkward.
A.B.
As Cttee says posn. is obscure, Govt. can’t do nothing. Favour (ii).
P.M.
What is status of advisory opinion? Doesn’t bind the courts.
Att.G.
In fact courts wd. follow that opinion.
C.E.
If common informer succeeded, H.O. might come in. Mecca Café.
Remn of Pen. Act 1875 empowers me to remit penalties recovered by
commons informer in Sunday Observance cases. Doubtful if I have
power to remit in this case.
P.M.
Suppose advisory opinion is tht. he is in breach of law? What do we
do then? He has incurred penalty. How can we promise indemnity in
advance?
A.
Course (i) is impossible. Govt. must do somethg. Course (ii) is the
least we can do.
R.S.C.
Penalty doesn’t arise until sued for. Indemnity promise wd. only be a
promise to oust common informer – i.e. to prevent an action.
Att.G.
This diffce if we promised it in advance of Privy Council opinion we
shd. give him a licence to sit m’while.
R.S.C.
We need only decide to indemnify: we shd. not announce now what
we wd. do about indemnity before Privy C. decides.
51
H.M.
Shall have to debate this. Must make a case for not legislating as Sel.
Cttee recommended. Shall be pressed to state our intentions v.
indemnity.
Att.G.
Need say no more than promise to consider. For Indemnity Bills relate
to past misdeeds: they don’t give licence to misbehavr.
H.McN.
Argument for promising indemnity in advance – we shd. thereby avoid
disfranchising his constituents until law is made clear.
J.
Refer to Judicial Cttee promise (sympathetically) to consider
indemnity ques. when opinion received, w’out commitment.
G.T.
Diffies of (ii) may be great. But (i) or (iii) Wd. be worse.
Att.G.
That ordinn under Act of 1801 = ordinn into establd church.
H.M.
I’m against that.
R.S.C.
Legn to make MacM.’s posn clear wdn’t clarify the law.
Legn to clarify the law wd. be v. controversial.
Agreed :
3.
Advise H/C. to follow course (ii).
[Exit W.W,. and Att.G.
[Enter N.B., M.W., B. and
G.S.
Economic Affairs.
R.S.C.
State of “near boom”. Risk of excessive optimism.
Dangerous feature – b/paymts. overall balance is not developing as
favourable as dollar balance. Reason prob. = terms of trade not as
favourable as we expected with non-dollar world.
H.W.
High import price of rubber, wood & Jute. But down overall balance
and dollar balance no.
R.S.C.
Wd. be serious if it got worse.
External trade also showg. more favourable trend of invisible than
expected.
Balance is on p. 4. Gold and dollar holdings increased since last
quarter of 250. : and 315 if followg. 2 weeks added. Awkward for
Congress debate on Appropn for E.C.A.
Industry. Coal is main worry. More allocated to domestic use: means
reducg. exports: N.C.B. believe damage to confidence and goodwill
may be disastrous in loss of export markets. Only way out: increased
prodn.
N.B.
Target 205-210 m. meant 40-140.000 tons improvemt. Now 54.000.
Viz., above lower figure. And 2nd half-year is apt to be better than 1st.
52
Man power at face stable last 6 wks. if we can hold that, we may do
better than expected. N.C.B. less worried than when they said
what R.S.C. reported.
P.M.
V. serious prospect. Cdn’t we have drive for increased output. Appeal
to men. Only marginal increase of effort.
R.S.C.
I am spkg. at miners’ rally – will mention it.
H.M.
What of No. 10 mtg.
N.B.
Will make proposals.
A.B.
Mining is impossible in modern condns – no one will do it if he can
earn living otherwise. As society develops more attractive
occupns you won’t get men to go down the mines.
Against another campaign of exhortn. Scientific re-organn is only hope
for increased output. Exhortn emphasises peculiarity of mining: want
rather to stress its normality. You can’t get coal by crusades.
E.Sh.
Support A.B.’s view. Publicity: appeals are at least useless – may even
be adverse.
Mtg. of P.M. etc. with N.C.B. – to cross-examine them on speed of reorgann might be worthwhile considering.
Can’t blame the men: o.m.s. has risen and is above pre-war.
[1947-8 nos. increased : now dropped to 700.000.]
P.M.
I don’t know enough to ask the ques. I’m against both exhortn and a
mtg. with N.C.B.
H.W.
Agree with P.M. Re-organn is procdg.
Factors i) smaller families and better educn means fewer
recruits for mining.
ii) condns are much better and we are almost m’taining
labour force. And o.m.s. is rising: absenteeism falling.
If we stop these appeals, we shall prob. get the coal.
J.G.
Cd. we know N.C.B.’s plans for future. Reid Rpt. contemplated labour
force of 500.000 and thght with mechann that we cd. get coal we
need. I went into pit at 13. I wdn’t have gone at 15. And now boys
stay on at school until 15.
Knowg. trends of man power, how do N.C.B. propose to offset them?
Industry is quiet: no strikes: leave well alone on exhortn.
Early July annual confce of N.U.M. will show feeling in industry. Cd.
have a private confce then with some members of Govt.
53
A.B.
N.C.B. and N.U.M. are not worried about long-term problem.
Mechanisn will off-set drop in labour force. Preparg. national plan: I
expect it soon: we shall have to examine it before publn.
M’while short-term improvemts. in output since ’46 are impressive.
Juvenile intake is fairly good: problem is subsequent wastage before
21 or so.
13 m. days lost p.a. betwn. wars. 710.000 since natn - 80.000 this year.
Against genl. exhortn but we shd. get more done by lodge leaders.
H.M.
What are we going to do about it, then? Let things drift?
A.B.
Need is for a stronger technical drive.
P.M.
Short report fr. M/F. & P. on technical development.
G.T.
Trouble still in relns betwn. men and local management. Time is being
lost over that – thro’ managerial incompetence.
G.A.I.
Generally there has bn. an improvement. Disputes are being composed
more quickly. Wd. like to add somethg. on this in N.B. report.
Exports.
H.W.
3½% increase in daily rate of exports in May.
23 m. dollars to U.S. in May – record. To Canada 34.7 m. in May.
Textiles.
H.W.
Cotton and wool prodn is moving well. Synthetic fibres (to avoid
imported materials). Rayon ⅓rd more than last year. Nylon 6 times
more than early ’49 and price is dropping. Shd. help clothing
prices – summer dresses at 20/=.
Nylon figures shd. be included in Econ. Rpt. (?)
Nylon hose. 20 m. p.a. to home market. Quality better than U.S., wh.
have now bn. made to ladder so as to sell more.
E.Sh.
P. 2. A misconceived point.
H.D.
9% - beats prophecies. Experts said only 4½%. Re-inforces my point
tht. plans based on pessimistic estimates.
R.S.C.
E.P. Union.
At beginning this wk. arranged method (in Paris with Fr. and U.S. and
others).
Main point was gold point. Times today: Belg. Govt. have rejected it.
Will be awkward to hold others to it – in view of Paris attitude on
Labour Party manifesto. May mean we shan’t get E.P.U.
54
Man Power.
A.
Para. 4 suggests we have made no impn on unemplt. in dev. areas.
Debate H/L. Said factories doing well in these areas were being
prevented fr. expanding their activities. 2/5ths of total emplt. is in
dev. areas.
H.W.
Recovery is lagging. Tho’ over 1000 new factories, unemplt. is
no less. Reason mainly: no. of new factories have dropped away.
Dollar investmt test has inhibited some expansion of factories.
See my memo. to Prodn Cttee.
H.D.
Quicker and better results fr. concentratg. on extensions of existg.
factories via bldg. new ones.
H.W.
We need both.
C.E.
Emplt. openings for men all sadly needed in dev. areas.
[Exit M.W., B. and N.B.
4.
Iron and Steel Act.
G.S.
If we want Corpn on 1/10 and resting on 1/1/51, I must go ahead now.
But I can’t get a Corpn if there is to be an Election in autumn.
The best people in the industry will wait to see results of Election.
Don’t want to start with weak Corpn. Wd. wreck chances of success.
My concln : we must announce before 1/10 tht. we propose a
p’ponemt. eg. for 3 months.
P.M.
This raises ques. about date of Election which we shd. discuss w’out
offls.
[Secretariat then withdrew.]
55
19th June 1950
C.M. 37(50)
1.
Malaya and Singapore.
[J.S. and K.Y.
P.M.
V. valuable report – and good thing both Ministers went.
J.G.
First visit by Col. Secy. Welcomed on all sides.
Valued 2 mtgs. with M.M. – includg. one with C.O.S. present, attended
by J.S.
Military situation: bandits had bn. chased out of one area into another.
Briggs’ plan therefore based on civil consolidn behind mily advance.
Begun on 1/6 in Jahore. By end/Nov. expects to clear that and
adjacent State. For further success, re-inforcemts are essential – see
paras. 2.6 and 11 of memo. – i) Police, officers and n.c.o.’s. H.O. have
promised to help: won’t be easy: if we can’t get all here, prs. we might
get some fr. Australia.
P.M.
Retired Indian Police ?
J.G.
Some diffies fr. re-inforcing from Pal. Police earlier. Wd. be easier for
Malayan Police if re-inforcemts. came fr. H.K. Police. Wd. like to try
that source first. Jungle squads – 45 cos. planned. To keep cleared area
clean of bandits. For these we need n.c.o. from Army. Callg. for N.S.
men to volunteer for continued service in that capacity. Asian officers
needed also – Police College to meet that need.
ii) Adminve Re-inforcement. Many men are tired – many are people
who were captives in Jap. hands during war.
iii) Repatn of Chinese. This was done formerly and was determent.
Since Sept., new Comm. Govt., this has had to be stopped. Detentn
camps are unsatisfactory – mass escape wd. be possible. 10.000
already and nos. will rise as Briggs’ Plan succeeds. Problems and
dangers will increase. Fully discussed. Arranged tht. 200 shd. leave
on 5/7 for Swatow: master was willing, but ship has m’while bn. lost.
M.M. is considerg. removal of some to Christmas Island – if Australian
co. with concession then wd. agree.
iv) Propaganda. Will report in detail to Malaya Cttee. Much scope for
improvemt.
v) Finance and Economics. M.M. is preparg. apprecn of econ. sitn of
Fedn by reason of emergency. Clear tht. U.K. will have to give more
help. Will discuss with R.S.C. when apprecn is available.
Told local Govt. they must increase their revenue, prob. by increased
export tax on rubber and tin – from 20% to 30% or even 40%.
R.S.C.
That wd. mean paying tax in dollars and reducg. our dollar market.
56
J.G.
Alternative = income tax and they can’t administer that.
The export tax is there now.
R.S.C.
But it hits us. And might make U.S. go over to synthetic rubber.
J.G.
Contacts with T.U.’s. The T.U. adviser in Malaya is doing v. good
work.
Want to give T.U.’s a boost – as only direct contact with masses.
They asked me tht. Fred Dalley shd. go out for 6 or 12 months to help
them.
Hope to persuade him to do so.
Europeans pressed for assurance we wdn’t leave Malaya for 20/25
years.
I declined to go beyond P.M.’s statement.
Raised ques. with M.M. – who believed, with Govrs. and officers, tht.
it wd. take 25 yrs. to train Malayans for self-govt. : but he now thinks
tht. S.E.A. political climate has changed and we shan’t be given 25
years. My view is tht. pressure for constitutional change will come
after emergency is over. Plans shd. therefore be made now – or we
may lose initiative. Social plans, apparently, as well as constitutional –
develop social services and road development and rural standards of
life. W’out added fin. assistce, Fedn won’t have resources to go ahead
with these plans as well as paying for emergency.
J.S.
These points to add:i) Support plan for Police and adminve re-inforcemt. Paras. 6-11.
Otherwise, all Army’s work will be lost.
Needs as now establd are reasonable and based on full appreciation.
Army morale, now good, will suffer if areas pacified by them ship
back into anarchy.
ii) Repatn of Chinese. Must decant them somewhere. But to China –
only after careful screening; for to send back member of Comm. Party
wd. mean only giving him a refresher course - getting him back in
worse form. Send only suspects who aren’t politically dangerous.
Powers of detn need strengthening. Release on recommn of advisory
Cttee is weakening posn of Army and Police.
iii) Informn Services. Key appointment. Political warfare. Welltrained political mind – man trained in Labour movement.
Many of officials are v. naïve about all this. Someone who can
combine severity in repressing emergency with far sighted apprecn of
need to come to terms with growing nationalist movemt. Also
appreciate T.U. movement. Brazier gets support fr. Govt. but bitter
opposn fr. Employees, both British and Chinese.
57
P.M.
Disturbing thing is late stage at wh. civil Govt. work up to need for
Briggs plan of consolidn behind Mil. advance.
Questions i) why do they prefer police fr. U.K. rather than ex. Indian
Police, who understand Asiatics.
J.G.
Re-inforcemt. fr. Palestine Police 2 yrs. ago. upset Malayan Police –
many of whom were displaced. They don’t want that to happen again.
A.V.A.
People with Asiatic background wd. fit in easier.
J.S.
Malayan Police are jealous of new-comers arriving.
There will be some row even over introdn of U.K. re-inforcements.
P.M.
Can’t bow to inefficiency of Malayan Force.
C.E.
Maxwell’s report was devastatg. qua efficiency. Force is in rotten
state.
Drastic steps needed – fresh blood essential for that.
We have no surplus in U.K. And won’t be easy to get men to go out.
Espec. as they can’t take families out. Also recruitment for Pal. and
Germ. Police Forces isn’t encouraging. They will be sceptical v.
continuing emplt. Am willing, however, to try. Will put national need
to a conference of Ch.C.’s and urge them to call for volunteers. Shall
get some but not v. many. No power to second men. And Police
Council wd. oppose legn giving such powers. Might persuade
individual Police authy to make arrangemts. facilitatg. departure of
volunteers – and cd. show a good example qua Met. Police.
G.W.
Some good Indian Police must still be available – M/L. shd. know.
Must be some U.K. police coming free fr. German Force.
C.E.
They are v. disgruntled. Dangerous to send them out.
G.W.
Will ascertain facts, with M/L. re Indian Police.
G.A.I.
Must be army ex. officers on my Register.
R.S.C.
What type of men for adminve re-inforcemt?
J.G.
Col. Service probationers. We are handling that.
E.Sh.
Of course emergency must be brought under control.
But this country won’t be put on its feet by re-inforcemts. of police etc.
What is record of local Govt.? First phase: complacency and overconfidence. Second phase: before arrival of our Ministers, mil.
demands for re-inforcemts. of all sorts wh. under x-examinn turned into
need for stronger civil administration. Viz., at first, local Govt. were
confident they cd. handle it on their own: then, they panicked for much
more help then we cd. possibly give.
58
“Build up T.U. movement.” Why? Because social and industrial
condns are v. unsatisfactory. Chairman of one of big tin cos. (paying
60%) has said tht. trouble with workers of Malaya is tht. they had no
sense of social order. The Employers are intensely re-actionary.
By T.U. movement we may off-set effects of Comms. There are only
4.000 of them: they cdn’t have succeeded so far unless condns had bn.
so unsatisfactory.
This needs careful and prolonged study. ? in Malaya Cttee.
I suspect tht. a more positive policy is more important than reinforcemts.
Amnesty?
J.G.
Leading Chinaman in Malaya had informn tht. most bandits wd. be
ready to throw their hand in on basis of amnesty. But I’m, sure tht.
this, now, wd. be regarded as defeat for U.K. Captured document
shows bandits are discouraged because thght they cd. beat U.K. troops
as easily as Japs did – in 80 days. We must go on a reverse effect of
our rout before Japs. Otherwise our prestige will not recover.
Don’t close my mind to it for future. If Briggs plan succeeds. in
clearing Jahore and neighbourg. State, we shall go on to Pehang. That
is where Comms. are strongest. If we cd. defeat them there, amnesty
might be worth while. To offer it now cd. be read as sign of weakness.
P.M.
Genl. financial position? Do local people still dislike Ldn. cos?
R.S.C.
Posn has changed. It’s small men who have done well lately, not big
estate co. Now they are v. prosperous because of high price of tin and
rubber.
But they have had to spend a lot on war damage: bandits.
We must give them more help, but on condn i) tht. they reform own
taxn system and ii) contribute to policy of social improvemt.
Ready to say at once tht. in principle we will help. But we must make
this the occasion for a clear understanding of what future policy shd
be.
A.B.
Hope apprecn will cover economic problem – excessive dependence on
rubber and tin.
J.S.
A capitalist society, doubtless, for many years to come. But it must be
an up to date one. There must be some substantial re-distribn of
income.
Civil Service still see their duty as one of securing maximum output of
tin and rubber at cheaper prices.
P.M.
Parliamentary statements. Shd. be one only – Wedy is most suitable
day – by J.G., referring en passant to J.S.
J.S.
I was told by H.M. tht. he wanted me to make a statement.
And I have now promised it, in reply to P.Q.
59
R.S.C.
Awkward for J.S. to draw back.
J.G.
Will p’pone mine until Wednesday.
P.M.
Let J.S. statement be more brief and follow on same day. As an
addendum – followg. up at once.
Agreed.
R.S.C.
Wd. like to consult re method of mentiong. financial assistance –
perhaps suggesting somethg. about condns we shall impose.
I will send over a re-draft.
[Exit J.S.
2.
J.G.
J.
Coloured People from Colonies.
Crowded colonies of these people in 4 or 5 areas. Provokes fear of
coloured ghettos.
Prime need is to disperse. Avoid creation of large communities.
M/L. are doing their best. Some employers and T.U.’s make diffies
over emplt. of coloured people.
Diff. to integrate them into community. Want Govt. Dpts. and vol.
agencies to come together over this. Decided to convene a Confce for
this purpose on 10/7. in hope of permanent national advisory cttee.
These problems are serious enough to warrant that.
Stowaways – fr. W. Indies and W. Africa. Continuing. Ship arriving
B’tol tomorrow with at least 14 stowaways on board.
Amend law to empower you to send anyone back who arrives as
x/ stowaway wthr B. subject or not.
A.B.
Prefer tht. C.O. shd. ascertain what Col. Govt. do to verify no
stowaways on board.
J.
Done by collusion with members of crew.
P.M.
Let L.O.’s consider x/. The whole of the growing surplus of W. Indian
y/ populn can’t be discharged into U.K. On basis of H.O. and M/T.
advice.
G.A.I.
My diffies i) getting employers to accept them ii) objns by individual
employee. Avoiding aggregation.
P.M.
Want genl. ques. examined, in light of y/.
3.
R.S.C.
European Payments Union.
H.G. has done a v. good job on this. As Chairman, second agreemt. on
all major points.
Hope we may now get full agreemt. by end/week.
60
4.
R.S.C.
Canadians have nothg. specific to discuss.
But we may have to give something by way of increased imports into
U.K.
5.
P.M.
Anglo-Canadian Continuing Committee.
Lord Addison : 81st Birthday.
Telegram to L.P.S. on his 81st b-day – from Cabinet.
4.
Anglo-Canadian Continuing Committee (continued:).
A.B.
Hard wood.
R.S.C.
Howe has done excellent job. Has got rid of “have regard” Clause.
61
22nd June 1950
C.M. 38(50)
1.
H.M.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W., Att. Genl.
Schuman Debate : another ½ day in response to repns
Govt. spkers : R.S.C. and P.M. – in that order.
2.
Mr. MacManaway’s Position.
H.M.
Was ready on Thurs. to take Cab. line. But no-one raised it. Inclined
to let things drift. MacM. is away for 2 mos.
J.
Must get on with Court if it is to be tried.
R.S.C.
We did decide tht. this course shd. be taken.
P.M.
Constituency is unrepresented m’while.
A.
You are the Govt. Can’t shelve it indefinitely.
H.M.
V. well: let Ch.Whip see if Opposn will raise it on Business today.
And we shd. have to find ½ day for debate next week.
C.E.
Can’t we wait until it’s raised? MacM. has challenged c. informer to
go for him, by takg. oath and constituency is not disfranchised.
A.
Disagree: Govt. has duty to get issue decided.
P.M.
Undignified for H/C. to leave it to c. informer.
A.B.
And you have Sel. Cttee rept. recommendg. legn – because they admit
the doubt.
P.M.
We as a Govt. remitted it to Sel. Cttee. If we don’t accept their
recommn we must put fwd. one of our own.
A.B.
Awkward for Opposn to reject suggn of Jud. Cttee solemn body.
Att.G.
Need Whips be off on a motion tht. Govt. shd. introduce legn?
H.M.
Traditional in matters affectg. composn and procedure of House.
Agreed : Govt. to take on initiative.
Att.G. and J. Then we wd. like a decn next week so tht. prepns can
proceed.
H.M.
Half day on Tuesday next.
62
1.
Parliament (resumed).
Memorial to Keir Hardie.
H.M.
3rd Priv. Mem. Motion on Friday advocates monument in Parlt. Square
to Hardie (Keir).
Rejected by earlier Labour Govt. – Lansbury.
Not suff. Parliamentarian?
Propose to say can’t decide today, tho’ sympathetic.
A.B.
Titular founder of Labour Party. Marked its emergence. Shd. be some
commemoration. V. diff. to reject.
R.S.C.
Snowden. Bust in my room awaitg. sufft. lapse of time to be put in
H/C. What has happened to that?
P.M.
Memorial via statue.
H.M.
By Address if done at all.
Kitchen Committee.
R.S.C.
Rpt. due next week. Shd. be discn of principle. More grants requested.
Will be comment in country on public money for M.P.’s eating
P.M.
Put in memo. to Cttee. R.S.C. H.M. and W.W. and R.P.S.
3.
Pensions for Judges’ Widows.
[Exit W.W.
[Enter E.Summ. and Wheatley
J.
Worried most by Co. Courts.
Jurisdn has bn. extended v. much faster than salaries.
V. diff. for me to get right men at present rates.
Can’t propose salary increases at this stage. Ask therefore tht.
widows’ pensions be provided on same basis as for Civil Service in
1949 and for doctors.
Ask only for leave to approach Judges to seek their agreement and, if I
get it, to go fwd. with scheme.
Details of scheme: on basis of Co. County Judge.
Main worry of Judges is to make provision for widows out of taxed
income.
Recognise we couldn’t legislate this Session.
E.S.
Thought this shd. be deferred because askg. T.U.C. to p’pone claims
for suppl. pensions schemes in socd indies.
On reflectn see cases aren’t dissimilar. We are askg. men to refrain fr.
askg. for new schemes. This is only modificn of existg. scheme.
63
R.S.C.
Moreover, fully contributory.
G.A.I.
I also was doubtful because of repercussions.
Diff. to go on restraing. T.U.’s if Judges, much better off, get this.
Realise it may not be public for some time.
A.B.
No analogy betwn. this and doctors. New service: and sale of practices
prohibited.
But impressed by diffy. of getting new Judges. That is overriding
considn. We have applied it before eg. to miners!
W’draw my objn.
P.M.
I was apprehensive and still am. Will it be a material contn to getting
good Judges?
R.S.C.
On C. Service analogy, it will.
H.M.
Will be incentive to press for higher salaries.
T.U.’s argument not met by argument tht. this is existg. scheme. For
rlways etc. have pension schemes and we are saying new entrants can’t
join them.
R.S.C.
Basis = reducg. existg. pension in return for provn for widows.
E.Sh.
Is there new State money in this?
J.
See para. 3.
H.G.
Govt. will be in awkward posn if legn goes thro’ with controversy.
R.S.C.
But no T.U. feeling over C.S. pension scheme. And not a single
protest on the legn – tho’ that covered thousands and this will apply
only to a handful.
Further discn: stress on diffy. of finding right calibre of men for
Co. County Judges and Met. Mags.
G.T.
Only real repercussion is to teachers. They have taken the point on
C.S. Superann Act. Bound to continue to press for this. This Act
won’t increase the pressure.
E.Sh.
Why is there no estimate of cost. Ty. usually insist on this.
R.S.C.
V. small: not worth bothering to work it out. A few thousands only.
Memo. approved.
[Exit Att.G. E.S. Wheatley
64
4.
[Enter M., K.Y., G.S. and H.G.
Economic Development in S.E.A.
R.S.C.
As in para. 5.
P.M.
Congratns to Paymaster.
Memo. approved.
R.S.C.
Hope C.R.O. will allow Thompson or some good man to go to
Colombo.
H.W.
Will do my best – wanted him for Canada.
P.M.
Support plea for Thompson.
J.
Publish conclns as soon as poss.
This Govt. must treat this with gt. urgency.
A.
Before others do.
5.
Integration of Coal & Steel Industries of Western Europe.
ns
[Enter N.B.
[Exit M.
R.S.C.
Don’t agree with all recomm . V. valuable
report. Cd. a few Ministers go into it in gter. detail.
E.Sh.
Internatl political aspects, incldg. strategic? When is that going to be
considered.
P.M.
First, economic side: R.S.C., K.Y., G.S. and N.B.
Then, political and strategic: E.P.C. might consider that and report to
Cabinet.
R.S.C.
i) small group on economic ii) then E.P.C. to bring in political etc.,
iii) P.M. to put main issues to Cabinet.
P.M.
M/Def. can put in memo.
H.W.
I shd. be in.
G.W.
Comm. angle: will put in memo.
A.V.A.
Consultn with experts?
K.Y.
Steel Fedn individual T.U. repves: but no formal consultn with Unions or
T.U.C.
A.V.A.
Concerned at para. 60 – repercussions on workers.
65
N.B.
We have consulted members of N.C.B. in confidence.
Have had genl. talks with N.U.M. and N.C.B. on international control:
but can’t talk to them on a document of this kind.
R.S.C.
If Cab. decides wthr. we go on with this or not, we can then have
consultns.
We mustn’t consult in advance of that.
Not limited to coal and steel – affects all industry in consequence.
A.B.
Workers won’t accept this unless accompanied by detailed plans
(financial) for expansion.
H.W.
“They” assume planning v. an impending surplus. “We” don’t accept
that: we mean to have expansion.
N.B.
Paris talks won’t lead to early solution.
P.M.
But may be early break-down and then we may be called in.
A.B.
Examine
i) organn for control and management.
ii) political mechanism for supervising it.
ii) financial plans for expansion.
Otherwise this is no more than a restrictionist cartel.
R.S.C.
Ques. i) Is economic co-ordinn desired?
ii) No extra – national body to run our industies outside Govt.
control.
A.
Don’t let us be hurried.
K.Y.
Fr. havg. promised to keep us informed will expect us to comment.
May be awkward to refrain. That will be 1st moment – on time factor.
N.B.
Important tht. we shd. thrust fwd. development issue, early.
A.B.
Yes: for Schuman was considerg. only prodn against assumptn of
impendg. shortage.
We shd. ask for p’mme of progressive expansion eg. steel
consumption.
Otherwise all T.U.’s will resist – won’t have stabilisn or reduction.
Plug investment ques.
Debate on 26th June.
P.M.
Opposn motion: answer is in Times leader.
Able article by Lionel Robbins in Lloyds Bank Review.
R.S.C.
Broad line: a) supra-national authy or cartel are out. But between the
two broad area for investign.
66
E.Sh.
Is any internatl authy compatible with sovereignty?
R.S.C.
Yes: U.N. or O.E.E.C., which latter has done v. much. All liberalisn of
trade in Europe has bn. done by O.E.E.C.
H.G.
Internatl action followg. discn and agreemt. betwn. Govts.
Draft amendment to Motion – approved.
P.M.
Assumed W.S.C. will open.
There might be a “practicable” scheme wh. wd. not be “desirable”.
R.S.C.
Take opportunity of saying what we have done in Europn co-opn.
G.S.
Stress initiative we have already taken.
A.B.
International value of allowg. sterling balances to be drawn down.
N.B.
Tories are not champions of internationalism.
G.T.
How wd. this relate to W.S.C.’s proposal of Anglo-Fr. Union in 1940.
P.M.
Only common citizenship. Nothg. much in that.
Comm. posn. W.S.C. V. vulnerable on that aspect.
A.B.
We favour functional approach. Fedl approach has precluded internatl
action. And it is action which we want. Hope R.S.C. will use the
Party clichés.
E.Sh.
Don’t forget average man in street, who is anxious to retain his
advantages of full emplt. and the Welfare State. Don’t prejudice those
gains.
N.B.
Want rising standard of living throughout world – to assure full emplt.
That has bn. our constant aim.
K.Y.
W.S.C.’s speech in F.A. debate of March is worth looking at – fr.
Franco-G. angle.
P.M.
Perhaps a mtg. on Tuesday am. to take stock.
Cab – Tues. via Monday.
67
27th June 1950
C.M. 39(50)
1.
Schuman Plan – Debate.
[Enter G.S., H.G., N.B.: R. Makins
P.M.
R.S.C. made good case – we had better of debate.
R.S.C.
W.S.C. may upset his Party by going too far in dirn of Fedn.
A.E. was reasonable.
P.M.
May address himself mainly to Labour Party pamphlet.
My task will be to bring debate back to real issue.
Times has publd much of Fr. proposals.
R.S.C.
Our informn about them has bn. obsd in confidence and can’t be used.
H.D.
A.E. gave guarded reply when pressed. Cd. P.M. tempt W.S.C. into
un-guarded answer.
[Enter R. Makins.
G.W.
W.S.C. alleged tht. Fr. Govt. supported “our amendment”. Massigli
was saying the same in lobby.
R.S.C.
Serious notice shd. be taken of that.
R.M.
Was suggd to us unofficially in negotns tht. we might adopt same line as
Dutch. Was never put to us officially.
R.S.C.
It was not Monnet’s view.
P.M.
Let R.S.C. try to get A.E. to stop W.S.C. from repeatg. this.
A.
W.S.C.’s main case will be tht. we haven’t bn. helpful – shd. have
taken initiative.
R.M.
i) For 2 wks. before Fr. announcemt. we were in closest consultns with
French on Franco-G. ques. and not a word was said.
ii) To improve Fr. G. relatns only people who cd. take initiative were
French.
A.B.
Decln. of Internatl. Socialist Conference is an answer to pamphlet
criticism.
Refer to financial plans for expansion – no word of that yet.
For capital expn in Europe some new financial injectn is necessary if
inflation is to be avoided.
H.G.
Turns on A.E.’s words “subject to necessary safeguards and condns”.
This is crucial weakness of Tory Opposn.
68
R.S.C.
Care over that – it cd. have bn. done that way : acceptg. principle.
Dutch did.
H.McN.
Supported R.S.C.
P.M.
Our main objn must be to supra-natl authy.
H.D.
And stress defence considns in that connection.
J.G.
T.U.C. and Unions have exprd gt. concern. T.U.C. will prob.
pronounce on it today.
N.B.
Miners also v. anxious for internatl. arrangemt. as protn v. slumps and
raising wages all round. Fear of competn We can welcome internatl
arrangemt.
R.S.C.
* In O.E.E.C. it broke down because Belgians said tht. cdn’t control their
steel industry.
[Exit N.B. and G.S.
[Enter M.W.
2.
White Fish Industry.
T.W.
Prodn Cttee approved Bd. in principle.
Smaller mtg has discussed subsidy.
Circulated draft answer. Verbal amendments approved.
P.M.
Not much comfort in this.
H.McN.
Agree: that is why I urged subsidy – but no one wd. agree with me.
Subsidy of £3 - 3½ m. p.a. is near: middle water fishermen.
H.W.
Considered at a mtg. last night – all Ministers save H.McN. were
against it.
And H.McN. admitted it was only to buy time pendg. legn of foreign
landings etc.
P.M.
But promise of future legn doesn’t help.
T.W.
1.900 fishermen unempld in Grimsby alone.
Our purpose in suggestg. subsidy was to help in m’taining existg.
catches pending O.E.E.C. discn and long-term policy.
But other Ministers didn’t support it.
R.S.C.
You didn’t advocate subsidy.
Disastrous to try to buy off this sort of posn with a subsidy. It will put
no-one in work. If you give more to put them in, the prices will go
lower still.
E.Sh.
Problem: under-consumption not over-prodn. Subsidies won’t touch
that.
69
P.M.
Are we sure tht. we can stick to this line?
H.D.
Don’t announce today – Korea and Schuman.
H.W.
Let M/D. get Services to eat more fish. But long-term.
P.M.
If we are going to give subsidy in reply to pressure, I don’t want to
refuse it today.
E.Sh.
Willing to play my part in an “Eat More Fish” campaign.
H.M.
Ought we to restore price control? (minimum price).
“
“ “ restrict foreign landings?
This looks rather hurried ……..
P.M.
Put this off.
H.D.
Stimulate demand.
R.S.C.
M/F. think there’s little to be done.
H.G.
Fish has done v. well for years: and dropping now because other foods
available.
Can’t subsidise indies for dropping demand.
There may be case for reducg. subsidies to eggs and meat and
transferring it to fish. Then: not on grounds of helping a distressed
industry.
T.W.
Can’t alter Feby review w’out amending legn.
P.M.
I will promise a statement next Tuesday.
Services to say by then how much more they can eat.
M/F. to consider stimulatg. consumption.
R.M.
Discns in O.E.E.C. will be v. diff – esp. with our Scandinavian friends.
R.S.C.
Truth is: industry must contract.
H.W.
Also distn is bad – fish still costs consumer too much.
Special enquiry now into fish distn.
P.M.
Let D. and M. Cttee look at this.
R.S.C.
A subsidy if given will go largely to distributors.
P.M.
Special Cabinet this week.
70
3.
Marginal Land.
P.M.
As in my brief.
R.S.C.
Also puts up value of land – extra capital value will go to owner. Shd.
be provision ensurg. tht. extra value accrues to State, or at least to
farmer.
H.M.
“Stock breeding land” via “marginal land”.
Exhibited some pictures – before and after.
Some of this wd. do us more good than higher prices for food imports.
A.B.
Shd. this be pre-digested by Cab. Cttee?
[Exit R.M., M.W., H.G.
[Enter W.S., Att.Gen. K.Y.
4.
K.Y.
Korea.
i) Holmes has given me copies of telegrams fr. State Dpt. Sent to all
N. Atlantic Powers, Austr. India. N.Z. Read out longer of these.
Fleet action to forestall attack on Formosa.
Re-inforcement of Phillipines.
Mil. aid to Indo-China.
Announcement 27/6 at 12 noon E.D.T. = 5 pm G.M.T.
ii) Telegram to U.K. Govt. only v. resoln in Security Council
recommendg. U.N. members to give such aid to S. Korea as will
enable it to repel attack.
iii) Read also message fr. U.N. Mission to S. Korea. No contact
possible earlier with N. Korea. Rapid deteriorn: N. Korea won’t heed
Sec. Council resoln or accept our offices. Suggest they be asked to
accept mediator etc. (as in this a.m.’s Times).
In reply to R.S.C. – both N. and S. Korea have applied to U.N. for
membership and neither has bn. accepted. But electns etc. mean tht. S.
Korea has bn. recognised by U.N.
P.M.
This action by U.S. links up S. Korea with no. of matters not before
x/ Sec. Council at all.
A.B.
Also reversed China policy, w’out consultg. us. Ready to defend
Formosa v. regime recognised by us.
R.S.C.
Sec. Council havg. asked N. Koreans to w’draw and asked all members
to render assistce in execution – U.S. action is consequent on that, so
far as S. Korea is concerned.
71
K.Y.
Also Art. 51. entitles friends to come to aid of nation attacked. That
wd. be easier argument for U.S. to use. And they will follow up with
2nd resoln.
E.B. thinks we must support 2nd resoln.
On x/. E.B. doubts wthr. we shd. publicly say anything to isolate
Korean incident fr. others because don’t want discourage U.S. support
in our diffies in Malaya and Fr. in Indo-China.
Refce to civil war as instrument of policy – in his last F.A. debate.
But stick to what U.N. authorises – don’t go outside it.
Defiance of U.N. and Sec. Council resoln can’t do less than support 2nd
resoln. But on those grounds. And advise U.S. to stick to those
grounds.
U.S. statement designed for release before Sec. Council meets.
Text and time will be known by 2.30 p.m.
A.B.
We shd. certainly support U.N. on S. Korea.
But Soviet haven’t identified themselves with N. Korean action: and
we might have avoided affront to Soviet.
But Truman’s decln opens offensive v. Soviet Union. W’out consultn
with interested Powers. Gives R. no chance to w’draw.
May be calling a bluff: but cd. have bn. called in S. Korea alone: w’out
takg. this enormous risk.
E.Sh.
Telegram fr. Moscow last night. U.S. Amb. instructed to call on R. to
disavow interest in N. Korea and urge them to w’draw their troops etc.
U.S. have taken other action as well.
Also telegram from Tedder. We replied to him last night askg.
following ques. re military situation. His reply received.
S. Korean resistance has collapsed. Bradley’s view: if U.S. air had bn.
given free hand attack cd. have bn. held, but too late now to restore
military situation. R. instructors are with N. Koreans – 3.000 (500
U.S. left in South K.). No policy decision on Formosa. Addendum:
next move is Iran: early U.S./U.K. concerted plan on that.
P.M.
Throwing down major challenge, in mood of levity, to U.S.S.R. And
unnecessarily, for cd. have bn. limited to S. Korea.
H.M.
V. important point in history. Likely beginnings of ’39 – Jap. attack on
Manchuria. Ques: what is the point at wh. you make it clear you aren’t
putting up with it.
Doubtless Truman thght tht. w’out immed. action S. Korea wd. have
bn. over-run and Soviet wd. have got away with mil. aggression. Once
that is conceded there’s no stopping them.
Firmness is only thing likely to stop R.
We can’t refuse to support the resolution.
R.S.C.
Qua Korea and support of U.N. – we agree we must go all out.
Ques : can we do anything to stop U.S. linking this up with Formosa.
V. serious for us in H. Kong.
No refce to Malaya.
72
We shall have to comment today.
H.McN.
Nothg. can be done now to save S. Korea.
Does R.S.C. suggest attack on N. Korea?
P.M.
It isn’t wording. Bite in U.S. statement is action taken, wh. is not
related to S. Korea as such.
A.V.A.
U.S. purpose is to give due notice to R. tht. they won’t run into
Formosa and Indo-China while eyes are directed to S. Korea. They are
concentratg. their strategy.
E.Sh.
I think U.S. are right. Risks, no doubt: but greater risks in not doing
this.
Fatal if we don’t respond.
Don’t fall foul of U.S. just when they are keyed up to act boldly.
Doesn’t commit us to mil. action save at request of U.N.
K.Y.
Read F.O. draft of tel. to U.S. Govt. – deprecatg. refce to “centrally
directed Comm. imperialism”: allowg. Formosa etc. action to speak for
themselves.
Allows Sov. to climb down.
A.B.
But do we believe U.S. action v. Formosa etc. is right.
We must keep R. in the wrong throughout.
J.
If we can’t get U.S. to alter their decn (and time alone prevents it) don’t
let it appear there is any division of opinion betwn. us.
Whatever we say to them in private, let there be no open division on
policy betwn. them.
A.B.
U.K. faced with succession of coups d’etat: first Schuman and now
Truman. We shd. be consulted by U.S. at least, before we are exposed
to air attack in U.K.
H.W.
Also: make sure preamble to resolution doesn’t include references to
Formosa etc.
Comm. Govts. shd. know our views at once.
P.M.
Jebb. shd. go out to N. York.
Early appreciation by C.O.S.
73
29th June 1950
C.M. 40(50)
1.
Iron and Steel Act.
Secretariat not present.
2.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W.
P.M.
Congrats to Ch. Whip on whipping in Schuman debate.
H.M.
Business for next week.
Korea: if pressure for debate, Opposn will give Wed. Supply Day. The
Opposn don’t want it but Silverman was murmuring.
J.
V. undesirable to have debate. Room for argument on legal points
under charter.
P.M.
Strongly deprecate debate, say so – H/C is solid.
H.M.
6th July. Debate on P.O. Unions. * P.M. shd. see P.M.G. re line of his
speech.*
7th July. Kitchen Cttee Rpt. Ministers are mtg. this p.m.
H.D.
Iron Ore. Agreemt. reached. L.P. Cttee will endorse Fri. Announce
Tuesday.
[Exit W.W.
3.
Whaling Base on Deception Island.
R.S.C.
Ty. can be consulted: we can settle outside Cabinet.
J.G.
M/F. said they needed Cab. decn.
R.S.C.
No ques. of principle. Put it to Ty.
4.
[Enter K.Y.
Electors’ Lists.
C.E.
Diff. to explain to electors how to verify they are on list.
Up to ’20 draft Register was available for inspn.
Tried 3 times in b’cast to explain present method, of 3 lists, and can’t
get it over simply. Tried therefore to get back to pre ‘20 system – one
list.
Astonished at estimate of high addl cost. Told it’s double handling of
forms.
After G. Election series of P.Q.s alleging register was faulty. Easier to
meet this criticism on basis of one list.
H.McN.
Sc. agents are emphatic for change. Simplest we cd. devise.
74
R.S.C.
No diffy. for skilled person like an agent.
2d. per name on register is too heavy a price to pay.
We can spend £200.000 to better purpose on other things.
G.A.I.
Estimate must be excessive. Must be a big margin in this.
R.S.C.
We have questioned that already. And can’t sweat it down.
C.E.
It’s double handling of the big list.
A.B.
What is £200.000 to the “Fulcrum of democracy”. Nothing is more
important thn. accurate register. Was wrong to reduce Register to once
a year via two in the autumn.
C.E.
Stationery Office have bn. into it twice. They got a bit off the total.
May be as low as £170.000.
H.M.
This change won’t mean tht. everyone can vote. Won’t cure all
complaints.
Worst case is when they miss a whole street.
Advisory Cttee is getting perfectionist. Postal ballot, poll-card – were
“perfect” solutions wh. have brought us trouble.
Support R.S.C. on balance.
C.E.
By makg. it simpler, we may attract a few more people to look at
Register and we deprive them of excuse tht. it’s too complicated.
R.S.C.
Is it so complicated? If they try at all, they won’t fail.
G.T.
New system (or pre-war) has only just bn. introduced. Don’t fiddle
with it. Real improvemt. wd. rest on house to house calls beforehand.
Spend more money on compiln of first register.
P.M.
Too much money for a v. small improvement.
[Enter Att.G. & M.W.
5.
London Meat Strike.
C.E.
Read typed statement.
If we adopt recommns 1-3 on p. 2. we cd. assure Ldn’s meat supply for
next week and thereafter. But it means employg. these troops if coldstore men and dockers come out on strike. Post workers’ Cttee is body
wh. has conducted unoffl. strikes before – and Govt. can’t afford to
bow to their will and deprive Ldn. of meat.
P.M.
This Cttee don’t represent the men.
C.E.
Not the drivers. They are intervening fr. outside to ferment an illegal
strike.
75
G.A.I.
Shd. this go under Art. 1305? Both sides got stymied. But even so,
unwise to refer. For i) gettg. more wages than road hauliers agreemt.
ii) Employers are makg. condn of removal of restve practices. M/L.
don’t think it shd. go to arbitrn.
Earnings are well above £7.5.0. minimum rate; viz £10 for drivers and
£8 for rest.
Object is to embarrass Govt. not to improve condns. They got
substantial rise in Aug ’49.
P.M.
Attitude of T.G.W.U.?
G.A.I.
Urging men to return to work.
M.W.
Shall distribute 1/= ration for all and more for some – but all in corned
beef – by Saty next.
H.M.
There is a subtle brain behind this.
Housewives are getting tired of this Smithfield business.
G.A.I.
Is Smithfield really necessary.
C.E.
Shd. be w. party of officials to consider meat distn in Ldn. Believe we
cd. remove Smithfield bottle-neck.
M.W.
Not short-term because of cold storage. Considering long-term spread
of Ldn. meat markets. But the bad men wd. get into the other depots.
H.M.
x/ Start a rumour tht. we are going to abolish S’field.
A.B.
Advocate firm and quick action. Support x/.
E.Sh.
I was for going slow. On basis of M/L. statement to Em. Cttee this
seemed a justifiable strike because wage appln had bn. dragging on for
a year and men had held back because of wage freeze. Raised again in
June when T.U.C. were re-considg. wage freeze.
Secondly, not alleged at Em. Cttee tht. there was conspiracy with
Comms. behind it.
Arbitratn. I favoured invokg. it. Told it cdn’t be done. There shd. be
some machinery wh. can be invoked. Disturbg. tht. such doesn’t exist.
P.M.
Do you suggest machinery for dealing with unofficial strikes?
E.Sh.
Realise diff. for Unions, in unoffl. strikes, to do other than say “return
to work”. But Govt. can’t allow nothg. to happen.
x/ Shd. be some means of bringing 2 sides together.
Troops have had to be called in 3 or 4 times in last year.
V. serious. i) effects on training ii) may create ill will betwn.
Servicemen and strikers.
76
When “essential service” is affected, Govt. must intervene. But is
meat an essential service? I don’t think troops shd. be brought in too
soon.
C.E. asks for 1.000 vehicles and 5.000 men. Can’t go on producg.
these nos. Esp. in summer, with T.A. camps.
P.M.
What is alternative?
E.Sh.
None – save consider x/ as long-term problem.
Abolition of Smithfield wd. or might cause even more serious trouble
with the men.
A.V.A.
Get at unofficial interveners from outside.
Continuous repetn of unoffl. strikes.
P.M.
Att. Genl’s memo. Note his position.
Wd. this be a case when prosn could be taken?
Att.G.
Yes, if informn (evidence) available. Considering it.
But G.A.I.’s statement on comp. arbitn makes it more diff. Seems tht.
Order 1305 is dead lr. where Trade Board.
But illegal strike is tied up with 1305. Can it be argued tht. strike is
illegal if Arbitn under 1305 is impracticable.
Surely M/F. cd. make meat traders invoke 1305.
Don’t want to go on shutting my eyes – as in memo.
But not easy to operate criminal side of it if M/L. side is not being
operated.
G.A.I.
No diffy. if evce available, fr. prosn of members of Port Cttee.
But consider expce of recent years in prosn of strikes as such. Case at
Betteshanger – 1946 or so or earlier – fines and never paid. Newcastle:
employers paid fine. Middlesboro’: only 1.000 men and more
successful.
Procdgs. v. nos. of men exacerbates feeling.
Wd. like to see case made v. members of Port Cttee.
J.G.
Civil actions for damages have proved salutary with miners. Union
leaders can use it to prevent further strikes and re-assert authy.
On criminal procdgs. and impt. – that only makes martyrs.
Doesn’t make for good industrial relations.
P.M.
But are we to leave law un-enforced?
Wd. like to see a good case v. inter-meddlers eg. Port Cttee.
A.S.C.
It is the action of unoffl. strikers wh. puts arbitn out of possibility.
That meets Att.G.’s argument above.
Att.G.
Doubt that. It wd. mean tht. you cd. never have arbitn after a strike has
begun.
77
E.Sh.
Wd. support procdgs. for conspiracy, if evce available.
Practice varies fr. industry to industry on Arbitn.
J.
Small group instigating strife – if can be proved – is appropte for severe
action qua sedn or conspiracy.
But procdgs. v. larger nos. – shd. end in fines, not impt.
G.T.
Don’t touch individual striker, rank and file. But get at instigator.
H.D.
Go for Port Cttee and get them in jail. Korea wd. help you. Leave the
others alone.
C.E.
Diffy. will be to get evce.
P.M.
2.
{ This gives Att.G. a line.
{ Approve recommns of Em. Cttee.
{ Let E.Sh. put his point to M/L. or submit memo.
on it.
Parliament (resumed).
[re-Enter W.W. Exit M.W.
W.W.
W.S.C. ready to help Govt. But he thinks H/C. may press for debate.
Must watch their attitude
Silverman, on behalf of Govt. supporters, askg. for fixed day: if it can’t
be promised, will make a fuss at Ques. today.
P.M.
H.M. must watch temper of H/C.
H.M.
Will try the line tht. sitn is fluid, not in public interest to debate it now.
A.B.
Heartily support action taken. Wdn’t debate demonstrate solidarity of
H/C. in support of collective security.
P.M.
Effect on Soviet of things wh. might be said in debate – might push
them into wrong attitude.
Can say: clearly will have to be debate some time, but inopportune
now.
J.G.
Comm. Party will prob. go hard for trouble over this in T.U.’s.
To back up our people in T.U.’s a unanimous decn by H/C. wd. be
valuable. Keep open mind therefore: but don’t debate it yet.
K.Y.
Advantages in debatg. it fairly soon. But not at once.
Don’t fix a date.
[Exit W.W.
6.
G.W.
Seretse Khama.
Two reasons for tempy visit almost exhausted.
78
Had hoped they cd. stay in Protectorate outside Reserve. But have
seen Baring and have come to concln we can’t. Govt. in Reserve has
broken down – taxes and courts. Not because Seretse has w’spread
support outside Serowe: much feeling v. him in outlying districts and
neighbourg. tribes. Break down is due to fear tht. S. will return and
x/ ruin anyone who co-operated in interim system of govt.
Ruth has bn. threatening this.
Also want to build up more repve govt.
Local reasons are enough to determine our policy, but we must also
take a/c of S. African re-actions.
Re-action in U.K. Some evce tht. S. wd. accept decision. Doubt is
about Ruth.
Decn needed in early August. The cattle case will be settled out of
court about end/July. In Recess; but in my absence.
V. awkward to delay decn after cattle case is over, until my return.
Proposals re help to Seretse if he comes here willingly. Avoid
exclusion order. But written warning tht. order wd. be made if they
returned.
More diff. if they wdn’t go voluntarily. Might mean i) serving written
orders on them. S. wd. probably accept that. Or ii) d.o. and force.
Must be prepared to do that if it becomes necessary.
Shd. have W. Paper ready to issue if sharper public reaction.
Don’t decide to publish in advance.
J.G.
On first decision, some re-action in Colonies esp. in Africa where it
was connd with Malan’s speeches. Apart fr. S. case I’m disturbed at
rising tension betwn. races in Africa.
The feeling over S. has died away. Won’t be revived if S & R go
quietly. If order – or, worse, force – has to be used to remove them,
there will be emotion: extent of trouble and re-action can’t therefore be
estimated. Persuade them to leave quietly, even if it takes much longer
to do it.
P.M.
You now feel evidently tht. S. will never be fit to be Chief.
G.W.
Can’t be sure. Trouble is he is only heir.
P.M.
What of argument at x/?
G.W.
Can’t guarantee to re-build adminn in 5 years.
A.
Adhere to 5 years’ delay and to decision tht. they can’t stay in Protectte
m’while.
Decn suggd involves ultimate use of force if they don’t go willingly.
P.M.
G.W.
Inevitable: for weakest posn will be to w’draw if they won’t go
willingly.
A.B.
She will make diffies in U.K.
79
P.M.
Not for long.
A.B.
Pay them double to live elsewhere.
G.W.
Daren’t offer it – wd. leak.
Memo. approved.
2.
Parliament (resumed).
W.W.
Silverman has submd Motion for adjournment – on use of B. Forces.
And spker is bound to accept it, unless there is date fixed for debate.
H.M.
Will he get 40 Members?
P.M.
Let Ch.Whip divert him.
E.Sh.
Better fix a day next week than risk debate today.
A.B.
Tell speaker we expect debate v. soon.
H.M.
He will want protn publicly – at least by somethg. said in Business
Statement.
Debate might be embarrassing to U.S. Govt.
Can we say: H/C. shall have debate: posn fluid: don’t yet know what
date was suitable: will keep in touch thro’ usual channels.
A.V.A.
E.Sh.
No precedent for delaying debate for long if action taken by Govt.
which involves some risk of war.
I wd. fix a day eg. for Thursday next.
[Exit G.A.I.
Must avoid appearg. to resist debate.
R.S.C.
And Govt. shd. take initiative and rob Silverman of his chance.
H.M.
Then announce firm date in Business Statement – Wednesday.
W.W.
And take it at Party Mtg.
[Exit T.W.
7.
R.S.C.
Civil Aircraft at Hong Kong.
Now Korea has intervened, I w’draw my original suggn.
[Exit Att.G.
8.
P.M.
The New Hebrides.
Why wasn’t I told earlier of Spender’s letter of 14/1/50?
80
G.W.
I don’t know.
J.G.
Summd memo. Best solution is to put Australia in to bat.
If we don’t, we shall have trouble with French: can’t leave things as
they stand.
P.M.
V. good bargain for us.
G.W.
Repercussions on S. African ques. : awkward but not fatal.
H.McN.
Won’t be done quietly. U.N. will note change – and debate it.
K.Y.
Warn Australians to play it down.
81
3rd July 1950.
C.M. 41(50)
1.
Wages Policy.
R.S.C.
Tewson agrees with draft.
P.M.
Endorse.
H.M.
A word of praise for T.U.C.?
R.S.C.
Said it in Budget debate.
T.W.
Claim by farm workers. Will this invite independent members to
support wage increase. Pledged at a special review of prices to recoup
for sudden increase in wage costs.
Road men have appln in.
R.S.C.
My statement will emphasise right part of T.U.C. statement. This =
most we can do at present. After Sept. confce T.U.C. may be ready to
go on talkg. about policy – machinery etc.
A.V.A.
Cd. final 2 lines make it clear it wd. re-act on workers’ conditions –
bring this house to them.
R.S.C.
I will do this – in statement or in reply to supplementary.
P.M.
Add words at end – quite a few.
H.M.
At end of T.U.C. statemt. mild invitn to Unions to consult T.U.C.
In Sweden there’s some collective arrangemt. Cd. M/L. report on this.
G.A.I.
Several precedents – Holland, A. and N.Z. also. Precis is being
prepared.
For L.P. Cttee or Cab.
Last sentence designed prob. to fly kite at Congress – get their views.
R.S.C.
T.U.C. are aware of all that – don’t want to mention it until after Sept.
mtg.
A.B.
Callg. off a standstill will be taken by all tribunals as invitn to go
ahead.
This statement doesn’t suggest we have any labour (wages) policy at
all. No guidance to tribunals. No refce to lower paid. E.g. miners
claim: there is a case for lower paid.
This seems to abandon wages guidance altogether.
R.S.C.
T.U.C. won’t agree v. lower paid because of differentials.
A.B.
Relatg. wages to economic needs.
82
R.S.C.
Tried that too; but T.U.C. wdn’t have it because of appearance of
dictatn of Govt.
A.B.
Then we have abandoned wages as instrument to serve ends of
economic planning by influencg. distn of man power.
R.S.C.
Can stress tht. W. Paper doctrine still remains – and that has element of
guidance in it.
A.B.
Give away “under paid”: stick to distribn of man power.
R.S.C.
Insert words referrg. to W. Paper. Then can quote it again to Tribunal.
A.B.
Add reference to increased earnings due to productivity. (Agreed).
R.S.C.
Means lengthening it.
A.B.
Useful qua guidance to Tribunals.
H.D.
Expounded at length in Budget speech.
A.V.A.
Wd. also weaken Ty. posn on fixed salaries.
Draft approved: subject to these 2 amendments.
To be announced in reply to P. Notice Ques. today.
[Enter K.Y. and Willey
2.
White Fish Industry.
A.
If subsidy, make it clear it only lasts until Bd. is establd.
P.M.
Essentially a short-term plan.
A.
But bring it out in any statement by P.M.
H.McN.
Para. 12 of P.C. 64.
P.M.
Can the £3½ m. be switched?
W.
Price increases elsewhere. We shd. be giving the subsidy w’out price
decrease.
We are close to subsidy ceiling.
Can’t say to what price addn wd. be made.
A.V.A.
Purpose of subsidy: Near and inshore only?
T.W.
Yes.
A.V.A.
V. diff. to separate short and long-term.
83
Retail sales are down by 40% as cpd. with ’49 – in volume. Prices are
about same as pre decontrol., for better qualities. Coarse fish – prices
to catchers have bn. raised.
Unless condns to subsidy there will be remedy. Waste: losses due to
excessive competn at ports: will continue.
No course save natn from trawlers up to retailer.
Many other subsidies are related to home prodn targets – dangerous to
switch away fr. them.
T.W.
Doing nothg. will leave things in same disorderly state.
All Cttees earlier have rejected natn of trawlers, whatever else.
A.V.’s points all relate to need for long-term re-organn wh. is admitted,
and is to be done by the Bd.
H.D.
Who wd. get the £3½ m?
T.W.
Last 3 paras. of Annex B. to P.C. 64
Offer could be limited to 6 months, subject to review.
R.S.C.
Most are shore fishermen. Get good pay for what is caught. Owners of
trawlers are losing their share because of low wholesale price. Subsidy
will enable them to carry on pro tem – whereas otherwise they wd. stop
sending trawlers to sea.
A.B.
This supports my solution tht. Govt. shd. own trawlers and lease them.
The subsidy wd. m’tain value of trawler to owners and later we shall
have to compensate at that level.
Step in now and buy the trawlers.
T.W.
Too many trawlers and over prodn is cause of trouble, or cause of low
price to fishermen.
K.Y.
Doubt if it’s true tht. if nothg. is done in short-term, more ships will be
laid up. Owners are laying up in turns (normal seasonal thing) and
threatening to do more: but not sure they will – it’s a bluff.
If subsidy given, shd. be clear condns.
Posn of Bd. wd. be strengthened if owners had bn. forced to accept
public money.
E.Sh.
Convenient, ???? to offer subsidy. But it wdn’t be temporary
Bd. wd. have to solve same problem. They, seeing subsidy accepted in
principle, wd. urge its continuance – at least, for some years.
Problem is one of price. Distributg. costs are prob. too high.
R.S.C. suggests switchg. subsidy fr. other commodities. You will get a
row about that, and no credit for what you have given to fish.
Why not let fish prices go to economic level? When it rises, we think
we must intervene, if only by expressg. disapproval.
84
T.W.
They rose on de-control, but only for a day. Now retail prices are
below controlled level.
E.Sh.
And we are now asked to give subsidy.
Against it. Won’t do owners any good and will have to last.
P.M.
Will everyone stand firm v. subsidy. Or will you force me to give
way.
A.B.
Won’t end pol. anxieties by subsidy. Will still be unempld and we
shall have given money only to owners.
H.W.
This will prevent nos. of unempld fr. rising. Subsidise amount of fish
caught: but not expected to increase quantity merely to keep it up.
Situation aggravated by de-control of distribn. Are distributors getting
larger margins than before de-control? If so, case for re-imposg. min
and max price control.
T.W.
Near and middle men started to lose money last Oct, before de-control,
because of coarse fish fr. further out. Posn wd. be same if distributors
took no profit at all.
H.M.
What are real troubles a) inevitable post-war redn in consumptn.
b) increased costs of trawler bldg. &
m’tenance.
They made enormous profits and wages during war.
Normal economic process wd. be for industry to re-adjust itself to
current condns. Painful but healthy.
Appointmt of Bd. won’t solve anything.
State-owned trawlers – wd. rent be economic or aided (= subsidy).
Subsidy will not be temporary.
H.W.
Only argument for subsidy = buy time while you re-organise.
Will also prevent sitn from gettg. even worse.
But doesn’t solve any problems.
G.A.I.
How much is this unemplt. due to this trouble? Much is seasonal.
[Aug. ’49 dropped to 1.000 odd. May ’49 5.130. 8.000 odd now.]
What abt. ship-bldg. Does that earn a case for subsidy.
Shall we, by subsidy, reduce unemplt. pay cost?
More politics in this than economics. Grimsby owners are trying it on.
C/living index on knife-edge. Even transfer may upset it. And one
point rise wd. be awful qua wages.
H.D.
Increased consumption. Is it as bad as M/F. memo. suggests?
Are friers really provided with enough fat?
R.S.C.
Yes: that shortage was 1 year old.
85
W.
Friers aren’t taking up full allocn. That = general posn.
H.D.
Some cd. take more.
E.Sh.
Satisfied, despite W.O. tht. Army cd. use more fish – fried, with more
fat allocated.
H.D.
Increased consumptn hasn’t been sufficiently explored.
A.B.
Subsidy to keep empld those who are fishing now. But campaign for
increased prodn to put unemployed fishermen back to work.
Two pronged attack.
Agree subsidy will continue.
Shd. the £3½ m. come off other food subsidies? If meat were dearer,
more fish wd. be bought. Spread this therefore over other foods. That
will help us to fend off subsidy claim from eg. ship building or
repairing.
Ask M/F. on what other foods it cd. go and what it wd. cost.
H.D.
Use it to reduce price of fats.
W.
No: reason is tht. amount of demand for fried fish has dropped.
R.S.C.
cf. this weekend, when fish sales in Ldn. rose when only 1/= meat
ration.
G.T.
Reason: fish is dearer than meat and people will only eat it fried.
Friers are selling their “allocn ” of fat : good-will of business.
W.
Doesn’t apply now: for anyone can enter industry and get an allocn.
H.McN.
Why continue allocn? Why not free it?
H.W.
Why not subsidise increased consumption of fish? We do for meat.
G.T.
Support Govt. ownership of trawlers.
Grimsby owners have got out with intent to buy back at low prices.
And home-killed meat is cheaper than plaice at 2/= a pound.
These small remedies won’t touch that.
H.M.
This is a diff. kind of subsidy – it’s to prop up an industry, and stave
off a v. small amount of unemplt.
J.
Fallacy to say you are buying time. Will never get rid of this subsidy.
H.McN.
Long-term diseases and remedies were in our other memo.
86
L.P.’s line: let industry solve own diffies. It has always done so by
reducg. catches, increasg. prices and causg. unemplt. Is that to be our
answer to Labour M.P.’s fr. fishing ports.
Social and defence reasons for keeping industry going.
Industry has bn. weakening for 8 mos. In another 4 it might adjust
itself at cost of ships wanted in war.
Political activities at Grimsby. Half that fleet is in distant water.
They aren’t askg. for our help. Near and middle: mostly small men,
sharing in ownership of one or two trawlers.
The subsidy plan is a means of buying time.
P.M.
Thought near and middle caught better quality fish, as eaten by Tories.
E.Sh.
M/L. shd. ascertain how many of these “unempld” are really part-time
fishermen only. Always bn. trouble of this kind in trawler industry –
since 1914. Is this an unemplt. problem, really?
Answer to P.Q. i) promise efforts to increase consumption of fish. (I
cd. do more with W.O. than M/F. did). ii) Pendg. establmt of Bd. get
the facts re unemplt.
H.D.
Case for this subsidy hasn’t bn. made.
Add for reply iii) promise to get agreemt. to limit foreign landings.
H.McN.
Consistent with i) tht. subsidy decreases as catch grows.
H.M.
Poor incentive.
H.M.
Publicity – shd. be done by industry, not by Govt.
T.W.
Industry: employers ask for subsidy: men for Bd. + subsidy.
R.S.C.
Political ques. only: can you hold it?
G.W.
No: you will give way in weeks.
P.M.
Then I’m in favour of announcg. a tempy subsidy.
Agreed: Offer subsidy.
87
4th July 1950
C.M. 42(50)
1.
P.M.
Queen Mary’s Carpet.
Letter of thanks from Cabinet – Agreed.
2.
Integration of Coal & Steel Industries of Europe.
[Enter G.S., H.G., Robens. K.Y.
R.S.C.
If appd in principle, officials cd. work out detail.
H.D.
Doubts about para. 11 – veto on investment plans. Shd. rest with
Council of Ministers.
R.S.C.
They have genl. power of direction. But might be better to give them
veto.
Ques. where shd. line be drawn betwn. policy and execution.
Investment does not cover closing of particular works or mines.
Save as in direct consequence of modernisation elsewhere.
For considn.
A.
Para. 15 – dual pricing.
R.S.C.
Shall have to give it up before this organn comes into opern.
T.W.
Need for care – Durham wd. be unprofitable and S. Wales also, if the
addl £1 for export were lost.
H.W.
N.C.B. equalises betwn. regions.
R.S.C.
Council wd. have to settle this. Price policy wd. be their affair.
H.M.
Salaries of executive?
R.S.C.
If 6 only, it wd. be whole time heavy job. If 12, half wd. have less to
do.
A.B.
Investment – where shoe pinches. We shd. start by reservg. that power
to Ministers. Might devolve later.
R.S.C.
x/ I accept that.
Agreed: power over investment shd. be reserved to Council of
Ministers. Perhaps under para. 12.
H.McN.
I wd. go further. It is for Govts. to stimulate demand: and for them to
notify Council. Paras. 11-12 shd. be recast.
88
A.B.
a) improvement of technical efficiency of existg. plants.
b) increase in total productive capacity.
At some stage more prominence shd. be given to (b). A more
y/ organic connn with financial mechanisms of investment save inflation.
Otherwise will ship back into cartel conception.
P.M.
Cttee shd. keep under review. Genl. principles approved.
Officials to work out details.
A.B.
And further thought to y/.
R.S.C.
Para. 10.
H.D.
Say also we look to expansion, to meet needs of 6 ward areas. Elaborn
of this point is essential.
P.M.
Service to world – not to Europe only.
Agree, subject to x/ and y/.
R.S.C.
Timing. E.B. wants now to communicate to Schuman our attitude as
defined in debate. Leave it at that until Schuman asks for U.K. views.
We mustn’t accentuate diffies w’in French Cabinet.
P.M.
Must deal only with Schuman and only thro’ approved channel.
Don’t chatter to others.
If it fails, they wd. be glad to put blame on us.
R.S.C.
Agree. Belgians are oiling out on “our” grounds. They wd. be glad to
blame us. (cf. today’s Times).
H.McN.
We may still get blame if we don’t make our posn plain.
R.S.C.
We cd. do that later.
Point is: shd. I be drawn by Petsche and others who are opposed to
Schuman on this. E.B. wants me to leave it to Harvey.
K.Y.
Para. 2. was written before new Govt. formed. The new Govt. is much
the same and is more solid for Federation. Posn is stable pro tem.
G.W.
Don’t talk this week. But is it wise to decide now to say nothing until
we are asked. When it’s ready, we shd. consider putting it to Schuman
– of our own initiative.
A.B.
Support G.W.’s view. We shd. be ready to seize any favourable
opporty to announce.
P.M.
No need to decide that now. No disclosure this week. Agreed.
A.B.
Para. 7. “internatl status” I’m against it.
89
J.
So am I.
{Took note of pp. by M/Defence and C.R.O.
{Further attentn can be given to them by the Cttee.
H.D.
General. Para. 11. “ …. in those countries wh. can be produced most
efficiently”. Not safe – unless defence considns are taken into a/c.
G.W.
Informn to Comm. Govts?
P.M.
Not yet. Leaks.
3.
Korea.
[Enter C.E.
Parliamentary Debate.
P.M.
Tories will table Motion if we don’t. We’d better do it.
K.Y.
Produced draft Motion.
P.M.
Somethg. shorter. Resist aggression. Support Security Council.
H.M.
I shd. announce this afternoon. Names : P.M., L.P., E.B., C.R.O.,
Att.G, M/Def.
Agreed.
Legal Issues.
P.M.
Shd. I avoid legal points altogether?
J.
I wd. try to. Letter in Times today.
Art. 27 = trouble. Affirmve votes of 7 members includg. perm.
members.
Argument: as one perm member wasn’t there S. Council cdn’t decide.
Answer: practice of regardg. decns as valid despite absence of a perm.
member.
H.McN.
R. have raised no objn. But have gone on record tht. they don’t think
its right.
P.M.
U.N. was intended to work. Must make it do so – takg. advantage of
use and work which has grown up. Shd. like to say so, positively.
A.B.
Sec. Council has acted before w’out strict adherence to rules.
There are 2 U.N.’s – one in Charter and one in reality. It’s the latter
wh. we want to work.
J.
Art. 51. “ …. inherent right of individ. or coll. self-defence in event of
aggression v. a member”. This is strength of our posn tho’ S. Korea
not a member. I wd. stress that.
90
P.M.
U.S. appealed to that because otherwise fait accompli.
K.Y.
Must base our action broadly on U.N. – even if there are quibbles
about Articles of Charter.
H.McN.
U.N. has taken v. important decisions on votes of less than 40.
Parliamentary Debate – other points.
E.Sh.
Ques. will be asked about forces. eg. land forces.
P.M.
We haven’t yet bn. formally asked. Can only say we shall consider, if
asked, in light of other commitmts.
E.Sh.
C.O.S. have decided v. sending even token land forces.
K.Y.
U.S. action re Formosa has freed Chinese armies for other opns eg. V.
H. Kong.
E.Sh.
They may do this to save face.
Economic Sanctions.
K.Y.
U.S. already stopping trade to N. Korea.
This doesn’t cover strategic exports – in other memo.
No diffy in stopping trade fr. U.K. Shd. do it, to help H. Kong Govt. to
lay on embargo on their trade to N. Korea.
If we are takg. mil. action, this action follows a fortiori
P.M.
Agree: but not to China.
Proposals re N. Korea approved.
K.Y.
China. Ask Shell not to increase supplies.
P.M.
Can’t go further.
K.Y.
Techn. point. They aren’t economic sanctions under Art. 44.
Refer to this publicly as “blockade” via “sanctions”.
J.G.
Wd. help H. Kong if they cd. take power to control exports to all
destinations.
H.W.
As we did when controllg. strategic exports to E. Europe.
R.S.C.
H. Kong can’t do it effectively.
P.M.
Don’t do it.
91
A.B.
R.S.C.
We can do it. But are we going to do it from H. Kong? Suggests H.K.
= imperial possn which we shall use v. China. Surely U.S. cd. see this
was provocative.
/
x/
/
Take genl. powers as proposed. Apply at once to N. Korea.
Consider when time is ripe wthr. it shd. be applied to China.
Tell U.S. we shall do this.
H.McN.
Why draw back now, when there is urgency, from agreemt. we made
12 mos. ago to do this thing – fr. H. Kong as well as U.K.
A.B.
At that time U.S. policy was to w’draw fr. China.
J.G.
Enough to take powers to prevent export of these strategic materials fr.
H. Kong and Singapore and that Govrs. will do their best to stop such
exports to China, as well as N. Korea.
E.Sh.
Don’t pledge ourselves to take undue risks.
We have given more R.N. ships than U.S. had there – tho’ it’s
supposed to be a U.S. sphere of interest.
Agreed : as at x/. above.
Formosa.
K.Y.
Full implicns of U.S. action will be put to Cab. later. This is only for
purposes of debate.
P.M.
Difficult line. I shd. try to dodge it.
H.M.
May be outside terms of Motion – out of order.
K.Y.
We haven’t committed ourselves to support of this U.S. action.
R.S.C.
Can say tht. U.S. have stopped fighting betwn. 2 sides in China.
Take note of memo. and hope for the best.
G.W.
Can I tell Australia we don’t intend to object to U.S. action v.
Formosa.
P.M.
Stall.
4.
H.M.
[Exit Robens, K.Y. and G.S.
[Enter W.W., R.R.S., B.
House of Commons : Kitchen Committee.
As in memo. Suggest investign – maybe also accounting enquiry
before H/C. goes further into this.
After discussion – memo approved.
92
5.
Soap Rationing.
[Exit W.W., R.R.S. and B. & H.M.
[Enter M.W.
M.W.
As in memo.
R.S.C.
Awkward we weren’t consulted – thro’ Prodn Cttee.
Cd. we have some regular machinery.
Export drive: supply posn of fats.
H.W.
We shd. welcome de-rationing.
Increased prodn wd. give us more glycerine – wh. wd. be useful to us.
Approved.
To Prodn Cttee in future.
6.
Scottish Affairs.
H.McN.
For informn.
A.
Rather abrupt.
7.
[Exit H.G. and M.W.
Meat Strike.
C.E.
Maintenance men are workg. Skilled R.N. men, detained to take their
place, can now return to duty.
Next week may have to go into docks, to unload ships. Em. Cttee must
consider implicns.
G.A.I.
Loss of man power: 3.500. No indicn of extension of strike.
Smithfield. I believe a threat wd. do harm. Ques. has bn.
[Exit J.
raised in Press and there is a P.Q. that’s enough. A soft answer wd. be
wiser.
A.B.
Cd. D. & M. Cttee get R.A.S.C.: Rlway Executives to consider
Smithfield problem?
H.D.
Transport experts already brght in.
P.M.
Get R.A.S.C. in. H.D. will consider.
93
6th July1950
C.M. 43(50)
1.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W.
H.M.
Business for next week.
A.
One or two Bills due for H/Lds. – only 2 wks. left.
One to come to H/C. – on brkg. up roads and will cause some trouble
for many amendmts made in H/L.
J.
Liberties of Subjects Bill.
Politics – trying to put Labour Party in posn of opposing principle.
Impossible to seek to amend, clause by clause. Propose to move none:
but oppose each clause, on “stand part”. May divide on some and not
on others.
H.M.
Not unduly worried. Other people may move amendmts.
We shall kill it in H/C. – shan’t give facilities.
A.
Torpedo each clause by argument and say if you want to pass this silly
clause it’s yr. responsibility.
And we will keep it in H/L. until last week of Session.
H.M.
We shall adjourn on 28/7 and meet for a week on 17/10.
A.B.
Don’t say so now: for it assumes a King’s speech.
W.W.
Not unless you go further and announce opening date of new Session.
White Fish.
H.McN.
Fish is to be discussed in Sc. Grand Cttee next week. I shall be asked
for details of subsidy. Fishery Dpt. Estimates.
H.M.
Cd. slip out on grounds it involves legn - Supply.
Any full explann must be given to H/C. as a whole. You cd. say so, as
excuse.
H.McN.
Will discuss with T.W. and W.W. and report to H.M.
[Exit W.W. Enter K.Y.
2.
P.M.
Korea.
Have discussed in D.O. Can’t send land troops to Korea. For we are
exposed elsewhere in F/E. and S.E.A.
Examing ques. of help fr. Austr. and Pakistan.
Mustn’t neglect West.
Getting in touch with U.S. Alerting our Commns. Overhaulg. our war
plans.
94
If sitn isn’t cleared up quickly, we shall be in danger all along our
exposed front.
H.D.
Y’day’s debate was satisfactory. Legal quibbles weren’t stressed.
A.B.
Govt. supporters behaved well.
H.M.
Party mtg. was useful prepn.
A.B.
R. re-action was curious. R. wd. not now wish U.S. defeat in Korea.
R. will want to save U.S. face.
P.M.
They wd. prob. prefer longer drawn out Malayan affair to keep U.S.
bogged down there to neglect of other theatres.
K.Y.
S. Council seekg. to give MacA. free mil. hand and at same time gain
appearance of adequate U.N. control. No trouble over first. Second:
suggn. of Cttee. Awkward because of composn. Many of Comm.
contributors aren’t on S. Council. We don’t favour Cttee at all.
3.
[Exit K.Y.
[Enter B., Att.G., M.W., R.R.S.
Meat Strike.
C.E.
Full ⅛ ration (includg. bully) this week. But for next week, we shall
have to go into docks and unload ships. Risks complete dock strike.
Must face that risk.
Suppl. Ques. by Mellish y’day (or Tues). He has since told me that,
however good a case we have, Ldn. docker is bound to strike as soon
as troops appear. Tho’ they don’t want another stoppage.
Can’t contemplate workg. whole of docks with Service labour.
Wd. throw mil. training (includg. T.A. camps) into chaos.
Recommend alternative A in para. 6.
Mtg. of strikes last night – 70 men only. Another this a.m.
G.A.I.
Another P.N.Q. today.
At mtg. this am. don’t know what may happen. H’to promised to
return to work on unacceptable condns.
Last night’s mtg. demanded tht. all out-standg. claims in road haulage
industry be settled w’in 21 days. (There aren’t any).
Also, threat to extend strike into p.u. field if Smithfield workers aren’t
taken back. Depn going to Transport House.
Tug. boatmen’s strike. Sunday: employers’ proposals were put to men
who authd leaders to negotiate. Unoffl. mtg. then decided to proceed –
takg. meals at fixed hours regardless of posn boats were in. Employers
were going to issue notice of dismissal: on repns fr. M/L. will now
issue notice of warning. We must acquiesce in that.
P.M.
Comm. inspiration?
G.A.I.
Yes. Related to Korea.
95
B.
Potential trouble in transport world.
Might be provoked by precipitate use of troops.
Don’t bring docks out – over this use of troops – at our invitation.
Men are gettg. bored. Strike may collapse before w/end. Esp. if
T.G.W. Union wd. do their stuff. By Govt. action always we are
playing into Comm. hands.
cf. Mellish’s views.
Must produce collapse of S’field strike by action w’in TGW Union.
May be call for volunteer labour, via troops or as well; and that wd.
inflame feeling throughout transport movement.
C.E.
Increasg. impn tht. T.G.W. Union have no discipl. control over their
men.
M/T. suggn wd. have spread the strike.
G.A.I.
Comms. are out to get Deakin, who is spearhead of T.U. attack on
Commn.
H.W.
Anyhow, we are now commd to use of troops: cdn’t make less use of
them now.
B.
Agree: but concurrently by policy of getting as much co-opn as poss. fr.
loyal elements in T.G.W. Union.
G.A.I.
Deakin’s attitude. No compromise. No concession to unoffl. strikers.
A.
Can’t you find out who is behind these strikes?
G.A.I.
H.O. have found nothg. save Post Workers’ Cttee.
C.E..
No evce of Comm. inspirn.
H.D.
Can’t you identify particular men, wthr. they are Comms. or not.
A.
Who called last night’s mtg?
C.E.
Nothg. illegal in summoning such a mtg.
A.B.
Comms. have all advantages of surprise.
Suggestn. Para. 4 gives more infn than we have ever had.
Shows the sensitive points
Authorise para. 6(a) if Em. Cttee after examing. para. 4, can offer no
alternative action.
Under 4(b) we might get much meat w’out conflict with dockers.
C.E.
Those men are on strike. We have to put troops into docks to get the
4(b) meat.
96
A.B.
No: we cd. use Co-op drivers and other loyalists to go into docks and
fetch it.
B.
And make Executive of Union a party to that opern.
C.E.
Still a risk tht. individual drivers wdn’t do it.
Cold store capacity in Ldn. = 100.000 tons. Cd. not this be used for
meat. Most of them cd. be used w’out access to S’field. This storage
shd. be kept filled to capacity until we are out of Comm. risks.
B.
Dockers don’t want to strike. Might persuade them to co-operate if
elsewhere labour were used.
G.A.I.
Ready to approach Union on this.
J.G.
Support such an approach.
Agreed : this should be tried.
J.
Wise to distribute all reserve of meat.
P.M.
Exp. if we want to mobilise p. opinion v. strikers.
H.McN.
Plans already announced.
P.M.
Agree: can’t change plans now announced.
Agreed.
G.T.
Some opportunity will have to be given to the end for strikers to climb
down. Cd. we link that with refraing. fr. use of troops in docks?
P.M.
Em. Cttee to consider problem of keeping cold stores 100% full ,
varying ration as required, in order to make Govt. less vulnerable fr.
strikers at S’field.
Agreed:
C.E.
Try Barnes’ plan in consultn with Deakin.
If that fails, adopt para. 4(a).
Tug-boatmen. People seeking to force a show-down. Hold it over for
a week. Might start trouble all round.
Agreed: urge employers to hold their hands.
E.Sh.
Views of Services on use of troops. Read out brief.
Att.G.
Police are lookg. for evce for criminal procdgs. Have employers
considered procdgs. for damage?
P.M.
Let M/F. enquire.
97
10th July 1950
C.M. 44(50)
1.
Korea.
[Enter W.W., M.W.
Strategic Exports to China.
P.M.
Read minute from E.B.
We were committed to U.S. subject to reservn which has now bn. met.
overt action required. No reason therefore to suppose offence will be
given to China. U.K. action not dissimilar from that recommended for
H. Kong and Singapore.
R.S.C.
We had no scruples about U.K. – only about H. Kong and Singapore.
H.W.
Thought we had agreed to do it qua U.K.
P.M.
Minutes of earlier Cabinet didn’t ques. effect to our wishes which were
in accordance with E.B.’s views.
2.
H.M.
Parliament.
Re-arrangement of business to facilitate personal statement by
Strachey.
Tuesday: (via Education) Debate on Strachey’s statement, in supply:
followed by debate on War Damage Claims – prob. on Adjournment.
R.S.C.
Some old cases are being admitted now, when merits are good, even
tho’ appln is out of tune. What Mrs. Middleton is asking is that all
claims be admitted automatically which were notified to l.a.’s
This we couldn’t agree to.
A.B.
Cd. you not admit that as ground for acceptg. late application.
R.S.C.
We do, where applicant was told by l.a. official tht. he needn’t apply to
W.D. Commn.
C.E.
This is alleged but can’t be proved in some cases.
A.B.
Can’t give way to Tories what we refused to our own supporters in last
Parliament. Defend our adminn (as now): but admit no new principle.
H.M.
Doubt if Tories will have this on Adjournment. They will prob. want a
Motion.
Agreed :
H.M. and R.S.C. to consider wthr. Labour supporter
shd. be asked to put down a Motion.
98
3.
Renewal of Emergency Powers.
H.M.
Not yet settled wthr. we have Econ. Power Bill. But clear now we
cdn’t assume it wd. pass before 10/12 even if Cab. decided to go on
with it.
Ques. arises when we shd. renew existg. Acts.
Adminve diffy. that Orders can’t be expd as continuing beyond 10/12.
M/F. diffy.
Recommend we do this in week of this Session in Oct.
P.M.
Cd. you announce in advance intentn to renew.
H.M.
Just before summer Recess. In last Statement on Business.
T.W.
Important thing is tht. Dpts. shd. know.
J.
H/L. may decline to pass the Address.
A.
Must make a good case.
R.S.C.
May be wise to announce at same time our intention to introduce
permanent legn.
H.D.
Tho’ latter is what Tories do oppose – not tempy extensn by renewal.
A.B.
Early prodn of Bill with long preamble giving purposes.
H.M.
I advocated that: but Cab. didn’t then like it.
4.
[Exit W.W.
[Enter B. and Att.Genl.
Meat Strike.
G.A.I.
Deakin is satisf. with his men’s resistance to strikers’ demand for
extension of strike. Some stoppages, but only at places related to
Smithfield. In genl., 75% are workg. No stoppages at Shell.
Only 59 men are out, in genl. haulage.
1.475 men out fr. road haulage Executive – addl to original but nearly
all in places related to S’field.
Covent Gdn. is however affected. About 250 vehicles will stop
tomorrow.
Tugboatmen. M/L. suggd Cttee of Investign. Men have accepted this
and men on light boats have returned to work. But now the heavy
boatmen have come out, on 3 days’ token strike over dismissal of one
man.
Mtg. this pm. to get petrol-tanker drivers out. Union resistg.
C.E.
Confirm G.A.I.’s informn.
Most serious threat = petrol-tankers. That, if effective, wd. bring all
transport to a stop for lack of fuel. No dispute at all in that group.
99
No evce of any political motive in this strike: tho’ we have tried hard
to find some. Sp. Branch rpt. to D.P.P. – names a man (Tribe) whom
Mellish believes to be at bottom of it all. Paid organiser for T.G.W.
Union in S’field.
Cab. decided Thurs. tht. troops might go in to docks today.
Emerge. Cttee decided it wd. be unwise – they cd. go on clearg.
S’field. We thought they shd. go in on Tuesd. Now recd memo. fr.
J.A. who is v. use of troops in docks. And we don’t want docks out if
strike is to spread to road haulage generally, esp. petrol. M/F. can
devise means of feeding Ldn. this wk. w’out using troops in docks.
M.W.
Four ways of doing it a) full corn-beef ration, as in 1st week.
b) take cow-beef from non-dock cold stores
(usually used in sausages).
c) bring meat to Ldn. fr. provincial cold
stores, by mil. labour.
d) run meat to rail sidings.
But c) and d) wd. spread the strike.
I recommend a).
P.M.
I support a).
G.A.I.
Deakin will see strikers, if they ask to see him, and tell them to go back
to work w’out condns.
He believes he can prevent any further extension.
A.B.
And if he does, the original strikers will go back.
C.E.
Don’t share this optimism. Petrol men may come out. Thus most
drastic action will be necessary.
B.
Is Emerg. Cttee mtg. today? This is a critical moment.
If strike widens, we must press Union and employers to handle the
situation themselves w’in industry. Mistake not to have done this
earlier. We ought to be takg. steps to get loyal men mobilised behind
their Union leaders.
M.W.
There is gross intimidn in markets. Many men say they wd. go back on
secret ballot. Wd. Deakin hold such a ballot?
G.A.I.
In dock strike it was done and pickets intimidated the ballot.
Att.G.
Saw D.P.P. this am. Raised diffies re procdgs., includg. M/L. view that
stoppage in other parts of road haulage industry is not “indl dispute”.
No evce v. anyone of inciting others to strike. Cd. prosecute a few men
for strikg. Have told D.P.P. tht. member of Strike Cttee shd. be asked
by Police wthr. they are members.
100
H.M.
G.A.I.
x/ Cd. P.M. + G.A.I. and C.E. see Deakin M/Transport (Barnes)
Or, better, cd. E.B. see him?
E.B. has seen him – he’s concerned only to save Deakin’s face.
Agreed at x/ : M/L. to arrange.
Course a) regarding Ldn’s meat – approved.
J.G.
We shd. mobilise our loyal supporters in Labour Party and T.U.’s to
fight Communists at this juncture. Ask Deakin what he will do.
5.
P.M.
[Exit B., Att.Genl., M.W.
[Enter K.Y.
Korea.
a) We told Kelly to go to Soviet F.O. and ask them to use their
influence.
Subsequently Gromyko asked him to call and implied they might
be willing to try jointly. Diff. to judge if it’s genuine. We have
told U.S.
Taken line we shdn’t fail to try any chance to get this broken off by
Security Council.
We must base it on Sec. Council resoln tht. N. Koreans must w’draw.
Must keep this dark pro tem.
We are taking our own line, tho’ keeping U.S. informed.
b) U.S. Bombers in U.K. U.S. want to re-inforce these (nos. have run
down) and some fighters want to do it now because F/E. sitn may make
it diff. to do it later. C.O.S. recommend. Politically, however,
awkward if it can’t be presented as a routine move. Might be thought
by R. otherwise as a threat.
K.Y.
E.B. endorses that view. Only acceleration of nos. planned. Shd,. be
repd w’in framework of Atl. Pact arrangemts – we aren’t allowg. F/E to
interfere with that.
R.S.C.
Least said, better. Don’t say even tht. acceleratn is related to Korea.
Wd. be misunderstood.
Agreed :
accept plan; play down publicity; don’t explain
by refce to Korea; let U.K. control any publicity.
[Exit K.Y.
6.
A.B.
Nationalisation of Water Supplies.
[Enter T. Fraser.
Have seriously considered Joint Board alternatives to natn. But can’t
recommend it. Wd. put heavy financial burden on urban users in such
101
areas as Norfolk or Suffolk. Also, on areas – sources wd. often have to
be far outside the area, unless you made them wide enough to link
B’ham and N. Wales etc. To satisfy the pride of such towns as these,
v. wide areas wd. be requd.
P.M.
Why assume a Joint Bd. must have control over areas where its
gathering grounds are?
A.B.
Because I want all areas on pipeline to be able to tap it.
P.M.
Why? Suppose immense consumer like B’ham brings its water thro’
no. of areas whose supply needs can be met locally, it isn’t essential
tht. these shd. draw on pipeline.
A.B.
Can’t ignore functional interests in identifying areas of Boards.
Driven therefore into commendg. a scheme of natn. Plus l.a. advisory
function, on wh. I wd. be ready to consult l.a. associations.
In H/C. we shall have trouble with p.u.’s. Necessary politically, to
split them and l.a.’s.
Compensation – on basis of value of assets or on populn basis.
I favour the second – in order to embroil l.a.’s with one another.
T.F.
Situation in Scotland is different. There natn wd. be most unpopular.
All supply is by l.a.’s. Many regional schemes.
Our big areas don’t run pipes thro’ thirsty areas – they give them drink
of their charity. Cost of rural supplies wd. loom v. large in total bill for
water in Scotland. – diff. relative propn of urban and rural popns. Water
rate in Edinb. and Glasgow wd. rise from 9d. or 10d. to 2/6d. Some
rural interests wd. therefore not be so bitterly opposed to natn as the
urban areas. For Labour this wd. be electorally disastrous in Scotland.
We want therefore nothg. more than extended powers of
amalgamations.
If we must go further because of E. and W., we wd. go as far as Joint
Bds.
P.M.
V. doubtful v. expediency of makg. another cut at l.a. powers.
M/H. makes a good case – too good a case. Litigiousness of l.a.’s is
not confined to water ques. They can be made to collaborate.
It is the Labour Councils who will suffer most – eg. Sheffield.
Wd. prefer a more gradual approach.
Much agitn but trouble is mainly due to inactivity in past of R.D.C.’s.
We shall kill l.a.’s if we go further in this direction.
Discussion to be resumed at a special mtg. of Cabinet.
102
13th July 1950
C.M. 45(50)
1.
P.M.
Queen Mary’s Carpet.
[Enter W.W.
Q. Mary has written to thank Cabinet for their letter.
2.
Parliament.
H.M.
Business for next week.
A.B.
Medical Bill. Due in H/C. tomorrow. Many Labour amendmts. may
not finish. Tories will, however, give facilities to get Cttee stage later.
H.M.
Adjournment. 28/7. Resume 17/10. Reorganise, if possible, after 2
wks. K. Speech on 31/10. Opening of old Chamber Thurs. 26/10 at 10
am.
P.M.
Defence Debate. S.S.L. has asked for one before H/C. rises – they can
have it. He pressed for Secret Session. Some case for it exceptionally
here.
Deficiencies of Europ. Allies will be stressed – awkward to have this
publicly. Have sought E.B.’s views. Appropn Bill – Wed. and Thurs.
of wk. after next.
Need for balance betwn. defence needs and losing cold war by trying
to spend too much on defence.
E.Sh.
Serious deterioration since Korea. ½ yearly report by U.S. Secy. for
Defence is v. optimistic in tone – dangerous tht. it shd. have bn. publd
at this time.
What do we say to U.S.? Cd. we rely on land forces fr. them in
Europe– certainly not in M/E.
What about defeatist attitude in W. Europe?
How far shd. this sort of thing come out.
R.S.C.
Frank talks with Opposn followed by open debate?
Any admissions in S. Session wd. leak out.
Alarms re U.S. diffies + discouraging statements re Europe wd. have v.
bad effect.
P.M.
Wdn’t satisfy W.S.C.
E.Sh.
There’s much more tht. cd. be said to him v. Europe.
P.M.
He knows all that – even tho’ we haven’t told him.
H.M.
Last Wedy on earlier Cab. decision, I defended in H/C. not havg. a S.
Session. What new circs? Does Korea make it more desirable or less.
Worrying to public opinion. Effect on Russia?
P.M.
Tories are forcing a debate. And open debate will be v. awkward.
A.B.
Effect on R. might be good. For, assumg. they don’t want war, they
must be as anxious as we and wanting to stop others’ re-arming.
[Exit W.W.
[Enter B., N.B., P., E. Summ.
3.
H.M.
Pensions in Socialised Industries.
In various socd indies there were pensions for some employees under
private enterprise. Our line was: leave existg. men with their pension
rights but give none to new-comers. Awkward both ways. If you
conceded this to rlways, gas and electricity wd. follow and then
miners, followed by steel workers. Might mean £27 m. fr. our Bds.
and workers. Told T.U.C. workers hadn’t realised level of their contns.
Private enterprise wd. then be pressed to do the same.
Price increases wd. be inevitable. And re-action on o.a. pension rates.
On other side T.U.C. may have to give way to pressure on this.
Labour Party Policy Cttee have proposed enquiry (para. 9). Might last
some time. Wd. produce facts. Possible compromise to put to T.U.C.
Another review by M/N.I. might be linked with this.
Departmental Cttee wd. do. R. commn (wh. wd. take longer) wd. be
regarded as putting it all off.
R.S.C.
16 : 100 to 31 : 100. Reln of wage earners to pensioners. Estimate
(1946) of Govt. Actuary. V. marked tendency – even if figures can be
revised in light of rising birth rate.
Examn shd. therefore include ques. of retiring age. Pension at later age
wd. be only way of easing load – wh. wd. otherwise involve intolerable
increase in c/living.
N.B.
67% in electricity and 70% in gas were covered by insurance schemes.
H.D.
Will the schemes become insolvent if new entrants don’t come in.
R.S.C.
Most of schemes are insolvent already because of increased expectn of
life.
14% in coal are covered, includg. 80.000 miners.
N.B.
I favour enquiry.
E.S.
I also support it. But stress importance of getting balanced and
experienced members on Cttee. Also wide t. of r.
Believe retiring age shd. be considered because of increased expectn of
life.
Existg. rules reflect attitude of 19th century.
B.
Enquiry won’t avoid serious trouble on rlways.
104
Loco. Union lately refused to associate themselves with appln for wage
increase because attd more importnce to suppl. pension scheme.
Loco. men feel v. strongly on this. Lengthy enquiry won’t be
acceptable to them. Week-end strike will prob. be technique – wh. are
worse than big strike which comes to a head and finishes.
If Govt. can’t accept suppl. schemes, it wd. be better to come out quick
and firm and say so. With delay while enquiry proceeds, ill-feeling
will increase.
A.B.
Mayn’t enquiry pile up trouble for us. Will show up inequities betwn.
professional classes and manual. What we want to do is provide suppl.
pensions only for those indies wh. we find it diff. to man. Pensions
keep men in an occupn up to retiring age. Want them on that a/c for
miners. This line wd. be better than increase in genl. pension rate.
Wd. help to fill gap left by our failure to devise an effective wages
policy.
Enquiry, if we have one, shd. not be limited to facts but shd. work out
a policy on above lines.
H.M.
Argument ad hominem (miners)
5 day wk. began with mines. It’s more universal. (Disagreement).
Doubt if you can deliberately discriminate betwn. industries.
Spending millions on S. Services.
Productivity increases – we have spent most in advance.
P.M.
Danger of continuing pressure to do more for the old.
One day the young will kick.
G.A.I.
Support enquiry because of ramifications.
Trouble with Unions: principle tht. they shd. be free to make a deal
x/ with employers.
M/H. suggn is attractive at first sight. But can you manipulate
pensions like this?
What value have we had fr. offer of increased pensions if they work
after 65.
Many men in my Union are workg. well after 70.
Cd. that idea be exploited equally in any supplementary pension
schemes.
G.T.
Support G.A.I.
Industies wh. enjoyed these schemes were assocd with l.a.’s – and this
was resented by other indies whose workers had to pay for it in higher
prices eg. for gas.
Favour enquiry. But cd. it be wider – suppl. schemes only by
individuals, not by industries, and thro’ N.I. scheme. That wd. get rid
of much diffy.
J.G.
I attended T.U.C. discn last year – Council nearly defeated. x/ was the
trouble: since natn workers have lost right to negotiate such schemes
with employers.
105
Favour enquiry if T.U.C. can be persuaded to agree to it.
T. of ref. need re-constitn. Most existg. schemes are by firms: men
want them enlarged so tht. man can preserve his pension rights on
leavg. original firm. Omit para 1) “management and soundness of
existg. schemes”.
Cd. we accelerate N.H.I. enquiry? If not formal enquiry, then some
linkage of this and N.H.I. schemes – includg. pension age under N.H.I.
and also wthr. bonus for continuing in work thereafter cd. be increased.
H.D.
Don’t accelerate statutory enquiry N.H.I. That wd. go beyond
pensions.
Have a wide enquiry on supplementary pensions. Make it fairly quick.
Agreed: wide enquiry: H.M. will settle t. of ref. and
membership with Ministers concerned and report to P.M.
Take this line with T.U.C.
[Exit B. and P.
4.
Involuntary Absenteeism in Coal mining.
[Enter W.W.
N.B.
Certification.
A.B.
We agree : have already agreed to put them into operation.
E.S.
Trouble is giving men a final week. Doing our best with sick visitors.
A.B.
Don’t believe these figures. We are getting men back to work more
quickly than before.
R.S.C.
May be unwise to get men back too soon.
T.W.
Gradual cure – education etc.,
H.M.
Pity Lidbury Cttee didn’t use Social Survey and Human Factors Panel,
as contemplated by Cab.
G.T.
Go slow with this long-haired stuff.
Higher earnings is a greater cause of absenteeism than anything else.
E.Sh.
The flat-rate men are as well off under compensation as at work.
Don’t pretend there’s no abuse.
N.B.
Agree there is some – hence paras. 4 and 5.
J.G.
Avoid keeping miner under microscope. Don’t suggest that this
applies only to miners.
H.M.
This is greatest problem of statesmanship in 2nd half of 20th century.
106
Don’t dodge it. And don’t let socialised indies lead the way.
Tragic if consequences of better condns is more slackness.
R.S.C.
Much scientific study on this eg. in B.I.M.
Facts in this report shd. be made available to those bodies.
H.W.
Danger tht. this wd. spotlight the miner again.
A.
Those reports have no edge – sloppy guidelines, leading us nowhere.
Plenty of research of a sort: but needs discipline.
Memo. approved in principle.
2.
Parliament (resumed).
[Exit E.S. and W.W.
Enter K.Y.
Defence Debate.
P.M.
E.B. is against Secret Session. Read letter from E.B.
T.W.
Hasn’t there bn. S. Session in U.S.?
K.Y.
No: only routine mtg. of Cttee.
R.S.C.
E.B. suggests giving W.S.C. confl information.
K.Y.
Includg. telegrams to U.S. Govt.
P.M.
This won’t divert him from his demand for S. Session.
E.Sh.
These telegrams aren’t relevant. W.S.C. is concerned about internal
ques: condns of our Forces.
A.
Stress E.B.’s point re French Govt.
P.M.
Preponderant opinion v. S. Session? Agreed.
A.
You can’t avoid it.
A.B.
Let P.M. have discretion to decide, in light of Tory pressure.
H.D.
It’s for us to decide.
P.M.
I think genl. view favours open Session
5.
N.B.
Short-term Measure to Increase Coal Output.
Table on p. 5. Big return on N.C.B. investmt already – and will
increase.
107
Ques. i) Para. 27. Wage incentives. Hope this may succeed.
ii) Final para. Quick return fr. more investmt.
Not sanguine about this.
H.D.
Para. 23. Need for gt. care. Men won’t always go. Hope N.C.B.
aren’t over sanguine about this.
N.B.
Of course it needs care. N.C.B. always work with N.U.M. on this.
467 uneconomic pits are workg. today and producg. 55 m. tons p.a.
H.D.
Eric Young is quite incapable of understanding psychology of miner
on this ques.
A.B.
V. good report. Healthy technical situation.
J.G.
Agree.
A.B.
Open-cast. Aren’t N.C.B. frightening people unnecessarily by bore
holes?
N.B.
It’s not N.C.B. but my Dpt.
A.B.
Consultn with M/H (water) T.C.P. and M/Agr. before boreholes are sunk at all.
P.M.
There shd. be consultation.
H.D.
I’m consulted before working is decided upon. Haven’t yet asked for
earlier consultn.
P.M.
There shd. be – for may be social reasons wh. rule out any possibility
of working open-cast. Must be reasonable hope of coal and hope of
workg. it.
H.D.
Policy: reduce open-cast and continue uneconomic pits at a loss.
E.Sh.
13 m. tons p.a. V. unwise to close down on it.
N.B.
Para. 30. Is it worth pursuing?
P.M.
No: L.P. Cttee.
Labour Relations: in Mining.
G.A.I.
Para. 8. More and shorter strikes.
At outset N.C.B. officers were too remote. Better now (para. 1).
Ready acceptance of arbitn decisions.
P.M.
Proof, in these figures, of unsatisfactory management. Appalling no.
of strikes.
108
N.B.
V. gt. progress in last year. Of 15.000 disputes, 13.000 were settled at
pit level by conciliation level.
Pre-war mines accounted for ⅔ of all days lost. This year only 1/5th.
Feeling twds. Bd. is changing.
J.G.
More power to local manager and local repve of men. Real remedy.
R.S.C.
Figures reflect full emplt. = increased power and influence of strikers.
Heavy increase from 1943 to 1948.
H.W.
Actually figures pre 1942 weren’t so good. Therefore post-war
improvement is even greater than appears.
6.
[Exit N.B.
[Enter Ogmore.
Japanese Peace Treaty.
K.Y.
No re-actions yet fr. Comm. Govts.
Time we took initiative.
Cost of this report cd. go to U.S. All save i) some B/T. point 28 and 34
and ii) Annex B.
Korea needn’t alter our intentn to acquaint U.S. w’out commitmt
Want therefore to send to U.S. if other Comm. Govts. agree.
O.
Support this.
E.Sh.
Paras 16-23 = defence. No objn to despatch to U.S.
H.W.
The incln of trade sections (28-34) will embarrass us on m.f.u. for
Japan.
Approved.
7.
C.E.
[Exit K.Y. & Ogmore.
Meat Strike.
Can’t get ¼ of carcase meat, but will make up balance in bully.
Trouble because of requiring men to pay own fares to places where
they left lorries.
J.K. will settle: men being given warrants m’while.
Troops returned to duty at noon y’day.
109
17th July 1950
C.M. 46(50)
1.
P.M.
Welcome – old friend – peace and war.
V. suitable moment.
2.
C.N.S.
Mr. Menzies.
Military Situation.
Remains critical. Korean defence line fallen this am. Line of retreat
across enemy.
S.K. fightg. better in east – may mean less dangerous.
Best U.S. can do is hold bridge head.
U.S. C.N.S. has said we’ve done enough at sea and shdn’t weaken
ourselves in W.
Land forces: no word yet.
Signs of increasg. R. sub activity in F/E. 30/40 there.
We have 40 destroyers/frigates. But subs wd. be v. dangerous.
C.I.G.S.
42 k. 196 w. 265 odd missing. Total U.S. casualties. 1 Divn. engaged
– but only 2 Rgts. seriously.
Divns. not at full strength – peace establmts. Small force.
R. tanks impervious to war time bazooka.
Our 17 pds. wd. deal with them. Only 1 battery in H. Kong. They will
get their own fr. U.S. as quickly.
Only 2 U.S. divns left in Japan. Won’t send more from there, except
one (cavalry divn)
C.N.S.
1 addl carrier nearly there. Marine Divn. due arrive Aug. Only 1
Brigade Group.
C.I.G.S.
Koreans themselves not v. formidable. Doing well because 2 Divns.
embodied with R. for some time and R. mission of 2.500/3.000 with
them.
“Advisers” prob. in command.
C.A.S.
150 N. Korean aircraft. S. Korean virtually nil.
U.S. had 500 in Japan includg. 80 bombers. 50 more B.29’s since and
also Mustangs. 77 Austr. Squadr. also – had done v. well
Weather favours Koreans: July/Aug. are worst months. Much cloud to
4/5.000 ft. and mountains that high. Up to first 3 wks. flown on 1200
sorties. Close support of troops in the main - tho’ B-29’s are going for
oil targets.
1 Br. + 1 U.S. carrier, also.
Weather = main reason why air hasn’t had more effect.
Various targets in N. Korea – industrial. But so far attacks mainly on
commns.
P.M.
Hydro-electric plants alleged to serve China too. Dangerous to attack
them. x C.A.S. to look into this. x.
C.A.S.
Successes v. tanks – claims prob. exaggerated. Tho’ rockets used wd.
be effective if they scored a hit.
M.
What prospects of hanging on?
C.I.G.S.
Depends how soon re-inforcemts. arrive.
Their posn = same as ours in Burma in ’42. Every line they try to hold
is circumvented by larger: more mobile numbers.
A.B.
Evce tht. R. Mission are with N. Korean troops.
C.I.G.S.
Identified (15) thro’ N. Korean p.o.w. No R. fighting troops.
C.A.S.
Jet Yaks reported. May be R. operated.
P.M.
U.S. mil. mission in field with S. Koreans?
C.I.G.S.
Probably.
T.W.
Reinforcement time?
C.N.S.
3 wks’ passage.
C.I.G.S.
At least 75% of U.S. troops have not had expce of battle.
They are fighting well, despite U.S. press correspondents.
50/50 chance wthr. U.S. reinforcements arrive before bridge-head is
broken down.
A.B.
Are S. Korean civil popn welcomg. N. Koreans?
C.I.G.S.
On the whole, no.
A.B.
No Internatl Brigade fr. China?
C.I.G.S.
No sign of it yet.
A.B.
No publicity yet given to presence of R. Mission with N. Korean
forces? No.
C.E.
Nos. of U.S. troops in action so far?
C.I.G.S.
8/9.000.
111
C.E.
Aren’t casualties v. small if U.S. troops have bn. fighting hard.
C.I.G.S.
They do look low. But form = U.S. falling back when S. Koreans front
is broken and N. Koreans come round behind. This means few
casualties.
P.M.
Lie’s request for re-inforcements. Odd that he shd. send it.
C.N.S.
Token force – supply commitmt wd. rule that out.
Larger force – C.O.S. considg. this pm.
U.S. have never asked us for more – not even for sea transport.
R.S.C.
In a bridge head other troops with separate supply lines wd. be useless.
P.M.
V. genl. request. We are in trouble elsewhere.
H.D.
Some Tories wondering v. re-inforcements. fr. H. Kong on condn tht.
U.S. wd. put replacements into H. Kong. To get U.S. more identified
with H. Kong.
P.M.
They might ask us then to come in to Formosa.
E.Sh.
Re-inforcements wd. mean callg. up reserves by Proclamn.
Re-inforcements for Fleet and Naval Air Arm. Believe this will
involve Proclamn and announcemt. to H/C.
M.
Wd. upset long term planning.
C.I.G.S.
Visit – stress on M/East.
Don’t want to get excessively preoccupied with F/East.
Suppose we contributed a force to Korea – wd. interfere with home
defence, M/E. prepns., Natl Service. And psychol. diversion of public
opinions – wh. wd. make it hostile to M/E. conceptn. Wd. serve R.
ends.
I therefore feel peevish about Lie’s public appeal.
Our squadron is crack one and considble propn of our fighters strength.
My feeling: we shdn’t let R. push us off our main defensive strategy.
C.N.S.
Believe U.S. wd. agree. They have told me not to weaken our naval
posn in West.
U.S. G.I. may think differently. That’s why Bradley wanted some
token forces. Br. hospital ship, however, is now evacuatg. U.S.
wounded.
M.
Token force wd. complicate supply unless they were assimilated to
U.S. in weapons etc.
Legal limitn on using Austr. troops N. of Equator. 92% of our Austr.
force in Japan were enlisted for Japan – and wd. have to be invited to
volunteer for other duty. Only 586 are operational.
112
Build-up fr. Austr. wd. be diff. Already agreed with U.S. to recall
them – partly to build up regular Army partly to train conscripts.
Don’t want to disturb any of this.
P.M.
Personal message to Truman. Bradley/Jessop nominated. Our chaps
will join them about 19/7. Those discns will cover whole show. No
decn to reinforce ground forces in Korea until those discns have made
progress.
Reported D.O. decns on strategic exports to China. |
oil in China. | x
Spoke from brief re. talks with U.S.
First Korea.
Formosa – v. embarrassing to us. U.S. won’t get U.N. support esp.
Asiatic nations. Also genl. feeling throughout Commonwealth tht. we
aren’t in on Formosa.
Hong Kong.
Malaya.
Indo China.
Further afield, must preserve our all-over strategic concept.
Persia.
Berlin.
Gtest diffy. = Formosa. Must disentangle that from Korea.
K.Y.
On x/ we were anxious to avoid publicity. But diff. to avoid saying
somethg. esp. on oil. The C.O.S. have bn. questioned and hinted at
Govt. dirn. P.Q. on Wedy. Can’t hush it up. Can say we are preempting it for own purposes.
P.M.
And can say we must prevent it trickling into N. Korea.
H.M.
Lie’s request. Curious procedure. Shd. he have done this w’out authy
fr. some organn of Security Council. Shd. there not be some S. Council
machinery for handling this sort of thing privately.
P.M.
Diffy. We discouraged Cttee because of composn. Was therefore left
vague.
K.Y.
We aren’t fully aware what’s behind Lie’s request.
He recd some approach from U.S. re further assistance.
Certainly is embarrassing. But may be fault of U.S. as well as Lie.
A.B.
Also want U.N. kept in picture. Don’t want this to appear unilateral
action by U.S.
P.M.
Tels. 705 and 706 fr. New York.
H.McN.
Lie also had responsibilities under Charter.
U.S. must have prompted him.
113
P.M.
Evidently discussed with U.S., President of S. Council. and repve of S.
Korea.
[J.
What wd. be involved in invading Korea if U.S. were thrown out.
P.M.
C.O.S. have bn. asked for appreciation on that.]
M.
Not sure Lie is to be trusted. This is significant action because it’s
U.S. forces – not because it’s U.N. resoln. Risk tht. he will assume
functions of a Commr. We shd. make it clear to him tht. we don’t want
any more of this public manifesto method. A little bold criticism.
Wdn’t do any harm.
H.M. & A.
Endorsed. Avoid repetn.
E.Sh.
U.S. public won’t like it if we can’t respond.
P.M.
Wait until we have seen record of discn with Lie.
Indo China.
E.Sh.
Urgent Fr. need of equipment – wd. enable Fr. to equip locals and
return regular Fr. troops to Europe.
U.S. mayn’t send this if they get bogged down in F/East.
P.M.
Reflectn of genl. posn tht. everything in W. Europe goes slow because
Fr. are bogged down in Indo China.
Malaya.
M.
Accepted C.I.G.S. view tht. this priority 1. in cold war.
If we cd. lay hands on Commando Force, C.I.G.S. wd. still think best
place for it wd. be Malaya not Korea?
C.I.G.S.
Yes.
Team of jungle experts are on the way. Assured they will get all
informn in Malaya despite their rank. When they get back and report,
my Govt. will consider wthr. there’s any more they can do.
Egypt.
M.
Talked with Stevenson and then with F. Secy. a tricky gent. He began
by askg. what A. wd. do if U.K. got into war. I replied tht. we didn’t
suffer fr. neutrality. Then, he said, case for evacuation of Canal Zone
is complete: for U.K. with A. and N.Z. wd. be there to save Egypt.
I told him
i) we regarded security of M/E as vital.
ii) we were workg. with U.K.
114
I asked cd. you defend Egypt? He said: either yes, or if not fault of
U.K. for keeping us unarmed etc. for 50 years.
I tried to pin him down to practical point: what is needed as point for
expansion of mil. strength in war.
C.I.G.S.
He is the worst of the lot.
King knows wh. side his bread is buttered.
And, apart fr. F. Secy., all Ministers realise N.O. point re defenceless
and need of Br. base. They don’t really want us to go. But if any said
that publicly – or suggd new conceptn of defence, equal alliance (as
U.S. in U.K.) – others politically will say they are sold to British. And
they fear, in particular, tht. F. Secy. will rat on them.
But they are trying to find some formula. They are scared.
Burma.
O.
When will those troops be disarmed?
C.I.G.S.
About 2.000 settled in corner nr. Siam. Refuse disarmed. Genl. went
to Bangkok and made Press statement. Burmese Army cdn’t deal with
them.
Worrying Thakin U.
Comms. are split. Karens have had it. Govt. much stronger. But Nai
Win controls Army and Police and P.M. can’t control him.
115
20th July 1950
C.M. 48(50)
1.
Korea.
[Enter K.Y., H., Att G., Wheatley, Ogmore
P.M.
Considerg. statement re exchanges thro’ Gromyko.
Tass have now released ex parte report. Repeatg. Sov. soln of Sec.
Council and China: repve of Korean people.
R.S.C.
Unusually fair summary.
P.M.
Think we shd. make statement today.
K.Y.
Wd. then have to omit final commn now under considn in W’ton.
P.M.
Thought we were only informg. W’ton.
K.Y.
No: consultg. them.
Hope to get it cleared and delivered tomorrow.
P.M.
Tell Kelly to go ahead. And let us announce tht. H.M. Amb. “has bn.
instructed” to give this reply.
U.S. President’s Message to Congress.
P.M.
Welcome to Truman’s message. Read draft.
We ought to indicate tht. our belts have bn. tightened for years past.
R.S.C.
Statement fr. Downing St. will suffice to meet Frank’s view.
K.Y.
Agreed.
H.D.
Awkward to do it in H/C. – diff. Ques. re Formosa etc.
A.B.
Shd. decide what we mean to do if hostilities brk. out over Formosa.
Diff. for us to follow U.S. lead on that.
R.S.C.
T.’s statement qua Formosa is improvemt. on earlier.
Agreed : Put out statement from No. 10 before Ques. Time.
On content: careful not commit ourselves to doing more: but equally
careful not to give U.S. publ. opinion chance to grumble tht. we are
leavg. it all to them.
H.McN.
Is it wise then to make any welcomg. statement at all?
P.M.
Franks doesn’t suggest we shd. say what we are going to do.
Agreed: From No. 10. Limited to welcomg. this lead.
[Exit K.Y.
2.
Subversion Activities.
C.E.
Disturbed to find powers not available to deal with offenders if it’s
found tht. P’smouth explosion was sabotage.
Has happened in Austr. and France.
Malaya: same issues wd. arise if supplies to them were hindered.
Shd. take adequate powers.
Att.G.
Existg. powers are inadequate. We aren’t at war. Acts wh. wd. be
treason in war can’t be punished.
But need to consider form.
Mistaken to link these powers legally with U.N. Charter – For
i) not actg. in pursuance of legal obligns under Charter. (ii) Also opens
door for argument. (iii) Coll. security action might be taken not under
charter (because of Veto) but under H.M. Pact.
Act enablg. H.M. lg. O-in-C. to make it offence to do any act intended
to interfere with supplies to H.M. Forces in action operations or
calculated to assist forces opposing us in those operations.
Wd. that go too far?
J.
Put the powers in Act, and let O-in-C apply it only to given occasion.
To avoid criticism tht. you are re-enactg. D. Rgs.
Att.G.
Might be diff. to prove knowledge of connn with particular opns.
P.M.
Do you intend legn before Recess?
C.E.
Not possible to resolve legal diffies in time. But if Parlt. had to be
recalled in Recess might have to do it then.
H.M.
Fancy Att.G.’s line. Will be troublesome – Silverman and civil
liberties.
But serious gap in powers. And this danger fr. Comm. is greater than
from B.U.F.
A.B.
Diffies over “intent”.
J.G.
Anxious to avoid saying “war” in reln to Malaya.
P.M.
Can’t rush this thro’ before Recess.
Approve in principle; but let officials consider in greater detail precise
form of legisn.
H.
M/D. welcomes. Admy do in particular. Alarming signal re P’smouth.
No room for doubt tht. fire originated from thermite fuse planted.
Ship was going to Korea. Intended to stop it sailing or destroy it at
sea.
H.M.
Cd. we bounce legn thro’ on this basis.
117
Wh.
Against framg. it on para. 6 basis – agree with Att.G.
D. Regs pattern (para 3 of memo.) might help. But are you going x/ to
add the saving v. strikes? T.U.’s wd. be concerned if you didn’t.
Acts preparatory as under D.R. 90.
Cttee of officials with draftsmen.
[Re-enter K.Y.,
Att.G.
On x/ limit saving to legal strikes is furtherance of legitimate trade
dispute.
Agreed :
3.
Admy to consult P.M. re announcement on
P’smouth.
Reject para. 6.
Pattern of D. Regs.
H.O. to convene Cttee to consider form of legn.
[Exit Att. G. and Wheatley.
[Enter W.W.
Parliament.
H.M.
Business for next week.
Civil Defence: debate on 24/7.
C.E.
Our case is v. thin.
A.B.
Leave it therefore to Parly. Secies and take the line tht. we can’t use up
economic resources in defensive prepns: must concentrate on active
measures.
P.M.
Be frank. Can’t afford Civil Defence.
H.M.
Defence. 26/7. One day only. M/D. to open and P.M. to reply.
P.M.
Opposn told we don’t favour S. Session. They have countered by
demanding public debate. W.S.C. didn’t return to charge last pm.
H.M.
Shall I repeat assurance tht. Parlt. will be recalled if needed?
P.M.
Yes.
4.
H.W.
Newsprint.
[Exit W.W.
Not prompted by newspp. campaign, but my continuing solicitude for
newsprint posn deterioratg. thro’ monstrous size of U.S. newspp!
All that has happened is tht. they have had to go back to 6 pp. fr. the 7
pp. given them for purposes of Election. No harm in that.
But they now face further cuts and no prospect of going beyond 6 pp.
in 1951.
Rate of export to Australia. Menzies wants more, so do S. Africa.
118
We agreed in E.P.C. to increase to 100.000 t. We cd. go higher now, at
expense of U.K. newspp. But diff. to justify even 100.000 – for
Australian newspp. are bigger than ours and are fighting circuln battle.
L.P. suggests minimum size below wh. pp. shdn’t fall and max. to wh.
we aim to raise them.
R.S.C.
Import posn too uncertain for that.
All we can do is to fix to 6 p. minimum.
H.W.
Then we must be ready to cut exports if necessary.
H.M.
V. bad thing if they went to 4 pp. Must keep them at 6 pp.
R.S.C.
Mustn’t drop exports – long term contracts.
Agree not to increase exports.
Agree to dollar purchases for 2nd half of ’51.
O.
Another aspect to Canadian side. We’re being pressed to waive prefce.
?Australia/Canada can get exports fr. U.S. and Scandinavia if prefce
waived.
H.W.
Not so. Real trouble is Scandinavia won’t supply to Austr. except on 5
yr. contract.
J.G.
Col. Govts. want early informn re their allocns for ’51.
O.
And S. Afr. will supply dollars for purchase of material. Any objn?
H.W.
Yes: because not shortage of pulp, it’s shortage of capacity.
S. Afr. plan doesn’t help.
Recommn 21 (iii) – approved.
Recommn 21 (iv) – propose to announce this today.
R.S.C.
Make (iv) a condition of (i).
H.McN.
Surely going too far, in intervention.
H.W.
Better not prs. to intervene as condn. Relate to 6p. aim.
5.
Ratification of International Labour Conventions.
G.A.I.
As in memo.
G.T.
Value: same as permissive legn in U.K.
pressure on backward l.a.’s.
Progressive l.a.’s bring
Diffy. is tht. we are represented unfairly in I.L.O. as re-actionary.
119
A.V.A.
Mrs. Roosevelt is forcing the pace on “reforms” at E.C.O.S.O.C. – in
advance of U.S. Govt.
Note taken.
6.
J.G.
[Exit Ogmore.
Colonial Service : Native-born administrators.
As in memo. Not discouraging.
7.
Civil Service Salaries.
Secretariat were not present for this item.
120
24th July 1950
C.M. 49(50)
1.
P.M.
[Enter H., W.W., Att.Genl., Wheatley
K.Y.
All precedents v. mentioning his death in Parlt.
We shd. refrain.
I have put out a message.
R.S.C.
Cd. we not, as Cabinet, send a message to St. Laurent?
P.M.
Yes.
2.
Mackenzie King.
Explosion at Portsmouth.
H.
Gave informn showg. latest results of enquiry.
P.M.
Men there have bn. given demonstn of similar explosion – they say this
is what happened. No doubt this was sabotage.
Read draft of Parly statement.
Wd. this be covered by Malicious Damage Act?
Att.G.
Yes. And if w’in dockyard, it wd. be capital offence.
Draft Bill cd. not be justified as necessary for P’smouth. But other
incidents of sabotage might occur for which Bill wd. be necessary.
3.
Interference with Military Supplies.
P.M.
Shd. consider passing this Bill tomorrow, as matter of urgency.
C.E.
Diffy. of drafting due to fact tht. there is no known enemy – intentn
can’t be based on criterion of assistg. the enemy.
Cl. 3: Propaganda. Reserved for special Cab. decision. not personally
in favour of it, because proviso wd. make conviction v. diff. to obtain.
Might be of some use in terrorism.
Form of Bill: unlike E.P.(D) Act, powers are specified in Act itself.
Parlt will have pronounced on them. Avoids any argument tht.
Executive is going beyond intentns of Parlt.
Para. 5(c). Shall have to concede affirmation resoln if point is pressed
in Parlt.
P.M.
Cl. 1(1) – why only 2-7.
R.S.C.
The other sections will be in force, as part of genl. law, throughout.
P.M.
Cl. 3. Will give unnecessary trouble?
R.S.C.
Cdn’t you cover this under incitement?
Att.G.
No: general propaganda wdn’t be incitement.
Don’t think Cl. 3 as drafted is v. useful. Wd. prefer to go wider – if
anyone with intent to help publishes anything prejudicial + proviso.
W’out this, we shan’t have powers we had in war to deal with
propaganda. And situation may be as serious.
A.B.
Parlt. wdn’t pass the Bill with Cl. 3 in.
We must be careful. Cl. 2(4) – lawful strike.
Att.G.
Unofficial strike is just the weapon that is likely to be used.
P.M.
a) Wd. raise old bogies of 1927 Act. b) Implies No. 1305 wd. be
permanent.
R.S.C.
b) isn’t a good point – wd. mean what is “lawful” for the time being.
E.Sh.
Ques.: do we pass Bill now, or introduce it as a warning and leave it
until we meet again – when we cd. stiffen or modify it as circs.
warrant.
I am inclined to favour second course.
P.M.
If there were then unoffl strike, you wd. have to recall Parlt. to pass the
Bill.
E.Sh.
On merits, you prob. shd. do so.
Concerned at Comm. action. Two examples – a) Ihrenberg shdn’t
have bn. allowed to spk. in Trafalgar Square at this time. b) Mtg. of
Comms. in E. Zone of Germany. Pollitt is going there. Shd. he have
bn. allowed to go?
H.M.
Cd. have bn. done under existg. powers.
Use of Bill as a threat. Wd. expose us to criticism of being un-serious.
I favour makg. P’smouth announcement and then saying we must have
further power.
A.B.
Even so, Parlt. won’t pass it in a hurry even w’out Cl. 3.
What we really want is powers to make Orders, subject to Parlt.
x/ confirmn.
Associated Powers. Wd. it cover Egypt?
R.S.C.
No need for Govt to apply it to Egypt.
H.M.
As much criticism against x/.
R.S.C.
And less effective: for Parlt. wd. have to be sitting.
122
A.B.
Suppose it’s true tht. U.S. have less powers than us.
Unwise for us to be first of all Powers to take this action.
H.McN.
If we rush this thro’ we must be sure it’s effective.
If we accept need for affirmve resoln, Bill wd. be no use in Recess.
We can’t rush this Bill at same time resist affve resoln.
C.E.
Wd. give us 7 days. And we shd. re-call Parlt. if we wanted to use it.
R.S.C.
Pass a short and simple Act – amend it in Oct, if need be.
Omit Cl. 3. Consider modifying Cl. 2(4) to avoid controversy even if
loop-hole is left. Worst case wd. be to introduce this and fail to get it
thro’.
C.E.
Attach special importance to Cl. 2(4).
Unofficial strike = main menace.
Att.G.
Most useful provn in Bill. You cd. prosecute those who incited others
to strike v. a Union.
R.S.C.
No: this saving applies only to those taking part, not to instigator.
Omit “lawful”.
[Exit Hall.
P.M.
Not capable of dealing with complicated issue much more simply.
R.S.C.
You cd. limit it to Cl. 5 in events of Cl. 2. Deal only with incitement.
Wh.
Incitement. Wd. be diff. to prove intent. (Cl. 2. intent), if limited to
incitement.
W’out somethg. about strikes, Bill wd. be useless.
J.G.
Who settles wthr. a strike is lawful or not? What do we mean?
P.M.
Omit Cl. 3. Agreed.
H.M.
Preamble. Effect in limiting Cl. 1? Limited to world peace: does this
mean it doesn’t apply to eg. Malaya.
Att.G.
May be undue emphasis on coll. security. Designed to give it an air of
respectability.
J.
Better delete preamble.
Att.G.
I like it.
H.D.
On merits, shd. be wide enough to cover routine supplies eg. to Malta,
when action opns going on elsewhere.
P.M.
Isn’t “may be engaged” enough to cover that.
123
Att.G.
No: it’s Cl. 2, not Cl. 1, that matters for this purpose.
J.
And on Cl. 2(2) it doesn’t arise at all.
J.
Bring it in as operatg. for 6 months only. An emergency measure.
Adjust later, when more time is available.
E.Sh.
Not a simple Bill – it’s controversial – lawful strike etc., view of T.UC.
R.S.C.
Depends on Cl. 2(4) – main element of controversy. Ask T.U.C.?
A.B.
Power to deal with P’smouth. No evce of any further dangers – Strike
ques. v. diff.
J.G.
Don’t take powers you can’t enforce.
P.M.
Consult T.U.C. if we are to proceed at all.
If necessary, re-call House to legislate.
C.E.
My anxiety: inflammatory speeches may lead men to do things
dangerous to safety of citizens as well as State.
R.S.C.
Incitement to sabotage – mainly covered by existg. law.
Att.G.
Easier to prove under Cl. 2(1).
R.S.C.
Then confine legn to that.
P.M.
Consult T.U.C. on Cl. 2(4). – L.P. F.A.I. and Att.G.
Cabinet can consider again.
124
25th July 1950
C.M. 50(50)
1.
Inter-Parliamentary Union.
[Enter Ogmore and K.Y.
C.E.
Inter-Parly Union mtg. in Dublin. U.K. Delegn includes Savory and
Delongy.
F.O. suggestg. offer shd. appl. to them and give advice on Partition.
Think Minister shd. do so, if needed.
But prob. they need no advice.
P.M.
Perhaps C.E. wd. do it himself, with Ogmore.
Agreed: C.E. to see Milner (Leader of Delegation).
2.
Defence Expenditure.
P.M.
Explained recommns of Defence Cttee.
Additional £100 m. on Defence – of which £30 m. wd. fall in current
year.
Europeans now showg. signs of getting a move on: and U.S. will be
willing to make a contribn.
Personnel problems – deficiencies in air crew. and tradesmen and poor
recruiting for regulars. Continued as in brief.
E.Sh.
D. Estimates for 50/51 were based on £840 – reduced to £810 – and
Cab. decided £780. The £30 m. only covers that gap – to £810.
Immediate deficiencies – and to increase slope of original programme.
Must have big figure next year. Don’t need to state precise figure in
Parlt. But must give a hint.
Service Pay. Diff. to find a formula. Not ready with details: Cttee’s
rept. still with Service Dpts. No increase for Nat. Service men. Air
crew and tradesmen shd. be mentioned. Also need to increase regular
content by recruitment and by inducg. N.S. men to stay on. Want
therefore to hint tht. some pay increases will be required.
R.S.C.
Thght Def. Cttee had taken view tht. no commitment wd. be made in
Debate.
For we may either increase pay or increase period of N. Service.
If we mention genl. pay increases, we may find ourselves doing both.
P.M.
Must refer to special rates for tradesmen.
R.S.C.
Don’t go beyond that.
P.M.
Say doing differentials for R.A.F.: lookg. into wider appls and so forth.
E.Sh.
Not proposing to foreshadow any increase in basic pay. But for special
skills some special inducements are required.
Agreed : E.Sh. to settle form of words with R.S.C.
E.Sh.
On general posn we have a good case. Much equipment – but a few
deficiencies wh. must be made good before we can fight.
No help fr. Europe. Shall have to give supplies to them.
Somethg. fr. U.S. – aircraft and may get more.
R. strengths: we have detailed informn. Shd. I tell H/C. what we know.
I favour doing so. Hard facts shd. not be withheld.
P.M.
Give it. If you don’t, W.S.C. will.
A.V.A.
If you disclose in detail, our intelligence sources will dry up.
But Soviet Budget gives general deduction v. defence expenditure.
E.Sh.
40 fully equipped divns cd. mount immediate attack.
P.M.
Give a broad picture.
E.Sh.
Shall present potential combined strength of Allies.
P.M.
Doubtful – depends on time of deployment.
Expenditure.
A.B.
This will absorb all increased productivity over next few years. i) No
improved standards of living. ii) And we have set wages free. iii) We
had already banked on increased productivity to sustain our dollar
balance.
Concln: standards must be reduced, or we must accept contd
dependence on U.S.
R.S.C. doesn’t mind: for he will take it off civil Dpts. But social
implicns.
We shd. have chance of examing. these.
R.S.C.
These major ques. will have to be settled on Def. Estimates.
At present we commit ourselves only to mtg. deficiencies – 30 m. now
and 70 m. in next year.
A.B.
i) No action now to commit us to £200 m. extra in 1951/52.
ii) Assurance tht. this addl. prodn will absorb unemployed.
R.S.C.
Being investigated now.
unemployment.
H.D.
Also reversion of R.O.F.’s in developmt. areas to war prodn.
R.S.C.
Yes: on the longer term. Dispersal must be taken into a/c.
A.B.
Marry all this into our economic plans.
126
Naval p’mme will absorb shipyard
P.M.
Will be done.
H.McN.
Useful if a sentence to that effect were made in debate.
R.S.C.
By P.M. Have suggd a draft
A.V.A.
W.S.C. will say: re-arm Germany. What will you say?
E.Sh.
I shall ask F.O.
Civil Defence Expenditure. D.O. recommns approved.
3.
Korea.
P.M.
Put D.O. views v. 1 Brigade Group.
T.W.
Age limit?
E.Sh.
Shall have to include a no. of N.S. men.
A.B.
Aggressor will always have advantage if we spread our forces over all
soft spots, in small packets.
E.Sh.
Militarily not v. desirable. Psychologically inevitable.
A.B.
I mean force shd. be larger.
P.M.
U.S. are going to hit him v. hard.
H.D.
Favour proposal. But keep it at token strength. And Emphasise our
contns at sea and in air.
[Exit Ogmore.
4.
Enquiry into Income Tax.
R.S.C.
As in memo. P.M. and I to concert membership.
H.D.
i) Wd. like “equitably” distributg. tax burden, in t. of ref.
R.S.C.
“Fairly” after burden. Agreed.
H.D.
ii) 1920 Commn included Wm. Graham. M.P.’s were not debarred
then. There are some today.
R.S.C.
Labour outside H/C. is a better source fr. wh. to supply this need.
H.D.
I will suggest names. Socialist though shd. be represented.
H.McN.
A Scot.
127
J.
Don’t announce tht. chairman will be a Judge.
P.M. to secure approval of the King.
[Enter Wheatley & W.W.
5.
P.M.
Overseas Operations (Security of Forces) Bill.
Took A.G.’s points in memo.
i) Associated Powers – point approved.
ii) Cl. 1(1) “Shortly”.
J.
I’m against all this preamble etc. Why not take simple power to
declare an emergency.
G.A.I.
Seen T.U.C.
Wh.
Cdn’t give answer y’day. They had Cttee this morning wh. considered
memo by Att.Genl.
It was put to them tht. Cl. 2(5) was unnecessary because intent was
essential ingredient in Cl. 2(2). Psychological only. And once you
discriminate betwn. one kind of strike and another you are in trouble.
T.U.C. say psychologically unnecessary.
formula.
And they prefer D. Reg
P.M.
Then the Bill is useless.
G.A.I.
My Dpt. favour omitting Cl. 2(5).
Don’t really know what T.U.C. want.
P.M.
Can’t v. well go on with the Bill if no sound basis with T.U.C.
A.B.
This Bill won’t help you to catch Communists because T.U.C. insist on
savings for workmen and these cover Comms. too.
H.M.
Lost psychological moment. T.U.C. is uncertain. Drop this now. and
keep it for next Session.
R.S.C.
Go on with prepn of a Bill. But more effective Bill.
L.P., G.A.I., C.E., J. and L.O.’s to review the position.
[How far existg. law covers mischief.
[How can it be strengthened.
Consult with T.U.C.
128
27th July 1950
C.M. 51(50)
1.
P.M.
Mr Mackenzie King.
[Enter K.Y. W.W.
Telegram fr. St. Laurent acknowledging Govt’s message.
2.
Parliament.
P.M.
W.S.C.’s demand for 2nd day of Defence Debate in S. Session. Worst
of all worlds.
Ques. now – who shd. speak today? Prob. M/Defence (wind up).
H.M.
Reserve ques. until we see how it goes.
E.Sh.
Points to be cleared up.
i) Shd. we send N.S. or others under 19
to Korea? Must send N.S. men. But if we can avoid sending under 19
yrs. old, it wd. be a good thing. On physical
grounds.
ii) “£5.000 m. since end/war”. Includes
much increased expre on amenities (pay etc.,) wh. we shd. advertise.
R.S.C.
Also mention heavy terminals.
iii) Make public also tht. W.S.C. had no
concrete sugg to make in the confl. talks.
ns
P.M.
Let E.Sh. say this. Why didn’t he send in memo. he promised?
H.M.
How far can you reveal what passed? Agreed: “we await his concrete
proposals”.
iv) Main theme of speeches: Service pay.
Have got Dean Rpt.: will discuss it with Serv. Ministers: want to see
Ty. soon.
P.M.
Agree we must take these points v. soon. But no genl. increase.
A.V.A.
S. Sessions. What are permanent records? W.S.C. will make a set
speech.
For publn later – and no one will publish the reply – for no shorthand
report.
H.M.
Business for week after Recess.
Solicitors Bill. Useful – private members Bill. Any objn in principle
to takg. this private members’ Bill fr. H/L. when H/C. has bn. denied
time for such Bills?
C.E.
Precedent for Pets Bill on wh. similar tactics are contemplated.
P.M.
Dangerous precedent.
A.B.
If I were on back benches in H/C. I wd. protest v. strongly.
H.D.
Start it afresh as Govt. Bill in H/C.? next Session.
J.
I wd. be content with that – tho’ I wd. introduce it in H/Lds. Agreed.
Maintenance Orders.
J.
Defect discovered at last moment – amendment required. Bill passed
H/C. Will mean returng. it to H/C. in October.
Emergency Powers.
Shall give notice today tht. Addresses will be moved in U.K. beginning
23/10.
May have to give indicn about permanent powers. Shd. it be H.M. and
C.E.?
C.E.
No. H.O. interest. H.G. via C.E.
Agreed.
[Enter N.B., B., H.G., G.S., M.W.,
3.
H.M.
Economic Powers Bill.
Good Bill to have a row about. Tho’ rather negative: good thing if we
cd. think of ways of includg. more positive elements.
Believe it wd. be better to seek permanent powers next Session than to
continue to rely on annual renewals.
Dpts. are broadly satisfied with powers in Bill.
Sufficiently
comprehensive.
Title: chosen for political propaganda purposes. Preamble also
included for those purposes. Wd. it have any effect on interpretn by
Courts? (2nd para. might include some reference to Parly control).
Ques. i) Is this broadly the Bill Cabinet wants?
ii) Is it to be in King’s Speech for 1950/51.
iii) Will it afford a good occasion.
R.S.C.
Bill doesn’t match title. Does no more than perpetrate war controls.
Shdn’t move position powers e.g. Govt. factories, be included?
If such a title, Bill shd. go to limit of Party policy on planning.
Before Oct, add these position suggns i) A.B. sub. Cttee. ii) H.W.’s
memo. iii) Party’s proposals.)
P.M.
Title doesn’t disguise what it is.
130
H/L. wd. throw it out. Is it therefore Bill on wh. we shd. invite
challenge?
My view is “no”. Not unless it can be transformed into positive
measure.
A.B.
Meeting next Tuesday on Govt. factories etc. That wd. be one positive
element.
H.W.
Concerned tht. Bill didn’t cover this.
Not satisfied tht. price control powers are adequate.
B/T. work on Consumers protn – might be considered for inclusion,
tho’ I think not.
J.
I cdn’t support this Bill.
Favour positive powers over narrow field. But this Bill takes sweeping
power over whole field – displacing Parly control w’out limit in time of
peace. H/L. wd. reject: would public feeling be with us or with them?
If this Bill were in background, doubt wthr. H/L. wd. give annual
renewals.
H.D.
Why: Bill only makes permanent what we have bn. doing for 5 years
of peace.
P.M.
This puts v. baldly the negative character of war time controls.
Merely fettering people’s initiative.
J.
Look at the width of the powers’. Will be represented as attack on
Parly procedure.
H.M.
Challengeable by Prayer. Annual report. This is less drastic than
Supplies and Services Act.
What alternative? Rely on annual renewals? If H/L. rejected renewal,
they wd. wreck economic planning and wreck full emplt.
A.B.
World re-armament can’t take place w’out such powers as this to
control inflation. Climate of opinion will move in favour of such legn
as this. All democracies will have to do it.
P.M.
Remedy for that wd. be to renew war time powers. Or at least Opposn
would say so.
J.
When we know what positive measures we propose, let us consider
then what form the legn shd. take.
H.G.
Agree – let us consider all powers requd for full emplt. policy and try
to get them all in.
If Korean situation develops, people won’t be interested in full emplt.
but in anti inflation measures. This is an anti-inflation Bill.
131
N.B.
People wd. accept this as emergency measure. But if it’s permanent
legn we want somethg. more positive.
P.M.
This is all a question of timing.
{Agreed in principle some permanent legn (includg. positive
{features) shd. be ready by Oct.
{Timing of introduction will need thought.
C.E.
Diffies with N.I. For in peace these matters are w’in their competence.
May have diffy. in persuading them to pass corresponding legn.
A.V.A.
There shd. be consultns eg. with Co-operative Movement.
H.M.
Suggd tht. I shd. take charge of the Bill.
P.M.
I think you should.
4.
Economic Affairs.
R.S.C.
Shortages of coal, bricks and cement. Latter being remedied by
increased prodn (bricks) and imports. Coal is worst case: import of
coal is being suggd.
N.B.
Don’t think we need cut much off exports. Am reportg. to Prodn Cttee.
It’s only ½ mill. tons.
R.S.C.
That wd. endanger actual export contracts.
N.B.
N.U.M. have agreed to run output drive fr. Sept. They hope to get 1 m.
ton increase. Wage incentive scheme. Sampson strippers. Also prs.
Joy Continuous Miners (!) tho’ they cost dollars.
H.G.
Current Diffy. due to increased consumption – even more than fall in
output. Due to increased industrial prodn.
N.B.
Rising curve of productivity involves about 4 m. tons of addl coal p.a.
A.B.
Wage negotns (over lower paid) is dragging on too long.
J.G.
Communists will exploit this delay.
N.B.
Agree: but development has occurred. N.C.B. cdn’t concede original
claim - £9-11 m. p.a. Now offered £2½ m. settlement. This can go to
arbitn reasonably quickly.
[Enter A.
Import Prices. – continue to rise.
R.S.C.
132
Means lighter prices for our exports of rubber or tin, in dollars. But
also we have to pay more in sterling. Thus while st. area is doing well
in dollars U.K. is getting into greater debt with rest st. area.
H.W.
Shortages now in soft currency countries. We are being driven into
dollars.
5.
Iron and Steel Act.
G.S.
Saw Steel House leaders – invited them to suggest names. They said
must consult Executive. Did so – reported tht. unanimous in declining
to suggest names: tht. if anyone asked for their advice they wd. tell
them not to serve and wd. forfeit trust of industry.
M’while, have got a few candidates from outside the industry. Have a
Chairman but not many members.
P.M.
Carry on.
[Exit 5 invitees + ? K.Y.
6.
Services Court Martial.
[Enter 3 Serv. Ministers & Wh.
J.
I don’t decry workg. of existg. system. We shall leave it as today
subject to creation of Ct. of Appeal linked with C.C.A. Appeal at
instance of convicted person or reviewing authority.
Two minor points –
i) “other ranks” on count. Blackburn only member of Cttees who
favours this. Tho’ Att. is in sympathy. Some such system in U.S.
ii) “unanimity”. If we had bn. recastg. whole system, strong case for it.
But as we keep it, wiser to follow principle of Bench of Mags.
P.M.
V. satisfactory conclusion.
E.Sh.
Propose to accept Napier Cttee! recommns.
i) above may provoke controversy.
ii) above.
What are we going to do about this? A White Paper – indicatg.
separate action on Army and R.A.F. with R.N. to follow with Pilcher
main report (now in). Or shd. we get on with considn of Pilcher and
have legn cover all 3 Services a little later. I favour 2nd course – esp.
now tht. Pilcher final Report is in.
P.M.
Obviously must go forward together. Pilcher was our reason for not
legislating earlier on Army and R.A.F.
Agreed: legislate simultaneously even if unified system isn’t possible.
133
H.M.
Not in this Parlt. Can’t control H/C. on this subject. Service voters
etc.
E.Sh.
We can limit it to ques. of appeal – on that there isn’t much
controversy.
R.S.C.
Cd. limit it by title.
A.B.
Can’t escape controversy over i).
P.M.
Don’t believe “other rank” representn wd. be of any value in practice.
H.D.
Why not have it all the same.
A.H.
U.S. courts martials aren’t any worse than ours. Accused has option to
ask for “other rank” on the court – it isn’t obligatory.
Officer nominates the “other rank”.
H.M.
Is this “pre war” atmosphere suitable for this legisln?
T.W.
V. diff. to get i) past the H/C.
E.Sh.
Can we purport only to deal with appeal ques. – under restricted title
excludg. other matters.
A.V.A.
Will it apply to capital offences in war?
E.Sh.
Shall have to be careful about that.
P.M.
Consider possibility of such a limited Bill.
H.McN.
Scottish soldiers shdn’t be subordinated to an appeal court modelled on
C.C.A. Wd. prefer some ad hoc Tribunal.
J.
Military law is law of England.
Wh.
Yes: don’t dispute that. The point is: if you invent a court of appeal it
shd. be independent of courts of either country. Shd. be organised ad
hoc, not linked to C.C.A.
J.
Will consider that.
[Exit Wh. 3 Service Ministers., C.E., H.M.
7.
G.A.I.
International Labour Conference, 1949.
Transport Conventions – as in memo.
Migration for employment.
Cannot accept Annex I.
Can accept Annex II.
134
Agreed.
Cannot accept Annex III – customs duty.
We therefore wish to accept Convention less Annexes I and III.
A.B.
Will it help movement of labour from Italy to France.
G.A.I.
No.
Miscellaneous Migration.
Can accept all save para. 14.
135
1st August 1950
C.M. 52(50)
1.
K.Y.
Korea. Security Council.
[Enter K.Y., Att.G., H.G.
U.S. had wished to submit unfortunate resoln. We rode them off.
At 7.30 pm. last night we heard of a new one – i) condemning N.
Koreans for defiance of U.N. ii) Callg. on all to continue resistance of
this defiance. iii) Callg. on all to avoid action tending to spread area of
conflict.
We saw no advantage in pushg. this in before Malik’s arrival. Weaker
repetn of earlier resolns on ii) and i) : and iii) wd. give opening to Malik
to attack U.S.
We therefore advised delay. But U.S. went on with it. Ques. now will
be wthr. this gets precedence over Malik’s Agenda. That was
presumably object of manoeuvre.
2.
Security Council: Admission of Chinese Communist
Representation.
K.Y.
We have told U.S. tht. if R. raise this on merits, and not as part of
bargain over Korea, tht. it wd. be diff. for us to do more than abstain.
Indeed we may feel obliged to vote in favour.
P.M.
We shd. not be put in posn of voting for Nationalist Chinaman. Wd. be
wrong in principle and awkward qua Asia.
Nor shd. we take line tht. this can’t be settled until Korea is pacified.
That wd. be no more reasonable than R. attitude tht. it must be settled
before Korea is discussed. The conditional point of view is wrong
either way.
A.
Weak attitude to wait until we know there’s going to be a majority.
Cdn’t we take a definite line.
K.Y.
Didn’t want to offend U.S. opinion unnecessarily by a vote wh. wasn’t
going to be effective. But we’ve m’tained that line for 6 mos. and to
go over now to a more positive line wd. provoke U.S. opinion.
H.McN.
We have taken positive steps – oil, ships, men – to keep U.S. with us.
Unrealistic to alienate them over a thing like this. Much political
advantage in adhering to our policy.
P.M.
No argument for doing everything U.S. wants, even when we think
they are wrong.
Dangers of Europ/Asiatic line up over this – emotionally v. dangerous.
Esp. on a point like this – Comm. Govt. is the effective Govt.
R.S.C.
And U.S. have said they will accept majority view on Security
Council.
A.V.A.
Has anything come of our recognition? Ambassadors not exchanged.
K.Y.
Their complaints weren’t framed as condns of exchanging dipl. repves.
Nor have we promised to vote for their admission – unless it’s clear
there will be a majority.
A.V.A.
Don’t let’s make any change of policy.
P.M.
Looking ahead to situations that may arise.
A.V.A.
Abstain from voting – safer course.
P.M.
Our guiding principle must be to avoid driving China into the arms of
Moscow.
R.S.C.
x/ As U.S. have said they will be bound by majority, x/ it is our duty to
express our opinion by a positive vote. If everyone abstained, an expn
of view cd. not be secured.
P.M.
Agree: if it comes up on its merits, we must vote in favour of admn.
K.Y.
They have never said x/ to us. Only to Indians.
R.S.C.
It was published.
P.M.
Avoidance of alienatg. Asia is fundamental to us.
H.McN.
If Korean resoln can be taken first, our dilemma wd. be eased. For if
R. are reasonable about Korea, we can easily vote for China: And if
they aren’t and walk out the China resoln won’t arise.
R.S.C.
Our repves must receive firm instructions.
K.Y.
E.B.’s view was tht. they shd. ask for adjournment before voting, even
on this China issue. We must see how it arises.
P.M.
Yes: but useful for E.B. to know genl. views of Cab. viz., we shd. not
be put in a posn in wh. we appear to vote v. adminn of China: don’t
want it to be part of a bargain: don’t want to look weak by waiting to
see how others will vote.
3.
Convention on Human Rights.
K.Y.
Convention must be adopted – we couldn’t oppose it in principle.
Further amendmt. won’t get us anything better than this draft.
The European Court is based on optional clause: we don’t need to be
bound by it.
P.M.
Will this be a paid body? Watch that.
137
K.Y.
Art. 23.
R.S.C.
This Convention makes a planned economy impossible. Eg. inspection
of premises. Arts. 4, 5, 8, 13. Policy twds. Communists in Civil
Service wd. also be barred.
P.M.
All the Greeks etc. will vote for it, even tho’ they won’t carry it out.
We shall look v. foolish if we vote v. it.
H.M.
Is Council/Europe the right place for this sort of thing. Tories wd.
enjoy supportg. somethg. embarrassing to “planning” Govts.
A.V.A.
I was briefed by F.O. to stall on this in E.C.O.S.O.C.
Can we take an opposite line at Strasbourg.
R.S.C.
This Convn wd. enable U.K. co. to object at this court to a planning
Reg.
Att.G.
Policy of workg. for a Convention has gone on too long to reverse it
now.
This draft follows what U.K. repves proposed.
We cd. meet R.S.C.’s view by small amendment of Art. 8.
All these Conventns will be apt to be out of tune with letter of
municipal law. Enough if consistent with genl. principle and substance
of our law.
J.
Opposed to that view. We shall be jockeyed into accepting the court –
wh. administers no known law but only generalities – and overriding
our courts and our legislature.
We shd. be surrendering to the Commn and the Court control over our
law.
No pol. advantage. For Russians and others won’t pay the slightest
attention to Convention and we shall feel obliged to.
J.G .
Political diffy. is tht. we shall have to oppose it in public in Assembly.
Hope therefore we may take opportunity of seeking amendments in the
Council of Ministers, in private. Esp. Art. 23.
Parallel Convention under discn in U.N. That restricts right of petition
to States. If this is carried in C/Europe same principle may be inserted
in U.N. draft.
Urge therefore omission of Art. 23. or at least its modification.
K.Y.
But can we go back on genl. policy of support for a Convention.
H.M.
We can either a) say that havg. seen the draft we don’t like it.
b) U.N. are doing one: no sense in having two.
R.S.C.
How come we to put fwd. such a draft as this – inconsistent with
planned economy.
138
K.Y.
Don’t accept that it does.
P.M.
Take the line tht. U.N. shd. do this, and C/Europe shd. leave it alone.
H.McN.
We cd. have said that a year ago – and didn’t. What new reason for
saying it now. Only hope is to try to reduce it to a declaration. Or kill
it by a 1.000 cuts at particular provisions – eg. Art. 23 and Court.
P.M.
Are you going to have a Commn.
Att.G.
K.Y.
There’s bn. a declaration already. Too late for that line.
We have agreed to go ahead with Conventn.
If we oppose it now, we shall be alone with the Greeks.
x/ Best line wd. be to stall on this, on drafting grounds.
M’while let J. explain the legal diffies to Maxwell Fyfe.
Cab. shd. realise it will be seen, at Assembly stage, tht. we have made
volte face.
Agreed as at x/.
R.S.C.
Can we have a memo. showg. how this came about.
P.M.
Yes. Shdn’t anyway have come up so late.
[Exit Att.G.
[Enter G.S.
4.
Defence Requirements and U.S. Assistance.
R.S.C.
Point for Cab. decn how far are we prepd to go in committg. ourselves
to expenditure on defence over next 3 years or so, both with and w’out
U.S. help.
Explained para. 4. Increased labour on munitions of ¼ m.
In para. 5 we have put our views on U.S. help.
The £900 m. takes a/c of about £30 m. for increased pay – otherwise
only figures decided by Cabinet.
How much wd. we be ready to spend in this crisis, assumg. we are not
going to destroy our economy? We believe: £170 m. (para. 6(ii) as a
maximum. Addl prodn over and above that can be undertaken only
with U.S. help – wh. shd. be given (para. 7) in free dollars.
For most will fall on engineering industry and must involve redn in
exports (eg. of cars) and we must increase our dollar reserves as
against deficit this incurred in sterling.
E.Sh.
No detailed examn of requirements. Annex II hasn’t bn. vetted by
M/D.
No a/c taken of increased costs and new weapons.
Calculations in para. 4 assume current expre at £780 constant. In fact,
on existg. policy, expre wd. rise (eg. for Korean operations, rising costs
etc.,)
139
Includes C.D. expenditure at £90 m. Didn’t expect it wd. be so
included.
R.S.C.
V. stupid to omit it because showg. U.S. how much we have to spend.
E.Sh.
1951/52 gives us £900 m.
R.S.C.
No: £1075. Of which, we cd. carry £950 m.
E.Sh.
Figure of what we require is too low.
A.V.A.
First line at 780 m. doesn’t take a/c of rising cost of existg. policy.
R.S.C.
We can indicate to U.S. tht. our expre (requiremts) may be higher.
In particular, we weren’t ready to put in estimates for personnel tho’
U.S. asked for them. But £950 m. is all we can pay for.
A.B.
V. serious. Means increased taxn or decreased social expenditure.
The social and pol. offensive v. Communism is to give place to the
military offensive. You regard R.’s military threat as more grave than
the other. I disagree. U.S. are wrong: and so are we in followg. them.
If this is approved, civil Ministers will be in a clamp. Can only accept
redns in our p’mmes. Only freedom will be to decide which of our
social p’mmes shall suffer first or most.
Tories will like to see us do this.
I disagree and must carry my disagreement to last point.
Better way: build up economic standards. Democracy is function of
capital accumulation.
We cd. prob. stand this p’mme. But doubt if France or Italy could.
And means tht. we shall deny ourselves the chance of helping them to
resist Commn by increased social and economic standards. Dissent
from this fundamental re-orientn of our post-war policy.
H.M.
My fear is tht. this isn’t the last of it. Believe there may have to be
more expenditure.
P.M.
Adjustment is not a reversal of policy.
Loss of Malaya wd. be a much greater blow to social standards.
It’s a ques. of balance – accordg. to events.
If M/H. found a huge disease epidemic in U.K. he would have to ask
for more money to meet it.
E.Sh.
Have never had adequate discn of defence – in Cabinet – since election.
P.M.
Idle to suggest tht. internatl condns haven’t deteriorated.
Public realise tht. they have.
Fact tht. French etc, have spent less on defence doesn’t mean they have
done better in resistg. Communism.
We can’t afford not to do at least what is proposed here.
140
E.Sh.
We are totally unprepared for emergency. A.V.A. never got the
money.
But we have no right to order men into battle w’out proper equipment.
Mistakes doubtless were made – in disposals etc. – because we didn’t
expect this early emergency.
Posn in W. Europe can’t be worse. Allies don’t act. Only hope is to
show an example.
Choice for us: spend much more on defence or chuck our hand in.
R.S.C.
Two aspects: money and production.
Prodn total = 1075 m. 1951/52. Some we expect, in dollars or gold, fr.
U.S. But transfer to defence prodn will be betwn. 950 and 1075. At
1.000 m., say, it means 200 m. more than this year – Some off exports
(U.S. paying). Some off. home investment. And prs. some off
consumption.
On this basis, on % of national income, our defence expre will be v.
much the same as that of U.S.
A.B.
Concerned at para. 10.
Shd. we not say our existg. expre on social services and investment is
fixed: we offer the product of increased productivity.
R.S.C.
That wd. be much larger. £300 m. or more.
And we have pledged it already for non-defence expenditure: increased
Govt. expre and capital investment.
A.B.
Memo. implies redn in existg. standards.
R.S.C.
No. We have planned increases. More Govt. expenditure: rise in
earnings: increased capital investment. We may have to p’pone the
improvement.
A.B.
I’m ready to concede tht. Defence has prior claim on increment in
productivity. Believe we can m’tain existg. standards plus the
automatic eg. addl. o.a. pensioners.
R.S.C.
Our p’mmes (eg. capital investmts) are expanding p’mmes.
We shall have to cut back the expansion.
Can’t yet say exactly how p’mme wd. affect us – esp. before we know
precisely what the production is.
P.M.
What impact will this make on U.S.?
H.G.
a) same percentage of national income.
b) total over 4 years = £1100 m. : 50% from U.S. surplus over 780.
c) decided not to base demand on estimated loss of exports.
But U.S. element in this wd. cover dollar cost of addl dollar imports
and compensn for loss of exports. Takes care of b/paymts. posn.
If we tried to do more, b/paymts. posn wd. suffer.
141
A.B.
We have bn. doing more than U.S. up to now.
R.S.C.
U.S. have now increased her defence expre.
A.B.
We haven’t got a relative b/sheet of natl expns on defence.
H.G.
We must give a lead. Emphasise percentage of natl income approach.
Canada’s eg. is v. low.
J.
This looks to me to be on small side.
If your def. expre is inadequate it’s all wasted.
E.Sh.
Ours is ok – save for my point on the first 780 line.
G.S.
P’mme will make considble impact on some industries.
A.B.
Watch inflationary effects.
Memo. approved.
5.
A.B.
Capital Investment.
Political consequences of refusg. sewage schemes to small rural areas.
6.
P.M.
[Exit K.Y.
[Enter M.W.
Nationalisation of Water Supplies.
Much difference of opinion. This must stand over until after holidays.
7.
Call up of Reservists.
A.B.
Ty. have decided tht. reservists called up shall have balance of pay
made up.
And said tht. N.H. Service may do same.
P.M.
R.S.C. shd. enquire into this.
142
16th August 1950
C.M. 54(50)
1.
Birth of Princess.
[Enter H., A.H., H.G., J.S.
Message to their Majesties – congratulations.
2.
P.M.
Agreed.
Recall of Parliament.
W.S.C. is pressing for earlier recall. No reason disclosed. Invited him
to call.
Reasons against: don’t want another W.S.C. speech.
want to have concrete proposals.
C/Europe mtg. continues to end/month.
Propose to stand firm.
E.Sh.
I had favoured somewhat earlier date. Esp. to get ahead with extension
of U.S. Might have influenced W. Union Powers.
What shall we do save Bill, in Sept? Announce other plans eg. prodn.
P.M.
Somethg. on that. Also Pay. Genl. defence sitn.
One week wd. suffice.
3.
Defence: General Situation - Re-equipment.
E.Sh.
Prodn. Details not worked out and some confusion. 3.400 m. over
next 3 years. Don’t know how much will go to prodn. Must work it
out.
M/D. confused about amount of money available for prodn. Now only
£250 m. out of 1.780. In 950 m. p’mme, rather under another £100 m.
– some attributable to increased pay and some C.D. Prs over £6.00 m.
total over 3 years on prodn. Not a v. large re-armamt p’mme.
H.G.
We told U.S. £3.400 m. with aid fr. them. That included extra £800 m.
for prodn. Also asked U.S. for £550 m. That means extra £250
ourselves. Pay and N.S. decn won’t make more than £50 m. diffce.
On old decn of £100 m. detailed work is going ahead. But planning is
held up on rest because don’t know what U.S. aid will get. Seemed
unnecessary caution. I therefore suggested re-appointmt of Ty. InterService Cttee to allocate another £100 m. – bound to spend that,
whatever U.S. aid we get.
E.Sh.
That £800 m. relates to physical capacity, not to what we mean to
make.
Essential need is early orders.
Cd. P.M. issue directive to Cttee a) to get figures right b) authorising
orders to be placed.
H.G.
My decision will cover precisely that. Wd. go up to £150 m. if
necessary. The rest must wait upon U.S. decision.
A.
Subject to close control of prices.
E.B.
Are priorities being worked out precisely, with U.S., to make efficient
Army. Shall we find ourselves with equipment and no men to use it.
What machinery available for that?
E.Sh.
The first £100 m. only meets deficiencies.
The rest – is no more than we need. But balanced plan on E.B.’s basis
can’t be made until we know final figure.
J.S.
Fitting in with balanced internatl force means unbalancg. our own.
Can’t do that, even if we take the risk, until other forces are known.
But P’mme B. wd. not include anythg. wh. wdn’t be needed on any
view.
A.H.
Bldg. up R.A.F. – ques. is wthr. we shall have crews to man the aircraft
ordered.
P.M.
Our Pay proposals are designed to meet E.B.’s point.
E.B.
It’s our responsibility to build up B. Forces: then decide where they
shall be deployed. So many places where R. cd. strike. Mustn’t get
commd to France.
E.Sh.
But unless we do enter into such commitments, W. Union Powers
won’t do their part.
Plans do exist for mutual support in W. Europe. Now suggd our contn
shd. be substantially increased. Long way to go before we can get
minimum of 20 battle worthy divns.
We are expected to get 5 divns ready by next year. I myself don’t think
that’s enough – even 5 divns. France wd. not then go higher than 10
divns.
A.B.
I assume standardisn of arms. If we haven’t got that, where are we?
P.M.
Internatl un-balancing doesn’t arise for some time to come.
H.W.
Is there machinery for dove tailing in plans?
E.Sh.
J.W.P. Cttee.
H.W.
But has it statistical control over p’mmes.
E.Sh.
Machinery is ok for now. Wd. have to be expanded if we went much
bigger into re-armament. We shd. then want a man i/c of prodn fulltime.
144
P.M.
Consider.
E.Sh.
Standn is makg. good progress w’in limits of what is practicable.
4.
E.B.
National Service.
Replies fr. W. Europe are disappointg.
y/ Alphand also takg. line tht. Fr. won’t take the first knock unless Br.
and U.S. forces are already there.
I therefore veer twds. Anglo-U.S. approach. And favour building B.
Forces on our own in our own way. Can’t base our action on what
Europe will do.
Decide this issue on our own.
E.Sh.
Sitn in W. Europe is not satisfy. But not hopeless. Some improvemt in
last 6 mos. Dangerous to “write it off”.
We shd. go on with this, on our own responsibility.
I’m again askg. C.O.S. to tell me what they wd. do if we fought alone.
P.M.
Clear the others won’t come along. We must now give the lead.
A.B.
French: joint plan of action etc.
Which gives us best leverage to bring others along. I’m still doubtful.
They are still at 1 year. Suppose we cd. concert with them a common
plan of 18 mos. for all – or even 18 for them and 24 for ourselves.
Believe we cd. get more out of them thus than by unilateral action.
E.B.
Wd. only invite French to insist on y/. I think we’ve made too many
commitments already to W. Europe.
W.S.C. and his European Army also will be seized upon by French as
excuse.
Make Atl. Pact (vice W. Union) the basis of all our defence prepns.
We can then make firm Anglo-U.S. understanding.
P.M.
With 2 yrs. service we can say to France “we are providg. the
divisions. What are you doing”?
A.V.A.
Agree. But A.B. is right to draw our attn to our pol. diffies here.
Labour Party Policy for years has accepted adequate forces only for
collective security.
W. Union Powers are in N.A.T.O.
Somethg. therefore to be said for pressing W. Union Powers. We cd.
say tht. we too have Parly diffies: but are going ahead.
Pleven deprecates unilateral action by us. Put pressure on.
H.McN.
If we go ahead unilaterally, France will be back – thinkg. we have thus
committed another divn. to fight in France.
145
We were told this was necessary because our commitmts were
increasing.
Cd. we not say to France tht. these must be met fr. existg. forces, and
we shd. have less for France – unless they will all come along on the
U.S. proposal.
Cd. we not threaten the French a bit more?
Failg. that, do other Govts. realise tht. if pressed we shall say in H/C.
tht. we approached them and got no response?
J.S.
W.O. case for N.S. increase doesn’t rest on major way basis – it is
needed for another Korea incident, eg. in Iran. It wouldn’t help for
major war.
A.B.
Presents to Kremlin on 12/9 – a) breach in our Party b) admission tht.
other W. Union Govts won’t follow suit. Major diplomatic defeat for
us.
E.Sh.
The Kremlin wd. like even better a decision to rest at 18 months.
Not much Parly diffy. over b). Don’t have to say they refused: they are
considering it.
C.E.
Necessary in order to get the N.C.O.’s. No escape from it.
Wd. have bn. nice if we cd. have added tht. as result, others are
followg. suit.
We shd. press them again, as soon as our decision is announced.
A.H.
R.A.F. is only 3 yrs. old. Only 20.000 who served pre-war. Our rebuilding plan assumed 1954/5 as target for balanced force. The 3 yr.
Service wd. help us: it wdn’t solve our problem.
H.G.
Favour this.
Only ques. is wthr. we can force others to follow suit before we
announce.
a) E.B. has tried and failed.
b) We invite retort: how many divns will you guarantee to France?
Any discussion with Spoffard?
E.Sh.
Decided not to.
A.
No reason to believe a 2nd attempt wd. be any more successful.
I at least was convinced by merits of the case.
H.
Won’t help the Navy. But I support it on behalf of other 2 Services.
P.M.
Clear tht. N.S. men are best material.
G.T.
Then treat them more generously than we proposed last week.
“Manning-up an essential industry” can’t be done w’out cost.
Regular pay for at least the last 6 months.
146
H.McN.
Then at least let us try to avoid increased commitmts to W. Europe.
Agreed :
Increase N.S. by 6 months.
M’tain pressure on W. European Powers
(after our announcement) to follow suit.
P.M.
How many men will be held longer than they expected?
E.B.
M/L and Serv. Dpts. shd. make a plan wh. will reduce the no. of cases
of extreme hardship? P’ponements and arrangements.
Esp. those who expected release betwn. Oct. and Christmas.
P.M.
Greatest trouble is caused by short notice. Cd. you let it start on 1st
Jan.
A.B.
Wd. lose you 50% of immedte increase.
(N. Brook to arrange!)
x To report to Cttee of Ministers, if required. x
Publication of White Paper.
Shd. cover both points.
Shd. be in newspp. next morning.
[Enter Robens.
5.
C.E.
Electricity Power Stations: Risk of Sabotage.
Put Citrine’s suggestion.
H.O. and M.I.6. both think it v. injudicious to take such action in
advance.
Nor at present is it wish to imply tht. Services are readily available in
support of civil power.
Series of panicky suggns of sabotage. eg. Theseus. May put ideas into
head.
H/Commons.
{Advise Citrine not to take action at present.
{Increase all practicable precautions.
Robens.
I agree.
Electrical Union. Anglo-U.S. refinery at Fawley.
G.A.I.
Support that view. Strike over victimisation.
147
4th September 1950
C.M. 55(50)
1.
P.M.
[Enter W.W. and E.E.B.
Thanks fr. Elizabeth and the King for Cabinet’s message.
2.
H.M.
Birth of Princess Anne.
Parliament.
Debate of Govt. Motion – 2 days. To enable wide debate, incldg.
increase in Service pay and period of N. Service. Followed by introdn
of Bill. 2nd Rdg. and all stages on next day. Bill can’t be available
until Motion carried: proposed therefore to produce W. Paper containg.
text of Bill.
Motions can’t appear on Order Paper until morning of 12th. Proposed
to hand it in on Fri. and let it be known to Press.
W.W.
Seen B. Hepburn: told him of these proposals. He was anxious to
finish by end/week: but hasn’t seen W.S.C.
P.M.
Terms of Motion (approved by Cabinet) may be commd to Opposition.
3.
Defence Programme: U.S. Aid.
P.M.
Diffy because no assurance of U.S. financial aid.
E.B.
Have sent strong personal message to Acheson.
Favourable response fr. France (18 mos) and Belgium (24 mos). v.
increased length of N. Service. Hope Dutch and Luxemb. will follow.
May mean tht. W. group give equal total in man-power.
Can’t get financial assurance fr. U.S. - £550 m.
Two consns on this: a) Man-power. Didn’t think Congress wd. accept
our man-power proposals.
Pressing U.S. to give us at least moral assurance tht. what we spend
will be met (?). Hope to get reply before 12/9, so tht. Govt. can say we
are going on with p’mme and U.S. will pay their share.
Creation of United Force in Europe, under U.S. command, incldg. a
German unit. I have said, on last point, don’t go beyond German Pol.
Force of 100.000. – for fear of French apprehensions. Fr. wd. agree to
gendarmerie: if U.S. agreed, posn wd. alter at once.
Holmes made it clear to me this am. tht. U.S. were ready to increase
no. of their troops in Europe.
Ty. tell me tht. it will be diff. for us to place orders beyond a point
w’out assurance of U.S. aid.
Therefore, my line will be to agree to discuss Europ. Force in trilateral: N.A.T.O. – provided tht. U.S. will make their posn clear on
finances.
E.Sh.
We are being pressed to increase our man-power contn to W. Europe.
We are expectg. to get 3¼ Divns. in W. Germany by March.
2 extra divns in strategic reserve in U.K. by April.
By April we shall have more than 10 Divns. at home and overseas.
And, 4 T.A. Divns. mobilisable in, I hope 6 weeks.
Finance. Disturbed. The first £100 m. – orders placed, in excess
y/ of amount. If we get no more money, we shall be in trouble.
Also announcemt. of £950 m. made before Service pay and N.S.
decisions. We need £990 m. w’out much increased prodn indeed none
above the first £100 m.
U.S. were suggestg. aid be related to specific projects. Are they
sticking to that?
H.M.
Cd. we ask U.S. for more than £550 m. by reason of Serv. pay and N.S.
decisions?
E.B.
Diff. to ask another Govt. to pay your men. Mercenary army. Diff.
propaganda point. Easier to allow them to pay for materials.
H.M.
Don’t ask for more on that basis. But do ask for more.
P.M.
If we can get more, so much the better.
Expect another report from E.B. before Parlt. meets.
E.B.
Improved state of morale in W. Europe – during last few weeks.
Gt. efforts made by U.K. Ambassadors.
* Memo. on United Europ. Force shd. come to Cab. on Wednesday.
A.B.
Queried y/.
E.Sh.
On aircraft. But not for suppl. this year. Will be on next years’
Estimate.
A.B.
Will U.S. aid by expd only as one years’ allocn.
E.Sh.
Presumably we shall have an informal understanding.
A.B.
Must avoid Marshall Aid situation on defence.
(Annual) increase in regular recruitg. since announcement?
E.Sh.
Too soon to give figures.
A.V.A.
Cd. Cab. have informn about despatch of Forces fr. H. Kong.
E.Sh.
2 Batts 2.000 men.
In Oct. 10.000 will go – the Brigade Group.
H. Kong replacements from N.S. men.
A.B.
No commitment to send more Divns. to Europe w’out Cab. authy.
149
P.M.
We are only stepping up Forces on continent in peace.
4.
Far East and S.E.A.. [Enter C.O.S., J.S., Att.G., Ogmore.
General.
E.B.
U.S. have become more reasonable because of diffies encountered.
Warned them not to go on until involved in war with China, and SinoSov. Treaty invoked. H/C. wd. not support us then.
No need to get China involved in this war.
U.S. opinion similar to that in U.K. in time of Boer War. Because of
initial smack on the nose.
Hysteria in U.S. over Korea – Russia and China as a whole emerging
to new consciousness tht. they have somethg. to fight for. M.S. Tung
may have promised 8 m. men, if R. will provide material.
Formosa – we shd. try to swing this on U.N. And Truman has now
agreed to do so.
Need to take care of Nehru, over this.
Have therefore proposed initial talks betwn. Franks and Acheson.
Then call in Ambassadors of interested friendly Powers. Then a wider
circle. All this before we promulgate any proposals in U.N.
That method is beginning to work. Want it endorsed by Cabinet.
J.G.
Agree with E.B. Importance of emergence of Asia problem.
Any conflict in China wd. make gt. diffce in Malaya. There are 10 m.
Chinese in S.E.A. outside China – v. powerful 5th column.
H. Kong cdn’t be saved. ⅔ of popn of Singapore is Chinese.
E.B.
Formosa. Recommns in para. 15.
P.M.
Relns of Europe and Asia are all important.
E.B.
Let us be firm on para. 15 G.P. 194. Believe we can carry India and
Pak. on that policy.
P.M.
Spinder suggd tht. Formosa belonged neither to China nor Japan and its
future shd. be determined by views of inhabitants.
E.B.
Diffy: we announced decn tht. F. shd. revert to China. Part of policy of
ceding extra-terr. rights. Do we imply tht. this changed merely
because Comm. Govt. now in China? V. diff. to imply that.
Doubt if U.S. cd. keep it separate by force. And only argument in
favour is the strategic one – wh. won’t look good in U.N. China, if
admd to U.N. wd. argue tht. U.S. held Formosa wd. be a standing
menace to the mainland.
P.M.
Doubt the strategic conceptn.
C.N.S.
a) No peace in F/East until Formosa goes over to China.
b) We don’t think much strategic value in retaining Formosa.
150
c) No strategic value to us. Some to U.S. if at war with China.
But Comms. wd. find diffy in holdg. it w’out sea power.
H.McN.
A good working proposal.
But i) anything like U.K. imposg. her will on U.S. wd. be politically
diff. for Adminn.
ii) Can’t get Commn w’out concurrence of Chang K. Shek. U.S. shd.
square him.
iii) Try to get Nehru to provide leadership of Commn – himself
nominally, with a repve on the spot.
A.B.
Support memo.
H.McN.
Politically imposs. to get U.S. to hand F. over now to Comm. China.
That is why para. 15(c) is so valuable.
E.Sh.
Suppose U.S. can’t be persuaded to agree. eg. MacArthur’s recent
statement – even tho’ Truman snubbed him. What do we do then?
C.O.S. have said we shd. stand aside in hope conflict may be localised.
But will it be? Look at our increasg. commitmts in Korea.
But if we do stand aside, what about H. Kong?
O.
i) These proposals will in genl. be welcomed by Comm. Govts.
May I inform them of these 3 memoranda?
ii) India will want close adherence to Cairo declaration.
Must try to persuade Nehru tht. this para. 15 isn’t designed to delay.
E.B.
Want précis of all these pp. to go to Comm. Govts. and to Govrs. of
Colonies in S.E.A.
[Agreed].
Korea. Line of approach.
H.McN.
If Sec. Council is seized of a problem, Assembly can’t recommend.
But if Sec. Council took it off Agenda, no U.N. organ. wd. control the
U.N. Forces in Korea – prs. for 6 weeks.
Soviet wd. take the point.
And we pleaded the point to avoid discn of Palestine.
E.B.
I will take further advice on this point.
Att.G.
Whole legal posn is v. diff.
P.M.
L.O.’s and Ld. Chanc. shd. discuss and submit memo. to Cabinet.
5.
E.B.
United Nations: Abuse of Veto.
Don’t believe there’s any solution.
151
P.M.
Canadian horse won’t run.
E.B.
I cdn’t support original U.S. plan of a standing Commn with powers of
Sec. Council – for may be occasions when U.K. wd. want to use Veto.
I cd. however support B. in C.P. 196.
Can’t solve our problems by amendmt. of Charter – it’s a ques. of
goodwill not words.
H.M.
If R. had vetoed Korean resoln, we cdn’t have acted as we have done.
If therefore this veto ques. isn’t solved, U.N. is no guarantee of
security so long as R. and satellites are members.
P.M.
We recognised at S. Francisco tht. it wdn’t work if one of big Powers
was aggressor or favoured it.
Only solution then is for States to act under Art. 51.
Att.G.
R. cd. ditch B. by puttg. the matter on agenda of Sec. Council wh. wd.
stop action by Sec. Council.
A.B.
Will be awkward debate. And will give R. a good argument.
They will say U.K. are as keen on veto as we are.
Agreed: Resist A.
Talk benevolently about B.
[Exit C.O.S. and Service Ministers.
6.
United Nations: Representn of China.
E.B.
Have made our attitude clear to U.S. Haven’t had a reply.
They still want us to vote against. But no grounds for that. Ch. K.
Shek represents no-one. Not proven tht. Comm. China will be R.
satellite. Our policy must be to work thro’ an Indian friendship with
China.
No evce tht. Pekin Govt. have done anythg. to help N. Koreans – save
Press abuse of U.S.A.
Para. 7 of memo. Feel sure Assembly will settle this on political basis.
H.McN.
I wd. bury this rather than disagree with U.S.A.
There are 12 or 13 other applns on wh. disagreemt. persists. Cd. Ch. be
embodied in a genl. resoln covering all?
E.B.
Trouble is tht. Nat. China is there.
H.McN.
Siam: precedent over coup d’état.
Att.G.
This will be raised on first day by challenge of credentials.
And Assembly will have to decide wthr. Tsiang represents Govt./China
– on claims of the two rival claimants to be Chinese repves.
Memo. approved. Vote in favour of Comm. repve
152
Comm. Govts. to be informed.
[Enter G.S., Exit Att.G.
7.
Strategic Exports to E. Europe and China.
E.Sh.
Abnormal demands fr. China for goods wh. wd. be useful to N. Korea.
Want to keep the supply w’in normal levels. Also to get these goods
included on stop list while Korean war continues.
U.S. are now becoming more censorious of our policy.
H.W.
I agree with memo. save on one or two details.
Evce in July of abnormal orders – persuaded firms to decline.
Agree – but shdn’t send out swarms of letters. Limit it to firms
concerned.
Also agree tht. w. party shd. go into comprehensive measures – but
shd. consider need as well as possibility.
High feeling in U.S. over this. Will come up at high level – and connd
with military aid.
We shdn’t be stampeded into violent change of policy. E.P.C. decided
in July v. U.S. plan of genl. blockade.
y/ Distinguish betwn. goods of strategic value to R. and goods needed for
re-armament by us and our Allies. If we apply second principle, we
can deny to R. (requisitiong. if need by).
If U.S. press us to genl. blockade a) they must compensate us for
essential supplies eg. timber we get fr. E. Europe. b) If they think we
are so near war, they must be ready to pool resources in raw materials
– combined boards etc.
E.B.
x/ On manufacturing for defence, precedent shd. go to N.A.T.O.
countries. That shd. be a principle.
We can’t expect U.S. to give us m. tools if we are selling them to R.
This policy might affect M/S. on metals. Can’t deal with this on
narrow basis.
Timber – meat.
R. sure to take counter measures and deny us these supplies.
Unwise to come out on so narrow a front.
Cdn’t W. party give one a v. wide brief – starting from x/. and
considering what N.A.T.O. countries can do in return w’out
prejudicing our posn on timber, meat, non ferrous etc.
And let me argue the point with U.S.
H.D.
Talk in N. York. Don’t be stampeded.
China. How do they pay?
H.W.
Thro’ H. Kong.
G.S.
Immediate problem. a) to preserve what we or N.A.T.O. want.
For that may I use D. Rgs. to requisition?
153
b) Other M/D. proposals wd. be ineffective.
Thousands of firms are concerned. Cdn’t influence them all.
Also they wd. demand Govt. direction, on security grounds.
V. ineffective in stopping the flow.
c) Goods destined for Korea wd. go to European destinations not
Chinese.
And we cdn’t make effective explanation.
My concln if we are to go beyond earlier decn we must have general
export control.
Suggest further considn of ques.
T.W.
Must not prejudice supply of feeding stuffs.
P.M.
i) Authorise requisition * of goods needed by us and
other N.A.T.O. countries for defence purposes.
Agreed.
ii) let W. party study whole ques. further – and prepare
brief for E.B.’s discussion in N. York.
Later negotiations to be handled by B/T. repves.
A.V.A.
But somethg. will have to be said in H/C. on 12/9.
Plenty of precedent for i).
Statement by Parly. Sec. B/T. wd. be good defence, if it’s true.
H.W.
Put it on basis at y/ overleaf.
* subject to inter-departmental consultn and consultn with L.O.’s in
each case.
iii) Further discussion this week on Parly handling. of
this ques.
F.O., B/T., M/Supply and M/Defence can look at this from angle (iii)
especially and immediate action.
Officials first and Ministers thereafter.
To come to Cabinet by end of week – or before 12/9.
Doms. not to be informed until after next Cab. mtg.
154
11th September 1950
C.M. 57(50)
[Enter C.O.S., Serv. Ministers., K.Y., H.G.
1.
K.Y.
United Nations Armed Forces.
This: 3rd limit of U.S. resoln. Two alternatives a) earmarking. b) F.
Legion. No-one favours (b). Mil. opinion is against it.
Shd. be no diffy. in edging U.S. off this. Agreed.
On a) : ques. for considn is wthr. we wd. work somethg. out with U.S.
on these lines for use by ⅔ majority of Assembly – to avoid veto in
Sec. Council. Dare we risk use of such forces, w’out power to veto.
Fr. Assembly, only recommn. Only Powers voting for it wd. be commd
even morally to supplying a contingent.
The diffies aren’t considered by F.O. to be decisive. C.O.S. don’t
object.
Pol. grounds for going as far as we can with U.S.
Mght. be useful in spreading U.N. burden more evenly: in easing
domestic diffies eg. of Canada.
Att.G. raises legal diffies. Haven’t had time to get advice on these. But
any attempt to get round veto is bound to involve legal diffies. Many
Articles of Charter can be construed broadly or legalistically – may be
necessary to take broader constructn eg. tht. jurisdn of S. Council is not
exclusion if it is shown to be ineffective. Aim of policy must be to
make Charter more effective w’out driving R. etc., out of U.N. Hope
therefore Cab will authorise E.B. to adopt symp. attitude to U.S.
proposal – while we consider how to handle legal diffies.
Att.G.
Memo. puts my genl. view on all of U.S. proposal. Paras. 4-6 deal with
this limb of it. Assembly cd. pass resoln recommdg. nations to ear
mark: but only S. Council cd. order those into opern or control them.
Charter, properly read, wd. make U.S. proposal as a whole ultra vires
And if R. took it to Intern. Ct., we cdn’t resist submn and I believe Ct.
wd. rule as above.
P.M.
Accept that view.
Pact under Art. 51 wd. be preferable?
Att.G.
Yes: legal under Charter, even tho’ R. wdn’t like it. I suggest Atl. Pact
writ large.
A.H.
Counsel caution on this. Att.G. plan by-passes both Assembly of S.
Council. World opinion on Korea which influenced by fact tht. U.N.
sanction is behind it. Need for authoritative voice of U.N.
Atl. Pact is Regional.
H.M.
Reality is tht. R. may make trouble anywhere at anytime.
Problem: how to unite peace loving nations on maximum scale. So
long as veto stands, R. can stop effective U.N. action v. aggression.
What can we do? To get quickest action.
How to get earmarked contingents into operation? Much to be said for
Att.G.’s plan. Doubt if it wd. shock world opinion.
J.
Support Att.G. His plan is a second best. Let us bless U.S. plan but
look ahead to legal diffies. And if they prevail fall back on Att.G.’s
plan. Art. 51 method is only sound legal method. Tho’, if everyone
will agree to U.S. plan, we cd. go on with it.
H.D.
Need we do more than tell E.B. of the legal diffies. May be they will
impress U.S. lawyers too. If they do, action under Art. 51 may be
acceptable to them.
But don’t let’s overlook main objective – of getting the forces
earmarked.
Att.G.
Yes: let’s aim at resoln recommendg. tht. forces be held ready and
avoid ques. how to order them into action. Consider that at leisure and
choose most legal method.
P.M.
Always recognised int. charter cdn’t prevent aggression by a major
Power. U.S. can’t get round that w’out destroying Charter.
A.B.
Action under Art. 51 wd. break up U.N. as it stands. Wd. admit tht.
U.N. had no effective sanctions.
Do we forge veto in Art. 51 action? If so, why do we insist in retaining
it in S. Council?
Suppose R. joined Art. 51 club. Wd. we want veto then?
How is force invoked by Art. 51 group? You don’t avoid that issue by
transferring to Art. 51.
Att.G.
We cdn’t ask for veto under Art. 51.
What we are trying to do is to build collect. security v. aggression by a
major Power – for wh. U.N. does not provide.
A.B.
We are seekg. to form a club w’out the Russians.
Att.G.
No.
J.S.
This = delete Atlantic fr. Atlantic Pact. That wd. mean a change in
character. A. v. big issue.
Wd. give you a) U.N. – forum for discn?
b) Alliance of non Russian Powers.
Can we jump twds. this?
P.M.
Whole thing is a bit unreal.
What value in ear marking? Not effective forces. What accession of
strength.
Where do you get to – wthr. you try by Assembly resoln of Art. 51.
C.A.S.
Ear marked contingents wd. be a nightmare.
156
But don’t want to crab U.S. plans.
In long run not v. difft. for us, from what we do now.
We shdn’t prob. send an actual earmarked contingent from a U.K.
reserve.
If you have to increase B.A.O.R. greatly, that wd. conflict with
earmarkg. for U.N.
E.Sh.
In detail, impracticable. Size of Force: command: pay.
We can’t find enough Forces under Atl. Pact. Surely we shd.
concentrate on that first. More practical. Later on, we cd. have a Pact
embracing S. Au. states and/or Pacific. There are diffies even over
latter.
What about our own commitments? Are all Col. issues barred.
If our own are, as Att.G. say, what about Indo-China.
We have no large strategic reserve.
Let E.B. discuss sympathetically, but no move.
P.M.
Prefer: agree to examine plan, not commit ourselves in principle.
K.Y.
Let E.B. show sympathy. Acheson wants U.N. sanctions for U.S.
action.
He prob. wdn’t be content with Art. 51 sanction.
P.M.
Let him discuss. But don’t get committed in principle.
H.M.
Diff. for us to say in advance how many troops we will make available.
When time comes, we may be fully committed elsewhere. And we
shd. then have to break faith.
A.B.
That means: the more friends you have the more troops you need.
Nonsense. This isn’t increase of commitments.
E.Sh.
Does have effect of increasg. commitments. The reserve in U.K.
H.D.
Can’t earmark actual units – only a given force.
P.M.
Give E.B. warning of view expd.
Sympathy – no agreemt. in principle.
Promise to consider details.
G.W.
This wd. facilitate action by S. Doms., who need U.N. sanction.
A.B.
E.B. shd. go as far as possible to find means of [sic]
H.M.
Art. 51. We are now in situation in wh. so long as veto is there, U.N.
will be ineffective v. R. aggression. We must look at that situation.
Suppose R. struck in M/E., where Atl. Pact doesn’t apply.
Give notice tht. we shd. discuss this v. soon.
Want to consider gain. Thursday.
157
2.
Employment of National Service Men.
[Exit Att.G.
J.S.
As in memo.
Under 2 yrs. N.S., the old rule won’t exclude, as it used to, emplt. of
N.S. men in distant theatres.
C.A.S.
C.O.S. endorse.
H.
In R.N. we have for generations sent boys to sea – 17 or 17½ and
upwds. on operations. We must be left out of this.
E.Sh.
Not intended tht. this rule shd. cover R.N.
H.
Don’t intend to send N.S. men to F/East.
E.Sh.
Combat Pay. Ques. will be raised in debate wthr. they shd. be paid at
regular rates after 12 mos via. 18 mos.
H.D.
Equal pay on active service. But not after 12 mos.
H.G.
Will examine that.
H.M.
Don’t get committed to that. Case for increased pay was to attract
regular merits.
P.M.
No decision without memo.
A.V.A.
Early decision required because Nally’s amendmt.
H.D.
Footnote on Malaya. Under 19. There will be trouble over that.
J.S.
Has bn. discussed and defended in H/C. No need to run away fr.
existg. decision on that.
3.
W.W.
Defence Debate.
[Exit C.O.S., A.H., J.S.
[Enter W.W. and G.S.
Business statement may be necessary tomorrow.
If Party willing to pass Bill on Friday – might finish by end/wk.
Opposn might raise debate on Iron and Steel on last day.
P.M.
I will open. E.Sh. and H.G. will speak. May want another Minister –
G.S., or K.Y. or a Service Minister.
H.
H/L. propose to meet Tues and Wed. Putting this to Opposition, who
are expected to agree. Debate on Defence.
Will be diff. to pass Bill on Saty because King at Balmoral.
We shd. prefer to do it on Tuesday followg. H/C. wd. have to meet
that day.
158
[Exit W.W.
4.
Control of Strategic Exports to E. Europe and China.
E.Sh.
Put conclusions set out on p. 2 of memo.
On (b) – effect on natl economy both by loss of export earnings and by
danger to our essential imports fr. these countries.
T.W.
On (3) – will R. be told soon of our intentn to requisition?
G.S.
Won’t be finished for 2/3 months.
But looks as tho’ it was sold to Poland under agreement wh. specifies
no Govt. interference.
Only an example of requisitiong. policy. Lots of others, probably will
be needed.
P.M.
Can’t w’hold informn fr. H/C. for long.
H.W.
Poles may cut up rough over breach of contract, Governmentally.
R. have had no assurances v. export licences. P. were given assurance
tht. Govt. wdn’t stand in way of shipment.
To do so wd. give Poles a big propaganda weapon.
E.Sh.
Craven Bros. emerged fr. W.S.C.’s b’cast. I thght therefore we shd.
implement existg. contracts and requisition etc. fr. now on.
H.W.
L.O.’s will be consulted on Craven tool because of Policy agreement.
H.G.
What is to be said in debate?
Is recommn (1) subject to (2)?
H.W.
Line will be: shan’t allow exports to interfere with our own rearmament and requisitiong. will be used “in appropte cases.”
G.S.
Trouble will arise over things wh. are of value to R. and aren’t wanted
by us.
H.G.
Are recommns 4) and 5) to be made public?
A.B.
Are they consistent with last Cab. decision?
What of retaliatory action by R? Will U.S. compensate us?
H.W.
This was aimed at orders in excess of normal trade – huge orders eg.
for wire. We can stall on those, and prevent export of undue
quantities. Somethg. to that effect cd. be said.
On (6) E.B. will be discussg. with U.S. – can’t expect total blockade.
Must make it clear to U.S. tht. we look to them to see us thro’ if R.
retaliates.
G.W.
Shall continue to keep Dom. Govts informed.
159
14th September 1950
C.M. 58(50)
1.
Industrial Unrest.
[Enter G.S., and H. and W.W.
G.A.I.
D. Herald this am. Evce of organised movemt. to disrupt commns –
inspd fr. Warsaw. L’pl. (M.I.5.) will be attempt to stop work in docks,
on pretext of delay in concedg. wages charters.
Ldn. Bus Strike. Applns for extra £1., based on emplt. of women
conductors tho’ they have equal pay. Also paid sick leave.
Meat Market, dockers and meat transport – mtg. this Sunday.
Much of this informn comes from Deakin.
Polish attempt to get shipping via Gdynia on argument tht. in capitalist
ports interruptn thro’ strike will mean constant delay.
Deakin suggest prescribing Comm. Party – and suggests Govt. shd.
consult T.U.C. at once about this.
Attempt to stop 2 ships loading for Korea.
H.W.
Heard of L’pl. trouble last week. 1945 dockers’ charter. Don’t think
dockers will be taken in this time. Not wholly Communist – a leading
PLC was in it to.
If we cd. say in advance of strike tht. this was Comm. organised, it wd.
help to keep sensible people out of the strike.
H.M.
Must consider this v. carefully – organised pol. warfare.
Is this Polish M/T. story reliable? Check up on it.
Labour Party must get a counter organisation.
B’cast to workers. Cards on table. Get at rank and file and stop them
being sheepish.
H.McN.
Who is Free Czecho-slovak Agency? Be careful about that.
Cd. a Cab. Cttee go into this v. quickly?
E.Sh.
Comms. will run organised sabotage. Must go for them.
H.D.
Slack – Dickens – Jones. Are these men capable of being arrested for
conspiracy? Jail them.
Plus full publicity.
G.A.I.
H’to no evidence for charge. Maybe there is now.
J.G.
Struggle for leadership of T.U.’s. We must find means of winning this
fight. Favour early consultn with T.U.C. and prs. Lab. Party Executive.
Reg. Councils might be called and told of situation, mobilise our
supporters, with agreemt. of Genl. Council of T.U.C.
J.
Existg. law won’t do. Agitn to promote strikes isn’t an offence – you
will have to prove seditious intent.
Must either strengthen law on basis of emergency or ….. [sic]
A.B.
Don’t panic. This is revolving drum tactic, practised in France for
some time.
1) First: tell our people the facts. Put it over via B.B.C. announcer.
2) Start active propaganda. Facts v. Comm. Russia.
No use prescribing Comm. Party or dealg. with this by strengthening
law would draw it underground. They have gone to ground by decidg.
to support Labour Party.
3) Support J.G. mtg. with T.U.C. Reg. Councils.
P.M.
Can’t get B.B.C. to put this over. Favour M/L. doing it.
J.G.
Do both.
G.W.
B.B.C. wdn’t mention names because of libel.
Also must say at once what action will follow - and only Govt. cd. do
that.
E.Sh.
Reply to P.N. Ques. today v. strike – saying emergency powers will be
used if required.
H.M.
Follow it by Ministerial b’cast tonight.
Don’t talk of emergency powers yet. H.O. Bill coming up Mon.
Cttee wh. handled Bill shd. consider wthr. more can be done.
P.M.
{M/L. to reply to P.N. Ques. Friday.
{B’cast by G.A.I. telling men not to be led astray
H.M.
Defer b’cast until we can get a good one. E.g. Sunday mid-day.
P.M.
H.M. shd. grip all this – general political action.
2.
Parliament.
H.M.
No Sat. sitting.
If Iron and Steel announcemt. made, Opposn will prob. move censure.
Censure may be taken then on Tuesday.
Need then for case in timing movemt. of adjournment.
If Govt. were defeated on censure after adjournmt. moved, diff. sitn
wd. arise. Must therefore take unusual course of takg. adjournmt.
motion after censure motion.
P.M.
W.S.C. puttg. P.N. Ques. askg. tht. Steel be p’poned because of
emergency and until after fresh mandate. Spker will allow unless told
we shall make a statement anyway.
W.W.
Majority = 1.
161
P.M.
A bad thing to go to country upon.
G.S.
Removg. uncertainty – good thing for war prepn.
P.M.
Last majority on this was 14.
H.M.
Looks as tho’ Govt. are throwg. in controversy – in defence debate wh.
otherwise wd. go w’out a division.
G.S.
Prefer to take initiative and offer statement. Not in reply to P.N. Ques.
H.G.
On timing – this announcemt. is unfortunate. Support H.M.
H.McN.
I support that view.
E.Sh.
This is a crisis. By Oct 17 we shd. be in better posn – know more about
defence (U.S. aid etc.). May have more public support then than now.
This announcemt. does involve risk of dissoln.
Wd. prefer to p’pone announcement until Oct. 17.
P.M.
I can’t give the assurance W.S.C. asks for. Once I say “no” the issue
arises.
G.W.
You cd. say – no decn until House resumes.
H.M.
No. For members of Bd. have accepted appointmt for 2/10.
H.
The H/L. will have a censure debate.
Agreed: Announce (no P.N. Ques).
Concede a debate in both Houses.
(G.S. and H.M.)
3.
P.M.
Germany. Police Force.
Drew attentn to telegrams fr. W’ton.
Agreed: leave this open in debate.
H.McN.
Doubtful about merits.
E.Sh.
Def. Cttee gave provisional approval to these ideas.
K.Y.
Ques. of timing. There will be leaks in U.S. or France. We wd. have
preferred to stand on D.O. line because if we are going to take this
controversial step, we shdn’t do it now when no gendarmerie and our
occupn forces are weak. We hope tht. this won’t be endorsed in W’ton
as alternative to gendarmerie.
Doubt if U.S. participn in Europe really depends on our acceptg. this.
162
A.B.
Why announce before we’re ready to do it. Credit to W.S.C. And will
unnecessarily provoke R.
E.Sh.
German leaders don’t want an Army.
This telegram only “envisages the possibility …” Doesn’t follow tht.
this is next step. Depends on G. attitude. M’while we shd. stand on
D.O. memo. and say no more.
H.McN.
Leakg. already in U.S. Press.
French attitude as diff. on this as German.
We don’t yet know what arms we can supply to G.
Urge E.B. to keep to D.O. memo.
P.M.
Let him continue to explore – w’out committg. himself in principle in
advance.
163
18th September 1950
C.M. 60(50).
1.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W., G.S., Att.G., K.Y. H.G.
W.W.
Prospects for Labour voting in Divn.
Driberg mayn’t be back fr. Korea. – on his way.
Shd. have a majority, for Tuesday.
H.W.
Shd. be able to avoid a division on E/W. trade ques. on Monday. Can’t
be sure.
P.M.
Shd. we table amendmt to Tory Motion for Tuesday?
I prefer a straight negative.
H.M.
So wd. I.
W.W.
More in accord with vote of censure.
Iron and Steel Act: H/Lords.
J.
H/L. meet this pm. I shall repeat M/S. announcemt. of last week, at
request of Salisbury. He wants to say their attitude is known and no
need for them to meet on Tuesday i.e. no debate in H/L.
Iron and Steel Corpn.
G.S.
Lr. this am. fr. a part-time member, resigning because doesn’t want to
be involved in controversy. McLean. Wants to publish his lr. Propose
to see him. Can’t stop him publishg. His lr. – shall publish reply
makg. it clear tht. he did undertake to carry out Act.
H.McN.
I wd. have said he was trivial creature, if consulted.
2.
Overseas Operations (Security of Forces) Bill.
[Exit W.W. G.S.
[Enter Wheatley
C.E.
Mtgs. of Ministers. Tried give effect to Cab.’s views.
Essential diffy. cover mischief w’out penalising free speech etc.
Att.G.
Doesn’t purport to cover G.A.I.’s statement of last week – internal
troubles.
Cl. 3. controversial. Prefer 2nd form. Even tht. I wd. wish to amend.
For “likely to prejudice” wdn’t get you home with Courts. Omit this
and subst. “with a view to influencg. public opinion in a moment likely
to be prejudicial “… Or another formula not heard.
But does Cab. want a Cl. 3 at all?
Cd. amend the Bill to cover any action likely to interfere with essential
services. Wd. cover bus strike etc., as now.
G.A.I.
Electricity and gas strike is spreading. Appln for exorbitant rate: small
award at arbitn: strikers standing out for full claim.
Extended Bill suggd by Att.G. wd. be v. reliable.
C.E.
Bill wdn’t help, even as amended, w’out a Korea operation.
Att.G.
You wd. then have to use Act of 1920 – emergency.
Mil. opn wd. justify amendmts I have suggd.
J.
Trouble: cd. you operate such an Act anyway? Deterrent perhaps. But
if it doesn’t deter, wd. you use criminal law? And if you refrain you
are open to more criticism for inaction.
That is the broad issue for Cab?
Att.G.
I may be asked if existg. powers are adequate to deal with G.A.I. story.
If not what do we propose?
K.Y.
Distn betwn. direct relns with opns (this Bill) and G.A.I. story.
Dangerous to trick this Bill up into covering G.A.I. story.
Wd. it be effective. Or even politically satisfy.?
Shd. we try to cope with G.A.I. story by legn at all?
H.M.
My Cttee was thinkg. of P’smouth sabotage – or trade disputes holdg.
up mil. supplies.
W’in those limits, worth procdg. with Bill.
But much larger issue discussed by Cab. on Thursday.
Att.G. cdn’t say now we were going to legislate. Wd. anticipate K.
Speech.
Shd. my Cttee look at it again qua wider issue, and report?
C.E.
To cover G.A.I. story, Bill’s scope wd. be so much enlarged tht. it wd.
be diff. Bill.
Prob. shd. need 2 Bill’s. M/L. wants powers irresp. of mil. opns.
H.McN.
Agree with C.E. This Bill is ok for its original purpose.
If other legn for G.A.I. story, let’s consider the 2 together.
Don’t consult T.U.C. separately on 2 Bills.
But cd. Cab. at least say wthr. this Bill is ok for original purpose.
H.M.
I wdn’t delay consultn with T.U.C. on this Bill.
P.M.
Genl. approval of Bill. Don’t commit ourselves to going on with it.
G.W.
Att.G.’s amendmt wd. meet G.A.I. story so long as Korea goes on.
Why not have it? This is all we are concerned to counter pro tem.
P.M.
Diffy. of linking gas strike in public mind with Korea.
A.B.
G.A.I.’s statement has made it imposs. for us to go on with this limited
Bill. It wd. be measured v. his statement and found inadequate.
165
Consider now what legn you wd. wish to have for wider issue.
P.M.
H.M.’s Cttee to review posn again in context of G.A.I.’s statement.
H.McN.
Can’t we go on with this Bill for Korea? Consultg. T.U.C.
A.B.
No. There wd. be a leak.
Wd. prefer to legislate if at all on that when no Korea incident is going
on.
Danger of fallg. betwn. 2 stools.
Situatn not so serious as to warrant panic action.
Comm. leadership can be broken if exposed.
C.E.
Sitn in docks and meat trade may be serious by end/week.
If T. and G. Union apply discipline to men who engineered last dock
strike then will prob. be trouble. Union haven’t yet dealt with Trib.
Let’s get this Bill appd in principle by Cabinet.
Then let H.M.’s Cttee consider wider issue.
E.Sh.
Bill is ok – apart from Cl. 3. What is alternative? Reforming T.U.’s?
That wd. take too long.
Cl. 3 is weak and doubt if it can be improved. I wd. drop that.
Apart fr. Korea, we shall prob. have forces operatg. elsewhere.
P.M.
Inadequate and inappropriate if Comm. attack takes form of disruption
of internal situation.
I wd. prefer to approve this in principle for purposes covered, take no
decn to introduce, and go on to consider wider issues.
Agreed – as in P.M.’s view.
3.
Att.G.
Legal Implications of Korean Conflict.
J. thinks it’s war. But Truman and St. Laurent have said it isn’t.
I have suggd a half-way house – wh. Beckett and Lauterpacht approve.
Important because For. Secy. cd. give certificate wthr. we are at war or
not – and if he declined to say war, wd. follow we are at peace with K.
Suggest consultn with U.S. etc. to see wthr. we can agree.
P.Q. by Beamish – today – re correspondents with N. Korean forces.
If Cab. agree tht. people shd. understand tht. law of treason applies, I
cd. say “it must not be assumed that it doesn’t”.
Opns are “active service” w’in meaning of Army Act. I have so
advised J.A.G.
P.M.
Truman and St. L. were surely wrong.
J.
Repugnant to common sense.
166
N. Koreans are clearly at war with S. Koreans. Action v. organised
State = war, not police action. Those who join in, on either side, must
also be at war.
But it is desirable to keep in step with U.S. and Canada.
Therefore, let Att.G. consult them.
A.B.
If you believe our law of treason applies, say so more clearly.
“It must be clearly understood tht. the law of treason applies”.
The law refers to King’s enemies, not a state of war.
K.Y.
Not sure pol. advantages are on side of Att.G.’s formula, re intern. law.
Some internatl action requd to make it valid in internatl law.
See p. 6. Our decln (to respect rules of war etc.,) wdn’t bind the other
side.
Also ambiguities in domestic law eg. Trading with Enemy.
Agreed statement – J., L.O.s, F.O. and C.R.O. to work it out for submn
to U.S. Govt. and Comm. Govts.
Att.G.
Not much confidence in my ½ way house.
But many experts favour it.
No precedents: therefore consensus of opinion can make new internatl
law.
H.G.
Then hadn’t we better decide what we want the law to be.
There are policy considns – e.g. financial.
P.M.
Examine both legal and policy considerations.
[Enter M.W., G.S.
4.
Strategic Exports to E. Europe.
H.W.
[Opening statement not heard.]
Circulate informn re all manufacturers to N.A.T.O. and Comm.
countries.
Suspend m’while decision.
But follows tht. if no one wants it, it wd. have to go to E. Europe.
G.S.
Cravens have told me this am. tht. both tools were ordered before
Policy Agreemt. was signed. Our assurance therefore applies to both.
Att.G.
We are then under clear legal oblign to allow export of both.
On orders placed after Agreemt. posn is obscure. Read Art. 9 of
Agreemt. Refce to “export policy” means policy at that time.
If order was consistent with that policy, we are obliged to secure
delivery.
But doubt arises fr. confidential lrs. suggestg. tht. firm assurance re
export licence be obtd in each case. Machine A. is subject of such an
assurance. If we flout tht. oblign we needn’t bother about B.
Tho’ for B. an export licence was granted.
167
Clear oblign to deliver Machine A. Poles wd. have good cause to
complain if Machine B. were stopped if ordered (as prev. said) in Apl.
’49.
If (as now said) ordered in Nov. ’48, clear oblign to deliver Machine B.
H.G.
Support H.W.’s plan of circular to N.A.T.O. Powers and Comm.
Words “subject to Treaty obligns”, can stand. Needn’t say in debate or
in advance what decn we shall take in particular cases – wthr. we
breach the obligns or no.
On Craven tools, we shall have to say they are subject to Treaty obligns
We are now about to talk to U.S. re free machine tools from them.
Some Americans suspect we are selling ours and getting them to
supply us free. It wd. help in those discussions if B/T. cd, say in
debate tht. we cdn’t expect U.S. to supply tools wh. we are sellg. to E.
Europe. But restrict it to Iron Curtain countries.
H.W.
Agree – tho’ I wdn’t speak in terms of U.S.A.
Can’t announce a decn re Craven’s even on basis of their latest informn.
For they are so unreliable.
Att.G.
No doubt about Machine A.
H.W.
But it’s B. tht. is important to us.
P.M.
In what circs. wd. we be justified in breachg. oblign re Tool B.
E.Sh.
Present circs – because urgency of acceleratg. tank prodn. Pinch it and
compensate Poles.
H.W.
Do we denounce Polish Agreemt. in order to take this tool?
A substantial change of circs. warrants diff. view of Agreement.
Good moral and pol. reason for breachg. our obligations.
On balance I favour breakg. our oblign because circs. have changed.
P.M.
I endorse that. Cover both A. and B.
H.W.
I will say specifically we want B.
No need to say they won’t get A. because we don’t yet know wthr. any
N.A.T.O. country will want it.
T.W.
Don’t decide today about A. Importce of Trade Agreemts.
A.B.
Need we commit ourselves to anything beyond P.M.’s b’cast – before
we know what U.S. will do, wthr. other N.A.T.O. Powers will follow
our lead etc.
We have no assurances about timber, coarse grains etc.
K.Y.
Support H.W.’s view. Want firm statement on B., to placate U.S.
Breach of agreemt. can be justified by change of circs. We don’t think
this alone wd. cause Poles to cut up rough on trade generally.
168
Vagueness A. wdn’t hurt E.B.’s negotns with U.S.
This need not be taken as irretrievable step twds. econ. blockade.
(as indicated in B/T. memo.)
G.W.
If we are going to circularise N.A.T.O. Powers, shd. we not make them
do the same?
G.S.
Must do the examn quickly because finish is diff. for diff. countries.
[Exit G.S., Att.G., Wheatley
5.
M.W.
Groundnut Scheme.
Average year in Kongwa: But consider results –
G’nuts £31.000 value. £96.000 cost. on farm alone: no overheads
Sunflowers 46.000 “ 480.000 “ of Corpn etc.
Maize
22.000 “
29.000
Sorghum
6.000
9.000
Total:
105.000
614.000
Feel therefore I had no alternative but to cut down opns next year.
J.G.
Support M/F.
M.W.
My view: this scheme must ultimately be Col. Dev. scheme.
Propose joint adminn from now on with C.O.
E.Sh.
Do that earlier?
M.W.
It will come up in Nov., on future of scheme as a whole.
H.M.
Timing of announcement. Most awkward to have this out on Wed.
next.
M.W.
I cdn’t have foreseen steel debate.
J.
Better to let it out on Wedy – submerge it in other fuss.
P.M.
Whole ques. (substance) shd. come to Cabinet.
6.
Emergencies.
C.E.
Statement in Press tht. Police knew what was going on at mtg. of
dockers.
Such disclosures may damage work of Sp. Branch.
H.M.
Let Home Sec. spk to Editor. D/Herald.
169
26th September 1950.
C.M. 61(50).
[Enter H.G., E. Davies., Att.G.
1.
Gas Strike.
G.A.I.
M’tenance men only are affected. Applied 5d p. hr. increase:
negotiated settlement by Union at 1½d: men won’t accept it.
Fedn anxious tht. M/L. shd. work thro’ them not go to local Union wh.
in Ldn. is dominated by Communists. No means of reachg. rank and
file.
Now telling Fedn we must go direct to Unions. Main trouble is E.T.U.
is Comm. dominated.
Trying to find out if producers wd. come out if we put troops in.
Attempts to spread it beyond N.E. Ldn. have so far failed.
C.E.
Offl. Cttee mtg. this pm.
Att.G.
Have written to Ministers re prosecn of leaders of Cttee for themselves
going on strike. Cd. get them – wd. it spread the strike.
G.A.I.
I feel bold.
P.M./C.E.
Let Ministerial Cttee also meet. And don’t authorise prosecns if they do
decide – not w’out further refce to Cabinet.
Att.G.
Procdgs. wd. be under compuls. Arbitn Order – qua illegal.
2.
Korea: Future Policy.
Consolidated text fr. draft resoln as revised handed round.
P.M.
A good draft.
Was anxious to avoid unregulated and unauthorised pursuit over 38th
Parallel. Also concerned re Koreans. Part C is important – also
economic resoln at end.
A.B.
Why mention N. Korea.
Att.G.
Initial Govt. wd. be mil. under McArthur. Shd. give place quickly to
civil Govt. Unwise to let existg. S. Korean Govt. loose in the North.
Read out 4 points – in substitn for existg. draft.
Legal posn. Strictly Assembly prob. not entitled to make any such
recommn until S. Council is quit of it. But inopportune to press this
strict view of the law.
H.M.
Fear Comms. will capture a free Govt. when it is establd. Can we avert
that?
A.B.
F.O. memo. threw sponge in over that.
We must include clause tht. we (U.N.) hold fort until it’s clear tht.
democr. govt. can stand.
H.G.
We are v. strained economically. Assistce must be on basis of what is
really necessary – no more China. We shd. be represented. And
contribns shd. be fair.
E.D.
Ad hoc Cttee after consultn with E.C.O.S.O.C., separate fr.
Commission.
H.G.
We shd. be on.
E.D.
And a lot of Asians.
H.McN.
Shift to Assembly dangerous precedent - ⅔ lobby v. us on Col. ques.
Can’t avoid it. But warn U.S. of dangers.
x/ in A. of Resoln. V. diff. Shd. make it clear tht. S. Ree has no title to
lead a govt. of Korea. Mustn’t appear to be sustaing. him.
Three states i) mil. govt. ii) Quick transfer to a civil govt. iii) Longer
prepns for free elections.
Econ. rehabiln: Keep S.E.A. Commn out of it. Don’t therefore go near
E.C.O.S.O.C. (Agreed).
G.W.
India will be troubled re going beyond 38th Parallel. Later on might
acquiesce – won’t support resoln now.
Still think it right to go on.
India prob. won’t make trouble over it.
Canada takg. legalistic point tht. original electns in K. are valid for
whole country.
Rest of Comm. likely to support.
E.Sh.
C.O.S. anxious not to commit our troops n. of 38th Parallel.
Want to get our chaps out as quick as possible.
Att.G.
Somethg. like para. on p. 2 ought to go in.
P.M.
Wiser to leave it more open.
G.W.
The main point is a good one – civil govt. gap.
P.M.
Call attentn of E.B. to that gap w’out }
suggesting words.
} Agreed.
Let E.B. know views of C.O.S.
[Enter C.E.
A.V.A.
This resoln wd. commit us to support action beyond 38th P. – paras. A.
and B.
Remember dangers in Germany. Mustn’t risk open conflict.
171
P.M.
Can’t say tht. in no circs. can U.N. Forces go beyond this imaginary
line. Can’t say tht. U.K. Forces mayn’t go if others do.
Att.G.
Whole resoln assumes mil. control of N. Korea.
elections etc. unless U.N. had control.
J.G.
Critical moment when U.N. Forces cross 38th p.
If we do it deliberately, after Koreans beaten, our reasons for going on
must be clearly seen.
E.Sh.
Make it clear to E.B. tht. if U.N. Forces go beyond 38th p. they do so
for limited purpose. May be guerrilla warfare for ages. Are we going
to commit our troops for so long?
A.B.
Can’t in reason stop at 38th p. For we believe in unified Korea.
H.McN.
Supported this view. H.M. and P.M. also.
Cdn’t supervise
[Exit G.W.
E.D.
To stop at 38th p. wd. = R. victory.
P.M.
E.Sh.’s point can only be met by warning E.B. tht. we don’t want our
troops committed there for too long.
E.D.
F.O. have addl para. in tel. to Nehru.
172
28th September 1950
C.M. 62(50)
1.
C.E.
Gas Strike.
[Enter Att.G., E. Davies. H.G., M.W., N-Baker.
Mtg. of Em. Cttee (Ministerial) y’day.
G.A.I. and Gould are seeing Tanner (AEU – representg. ⅔ of strikers).
Shop stewards decline call mtg. of men, despite request of Confedn:
Tanner may be willing to go straight to men. Links betwn. Confedn
and men are largely Communists.
Supervisory staff doing some m’tenance work w’out provokg.
producer men.
Bd. hope to do more of this. Don’t recommend use of troops – they
cdn’t suffice if strike spreads.
Prosns under Act of 1875. N. Thames Gas Bd. had advised v. prosn of
28 leaders. But they have reviewed their attitude since. My Cttee
x/ thought tht. if Att.G. had enough evce and men hadn’t returned by Frid.
no pol. or industrial reasons v. procdgs.
G.A.I.
Seen Secy. of Genl. and Mun. Workers – trying to keep his men steady
and in work.
Deakin similarly using influence quietly.
N.B.
Y’day, threat to industry and employmt.
Domestic: 15% no gas: 30% only some. Many people stopped using
gas y’day and holders now full and pressure has risen on that a/c.
Fewer plants in opn: one broke down y’day.
Need: mass mtgs. of workers thro’ Tanner. Because Union leaders
have not bn. helpful.
Prosn some day we must prosecute someone. This is as good a case as
we are likely to get.
Att.G.
In view of posn M/L.’s public statement increasingly diff. to refrain fr.
operatg. crim. law – esp. Act of 1875.
Over a yr. ago, on electricity, Cab. said Bds. shd. proceed for breach of
contract. I believe they shd. at outset. If men go back, Bds. cd settle
y/ as we cdn’t with crim. procdgs. And failure to pay fine isn’t followed
by impr. but only by distraint.
H.G.
Effects on industry are now beginning to be serious.
A.B.
Put y/ into minds of men not on strike. Bds. shd. issue pamphlets after
consultn with L.O.’s on language.
N.B.
Willing to follow that up. Will do so.
E.Sh.
T.U.’s shd. be consulted in advance if this is to be done.
Agreed as at x/ and y/.
[Exit N.B.
2.
E. African Ground Nuts: Kangwa.
M.W.
If we plant as before, gt. loss. If we stop all operns blow to prestige.
Cattle = reasonable middle course. Ample safeguards on markets and
water.
P.M.
Any redn of overheads in consequence?
M.W.
That will come in genl. review of whole scheme in Nov.
H.G.
Support M/F. Limiting commitments. No new capital expre.
J.G.
I support it too. Cattle necessary to hold cleared land.
A.V.A.
This rpt. will be joy for Opposn – not only because past history but
because interim nature of rpt. Sunflower business will be exploited.
Hope we shall get better infn on final report.
Cattle even are to be confined to narrow area. Tho’ this is the one
thing proved possible by experiment. Tho’ we still don’t know the
market for them – that is still subject to research.
H.McN.
V. uninformative report – save re failures.
Why stores. Why not breeding cattle. Poor return on 2 yrs. feeding.
Why only a little maize? Looks easiest crop – indigenous.
M.W.
Maize will grow only in valley – using all available ground of that
kind.
Cattle. Breeding wd. involve heavy capital expenditure.
Outlets – in Africa, type of meat not popular elsewhere. Bd. satisfied
tht. quantities this year cd. be sold w’out diffy.
J.G.
Also hides can be sold to U.K. – usefully.
M.W.
W. Party cdn’t begin opns until results of this years’ working were
known.
H.M.
If rept. publd there will be a row – sooner the better.
Simultaneous statement by Corpn or M/F. – “harmed lesson and
changes made”.
M.W.
Bd. are issuing rpt. Chairman is mtg. Press.
A.B.
Other undertakgs. overseas have bn. more successful. Cdn’t we marry
them in announcemt.?
J.G.
Diff. for Coates to pray in aid C. Dev. Corpn schemes. Their rept. was
publd recently and had a good Press.
M.W.
No new repts. on other projects available. Dragging out old ones wd.
be seen through.
174
G.W.
A good Ministerial speech is only way of mtg. A.B.’s point.
P.M.
Hope M.W. and J.G. will both take opportunity of makg. genl.
statements to put this into perspective.
Also H.G. re S.E.A.
[Enter Henderson
3.
Surrender of War Criminals.
H.
Made clear at time tht. this was to be short term policy.
5 yrs. have past: no d.o. every made for this purpose.
Time to w’draw our undertakg.
The 19 Yug. traitors - Yug. Govt. not likely to shout v. much.
Germany: no traitors surrendered for 1½ yrs.
War criminals “
only on prima facie evce of murder.
But more likely to need this in G. than in U.K.
C.E.
I provoked this. Fully support it.
Embarrassed by existence of undertakg. E.g. Dr. Dering, wanted by
Poles.
Agree.
[Exit H.
4.
G.W.
Relations with S. Africa.
a) Genl. – most diff. problem in C. Relns.
Native policy – causes diffy. in Colonies and in Labour Party.
On other hand, genl. economic relns are satisfy. Defence talks are
encouraging. Present Govt. has gone further twds. committg.
themselves to give mil. support in war than any S.A. Govt. has ever
done.
We must keep them in Comm. Oppose them on H. Commn Territories
– can’t hold those v. hostile S.A. Govt. Avoid expressg. sympathy
with native policy – but refrain also fr. condemning it. Can, A. and
N.Z. have same attitude as U.K. on this.
b) U.N. Problems.
i) Indians in S. Africa.
ii) S.W. Africa.
On ii) main diffy: some countries will try to dodge acceptg. full
opinion. They will say there shd be rpts. and petns but they shd. go to
Trusteeship Council. We must try to get full report: if we can’t keep
our hands free. Support least violent resoln acceptg. full report.
c) Michael Scott. U.S. refusg. visa because of Comm. affiliations.
Indians will move resoln invitg. him to attend. S. Afr. will walk
out in that event before discn begins. We are trying to persuade
U.S. to grant visa now – as they have indicated they will if Ind.
resoln is passed by Cttee. What shall we do if resoln is put? I
favour voting against – wrong to invite individuals and India won’t
175
mind such a vote. S. Afr. wd. hate our voting opposite way. We shd.
oppose on principle any resoln invitg. him to speak to Cttee.
P.M.
Stand on basis of no individuals to partake in mtgs. of States.
E.D.
We stand (F.O.) by that principle. But in favour of abstaining for
i) we are changing our line on Col. matters. Don’t want to be courting
unpopularity at outset.
ii) pol. reactions in U.K. Much feeling in his favour.
J.G.
Must stand firm v. hearing of individuals – as a principle.
But C.O. diffies. If we oppose Scott we seem to be siding with S.
Africa.
On genl. issue: see defence and econ. advantages of keeping S. Afr in
Comm: but we may have to choose betwn. S. Africa and our Colonies
– in Africa. Penetratn of Afrikaners into N. Rhodesia.
Abstention may be best course.
Essential tht. we shd. accept Intern. Ct’s decision fully. No dubiety
over that – or over Col. posn will be prejudiced.
Att.G.
On M. Scott. V. dangerous precedent if he is admitted. We opposed it
last year, on principle. Can’t admit principle tht. individuals can
appeal to Assembly over head of their Govt.
H.McN.
Also quite imposs. administratively to admit individuals.
We shd. be honest and oppose it – as wrong in principle and
unworkable in practice.
Visa – not our business: we shd. express no view.
Speak and vote against admission of M. Scott.
P.M.
Abstention wd. be weak. On the point of principle, we must make our
posn clear.
A.V.A.
Endorsed that view.
A.B.
Genl. issue is v. diff. Awkward not to express any opinion on S. Afr.
policy. Whole literature of protest.
We may have to decide tht. we lose more than we gain by supportg. S.
Africa.
Originally I disagreed with our line re S. Africa. And in event we were
in humiliatg. minority in U.N.
Must therefore support opinion of Intern. Court.
On admission of individual, need we incur such unpopularity.
E.D.
First resoln will merely invite him to be in N. York.
G.W.
But only purpose of that is to follow with 2nd resoln allowg. him to
speak.
E.Sh.
This genl. problem is not easy.
Agreed.
176
Gt. defence importce of S. Africa. They have now come across with
offer of armoured divn in M/E. No such offer from India.
Believe they are influenced by desire to assume gter responsibilities
and powers over Africa.
Thus: accept decision of Court.
(re-affirm principle of not hearing individuals in U.N.
(v. weak to be constantly abstaining.
P.M.
Colour ques. isn’t all that easy. S. Afr. may be extreme. But there’s
also a problem of our own in Malaya. And there’s a White Australia
policy. Also (mentioned earlier) U.S.A.
H.M.}
E.Sh.}
Stressed need to keep S. Africa in Commonwealth.
P.M.
Problem is to influence less extreme opinion in S. Africa.
support opp. extreme (eg. Scott) we may alienate moderates.
If we
P.M. (i) Uphold decision of Court – vote for it.
Agreed.
Unambiguously: tho’ not necessarily takg.
initiative. Decision as a whole.
(ii) M. Scott. Say, whatever the merits, we uphold
principle tht. individuals can’t be heard in appeal
r. municipal law of States. Don’t mind his coming
to N. York.
5.
Korea.
P.M.
Indian Amb. in Pekin thinks China will re-act v. violently v. any
crossing of 38th P.
E.D.
Diff. to know wthr. Ch. fears are real or wthr. it’s bluff.
Also Indian Amb. may be a panicker.
Stand to our resoln try to re-assure China in presentg. it. Might help if
U.S. wd. agree tht. Ch. be invited to N. Yk. for Formosa or some other
ques.
Wd. like to put that suggn to E.B.
P.M.
Endorsed that.
G.W.
Also: can any more re-assurance be given re bombing across Ch.
frontier.
177
9th October 1950
C.M. 63(50)
1.
Socialised Industries: Supplementary Pensions.
[Enter N.B., B., E.S., H.H.M. D.J.
H.M.
Summarised memo. Awkward attitude of T.U.C.
Burden on Boards. Electricity and gas might manage it because they
have much on these lines. But miners, steel and road transport wd. be
new. And then private industry.
Yet T.U.C. support claim tht. Unions shd. be free to negotiate it.
Want to get facts establd by a Cttee and many of existg. schemes are
insolvent.
T.U.C. regard that as evasive: preferred quick Dpl. enquiry.
We propose to go on with Cttee but give Unions and Bds. right to
negotiate and promise to consider results on their merits (of the
particular case).
E.S.
Support H.M.
On composn of Cttee – shd. be people outside Dpts. For recommns shd.
carry weight with workers and public opinion.
H.H.M.
Effect of Cttee on pensions. Wd. increase demand for Sel. Cttee on war
pensions.
In last Parlt., despite 3-line whip, 3 Govt. supports voted v. us.
Interests are now urging Dpl. Cttee not Sel. Cttee. I don’t favour that.
But Service pay increases have wakened it up: and this wd. add fuel to
the fire. Br. Legion may now support the demand. No logical connn
but sentimental one. Will be argued tht. Labour Govt. is more
sympathetic to industrial workers than to war pensioners.
D.J.
Agree to H.M.’s proposal.
N.B.
Pre-war, publ. utilities tied men to industry by these schemes. This
policy succeeded. With full emplt. their posn is more diff.
First gas strike in history.
B.
Cttee shd. meet as soon as poss., fr. my pt. of view.
I have to tell B.T.C. tht. new entrants shan’t come under existg.
schemes. Haven’t done so yet. If we say negotns can start. diff. to
keep out new entrants.
J.G.
Vice new Cttee cd. you seek advice of existg. Cttee under N.I. Act.
Might avoid H.H.M.’s diffy. T. of R. might have to be adjusted. Wd.
give same authorisation voice.
H.M.
Wd. like to consider this helpful suggn.
E.S.
My Cttee are names not known to public.
J.G.
But are known to T.U.’s.
H.D.
And are likely to be more responsible.
N.B.
T.U.’s didn’t want to be represented on the ad hoc Cttee.
H.M.
They prob. wd. w’draw that opposn if right to negotiate is conceded.
G.A.I.
Agree with H.M. And favour J.G.’s suggn.
E.B.
Does it cover private industry?
H.M.
Yes.
[Exit H.H.M., E.S., B., D.J.,
[Enter Att.G.
2.
Gas Strike.
G.A.I.
Gas industry proposed to suspend the 10 men on full pay, while on
bail.
Men will be allowed to return to work. But Union will be asked why
they shd. work or be suspended on full pay – option.
Troops held until this pm. – to be ready if more trouble.
T. Williamson represtg. producers) has bn. firm and steadied his men.
Men sentenced. Shown tht. law can be enforced. Need prosecution
press for penalty, on appeal.
E.B.
Don’t discuss that in Cabinet.
This was organised move.
Some Union didn’t give up the help we needed. Confedn passed it all
on to its Ldn. District, dominated by Comm. Berridge. He sabotaged
attempts to get mtg. of men. A.E.U. never urged its members to return
to work. E.T.U. sheltered behind Confedn and did v. little. Line was:
“Comms. got them out, let Comms. get them back”.
E.B.
Did Unions pay?
G.A.I.
No. But they cd. have taken stronger line in condemning unoffl. strike.
P.M.
Criticisms tht. Govt. shd. have acted sooner.
We deferred to M/L. advice. But might have cracked down quicker.
N.B.
Danger of spreading the strike. Bds. feared that. T. Wmson’s Union
did v. well. Got many groups back before end and helped to change
opinion among the men.
H.M.
Did Wmson. share Bd’s fear re extendg. strike. Acc. to my informn he
didn’t. Was he consulted on that point, as well as Bd?
179
C.E.
As soon as Council w’drew their fears, procdgs. were begun. At the
earlier stages they were v. apprehensive. And if their fears had proved
to be justified, Services cdn’t have handled situation.
We had to take that into a/c.
Att.G.
We ought to move more quickly in future – if not procdgs., at least
calling in troops. Wd. have bn. better to put troops in earlier.
In any discn in Parlt. we shd. make it clear tht. Berridge has bn. doublecrossing. When instructed by superiors to urge men to return to work,
he in fact did opposite. And fact tht. he employs man sentenced to 6
yrs. pr. in 1946 for selling military secrets to Russia. [Glading.]
Police think procdgs. helped to get men back.
Comm. campaign (started in Hyde Park y’day) will be continued until
hearing of appeal. And will put Q. Sessions in position in wh. they can
do nothg. but confirm sentences. This is clearly contempt of court.
Nervous of consequences.
E.Sh.
If you quote Berridge in H/C., you’ll be asked to say what you are
going to do.
Att.G.
Can point to diffce betwn. knowledge and legal evce.
J.
Wish we cd. prosecute ringleaders as such for incitement. Instead of
charging them only with striking.
Att.G.
Lack of evce of incitement. Tho’ we selected for prosn the members of
Strike Cttee.
E.B.
Order 1305. Many undertakgs. given before it was made, in order to
secure T.U.C. agreement. Many Unions now favour its repeal – and
Comms. are cashing in on that feeling.
Att.G. shd. be made aware of the undertakings.
Can’t prosecute for breach of contract w’out fresh legisln.
Att.G.
Wd. like some modern legn on the subject.
But while Order 1305 is there, I can’t continually neglect to enforce it.
E.B.
A.E.U. always slow to take firm line. Executive elected by ballot.
Some members always nervous of re-election.
N.B.
That factor has come into play this time.
Att.G.
I want to see references in H/C. to Union mtgs., Berridge’s activities
and existence of Glading.
P.M.
Get Gas Board to take sensible line about suspension with full pay.
M/F and P. to take this up with Bd. Agreed.
180
E.B.
Fresh legn Apart from 1927 Act, never bn. legn w’out public enquiry.
And we made a point of that [when repealing 1927 Act.] or [in Parly
discn of 1927 Bill?]
H.M.
Might be good thing to have such an enquiry.
E.B.
On limited issue eg. breach of contract, then might be agreement.
C.E.
I like the idea of enquiry.
[Exit N.B. Enter H.
3.
E.B.
Foreign Affairs.
Will try later to put in comprehensive report. But some urgent aspects
to wh. I must draw immediate attentn.
At our N.A.T.O. mtg. in Ldn. in May, our main task was to convince
U.S. tht. Europe cdn’t again hold the fort until U.S. came along.
Everyone wd. have to be in fr. 1st day. Betwn. then and Council mtg.
in N. York, U.S. and Canada have bn. faced up to that. I was thrown
out in this by W.S.C’s resoln at Strasbourg. For European Army wd.
leave out U.S. and Canada: and Europe wd. be in posn for askg. for
their aid.
U.S. offer to put troops in Europe: to help with navy and air force: to
give financial aid. She has accepted full responsibility for sharing in
defence/Europe. But she realises we must fight as far east as poss. –
i.e. on German soil. Then what is her role? Conclusion (with which I
agree) no alternative but for G. to provide units in integrated Army for
defence/Europe.
France stood out v. that., on principle. Maybe she is moving a bit, if
Schuman’s speech of y’day is Fr. Govt. policy. German participn in
defence must be related to progress of Fr. re-armament.
Discn then re G. Police force, wh. might be used in emergency.
This brings us into conflict with G. Soc. Dem. Party. They won’t have
it. They insist tht. external defence must be open and above board and
linked with Europ. defence forces. They will support police – but
press police for internal order only – and army for external defence.
Timing. France won’t accept any re-arming of G. until the Europ.
defence forces are in being on the ground.
But time is on wing. Hence draft telegram to Paris: handed round.
J.
Put a point on paras. 4 and 5.
P.M.
But Genl. Staff and training organisation wd. be called into being by
this. That is the danger.
E.Sh.
Who is to command these G. units – brigade or battn.
If they can create force up to a divn it must have logistic backing.
181
[Exit H.M. & G.A.I.
Fr. have objected to principle of creation of G. units.
Schuman suggd delay of 9 months, to study the matter.
In my discns with Moch and Pleven, they have always promised to
consider this as and when provision and equipment of Europ. forces
proceeds. So Schuman’s statement of y’day is nothg. new.
At mtg. of 3 Def. Ministers., Marshall produced memo. by U.S. C.O.S.
It began: we can’t create G. Army now. Went on to armed Police
(Moch accepted): labour units: adminve backg.: defence works.
Moch accepted all save creation of G. armed units.
Whole ques. is one of timing. Cdn’t force Fr. now to accept principle.
But if we convince them first tht. we are bldg. up, they will come
round.
Para. 4. of draft. Accept argument. But if we can’t get anything more,
x/ wd. it be wise to reject this?
Also, if we fear gendarmerie comg. under G. control, same applies to
G. armed units. Para. 4 argument inconsistent with para. 5.
N.A.T.O. Defence Cttee meets on 25/10. Must make practical progress.
We must table our contns, all of us. Must make a start. No one but
U.K. has done anything, save talk. Idle for French to talk of 10/15
Divns when no equipment for them, and unwilling even to extend
period of n. service.
E.B.
Need for speed on G. army ques. For risk tht. U.S. will w’draw their
offer.
Trouble = weakness of Fr. Socialists, who won’t take a firm line.
Paris telegram of 8/10 reportg. conversn with Parodi.
This draft telegram to Paris shd. represent Govt. policy.
Esp. as it is being suggested tht. on this I am at variance with some of
my Cab. colleagues. Sandys is putting this sort of thing about.
Let Harvey take this up politically, while M/D. talks to Moch.
On para. 4 point. x/ Police force alone wdn’t give us enough.
Also we are in diffy. in handling Germans over this. Tel. 1468 from
Warnerheide. Avoid imposing decn on G. or even putting a request to
them – merely ask if they are ready to make a contribution.
Relaxation of control over Germany. Have gone a long way.
Defence obligns must be accepted in return for these concessions.
General line of draft telegram approved.
Subject to
i) considn of detail by M/D.
ii) review of para. 4.
iii) on para. 5. might it help French if
H.D.
brigade rather than divn was upper
(suggn only.)
limit.
182
E.Sh.
May be better to make no refce to
size of “units”: stick to “units”, w’out definition.
183
[Re-enter H.M.
16th October 1950
C.M. 64(50)
1.
Overseas Operations (Security of Forces) Bill.
[Enter 6 invitees.
P.M.
Is this a good time. No occasion for it. Wd. provoke enquiries v.
wider issue.
H.M.
Wd. have liked to do it. But admit we have missed the bus.
Keep it ready and introduce if a good occasion arises.
C.E.
Agree.
J.
Get it cut and dried, however – includg. discns with T.U.C.
G.A.I.
Agree – includg. T.U.C.
A.B.
Don’t discuss with T.U.C. – leakage – until occasion arises. Agreed.
C.E.
P.Q.’s re Daily Worker. No powers to act. Shall say No.
P.Q. by W. Smithers. Shall also reply No.
A.V.A.
Will be debate in Address on genl. ques. of Commn threat.
Agreed: Exclude this Bill from King’s Speech.
2.
Legislation Limiting Rights to Strike.
P.M.
Your (a) seems best runner. p.2. of C.P. 229.
H.M.
Legisn on (b) wd. be controversial.
Ballot – (c) cdn’t be done w’out public enquiry.
Ques.: do we have enquiry. If not, (a) is best line – coupled with civil
procdgs. by Boards. Perhaps explore the second half and also have an
enquiry.
Att.G.
I prefer the idea of a ballot.
Course a) wd. mean more prosecutions, wh. I don’t favour.
Course b): Order will fall for renewal at end/year. So long as contd it
will become more use for me to enforce it because of prosn wh. I took
v. gas strikers. If it is to be renewed, I think it shd. go on statute book.
Don’t want a) alone: because puts too much emphasis on crim.
procdgs.
On civil procdgs. urge line indicated in C.P. 224.
P.M.
Is ballot practicable? Short stoppages.
A.B.
Unoffl. strike takes place in hot blood. You wd. still have diffy. of
enforcemt. when no ballot has occurred.
I favour C.P. 224 – preceded by publicity letting the men know, eg.
leaflets. Shd. be discussed with T.U.C.
C.E.
If ballot went in favour of strike, moral posn of strikes wd. be stronger
than now.
T.W.
Lightning strikes – every man wd. be liable to penalty. Tho’ often
solution is found in 24 hrs.
G.A.I.
Can’t take ballot in unoffl. strike. who wd. take it?
On offl. strikes we have toyed with idea of discn with T.U.C. But have
held off because of suggn of public enquiry.
Can you always trust Union to take charge of ballot.
At present there are on average 6 strikes a day. Most are sudden
stoppages and on most occasions Union offls. get them back.
Order 1305. Remains in force until Govt. take initiative to repeal.
So far both sides have wanted it retained. Unions want one or two
minor changes – so do we. Might discuss with T.U.C. what they want.
Havg. prosecuted under it, we can’t have it in background.
E.B.
If men comply with 1305, what can you do?
Att.G.
But it’s absolute prohibn of any strike, offl. or unoffl. – unless M/L.
decides not to refer to arbitn.
E.B.
I don’t urge enquiry legn. I only said don’t legisl. w’out one.
P.M.
Not good time for enquiry – Tories out to raise points on Union
structure.
N.B.
Against c)
On a): little to be done to increase security/tenure.
Considerg. leaflets to workers.
Wd. like to consult T.U.C. on whole ques.
On C.P. 224. i) wrong to make natd indies do this and not private
industry.
ii) test shd. be essential public service: and steel not
coal comes under that. And food does.
Att.G.
Don’t want to limit it to natl indies. Want to show good example.
Wh.
a) Where do you draw the line on what is essential.
b) We can operate this. Most practical of the three.
c) Not practicable. How define area of ballot.
On C.P. 224. Long drawn out procdg. Strikers cd. get legal aid in
Scotland. Incident forgotten by time damages awarded.
P.M.
Found in practice to be useful deterrent.
185
Must find something effective for serious cases.
E.B.
Doubt if Order 1305 can go on in peace. Amounts to compuls. arbitn
and T.U.’s never believed men wd. conform. That is first thing for
M/L. to face.
If you can’t have compuls. arbitn can you make an arbitn system readily
available wh. will attract the men.
Compuls. arbitn works only in Comm. countries when strikes are
prohibited.
Cd. we promote arbitn machinery attd to Trade Councils via one central
arbitn court. Steel, boot trade, have developed this to a high pitch.
Hoped same thing wd. evolve in mining round Porter Award
machinery. Tedious job: but prob. only way out.
But enforcement in courts is broken reed. Can’t act until strike has
gone on for some time.
P.M.
I favour discn on this line – first with T.U.C. and thereafter with
employers.
G.A.I.
Accept that. May be need for public enquiry later.
H.M.
Swedish model might also be considered. There is a central body
there; and that enables the general econ. sitn to be taken into a/c.
Dangers of de-centralisation of machinery for settling wages etc.
G.T.
Full emplt. has altered condns for T.U. work. We must think out
functions of T. Unionism in new society. Not surprised T.U.’s accept
Order 1305 in this sort of peace.
What is function of T.U. now – esp. in natd industries. That is what we
ought to be considering.
H.McN.
But now we are concerned with limited ques. what action we can take
to check “conspiratorial” strikes. Don’t favour talking to T.U.C. on
that ques. esp. as it will be discussed in H/C.
What are we prepd to do? Eg. to have crim. procdgs. in a natd industry.
Not to take criminal procdgs.
No approach to T.U.C. w’out specific proposals. Cd. we have a memo.
on this.
A.B.
Small Cttee under M/L. to make concrete proposals of what we are to
put to T.U.C. Wages policy in public sector: need for some machinery.
P.M.
Must be ready by Debate on Address.
E.B.
Also Cttee of officials.
{
Scope : a)
Strikes – on lines of C.P. 224.
{
b)
Long-term improvemts. in structure for wages
{
settlement.
{
Of these, a) must come back to Cab. before Debate on Address.
{
b) can be taken more slowly.
186
Cabinet Cttee Ministerial and official, side by side.
3.
Mr J.G. MacManaway.
[Exit 4 Socialising Ministers
[Enter W.W.
H.M.
As in memo.
Shd. Whips be on? Bad if H/C. ignored Judicial Cttee opinion. Needs
considn.
Bill of Indemnity. Wd. look spiteful if we excluded his vote on the
Steel Bill decision. Bill shd. extend up to next mtg. of Parlt.
(resumption after adjournment).
C.E.
Para. 1 of memo. assumes tht. I will present this orally.
Privy Council have followed precedent of Samuel case, when L.P. was
in H/L. The Judicial Cttee is only a Cttee of the Privy Council, over
which L.P. presides. L.P. shd. have done this. But as Judicial Cttee
have ordered me to do it, I will. Tho’ I needn’t present it orally: can
merely hand it in.
Have arranged for it to be in H/C. late Tues. evening.
Leadbitter shd. be told tht. L.P. if member of H/C. shd. have done this.
A.B.
There shd. be no delay. Shd. be announced to H/C. tomorrow.
W.W.
Cd. be included in L.P.’s statement on Business.
H.M.
Let C.E. make statement at end of Questions.
We must stand firm v. pressure for general legn.
Att.G.
Need for quick discn with N.I. Govt. If they accept the Opinion cover
N.I. Parlt. in Indemnity Bill.
[Exit Wheatley. Enter D.J.
4.
H.M.
Legislative Programme.
Policy and drafting are both in arrear. Demand is in excess of time
available. For both reasons Leg. Cttee must have discretion to adjust.
Ty. want to add Public Works Loans Bill – needed before Dec.
Major issues – para. 5.
a)
b)
c)
d)
Cab on Thursday.
Dropped – Minute 2.
Don’t want to help Press with this until they help us.
Reserve for Party policy – in p’mme for next election.
Private Members’ time – will report to Cabinet prs. on Thursday.
Leasehold. Is coming up to Cabinet.
P.M.
Ministers shd. hurry up and get legn ready earlier.
Slipping into habit of supposing everything must be mentioned in K.’s
speech.
187
J.
On c) couldn’t we pass the Bill and defer its operation.
A.B.
Sugar Corpn Bill. Does this prejudge Cab. decn on policy?
H.M.
No.
P.M.
Why not put c) in Speech. And not bring it on unless Press plays.
H.W.
Prefer H.M.’s line.
Att.G.
This is somewhat controversial. Many people aren’t anxious to make
concessions to Press.
H.McN.
Improper to link this with Press Council. Tho’ I don’t favour Bill.
Agreed: on c): make no reference to Defamn Bill.
5.
King’s Speeches.
Prorogation Speech.
A.B.
Add reference to Medical Act.
Two drafting points as noted in my copy.
H.M.
Add references to extension of emergency Powers.
References to Bills passed may need adjustment.
Opening Speech.
On defence – M/D., C.R.O and F.O. to consult on a wider formula.
E.Sh.
No reference to Housing. There shd. be one.
H.W.
Also cost of living.
P.M.
And export drive.
Agreed: prodn, export trade, housing and c/living shd
be included in general terms.
E.Sh.
Omit refce to pensions of Judges’ widows. Can legislate w’out refce in
Speech: and inclusion of it will provoke ques. re other pensions.
Agreed: Omit reference to it in K.’s speech.
H.M.
Certain Bills mentioned wh. Won’t be prejudiced by not being
mentioned in speech.
Agreed : Final terms to be settled by L.P.
188
6.
H.D.
Foreign Affairs.
Demonstrate v. good dipl. handling. esp. improvement of U.S. policy
to China.
Note taken – with compliments. [Valuable pp.]
7.
E.B.
United Nations : Abuse of Veto.
Jamali’s motion for mtg. of big ‘4 – as alternative to U.S. plan re
Security Council.
Wd. have veto operative as before. Want to take line tht. 2 proposals
are not interdependent, must get U.S. plan through independently. But
say, of course, will be ready to meet if one of other 3 invites and
Agenda is known.
189
29th October 1950
C.M. 65(50)
1.
P.M.
Meeting of Commonwealth P.M.’s
Invitns issuing.
Secrecy – until simultaneous announcement.
2.
United Nations: Secretary General.
E.B.
R. are now putting fwd. Bajpai vice Lie.
May be difficult. Good on merits: but awkward tht. R. propose it.
A.B.
Support Lie because India has taken separatist line over Korea.
E.B.
Will consult P.M. before deciding finally.
H.McN.
S. Genl. shd. be from a small Power.
[Enter W.W., Att.G., A.
3.
Parliament.
H.M.
Business for next week.
A.B.
Why shd. H.M. speak both on Mon and Wed? Why not play down
extension of supplies and Services – leave it to Parly Secretaries?
Many Dpt. Ministers are concerned.
H.M.
V. many: so many it’s diff. to choose. And I have done the co-ordinn:
thought it natural that I shd. do it. Will be debate of importce. M/State
(E.A.) cd. wind up.
P.M.
Let H.M. speak on Supplies and Services.
4.
H.M.
M. MacManaway.
Parly Lab. Party y’day was critical of Govt.’s magnanimity. Appeased
by promise tht. Govt. wd. criticise McM in speech and Tory Party too,
for voting after ques. referred to Judicial Cttee. Some wd. have liked to
exclude tht. period.
On Indemnity Bill: suggd there shd. be some criticism – either in Govt.
speech or by Labour amendment. But shd. need assurance tht.
amendment wd. be w’drawn.
Att.G.
Tory Amendmt. They will suggest R. Commn to enquire into anomalies
in connn with election of clericals. eg. letter in Times this a.m. It is
true tht. there are anomalies.
P.M.
R. Commn is wrong instrument. H/C. matter. Shd. be handled by
Select Cttee.
C.E.
Endorse that view.
H.M.
Yes. For Govt. supports wd. dislike any concession to Tory views
today. Also remember on report of any enquiry we shd. have to act:
and v. diff. issue eg. R.C. disabilities.
P.M.
Sel. Cttee has recommd legn: Govt. has declined: awkward to do
nothing.
Better offer (another) Sel. Cttee.
J.G.
Wd. arouse controversy in country if suggd we are considerg. admittg.
R.C.’s.
Att.G.
Sel. Cttee unlikely to report in favour of removing clerical disabilities –
because of v. gt. diffies involved.
H.D.
Better to stall.
Att.G.
Yes: if a soft answer is given.
E.Sh.
In long run. R. Commn might be better because appointmts need not
reflect state of Parties nor report quickly.
P.M.
Can you get a R. Commn composed wholly of agnostics.
Also H/C. shd. reserve this right to itself.
5.
Festival of Britain: Sunday Opening.
[Enter D.J.
H.M.
Some legn is inevitable because known tht. a common informer would
move.
If Fun Fair not opened, not worth opening Festival Gdns. at all. And
trouble with contractors.
P.M.
Why?
H.M.
They have assumed a 7 day week: justifiably because practice is
common outside London.
Believe visitors will think it odd if Fun Fair closed on Sundays.
Not going to be noisy – necessarily – there isn’t in Sweden.
Views of Churches. Generally against: tho’ Battersea clergy are in
favour.
Fun fair will be popular: if not opened on Sundays, there will be public
demand for it.
G.A.I.
Don’t let’s be so kill joy in London.
Public opinion will support H.M.’s view.
191
J.G.
Why do we need legn in London if places in Annex can open w’out it.
C.E.
Because they don’t charge admission.
I take opposite view. Non-conf. opinion will be strongly opposed.
And Provinces (who also vote in H/C.) must be regarded.
Churches aren’t reliable because they want to get rid of common
informer as humiliating to them.
Recommend we apply ordinary law to Gardens. Legal for years to
open Museums.
One thing to open Exhibn: another to promote special legn to open Fun
Fair. Bound to arouse controversy – at a time when we don’t want to
alienate non-C. votes.
J.G.
Such legn wd. be linked up in Wales with movement to repeal Sunday
closing of pubs., promoted by brewers. Our Party wd. be identified
with brewers. Avoid legn if at all possible.
Many Welsh members wd. vote v. it.
H.McN.
Agree with C.E. Wd. arouse gt. opposn in Scotland. Govt. supporters
wd. be embarrassed. For many people this is a ques. of principle.
Where wd. we be if Tories chose to oppose it?
W.W.
Tremendous feeling in our Party v. encroachments on Sunday
observance.
You wd. have diffy. in getting it thro’ Party.
A.B.
As an agnostic I am against Sunday opening. If Christianity had not
thought of a day of rest, it wd. have bn. necessary to invent it.
P.M.
Arguments in memo. are pitched too high.
D.J.
i) Agreed Ty. subsidy £9 m. on basis of Sunday opening.
ii) B’sea opposed Fun Fair because denied access to Park. Worst still
if they are excluded.
A.
Fun Fair is only ¼ of Gardens. The other ¾ could be open?
H.M.
I think so. Ques. wd. it be worth while?
C.E.
Not opposed to concerts etc. in Festival Gardens.
J.
Travel Assocn attach importce to it.
C.E.
That wd. make non-C. opposn worse.
Att.G.
Amendmt will be moved to include Fun Fair. Ques. really is: shd. we
leave that to a free vote.
H.M.
Will consider drafting Bill that way and allowg. a free Vote on Fun
Fair item.
192
A.B.
How will Govt. vote? We shall be in trouble: eg capital punishment
issue.
H.M.
This is a rather diff. issue fr. capital punishment.
J.
More like Prayer Book.
A.V.A.
Against this.
J.G.
Settle on basis of para. 4.
Is Festival really going to break financially on Fun Fair alone.
J.
If any legn necessary, amendmts will be moved: and we have to decide
what Govt. attitude shd. be.
P.M.
Leave this particular issue to a free Vote, includg. Ministers.
Include it in Bill, but say at once this will be left to a free Vote.
[Enter Wheatley
6.
Leasehold Reform.
P.M.
Is temporary legn required?
Att.G.
No simple matter, as we thght. Shape of it will compromise perm. legn
E.g. if we allow rents to rise: perm legn wd. have to be on same basis.
Tories may argue we cd. deal with it by perm. legn now. It wdn’t be
much more complicated or controversial than this.
I believe “rent not exceeding rateable value and on a market not
affected by scarcity” wd. prob. meet the case.
A.B.
Cd. we have perm legn with present Parly majority?
Our only hope is to put up tempy umbrella, and give time for thought.
J.
I agree with A.B. Satisfd we must have tempy legn – for as short a
period and with as narrow a scope as possible.
Agreed: temporary legn is necessary.
Para. 5(a)
A.B.
All leases. For landlords are exploiting grander property, esp. in
London.
Said there is no evidence. Look in Willett’s window: £7/10.000 for 30
year lease of house of rateable value of £120. We shall be accused of
class legn if we limit it to Rent Act field.
For shops, no limit at all.
J.
If perm. legn I wd. agree. As only tempy, I want to narrow field as
much as possible. …… (part unleased) ……
193
Para. 5(b)
A.B.
In favour of all leases wthr. pre-war or post.
J.
Don’t feel strongly about this.
Att.G.
Circs. haven’t changed. There is justifn. for intervention : and it doesn’t
apply to post-war leases.
7.
Socialised Industries.
C.P. 233 improved.
8.
H.M.
Economic Planning: Full Employment Bill.
If we agree now tht. Planning Bill be mentioned in King’s Speech we
can consider later wthr. positive powers be included in it.
Agreed on that basis.
6.
(cont’d) Leasehold Reform.
Att.G.
No evce of hardship on post-war leases. Cttee found more.
A.B.
Unless tenants are protected, we shall be in trouble.
H.M.
All landlords aren’t wicked rich.
A.B.
Labour Party have always favoured those who are using a house more
than those who derive income from it.
Att.G.
I wd. compromise on 1945 as starting date.
Agreed: accept December 1945 as compromise.
Discuss remaing. ques. in memo. on Monday.
[Exit J. and A.
Wh.
Trouble arising fr. applying same formula to long ground leases and
other leases. First class won’t thank you for turning them into
protected tenants.
Att.G.
This is why I didn’t favour tempy legn.
H.McN.
We aren’t dealing only with long ground leases. And anyhow some of
those have changed hands in recent years.
194
A.B.
Also paras. 19-20. make my case against restrictg. this to long ground
leases. And this is why I still want to go even beyond Dec. ’45.
Att.G.
M/H. is trying to amend Rent Acts in fact tho’ not in form.
Tied Cottages must also be excluded specifically,
[Exit W.W.
and this will raise a storm.
Att.G.
L.P. Cttee did consider tied cottages.
195
20th October 1950.
C.M. 66(50)
1.
P.M.
Sir Stafford Cripps.
Regret at his resignation.
2.
Yugoslavia.
[Chas Peake, M.W., D.J.
E.B.
Not solely financial. Pol. sitn in area and risks if Tito went down.
Trouble = drought. Affected him – and us too (qua maize).
Wd. be mistake to make it condn of loan tht. he shd. take our advice
etc.
Wd. wreck our own policy to rob him of his independence.
But we shd. ask him (not as condn) to be more reasonable re C.K.
children.
Also ask for his help in increasg. exports of soft wood.
Main objection: to keep him afloat. Suits our purpose. Avoid adding
to our mil. obligns in that area. Holds Albania as less useful to R.
Shall have to discuss with U.S. But they seem to be awaitg. a lead
from us.
H.W.
Discns thro’ summer – various Junior Ministers went there and returned
with strong convictions of need to keep Tito afloat. Was about to ask
how far our econ. objectives and policies shd. be sorted on that a/c.
Yugoslavia said to be worth many Divns. to us.
Y. were running into econ. trouble even before drought.
Credit for consumer goods wh. we can supply from U.K. Cd. do that
w’out waitg. on U.S. decn re food – of which we can rend little, save
whale meat, surplus herrings etc.
Extravagant Y. plans of development. – in genl. shd. be toned down.
But on some, we are interested, eg aluminium and zinc.
Timber: Y. supplies developed to point where they are nearly our main
Euro. supplier. Contracts lagging now because of disorgann. We shd.
send special mission on timber – apart fr. genl. econ. mission and in
advance of it. Main need = 100 miles of light rails – and a small price
for timber available. Might double their exports in year or so.
D.J.
Overwhelmg. case. But want assurance tht. help will do good to Y.
and ourselves. Root cause = excessive investmt p’mme, apart fr.
drought. Unless that policy is modified, £5 m. won’t rectify situatn
Under genl. econ. mission can we see tht. Y. adopts more realistic
econ. policy.
Para.12(b). Ty. shd. be consulted in choice of experts.
E.B.
Technicians. Econ. advisers are easy. Operatg. technicians also
needed. Favour lettg. U.K. firms take their own experts.
H.W.
Timber Control + private firms (in that order).
E.B.
T.C. don’t cut timber. Want to get practical men.
H.M.
Cdn’t we give Tito some economic educn?
A.B.
Careful – don’t act like Russians. And don’t forget tht. aim of b’ward
countries is always bldg. up capital equipment.
P.M.
Advice isn’t necessarily the same as orders. No diffy. in advisg. a man
not to go too fast along the right road.
H.D.
Can be done tactfully.
Timber is well worth having in return for credits.
E.Sh.
Defence aspects are even more important. His 18 Divns are well worth
£5 m. – defence of Adriatic.
H.McN.
Need for gt. tact. For basis of their separation fr. R. was, not pol., but
economic – because R. tried to slow down their capital developmt.
Their main problem = shortage of competent personnel. Any way pol.
acceptable to Y. of supplying adminve executive and operational
mission. Thro’ them, filter in advice.
We can supply food – herring, salt white fish, potato mash etc.
Memo. approved.
3.
Leasehold Reform.
Att.G.
Demand – in Party and P.Q.’s is for propn of occupants of houses
under long bldg. leases. But, if we limit tempy legn thus, we must at
same time decide, and say, to get on quickly with permanent legn.
A.B.
My Dpt. agree this is simpler proposn. But leaves large field of
hardship untouched. Esp. ex-Service men. Thght people occupying
part of large houses were protected by Rent Acts. But courts have
ruled tht. rateable value of whole house must be criterion for Rent
Acts.
Att.G.
All emphasises need for review of Rent Acts.
A.B.
True tht. long ground lease has bn. publicised most, but only in v. few
cases is occupant the lineal descendant of original builder.
Many such houses have bn. bght. by colliery cos.
Crown Property cases.
Att.G.
Puts them in same posn as other l’lords.
A.B.
Doesn’t put them right back under Rent Acts. 7.000 cases already.
197
Where people have bought Crown lease and sub-let. People are being
evicted.
J.
Support Att.G.’s plan. Wd. cure incidentally the anomaly of the
Knightsbridge case.
This problem will remain, however. If these long leases are extended
for 2 years, the middle man will benefit.
Att.G.
Covered by para. 2(b) of my memo.
H.M.
Need to get on with permanent legn.
H.McN.
Won’t oppose because can’t think of anything to solve wider problem.
But don’t imagine this solution will avoid pol. difficulties.
If we were to do justice, we cdn’t limit scope.
A.B.
Won’t satisfy our friends.
H.D.
V. disappointing. Hurry up with perm. legn.
Att.G.
Most of the grievances are Rent Act ones. And we can’t legislate on
that with our present majority. We cd. say tht. since Ridley Cttee rept.
addl diffies have bn. disclosed: we are apptg. w. party to see how we cd.
amend and consolidate Rent Acts.
P.M.
Memo. to be submitted by M/H. to Cabinet on Rent Acts problems.
198
22nd October 1950
C.M. 67(50)
1.
P.M.
Germany: Re-armament.
Alleged statement by Morgan Phillips. Didn’t consult F.O. Supposed
to have said “Br. Govt”….. Shall get in touch with him. M’while shall
stand on N. Yk. communiqué. Hope other Ministers will do the same.
Has upset France: U.S.
Need for gt. care in speech makg. to avoid refce to this ques.
3.
E.B.
[Enter Att.G. & Callaghan. W.W.
Welcome to new Ch/Exch.
2.
E.B.
Mr. Gaitskell.
Palestine.
Econ. and pol. sitn v. serious. Black market: break in majority Party:
no grip on econ. sitn.
V. little response fr. U.S. on econ. and fin. aid. Wealthy U.S. Jews
think Pal. Govt. is too far to Left: and middle section have lost
influence in U.S. Trade Unions.
Israel Govt. have allowed excessive immigrn – can’t absorb it – we told
them so.
Also Poles and E. Europ. are difft. kind of Jews: tough eggs.
New Arab policy. Iraq, eg. releasg. Jews too fast: makg. diffies for
Israel.
Loss of faith, in U.N., because Jews haven’t accepted internatn of
Jerusalem.
Has aroused powerful R.C. organn in U.S., anti Jewish lobby.
Gives me anxiety re M/D. as a whole. Our posn in Egypt uncertain –
and E. pol. seem disturbed. Rows in both places might disturb whole
area.
Warning to Cab. No policy proposals. F.O. considg. what we can do.
4.
E.B.
Russian Policy: Prague Declaration.
Prague resolns.
Prob. seekg. to influence France. Frightened of re-armed Germany.
So am I. But they brght it on, by arming E. Germ Police.
Seekg. therefore to stop N.A.T.O. move.
Also v. anxious to get 5 Power mtg. in being. Either to delay us or to
settle because they are frightened. Which?
Tried a rehearsal for coup in Austria. Caccia’s analysis.
It failed because Austr. resistance. And Austria preparg. v. second
attempt.
R disturbed at Sov. citizens in from Curtain countries – and l/c there if
trouble came. Trying consolidated power there. May try more
transfers/popn.
5.
United Nations: Secretary General.
G.W.
If R. produced reasonable name, we are commd to vote w’out
adjournment. And shd. have abstain.
Diffies a) We shd. have time to consider wthr. we need abstain.
b) Surely R. entitled to consn of a reasonable name.
E.B.
Was told no adjournment wd. be allowed. Not tht. we object to
adjournment: just no opportunity.
Never bn. advised tht. R. wd. put up reasonable name. Tried to keep it
open in case: but told as above.
Then said: if no chance to consider during adjournment, only course is
to abstain. What other advice cd. I give?
As protest v. refusal of adjournment.
Don’t want Comm. candidate pushed in as manoeuvre. Wd. prefer to
go on voting for Lie.
P.M.
Jebb shd. fight for adjournment: but, if he can’t get it, abstain.
6.
Japan: Peace Treaty.
E.B.
Shall have to face it.
U.S. haven’t made up minds still.
Important apprecn by Gascoigne.
Urging Franks to make U.S. face it.
G.W.
Australia wd. take same attitude to re-armament of Japan as France are
over Germany.
[Exit Callagan.
7.
King’ Speech: Opening of Parliament.
H.M.
Shd. offices be included in Leasehold Bill?
C.E.
Wd. give credit to Tories if left to amendment.
H.D.
Mention shops and offices.
J.
Diff. basis for these. “And will also introduce proposals for renewal of
tenancies of certain business premises”. Agreed: shops and offices
via business premises.
A.B.
Adminve paragraph. V. weak formulation. Prefer my own formula –
housing will continue enjoy its high priority.
200
H.G.
No objn re housing. But care in referring this to social policy. l.a. are
willing to accept housing.
H.D.
Put housing in separate sentence: commit ourselves to that.
H.G.
Yes: then let wording of para. as now stand unaltered.
Employment Bill.
H.G.
Negative only – or positive – or both?
H.W.
Memo. recommend, positive powers awaits Cab. decision.
H.G.
Shall be asked to say in debate on Address.
Approved: subject to amendmts.
8.
Council of Europe.
[Enter Callagan
E.B.
Memo. speaks for itself.
H.D.
Endorse memo. Have circulated Transp. House paper for background.
On one hand vague urge for Federation. Against it U.K., Scandinav.
and Irish (of all parties).
P.4.: 17 iii and iv.: no interference with Fed. ???? in limited circle by
those who want it.
Para. 19(2). Full emplt. Was main U.K. initiative at Strasbourg.
We did well: good Cttee. Hope E.B. will back this firmly.
Has good propag. value. may help W. Germans: in line with our Br.
initiative at E.C.O.S.O.C and I.L.O.
Agree no Ministers shd. go in U.K. delegn in future. Embarrassing for
us. No need for them now. V. good Labour team this year – less
Ministers and Mackay they wd. make a v. good lot.
My only doubt on memo = suggn of includg. Non-Parliamentarians.
Essence of Assembly was Parliamtrians. Stick to them and pick them
well.
Discn in H/C. of Strasbourg results. W.S.C. promised to find time in
Supply Days. Useful to have such a discn. Can we have it – preferably
in Oppn time.
H.M.
Don’t want to give a Govt. day. Mustn’t imply tht. these ques. are
subject to Parly ratification.
P.M.
Prefer to stick to Parliamentarians.
H.M.
Scientific co-opn is a practical propn. And safe than social services.
Glad E.B.’s memo. is a bit forthcomg. on co-opn.
For eventually much to be said for Federation (!).
201
Para. 19(3). Assembly’s follies are embarrassg. to Govts. Worth
trying to prevent them. Leads me to Ministerial participn.
See disadvantage of that. But remember we are coherent Govt. most
others are Coalition. Fear our Members may be seduced fr. their duty
if Ministers aren’t there: our Tories may get them to support things
Govt. wdn’t like. Wd therefore prefer to keep this ques. open until
nearer next mtg.
Against incln of non Parliamentarians in delegn.
H.D.
Helpful if good F.O. official were there to advise delegn.
H.McN.
Endorse E.B.’s view – have always thght it wrong to associate
Ministers with non-Governmental Assembly.
Why extend specialised agencies technique to C/Europe?
C/Europe won’t do more on full emplt. than E.C.O.S.O.C. Duplicn.
H.D.
Full emplt. wdn’t be matter for a specialised agency.
H.McN.
Even so, leave it to E.C.O.S.O.C.
Scientific co-opn. Already organisns for this.
U.N.E.S.C.O. into it.
Cdn’t we steer
G.T.
Is doing so already.
H.McN.
Para. 13. Study of constitutn. Experts better than Ambassadors.
Slippery slope. Shall have pressure for amendmt to Federation.
Better take line tht. it’s too soon to change constitn.
9.
Discn adjourned.
[Exit W.W.
British Sugar Corporation.
[Enter M.W.
M.W.
Shareholders run no risk and shd. receive no profit.
Para. 5. Effective public control. I don’t mean to imply tht. we shdn’t
eventually take over private refineries. I meant effective for immed.
practical purposes.
P.M.
What wd. be relationship of corpn with Govt.? May you not have less
powers?
M.W.
No. Every member of Bd. wd. be under Govt. control – at present
some represent private firms and are obstructive.
We are considerg. precise powers etc. Shall have to define these in
Bill. Had wished to bring it into Dpt. but S.I.M. against that. Need to
know what powers are needed to give day to day control.
Powers today are greater than under 1935 Act – and wd. revert to that
when 1942 Act lapsed.
Att.G.
Powers needed exceed those over other Corpns.
202
H.G.
Subsidy – involves need for further powers than normal with public
corpn.
A.B.
Leave this alone until full natn comes along.
M/F. has v. extensive powers over existg. Corpn, as in memo.
V. much more than we cd. easily take for a public corpn new style.
Para.11 of Annex. This will frighten sugar refiners and enrage our
friends.
Leave it alone. Don’t be tactical. Or go ahead and nationalise this
monopoly. This Bill wd. make our people think Lord Lyle has won.
H.M.
This means: if Parly situation doesn’t allow us to do all we promised,
do nothing and renew Tory legn.
If we renew, we leave these private interests protected from all risk. It
wd. be at least a move forward.
Good sense to go as far as we can. Wd. give us a beginning of a grip
over Tate and Lyle.
Only advantages
i) may pay less.
ii) gives some access to Tate and Lyle refining.
A.V.A.
That is domestic prodn only. Real ques is refining imported sugar in
off periods of beet factories.
I argued for natn at Election time. But this limited move wd. enrage
our friends. Better go for whole hog at appropriate time. M’while
renew existg. legn making it clear we don’t modify our policy attitude.
A.
What are we going to do in 1952?
If we leave it alone now, we perpetuate wicked 1935 agreemt.
People who wd. be enraged by this plan = Tate and Lyle (not Labour
supporters) because it wd. give Govt. a hold over refining.
My object is to undermine power of refiners over factories wh. have
largely bn. built out of Govt. money.
In principle, M/F. must be right.
H.G.
Sugar wdn’t have appeared in our p’mme if it hadn’t bn. for this point.
For no Labour Govt. cd. ask Parlt. to renew 1935 agreement. But most
we cd. do now wd. be as in M/F. memo.
I therefore support H.M.
P.M.
We are on strong ground because we must take some action.
H.D.
Competitive enterprise. We can here ruin Tate and Lyle by underselling them.
Lukewarm support for our sugar natn plan.
J.
Whole object of this is to get rid of refining agreemt. which is
indefensible. Make this the point of attack.
But does this plan get rid of it?
203
H.W.
It may automatically lapse, as matter of law. But, if it doesn’t
Chairman will be stronger to negotiate if Govt. corpn.
Att.G.
If we find it doesn’t lapse, we shd. legislate to end it, not negotiate for
it.
A.B.
Wd. that give rise to claim for compensn?
A.V.A.
Unwise, with present Parly majority, to raise for 1st time ques. of public
corpn competing with private enterprise.
H.W.
Shd. take a/c of views of Chairman. If he feels he wd. be on surer
ground on this basis, we shd. go ahead. Not otherwise.
204
24th October 1950
C.M. 68(50)
1.
Council of Europe.
[Enter W.W., E.D., Att.G., Callagan.
a)
Composition of Delegation.
E.Sh.
Some point in includg. experts or T.U.C. men on occasion –
knowledge of industrial side.
P.M.
Dangerous door. Experts can advise – but not on floor. Place for
Parliamentarians.
Agreed: no non-Parliamentarians.
A.B.
Ministers: don’t defer decision until Agenda known – otherwise may
imply lack of interest.
E.B.
Unworkable to have Ministers. Must declare at same time we aren’t
committed to Assembly’s decisions. Must make it clear tht. Govt.’s
decisions are reserved.
Also Govt. must reserve right to decide what it brings to H/C.
Genl. discn of C/E. work, but “ratification” only at motion of Govt.
C.
But tell our chaps what Govt. line is. Agreed: no Ministers.
b)
Duplication with U.N. Agencies.
E.B.
I will think of a different term to express my meaning so as to avoid
confusion with U.N. “specialised agencies”.
Federalism. Assumed on Continent tht. U.K. will stand out and defeat
it because of Schuman Plan. But we want to make it clear if two or
three countries in Europe want to make a federal arrangemt. for some
service we won’t use veto to prevent it, and want to be free to join or
not as suits us. It’s the fault of the unanimity rule, which I didn’t want.
A.
Layton has a whole bunch of Cttees in mind wh. overlap U.N.
organisations.
E.B.
C/Europe is excluded fr. O.E.E.C. field.
H.G.
That is the important point. So long as it is held, no gt. objn to C/E.
overlapping E.C.O.S.O.C. May be similar examples of useful work
C/E. cd. do.
H.M.
Don’t let us get let in – for paying for it too.
E.B.
x/ Keep these activities off the Genl. Budget. Then if 2 or 3 people want
a show of their own, they can pay for it themselves.
Endorse Para. 17(5).
A.B.
Don’t have overlapping with W.H.O. – not enough staff.
Emphasise x/.
{Don’t boycott others: but don’t be dragged in ourselves.
{Don’t have overlapping staffs.
{Keep it off the general Budget.
E.B.
No def. rule: policy – not to interfere with other countries combining,
but not part of general Budget.
H.M.
Try also to get it accepted tht. Assembly shall not set up such agencies
only recommend to Cttee of Ministers.
c)
Defence.
E.Sh.
What if Assembly insists on discussing Defence.
E.B.
We shall have to w’draw.
H.D.
I can ensure tht. Govt. supporters on U.K. delegn will follow our line
and w’draw.
G.W.
But next year?
E.B.
It’s outside Statute. But can’t stop people talking if they insist.
d)
Convention on Human Rights.
E.B.
Can’t avoid going ahead with this on condns agreed with Ld.
Chancellor.
H.M.
Gt. pity we are drawn into it. May be forced to have legn here.
And inconsistent with econ. planning – elevn of rights of private
property etc.
E.B.
No: I am not acceptg. any of new Assembly amendments.
H.G.
Was amendment safeguarding econ. controls added by Cttee of
Ministers?
J.
Yes. I accept E.B.’s position. Tho’ I regret the position reached.
My points have bn. met.
E.B.
Have verified in F.O. tht. Dpts. were consulted. They shd. have made
their Ministers aware of it.
H.G.
My Dept. was not consulted until July.
206
e)
Reform of Constitution.
H.McN.
Wd. prefer, if we have any proposals, tht. we shd. put them ourselves
via letting Cttee of experts have a free run at it.
H.D.
Several countries take our view. Safe enough to let it be considered.
E.B.
“Experts”: officials. Jebb did it all outset.
H.McN.
We shd. have bn. in a mess if H.D. hadn’t intervened.
E.B.
Not on Statute. That was done by officials alone.
H.McN.
Can’t be assumed of cautious recommns fr. such a
Cttee. Unless we lay down condns eg. limiting authy of
Assembly.
H.M.
F.O. officials aren’t so good at Parly arrangemts. And they did not get
it all right in early stages.
P.M.
“Experts” on Parly affairs aren’t officials – Parliamentarians.
E.D.
This memo. confines our experts w’in clear policy lines. And if they
can’t make our view prevail, we still have the veto.
Statute can be amended only by unanimous vote.
H.McN.
Take line it’s too early to decide on amendmt of statute.
E.D.
Already failing to work. Awkward to refuse even to examine means of
making it work.
f)
G.W.
Publicity.
Make it clear in U.K. tht. if you aren’t Federalist you can still be
internationalist.
[Exit E.D., Callagan, W.W.
2.
Att.G.
Commonwealth Consultation.
May I inform Comm. Govts. Agreed.
g)
C.
[Exit E.B.
British Sugar Corporation.
[Enter M.W.
Agreemt. is for indefinite period. Wd. not come automatically to an
end by transfer of shares to public corpn or by end of 1942 Act.
Wd. need specific provn – includg. provn for compensn by arbitn.
But in fact is not desired to terminate agreement, but only to modify it.
And that is a matter for negotn.
Need is therefore to put Corpn. in strongest negotiatg. posn.
207
M.W.
Case is made out for Bill, apart from ques. of agreement.,
Recommend tht. we decide to go on with the Bill now and leave over
for settlement by Cab. Cttee ques. how we deal with the agreement.
A.
Recalled history. Refiners tried to kill beet factories in various ways.
Doubt if much can be achieved by negotn – unless power taken in Bill
to terminate agreemt.
Att.G.
We cd. get more informn eg. re cost of compensn if we took that power
and what chance of securing essentials by negotiation.
Don’t therefore mention this aspect in King’s Speech.
Agreemt. cuts both ways – not wholly unfavourable to Corpn. Tho’ on
balance advantage of it is prob. with refiners.
E.Sh.
If we pass this Bill, will corpn be able to establish effective control
over sugar industry?
Att.G.
That ques. is bound up with M/F. use of his powers.
Legn wd. certainly put Corpn in stronger position: v. strong. if it
included clear power to terminate agreemt. Remember some agreemt.
is requd so long as refineries are in private hands.
J.
Compensn is a matter of policy, not law.
And this is a crudely monopolistic agreemt. wh. is against public
policy. There is therefore no necessity to compensate for breakg. it.
H.W.
Support that view. Never contemplated we wd. compensate for loss
resultg. fr. brkg. up restrictive agreemts. This Govt. have never done
so.
Cd. be argued tht. it isn’t a private agreement. But no need to
compensate because they got a Tory Govt. to give statutory cover for
their restrictive agreement.
H.McN.
Don’t forget other side of contract by wh. refiners paid a high price to
Corpn - for their sugar. Wasn’t a wholly one-sided contract.
A.V.A.
Cutting in on this will raise such a controversy tht. you wd. be better
advised to p’pone until you can deal with whole ques. of sugar
industry.
T.W.
If principle of nationalising Corpn is right, we must leave over ques.
how we deal with compensn – can’t settle it here.
Att.G.
Provide in Bill tht. agreemt. shd. terminate by given date unless new
one has bn. negotiated m’while. Support T.W.’s view.
P.M.
How far have we worked out our sugar plan – apart fr. puttg. it in Party
p’mme? Cdn’t promise legn w’out knowing what it is?
A.B.
You will either enrage Tate and Lyle or enrage Govt. supporters.
208
Public corpn will have v. involved relns with refiners.
What pol. or organic advantage in this?
V. unjustifiable to depart from Labour principles on this.
If we add this to Speech, are we p’poning main issue?
Don’t let’s compromise our principles. Eg. if we had natd land in
1946, we shd. have avoided many diffies. Nationalise or leave well
alone.
Att.G.
Favour short Bill on pol. grounds. Let Tate and Lyle oppose it.
E.Sh.
Must go on with limited Bill – but don’t take any credit for it.
Our supporters won’t regard it as adequate. And will even dislike it if
it leads to compensation.
Need we mention it in Speech? Yes. Must refer to agreement. (?)
Better put it in and consider details re agreement later.
H.W.
How far have we control over Corpn? How much more wd. legn give.
See end of memo. – most of directors seem to be outside Govt. control.
M.W.
We are using 1942 Act now. But next year I lose those powers and
under 1935 Act I have no powers. If I don’t have this legn, I must
renew 1942 Act.
But even under 1942 Act only a minority of Bd. are 100% Govt.
controlled.
Att.G.
Tho’ Govt. has veto, Bd. includes many repves of refiners. And all
Govt. control is subject to agreement – which does limit Corpn’s
development of beet industry.
This shd. be a public corpn – its capital ought not to be earng. private
profit. Achievements. a) Establish socialist organns competing in this
industry with private sector. b) It wd. be in strong competitive posn
and cd. dictate terms to refiners. c) It wd. encourage beet growers.
Bill passed – wd. avoid major legn wh. mghtn’t be v. good platform.
If Bill rejected, wd. be a good platform on wh. to fight.
P.M.
Favour limited Bill.
Att.G.
So do I. May be cheaper.
Is wording of Speech likely to influence ques. of compensn.
In earlier natns we have taken over all existg. contracts etc. If you
merely terminated 1936 Act, you might be better off than takg. over
shares.
H.G.
Don’t think this wording binds us to compensate for contracts.
H.McN.
Go on with this Bill. G.A.I., T.W., G.T.
H.W.
Wd. prefer 100% plan. At least make form of this case later 100%
209
Agreed:
Approve M/F. proposals.
A.B. asked that his view (?dissent) be recorded.
[Exit M.W.
3.
Printers’ Strike.
Att.G.
If report of court of enquiry is not accepted, I shd. find it diff. to refrain
from prosecutg. both sides.
If I prosecute at all, I wd. prefer to go for both sides.
Any advice from my colleagues?
G.A.I.
Urge Attorney to pause and consider report before he decides.
It contains many comments on attitude of the two sides.
Also employers understood to be willing to accept.
Att.G.
Counsel have advised tht. employers are technically in breach of Order
1305 and employees are certainly in breach.
210
30th October 1950
C.M. 69(50)
1.
N.A.T.O. French Proposal for European Army.
[Enter W.W.
E.B.
V. Zeeland came to see me (Chairman of N.A.T.O.). Discussed Fr.
resoln and sitn caused by it. Puts Benelux in diffies. Was design to
force them into acceptg. Schuman Plan and Eur. Army as condn of
going on with N.A.T.O.
V.Z. saw Schuman, who said not intended delay integrated Force.
Suggested mtg. of F. Ministers after Def. Ministers mtg. Cdn’t see
purpose. After consultg. P.M., said wdn’t commit myself to a mtg.
Wd. dramatise sitn and depress status of Def. Ministers. They cd.
discuss techn. aspects w’out prejudice to policy. Consider next step
when we see results of Def. Ministers mtg. Acheson has since agreed
with my view.
Later telegram suggests new twist.
As I see it now, however, Fr. don’t want to stop integrated Force,
includg. Germany. But at same time want go on with Europ. Army
(100.000) subordinate to main Force. Looks like a mere shop-window
force.
x Have asked F.O. to convene internl Cttee to ensure prodn in G. doesn’t
have bias twds. things wh. cd. have competitive commercial advantage
later – eg. thro’ our excludg. heavy prodn from G.
We cd. give G. a free run in trade and commerce. Diff. balance to
hold.
H.G.
Agree on last point. Important tht. arms shd. be produced in G.
Wd. rather they produced some than none at all.
How is Def. Min. mtg. going?
E.B.
Genl. desire to go on with Med. Term Plan.
A.B.
When do we know fin. commitment of Plan?
E.B.
When contns worked out. M’while we aren’t committed.
On Eur. Army – M/D. instructed to stick to N.A.T.O. conceptns and not
get drawn into discn of Europ. Army. He is doing so.
P.M.
Fr. plan is nonsense. If they want to do this sort of thing on their own,
let them. But we mustn’t be drawn into it.
Prob. only a Fr. political manoeuvre.
H.McN.
Prob. also a manoeuvre to get a French Deputy Commander.
E.B. will put in memo. as soon as M/D. gets a bit further.
A.V.A.
Empire Parly Conf. in N.Z. Shall have to give a paper on 30 Nov. And
later a confce in Canberra, incldg. U.S. repves. May I be kept up to date
for this purpose?
E.B.
Yes. Incldg. Dom. readiness to help in M/East.
A.V.A.
Also sterling area’s dollar expenditure.
G.W.
Diffy. of planning global war thro’ N.A.T.O. Danger of excludg.
Doms. Must be watched v. carefully.
E.B.
That’s why we sold the “Spender Plan” to Australia.
A.V.A.
Spender pitches pretty high his claim to teach us our business.
G.W.
He talks a lot. But Menzies doesn’t pay much attentn to him.
2.
Korea.
E.B.
I am presenting a factual White Paper.
Hope Cab. will agree to it’s going in soon.
H.M.
Before debate on Address. If no policy in it, we don’t.
3.
Egypt.
A.B.
Can Cab. have memo. on Egypt – with sp. refce to Suez Canal and
Haifa. Is tri-partite control of Canal dependent on riparian Power’s
rights to stop ships?
E.B.
Yes. But on powers, there is diffce betwn. lawyers.
P.M.
Statement by Att.G. shd. go with it.
H.McN.
Sudan shd. be covered too?
E.B.
Yes.
4.
Parliament: Private Members’ Time.
H.M.
Must have some. Para. 2(1) gives them too much. Sel. Cttee
compromise is better. Parly Party agreeable to Sel. Cttee plan
20 Fridays.
Allow Priv. Members to introduce Bill, but not 10 min. rule. Propose
to resist latter.
P.M.
You haven’t got your earlier argument of a mass of Govt. legn.
212
Diff. to oppose 10 min. rule. Why not offer them one day a week for
that, as in olden days.
A.B.
Are we going to have standing Cttees? If not, no harm in giving Fridays
for P. Members’ Bills – they won’t get thro’.
W.W.
Must have some Cttees and let some P.M. Bills go to a Cttee.
C.E.
Bound to concede this.
H.McN.
I agree.
Memo. approved. Ten Minute Rule: first oppose it:
then suggest one day: then Friday.
5.
Economic Planning Bill.
[Enter G.S. and Att.Genl.
A.B.
Cab. thght powers in Bill were too negative. L.P. Cttee put in a
preamble. My Sub. Cttee then went into positive side.
Found tht. apart fr. M/S. Dpts. have prerogative powers to carry on
prodn etc.
Att.G.
No power to spend money w’out statutory authority - so you would
need legislation anyway.
A.B.
I agree – ques. policy as well as law.
Suggest widest possible powers, removg. at same time limitns on
M/Supply.
Was not part of our t. of r. to consider how such powers wd. be used.
But before debate, we ought to be in a posn to say. We don’t want this
to be a frightening Bill, but a re-assuring one.
I contemplate a code indicatg. classes of case in wh. Govt. wd. enter
into competn with private industry.
H.W.
We haven’t the powers to implement our Election manifesto.
The point re prerogative is strongly held by M/F., who rely on it.
But Sub. Cttee agreed tht. powers shd. be statutory.
P.M.
Needs much more working out. What are occasions for exercise of
such powers.
Needn’t go into details on debate on Address.
All we need do now is remit Bill back to Sub. Cttee.
H.G.
This may cause Election. Must be sure we have a good case.
Sitn is more likely now to be inflationary – makes it easier to put case
for negative controls. Price control., eg. is popular.
Big attack on “powers of Execution”.
Mistake to include direction of labour in this Bill.
213
Stimuln of emplt. in depression – not a matter for new powers wh. cd.
go in this Bill. Mainly Finance Bill provns.
But some positive things cd. go in. Fin. guarantees etc. to public boards
and l.a.’s to spend or even plan for countering depression.
In private sector, can prs. do somethg.
Powers to manufacture and buy – care over this. Not a strong case for
makg. consumer goods to combat depression. Case in dev. areas: but
that’s different. Buying consumer goods: what wd. we do with them
when bought?
H.D.
Consider by all means. But sympathetically.
J.
This Bill won’t go thro’ H/L. Therefore make the Bill as attractive to
as wide an audience as possible.
P.M.
The M/H. sub. Cttee shd. include some repves of
{H/L.
{ I will consider what wd. be most suitable body.
A.B.
Can Ty. consider wthr. positive assurance can be given re powers of
Finance Corpn for small businesses – I.C.F.C.
6.
Leasehold Reform: Offices.
[Exit G.S. Enter Ld. Adv.
H.M.
As in memo.
J.
Problem was how to define “offices”. E.g. do you want to protect a
doctors’ surgery: drawing offices: welfare offices etc. V. diff. to draw
the line anywhere. Then anomaly by comparison with houses, when
only v. long leases are to be protected.
H.M.
Also gt. pressure in H/C. to produce our Bill quickly. Extension to
offices wd. delay both introdn and passage of Bill.
A.B.
Agree tht. diffies of definition are insuperable.
H.W.
Agree. But on detail we aren’t follow Sc. precedent: for that, by
accident, covers wholesale businesses as well as shops. Even so, B/T.
don’t ask tht. English Bill shd. cover offices.
C.E.
Disappointed. Tories will get credit for proposing extension to offices
to the benefit of small professional men. Awkward for us to appear to
be resisting this. Will deprive Bill of much of its political value.
Wh.
On our Shops Bill, Chair ruled out amendmts. extendg. it to offices.
H.McN.
Even as Tories will make the most of this limitation.
The 2 Labour members on our Cttee put in minority report advocatg. its
extension to offices.
214
P.M.
Yet in Scotland you accepted the majority view.
A.
Support C.E. How will you justify not covering offices.
T.W.
Temporary measure: get on with it, quick and simple.
J.G.
Do we intend to cover offices in permanent Bill? Can we say so?
G.T.
I wd. say so. And commit Tories to deal with it, too.
J.G.
If you can get a definition for permanent Bill, surely you can for a
temporary Bill.
H.M.
But no time – if you want tempy protn quickly.
Agreed: don’t extend to offices.
7.
Printers’ Strike.
Att.G.
Believe strike is now settled. I wdn’t therefore prosecute.
Have recd lr. fr. men complaing. tht. I haven’t prosecuted employers.
Shd. like to say tht. chronologically their’s was first offence.
But M/L. have said their initial action was not an offence.
G.A.I.
i) Hope strike will be settled.
ii) My view is tht. a go slow or work to rule is not infringement of
Order 1305. Impracticable, in any event, to apply Order to a
refusal to work overtime.
In this case, however, restrictive practices went so far as to make life
imposs. for employers. And I don’t think their action was a lock-out –
tho’ Att.Genl. does.
Att.G.
Counsel have advised tht. this is a strike w’in meaning of Order.
Concerted action to make employer unable to carry on his work is
tantamount to strike. Ban on overtime wdn’t amount to that.
J.G.
As a matter of social policy, may be awkward tht. go slow be
considered a strike.
P.M.
Moral: Depts. shd. consult L.O.’s more than they have bn. in habit of
doing.
In this case, no prosecution – against workers or employers.
215
2nd November 1950
C.M. 70(50)
1.
Defence.
P.M.
Defer until E.Sh and E.B. available.
H.D.
We are not committed on finance?
P.M.
No.
2.
H.M.
[Enter W.W.
Parliament.
Business for next week.
Business today on Debate on Address.
Controls etc. 7th Nov.
Are we going to take labour control powers?
P.M.
Better say we shan’t include it in Bill. Take those powers, if needed,
in separate Bill.
J.
Can I say so in H/L. today?
A.B.
Next week in H/C. – But better anticipate H/C. debate and take wind
out of sails by saying this in H/L. at once.
Agreed.
P.M.
On Tuesday justify Bill by refce to econ. planning and price control.
{T.C.P. will be one speaker.
{Either H.M. or H.W. the other.
3.
H.G.
Economic Report.
[Enter G.S., N.B., Strang, B.
Coal: will come to Cab. separately, from Prodn Cttee.
Cars: 80% going to export.
Building: big increase over last year – volume because no increase in
costs.
Exports: We are virtually in balance on visible a/c. But due to low
B/P. volume of imports and dropping stocks. Can’t continue that.
Must export b/payments to grow less good.
Exports: the target may be reached.
Pull to exports will be v. powerful. Our problem now will be to cope
with pol. conseqn. at home, shortages etc.
Dollars: substantial inflow: much of it capital movements. Not
speculative, but advance payments etc. on rumour of revaluation.
Our reserves will be v. high at end/year. We shall have to explain by
ref. to level of potential liabilities, not absolute figure.
In 2nd half year surplus will be larger than in 1st – over 100 m. and prs.
200 m. (on foreign balance). Overall not dollar.
Improvemt. mainly with dollar area because higher material prices.
Prices: Terms of trade continue unsatisf. We ought to be getting
higher prices for our exports: diff. to say so publicly. Import prices
rise disturbingly. Talks in W’ton: O.E.E.C. survey will be followed by
pressure fr. there for some action at least by U.S.A.
Cotton: U.S. have banned exports above prescribed level. V. awkward
for others.
Seekg. means of bringing pressure on them.
Wholesale prices are up in consequence. Retail will rise to 116 in
December.
No fear of wild inflationary movement. But must expect 3 or 4 point
rise prs. by mid/1950.
Wages: I expect a round of increases comparable to 1946 around 10/=
a week. Wd. fool people they had an increase in real income – for 6
months or so until prices catch up.
E.R.P. Out-turn of E.P.U. We have bn. running a surplus: part of it
conceded in drawing rights in return for dollars. Germany: large
deficit, prob. due (50%) to excessive stocking of materials, the rest by
purchase of consumer goods. They will prob. introduce import resolns
wh. will produce chain consequences. Must make G. realise they will
get no more credits.
E.R.P. When I was in W’ton they went no further than vague
warnings.
On my return found Bissell had told people in Ldn. tht. they must end
it, because of our reserves. I talked to him. And was agreed we wd.
talk it over.
H.W.
Exports v. satisfy. and likely to improve. No evce tht. re-equipmt. will
interfere for 12 mos. anyway. But balance due largely to small
imports.
Not so optimistic re productivity. In past due mainly to motor cars. If
it is going over to re-equipmt. we shall suffer.
Also growing shortage of materials may cause cut back in prodn.
Wood-pulp already short. Sulphur will be diff. starting to talk to U.S.
but private enterprise there. We face 20% cut.
Wd. hold back our rayon prodn. Jute will be short. Cotton is
monstrous: U.S. have given all domestic needs and then cut everyone
else w’out consultn.
Wool prices likely to rise even further when impact falls of U.S.
demand for uniforms. Inevitable increases in home prices – eg. 20%
on a man’s suit in 12 months’ time. Am circulatg. memo. on clothing
prices.
H.M.
Prices/Wages. Either act or explain or both.
If we cd. put it over tht. things aren’t so bad as they think, might be
right to do so. But a lot of Press propaganda.
217
Table 16 suggests people are buying more things.
Also on international prices. Australian attitude re. wool: U.S. attitude
re cotton. Shdn’t we let people know – and what we are trying to do
about it.
Wages in full emplt. If they rise, they stay high. And export trade will
suffer because prices get too high. Worrying.
Cd. Ministers concerned get together and see what we cd. all say?
H.W.
My speech on Monday gives all facts. Is going to all Labour members.
H.G.
H.G.’s speech today will cover international aspects, and something re
action we are taking.
A.B.
If reserves continue to mount, it means sterling is under-valued.
Action mght. have to be taken.
Our dilemma due to havg. controlled one part of economy while
allowg. rest to run free. E.g. if engineering workers on high wages cd.
buy a car vice clothes you wdn’t get inflation.
Unbalance in economy arises fr. our own action.
Diffies are due to our v. success. People can go outside utility ranges
and buy un-controlled articles – and those prices go higher. Not
enough therefore to base our action on c/living index.
H.G.
I agree tht. this is the psychol. problem. But I shall defend the index.
G.S.
Productivity in engineering will suffer fr. shortage of metals. Zinc
already 25% down: sheet and strip steel: aluminium next year. And, if
we can’t get German scrap, general steel.
G.A.I.
Wages: Ty. expect 10/= a week. Don’t think it will be so much.
Road hauliers’ settlement at 7/6. Engineers ? below 10/=.
Lag in prices (B/T.): I doubt it. I believe prices will catch up quickly.
Current round of increases won’t however satisfy workers unless
c/living rise is prevented. They feel tht. this is overdue on a/c of past
events.
Movement for wage increases is, however, official T.U. and orderly.
T.U.’s now able to take it over fr. unofficial groups.
Want to steer as much of this into Tribunal as poss. Workers’ are
ready to accept their awards.
N.B.
Miners’ wage award. Nearly £4 m. Negotn betw. N.U.M. and N.C.B.
was successful. Bedevilled by Horner’s story tht. miners were owed
money under War Addns Agreemt.: that is in men’s minds.
The award will yield only 3/= or 4/= for some men. Will be discontent
and may be strikes.
I am holding conference with N.C.B. and N.U.M.
218
A.B.
Cause = negotn conducted on capitalist basis. N.C.B. acts just like all
old fashioned employer. They just say “no” – instead of having a plan.
Can’t expect miners to be content with 3/= a week when teachers are to
get 30/=.
Wages policy of N.C.B. shd. be related to economics of industry.
Att.G.
Bd. were told by Govt. to hold wages freeze.
J.G.
1)
2)
Drop in labour force because school leavg. age. At 15 boy
knows better than to go down the pit.
Mechanisation reduces propn of face workers. Cdn’t N.C.B.
link day wage men with increased output productivity – now
tht. they are larger propn of whole force.
N.B.
More recruits in ’50 than in ’49. But we aren’t keeping them in.
This points to incentive scheme.
H.M.
Wait for the facts.
G.T.
General. We are constantly being given a target; and when we reach it
we are told it’s not enough and we get no credit.
Cotton, for example. Prodn increased (at U.S. suggn) and U.S. then cut
raw cotton.
These prodn figures are the best ever: but nothg. but gloom. Let’s
claim the credit for what we have achieved.
219
6th November 1950
C.M. 71(50)
1.
Housing. Debate in H/Commons.
[Enter Att. G.
A.B.
Sub. Cttee on efficiency of bldg. industry. Pp. by M/Works: no
conclusion.
But mistake to suggest in debate today tht. 200,000 figure is sacred.
Want to say tht. if productivity increases we will see wthr. it can be put
up higher.
P.M.
Say we aren’t going to raise false hopes. 200.000 is right now. But if
circs. changed we might do better. Not unalterable.
H.McN.
M/W. has mentioned 15% improvemt. in bldg. and 230.000 houses in
consequence. By programming and incentives.
A.B.
All I want is a little flexibility – mentiong. changes in internatl circs. as
well as domestic.
H.G.
Decision was to fix p’mme at 200.000 for 3 yrs. even at expense of
other p’mmes, in order to secure some stability in housing p’mme.
That alone requires 3% increase of efficiency in bldg.
We have superimposed another 3% in defence work. Means now a 6%
increase in productivity.
Materials shortages also.
Don’t therefore go beyond P.M.’s formula. Not 200.000 “for all time”.
Agreed: formula to be settled by P.M. A.B. and H.G.
2.
E.B.
Germany: Soviet Proposal for Four Power Meeting.
Soviet invitn received Friday. Considered line of reply. Approached
France and U.S. – with a view to delaying reply. Concluded: unwise to
reject offer to discuss.
Have bn. watchg. for change in Soviet tactics, by wh. role of aggressor
wd. be transferred to China and Soviet posed as peace-maker.
Believe that is part of the game.
France and U.S. have bn. thinkg. on similar lines.
U.S. want to be stiff: don’t like my flexible line. W’ton 3001 & 2.
Main diffce: U.S. unwilling to talk save on proof of good behaviour
whereas E.B.’s only condn was a firm agenda. On mtg. of deputies
suggn U.S. fear tht. unless secret it wd. commit us to C.F.M. mtg.
W’ton tel. 3002 gave text of U.S. draft reply.
No reaction yet from France.
U.S. approach in 3002 won’t get us anywhere. Doesn’t call R. bluff.
Merely evades – in masses of words.
Read F.O. telegram. 4899. Stress danger of mtg. with Prague decln
“comme base”. Hence need for clear Agenda. Stress also final para.
U.S. suggest our plan wd. lead to delay. Their’s wd. lead to nothing.
We cd. use mtg. to bring out no. of issues on wh. R. responsible for
delaying settlements eg. Austria, Rumania etc. Don’t want settlements
for sake of settlement: and U.S. seem to. Want to take a stand and be
seen to be doing so.
Ask Cab. to endorse 4899 policy: and let me urge U.S. towards it.
P.M.
U.S. reply most unwise. Plays into R. hands. Endorse E.B.’s views.
H.McN.
Say also to U.S. they aren’t taking suff. a/c of French views. It wd. be
a victory for R. propaganda in France. U.S. aren’t patient enough with
France – as over G. re-armament.
A.B.
Endorse E.B.’s view.
Agreed: support for E.B.
3.
E.B.
Korea: Chinese Intervention.
Have feared this all thro’ (?). Argued with U.S. tht. we were leavg.
China force (by not admittg. to U.N.) to take over R.’s aggressive role
whenever it suited R. But much prejudice from Austr. Govt. and a
little from N.Z. against admn of China to U.N.
Now China, outside U.N., is free to play role suggd by R. I was also v.
much concerned at going far beyond 38th parallel. Didn’t want to go
right to Manchurian frontier. Wd. have preferred to invent a new
strategic line. I didn’t prevail over MacArthur’s over-confidence.
Haven’t learned what passed betwn. him and Truman.
China have bn. contemptuous of Nehru. R. prob. believes Asia will
split anyway and I/Pak will side with West: they have therefore taken
chance on using China now. Alleged Sino – Sov. Treaty: supposed to
be based on Ch. man-power and R. Prodn for a war in F/East.
Our attitude now? I must wait a little longer. U.S. not v. nervous protem. Will keep Cab. informed.
E.B.
Don’t like tone of MacArthur’s statement. Political. Provocative.
P.M.
He will want to bomb Chinese targets. May precipitate a war.
E.B.
Have warned U.S. about that.
H.D.
Danger of increased commitments in F/East.
H.McN.
Can’t dissociate communiqué fr. tomorrow’s elections in U.S. State
Dpt. will prob. recover control after tomorrow.
Hydro-electric installns. We shd. try to meet Ch. over that.
221
E.B.
Tel. 3006 W’ton. Resoln in U.N.
Defer: another Cabinet to discuss if need be.
Tibet.
G.W.
Is this coming up to U.N.?
E.B.
Seeing H. Commr. India today. I have no informn. Hope India may
give me some.
Leavg. it as far as poss. to India.
4.
Korea: Communist Propaganda.
[Enter J.S.
Att.G.
Don’t want to prosecute. But Cab. shd. know because may be a row
over this. Thurtle’s Ques. Treason: too big a hammer. If Korea is to
go on, prs. we shd. introduce the Overseas Operns Bill.
J.
Sedition?
Att.G.
Don’t think so. Discussed with D. and P.P. On any charge other than
treason, issues of truth might arise.
P.M.
Sabotage at R.E.M.E. Aldershot?
J.S.
Rpt. due by noon today. Fair no. of incidents, tho’ investigns on each
occasion discount sabotage.
P.M.
Comms. in R.E.M.E. etc.
J.S.
Yes: because engineers run to Communism.
T.W.
Cd. Att.G. say other legn is under considn?
Att.G.
I shd. like to say so – in reply to Bromley Davenport. /y.
This sort of thing wd. have bn. covered in our Bill.
P.M.
Case for re-considering introdn of that Bill.
A.B.
Other considns too. i) dismissal of Tom Hopkinson for wishing to
publish photos of atrocities in Korea. Only diffce betwn. this pamphlet
and reputable newspp. = intention behind it.
Courts are of doubtful value in this. Guile is better.
P.M.
I’m more concerned with sabotage than propaganda. A clear sabotage
case wd. rally public support.
T.W.
This propaganda (end of pamphlet) used in big mtg. at Darlington with
Moffat speaking. Had a dangerous effect. Wd. like to see powers for
handling it.
222
P.M.
ii) Consider legn again before 20/11.}
i) No prosecn for treason.
} Agreed.
J.G.
Concern re atrocity stories among Labour supporters.
Early statement by E.B. or P.M. wd. be helpful.
E.B.
Must get the facts. Might be true.
E.D. has made a useful statement already.
On legisn: shd. it apply unless H.M. Govt. have formally supported
U.N. action?
Att.G.
That is made clear in our Bill.
E.B.
Must preserve our sovereignty.
L.O.’s.
Att. G.
iii) May I be authorised to tell Bromley Davenport as at y/.
H.M.
Don’t commit us. Cab. have swithered re Bill. Can’t Att.G. say it is
treason, but not worth proceeding.
[Exit Att.G., J.S.
5.
Can’t get collective body i/c our
Anglo-Yemeni Discussions.
Memo. approved.
6.
H.G.
Coal.
[Enter N.B.
Described various memoranda circulated.
Suggest genl. discussion this am. Followed by detailed considn by offl.
committee under Plowden.
P.M.
Discuss short term posn first. Yorkshire winders?
N.B.
Scottish men have gone back. No other strike in sight. Save notice by
winders.
H.McN.
My guess re Lanarkshire was wrong. That strike threat has collapsed.
Exports.
E.B.
Better not to make promises than to make and break them.
Don’t break contracts for 50.000 tons of coal.
N.B.
We were pressed (by Ty.) to put export target too high.
We aren’t only people to be cuttg. coal exports. Germany and Belgium
have done. Poland will. Holland may.
223
E.B.
W. Europe’s re-armament needs will have to be met fr. Poland – who
will let them down in due course. Mistake to drive W. Europe into
relying on such broken reed.
N.B.
V. doubtful if Poland can supply. They and Germany have increased
internal consumptn wh. is eating into their exports.
H.W.
We are exportg. our coal in finished goods – a better thing in long run.
We can’t hope to be big coal exporters again because of man-power
and increased inland consumptn.
We aren’t first to fall down on export promises. Look at our own
diffies in getting our imports fr. others. Don’t therefore be too
apologetic.
Try to get coal off bi-lateral basis – allocation thro’ O.E.E.C. as scarce
commodity.
H.G.
Have proposed to hand it in O.E.E.C. – if E.C.E. aren’t going to do it.
N.B.
Case for continuing this in E.C.E. is that it includes Poland.
H.W.
Greater risk is fuel crisis at home this winter.
E.B.
Cd. we avoid cutting exports to Scandinavia?
H.G.
M/F. and P. thinks he can avoid export licensing. Shdn’t be v. gt.
diffies.
H.M.
Daren’t risk crisis at home. No harm in ratting on our obligns to
Argentine and Eire.
H.D.
Total 17 m. Cdn’t it be re-distributed in favour of Scandinavia.
N.B.
C.P. 256 p.1. Believe we can handle this w’out breakg. agreements
esp. with Scandinavia.
Agreed:
Endorse Prodn Cttee’s decision [subject to
letting Scandinavia down as lightly as poss. –
bearing in mind tht. more oil can be burned
in Argentine.]
[
] was not v. firm decision.
Import of Coal.
N.B.
Prodn has turned down again. If this trend continues, danger of winter
fuel crisis will be greater.
Hence proposals in un-numbered memo. of 6/11.
Imports. Unless we buy now, we shan’t get it. N.C.B. expect they can
get ½ - ¾ m. tons, mainly in U.S. at cost of 6-8 m. dollars.
Extreme secrecy because of price.
224
Wd. sell here at current price – at loss of £1½ m.
H.W.
Political disaster to import coal. Prodn Cttee shd. consider other
possibilities first. E.g. double-bunkering, Service Dpt. stocks etc.
H.G.
Agree. Consider it urgently – thro’ Plowden’s Cttee. And let report be
made to Cab. on Thursday.
Cttee must, as 1st job, consider this and lay plans for the winter.
A.B.
Progressive decline in European output of coal. Reason: men won’t
get down mines unless they have to. Let’s have a report from C.O. on
coal developmt. in Africa, where socialist revoln has not yet dawned.
P.M.
Can’t face imports from U.S., while we continue to export to Canada
and Argentine.
J.G.
Better increase double-bunkering.
C.E.
Is there pol. influence in mining wh. keeps us always just a bit short?
Are the Communists not to blame?
T.W.
They aren’t the only influence at work. Suffering now for pre-war
sufferings of mining community.
P.M.
No imports. Go ahead with other measures.
Useful to have official Committee, as proposed.
H.W.
Let African suggn be considered too.
J.G.
C.O. and C.R.O. cd. submit memo. on that – not limited to Africa.
H.G.
{Offl. Cttee
{
a) This winter. Quick rept. for Ministers.
if decns needed.
b) Next year.
c) Long term.
225
13th November 1950
C.M. 73(50)
1.
Spain.
[Enter Att.G. and Dugdale
E.B.
[U.S. Amb. called re contribn to rehabilitation. We ????]
E.B.
P.Q.’s for answer. P.M. decided we shdn’t hurry. Awkward if I’m
asked for a date and can’t say. May seem to hedge. Say we shall send
when agreement secured.
P.M.
Not worth messing about.
H.McN.
Comm. Govts.?
E.B.
Pressing me to take it up. Want Amb. sent.
P.M.
Discussed at Colombo. genl. agreement tht. we shd. follow U.N.
G.W.
Inform Doms. – if possible in advance.
2.
Sheffield Peace Congress.
P.M.
Criticism because of our line of action is arbitrary. eg Manchr.
Guardian.
What is our answer?
C.E.
P.N. Ques. Blackburn today. I shall answer. Shall have precise terms
of Ques. later.
G.W.
Follow Times leader.
[Enter C.O.S.
3.
E.B.
Korea: (a) Chinese Intervention.
We tried to pursue policy wh. wd. avoid Ch. interventn.
Now comg. up in Sec. Council. We have voted to hear Ch. Govt. – on
both ques. on interventn, they have declined to attend “to discuss
MacA.’s report” because apparently he is appointee of U.N. (illegal
etc). So that ques. is being discussed. May be another line-up, v.
China for resistg. U.N. decision. Don’t yet know.
Hutchinson has recd unconfirmed rpt. tht. R. troops are passing thro’
Tsientsin. Trying to get confirmn. If U.S. bomb Manchuria v. serious
posn may arise.
India has lost influence over this because ignored by China.
Looks like a big tussle – in Korea and in U.N.
C.A.S.
Chinese in gt. strength in M’churia. In Korea, elements of 5 Armies
identified. U.S. think 35.000. R-type fighters in large nos.
Not v. effective – may therefore be flown by Ch. or Koreans.
Risk tht. U.N. overwhelming air power may be off set.
If Ch. took a v. serious offensive, U.N. forces shd. have reasonable
chance of holdg. it – mainly because of air power.
Complete clearance of all Korea and establmt of U.N. regime is not
now practicable w’out risk of major war. Lasting commitmt Ques: how
reduce it and prevent major war. Doubtful if we cd. reach or hold
frontier w’out attackg. targets in M’churia. To hold it, 450 miles line
in mountainous country. Alternative line across neck only 100/150
miles. Mil. threat wd. be same wthr. on frontier or other line –
guerrilla opns. Gt. disadv. of crossing 38th was always loss of air
weapon unless ready to bomb w’in M’churia. Want buffer area this
side of frontier. Ch. prob. playing R. game of involvg. us in lastg.
commitmt. Tho’ a genuine defensive element in their policy.
Recommend therefore U.N. stand fast on alternative line. Declare area
to N. de militarised – but bomb it if used by Ch/N. Korean forces.
Case fire on that line pendg. discn in U.N. And m’while clear up
guerrilla opns to the south.
Strategically Korea is unimportant and we want to disengage as
quickly as we can.
Alternative line – around 40th, about 120 miles n. of 38th.
Wd. cover most of importce in Korea save power stations. And it wd.
be militarily unwise to go for those.
E.B.
This brings in Relief – on wh. we have bn. talkg. to U.S. Amb.
I believe R. is switchg. aggressive role to Chinese. Want in U.N. to
take a line makg. it clear we aren’t threatening China. This will put us
right with Asian opinion. Don’t want it to appear tht. mil. necessity is
carrying us on Imperialist road.
Don’t want U.S. to go for 100% of Korea. State Dpt. are sound on
this. But are U.S. military?
C.A.S.
We don’t know and are nervous.
E.B.
Cab. decn on “buffer” policy wd. help, if put to U.S. and our friends in
U.N. Shd. like to make our posn clear at once.
Coupled with relief. U.S. want bigger contn from us, as evce of our
goodwill.
On U.N. proportions M. shd. give £5 m. U.S. suggest we give £12 m.
We shall have to spend on troops or relief. Combine [cost of] C.O.S.
“buffer” policy and instruct Younger in U.N. to negotiate relief budget
with thght in mind tht. we might go above £5 m. if we saw chance of
earlier cease fire thereby. This wd. make it easier to get a clear U.S.
directive to stop MacA. fr. embarkg. on dangerous adventures.
A.B.
How wd. no man’s land be administered? Wd. China be assocd with
it?
227
E.B.
Don’t know yet.
P.M.
Endorse this general line.
{We must continue to save U.S. fr. themselves.
{A way to save both U.S. and Chinese faces.
{Money for relief rather than troops.
Att.G.
No legal issues arise.
Ch. action no more illegal than U.S. over Formosa.
On legal basis, cd. we do a deal by wh. U.S. yields over Formosa and
Ch. over Korea?
E.B.
Policy will be settled in next 24 hrs. in U.N. Want to put across a
complete scheme at once: and get U.S. and Canada to sponsor it.
E.Sh.
Need to know wthr. U.S. wd. support this line.
Latest tel. fr. Tedder is reassuring. U.S. mil authies don’t want to get
embroiled any further.
F.O. telegram to Pekin re evacuation of B. nationals. Mght this not
give impression tht. we mean to cause serious trouble?
E.B.
Diff. choice. Suppose I leave them there and things go wrong. Apart
fr. criticisms, what cd. our Forces do then to help? Wd. reduce their
efficiency. Not fair to B. authies there to take this risk. Doubt if it wd.
influence Ch. policy decisions.
A.B.
Endorse E.B.’s general line. Wd. like to add one more thing. Convey
to Chinese tht. alternative line is not chosen on mil. grounds alone –
lest they feel reculer pour mieux sauter. Cd. we accompany it by
statemt. tht. we are doing our best to assuage reasonable Ch. fears?
They must be basing their policy on U.S. Press and MacArthur –
neither of wh. is at all reassuring. Also get Indians to vouch for our
sincerity. And, as soon as poss., associate Ch. with adminn of buffer
area.
H.M.
Last suggn mght provoke revival of Ch. Comm. infiltration fr. over a
line.
Endorse E.B.’s policy.
Cost of relief – mainly because of damage done by U.N. Forces. Was
more damage done that was strictly necessary?
P.M.
Rope Doms. into support of this policy.
G.W.
Don’t rely on India to influence China.
No man’s land shd. not include any part of Manchuria, as State Dpt.
appear to contemplate.
Agreed.
(b) Relief Costs.
H.G.
Recalled proposal in memo. U.K. max. contn of £10 m.
228
U.S. Amb. urged us not to be limited by our U.N. propn. Said U.S. wd.
accept 65% of cost.
We took line tht. didn’t want to commit ourselves because didn’t know
total figure and didn’t feel other U.N. countries had done enough.
His suggn wd. mean U.S./U.K. wd. carry 83%.
We therefore proposed negotns in U.N. and expd sympathy.
If we can get general policy endorsed, I wdn’t object to another £2 m.
Recommend Younger be given discretion to go to £12 m; but others
must cash in and we mustn’t increase our contn to same propn as U.S.
H.M.
Cost of mil. opns isn’t spread among all U.N.
H.G.
That’s why we are pressing for fin. contn from them.
E.B.
Let M/D. F.O. and Ty. agree a single telegram for despatch to W’ton
as well as N. Yk. Tedder too.
C.R.O. to be assocd so as to inform Doms. early.
c) Formosa.
P.M.
Coming up in N. Yk. this week. Can we settle our line?
E.B.
Not ready.
H.D.
Chinese will be there for that – contact with them.
P.M.
Do U.S. C.O.S. endorse MacA.’s views on strategic importce of
Formosa?
C.A.S.
More than we do. Not for themselves – in enemy hands they think it
wd. be embarrassg. But not worth a war with China.
E.B.
Will submit memo. on Formosa.
4.
[Exit C.O.S., Att.G.
Dugdale.
Germany: Soviet Proposal for 4-Power Meeting.
H.M.
Statement tomorrow vice today. Because of Strasbourg debate.
E.Sh.
Don’t delay. U.S. and France have stated policy.
Agreed: Make it today.
A.
E.B.
Is reference to Prague communiqué a bit too bald? } *
}
Will re-consider.
}
A.B.
But our main point is tht. we won’t talk on basis of a R. agenda.
229
Does this text bring it out as clearly as poss.? Last para. but two. Cd.
it not be more forthcoming? *
H.M.
When fuller reply is made, take a/c of this. Up to now R. has made
running on propaganda. Here is a chance to evolve a big 3 Power
statement on world situation – who is responsible for world’s anxieties
(incldg. R. peasants). List out diffies wh. have arisen, show it’s not our
fault and conclude it’s time we stopped. A peace offensive of our own.
Don’t miss this chance of it. Rally world opinion, not for bitterness,
but for real peace.
If that were contemplated, it mght. have some effect on wording of
this.
P.M.
Somethg. after para. 1. H.M.G. want take every chance of settlemt.
and are considg. with other 2 Govts. But ……. Agreed.
E.Sh.
Third para. Wise to make so much of quasi-mil. organn.
*
Conflictg. reports re strength and nature of it.
Apart fr. that, shd. we not base ourselves on more genl. grounds?
E.B.
In reply to H.M. my aim is a mtg. of deputies – to avoid Ministers
being delayed over settling agenda.
H.M.
Announcemt. of an agenda won’t meet my point.
E.B.
I will consider – and have a word with H.M.
A.B.
“Too narrow and unambitious a basis for discn ” at foot of p. 2?
H.W.
They will add to it. Don’t want that as “basis”.
H.G.
Must also make this reply accord with that of U.S. and France.
E.B.
Want to lead up to U.N. if C.F.M. fails.
P.M.
Ques. of order. Cdn’t x/ come before refusal in 3rd paragraph. *
2. (Cont’d) Sheffield Peace Congress.
C.E.
Read text of P.Q. and draft reply.
230
16th November, 1950
C.M. 74 (50)
1.
P.M.
Parliament.
Business for next week.
2.
Korea.
E.Sh.
Promised to make statement to-day.
Statement is too long, as drafted. But must go ahead with it.
P.M.
Add apprecn of behaviour of troops.
E.B.
Winter comforts – send them before a scram arises.
E.Sh.
Am looking into this.
A.B.
Diff. treatment of natl units in a U.N. operation. Pay, comforts etc.
Are we going for uniformity in future?
P.M.
Let M/D. look into this – tho’ v. difficult.
E.Sh.
N.S. men on lower ratio in Korea – am worried about that.
E.B.
All these ques. shd. be looked into – as this may be a long campaign.
Cd. M/D., H.G. & Service Ministers consider & submit memo.
3.
E.B.
Import of Turkeys.
[Exit W.W.
Tried to see wtr. ban cd. be lifted.
B. subject (Saunders) sentenced to 13 yrs’ impt.: sanctions applied:
fatal to our prestige to lift them for sake of a little Xmas food.
Firm attitude eg Sheffield Congress is essential. Can’t show any
weakness.
H.M.
Don’t agree. Parly. Party won’t understand. People are unhappy:
need cheering up. Turkeys at Xmas = ancient institution.
Will be politically diff. for Govt.
H.W.
E.P.C. discn on grain from E. Europe: I suggested collective
discn by Ministers – we never expected boy-cott to go on so long.
Have since had the mtg. with E.B. & I now support continuance
of boycott – necessary to secure reasonable commercial relations.
But cd. we not make exception for turkeys – only about £2m as
cpd. normal £13m of trade.
E.B. must judge political effects. Econ. effects of boycott cd. be
secured even with this exception.
E.B.
Make concession to turkey trade & other trade will press for same
concessions e.g. tomato puree, pickles, jam etc.
Also effect (of showing weakness) on our boycott on Argentine.
H.W.
We can resist pressure fr. other trades.
x| Blockade can’t be 100% because R. can supply her with essential
sterling. But it has made things awkward for her: & wd. in end
force concession over Saunders.
Att.G.
Long-term value of these methods is doubtful cf. recall of
Ambassadors.
Support x|.
Can’t spend dollars on Canadian turkeys because effect on Doms.
H.McN.
Price will be too high for people – unless 2.000 t. cd. be found from
Canada & Hungary to bring price down. H. supplies alone won’t
suffice to do that. So discn is academic.
H.W.
But we don’t know what supplies we can get from Hungary.
A.B.
y| Are we able to use trade as instrument of f. policy?
E.B.
Ready to re-consider with Ministers. But we must be ready to stand
behind our servants – as behind a victimised man in T. U.
P.M.
That’s all right if it’s effective. Any indications that it will be?
E.B.
Looked hopeful a few weeks ago. Seemed we might bring it off v.
soon.
P.M.
Inclined to support y|. We are economically too vulnerable.
H.W.
F.O. have never asked us to do it. In Hungary we are doing this to
support an economic repve. It is in the trade context.
E.Sh.
Traditional policy of U.K. is to protect our national repves. Send a
cruiser. Are we not to chuck our hands in for sake of Xmas
turkeys.
G.A.I.
Shall we break prices by importing these? Hungary will ask a stiff
price in these circs. Support E.B. Anyway, these turkeys won’t
go into working class homes.
Balance of opinion – in support of E.B.
E.B.
H.W.
But I’m still willing to consider with H.G. & H.W. wtr. any means can
be improvised of increasg. supplies of turkeys for Xmas.
Includg. apprecn of effectiveness of blockade.
E.B.
And use of economic sanctions generally.
232
2.
E.Sh.
(contd) Korea.
Another 2 pp. must go.
Agreed: condense.
Supplementaries. Future operations. May be asked if we intend to
advance further. Say: so far as requd to achieve U.N. objective
& want early terminn of hostilities.
Signal from Bouchier re bombing over M’churian frontier.
P.M.
Say: not for me to answer f. policy aspects. Fob them off.
4.
Defence: Finance.
H.G. & E.Sh. [Not heard]
E.Sh.
Only broad outline of a plan wh. remains flexible in detail.
P.M.
All finance is open. Depends what others do. No final decision is
possible.
E.Sh.
In W’ton I made it clear tht. our £3.600 p’mme was dependent on other
factors.
H.W.
Our officials are handling this well – M.A.C. & Nitze etc.
Important tht. we fight hard for method of sharing burden wh. will be
favourable to us. E.g. % age of national income wdn’t take sufft.
a/c of our efforts since 1938.
In this fluid condn, risk is tht. size of M. Term Plan will crystallise first.
Recognise 3-stage method., works in U.K.; but will it work in reln to
Pentagon? Will N.A.TO. 3rd stage deal as firmly with mil.
estimates as Cab. does with C.O.S.? Mayn’t U.S. say this is
minimum to save world from aggression? Even £5.000 M wd. be
physically more than U.K. economy cd. stand.
A.B.
We must also avoid situation in wh. U.S. helps us to afford what
N.A.T.O. thinks is necessary for defence. Politically
unacceptable.
P.M.
We can do it 12-power sharing common burden. If it’s too much, cut it
down. We can’t have U.S. contribn to our national defence.
E.Sh.
We must use this as means of forcing larger U.S. contribn of troops.
And Canadian contribn of munitions and air-crew training.
H.G.
Ty. offls. in Nitze talks are urging tht. basis be £3.600 & corresp. W.
Eur. figures vice Mid-Term Def. Plan.
233
G.W.
i) Our commitments outside N.A.T.O. Are they covered in
Nitze?
ii) Para. 3 (5) of Ann. I. A financial contn by Doms. wd. be
unacceptable especially while Doms. are outside N.A.T.O.
H.G.
On i), we have made our posn plain – para 16.
See p. 11: para 6 of Annex II for our view.
On ii), more diff. ques. arise. U.S. 3 (5) is because profits made by
r.s.a. countries: this is their come-back, Gone no further yet.
E.Sh.
Premature to try to associate Doms. with N.A.T.O.
P.M.
Cab. will endorse recommn of Def. Cttee. & others in para. 30.
[Enter N.B., B.
5.
N.B.
Coal.
Causes:
i)
Increased consumption.
ii)
o.n.s. increase is less than was assumed.
Plowden Cttee’s recommns
a) lighting: diff. before Xmas.
b) Coke control: I am considering.
c) bunkers: 300.000 t. is maximum
(M/T. & I agree)
This brings us to imports. Diff., I know: but lesser evil than fuel
crisis. 4 years ago Tories attacked us for not importg. before
crisis of 46/47.
Further cut in exports. At present, I believe this wd. be unwise –
recriminations, appeals to O.E.E.C., loss of imports. Tho’ we
shd. have to face it if we can’t get 1 m. imports. Cttee & ONC
shd. consider implications if we have to do it.
P.M.
Sudden change. Thought cut in exports was said to suffice.
N.B.
Warned Cab. last time – incldg. refce to imports.
H.G.
I have always bn. reluctant to import. Prodn Cttee were warned by M/F
& P. I have now come to concln tht. we must import.
If gap of 1 m. I wd. have taken a risk. Stock figures for
end/winter are larger than we planned for: bunkers: exports –
we cd. have taken a chance. But look at prodn trend. It is too
big a risk. If we do import, quantity doesn’t make much
difference. So, if we do import, let’s get enough to cover our
risks.
Support appln for 1 m. tons of imports.
Para 10 (2): on lighting. Politically as damaging as imports. And if
we import enough we cd. avoid this economy. May have to do it
later: don’t do it now.
234
Long term.
i)
ii)
prodn drops is due to overall man-power shortage. v.
dangerous phase. Must have big drive on manpower – with drastic decisions.
review open-cast p’mme.
J.G.
Inescapable concln on facts stated.
V. disturbing. Prodn curve seems to be turning down. When all
natural pull is for increased effort – Nov., when Xmas earnings
are incentive. Hope discns with both sides of industry will be
initiated.
Man-power. We have made mining areas so much more diversified
tht. coal has to compete in order to get & hold its men.
Here also, inducements. Wages won’t do. Try pensions.
After enquiries into 2 recent disasters are complete, M/F & P. must
make it clear tht. confidence can be placed in our takg. quick &
effective remedial action.
N.B.
Output does drop after a disaster.
But long-term remedies are also needed.
Pensions is best bet.
H.W.
On para. 2 figures, imports are necessary. Cd. we decide in principle
to import; but suspend action for a week & see how the figures
go. There was a drop like this in Nov ’43 and curve went up
gain. Let Ministers immed. concerned have discretion to
implement as soon as figures are seen.
Cd. we avoid it by buying coal abroad for Europe & keeping our
exports here.
B.
Bunkers. If situatn is serious enough to warrant imports, I am willing
to save 300.000 t. on bunkers. Unwilling to go further to the
450.000 mark. because that wd. involve v. awkw. consequentials
– controls etc., wh. wd. upset shipping interests.
G.T.
Must we assume tht. our miners won’t give us coal we need. If they
knew how serious posn was, surely they wd. put on a spurt. Cd.
we not discuss ques. with them – how much overtime is worked
etc.
T.W.
Time-factor makes that v. difficult.
Imports inevitable now. But match this with positive action to improve
man-power posn.
Disasters do depress output.
A.B.
Support G.T. Danger we shall incur pol. disadvantages w’out getting
the easement. Shall we get the coal? It’s short in U.S. now.
Can’t we find out if it is available before Cab. asked to decide.
Cdn’t. we get over tempy problem by appeal?
Also greater economy in consumption – by appeals.
235
P.M.
Is there any coal?
N.B. & H.W. Little doubt we cd. get some.
P.M.
Distribn of stocks?
N.B.
We are short on targets. End/year target at 14m. can’t be reached with
this dropping output. This is well-distributed.
B.
We cd. distribute imports – with some diffy.
E.Sh.
Importing coal = political suicide. After 5 yrs. of natn. Any other
remedy shd. be sought first.
Why has man-power dropped. Because we gave them a stimulus. (5
day week). They haven’t had another recently. All they have
had is a stupid arbitn award.
Suppl. pensions. No attraction to new entrants.
J.G.
Prevents wastage.
E.Sh.
Shd. analyse stocks & get miners together.
There is sabotage at work.
Wd. prefer to cut exports than bring in coal.
H.W.
Distribn of stocks. Do M/F & P. still keep track of stock figures of all
consumers?
E.B.
Buy coal in U.S. & hold it, w’out shipping. Then send it where needed
to fill our exports.
Buy in Rhodesia too, if you can.
A.B.
Plowden’s Cttee shd. be a Ministerial Cttee. These aren’t technical
ques.
H.M.
Decide this a.m. Can’t take these risks. Do it E.B’s way.
We prob. shd. see miners.
Careful public statement. P.r. work etc.
P.M.
Ques: how you do it. Put it across as for bunkers, Argentine etc., and
don’t publicise it.
H.G.
Can’t be kept quiet. Mght. wait a week or so. N.C.B. wd. have to be
asked.
A.B.
Get the leaders to Ldn. & offer them pensions & more wages.
To get in before Comms. do. …
Adjourned.
236
6. Leasehold Reform
Memo. approved.
237
20th November, 1950
C.M. 76 (50)
1.
J.G.
P.M.
East Africa.
Unrest in multi-racial communities. Due to
a. S. African Govt,
b. assocn with them of white settlers
c. constitl evolution in W. Africa.
Various suggns for handling it on E. African basis. That wdn’t do
unless Govt. had plan.
Prefer therefore to proceed by territories separately. Have taken diffr.
steps in diff. colonies.
Hence proposed statement.
Para. 2 (iv) of crucial importance. Can’t have S. Rhodesia as model.
We must retain ultimate control until a community is wholly fit
for self-government.
Countries in group are v. different. e.g. Kenya & Uganda. Is it right,
even in statement, to deal with all as tho’ one.
x| Wrong to separate one element of under-developed area problem.
Wrong to include “appeal” (para. 2. (v)) in a statement of principles.
Doubt if para. 2(v) shd. be included.
J.G.
Para. 2(i) meets x|.
E.Sh.
Beginning of 2 (iii). “We have assisted in … development & propose
to do so.” Present text treats them too much as children. Prefer
to stress economic than paternal note.
A.B.
Aim? To pacify white or native elements? Parts of this will excite
native feeling vice pacifying it. Para. 2(iii) – omit [].
In 2 (iv) is [] necessary?
J.G.
Yes: I think it is.
A.B.
But provocation to native elements.
Also “developing” vice “allowing” in 2 (iv).
G.W.
Doubt expediency of announcg. now statement of principles containg.
nothg. new.
Shdn’t we first look at policy twds. Africa as a whole. S. Rhodesia &
risk of driving her into S. African arms.
In inter-racial society “African” shd. cover all: shd. find another name
for nations.
J.G.
What other term? – which wdn’t be even more difficult.
J.
Is it necessary to make any statement.
238
A.
Sympathise with C.O. – subject to changes of working, & omission of
2 (iv). Healthy fr. pt. of view of Europ. settlers – and corrective
to influences occasioned by over-rapid developmt. in W. Africa.
E.B.
Events are moving fast. Africa may become cock-pit in U.N.
Decision re Indians may have repercussions.
Cd. we adjourn this for a week & see it in larger African setting.
J.G.
Committed to make a statement at some time. But cd. be p’poned for a
little while.
P.M.
Trying to deal with no. of places in one statement may trip you up.
Kenya was launched as white man’s settlement. Uganda never
was.
Evades ques. what sort of constitnl advance is suited to their
condns – implies Parly system is right for all.
J.G.
Kenya will press for constitution like that of S. Rhodesia.
We shall have to insist on multi-racial solutions. Important to make
that clear soon.
G.W.
Need for review of our policy. Reactions on other parts of Africa,
including other Colonial Powers. ? Cabinet Committee.
Agreed: Comm. Affairs Cttee to consider.
2.
Coal
[Enter N.B.
N.B.
N.C.B. want statement made to-day. They can’t begin to charter ships
until it’s made.
H.G.
Nothg. in draft re productions. Will be supplementaries on that. Better
to include para. in original draft.
Approved draft of statement, subject to amendments suggested.
Statement to be made to-day. N.C.B. & N.U.M. to receive
advance copies.
[Exit N.B.
3.
E.B.
Egypt.
Submitted draft of answer to various P.Q.’s.
Seeing Ambassador to-day. Will see Foreign Minister en route from
U.N.
Eg. Govt. wd. like to be included in N.A.T.O. Can’t do that. May be
advantage in discussing length of duration of Treaty: & get
some other States into it collectively, getting away from bilateral Anglo-Eg. pact. Doubt also if solution will be found on
239
basis of defence alone – prs. finance, trade etc., cd. be roped in:
for M/East as a whole. Arab/Jew rift has h’to prevented this.
Development of Uganda & Lake Tana will alter aspect of Egypt &
Sudan.
Problem: to keep people steady pending these developmts.
E.Sh.
Can’t get on with my M/E. plans until Treaty problem is solved.
V. urgent fr. my angle.
H.G.
Foreign Minister comg. next week to discuss sterling balances. Have
we still to be v. tender because f. policy & defence?
E.B.
I suggest I meet with H.G. & E.Sh. to discuss this – in light of this
weeks’ discn in U.N. re Libya. If that went well, our posn wd.
be easier.
Draft answer approved.
Sudan. If passed, shall put emphasis on developmt. to self-Govt. rather
than negative stand on condominium.
4.
P.M.
Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.
All P.M.’s have accepted save Malan.
Will announce on Wed. next. Both Houses.
[Enter Att. Genl.
5.
E.B.
Korea.
70.000 Chinese, acc. to latest element. And bad weather.
U.N. resolution – settg. out our objectives. To allay worst Chinese
fears.
Sounded U.S. on demilitarised area s. of M’churian frontier.
Tried for series of proposals.
Adminn of area. Thought for U.N. alone – w’out Chinese.
Fr. supported: U.S. didn’t discourage: India & Canada encouraging.
Was already resoln before Council. Shd. that be w’drawn?
Feared it wd. re-open everything. So going on with existg. resoln
(?)
Chinese delegn due to arrive.
Thgt. it wise m’while to make U.K. attitude plain to China directly.
Localise war: just settlement, early: united Korea.
Wanted at least to have tried. Instructed Hutchinson accordingly.
Informed Fr., U.S. & Doms. Most welcome our demarche – tho’
we haven’t yet had reply fr. India. Don’t think U.S. will oppose.
Aim of policy: to prevent hostilities going over into M’Churia. & thus
outbreak of serious war.
240
6.
Formosa.
Approved.
7.
Overseas Operations Bill.
[Enter B. & Wheatley
H.M.
As in memo.
E.Sh.
Does Bill cover deploymt. in prepn for opns,
B.
Omit provision re requisitioning of ships.
a) inappropriate to this Bill.
b) throws doubt on other powers.
Agreed.
Att. G.
Cl. 9 (3) meets E.Sh. point.
J.
Publicity clause: cd. we omit “with intent”?
Att. G.
That wd. be more extreme than D. Reg.
Wh.
2nd alternative was likely to meet civil liberties groups.
If “interest” remains, accused can still plead tht. he was drawg. public
attentn to truth with intent to get their opinion to change.
First formula won’t therefore evade diffy stated in memo.
Att.G
But he wd. have more diffy. than if truth were sufft defence.
G.W.
Expression of opinion shd. not be impeded. I prefer 2nd alternative.
Comm. pamphlet was not, in my view, improper publicy.
Violently expressed, but not improper expn of view.
A.B.
Danger in suppressing free expression of opinion.
P.M.
Doubtful if clause will be any use.
Att.G.
Thurtle’s P.Q. for to-day. Either treason or nothing. And I can’t say
it’s nothing.
Wh.
2nd alternative wd. be more acceptable to Parliament.
P.M.
What about Ll.G. in Boer war? Aren’t we getting rather too sensitive?
We shall be exposed to attack in Parlt. by Liberal traditions – on
ground tht. we are inconsistent with our own past.
H.M.
P.M.
W’out this clause, not worth going on with Bill at all.
Cab. asked for this Bill. We didn’t bring it up.
I wanted Bill for sabotage.
Att.G.
Was never necessary for sabotage.
241
Korean situation has deteriorated & propaganda about it has increased.
C.E.
We shd. have to consult Opposition before going on – as well as
T.U.C.
Not worth going on, unless cl. 2 is out of court.
P.M.
Att. Genl’s diffy. wd. be greater if new legn were passed.
Agreed: P’pone introduction of the Bill.
H.G.
Law isn’t satisfactory. Shd. we not review it?
[Exit B.
E.B.
Shd. we not consider legal effects or powers to ques. effect to U.N.
decns.
Agreed: Att.G. cd. say law of treason is under considn.
8.
Mr. MacManaway.
Memo. approved.
9.
P.M.
Rent Restrictions.
Took note.
We shd. stall, merely, in discns on Leasehold.
10.
Pensions for Judge’s Widows.
Att.G.
Sc. Judges object to this – as worsening posn of future appointees.
J.
Actuarially, this wd. benefit them.
Let us say tht., if they really want to be taken out of Bill, they can.
Scots & Irish.
Wh.
Shd. their attitude be allowed to prejudice posn of future Judges.
P.M.
Have you consulted Scottish Bar?
Wh.
No.
H.M.
Cd. individuals have right of option.
Wh.
Promise to consider in Cttee stage: & take soundings m’while.
Att.G
Is it certain tht. County Court Judges are in favour?
J.
As far as it goes. Tho’ they want more salary.
242
23rd November, 1950
C.M. 77 (50)
1.
Coal.
[Enter W.W., R.R.S.
P.M.
Shortage of coke. Stop exports (ex-contract): & industrial consumers
back to last winter’s level. 95% of previous. Avoids rationing.
H.W.
Diffy. with Sweden: talks starting: 50% of coal & no coke – means
corresp. redn in their supplies to us, esp. timber & wood pulp.
2.
Parliament.
H.M.
Business for next week.
F. Affairs debate. E.B. to open. P.M. to reply on 2nd day.
P.M.
Govt. made survey recently: prs. Opposn cd. start.
H.M.
Doubt if Govt. supporters wd. like that.
Agreed: E.B. to open.
E. Davies to intervene in reply to smaller points,
before P.M. replies.
3.
Supply of Arms to Egypt.
H.M.
Trouble in H/C. Offered debate, in response to pressure from our
supporters.
Opposn have [now] tabled a Motion: this will now be called, I
presume.
W.W.
Opposn claim tht. we have made more concessions to our side than to
them. Suggest statement at end of Ques. to-day to clarify
situation.
E.Sh.
Formula put in P.Q.’s. was acceptable to Opposn & to House.
And, if we are asked about debate, refer to what E.D. said in
adjournment debate.
In M/E. 2 Cent. Mark II. 60 Cent Mark III. 6s Comets and 108
Cromwells. Yet we are selling Cent. Mark III to Egypt. It’s
awkward debating point.
P.M.
Orders date back to earlier period when a certain amount of export
sales was necessary to keep our capacity in being.
A.B.
No one quarrels with that. But C.O.S. now say we haven’t enough for
our own purposes. And ques. we will be asked is: why send our
most up-to-date arms to unfriendly country?
243
E.B.
Not unfriendly: under oblign to train & equip them.
If Treaty is denounced, that oblign will disappear. But at present it still
applies: & not clear tht. it’s to our disadvantage to m’tain the
Treaty obligns.
A.B.
For 5 yrs. Eg. has bn. hostile. Tankers thro’ Canal. No memo. yet on
that. Shown in Palestine they are unfit to fight: yet we arm them
with modern weapons.
E.B.
Does M/H. wish to denounce the Treaty. Let him put in a memo. if he
does. And let’s see where we stand. Does he want us to come
out of Canal Zone?
E.Sh.
Equipmt. of our troops in M/E. is up to peace establishmt.
Jet aircraft wd. have to go into reserve, for lack of crews: & case for
selling them to friendly countries.
A.B.
Why haven’t F.O. put in their memo. on tankers thro’ Canal.
P.M.
That is a secondary issue. And before Security Council.
P.M.
Shd. have a memo. & full discussion on M/East.
E.Sh.
No need for it. I’m ready to stand by Def. Cttee decision. E.B.’s line
of yesterday will do.
Stand up to our own supporters: & don’t be kicked around by
them. This storm is not of importance.
E.Sh.
A certain quantity of modern equipmt. is insisted upon for training.
E.B.
And we never carried out our oblign to train Eg. Army.
Nor did we make it efficient country. Only money - & that all
went to Pashas.
Agreed: Leave it as it stands. No memo.
4.
Catering Wages Act.
A.
Expect trouble in H/L.
G.A.I.
We have a good case. Employers are trying to smash Act wholly, for
pol. reasons.
H.McN.
If separate organn can be offered for Scotland, opposn will be smashed.
E.B.
Labour Party machine shd. be turned on to spread publicity in favour
of this system – which, adjusted, is v. beneficial.
244
H.M.
Not only Tories. T. Johnston also is worried about effect of Act. –
others too.
[Exit R.R.S.
Adjustment is going v. slowly. And Festival approaches.
5.
Government Industrials: Annual Leave.
[Exit W.W.
[Enter P.M.G., G.S., H.
H.G.
Arguments in favour are clear.
Against: cost, but mainly repercussions on other industries.
On balance, (tho’ disappointmt. & prob. arbitn) I favour rectn.
P.M.
Output rather than money?
H.G.
Not much – because take 2nd week.
Repercussions in other indies – more ques. of output than cost.
T.W.
V. diff. moment to do it. Wd. make it imposs. to w’hold it from miners
– at cost of 4M. tons p.a.
G.S.
Wd. have some effect on output. Steel: old claim wd. be revived &
granted. – etc. V. unfortunate.
H.
Ditto. Reaction in ship-repairing & buildg.
Bring out amount of paid sick-leave which is taken. Consider that
before concedg. more hols. 9 days public hols. in addn to the
week.
N.E.
Ditto. 75.000 wd. be immediately covered. 120.000 others wd. claim
it.
We shd. have to recruit another 3.000. We wd. resist this.
G.A.I.
Ques. of principle. govt. is followg. industry, not leading it – on condn
of emplt. Don’t use arguments suggd by Ch/Exch.
Continue to justify Govt. practice on basis tht. we will follow good
employers – and they haven’t done this yet.
J.G.
How get round R.S.C.P. promise in para. 3?
Better prs. to give this in return for revocn of sick pay scheme.
T.W.
Wdn’t save us on repercussions.
E.B.
I’m opposed to principle of denying to one what you can’t yet afford
for all. Esp. as I have always used condns of one section to secure
the same for others. Why give so much more leave to clerical
workers etc. than to workmen.
Workers won’t be content with one week’s holiday.
Sometime we must change this: tho’ this may not be the moment for it.
Labour Party used to claim tht. Govt. shd. be best employer.
245
Can’t we hold an enquiry?
A.B.
Can’t restrict it to Govt. employees. Wd. have to direct Boards to do
same for socialised industries.
We must face discrimination betwn. industries.
P.M.
{ Say this can’t be conceded pro-tem.
{ We must have more informn re repercussions
{ Also consider swop with sick pay scheme.
Ty. & Ministers concerned.
[Exit N.E. and G.S.
[Enter 2 L.O.’s.
6.
Naval Courts Martial.
H.
As in memo.
Pilcher’s last report is now in & will be considered.
A.
Won’t they ask what our intentions are – on the report.
J.
They may. But, in principle, report on a non-secret ques. wh. is of
interest to public shd. not be with-held. Publish.
And answer ques. when it comes to legn.
E.Sh.
Will conform to procedure followed on Lewis Report.
H.M.
Decisions on 3 ques. of principle will have to be taken before the legn
comes under discn.
J.
We decided to leave those ques. on one side: legislating only on the
appeal court.
E.Sh.
Agreement betwn. Service Ministers on those 3 ques. will be the first
step. We will get on with this.
Att. G.
Had plenty of time to do it. Shall be under fire when Bill comes on.
Shall be pressed to state our views. Worse if we hadn’t published
reports.
Memo. approved.
M/D. to submit to Cab. [interim] report on 3 ques. of
principle.
[Exit H.
7.
Att.G.
Leasehold Reform & Rent Restriction.
No time to consider this properly on Monday.
We can’t laugh this off. We may have amendments put down. Must
have some reason for resistg. them. We must at least say we are
considering it.
246
A.B.
I asked Cab. to include reliefs in Leasehold Bill. My advice was
rejected – on L.O. advice tht. this Bill shd. not include rent restn
points. Cab. decided to confine this to simple Bill because if we
tried to cover rent restn matters in it we shd. be in diffies.
Att.G.
Because Cab. cdn’t reach a policy of increased rents & tied cottages.
A.B.
I was never warned tht. this simple Bill wd. expose us to r.r.
amendments. Thought we were told the opposite.
But if these amendmts. can be moved, we are sunk. Large nos. of our
supporters have changes to propose on r.r. which we cdn’t
possibly resist.
J.
Speaker will be advised tht. r.r. amendmts. are out of order. Gates will
not, in that event, be opened.
Att.G.
Any amendmt. of R.R. Acts related to 21 yrs. lease will be admissible.
H.M.
This really is fairly simple. All we want to say is we are lookg. into
R.R. Acts.
A.B.
Suggested alteration of formula: as on my copy of memo.
Agreed: subject to A.B.’s formula.
L.O.’s to consider what amendmts. wd. be in
order: so tht. Dpl. Ministers may be forewarned.
8.
Prevention of Corruption.
Att.G.
Proof is v. diff. because need to prove corrupt motive. Act of 1916
recognised that & shifted onus of proof w’in a narrow field.
But find now tht. Act doesn’t apply to B.B.C. Several cases where
known money passed but motive can’t be proved.
Also doesn’t cover “licences or permits” – wh. may be more
advantageous than contracts.
D. & P.P. agrees tht. Act shd. extend to charter or stat. corpn &
licences, permits.
P.M.
Is this really urgent.
Won’t Bill look v. wide?
Public Corpn: “state ownership has increased corruptn”
How great is the evil?
Att.G.
No doubt tht. corruption is increasing?
H.G.
What evidence?
J.
Black market.
247
H.W.
Not Govt. service.
Att.G.
W’spread corruptn in B.B.C. Practice in theatrical profession has bn
applied to dealings with B.B.C. officials.
A.B.
Long discn previously. With Ministers directly concerned.
Not true that corruption is increasing.
In l. govt. circles much more in 30’s and earlier than under full
employmt.
Public opinion may be more hostile to it or sensitive about it.
Politically v. unwise to introduce such a Bill.
H.M.
Root out corruption and smash it.
J.
Draft a Bill & look at it – narrow.
P.M.
Suggests corruptn is greater in public service than in private sector.
H.W.
18 months ago I was worried because didn’t want to check personal
contacts within the industry. Satisfied by Att. G. assurance tht.
he wdn’t prosecute in such cases.
If legn is introduced, it shd. extend to all public companies.
Doubt if this is right time to do it.
H.McN.
Support J.
Cd. say we are anxious to promote in socialised indies the traditions
accepted in Civil Service.
Wdn’t like proposal re permits & licences.
Viz., a Bill to extend 1916 Act to public corpns.
C.E.
No precise evidence of extent of evil.
Proposals for legn usually follow glaring case – wh. may be an isolated
one.
Att.G.
i) Act of 1916 regarded as Civil Servants as protection. It is those
who offer the bribes we want to prosecute.
ii) local authorities’ officials are exposed to much temptation.
e.g. examiners for driving licences.
iii) Ld.Ch., H.O., D.P.P. – all think corruption has increased in
recent years.
H.G.
Against suggn (2). C. Service doesn’t need this protectn.
Suggn (i) needs further thought.
G.T.
Less corruptn in l.a. circles than 40 years ago.
V. unwise politically to raise this at present time.
G.A.I.
Against transferring the onus of proof.
E.Sh.
No legn w’out evidence tht. corruptn is widespread.
248
Let’s make sure that there is a good case.
P.M.
Can’t get evidence of this.
Discussion adjourned.
[Exit L.O.’s
9.
Nepal.
E.B.
India’s action is comparable with Hitler & Russia.
Claim tht. reforms are needed & on that a/c Rana family must be
ousted. Their support of the old King is diff. to defend.
If internal civil war resulted, India’s responsibies wd. be heavy.
India’s tactics have bn lead.
Saw Keskar (?) returng. from U.N. P.M. has seen Menon.
My view: at some stage recognise new King in order to secure
stability w’in Nepal. Want to press Indian Govt. to take same
line.
G.W.
This is v. diff. India won’t budge, whatever pressure we bring.
Risk therefore of getting out of step with India, on ques. to wh.
they attach gt. importance.
Our line is right. India’s behaviour bad – seekg. interfere with internal
affairs of a State they have recognised as independent.
Shd. like U.S. support. They aren’t interested parties.
Work for delay. Try to get India to wait a week.
There is no discontent in Nepal. Let that be seen.
Mobilise U.S. into line.
Method for delay: Nepal Amb. in Delhi has suggd tht. he shd. go to
Katmandu to explain Govt/India attitude. Let’s urge Nehru to
accept that.
P.M.
Curious posn. For 60 yrs. King has bn. dummy: & hereditary P.M. has
ruled. India’s recogn of old King in revolt = in effect recogn of
P.M.’s usurpation of power.
All this is internal affair of Nepal.
A.
I wd. have disliked too quick a recognn of new King.
Trouble betwn. us and India wd. be much more serious. Don’t repeat
what we did over China.
A.B.
Don’t hasten to identify ourselves with re-actionary regime.
Nepal will share unrest of East.
Believe Indians rather than Falconer. Aren’t they more likely to be
right.
E.Sh.
But don’t do anything to imply tht. India can treat Nepal as satellite
State.
249
29th November, 1950.
C.M. 78(50).
1.
Korea.
E.B.
Tels. show posn up to last night.
Diffies increased (Indo-China) because Fr. Govt. have fallen.
Schuman merely hoping no precipitate action will be taken.
Ever since last F. Affairs debate, I have bn. anxious. Am now
v. worried re a move in Berlin. Have alerted intelligence
services. These have bn. at fault in F/East. Austria also a
danger spot. Cab. shd. be aware of this risk in Europe. Acheson
has drawn attention to this.
Later telegram from W’ton is more encouraging.
Cab. were concerned tht. Govts contributg. to U.N. in Korea were
being consulted on policy. I obtd satisfy. assurances on this from
U.S. Govt.
Concerned re U.S. C.O.S. reaction to latest developmts. Might carry
us beyond U.N. policy.
Was therefore in close touch with U.S. y’day. Read latest telegram:
fr. W’ton. Tel. 2776 assurances re-affirmed. U.S. will continue
to consult with U.K. & intend to handle situation thro’ U.N. &
not unilaterally. Purposes: resist aggression: localise hostilities,
wind up Korea quickly w’out commitment long-term of U.N.
Forces.
U.S. have taken line in Sec. Council tht. these organised Ch. armies =
act of open aggression. I agree. But how do we fight it?
If we get into M’Churia we’ll never get out. If there has to be
a fight better have it in Korea – l/c are easier, apart fr. politics.
Believe U.S. share this view. Fear pressure to bomb their l/c. –
esp. as Ch. based enemy bombers are workg. over Korea. But
avoid doctrine of hot pursuit.
Situation serious – but not out of hand.
MacA’s communiqués were ill-advised: but we can’t stop him.
All we can ask is assurance of consultn on policy: & this we
have. We can’t expect consultn betwn. all Govts on mil. tactics
& moves.
P.M.
MacA’s H.Q. has bn. over optimistic. This check may make him
over-emphasise strength of Ch. attack. His strategy was wrong –
advanced beyond neck and let S. Koreans hold vital centre. Bad
mistake. Watch his identificns of Ch. Divns.
V. talkative. We must keep cool.
Most fatal thing to get bogged down in K. Important only as symbol
of U.N. resistce to aggression: not important per se.
Must get large nos. pinned down there.
M.S. might have consulted us before Austin spoke.
E.B.
One ugly developmt. in U.S. – “dragging our feet”, Munich
mentality etc.
Must find means of challenging & countering this. But mustn’t be
250
rash over it.
T.W.
What happened over our views re stopping at neck.
E.B.
That view was put to us, but they were not in agreement. And
MacA.’s offensive cd. not in any event be stopped.
H.D.
Disregard of U.K. views is serious.
2.
Soviet Proposal for 4-Power Meeting.
P.M.
a)
Contacts with China in Sec. Council? b) And relns with Russia?
E.B.
b)
Read extract fr. speech. Main line: statement to H/C. when R.
invitn recd. No negative reply. Will seek settlemt. by negotn
wherever possible. In consultn Fr. & U.S. & can now announce
tht. 3 deputies are mtg. next week [or followg.] to discuss reply
to R.
A.
|
|
Expand explann, dipl. exchanges etc., of why we haven’t bn. able to
arrange earlier mtg. of deputies.
A.B.
Bad feeling in Parly Party. Much will depend on E.B.’s speech to-day.
Warn E.B. of this.
U.S. behaviour & MacA.’s personality make Korea appear a U.S.,
rather than U.N., affair. MacA. is v. unpopular with public
opinion U.K. The U.N. aspect of this is defeated by MacA’s
personality.
Presentn to-day. Thght. we weren’t ready to meet C.F.M. on Prague
Basis. “Deputies considerg. draft reply” will be ill-received. We
shd. say “mtg. to prepare a more comprehensive agenda.”
H.M.
There is feeling in Party.
E.Sh.
Party anxiety flows fr. present sitn in Korea, not 4 Power mtg.
We are drifting to a crisis.
Serious because v. dangerous posn in Europe if we get committd
in F/E. For apart fr. U.K. forces, no W. Europn strength.
All v. well to blame MacA. – and at some points he is at fault –
But on de-militarised zone plan, U.S. Govt. were v. unreceptive.
Why? The American C.O.S. were not prepared to interfere with
MacA.
How then can there be any consultn with other U.N. Govts.
This is being handled as U.S. affair - & U.S. Govt. allow MacA.
to run things as he wishes.
Implicns of Austin’s statemt. re aggression. If we bomb beyond
M’churian frontier R. aircraft will come in: & that = major war.
If U.N. resoln re aggression is carried, we must back U.N. resistce of
Ch. offensive. If 200.000 Ch. there already, good soldiers & well
1. (contd) Korea.
251
equipped, we shall have to put many more troops in. Shan’t be
able to decline. Thus weaken posn in Europe & M/East.
On Korea, we decided to back U.N. assumg. 38th parallel. But need to
get N. Korean surrender. Wd. be same re China. MacA. will
insist on bombing M’churia. That means major war.
H.McN.
Resoln doesn’t mention “aggression” by Chinese.
E.Sh.
That will come. Tentative suggn: shd. we make it clear now tht. we
shall resist. Ch. offensive in Korea: but shall w’draw to a line:
or preferably tht. we will not go beyond M’churian border on
land or air. Say it to U.S. – not publicly.
No hostile intentions v. Chinese. Make that clear.
U.S. have led us astray over this because not prepared to keep MacA.
in control.
No other country is helping us.
If our casualties increase, we shd. have diff. case to answer.
Told C.O.S. months ago we might have to fight alone. They thght.
me silly. Not sure now I wasn’t right.
E.B.
This doesn’t go beyond what Acheson has said in latest telegram.
J.G.
We shall be asked to-day wtr. we have a voice in MacA.’s counsels
As we have troops. Is there a B. repve strong enough to hold
his own with MacA.?
E.Sh.
No.
P.M.
How cd. we have influence over C-in-C. – on basis of our brigade.
All we have to do is to get assurances re policy fr. U.S. Govt.
H.D.
We shd. however emphasise our views v. sharply to U.S.
E.B.
I warned you – in a lr. from London Clinic.
H.G.
Can’t put blame on U.S. We agreed we must go beyond 38th in
spite of warning fr. India. We have known for weeks we were
takg. this risk. Thght. Ch. were bluffing – now know they
weren’t.
How cd. we fail to support U.N. resoln re Ch. aggression?
In last resort, we shd. have to follow U.S. lead.
If we w’drew support for U.S. strategy in Korea, they wd. be
the quicker to w’draw their assistce in Europe – w’out which
we shdn’t have a chance v. R.
Worried (not at mil. sitn for now proposed to w’draw to waist) but at
long-term solution. How do we end this?
Ch. cd. hold us indefinitely. Negotn will be inevitable at some
stage. Isn’t it time to have heart-to-heart with Acheson on
long-term problem. Are U.S. never to recognise Ch. Govt. –
is there to be no settlement with them ever?
252
A.B.
I see it rather as part of R. problem.
If Ch. movemt. in K. was prompted by R., it will be followed by
a move in Europe.
I don’t believe that. Not a part of wider R. strategy. I think Ch. are
merely frightened at MacA.’s intentions.
If we go back to waist, the war will (or may) die away.
U.S. Govt. are as ham handed as MacA. Para 4 of 3195 (we were
never consulted) if resoln carried, MacA. wd. have his right to
bomb M’churia.
We must get tough with U.S. Shall be told tht. we haven’t influence
with U.S. correspondg. to our place in U.N. I therefore propose
|
tht. on R. offer to talk, E.B. shd. take a bolder line & say we are
x|
ready to go in on comprehensive agenda. We must snatch
|
diplomatic initiative from R.
E.B.
That is precisely what I am trying to do.
A.
Delay decn on U.N. resoln condemng. Ch. aggression.
Get tough with the U.S.
Say we can’t be led by nose by MacA.
E.B.
Are you prepared to break with U.S.? And forfeit their support
in Europe?
C.E.
We aren’t ready for war in Europe, qua C. Def. Yet Fr. (Indo-Ch.)
U.S. (Korea) & U.K. (Malaya) commd heavily, at R. instance,
yet w’out R. involved
Can we tell Party our line of limitg. our commitments in Korea? That
we have consistently tried to avoid being committed.
A.B.
Party know that’s our view. What they doubt is wtr. we can influence
U.S. sufficiently to agree with our view. Also, they want an
effective response to R. invitn to a mtg.
J.G.
Also, distrust of MacA.
E.B.
What can I do about that? U.N. voted him Commander.
Am I to ask them to dismiss him? Will Cab. ask me to do that.
P.M.
After his outstanding success in fighting back fr. his bridgehead.
J.G.
Trouble is: he’s not merely a soldier. If there is crisis, U.S. shd.
know tht. U.K. opinion wdn’t be solid if U.N. Forces
commanded by a politician & a re-actionary one.
E.Sh.
U.S. wdn’t re-call MacA. at U.K. request.
H.McN.
Line with Party must be tht. R.’s main objective is to divide U.S.
& U.K. We can’t differ from them publicly.
Ques. really is: shall we tell U.S. at once (privately) tht. they must
253
not amend U.N. resoln. Stand on existg. 6-Power resoln.
254
30th November, 1950.
C.M. 79(50).
1.
Parliament.
[Enter Att.G., W.W.
H.M.
Business for next week.
Debate on Wales: industrial subjects mainly. Govt. spokesmen?
{
Parly Secretary B/T. and P.M.G. (to reply). M/F & P. to
{
watch because silicosis cases.
T.W.
Technical education may also be discussed – if they cd. get 2nd day.
Also agriculture, which is mentioned in report of Council.
P.M.
Leasehold Bill. Att.G. to reply to debate. H.M. to open.
(This Bill doesn’t cover Scotland.)
Xmas Recess: 15th Dec. to 23rd Jan.
E.Sh.
Opposn may ask for Defence Debate before Recess. We aren’t ready
on Germany because NATO discns procdg.
P.M.
They have had enough debates on Defence. Resist this demand.
2.
Durham County Council – Closed Shop.
E.Sh.
Motion re Durham Co. Council action – by Tories.
Shd. not there have bn. consultn with Council before M/H. & M/E.
made their declaration. It caused Councillors to dig in toes.
Made it an issue betwn. Council & Govt.
Cd. not M/H. & M/Ed. still have consultns with repves of Council – to
avoid trouble with Tories or, worse, split w’in Durham Labour.
A.B.
Cdn’t have stalled. Was asked in Parlt. for a statement.
Real ques: will they enforce resoln? Resolns have bn. passed
before, by other Councils, but not enforced.
Was going to see wtr. unoffl. talks cd. be promoted. But I cdn’t
equivocate.
E.Sh.
Compromise isn’t impossible.
A.B.
I won’t yield an inch. Public body can’t be allowed to co-erce private
citizens in this way. Someone shd. teach Durham a lesson.
H.D.
Somethg. must be done to bring reason into Council minds.
H.M.
In Parlt. Ministers must take firm stand – clear cut.
W.W.
Will see at week-end what cd. be done to get Council into more
reasonable frame of mind.
A.B.
Ready to join in informal talks.
255
3.
Korea.
E.B.
Intelligence fr. Indian sources: Ch. armies are strong, with big
reserves in M’churia. Looks serious.
Developmt: movement of R. bombers into M’churia. U.S. are
considerg. this & I’m in touch. Shan’t announce.
In addn to suggns re more troops, apprecn of whole sitn shd. be drawn up
for W’ton: political as well as military: to get U.S. minds clear.
Shall have to face ques. of re-inforcing U.N. troops.
P.M.
We can’t afford to send more - & get bogged down in F/East.
E.B.
At this stage, only want to get authority to ask C.O.S. & Dpts to
prepare full appreciation, covering whole area. Take assumption
tht. we are at war – for purpose of co-ordinatg. intelligence.
H.G.
Any indicns of R. moves elsewhere than in F/East?
E.B.
Some signs of movement of troops in Poland & twds. E. Germany.
Rumours only.
Mtg. in W’ton of friendly Govts. y’day: many favoured our idea of
demilit. zone n. of the waist.
Tels. sent y’day re 6-Power resolns, urging no addns re aggression.
Recd reply tht. U.S. will not press for amendmt of 6 Power
resoln or to name China as aggressor.
n’t
Must have troops drawn away fr. Europe.
Must force France to a decision on organn of defence. Lost 8 wks.
already, since W’ton mtg. of N.A.T.O. Council.
Not happy re pace of re-armament in U.K., of defensive organn with
Europe. We must prevent 3rd War.
E.Sh.
C.O.S. can appreciate on basis of informn available: but action does
not lie in their hands. We can only represent thro’ Tedder to
U.S. C.O.S. And latter have little influence with State Dpt. or
MacArthur. Our problem: effective co-ordinn betwn. U.K. &
U.S. C.O.S., so tht. our influence can be effective.
E.B.
What I want is a forward look, pol. as well as mil., fr. Korea outwds.
This is a new situation. Havg. faced it, pol. as well as mil.,
I want to put it to U.S. as co-ordinated document representg. all
parts of U.K. view: and demand reply from all sides of U.S.
adminn thro’ Franks. Separate approaches will not reach
co-ordinated end in W’ton.
H.W.
Raw materials will limit re-armament unless somethg. is done
v. quickly.
P.M.
Must be put to U.S. Govt.
E.B.
I want to put whole picture to U.S. – covering prodn, raw materials
256
and the whole story – what is needed if we are to go into war.
E.Sh.
Will P.M. give a genl. direction to Dpts telling them what
they are to do re appreciation.
Agreed.
H.G.
Combined intell. apprecn – defence & prodn.
What positive steps must be taken now v. risk of worse
things coming upon us – incldg. Joint Boards etc.
E.B.
Must know what liabilities we can undertake before U.N. resolution re
China come to a vote.
I doubt, Europe being as it is, wtr. U.K. ought to accept any further
commitment in F/East.
Must at least get U.S. commitmt e.g. on raw materials tht. they will
facilitate our re-armament etc.
[Enter C.O.S., Barnes.
Stevenson.
[Exit W.W.
4.
Egypt.
E.B.
Don’t believe E. Govr. will yield. King is now powerless. For
Minister’s attitude (cf. speech at So’ton) is v. stiff. I see no hope
of agreement save on basis of w’drawal.
My line therefore – there is Treaty: ready to consider any proposals or
widen confn M/E. But, if yours is just a blank refusal, we stand
on Treaty. Not getting out until it expires.
P.M.
Then they can say we have 20.000 troops above Treaty limits.
If it goes to U.N. we shall be in diffy over this.
E.B.
Why have we kept Mauritians there?
E.Sh.
8.000 – guards on depots. Combatant troops don’t exceed Treaty
limits.
E.B.
Also we have failed to train Eg. Army acc. to Treaty. Another
awkward point if we are taken to U.N.
H.McN.
Why shdn’t adminve troops be reduced?
P.M.
Because of stores.
E.Sh.
Def. policy hasn’t vacillated. C.O.S. favoured Egypt as permanent
base – even when Ministers favoured Cyrenaica. But no
settlement cd. be reached with Egypt.
Tried to solve depot problem by buildg. in E. Africa. Tho’ decided
not to go on with it after £5 m. spent – presumably a Ty. decn.
If we are to run down E. base, where else do we go in M/East?
Tobruk is filthy hole. Bengazi: but we are being edged out by
local politicians. Cd. build cantonment higher up in Jebel –
257
100/150 miles beyond Bengazi: and wd. cost £20/30 m. and take
10 years to complete.
Cd. put a few more in Cyprus. Cd. keep what we have in Tripoli.
x
Cd. try to get facilities fr. Israel. x
But all this is long-term. M’while we must remain in Egypt.
Means: run down troops to Treaty limits: find other place for
depot.
C.I.G.S.
Mauritians used in depot because cheaper.
Most successful operns of E. troops = raids on our depots.
H.G.
Mtg. with For. Minister on sterling balances y’day.
They demanded complete convertibility. Extreme breach.
But they want to go on talking.
P.M.
No alternative but to carry on with existg. “policy”.
Passage through Canal.
B.
We are being increasingly embarrassed, in shipping.
Att.G.
Para. 24 of memo. summarises legal posn. Subject to this: the further
we get away fr. Armistice, the less right Eg. has to interfere with
normal traffic. We cd. now take line tht., war with Israel being
over, it’s unnecessary for their security to place restns on traffic
thro’ Canal.
We cd. now take a stronger line. We are on firmer ground on this
than on Sudan or Treaty of ‘36.
H.McN.
We cd. say no tanks if they say no tankers because state of war.
B.
I will send particulars of incidents to F.O. & Att. Genl.
E.B.
Sub judice now because with Security Council.
Supply of Arms.
E.B.
Awkward consequences because Tripartite decln means equal
treatment for all. And wd. H/C. support me in bargaining
Canal and supply/arms.
H.McN.
We have in past supplied arms & accepted interference with Canal.
I suppose H/C. will force us to stop arms to E. so long as E. Govt.
want to push our troops out of Eg.
E.B.
H/C. pressure wasn’t related to Treaty or Canal?
H.M.
It was: they quoted hostile attitude of E. as a ground.
If you got reasonable accommn with E., H/C. wd. be easy re arms.
258
E.B.
A bit deeper than that. If I send arms to E., they will find another
reason to object. (It is the pro-Israel group that is at bottom
of this.)
E.Sh.
Real trouble in H/C. is tht. we shdn’t be exporting arms when we
haven’t enough for ourselves. That is Oppn line. And if we
resume supplies to E., we must do same for e.g. Syria.
Treaty (resumed).
P.M.
We are in breach of Treaty – no. of troops, location, failure to train
Eg. Army.
C.I.G.S.
Art. 8. Annex stipulates nos. Our forces don’t exceed 10.000 + nos.
necessary ancillaries for adminve & techn. duties.
H.McN.
38.000 in all. Docs “ancillaries” apply to R.A.F. only or both?
J.
Both, as matter of construction.
And are all your non-combat troops employed on “admin. & techn.
duties”. Guard duties aren’t that.
C.I.G.S.
17.000 combat troops. Brigade group.
What we want is peace-time base large enough to support big
Forces in war.
E.B.
If that’s what you want, we cd. get a deal – base in peace, with
limited no. of guards & technicians in plain clothes. They
accept war needs: it’s infringement of sovereignty in peace.
Sudan.
Att.G.
Legal posn is diff. Sovereignty does rest in Egypt. We weren’t
entitled to alter Sud. constitn w’out E. agreement.
J.
Yes. But we must stand firm.
G.W.
On 2nd memo. I shd. have some points to raise: if ever it came up.
Cyrenaica.
H.McN.
When memo. on Cyrenaica comes to Cab., can we have informn of
no. of installns etc. we have.
E.B.
Will make it joint memo.
5.
[Exit C.O.S., B., Att.G.
[Enter M.W.
Meat.
[ Not heard …..]
259
H.G.
Favour para. 11(a). Dangerous to make a small ration cut – they might
assume we are on the run.
H.M.
V. awkward date to start it – Xmas.
If we do this, let’s put the blame squarely on Argentine. And also
tell them at once they won’t get any coal.
H.W.
We tried double bluff: and it’s failed.
Won’t this big cut in rations also fail. Show Argentines how much
we depend on them and strengthen their stand.
I favour 11(b).
M.W.
V. serious risk. Our stocks are so low.
A.B.
V. serious position – politically because Xmas, and materially
because winter needs.
H.McN.
Commend stiff line recommended by H.M. They don’t understand
any other line.
E.B.
You won’t frighten them by a bluff on coal.
They are earning dollars for hides and wool. They can’t stand out
v. us on sterling.
Don’t take H.M.’s line w’out examination. Cut coal exports but
don’t try to use it as threat.
P.M.
Put in 4d of corned meat until January.
E.B.
Cd. we not find some meat from U.S.?
H.G.
Told M/F. dollars cd. be found for this.
M.W.
Cd. get 20.000 tons of meat fr. U.S. in a few weeks.
P.M.
Get it – quick.
M.W.
No freight.
E.B.
Use ship’s stores, as we do in war. Make M/T. do it.
Agreed.
[Exit H.G.
[Exit M.W.
6.
H.W.
Utility Wool Blankets.
Symptomatic of consequences of raw material shortage.
Comes with smaller lag because blankets = short-term prodn
& large wool content.
Wool has now risen to 147d – 9½ times pre-war price.
Only way of stabilising c/living will be re-introdn of subsidies on
clothing. Otherwise, fair shares will be imperilled – rationg.
won’t secure them. Can’t decide that in advance of general
260
review of fiscal posn by Ch/Exch.
M’while we can only raise price of blackest.
G.A.I.
19 on c/living index.
H.W.
Much greater psychological effect.
A.
Publicity – showg. it’s not Govt.’s fault.
H.W.
It wd. suffice for me to tell manufactr’s what their price wd. be –
& delay announcg. retail price.
7.
Nepal.
E.B.
Have sent Dening to Delhi. Urging delay.
G.W.
More chance now of gaining time.
Nehru’s correction of his speech.
261
30th November, 1950.
C.M. 80(50).
E.B.
1.
Korea.
……..
Appoint a C-in-C. Europe.
Saw W.S.C. & urged him to drop Eur. Army idea.
Ty. shd. give frank, short statement tht. part of our policy is to settle
r. materials problem – also the finance ques. 4 or 5 principles –
incldg. use of atom bomb (unanimity rule shd. apply – those
nations supplying Forces to Korea). On basis tht. this = cold
war, with little fighting.
P.M.
Those are the points.
This = brief for P.M., who shd. be supported by special staff.
H.M.
All notes supplied on r. materials ques.
E.B.
We can’t co-operate unless you give us the r. materials.
H.M.
I agree. Truman talkg. off the cuff.
State of nerves among back-Benchers.
We mustn’t lose our heads.
Truman’s was an off-hand remark.
Round robin askg. P.M. to repudiate. We cdn’t say we never wd.
use it.
Will see Ch. Whip. At end/debate P.M. might announce he is going
+ whole range of ques. to be discussed with U.S. That shd.
settle it.
P.M.
Hynd’s group is askg. P.M. to go.
H.D.
An announcemt. to that effect will settle it.
P.M.
M’while Whips shd. say I’m going to make a statement.
A.B.
Say: you are going to discuss this & other ques.
H.M.
Whole range of ques. – he was thinkg. of going anyway – don’t
pin point atom bomb statement.
E.Sh.
We have sent tel. fr. C.O.S. – makg. point tht. atom wd. be matter
for U.N. Told White House issuing correction of Truman’s
speech.
P.M.
He can’t pick it up now.
H.D.
Establ. contact at highest level in view of many grave issues
involved, r. mats etc.
Gt. feeling in H/C. tht. P.M. shd. go.
262
E.Sh.
No condemnn of U.S.
___________
E.B.
You must have answer fr. Truman before you announce.
G.W.
May I send copies to Comm. P.M.’s -
263
Agreed.
4th December, 1950.
C.M. 81(50).
1.
Interim Index of Retail Prices.
G.A.I.
P. Members’ Motion Friday: & P.Q. by Ellis Smith Tuesday.
Time to move twds. a new review.
Want to say in reply to P.Q. tht. we are askg. advisory cttee to
consider need of review.
Want to go higher up income scale.
H.G.
Support this limited move.
If there is a new review, there will be diff. ques. E.g. permanent
food subsidies: danger of going up income scale.
Don’t throw doubt of existg. index.
x Text of reply to be settled with me. x
H.M.
Use social Survey for budget enquiries.
H.D.
A good index: don’t criticise it.
Agreed.
2.
E.B.
Foreign Affairs.
Apprecn by U.S. C.O.S. received & under consn by our C.O.S.
Later, on report by P.M., Cab. will have to meet & take v. grave
decisions. Sitn is serious.
Must take a/c of French attitude. And decide wtr. we take risk of
re-arming Germany – in new situation.
Some factors may now have to be discussed in W’ton to-day, as
soon as P.M. arrives. May get a quick message.
G.W.
Messages from Nehru to P.M. (2 telegrams).
Pearson suggd to Nehru (w’out consultg. us) tht. he shd. publicly
propose a cease-fire.
E.B.
Message suggests India has bn. in touch with Chinese Govt.
G.W.
Message fr. Canada – deprecatg. ‘aggression’ decln etc. Shows they
are moving away from U.S. policy line.
E.B.
P.Q.’s re directives to MacA.
E.Sh. y’day in speech implied tht. MacA. went beyond directive.
I can’t find that he did.
E.Sh.
I was referring to limited objectives. When U.N. forces went
beyond 38th Parallel, we knew there were 70.000 Chinese
massing in N. Korea. MacA. decided to take offensive & then
found even more Ch. there. He had gone beyond the original
264
limited objectives.
H.M.
P.M. now in W’ton. We must not break with U.S.
P.M. has re-affirmed need for consultn with F.O. on speeches.
Even more important tht. Ministers shd. be reticent while W’ton talks
were going on.
E.B.
I must adhere in P.Q.’s to what I said in debate: viz., tht. MacA. has
not gone beyond his directive.
A.B.
If you take a/c of what MacA. has said, as well as what he has done,
it can be alleged that he has gone beyond directive.
E.Sh.
I am not mis-reported. Accept Times’ report.
Raw materials. Will also be discussed in W’ton. Ministers shd. say
as little as possible about it m’while. Tho’ some official
statement will be made in H/C.
agreed: H.M. to circulate advice to all Ministers.
[Enter B., N.B. & E.S.
3.
Coal: (a) Imports & Exports.
N.B.
………. not heard.
H.G.
Shipping difficulties worse than supposed. No chance of lifting the
800.000 t. of U.S. coal we have bought in U.S.
That is strongest reason for discussing Polish offer. We must see
what quid pro quo they wd. ask.
Exports. V. serious. I regret it. (Swedes more reasonable on ore than
at first.) But in all circs. (risks of stoppages here) I think we must
do this.
It shd. however be discussed in O.E.E.C. or E.C.E. as a raw material
shortage. Prefer to do it in E.C.E. If openly discussed there,
we shall instigate criticisms.
B.
Shipping, tho’ diff., is not quite so bad.
We shd. be able to build up enough to move it in Jan.
Cd. Cab. agree tht. 20 tramps chartered for S. Doms & F/East shd. be
diverted to this coal traffic.
H.G.
How much coal will you lift?
B.
Can’t say.
H.M.
Consider wtr. you have power to divert shipping.
H.W.
Accept the recommns re shipping.
265
T.W.
Don’t want ships diverted away from grain traffic – coarse grains.
H.M.
Won’t affect you – see Para. 2(a).
G.W.
Moral value of prefabs. to Australia. N.Z. needs cement.
B.
Only delays it for 3 months.
(b) Power Stations.
Memo generally approved.
E.B.
Is thermo-stat being introduced, in new equipmt., to maximum?
N.B.
Promotional sales work is being stopped.
H.G.
Only safe course is to stop all advertising of gas & electricity.
H.W.
Accept memo. But has M/F & P. as tight a control over consumers
as we had in war? Are we m’taing. operational control over
deliveries?
N.B.
Yes.
E.B.
Re-constitute Coal Allocations Cttee?
N.B.
Will meet Emergency Cttee of N.P.A.C.I.
Am pressing on with thermo-stat developmt.
H.M.
Consider 100% stop of all advertising for gas & electricity.
(c) Man Power.
N.B.
As in memo.
Don’t want such a concession to be dragged out of NCB by
Communists.
E.Sh.
Ring Fence. Solely to prevent volunteering for Services – wdn’t
work. For they cd. go via other industries.
Reservists. A no. were called fr. mining areas – to fill gaps in
County regiments. And many of them are now in Korea.
A.B.
Memo. is O.K. – if applied with common-sense……….
266
5th December, 1950.
C.M. 82(50).
1.
Korea.
Report of P.M.’s first discussion with Truman.
H.M.
H/C. askg. for military statement (only) on Korea.
E.Sh.
Hold it off until Thursday.
E.B.
I can’t say anything while discns procdg. in W’ton.
2.
Germany: Soviet Proposal for Meeting of C.F.M.
E.B.
In view of U.N. resoln tht. Gt. Powers shd. meet, I have put in
memo. I wd. welcome Cab. views.
A.B.
V. diff. to discuss independently of outcome of W’ton talks.
Cdn’t our officials stall m’while?
E.B.
Effect on R. of delay – wd. make it obvious tht. I link East &
Europe, if I p’poned mtg. of officials already arranged.
Exchanges with U.S., away fr. Korea atmosphere, wd. be useful in
bringing U.S. into European mind – and frame of mind.
May be, on report of offls., we shall have to consider in reln to W’ton
talks. Ready to agree there shd. be no final commitment.
Want to give R. impn tht. we are going on with what I said in H/C. –
any more than we are going back on U.N. Satellites will be
keenly interested because frontiers not fixed.
A.B.
Ques. for us = what directions are we to give to officials.
Suppose we said we were ready to consider unificn of G. w’out
re-arming them. That, once it came out in Paris talks, wd. go at
once to W’ton. U.S. might then disinterest themselves in
defence/Europe.
A.
Public opinion strongly in favour of exploring possibility of
4 Power mtg.
H.D.
We can’t run out of Thursday’s mtg.
But Course E wd. enable us to start talking w’out compromising
results of W’ton. They cd. spin it out by discussing what R. wd.
be ready to discuss.
H.McN.
The offls. must meet & must avoid giving impression that they aren’t
meaning business.
But avoid compromising P.M.’s talks.
Any course other than E wd. involve things embarrassing to U.S.A.
267
H.M.
Cd. you let offls. talk of alternatives & submit recommns.
E.B.
Ready to say: all you can do, as things have developed, is prepare
the reply to R. note.
Prepare a reply which gives a wider basis to the points at issue.
And spin out the preliminaries.
H.M.
Or let them discuss all alternatives, w’out commitment.
E.Sh.
Look at para. 25. That is the truth. And it’s not reflected in any of the
alternative “Courses”.
Is there not another Course viz., to seek to promote a change of heart
in R. Prs. by a Heads of States mtg.
Does R. really want to dominate the world. If so, it means war –
sooner or later. And what assurance of continuing U.S. support
in Europe. France seems to be trying to contract out. And the
rest are of no value.
Hence, shd. we not seek solution by political means.
H.McN.
This, if seriously meant, is radical departure on policy.
Our whole policy is geared to assumptn of U.S. support in Europe.
J.G.
Discuss alternatives w’out commitment.
Deep concern, however, in Party. Can’t fight unless our people are
with us.
R. having made offer, we can take initiative. Don’t p’pone talks.
A.B.
Ready to face internl sitn when all facts known.
Party won’t make trouble while P.M. is in W’ton.
G.W.
All courses save E. raise big policy ques. Shd. they go to officials
in this state.
Let talks be limited to Course E.
T.W.
Delete F. & let officials discuss A-E.
C.E.
Had hoped this memo. wd. force us to think out a policy.
Wdn’t be so bad to refer A-E to U.K. officials. But U.S.
& French are to be in it. Some of this wd. be v. unfavourably
received by U.S.A. E.g. admission of China to U.N.
G.T.
Object of mtg. = draft a reply to R. note. That cd. be spun out for
several days.
E.B.
We must settle a reply to R. note.
Fr. wd. prob. be willing to meet on R. terms.
U.S. are au fond prob. don’t want a mtg.
I think we ought to have a shot at it.
Put this memo. back in F.O. (shd. be kept v. secret).
Tell officials to draft reply to R. note. Try in it to broaden
268
substantially – in order of priority put tension points before
coming down to Germany. Don’t be in too great a hurry.
Spin it out until after W’ton talks. They may submit
alternatives – diverging views. Try for draft implying tht. a
mtg. (F Power) will be held.
Have discussed with Kelly. In Moscow they are waiting. We cd.
force them into wrong reaction. Need for care.
269
7th December, 1950.
C.M. 83(50).
1.
Parliament.
H.M.
Business for next week.
Coal (12/12): on Motion by Opposn. May be equivalent to vote
of censure.
Adjourn Friday, if poss. Provn for re-call, as usual.
Opposn expect statement by P.M. on his return & debate 48 hrs. later.
This might mean House sitting into followg. week. Thursday
booked for this – in case P.M. returns in time.
W.S.C. thinks defence debate is overdue: but has agreed to wait
until after Xmas.
A.
Civil Emplt. Bill. What is compromise?
G.A.I.
Will tell you during day.
A.
F/Britain Bill comg. to us so late tht. we can’t take it before Xmas.
Judges Bill. Informed now tht. it isn’t so urgent.
J.
Two Judges who want to retire at Xmas. Can meet it by a retrosp.
amendmt. applying it to those who were Judges at date of introdn
of Bill.
H.M.
Better method wd. be to push Bill thro’ as it stands before Xmas.
2.
Leasehold Bill.
A.B.
Won’t get thro’ now until end/February. M’while courts are evicting
people. Do Judges take a/c of legn wh. is passing thro’ Parlt.?
Can I exercise requisitioning powers to frustrate decision of
courts? Not only ground leases, but Crown property on
v. restve cases.
J.
Courts can’t officially take note of pending legn. But, where they
have a discretion, they will normally exercise it.
H.M.
Let M/H. discuss with J. & Att.G. & see wtr. anything can be done.
{Exit Dep. Ch.Whip.
{Enter Parly Secy. M/Pensions
3.
H.G.
Balance of Civil Pay.
On balance, I favour changing now what has bn. practice in last
3 wars. Diff. to justify discriminatg. thus in favour of public
servants, now that Service pay is higher: but War Service Grants
shd. then be adjusted to cover middle class incomes. Want to
discuss with C. Service T.U.’s.
270
M/P.
Single men with dependants shd. not be pegged down to N.A.B.
standards under W. Service Grants.
Att.G.
Shd. have to go into whole system of W. Service Grants.
E.Sh.
Arguments being evenly balanced, better to retain status quo.
That is view of Service Dpts.
Reasons:
i)
Departure fr. practice of last 3 wars. People are used to it.
No adminve diffy – whereas W. Service Grants wd.
ii) Might have detrimental effect on recruitment for
auxiliary Services. i.e. T.A. & womens’ Services.
iii) Not much money to be saved by change.
iv) W. Service grants means a means test. Wd. cause trouble.
Now considering call-up of Z reservists for annual training. They
won’t like it. They wd. like it less if they didn’t get balance of
civil pay.
W. Service grants system wd. give rise to hosts of P.Q.’s etc.
Maximum of £10 wdn’t cover all cases. And many employers
wd. make up pay above that maximum. Are Govt. to be less
generous than private employers?
G.A.I.
Support M/Defence case.
Follow good employer in this – as we did recently over paid leave.
Gave list of large firms who do make up balance of civil pay.
Means test is v. dangerous.
A.B.
I was first to raise this ques. M/D. & M/L. haven’t really gone into
this. The firms quoted by M/L. are monopolies – and can be
generous to employers at consumers’ expense.
What of Health Service (400.000): socialised industries (incldg.
miners). Enclave of privileged persons – civil servants and
employees of monopolies. Must now be all or none. What
compensn will you give to person directed to civil emplt. at
lower wages.
On W. Service Grants – must have principles clearly established.
Must not have a wide adminve discretion because risk of abuse.
Service pay is now attractive.
H.M.
In Local Govt. in 1939 I resented Govt. decision.
C.E.
Serious trouble with Police if Ty. proposal goes thro’.
May not answer be tht. Service pay is now so high tht. v. small nos.
wd. have to receive balance of civil pay if existg. system were
maintained.
Discussion adjourned. M/Defence to put memo. in.
271
4.
Future of Ground Nuts Scheme.
M.W.
Bd.’s report faces us with failure. It has cost us £35 m. to
establish tht. groundnuts can’t be grown on large scale methods.
My first inclinn was to pull out. But large amount of fixed assets:
& experience in tropical agriculture. Discussed therefore with
C.O. means of makg. some positive use of these. Hence this
plan for 7 years of experimental mixed farming.
J.G.
Arguments are in memo.
Choice now: abandon scheme or convert it into Col. Dev.
scheme. I am sure 2nd course is right, for reasons in paras 21-23.
First course wd. be serious blow, both in Colonies, & in world
at large.
Alarmed at growth of popn. We are saving lives far faster than we
can feed mouths. We must increase food production. Someone
had to try this: we did.
Must come over to C.O. Wd. not put it to C. Dev. Corpn – they have
enough to do with 50 projects they have in hand. They must also
go in for devolution. Maybe regional devolution will be best.
M’while keep O.F.C. with addn of repves of Tanganyika Govt. &
C. Dev. Corpn.
Legn will be involved. My recommn is in para. 28 – give O.F.C. power
to initiate similar schemes.
Must have guarantee for 7 years. In no shorter time can we be sure
tht. limited scheme can succeed.
Before abandoning it – if Cab. so inclined – Govr./Tanganyika shd.
have opportunity to come over & put his views.
H.G.
There will be major row over the past.
Ques. now: is what we do in future. Separate pol. consns & merits.
My first preference is to make clean slate & wind it all up.
From our point of view we wd. lose little.
If we go on, no assurance tht. we shan’t lose a lot more money.
That’s why C.O. want it on their Vote, not with Col. Dev. Corpn.
Personnel as well as money. S.E.A. plan is threatened for lack of
experts. If we closed this down, much of the skill & equipmt. cd.
go over to S.E.A. plan. Where is best place in “under-developed”
project to use these resources.
There wd. be a tailing off anyway. But a 7 year guarantee is v. much
the other way.
No estimate of prob. loss.
J.G.
We believe a good chance of growing some food. And chance of
proving it w’in 7 years.
First ques: shall we go on with clearing of 40.000 acres in S. Province.
We say – yes. And consider future clearing policy – 15.000 a
year for 3 yrs. – then review again: i.e. two reviews.
272
[Exit M/P Enter M.W.
H.M.
Proper way to ascertain what you can grow in Tanganyika is, not
large-scale, but small pilot experiment.
S.E.A. will need technicians. For same purpose of increasing food
supplies.
T.W.
By scientific means you can’t prove right forms of cultivation etc.,
in less than 7 years. Wtr. area is small or large you can only
prove this in time by practical experience.
A.
Agree re period. But doesn’t affect scale.
One experiment wdn’t suffice – for diff. areas etc., & condns.
Must have several. Needn’t be large.
Give 7 yr. guarantee over a limited field.
H.D.
Queensland is a success. Why make any change in it?
J.G.
Because you can’t have a C.O. scheme in Australia.
M.W.
The same people will run it.
H.M.
Make it accountable to C.R.O. vice C.O.?
G.W.
We don’t know views of Queensland Govt. anyway. We shd. have
alternative plan. We shd. keep our foot in on it. Trying to work
out a way of preserving U.K. interest.
A.B.
Africa. i) Can’t you isolate cost of social equipment e.g. ports etc.
ii) What size scheme wd. be requd to warrant keeping on the
social overheads, hospitals etc.
J.G.
O.F.C. recommn is status quo for 7 years in 2 n. areas. In the South
40.000 more + 15.000 p.a. for 3 years; then it will be economic
unit.
A.B.
That is only conjecture!
What I shd. prefer is to say: this is an experiment, its size is what
is requd if we are not to throw away social equipmt. already
invested.
M.W.
The size is determined under this plan by the amount of land
cleared or to be cleared.
H.G.
I must have some more assurance of financial liabilities involved.
Agreed: Ch/Exch. to go into that, with C.O. and M/Food.
(+ Coates & Govr. of Tanganyika.)
M.W.
Promised to try to present Wh. Paper before Recess.
H.D.
Let them wait for that.
273
Agreed: Discuss Queensland separately, if we can, while
P.M. Queensland is here.
No decn w’out further ref. to Cabinet.
5.
Meat.
H.G.
Price of the U.S. meat is £300 p. ton. And wdn’t be available until
end Jan. We have decided not to go on with it.
General approval.
M.W.
Argentine talks aren’t going v. well.
[Enter E.S.
6.
Marketing of Fruit & Vegetables.
H.D.
As in memo.
H.G.
Haven’t evaluated financial risks. Don’t therefore be committed in
principle before we talk.
Want to consider form of “public co.” further.
A.
Talked about for 30 years. This is first practical plan – and it’s
v. modest.
E.S.
Shd. have 6 or 7 to make experiment worth while.
H.M.
Shd. be made clear tht. it is experiment.
Don’t want an internal ground-nuts scheme.
Memo. approved.
[Exit M.W.
[Enter N.B., G.S., B.
7.
Coal.
(a)
Open-cast.
N.B.
Might yield 250.000 t. this year.
Hope M/A. & M/T.C.P. will clear these sites as quickly as poss.
H.D.
30 outstanding: 10 requd. Will try for marginal cases.
T.W.
I agree. Will co-operate on that basis.
H.G.
Offl. Cttee shd. report further on p’mme.
(b)
N.B.
International consultn.
Shd. we tell E.C.E. tht. exports next year can’t be assumed to be more
than 7 m. tons. Or at least warn them tht. we shan’t in April
switch back to full figure of 1950.
274
H.G.
Don’t mention a figure. Give genl. warning only.
Europe will take it hard: & will ask wtr. we are restrictg. our
consumptns enough. We must discuss that because we are
doing same on r. mats.
Shop-lighting. See if coal shortage causes real suffering in Europe:
if it will, we shall have to cut our lighting. Must get fair
shares internationally on raw materials.
N.B.
Ready to consider internationally.
H.M.
Shall prob. have to cut shop-lighting after Xmas.
A.B.
Must we sign away our sovereignty – and advertise failure of
coal natn.
H.W.
We don’t expect suppliers to make same cuts as importers. Never
asked Sweden to cut their consumptn of timber in order to give
us what we need.
H.G.
We want to take somethg. like this line with U.S.
E.B.
If G. steel goes to 13 m., Europe will be shorter of coal: and we shall
feel results.
Agreed: no decision on shop-lighting until after Xmas.
G.W.
Coal Cttee of E.C.E. are considerg. allocn scheme. We might be
involved in breach/contract with Eire.
H.G.
Not a strict allocn scheme.
(c)
Supplementary Pensions.
N.B.
As before.
H.M.
To be effective for purpose in mind, this must be limited to miners.
Genl. discn with T.U.’s. Some want each discussed on merits.
Others say if done for some must go for all.
Can’t believe T.U.’s wd. agree to have a scheme for miners only.
d
Soc indies trying to get on their feet – this wd. add much to their
burdens.
T.W.
No hope of holding man-power in mines, with full emplt., unless
somethg. like this is done.
Agree – no use if all other socd indies follow suit.
Men wdn’t be leavg. mines if it were true tht. miners are getting
excessive rewards.
J.G.
Miners now have big bargaining power. Comms wd. use it. The
275
Labour men say tht. they must have a means of getting in first
to preserve their hold over the men.
Advantage of scheme – not limited to giving it to miners alone.
For main purpose wd. be to hold men of over 40.
Doubtful if it’s wise to promise in principle. For scheme when
worked out, might be financially unattractive. Wd. rather see
scheme first. Worst of both worlds to offer a scheme the men
wdn’t appreciate.
E.S.
Hope no immed. decn will be taken.
Cttee was to examine whole field.
May soon have to review age structure of our whole pensions system.
We can’t make sense if we yield to pressure of particular industry.
It’s comparatively young men who are going – pensions doesn’t
hold them.
You cd. not limit this to miners. No chance of denying it to iron &
steel for example. Loses advantage to mining.
Prices bound to rise in consequence.
Don’t therefore do this in a panic: mark time pro tem.
G.A.I.
Scheme for miners will be followed by demands fr. other indies.
But miners know tht. N.C.B. are willing to discuss it & are held back
by Govt.
Don’t know answer to this ques. Let us therefore know what it
might cost. And what advantage it wd. have for individual.
A.B.
Mtg. of miner members of Cab. – felt tht. pensions scheme wd. be
most attractive measure for holding mining man power.
Repercussions. Tell other indies they depend on coal. That their
members can go into mines if they want suppl. pensions.
Let’s see how individual workers behave, with a pensions
scheme.
Next demand will be tht. suppl. pensions be made mobile.
That = addn to general pensions.
And makes it imposs. to use suppl. pensions as incentive to
man-up undermanned industries.
Fact is, you can’t hold miners under full emplt. condns w’out special
inducements.
Real problem = consciousness of lack of status of miners.
Tendency to be a class of sub-standard humans – whom girls
don’t want to marry. Pension will help to give status.
If we are to do this, we must do it quickly. Don’t let’s have to concede
it to Homer & Moffat.
A social necessity – (prs) Ty. shd. pay.
B.
No arrangemt. with T.U.C. wd. prevent transport workers from
pressing for same concession.
If this is given, Cab. must understand that.
H.G.
I believe A.B.’s case is unanswerable, in principle. Tho’ I have
276
h’to said stand-still.
Costs in mining will have to rise if man power is to be kept.
Don’t believe you can confirm this to miners. Decn will be to lift
Govt. ban on negotn. Try to hold it for a time. But you can’t
hold it for long. Esp. as in gas & electricity many of old workers
have pension rights.
My concln: this is the lesser risk.
Even if gas & electricity get it, don’t think that will destroy all value
of concession to miners.
C.E.
Make it a harsh scheme. No mobility.
Agree: status of miner has dropped.
N.B.
Even in U.S. there is a scheme of pensions for miners.
N.C.B. can’t produce a firm plan w’out consultn with N.U.M.
But for 1/= a ton they believe they can get attractive scheme.
E.B.
Flat rate scheme won’t work now. Must have somethg. proportionate
to earnings.
Need it cost 1/= a ton. Always some saving to be made.
cf. I.C.I. scheme, where a man cd. buy units of pension insurce &
their turn-over of labour dropped fr. 30% to 4%.
Do we know enough about turn-over.
Think there must be a scheme. But we mustn’t rush it.
Only chance of quick action wd. be an improvised scheme.
G.T.
Favour units system. Minimum, wh. follows you round: and
individuals buying units in addn. Then it wdn’t have to be
limited to miners.
Agreed: H.G., M/N.I., M/F & P., M/L & prs. a miner
Member of Cab. shd. now see T.U.C. & try
to get their support for an approach on these lines.
[Exit N.B., G.S. & B.
[Enter L.O.’s &
Pakenham.
8.
Durham County Council.
A.B.
Ready to meet repves of Council. Wd. leave M/Ed. out because his
powers are specific. And we want to keep discn general.
G.A.I.
Agreed.
277
9.
Emergencies.
a)
B.O.A.C.
Att.G.
B.O.A.C. – semi-official. V. tidy case of (unofficial) illegal strike
instigated by Communists. Tho’ M/L. has mucked it up in
reply to Suppl. Ques.
May be settled before Monday. If not, I shall prosecute.
G.A.I.
Arbitn rights refused on non-unionist ques. – in principle.
Employer shd. proceed for breach/contract. Heavy loss.
P.
B.O.A.C. will do so – unless back by Monday. I wd. support that.
G.A.I.
Don’t take procdgs. (criminal) where men refuse to work with
non-Unionists. Remember this was basis of strike.
Att.G.
I can’t take any a/c of that considn.
J.
He can’t.
Att.G.
I can’t delay crim. procdgs. now. Wd. have bn. O.K. if B.O.A.C. had
taken civil procdgs. 3 wks. ago. Too late now to leave it to civil.
J.G.
If 1305 is used to interfere in matter where workers’ feelings are
aroused, 1305 will be swept away. Att.G. shd. bear this in mind.
H.M.
Wd. prefer civil procdgs.
G.A.I.
Last prosecution has left a trail of trouble.
E.B.
If civil procdgs. are going to be taken, I wd. think that enough.
Breach of contract is better way.
Att.G.
I will consult B.O.A.C. on wh. is better method.
b)
Duple Motor Bodies Ltd.
Att.G.
Offl. – illegal because not notified to M/L.
Was subject of P.Q.
Strikers:
G.A.I.
Have bn. notified by employers & have referred it to arbitn.
Agreed: Consider on Monday. Memo. on facts by M/L.
278
11th December, 1950.
C.M. 84(50).
1.
Industrial Disputes.
(a)
Duple Bodies.
[Enter Att.G., Wh. & P.
G.A.I.
Para. 10. Mtg. has bn. arranged. Managemt. have considered repns:
can go no further than staggered resumption: no hope of
reducg. redundancy.
Att.G.
Clear breach of Order 1305. No gt. public interest. But Heald’s
allegn of intimidn at P. Royal works is another matter: & I
can’t prosecute for that unless I do for Duple’s. Diff. to prove
intimidn since Act of 1946.
G.A.I.
It’s the intimidn that matters, not the object.
Att.G.
But I can only get them for aiding & abetting Duple’s strike.
H.M.
Public interest not engaged. Don’t want 1305 in further trouble.
Att.G.
Agree re Duples. Trouble is intimidn suggn.
H.M.
What evce of intimidn?
Att.G.
Resoln tht. anyone who doesn’t contribute wd. be reported to Unions
as candidate for early removal in event of any redundancy.
A.
Action here wd. high-light inaction over B.O.A.C.
H.M.
Doubt if prosecution is necessary in public interest.
E.B.
Nothing unusual about this sort of strike – happening all the time.
Thought Att.G. had discretion to overlook this sort of thing.
If Executive of Union have approved the levy, & we take it into court,
we shall be in grave political trouble. Diff. matter if levy is only
a works’ decision.
Need for care.
H.M.
Att.G. must decide. But no pressing need, from angle of public
interest, for procdgs. in this case.
E.B.
If it isn’t settled soon, M/L. cd. help by announcg. a public enquiry
under Indust. Cts. Act 1919. Wd. avoid puttg. Att.G. into diffies.
Wh.
Att.G. cd. also say, in intimidn, tht. insufft. evce.
Att.G.
Heald wd. then produce his evidence.
279
(b)
B.O.A.C.
Att.G.
I ought to have prosecuted. My reason: M/L. won’t refer it to arbitn.
I ought to be allowed to make that clear.
G.A.I.
Assume men have gone back to work, this morning.
G.A.I.
I am submittg. a memo. on general ques. wtr. Order 1305 shd. be
kept on.
H.M.
If you want to make a reply in H/C., submit draft to P.M. – who may
want to consult M/Labour.
Wh.
Wd. encourage pressure for change in the law.
E.B.
Compulsy arbitn in peace-time won’t work.
[Exit 3 invitees.
2.
Korea.
E.B.
Mil. sitn, tho’ grave is less critical than it seemed 2 or 3 days ago.
Commrs. on both flanks believe they can disengage & hold a
posn just s. of 38th Parallel – almost indefinitely.
Procdgs. at U.N. Efforts of Indian Govt. – there and at Pekin.
Constructive & realistic approach. Wu told Rau on que tht.
Ch. Govt. were anxious to stop the fighting, wh. had bn. forced
on them. Cease-fire seems possible.
Have sent instns favouring cease-fire, w’out strings.
Have now heard tht. U.S. agree tht. Ch. must have time to consider
wtr. they wd. agree to a cease-fire. They won’t be precipitate.
I’m aiming at a demilitarised zone, w’out using the word. It was
satisf. in Kashmir: just draw 2 lines. Has some appeal for U.S.
Our indicns suggest tht. Chinese nor U.S. want fighting to continue.
G.W.
Menon saw me this a.m. Latest Indian approaches to China. No reply
to main repns. But official has said: China might agree to
negotns – on condns i) justice of Ch. posn in Korea recognised.
ii) not bound by U.N. resolns while not a member.
6 Power resoln: India won’t support it. Rau instructed to seek support
for simple cease-fire resoln, incldg. refce to negotns with China on
Korea & Formosa.
E.B.
Formosa – diff. problem. But we have kept clear line since June –
negotiation thro’ U.N. in light of events. We have a free hand.
H.McN.
If Formosa is introduced now, it will make it v. diff. for U.S. to
negotiate.
A.B.
P’pone all discn (save cease-fire) until P.M.’s return.
280
J.
Cd. Nationalists defeat Comm. attack on Formosa?
E.Sh.
E.B. was right in pressing tht. no conditions be attached to cease-fire.
Improvemt. in mil. situation seems largely due to unwillingness of
Chinese to make determined attack.
E.B.
Also diffies betwn. R. & China. R. didn’t want China’s admissn to
U.N. - & prob. were not behind latest Ch. aggression.
E.Sh.
Significant also tht. Ch. have not made much use of aircraft.
H.McN.
Cd. Cab. see summary of M/D. intelligence e.g. fr. x-examn of p.o.w.
E.Sh.
There isn’t v. much. We rely almost entirely on U.S. intelligence
from MacArthur’s H.Q.
3.
E.B.
Soviet Proposal for Four-Power Meeting.
Offls. have agreed upon a reply. Only ques. outstandg. is wtr. refce
shd. be included to Iraqi resoln.
Draft is forthcoming. Invites mtg. on broader agenda.
Text will be available to-day. Cab. to-morrow? Reply must go
w’out delay.
No attempt made by officials to delimit problems.
Note taken.
4.
German Participation in Defence of Europe.
E.B.
Proposed tht. mtg. be held in Brussels on Monday. To receive
report of Deputies. Ministerial mtg. of N.A.T.O.
Thght. Cabinets shd. have a chance to consider.
I gave a warning therefore tht. final decisions might not be
achieved.
P.M. not returned: no Cab. discussion etc.
Have agreed this a.m. tht. there shd. be a mtg. of N.A.T. Council on
Monday – with warning tht. I might not be able to give final
decision of U.K. Govt.
Don’t want this rushed. Timing. German re-action.
Sent telegram to P.M. in Ottawa. P.M. has said he is agreeable to
mtg. on Monday.
Monday’s mtg. will be preceded by Tripartite of Foreign Ministers.
E.Sh.
Cab. shd. consider Deputies proposals – carefully, this week.
Joint mtg. of Deputies & Mil. Cttee will be to-morrow.
Procedure. Council remitted this to Def. Cttee. We must therefore
meet & report to Council. On Monday Def. Cttee will meet &
recommend to Council.
281
H.D.
Timing. This wd. make 4 Power Talks more difficult?
Persistent G. dodging of issue of re-armament. Adenauer’s
statement this a.m. When you have cleared a formula with the
French, you will have diffy with Germans.
A.B.
Much to be discussed by Cab. this week – after P.M.’s return.
If we are going on with Item 3, surely we must soft-pedal on Item 4.
5.
E.B.
Nepal.
Only just missed a civil war.
Nehru as unreasonable over this as he has bn. reasonable over China.
But he has now come round quite a long way.
Sent Dening to Nepal – who have now promised various reforms.
These aren’t 100% satisfactory to Nehru. But situation looks
much more promising.
In our man-power stringency we can’t afford to lose Ghurkas.
6.
Egypt.
E.B.
Shall have to get Cab. decision this week.
H.G.
Financial talks. Complete deadlock – no chance of escape.
E.B.
Mine is not quite so bad.
7.
H.G.
European Recovery Programme.
Definite U.S. decn to give us no more E.R.P. Counterpart funds
assumed. And what is in pipe-line. But not the addl £1 m.
I had hoped to get for remainder of this year.
There will be agreed Anglo/U.S. statement.
8.
Meat.
H.G.
Argentine have rejected our offer. They are insistg. on time limit of
one month: & revision of £97.10.0. price thereafter.
I advise Cab. to stand firm against this.
M.W.
On 31/12 shall have to bring ration down to 10d + 2d corned beef.
Cd. hold it at that until mid/February. With Uraguay cd. go to
mid/Mar. But Argentine are telling M. to hold off.
If we conceded now, we wd. have to pay £120 – and put up with
price increases for meat fr. other sources.
Cd. increase ration of sugar (EPC) and cheese. And bacon in Jan.
But no more meat is available. Have bought manufg. beef in
282
France for £180.
Announcement by 19/12. To near Xmas. I favour making it
earlier – for effect on Argentina. If on Wed. next, it cd. cover
compensns.
H.McN.
Hope we shan’t mince words re Argentina’s tactics.
Fish prices?
M.W.
Too soon to mention re - imposition of controls.
H.McN.
Cd. give a hint tht. if anyone tries to exploit the situation we will
take steps …….
E.B.
Pre-1914 hawkers secured best fish for working classes.
Improve distribn system: central frying agency + “stop me & buy one”
tricycles. Cooked fish vice fishmongers.
T.W.
White Fish Authority shd. look at this.
H.W.
I favoured cutting off our essential exports to Argentina.
Ought we not to review that again?
In Xmas ’47 we brought Miranda to heel by cutting soda ash.
They are still sensitive to this sort of pressure.
For this means lower meat ration than at any time – takg. a/c of
increase in meat prices.
Can’t give in & give higher prices, after this long fight.
A.
Agree: let us fight too. Esp. as we don’t know how long they
will go on.
Agreed: O.N.C. to consider what retaliatory action we
cd. take.
Announce ration changes in H/C. not later
than Thursday.
E.Sh.
Make it clear what price Argentina is asking – and what it means
per lb.
H.G.
Don’t. Suggests we wd. pay £120 rather than £140. But point is
effect on prices in Doms. etc. Also wd. indicate to Argentina
what we wd. be ready to pay.
[Exit M.W.
[Enter N.B., Taylor.
9.
Coal.
a)
H.M.
House of Commons Debate.
Motion in H/C. 6 Ministers outside U.K. Cook recalled.
Marquand in Canada – also recalled, unless we can pair him.
Hope Cabinet endorse action wh. I have taken.
283
Also 7 sick.
Govt. spokesman: Parly Secy. as well as M/Fuel & Power.
Terms of Govt. amendment: enquiry wd. hamper N.C.B. & do no
good; welcome extra effort by miners; welcomes Govt.
effort to secure more output & solve man-power problems of
the industry.
E.Sh.
Vital point: was an enquiry, set up by N.C.B.; & changes of
organn followed. Surely that shd. be mentd?
H.G.
Was v. controversial: we never publd report: it was concerned
only with organn & what they are on is wider ques. of output.
The amendmt. is too long.
b)
N.B.
Agreed: let H.M. settle – much shorter. Don’t close
door to enquiry at some time.
Say not at this moment.
[Exit Taylor.
Opting for Mines.
Measures taken wdn’t give us 40.000.
Opting wd. give us a real flow.
E.Sh.
x/ Decided not to recruit in mining areas.
Shdn’t we stand on that pro tem?
Real need is to keep miners in the mines. Not to get these young
men diverted from other industries.
Services are also in need of man power.
A.B.
Can’t run this idea at same time as you are trying to build up
status of miners.
J.G.
You wd. get no value out of this.
H.M.
I advise you to put your weight on x/.
H.G.
You wd. lose people fr. the mines by this trick.
284
12th December, 1950
C.M. 85 (50)
1.
Mr Fraser.
Telegram of sympathy to be sent.
2.
P.M.
Washington Talks with Truman.
Received v. friendly manner. Agreed – 100% candour on both sides.
Mil. sitn changed while we were there. At first thought no more than 2
bridgeheads for limited time. U.S. have never had a knock
before – needed sympathy.
I made a broad statement. Wished vindicate U.N. but shdn’t be
dragged into major war with China. Gave apprecn of China –
chance they wdn’t follow Moscow slavishly – our object shd. be
detach them fr. R. Sitn must go to agreemt. or extension of war.
Stressed importce of Europe.
Acheson: U.S. doctrine tht. China is ruled by Moscow.
They agreed – avoid major war in F/E. Europe = vital front.
They were bombing M’churia.
They feared negotn posn wh. wd. bring in Formosa. I said no hope of
limited negotns . Both were covered in Cairo Agreemt.
Project of limited war. Ec. blockade + S.O.E. I was v. that. Ch. has all
the S.O.E. cards v. us – Indo-China, Malaya etc. Marshall came
down on my side. I concluded – sooner or later, negotns ceasefire mooted. Discn of terms. We favoured leavg. it free – w’out
condns.
China’s seat in U.N. Case for and v. stated. We agreed to differ.
Formosa not immediate issue. They fear it because jumping off place
r. Philippines. But Ch. fears it because jump off place for Chiang
K. Sh.
I suggd neutralising it for period under nominal Ch. sovereignty.
Europe. They agreed Supr. Commr. acdum. wd. be helpful. Then
heard Spofford plan was moving. Fait accompli. In my view, gt.
gain to get Commr.
They said their Forces earmarked for W. were being pulled into F/E.
But they will make new Divns. available in Europe in ’51.
Raw materials. They were v. forthcomg. Agreed on Steering Cttee –
U.K., U.S., France. Strong claimants: if one admitted other
claims cdn’t be resisted. Under Cttee a no. of commodity boards
on wh. offices wd. get their chance. Decisions in boards not
Steering Cttee. I put this to Can. Cab. - & no objns raised.
Canada will also help on r. materials.
U.S. hesitant on our doing more in defence. I said we had bn. doing
more than they since ’45. Said we wd. consider doing more: but
cdn’t commit Cab. There may be more pressure on that.
Control of operations. MacA. good general. They agreed he talked
too much. His intelligence hasn’t bn. good. I pointed distinctn
betwn politico-mil. decns & those for commr. in field - & said we
285
needed more consultn on first. Put in memo. on informal liaison
C.O.S. – which was accepted.
Atomic bomb. Truman didn’t realise he’d dropped such a brick. He
had no intn of using it in Korea. He hoped he’d never have to use
it. Regards it as joint possn of U.S., U.K. & Canada.
Fullest consultn before using it, save in retaliation.
I was fully satisfied.
General atmosphere was good. They needed our comfort. Robust
confidence of C.I.G.S. was helpful. Mil. sitn improved while we
were there. Now seems they may be able to hold a line. As soon
as its stabilised, we shd. try for cease-fire & negotiations.
Stressed tht. it’s U.N. affair.
Met Comm. Ambassadors in Washington. Also Comm. repves in N.
Yk.
Good talk with Cab. in Ottawa. They were solidly with us.
Press conference. With many ques. off the record.
Useful talks betwn. officials.
Procdgs. at U.N. Asiatics puttg. in cease-fire resoln. Also a resoln on
Ch. intervention, wh. doesn’t brand them as aggressors.
I said the first was to be preferred.
H.M.
Statement in H/C. To-day or to-morrow? Opposn wd. be willing to
wait until Wed. & have debate on Thursday.
P.M.
Better to do it at once. They may suspect disagreemt. in Cab.
Diff. to say more than was in communiqué.
E.B.
Davies has some suggns for filling out statement.
T.W.
Quicker the better. – qua. public opinion.
H.M.
Worth waiting 24 hrs. to make it a better statement.
A.B.
Diffy. If you make a much longer statement to-morrow, you invite xexamn w’out defence tht. you’ve only just got back.
Make it to-day & promise fuller informn in Thursday’s debate.
H.D.
Communiqué was longer than at first assumed.
P.M.
Imposs. to elaborate it a little in statement, and a lot in debate.
H.D.
Anti-climax if you don’t make a statement to-day.
H.McN.
Courtesy statement to-day. Para. 5. might be expanded. Otherwise
much as drafted.
3.
H.M.
Death of Oliver Stanley.
Proposed to have tributes in H/C. to-day.
286
P.M.
Against precedents. Only leaders of Parties. Or Ministers dying in
office. V. dangerous to extend it.
J.
Asquith or Alfred Lyttelton.
H.M.
I checked up with Whips’ Office – who said there were precedents.
287
14th December, 1950
C.M. 86 (50)
1.
Parliament.
[Enter Dep. Ch.Whip
H.M.
Business for next week after Recess.
H.McN.
Will try to get Salmon Bill completed in one day on 24/1.
C.E.
Summer-time. Order shd. be made w’out delay.
[Exit D. Ch. Whip
2.
Housing
H.McN.
As M/W. has had such a success with industry (esp. employers)
housing sitn wd. be politically eased by statement as in para. 8.
H.G.
Statement must follow these exact words. Can’t go further.
H.McN.
Wdn’t want to go further because timber situation.
3.
Soviet Proposal for C.F.M. Meeting.
E.B.
Amendments. Para. 2. Re-insert reference to Iraqi resoln. I don’t
object: merely reference to what Genl. Assembly has done. Not
open to objn of original wording, which went into substance.
Para. 3 – merely a drafting change. And additional para. at end.
A.
Why insert this provocative passage.
E.B.
Because they accuse us of arming W. Germany & deny they have
armed the east.
E.Sh.
Evce tht. Bereitschaften have tanks? We haven’t any.
E.B.
Thought M/D. supported this. Will check it up again. *
G.W.
Additional sentence does rule this in, unnecessarily. Accept only if Fr.
& U.S. are insisting.
E.B.
I agree
*
Para. 5: first sentence. Wording.
E.Sh.
What do you gain fr. 2nd sentence. Provocation again. Why not omit
it.
E.B.
Must make it clear tht. condn of conference is tht. we get down to
business. Can’t overlook R. behaviour on previous occasions.
I’m not going to put up with this attitude at a further confce
288
P.M.
They asked for confce on Germany. We must say it’s not G. alone, it’s
genl. attitude of R.
H.McN.
We have said 2nd sentence in 2 U.N. resolns. No provocation in saying
it again.
E.Sh.
No point in makg. such charges at outset of conference.
Won’t press my view.
Agreed: stet second sentence.
E.B.
U.S. amendment on para. 6. Prelimy examn of issues by officials.
I am not ready to have merits discussed by officials.
Tension affectg. world peace – Germany – Austria etc. Officials
bound to get bogged down. Ministers wd. never meet. This wd.
be seen to be a swindle. Either have a mtg. or say you won’t
have one.
Agreed
*
E.B.
Want reply despatched by Saturday – before Brussels mtg.
G.W.
Inform Comm. Govts. in advance.
Agreed.
E.B.
To Benelux in advance also.
Shown to Adenauer.
H.M.
Revert to idea of high-sounding declaration – peace campaign High
level idealistic propaganda.
Is it too late for this?
E.B.
Diff. to know how to do it in this Note.
This offer may be rejected by R. Don’t want to mislead people into
thinkg. there’s more in this than there is.
H.G.
A sentence or two in para. 2
* E.B. will consider.
4.
E.B.
German Participation in Europe Defence.
[Enter C.O.S.
Conception of partnership vice aid from U.S.
American C.O.S. considered this: & in August/Autumn the
implication of U.S. troops in Europe in peace was accepted by
Truman – as was implicn by us tht. we shd. do more. But U.S.
made this conditional on use of German troops.
289
Rhine line involved evacn of 4 m. Dutch - & that caused alarm in
Europe. Hence plan to fight further east: on German soil:
means G. must fight.
I cdn’t see any alternative but to accept principle of G. participn as
price for securing U.S. Commr., U.S. troops in Europe, &
conceptn of partnership. In those discns I gathered tht. Fr. wd.
take same line – Schuman gave me to understand so.
But Fr. Socialists wdn’t have this - & Fr. proposal for European
Army was put fwd. That won’t work.
After further consultn, Spofford compromise has bn. evolved.
Allows U.S. plan to start, while Fr. calls a conference on Europ.
Army.
Ques. came up while P.M. in W’ton. A letter sent to Fr. Govt. I made
2 caveats
i)
U.K. Govt. not commd
ii) decision wd. be taken in conference, not by corrce.
I have bn. worried by 2 things.
I am in favour of G. assistg. in Europ. defence. Am commd in
principle. But don’t want to do it in such a way tht. if R. cut up
rough we have nothg. with wh. to prevent another Korea in
Europe.
Talked to P.M. y’day. Consultns with Kirkpatrick. Net result:
i)
No one believes G. will respond to this invitn.
If they don’t, & there is a C.F.M., we shall be in weak
bargaining posn then.
ii) Not sure 51/2 U.S. Divns. will come into Europe if G. does
not respond.
iii) What chance of preservg. our grip on Berlin, if R. made a
move there.
Kelly prefers course I am now going to outline.
U.S. wanted to dump Spofford plan on G. & ask for answer.
I prefer
a) first to tell Adenauer we have adopted plan, if we do: but
don’t ask him to accept or reject.
b) insist on apptmt of Supreme Commr. & go on at once with
formn of integrated force.
c) in indefinite transition, go on with C.F.M. & discuss
demilitarisn of Germany. We shall not have taken irrevocable
step of arming W. Germany.
Also avoids having to beg Germany to come in, to assist in our
defence. Do no more than create a place for them.
C.I.G.S.
U.S. mil. are anxious to appoint Commr.
Re-inforcemt. is diff. because Korea. Bradley favours Nat. Guard divns
as soon as ready: can’t be until the spring. No reluctance to send
them: but they don’t like sending half-trained troops. But I
urged them to send & train in Germany. No U.S. Govt. decision.
P.M.
Delays by Fr. proposals. Then by Korea. Has defeated our hopes of
strength soon in Europe.
290
Endorse E.B.’s line.
Can’t reject Spoffard plan w’out estranging U.S. But care not to
provoke R. The C.F.M. project enables us to get best of both
worlds – don’t play the card yet.
C.N.S.
We want to get on with re-arming G. But wd. value opp. to talk
informally with G. to see how they wd. come in.
Att.G.
On what terms will G. come in? Only on equal terms? If so, more
diffy. with French. What is behind their fears. Genuine fear of
G.? If so, some assurances cd. be given to allay those fears.
E.B.
Have put this to Pleven – tht. N.A.T.O. is r. aggression, not r. R. If G.
was aggressor, N.A.T.O. wd. support Fr. r. them.
That assurance has bn. given. Believe it cd. be given again.
Benelux have not expd such fears – they assume tht. what was
said on this at signing of Pact still stands.
French are more concerned about their immedte political posn.
A.
Are Fr. doing anythg. militarily?
C.I.G.S.
Trying. Handicapped by
a) short length of mil. service.
b) Indo China absorb more than 1/2 Fr. regular army.
They have 5 divns in Europe.
H.M.
If it’s ques. of going easy temporarily qua tactics – I understand.
On fundamentals – we must face re-arming Germany. And
concede the status wh. goes with that.
Mil. sitn is so weak tht. we can’t afford to do w’out Germany.
Doubt if R. wd. fight preventive war.
If we say we daren’t re-arm G., the mil. outlook for us is v. bleak.
Don’t therefore p’pone for any length of time re-armament of G.
H.McN.
Cd. we re-arm them soon, anyway, because economic diffies. Even
with willing G. & acquiescent France.
C.I.G.S.
U.S. cd. have done it, but have lost much equipmt in Korea.
Re-inforces E.B.’s plan for delay.
E.Sh.
V. definite views wh. I have put to C.O.S.
We are in a mess in Europe.
If we had gone on, on basis of last summers’ agreemt., we wd. have
bn. O.K. U.S. then promised 51/2 Divns.
Spofford plan is before you – Annex A. Comg. up at N.A.T. Council.
In genl. we accept this. But some other countries will have views.
Doesn’t alter the principle. You can’t resist R. aggression in Europe in
foreseeable future w’out G. contn. G. wd. have to fight - & we
want them on our side.
Ques: when? Accept principle: implemn is another matter.
291
Diffies a) arms. Our first obligns must be to N.A.T.O. countries.
French divns aren’t yet equipped.
b) Are we thinking of ’54. Completely unrealistic – may come
in 1951. If Bereitschaften then attacked, you cdn’t organise
G.
Plan. Say at Brussels we accept this compromise.
Next step: present this to Germany. How? Better to persuade
them to apply than seek to impose it. Thus I agree with E.B.’s
tactics.
If we can let them start traing. in small units, that wd. be useful.
Wd. this provoke R? If so, it wd. do so at any time.
I suspect apptmt of Commr. etc, is a provocative as acceptce of
priniciple of G. re-armament.
There is so little strength in Europe tht. we can’t afford to alienate U.S.
– on whom we must rely.
H.G.
Approve E.B.’s tactics.
What will U.S. attitude be, if G. won’t come in?
E.Sh.
Spoke to Adm. Sherman last night. He advised caution in approach to
Germans. C.N.S. believe he now favours sending U.S. troops
w’out condition: & avoidg. begging Germans to join in.
H.D.
The arming of G. wd. be much more provocative to R. than other
measures. The R. are nervous of G. So am I. Don’t give arms to
G. until we have integrated force in being in Europe.
J.G.
Case in Annex B. is v. disturbg. Labour Party are makg. ground in G.
because opposn to re-armament. Workers & students are those
who oppose it.
We, as a Party, don’t want to find ourselves opposed to G. Trade
Unions & Social Democrats. Can we do anything to bring them
round.
E.Sh.
Don’t swing to other extreme. Adenauer & Schumacher are in favour
of a G. contribn – tho’ on terms unacceptable to French.
{Tactics proposed by E.B. approved.
{Comm. Govts. to be informed.
5.
E.B.
Egypt.
Have always feared E. wd. let us down at critical moment.
Need for troops in E. in peace = guarding stores. (E. reply: take them
away & Gippies won’t steal them.)
Revision of Treaty has turned into nationalist cry “clean out.”
Wd. now prefer to substitute term “Alliance” vice Treaty.
292
We shall be v. short of man-power in future war. We shd. use the 25m.
in Sudan & Egypt. Develop industries there, wh. wd. be useful to
us in war and m’while raise standards of living.
Uganda too.
Hence – idea of transfer of m’tenance respons. for the last to E.
In discns, took a chance on Israel. He replied – no chance of agreemt.
betwn. Arabs & Israel. In the end, he said no pol. opposn in
Egypt if U.K. & Israel make bi-lateral settlement, just as Eg/U.K.
settle bi-laterally. Must avoid religious opposn wh. cd. spread
thro’ Moslem world. I have made tentative approaches to Israel.
(v. secret) & gather they wd. welcome discussion of some
defence arrangemt.
Hence
i)
transfer base m’tenance to Egypt.
ii) Clear agreemt. for all facilities in E. in war for Britain or
her Allies.
iii) privileges for B. troops (? in war) on 1936 Treaty basis.
iv) in peace: B. technicians there. Asked also for some
uniformed personnel.
Is this a basis for settlement?
May C.O.S. study this sympathetically from angle of defence needs?
I want Eg. For. Minister to go home next week. And real negotn must
start in January. Want then to go for alliance w’out time limit.
Ultimately wd. like Turkey to be included.
Also Sudan.
C.I.G.S.
Hope tht. Israelis wd. accept B. striking force there?
E.B.
Can’t say yet.
C.N.S.
Our anxiety: this may impair our ability to defend M/E.
We shd. like Robertson & Air C-in-C to come home & discuss.
To see how far we can go to meet E.B.’s view.
H.G.
V. important financial implicn – esp. idea of new base in Palestine. V.
high cost.
Hope E.B. won’t give any further hint of this to E. For. Minister.
Wd. make Jan. negotn much more diff.
Wd. rather suspend or adjourn. Worried about (b) in memo.
We haven’t played all our cards yet. E.g. U.S. pressure.
H.McN.
Don’t say anythg. to Eg. now to lead them to suppose we were thinkg.
favourably of this plan. Cabinet now considg. this plan.
No secrets in Cairo. He will exploit this “concession” to his own pol.
advantage.
E.B.
I’ve seen him 6 times. Of course, I’ve outlined this approach already.
Only want now to tell him tht. we want to study it further.
293
H.W.
E. For. Minister will exploit E.B.’s tentative conversn anyway, if he
wants to.
G.W.
Don’t want A., N.Z., & S. Afr. to learn of this from Egyptian leaks.
Adds weight to plea for caution.
Agreed
i)
send For. Min. away on basis – interesting talk, I
am studying it., let’s resume in Jan.
ii)
C.O.S. to study as in (a) of memo.
[Exit C.O.S.
6.
Summer Time in 1951.
C.E.
Prepared to accept shorter of 2 extensions.
But don’t like it. Violent opposn in Parlt. to anything more.
Apart fr. agricultural objns, strong criticism fr. educationists.
i)
Double summer time – not pressed.
ii) Further 8 weeks.
T.W.
This wd. give us political black-eye.
For the sake of 50.000 tons w’in period of possible fuel crisis.
Surely not worth the agricultural objns.
Sauce to ask for it, when we promised help with open-cast.
Rubbish to do this & not reduce shop-lighting.
N.B.
Put fwd. because thought 100.000 t. wd. be quite significant amount in
circs. of this winter. At time when we shall have specl. diffy.
over stocks – esp. power-station stocks.
G.T.
Worth doing this on its merits. Double time also.
A boon to industry.
Farmers always have opposed it – on same arguments. Shown in
practice tht. rural diffies are not inseperable.
H.McN.
Asked to believe M/F & P. calculn are correct to .002.
But handicap to agriculture is obvious & inevitable.
H.W.
Favour C.E.’s proposal i.e. 8 weeks.
H.M.
Starting with bias in favour of M/F & P., I have grown to sympathise
with rural view. Economic importance of home food prodn I
believe addl. 3 weeks shd. be adopted.
Politically, I wd. sooner consider shop-lighting than this.
E.Sh.
Support H.M. – 3 weeks wd. be enough.
Economic in fuel consumptn.
N.B.
Expect we shall have to stop shop-lighting after Xmas.
294
C.E.
Do it generally – not in 1d nos.
H.G.
a) any economy more important than inconven. to agric.
b) link with shop-lighting.
Bring in after Xmas both 8 wks’ summer time & cuts in lighting.
T.W.
Saving is only 10.000 t. p. wk. for 4 weeks.
Think what you can get on a Sat. morning.
A.
3 wks’ extension is enough – no more.
J.G.
60.000 t. at a cost of v. bad feeling.
Surely there are simpler ways of saving 60.000.
Early summer-time increases absenteeism.
G.W.
Fuel crisis is worst of all evils.
J.
Favour longer summer-time.
H.G.
1/4 to 28/10
P’pone until after Xmas & consider all proposals for fuel
economy.
295
18th December, 1950
C.M. 87 (50)
1. Defence.
P.M.
Truman asked me to do more on defence – I promised to consider,
w’out commitment.
Have considered: so has M/D.: both concluded some acceleration is
inevitable.
Was planning still related to 1957.
New hypothesis needed. Must avoid assumptn war inevitable.
Truman’s decln, I suppose, nec. to give him powers.
Acceleration: completion of paper plans: but some new expre
C.O.S. likely proposals i) – iii) in brief.
This will all come up after Xmas.
But m’while Acheson’s statement at Brussels (as in brief).
What response can we make – to induce other Europeans to do
more. Conception of Anglo-American partnership.
As we shall have to accelerate, I recommend formula in note – re
acceleration.
E.B. & E.Sh. support this.
Avoid committal to a figure. Resist U.S. pressure for a figure.
c.f. experience in summit. Stick to statement re acceleration.
Read summary of Acheson’s probable statement.
Danger of U.S. failg. to keep balance betw. defence & econ. stability.
But we must keep in line – in case they put too much in F/East.
Read draft of E.B.’s reply.
H.G.
Spoke to E.B. before he left.
Agree: no new figure.
shdn’t accept double pre-Korean rate because ours far above
other countries.
support draft.
Implications
a) Acheson’s approach is too like August – aid concept.
Criticism of slowness of Nitze exercise. Shipping away from
partnership.
[Enter A
Don’t like being urged to do more & then look for some aid.
Almost all $ 5 b. = equipment.: v. little free dollars. That isn’t aid.
b) Diffies. at home unless we know implicn of acceln. £1.100
m. in 51/52 already. If 3.6 were to be completed in 2 yrs: or
if M & D.P. were to be completed in 2 yrs. (our share prob.
£5 vice 3.6) we shd. be near 2.000 m. in 51/52. Must have
some idea of what we are going to do. Prob. by getting
Services to say what they need. Much addn to present p’mme
wd. involve more controls. Even now, L.I.M.O.S.O. orders
will prob. be needed. If much more, prs. clothes rationg. &
divn of labour.
296
Don’t want to alarm Cab. but all these may have to be
considered. Requisitiong.: power to compel firms accept defence
orders.
H.W.
Even on present p’mme shall go long way in this dirn.
A 3 yr. p’mme in 2 wd mean doublg. pre-Kor. rate.
Don’t get commd such a formula. Don’t let them gain currency.
Speed up w’out increasg. 3.6? Hardly possible. Cdn’t have recession
in 2nd or 3rd yrs. Acceln therefore means increase in total p’mme.
We thght. our share of M & D.P. wd exceed 3.6m. Serious if U.S now
think M & D.P. not enough. Wd. wreck Eur. economy.
H.G.
We must say to U.S. – adequ. guarantees on r. materials.
E.B. will insist.
G.W.
Parity of restns – cd. that be agreed. If we have to ration clothes, U.S.
shd. do so too.
H.W.
They never did in 1939/45.
If we are to have standard of refce – make it 1938 base.
H.D.
Time for discn of fair shares, if we avoid new figure now.
We have done more than any, relatively.
Risk tht. slight addn to def. p’mme wd. seriously unbalance economy.
If G. reluctance helps us to concln tht. G. re-armament is not immedy
practicable, it follows tht. other Europ. must do more. This is
reason for doing more.
P.M.
U.S. may bust themselves – inflation.
C.E.
Doubtful of “increase & accelerate”.
Our economy is strained by 13 yrs. of war economy.
Disappointed at response of other Europeans.
We go to 2 yrs. mil. service. Others don’t follow.
They have diffies.: but so have we.
Care to avoid language implying further strains on U.K.
Cd. we “increase” w’out going over to war economy?
Must see some signs of vigour in other Eur. countries.
T.W.
Respond in words to U.S. – but not to their panic.
Remember limits to what more we can do.
A.
Danger tht. talk of acceln will increase prices etc.
We must have p’mme to see wtr. it is practicable.
Astronomic U.S. figures will involve infln.
P.M.
Things we can do apart fr. prodn. E.g. training of reserves in batches.
Also prodn of aircraft.
Don’t have a figure before a p’mme.
297
H.McN.
Cd. we add this to E.B.’s statement.
N.A.T.O. doesn’t put a proper plan.
U.S. & U.K. try to make promises good. Others don’t.
“Foolish offer figure: commit to acceln & increase if practicable. But
ask for further N.A.T.O. definn of mil. needs over next 2 yrs. &
fin. and econ. implicns.”
H.G.
Want a real basis with U.S. They haven’t accepted our 3.6.
Reason probly – diffce of view on strategic risks. Lack of common
appraisal of that.
Structure of N.A.T.O. Mily on abstract need. Never related to
practical realities.
90% of defence prodn in U.S., U.K. & Canada. Rest of N.A.T.O. can
do v. little.
Those 3 Powers shd. get appraisal of need & what can be done to
meet it.
A.B.
Don’t like tone of Acheson’s statement.
Pooling & partnership wd. be better than “we will help you if…”
This language puts weapons in hands of their enemies in Europ.
countries.
Marshall Aid was pol. diff. to digest. This is worse.
Can’t get spirit.
P.M.
They are thinkg. all the time of Congress.
A.B.
Failg. to get Europ. response, they fling in G. re-armament, wh. makes
v. inflammatory sitn. This invites R. attack now.
U.S. must leave us out, if they use this language.
U.K. relief at end of M. Aid. U.S. must not offend natl pride.
If we go on 10/15 yrs. at this rate, we shall exhaust world’s resources.
Agree = no figure. Ask A. to modify language. Soft pedal on G.
P.M.
E.B. will insist we are not in this Eur. queue.
G. re-armament: U.S. will prob. soft-pedal on that now.
H.D.
Don’t be committed to re-arm G. before 4 Powers mtg.
E.D.
Sov. note will prevent (because Fr. fears) any immedte - action on G.
re-armament.
U.S. are windy. But don’t forget sitn is worse. Accelern is requd on
merits – not merely in response to U.S. If so, let’s do it
voluntarily so we can range ourselves on ride of U.S. in pressing
others to do more.
G.W.
As partners, we shd. warn U.S. re language etc.
H.M.
Support P.M.’s formula. Sympathise with much said re U.S.
298
But don’t under-estimate gravity of sitn. I believe G. shd. take share:
tho’ accept E.B.’s tactics m’while. We can’t, in end, promise to
protect G. while they do nothg. to help.
Anyway, unrealistic. Look at R. strength (215 Divisn & better air
than all Eur. together). F/East is v. disquieting. Degree of
armament in W. is v. low.
Agree other Europ. haven’t done their share. One thing wh. is
doubtless worrying U.S. adminn & Congress (& worries me) is:
if we tell France etc. she can have aid of x, regardless of p’mme,
risk they wd. blue the money w’out producg. the defence.
Where shd. we be if R. attacked us and won? Our duty is to put our
defences in good state.
I don’t know what defence we shall get fr. 3.6. – no picture of B.
defence posn. M/D. told E.P.C. acceln wd. be requd – aircraft
prodn in particular he said was bad.
We need a memo on this by M/D. & C.O.S. – what we are doing
& what more shd. be done. On what elements is acceleration
needed.
Don’t under-estimate gravity of mil. balance in Europe.
Must force U.S. to send troops to Europe.
Doubt if it’s wise to delay G. re-armament for fear of provokg. R.
R. may not want war. If Eur. shows quickly she can build up defence,
they (R.) may be more co-operative.
We mustn’t drift.
P.M.
Agree it is serious: but don’t let U.S. panic.
U.S. are preparg. for inevitable war. We are trying to prevent it.
Doubt if R. want war. They believe they can bust us fr. w’in.
Must steer careful course.
Immediate line:
Keep out of queue. Stand in with U.S. Don’t let our acceln be
measured by America’s – they start fr. diff. standard: both
defence (less than ours) & standard living (higher than ours).
Let us join with U.S. in pressing the others.
J.G.
U.S. policy (raw materials) has meant we shall get less for our 3.6m.
They are reducg. effectiveness of our prepns.
Agree with H.G. on need to examine econ. implicns.
H.G.
E.B. will stress that, anyway.
A.B.
I do not advocate our being so weak tht. we don’t provoke G. to attack.
What I meant was: strengthen our posn before offerg. provocn of
G. re-armament.
J.
Endorse that.
“Increase or accelerate” is dangerous unless you say what you will
increase etc.
299
A.B.
Yugoslavs tell me tht. precipitate re-armg. of G. wd. alienate Y. who
suffered much fr. G.
Don’t assume all is well behind Curtain.
Agreed
1. Approve formula proposed.
2. N.B. to explain views of Cab. to E.B.
3. C.O.S. m’while to consider at once what acceleration –
so tht. its econ. implicns can be considered.
300
2nd January, 1951.
C.M. 1(51).
1.
P.M.
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting.
[Enter Att.G., C.O.S.
Attendance of Liaquat.
Nehru’s view – no discn with all, even if informal.
In fact, some wdn’t want to join in. St. L. confirms this.
We can’t accept Liaquat’s dictation. Must stand to line tht.
we can’t guarantee mgt. of all P.M.’s.
G.W.
No final answer until Nehru seen.
P.M.
Can’t have P.M.M. used as forum for accusation by one v. another.
G.W.
Shd. Rahimtoolale represent him?
P.M.
Not when his P.M. refuses to come. G.W. cd. see him now.
H.McN.
Offer Canada, Australia & U.K.
G.W.
Nehru hasn’t accepted that in terms & we can’t now ask him
until he arrives.
H.G.
Can’t we tell him S. Africa & Ceylon don’t want to participate.
That wd. help our position.
G.W.
I will try to draft telegram to Pakistan.
2.
Korea.
E.B.
Can we do anything in P.M.M. to influence situation?
U.S. may demand in U.N. tht. China be named as aggressor.
Will have to be settled by negotn somehow. But how?
First group discn will now be in P.M.M.
Aims: i) stabilise military situation. Had hoped U.N. forces wd. be
able to hold a stable line somewhere – to show aggression
doesn’t pay. Prospects of this now seem to be worse.
………………………….
C.I.G.S.
Mil. sitn. Opposing forces about equal strength ………..
H.McN.
U.S. attitude re China may be softening, since P.M.’s visit & since
finding themselves w’out friends on this in U.N.
Make it plain to U.S. & to Comm. countries tht. some delaying device
re Formosa must be devised. For dilemma can’t be resolved
now.
H.G.
Endorse analysis by E.B. & P.M.
Vital to hold in Korea a) keeps U.S. quiet b) gives some bargaing.
301
power with Chinese.
Pressure fr. U.S. likely to be on econ. sanctions v. China. Can we
hold our posn on this? If we can’t, we shall lose H. Kong.
If U.S. action provokes China to press expansionism – if Indo-China
went, Malaya wd. be in peril. And loss of Malaya wd. be a
v. serious economic blow. Can we prepare for that situation?
J.G.
H. Kong. Key T.U.’s are controlled by Communists. If they were
ordered to make trouble, they certainly cd.
Elsewhere in East many emigrant Chinese. Do U.S. remember this?
Ch. K. Shek is spent force.
Agreed: Endorsed policy submd. by E.B. First seek
support of Comm. Govts. for it
P.M.
M’while, keep it v. close for fear of leakage.
E.B.
Want to authorise Franks now to take Acheson into his confidence.
Not official intimation.
J.G.
Esp. as Truman is to make a pronouncement to Congress.
3.
E.B.
Germany: Soviet Proposal for Meeting of C.F.M.
Soviet reply received. V. long. Re-iterates much tht. was in earlier
note.
U.S. & French both wanted offls. to discuss substance as well as
agenda.
I had therefore to compromise on this at Brussels.
R. have now said offls. shd. not discuss substance.
R. don’t want officials to meet in N. York. I favour Vienna.
Seeking Kelly’s advice.
Am discussing with U.S. & France: & will submit draft reply.
R. accepts mtg: I am keen to go fwd. with it.
4.
Japan: Peace Treaty.
a)
Individual Claims.
E.B.
About £1½ m. assets may be available to us. B. claims v. it will be
v. large.
U.S. have gt. J. assets – and distributed them to individ. claimants.
Doubt if we’ll get much for this. Choice: prob. carry cost on U.K.
funds or say there won’t be compensn.
H.G.
Useless to provide for this in Treaty.
We have already spent £30 m. in compensn in Malaya etc. Let us
take the £1½ m. in compn for that.
302
Can’t accept p.o.w. claim. Agitn not strong. New departure.
How refuse it to p.o.w. ill-treated in Germany.
Repudiate liability to both – p.o.w. and property lost.
E.Sh.
Ty. have made ex gratia paymts. already. Accepted principle.
H.G.
Not aware of that.
C.I.G.S.
Claims paid were for kit lost e.g. in retreat fr. Burma or in Singapore.
No paymts. on basis tht. they were p.o.w.
C.O.S. don’t want that anyway – don’t encourage people to
become p.o.w.
Endorse recommn in para. 9.
Endorse principle tht. we don’t pay p.o.w. for having
bn. p.o.w.
Ty., M/D., F.O. and C.O. (with B/T.) to prepare agreed
line of statement: for submission to Cabinet.
b)
General Treaty Provisions.
E.B.
Indicns now tht. U.S. may prefer a short general Treaty.
H.McN.
Para. 7(0). Answered: inopportune for us to suggest now tht. China
be asked to participate.
Surely, mistaken for us to say we wd. conclude Treaty, w’out invitg.
to participate. U.S. clearly wdn’t invite them even. What do
U.S. intend? To go ahead, invitg. only F/E. Commn & Ceylon:
and prs. Ch. K. Shek?
E.B.
Don’t know. U.S. attitude may be changing.
Don’t bind Cab. to decn on that issue now.
H.McN.
India will take this point.
E.B.
We agree tht. China must be in. Only ques. is: who represents
China? And we don’t intend to say Ch. K. Shek represents
China.
H.McN.
We must make that abundantly clear to C.P.M.’s.
G.W.
Some trouble likely with A. & N.Z. over this liberal approach.
N.Z. wants to stop J. re-arming.
A. wants many econ. sanctions & claims included in Treaty.
Points wh. can’t be enforced.
a) P. 3. para. 8(viii) & (x) wd not be enforceable. Re-examine.
A.
Is para. 8(f) practicable either?
H.McN.
We must put it into the Treaty.
303
P.M.
U.S. will turn it down.
c)
Security Aspects.
E.B.
MacArthur’s last announcemt. increases need to put our C.O.S.
views to U.S.
C.I.G.S.
Our views stated in memo. Don’t want U.K. or U.S. Forces locked
up for ever in Japan. She shd. be respons. for her own security.
Isolated, she can’t be a threat. In last war, she was because
a) access to raw mats. in China b) large Navy.
This need not happen again.
E.B.
Do C.O.S. know of any change of mil. views in U.S.?
C.I.G.S.
No.
E.B.
I believe U.S. Govt. authd MacArthur to make his statement.
I want now authority to take this up with U.S. Govt. –
MacArthur’s statement.
Agreed.
E.Sh.
We are proposg. re-armament of G. before Peace Treaty.
Is MacA. proposing any more than that?
Be careful how we approach this.
H.McN.
No parallel. Policy re G. was agreed betwn. 3 powers.
H.D.
On merits – what chance tht. J. will go Communist. Pity to re-arm
them if they will join the other side.
E.B.
Can’t say.
E.Sh.
Com. strength is not believed to be great.
E.B.
Wasn’t in Czecho. This is a sound point. And I will take it up
with U.S.
[Exit C.O.S.
5.
International Status of Korean Conflict.
P.M.
Diff. ques. Domestic law as well as international.
E.B.
There are 2 positions to be reconciled.
E.Sh.
Wd. Geneva Convn apply?
Att.G.
Prob. not. But we shd. say we wd. regard ourselves as bound by it.
J.
Advantages for us both ways.
We cd. correct domestic diffies by amendg. legn.
304
Att.G.
Balance of expediency in favour of treatg. it as intern. pol. action.
Then amendmt of domestic law shd. be considered at once.
Shd. H.M. have power to declare they are to be deemed a war.
P.M.
Also what happens on a switch into war from this?
A.B.
Amending legn wd. embarrass us even more?
Take Note: officials to consider effects in dom. law.
6.
Industrial Disputes.
a)
Town Clerks.
G.A.I.
……. Town Clerks waitg. a court decision. If that goes v. me, they
will be in strong posn to force me to refer to arbitn.
Att.G.
Certainly don’t refer at this stage. If court decides Minister has no
discretion, he will have to refer T. Clerks to Tribunal.
If it doesn’t, he prob. needn’t.
A.B.
I couldn’t have forced l.a.’s to take difft. action. I gave them v. strong
advice: couldn’t have done more.
M/L. shd. not refer these claims anyway – for he wd. thus elevate into
formal “negotiations” talks wh. h’to have bn. a fake.
Att.G.
M/L. has sold that pass already: because he has referred M.O.H. and
D. Edn cases. If therefore court decides he has no discretion, he
will have to refer.
P.M.
Await decision in Kemsley case.
M’while expedite submission on Order 1305.
[Exit Att.G.
[Enter M.W.
7.
Future of East African Groundnuts Scheme.
H.G.
Mtgs. with Coates & Govr./Tanganyika.
Recommend we go fwd. on 60.000 acres schemes. For
a) If successful cd. expand to 102.000 after 2 or 3 yrs.
b) Abandonment wd. be little cheaper than 60.000 plan.
P.M.
Read note from L.P.
Political advantages of abandoning it altogether.
J.G.
We went into that. Satisfied there is a chance of success on 60.000.
Pol. disadvantages of abandonmt. wd. be v. great.
M.W.
Queensland – must remain in M/Food.
305
H.D.
Cdn’t we say in Wh. Paper tht. this is a success.
H.McN.
Beware. Let’s reserve self-praise until success in assured.
H.G.
Comments on drafting of Wh. Paper – will send them to M/F.
306
15th January, 1951.
C.M. 3(51).
1.
Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.
P.M.
Procdgs. v. harmonious. Tricky at times. Reasonable proposals
on Korea whatever result.
Kashmir: talks were unfruitful. Points of disagreemt. narrowed,
but no concln. L.A.K. was reasonable (E.Sh. On defence also.)
H.D.
Decln well received by U.K. public opinion.
P.M.
Hope some advantage in U.S. also.
2.
Defence Preparations.
P.M.
As in brief. Time-table.
Presentn a) reasons for acceleration b) its economic effect.
Suggd these can be done separately – but I doubt it.
I wd. have liked a single statement before Parlt. met.
H.M.
Public opinion – not Labour opinion only – is disturbed: some
anti-American strands in it: has 2 problems on wh. guidance
is needed i) worry about threat of war: avoiding looking it in the
face: doubt as to who is to blame, some criticism of U.S. They
need convincing of facts of R.’s activities: but also tht. we wd.
seek a peaceful settlement if opportunity offered by R. Must
start from basis of what is best means of preventg. war. Explain
sitn: make them face it: & convince them we are not seekg. war.
ii) disposn to think tht. defence need have no effect on social
policy & well-being. Labour must be made to understand tht.
this can’t be.
I had hoped P.M. cd. spk. before Parlt. met, e.g. in his constituency.
With advance hand-out of 2.000 words. Reason: don’t want it
made in Parlt, because then reported together with Opposn
comments. A White Paper, prs., as alternative. Or make it
outside Parlt., even after Parlt. has met – tho’ Opposn wdn’t
like that.
H.D.
Cd. not P.M. do it this coming week-end.
White Paper wd. not be suitable.
A.B.
Cd. Cab. be told, before country is told, what we are going to do.
What are the figures? Leaks in Press.
H.G.
These leaks are damaging.
Support L.P. Speech next week-end to prepare public mind.
No need to go into details at this stage.
Answer the criticism: is re-arming going to do any good?
Get across our posn vis-à-vis Russia. Need for re-arming,
307
regardless of scale & effect.
A.B.
Can you separate the two? Must tell people what impact will be.
Otherwise, produce scare – w’out realisation of what we shall
call on people to do.
We have never agreed on £3.6., in detail, now U.S. have declined to
give the £500. P.M. has said we shall have to forego increased
y/
advantages we might have expected: no-one has said we shall
have to give anything up.
H.G.
Posn is tht. £3.6 is going ahead: & we have since agreed to announce,
at Brussels, we were considering acceleration. Def. Cttee have
not considered that since.
P.M.
I have spoken in genl. terms. Can’t do so again, w’out details.
Doubt if we can yet say what econ. implicns wd. be.
I might hang a speech on Comm. decln – object to prevent war: action
on F/E.: mtg. of C.F.M.: m’while look to our defences.
But then shd. have to say somethg. re scale – critical of U.S. &
also awkward w’out decns on figures.
A.B.
Wd. be matched with U.S. extravagant plans.
Excessive publicity for Eisenhower.
Wd. provoke more talk of Coalition.
Before we spk., we must know economic impact - & esp. wtr. it will
come in 6 months or earlier.
H.M.
x/ Begun already – prices, raw materials.
Public expect guidance & leadership.
Pity detail isn’t ready: but not too early to begin to prepare public
for it.
Surely it cd. be hung on peg of Comm. decln.
x/ diffies are not due to our re-armament, but to U.S.
Our plans & impact can’t be announced this wk-end.
H.G.
Agree: you can’t spk. on that until Cab. decns taken.
But I think there is preliminary clearing of ground to be done.
Repeat E.Sh. disclosures re no. of R. divns under arms.
Repeat no. of spots at wh. we are under pressure – e.g. Malaya.
E.Sh.
….. Favour speech by P.M. B’cast. Not in his constituency.
He cd. say i) Adopted £3.6 p’mme. Are now revising it in light of
change in world situation – notably the fact tht. R. continues to
re-arm, on a vast scale. Their posn is far stronger than any other
country. Producg. aircraft at 300 p. month. Re-organising war
potential of Hungary, Rumania & Czecho.
Don’t like U.S. attitude. But, in view of our defenceless posn in west,
we must not antagonise them. We can’t afford to. We need
U.S. troops in Europe. We shd. steady opinion on that point
308
too.
Shall have to present Suppl. Estimates soon. Genl. defence debate
on that. Another on next year’s Estimates in Feb. Let P.M.
begin to prepare the way for those debates.
T.W.
If such statement is to be made, it must be followed by another
explaing. impact on our economy & on policies of civil Dpts.
Ch/Ex. askg. for economies wh. cut into policy as well as adminn.
Shall have to announce these publicly in reln to defence needs.
J.G.
Betwn. now & Sunday we shall know China’s answer on Korea. And
that will be dominant in people’s mind. Suppose it comes on
eve of P.M.’s speech. Might be wrong moment for such a
speech.
If it were not for that, I wd. be disposed to favour a speech.
P.M.
Impressed by that.
H.McN.
Unfortunate P.M. can’t give details. But still desirable to say
somethg. Two months ago public were expectg. us to say this
more than now. M’while, high hopes over Korea & our
steadying of U.S. policy has made people more optimistic.
Even if Ch. gives fav. answer, wise to check wishful thinking.
If they reject, say this is only one point in world sitn wh. requires
preparedness.
Wd. prefer a b’cast.
Share H.D.’s fears re Germany. Public are concerned at G. re-armg.
P.M.
How diff. to deal with that – when it’s a card for C.F.M. & we don’t
know how we shall want to play it. Yet, if I say nil. on that,
it will be thght. to be significant.
C.E.
Effect of our speeches on W. Europe. Went to C.D. course for
Europeans on day after Taft’s speech. W. Europ. in view of that
were discarding hope of Em. defence.
Handicapped by policy of avoidg. scare over C.D. I said: we put
active defence first & mean to fight as far east as possible; &
plan c.d. mainly to support morale of troops.
Depn from C.I. askg. for evacuation in war. Told them too we were
going to fight as far east as poss.
Necessary to state our determinn to stand fast.
But cost! All earlier figures are unrealistic. C.D. - £137 m. in 4 years:
revised estimate, on prices only, prob. 50% higher.
M.S. - £750 m. plan for shelter. When that comes home in
W. Eur., what effect will it have? If any steadying influence is
to be applied, we shall have to do it.
Wd. prefer one speech – later.
P.M.
So wd. I. I don’t want to suggest war is inevitable.
309
A.B.
Dissent from E.Sh. analysis.
Military always exaggerate strength of potential enemy.
R. can no doubt give more of her steel prodn to defence.
But I believe R. is not putting main reliance on military
coup.
R.’s game is to force us to re-arm on a scale wh. will embitter our
people v. democratic control.
All we need therefore is enough mil. strength to ensure tht. we aren’t
knocked out in 1st blow. For they can’t win a long war.
Don’t believe R. is formidable mil. power. Stories of their mil.
strength is schoolboy nonsense. My informn is tht. R.
bureaucracy has failed to organise prodn.
Concln. We dare not put such strains on our economy &
developmt overseas as to give R. their opportunity.
P.M. has bn. wise. P.M.M. has bn. remarkably successful. It’s
decln = historic. And has given us moral leadership of world.
For P.M. to spk. now as proposed wd. undo all the good that
has done.
Suggn tht. country is askg. for leadership echoes D. Express. This
atmosphere is created by enemies of the Party.
Diffy over U.S. They have never had our experience of m’taing.
army in peace. They arm for war: disarm in peace. If we can’t
restrain them, they will drag us into war. I won’t travel that road.
If H.G. comes to M/H. and asks for cut in Nat. Health Service, I won’t
accept it. Revert to y/. Can’t have atmosphere created by public
speeches wh. wd. prejudge that posn.
A.
Still favour P.M. speaking this wk-end. Peg = P.M.M. & its decln.
To induce mood of sanity.
Avoid detail. But sympathise with some of A.B.’s case. What is our
defence p’mme for. W’out knowg. that, can’t assess economic
impact.
State cause of re-armament frankly. Not Korea or China, but Europe.
Don’t believe R. can support vast Armies suggd on her steel
prodn.
Make a balanced statement before Parlt. meets.
J.
Support A.’s view.
Not as b’cast. For not precise enough for b’cast method.
Speech in P.M.’s constituency.
H.W.
Strong case for speech on P.M.M. in its own right. Wd. m’tain
moral leadership. Cd. take up generally some of r. materials
ques. – P.M.M. discns & W’ton announcemt.
Danger – reply “so what?” unless you promise further statemt. in
Parlt.
G.A.I.
Support H.W. Means a second speech soon afterwds.
Therefore Cab. shd. know somethg. re p’mme this week, so tht.
other Ministers can answer ques.
310
G.T.
Leadership sometimes consists in being quiet. P.M. has done
enough to make our policy clear. Against makg. a speech.
P.M.
V. diff. to judge from this discn what content or tone of speech shd.
be.
Main work of P.M.M. was Korea. Cd. follow up approach made to
that problem. Say it applies elsewhere. And end: but if worse
comes, we must be ready for it. But that isn’t a call to
sacrifice. It’s more hopeful.
If, however, I refer to R. danger: I imply preparg. for war & putting
country on war footing.
H.D.
Former is line: ending with need to be strong in case worse happens.
H.G.
You cd. go beyond decln & give some insight into P.M.M. mtgs.
Cab. decn of 18/12 (to accelerate) hasn’t bn. made very clear in U.K.
Tho’ disclosed at Brussels.
Cd. promise details when Parlt. meets.
P.M.
Want to know decns taken before I give that promise.
{ I will defer decision, for a day or two,
{ until I see what Chinese response is.
[Enter Att.G. &
Wheatley
3.
Order 1305.
Att.G.
[ Not heard.]
H.G.
Shd. not revoke at present.
Amendmt. I favour only (b).
A.B.
P’pone considn until we know implicns of re-armament.
J.G.
Desirable to keep Order going in some form.
Easy for Comm. leadership to get men out. If * Kemsley decn
enables them to use it – T.U.C. will decide next time tht. Order
shd. go. And M/L. then pledged to end it, if one side asks for
its revocation. *i.e. if held tht. M/L. has no discretion & unoffl.
Comm. leaders are enabled to get to arbitn. (?)
G.A.I.
Wd. like to canvass views on J.C.C. – especially if we prefer to delay
final decision.
P.M.
Throw it open: or put proposals?
G.A.I.
Throw it open for genl. discussion.
Att.G.
On p. 3(c) in M/L. memo. Is if meant tht. prohibn of unoffl. strike
to continue. Diff. to forbid them to go to arbitn & at same
time prohibit them to strike.
311
G.A.I.
Diff: for don’t want order swamped by multitude of small applns.
Want T.U. views on that ques.
Agreed: get general views of J.C.C.
[Exit L.O.’s
[Enter N.B.
N.B.
4.
Coal Economy Measures.
i)
Want b’castg. to be considered together with load-shedding
proposals – by L.P. Cttee or Prodn Cttee.
Summertime. Propose 8 weeks’ extension. Sitn much worse.
Prodn 1.6 m. above highest expectn. But some power stations
are now below 2 wks. stock. Domestic consumers: shopkeepers
industry – all bearing heavy sacrifices.
ii)
P.M.
Weather has improved. Thght. gap was small – due to lack of
normal autumn increase.
N.B.
Appeals have brght. prodn up to level of 1949/50. But we needed
an increase. Open-cast is being lost because weather.
Imports – 250.000 vice 350.000 hoped in Jan. May get 1 m. in all,
vice 1.6 m.
H.G.
M/T. never promised more than 250.000 in Jan.
T.W.
M/F & P. spks. in terms of m. tons. Saving fr. summertime
proposal is v. problematical. Doesn’t start until end/Mar.
Pol. diffies in Parlt.
In 1950 we had 3 wks’ extension. Now asked for 8 weeks.
More coal will be used by people sittg. up later, because
lighter. This won’t help this winter at all: & only 1 week in
next winter. Pol. black-eye for no results.
H.McN.
Supported T.W.
A.
Also supported.
J.
Start it immediately before Easter.
H.G.
Coal posn will be difficult in Mar. & Apl.
Favour compromise.
C.E.
Will be diff. to get any extension thro’ Parlt. Agricult. members will
be hard to convince.
P.M.
Is it worth while?
A.B.
Don’t think it is.
C.E.
Ready to ask Parlt. to agree to 3 weeks’ extension.
312
P.M.
A small & hypothetical saving wh. you can’t get Parlt. to accept.
Agreed: only 3 weeks’ extension.
i)
Broadcasting. (resumed)
H.M.
Direct saving 90 t. p.d. Indirect, about 60 t. p.d. (thro’ earlier
retiring to bed).
A.
Pin-prick.
iii)
Mid-Week Sport.
N.B.
Offl. Cttee recommended no mid-week sport – football or racing.
C.E. doesn’t want to touch racing.
I propose limiting this to football.
C.E.
No figures can be produced in support of this. F.A. will ask you to
prove your case.
H.W.
Only 30 matches to play. Only 10 draws are likely. Few mining
teams are left in. Only 3 re-plays in those areas. If Cup
replays are on Satys, League replays will have to be on
wk-days & there will be more of them.
H.McN.
In w. Scotland, mid-week games do draw huge crowds. And
miners in Lanark don’t like it. Valuable psychol. effect of
announcg. no mid-week Cup replays & later will consider
mid-wk. racing.
J.G.
St Leger on Saty vice Wed. wd. save more coal than any football
interference.
T.W.
Doncaster Council, if asked now, wd agree to Saty for Leger.
But don’t exaggerate saving of coal.
And doesn’t happen until next Sept.
A.B.
Don’t do this on basis of coal only. Wait & see if we have to do it
for defence prepns generally.
Agreed a) no interference with mid-week sport
on basis of coal only.
b) put St Leger on Saty - & take it up early
in the spring.
H.M.
Is N.C.B. giving enough attentn to managerial side of problem.
[Exit J.G.
313
[Enter H.H.M.
5.
H.M.
Supplementary Pensions Schemes.
Cab. agreed it shd. be limited to underground workers. Public
statement gives no precision to that.
314
18th January, 1951.
C.M. 4(51).
1.
Press Council.
H.M.
V. long delay. Nothg. satisf. in this plan, except that it is some
plan at last. Gives undue influence to proprietors: no repn
of outside public. T. of r. are also too tight.
What shd. be our attitude? There will be P.Q.’s.
Journalists are takg. it up.
We might say: noted, departs fr. R. Commn scheme endorsed by
H/C: seen unacceptable to journalists: assume proprietors will
be discussg. with journalists & more acceptable scheme may
emerge. W’hold comment m’while.
H.D.
W’out laymen, better have nothing.
G.A.I.
Insufft. repn of editors. Managemt., rather than editors or
proprietors, wd. be represented.
Support H.M.’s tactics.
Rotatg. chairmanship – Newspp. Society is too weak to hold up v.
the other. Need for independent chairman.
A.B.
Adhere to R. Commn recommns. Put proprietors on wrong foot.
Independent Secretariat wd. help.
H.M.
Let journalists run the opposn: but we can say tht. this plan doesn’t
accord with R. Commn recommns. Second point wd. preserve
our liberty of action.
Agreed.
[Enter H.H.M.
2.
Balance of Civil Pay.
H.G.
Memo.
Those who have had balance/pay in past have enjoyed preferential
posn.
Shd. we acquiesce in that, w’in field wh. we control?
The other system is fairer. Why shd. body of working class
taxpayers go on paying for pref. treatment for public servants.
No need to change now, if Cab. think not worth the row it might
involve.
E.Sh.
Beg Ch/E. not to press this. If arguments evenly balanced, wiser to
retain status quo.
Principle applies to manual workers in public service as well as others.
H.G.
Most of them are not called up.
P.M.
Broadly spkg. it is black-coated who benefit.
315
E.Sh.
Adminve cost. Proposals for simplifying procedure – wd. cut work
by 50%.
Bad time to make a change anyway. Formidable case wd. have to
be made for a change.
Service Ministers are v. makg. a change. If State does less than
private employers, controversy wd. be raised.
P.M.
Let drowsy dog sleep?
A.B.
Not so easy. N.H.S. – convention tht. doctors etc., are not civil
servants.
Decide against – but w’hold announcemt. until
[Enter E.B.
war breaks out.
C.E.
Cdn’t do that. I shall have to discuss with Police.
Gave details of effect on Police.
Majority of “manuals” will bet at least as much in Army as outside.
Problem is smaller. Increased Serv. pay has changed posn.
H.G.
That assumes tht. pay of regulars will be given to conscripts in war.
Must not assume that.
C.E.
You won’t be able to avoid that in war.
H.M.
L.a.’s were compelled by legn in ’39 to give balance/civil pay.
P.M.
Better leave this ques. until war breaks out.
G.T.
Can you – ques. arises now, thro’ calling up of reservists.
Equality of sacrifice is needed. Can’t compel private employers
to do this. Therefore, stop creatg. privileged class of public
servants.
P.M.
Carry on existg. practice, pro tem.
Consider implications – e.g. natd industries etc.
H.G.
I will consider further: and prs. have an offl. Cttee.
E.B.
Don’t strike overmuch for uniformity: creates more discontent
than it solves. War Grants scheme, with discretion, was wiser:
can’t avoid means test if you are trying to remove hardship.
P.M.
Because of incidence of taxation, State pays even in private industry
but employer determines who shall benefit.
H.H.M.
M/P. experience shd. be made available to any Cttee.
[Exit H.H.M.
316
3.
Convention on Human Rights.
J.
On 1st: I prefer Assembly text. Can Att.G. and I meet w. party &
discuss these points?
Must make it clear tht. decns e.g. on requisitiong. are by Ministers and
not for the courts.
Wd. prefer small amendments in Assembly text. Who is to decide?
Art. 25 wd. confer on private individuals right to bring such issues
to the Commn.
H.D.
On Assembly text: must reserve right to tax and to nationalise
(incldg. requisition). Wd. prefer that stated in positive terms.
We shall be under pressure to accept jurisdn of the court.
J.G.
Accept memo. Want it clear tht. Protocols may be accepted
separately in Col. territories. Cd. not apply 7 at once in
Colonies.
J.
Second Protocol. “….. so far as resources permit.” Who is to judge?
Can Commn rule tht. our resources allow of our doing more for
education in a Colony.
A.B.
Also “due regard to religious educn.” Who is judge of that?
P.M.
These attributes of sovereignty are all to be transferred to a Cttee,
respons. to no-one.
Att.G.
We must continue to resist jurisdn of any such Commn. So long as we
do, it doesn’t matter.
H.M.
I have always bn. against this Convention – all of it. Humbug.
A.
Prefer a frontal attack of this nonsense. Don’t express any sympathy.
Att.G.
Not merely Layton. Some Tories & Labour supporters keenly
favour it.
A.B.
Why start such a court off with these v. touchy subjects. Shd. rather
build up its authority by startg. with prosaic subjects like
co-ordn of steel & coal indies. This is not the end at wh.
supra-national bodies should start.
J.G.
These arguments really go against whole Convention, wh. we have
already signed.
E.B.
Cttee of experts mtg. this week.
Ld. Ch. Dpt. represented on Working Party.
{ Let Ld. Ch. & Att.G. meet the working party. Settle
Agreed. { instns to Cttee of Experts. But make it clear that
317
{ Cab. have not finally decided.
A.
Protocol added.
Let it still be clear that we resist, still, the jurisdn of the Court.
A.B.
Even so, decln of principle alone wd. be dangerous.
C.E.
Inconsistent with our conceptn of unwritten constitution.
Att.G.
Danger that a Conserv. Govt. might accept jurisdn of the court.
H.M.
Cd. a subsequent Govt. then contract out
E.B.
Yes: on 6 months’ notice.
H.G.
Assert right of Parlt to decide.
H.D.
The 2nd Protocol isn’t capable of suitable amendment.
I shd. prefer tht. this be dropped altogether.
The 1st cd. be made acceptable.
P.M.
Don’t think much of the 3rd.
Doesn’t prevent “single list” system.
J.
Prefer 1st part of 3rd Protocol & only last 3 lines of alternative text.
H.M.
If we argue for deletion of 2nd Protocol, you may have awkward
sitn in Parlt.
A.B.
Keep religious liberty & educn separately.
Att.G.
“….. with due regard to the liberty of parents to ensure religious
educn of their children.”
P.M.
3rd Protocol: restrict to home territories.
4.
[Exit Att.G.
[Enter Ogmore.
Cocos Islands.
J.G.
Para. 13. We shd. get it as condn.
O.
C.O.S. now think it more urgent to get air-strip prepd.
See Menzies: tell him decn: say we cd. have agreemt: & urge him
to hurry up.
J.G.
Privately. For Singapore Govt. are responsible. And Malaya are
concerned. Premature announcemt. wd. cause trouble.
No public statement, until all this settled.
[Exit O.
[Enter Scott, F.O.
318
5.
Korea.
E.B.
Peking Govt. have rejected latest proposals of First Cttee.
Frustrated efforts of P.M.M. – wh. was credit to Commonw. &
created world opinion in favour of confce betwn. e. & west.,
vice too dramatic talk of war.
This approach went a v. long way to meet China: & to moderate U.S.
policy.
Not sure wtr. their answer is final rejection. It may not be. Tho’ most
people assume it is.
N. Yk. have bn. considerg. what step if this rejected. Has bn. assumed
tht. we shd. be almost bound to support condemnatory resoln.
But that opens many possibilities – blockade, sanctions etc.,
& might lead to war.
On Saty we recd draft U.S. resoln. Gross points for resoln. Similar
paper fr. U.S. Embassy in Ldn.
i)
Is it a rejection? Yes: for lays down condns wh. are impossible.
ii) Does it offer any basis for counter proposals? Can’t find any.
Even to suggest that to U.S. wd. inflame them.
But don’t want hasty decn – don’t want it prominent in any resoln.
Have counselled v. hasty decn.
iii) What shd. U.N. do?
No condemnatory resoln shd. go beyond Korea. It shd. not
authorise genl. counter measures v. China generally.
C.A.S. went to W’ton last week for consultns with U.S. C.O.S.
He & Franks are explorg. posn in non-committal talks – to
ascertain U.S. intentns. We shall get final draft of resoln
Our aim has bn. restraint – negotns – limit any condemnation –
avoid precipitate action.
One diffy. of condemnation: we haven’t admitted Ch. to U.N.
membership.
Have therefore urged delay: Cease Fire Cttee: discuss: hold hand(s)!!
But I think weight of U.S. public opinion will force U.S. Govt. to
speak.
Must keep in consultn with Comm. P.M.’s.
Shall have to consider later what we do if U.N. authorise sanctions.
Also posn of H. Kong.
We assume Truman still does not favour war with China. Assume we
shd. keep as far away as poss. fr. anythg. wh. might provoke
genl. war.
Will U.S. hold b’head in Korea? If they do, sitn will be altered.
If they had held a line, P.M.M. plan might have succeeded.
Reply on C.F.M. just going.
H.M.
Tel. fr. Peking suggd China might reject approach but stop fighting.
They don’t seem to be fighting acc. to Press this a.m.
Cd. U.S. be pressed not to pursue them if they w’draw? Don’t let’s
make same mistake as we did in going beyond 38th.
319
E.B.
I will remind Tedder of this point.
If advice of our C.O.S. had bn. heeded, we shdn’t have bn. in this
mess. Hand it to them. Cdn’t have had better advice,
intelligence or informn.
E.Sh.
Doubt if you’ll restrain U.S. for long. Their conversns with C.A.S.
are not re-assuring. Bradley has said they can’t hold a big
enough b’head. Tho’ Collins has said they’ll fight.
U.S. considerg. action they cd. take after condemn. resoln. But they
don’t seem to know.
P.M.
Marshall will be saner on this than Bradley.
{
Keep steady: try to stiffen U.S. to hold on in Korea:
{
China may make a second offer.
A.B.
Instead of condemning China’s action in Korea, cdn’t we condemn
their reply to our approach. Wd. carry no consequences.
Wd. avoid diffies in future of having condemned Ch. as
aggressor.
U.S. actg. unilaterally, in condemning Ch. reply – w’out consultg. us.
Maybe, we shan’t be able to re-assert one influence over U.S. without
an open rift.
P.M.
In reply to ques. by E.Sh: no U.K. re-inforcemts. What about U.S.
puttg. some S. Americans in.
May have to condemn Ch. action in Korea. Don’t want a Cttee to
consider sanctions.
H.G.
a)
b)
Keep brake on as long as we can. But brake, not break.
Because of posn in Europe.
Sanctions. U.S. can do little more. They will ask us to do things.
Cd. we consider in comm. grps. e.g. rubber.
E.B.
Wd. prefer to handle this on same basis as E/W. trade.
A.
Not a rejection. An Oriental reply.
P.M.
This confirms view tht. I shd. not make a speech during coming
week-end.
C.E.
Hope we shall influence U.S. – diffy. of swinging U.K. public
opinion behind U.S. in aggressive action.
E.B.
When time comes, I shd. make the speech. This is F. Affairs.
I don’t want to do it at a time or in a way provocative to U.S.A.
Feeling in U.S. is bad: needs v. careful handling.
We must not lose U.S. support in Europe.
Pacific-firsters have quadrupled their power in last
2 months.
The less we say publicly on this sort of issue, the better.
320
22nd January, 1951.
C.M. 5(51).
1.
Service Courts Martial.
[Enter Att.G., J.S., Hall, Crawley,
Wheatley.
E.Sh.
Shd. we on the Bill, make decln of intention on these other ques.?
H/C. expect it. No alternative but to do so.
White Paper? Yes. But before 2nd Rdg. debate? Maybe we shd. hear
views of H/C. before deciding, on these ques. on wh. opinion
does not necessarily follow Party lines.
The three issues.
a) Civilian lawyer as President. We reject this.
b) Unanimity findings. We reject this also. Wd. be
impracticable in war - & to some extent in overseas
stations in peace.
c) Other ranks repn. Wd. attract some support. And A.H.
believes in it. Possibly J.S. favours it. If we can show
tht., by new appeal procedure, serving men will
have same safeguards as civilians I believe we can
satisfy most reasonable opinion.
P.M.
(a)
H.
Admy support memo. In peace, 80-90% of cases are disciplinary. Nos.
are small: down now to 83 p. annum. Pilcher Cttee have upheld
workg. of naval courts-martial. Expendre of providing civilian
presidents wd. not be justified.
J.S.
Unnecessary if we get appeal procedure.
A.C.
We support.
b)
Civilian President.
Agreed.
Unanimity Findings.
J.
Depends on analogy of Judge & Jury. If we follow procedure of
Justices court, no need to introduce unanimity.
Ct./appeal may bring out new problems. Can’t answer them now.
Let ct/appeal get to work: if it discloses deficiencies we can
remedy them.
Att.G.
Ct./appeal can’t review findings on fact.
But I support proposal in memo.
Wh.
No case for modifying status quo.
This is separate code: can’t apply civil analogues too narrowly.
Anyway, agree with J. re analogy of Justices court.
Agreed.
Procedure of reviewg. authority goes on – accused will get
2 remedies.
E.Sh.
321
c)
Other Rank Representation.
J.S.
I was attracted – justice shd. seem to be done.
But not recommended by either Cttee. I was ready to accept majority
view of my colleagues – at this stage.
A.Cr.
Att. still favours experiment – on U.S. basis, of giving accused option
to ask for other rank repn. Assocn with U.S. Forces might
sharpen demand for it.
P.M.
Any evce tht. other ranks want it?
E.Sh.
No.
Att.G.
Favour Att. view.
P.M.
Cd. we give the option?
C.E.
How select the other rank repve?
How be sure of a man who wd. stand up to view taken by officers?
In some Services, custom to ask junior offr. to give his view first.
In all services). A big strain to ask the private to give his view first.
This points to a v. seasoned Sergt. Major. And wd. that help accused?
(P.M.
A.B.
N. Health Service appeal tribunals are so constituted as to include a
“peer” of accused.
Awkward to reject this.
P.M.
I incline twds. giving U.S. option.
J.
Against interests of accused. Other ranks will be more severe.
Wh.
Remember we have removed diffce betwn. special & ordinary jurors.
No “class distinction” in civil juries.
If it’s true tht. presence of other ranks wd. be v. interest of accused,
they wdn’t opt for it.
Real diffy: where do you select other rank repn from & how.
H.
No demand for this. No advocacy of it in either Cttee.
V. unpleasant for lower-deck man in a ship. Diff. in Navy to draw
the man from “another unit”.
H.D.
Diff. to lag behind U.S. in superficial democracy.
-----------------[Enter E.B.
J.S.
Wdn’t affect decisions. Might give other ranks more confidence.
If views of Cttees are not a bar - & we are turning down some of
their recommns – I think there’s much to be said for it.
322
H.G.
Politically diff. for us to reject this if pressed in H/C.
Agreed: leave this ques. open, & consider U.S. practice.
Announcement of Decisions.
H.M.
I wd. prefer to publish Wh. Paper before debate. More s’forward.
E.Sh.
Wd. rather avoid definite line.
P.M.
Let us settle our line on Thursday on the 3rd point.
Naval Discipline Bill.
H.M.
Don’t promise anything this Session.
[Exit invitees.
2.
Fire Services in War.
C.E.
As in memo. Para. 8 commended. L.a.’s will be satisfied with that.
H.McN.
Nothing to add. My l.a.’s wd. accept this.
H.M.
Agree. “So far as this Govt. is concerned” – wd. meet it.
H.D.
No objn.
A.B.
Do you contemplate 2 Services, under para. 8.
C.E.
No. A single Service.
[Enter C.A.S. & Elliot.
K.Y.
3.
E.B.
Korea.
Sponsoring. Decided, with P.M., not to co-sponsor. I shall drop that.
Consider only wtr. we shall vote for U.S. resoln.
Agreed.
At A.’s request, read out terms of U.S. resolution.
Problem: what consequences.
U.K. attitude to Resolution.
i)
Condemnation of Ch. action in Korea. They have commd
aggression in K. Can’t deny it, as a fact. Diffy: what follows, if
decln of aggression made? We have promised support of action
v. aggression in Korea. But are we ready to support action
elsewhere v. China? Under this resoln: U.S. may w’draw fr.
Korea & carry attack v. China, a declared aggressor. That wd.
create new & dangerous situation. Wd. involve us in much
bigger affair. My view is: militarily unwise to get into that
position. It might involve transportg. Ch. K. Shek's forces to
m’land: fomentg. new civil war, in wh. we wd. be supportg.
323
ii)
C.K.S. v. Commts. Doubt if Comm. wd. support us in that.
Nehru says door not shut & claims we can still negotiate.
Told my repve in Peking to try to clear up ambiguity in Ch. reply.
viz., no cease-fire w’out precedg. negotns: but don’t say
what such negotns wd. be about. Is it local sitn of Armies:
or the long term issues re F/East. If latter, we cdn’t accept.
If former only, another matter: certainly then we shdn’t be
justified in launchg. major war on China. No reply yet
received. Might be wise to defer final decision until we
know.
P.M.
Krishna tells me Pannikar has received followg. from Peking Govt. –
Accept cease-fire in principle. Negotns for it & discns must be
settled before cease-fire. Venue: China – not of gt. importce.
Suggest H. Kong as alternative.
E.B.
iii)
iv)
China fears tht. once cease-fire accepted, negotns will be dragged
on. In U.S., serious war psychosis. They don’t want to deal with
Comm. China – don’t want to speak to them. They poured
money into China: missionaries & social work etc: and look
at results. Many understandgs. between. F.D.R. & Ch. K. Shek.
A long b’ground. They feel Chinese nation has let them down –
shown ingratitude.
Must find means of handling this so as to avoid breach with U.S.
Against this b’ground, consider Tel. 205 fr. W’ton. This is what
they think Resoln wd. empower them to do.
Coll. Measures Cttee – gt. power. Majority of states favouring
U.S. point of view. ⅔rd majority rule, & still only
recommendatory: but v. diff. for us to oppose such
recommns once made. Considg. wtr. any tighter safeguards
can be devised to ensure tht. action doesn’t automaty follow
on recommns of this Cttee. Must keep our discretion re U.K.
action in this field.
Defer final decision until to-morrow because of iii) above.
V. awkward for Jebb., who must speak to-day. May I authorise
him to condemn the aggression: but to resort to any means
of ensurg. negotns to avert war: U.K. seekg. clarificn of Ch.
reply: promise further speech to-morrow.
M’while Sweden, France etc., are askg. for a lead from us.
P.M.
Decln of U.S. policy twds. China – as stated on b’cast this morning.
V. dangerous.
E.B.
May be initiative of a P.R.O.
H.McN.
Gross said earlier Nat. China must be included in any conference
on F/E.
They wd. throw him over, if it suited them.
E.B.
324
C.A.S.
a) Korea. Remains U.S. policy to stay: but they explain why they
can’t. Only 50 mile perimeter at best: and doubt if they’ll hold
that. Ridgway said he cd. stay 2/3 months. But since I left,
MacA. & others have taken more optimistic view.
They gave me impn they didn’t want to stay in Korea.
a) They think Ch. cd. push them out if they tried.
b) They fear continuing commitmt there.
We are now back again in uncertainty.
Ridgway has toughened things up. Ch. will be affected increasingly
by U.N. air attack.
b) Future action. They are hurt at Ch. ingratitude. Talkg. of
“retaliation.” Strong pol. pressure. But that may pass –
it often does.
Tel. 205. Last Wed., mtg. of Nat. Sec. Council – to decide what next.
No v. firm conclns – messy mtg. Our views were taken into a/c.
Genl. conclns “just about along lines of your thinking” (Bradley).
They said: i) no action of Resoln until out of Korea.
ii) “establishg. a posn ” didn’t mean decisions on action:
promised to consult us first.
i) gives us some time.
They stressed need to avoid breach between. Comm. & U.S. Want to
be in same boat. Danger, qua Eisenhower & Europe, of any
U.K. action wh. inflamed U.S. public opinion at this time.
Doubt if they will go in for bombing of China – save prs. if U.S.
evacuating troops were under v. heavy attack. They don’t want
to extend the war.
Selective sanctions – Sherman. He didn’t favour naval blockade. He
wanted some selective embargo, thro’ licensing control at ports
+ navicert system. Wanted joint examn of that: but p’poned mil.
side of it.
Chang. K. Shek. Apart fr. Bradley’s enquiry (how wd. we regard
using his troops to support stabilised line in Korea) no
responsible U.S. authority seems to favour puttg. them into
mainland of China.
Continuing U.K./U.S. consultn. State Dpt. & Harriman wd. like it.
But State & War Dpts. can’t co-operate in this sort of thing.
H.M.
Don’t slam any door on negotns with Chinese.
Coll. Measures Cttee sounds dangerous.
Must consider our position v. carefully: even to point of expressing
some diffce of view with U.S.
A.B.
Urgent ques. this a.m. – is line Jebb shd. take.
P.M.
Read draft telegram to Jebb.
A.B.
If he says aggression has bn. commd, we are commd to voting for
resolution. Wd. much prefer him to condemn Ch. for failg. to
send more conciliatory reply. Don’t get on slippery slope.
325
Don’t prejudge our decision.
H.G.
Aim: get negotns going: but nothg. to discourage U.S. from hanging
on in Korea. We shall never get settlement if U.N. troops
w’draw.
Jebb wd. be drawing distinction betwn. collective action & its dangers
& admittg. fact of aggression. Support general line of draft
telegram.
Anyway, Jebb has condemned the aggression already.
H.D.
Support the draft. V. important to delete statemt. tht. China have
rejected offer.
J.
U.S. resoln assumes continuing U.N. action in Korea.
Support that, but keep away fr. collective measures para.
A.B.
Let Jebb say nil. to prejudice our vote on resoln.
H.McN.
Need he speak to-day? He won’t say any more than he has done
already. Let conversns go on in W’ton.
E.B.
We can’t avoid condemnation of aggression.
P.M.
Moral attitude: must condemn aggression.
What can you do about it? Another matter. Esp. aggression by one
of big 5 – whose aggression U.N. Charter never purported to
deal with.
E.B.
“….. aggression: but n’withstandg. that, U.N. offered negotn & regret
Chinese have not yet accepted that.”
If he has to speak to-day.
E.B.
P.M. of Canada also asked China for elucidation.
Has had a reply – wh. is not unconciliatory.
326
23rd January, 1951.
C.M. 6(51).
1.
Meat
[Enter K.Y., M.W., Ogmore & Strang.
M.W.
As in memo. Announce cut & consider in 2 or 3 wks. wtr. we shd.
make fresh approach to Argentine.
P.M.
Stand firm. No concession to blackmail.
H.M.
Then we must press them too – by w’holdg. exports.
But negotns since May – m’while world prices have risen. They have
a case for some increase.
T.W.
Consumer angle. Workers w’out canteens can’t go on with 10d ration.
Opinion in provinces is getting v. restive.
H.G.
Must now consider where this will end.
Tried hard bargaining - & have lost.
Thought, on last occasion, we were in sight of agreement. Chilled
meat give them climb down. But they weren’t authorised to
negotiate. Propn of chilled, as well as price. Ty. authy to go to
average price of £117 if they wd. accept propn of (?) 75% chilled.
People are prepd to pay more for (quality especially) meat.
Don’t therefore let us get in mood of excessive obstinacy.
Tell Amb. in B.A. we are ready to go near £120 if enough chilled.
How does he advise us to proceed?
Seek a way out on these lines. Tho’ m’while we must cut
ration and avoid immedte approach.
M.W.
They cdn’t give any assurance of propn of chilled.
H.D.
Para. 2(b). Means of pressure?
M.W.
No: for we shd. have bn. commd to pay £120 with no assurance
re chilled. They wdn’t resume shipment w’out assurance on
price.
K.Y.
Immedte approach to Argentine wd. yield no result.
P.M.
What of their assumed diffies?
M.W.
U.S. bght. large amounts for stock-piling etc.
Also farmers induced to hold back.
H.McN.
Increase of 3d a lb. wd. mean people cdn’t buy much more.
We must therefore make it clear tht. £120 is our top price.
If so, we must be sure we can hold 8d indefinitely.
M.W.
We can – if public will stand it.
327
H.McN.
They won’t stand it, unless we make it clear we are in a fight with
Argentine.
H.W.
Shall we win, in the end, if we try to stand out on basis of so low a
ration. Argentine diffies have not matured.
H.G.
On £120 p. t. at 50% chilled: 1d and 1½d frozen & chilled.
Ty. authy to go to 3d on chilled. M/F. wd. pass on 2d.
Allowg. for 5 Dom. consequentials, the resulting increase wd. be
1¼d if spread over all meat supplies. Wdn’t people be ready
to pay that?
H.W.
Needn’t increase real c/living because fish & rabbits, now being
eaten, are dearer. (Real, not index.)
A.
We are not going to beat Argentines down.
Public wd. pay another 1½d if they cd. get more meat.
Take the cowardly line.
J.
Prices are rising – get a long-term agreemt.
A.B.
Argentines are only doing for meat what Australia has done on wool –
seekg. best price they can get.
Seek easiest way of getting the meat quickly.
H.McN.
i)
ii)
No point in approachg. Argentines until we know what U.S. are
doing.
Approach thro’ Barings wd. prob. help if F.O. don’t object.
Agreed: Announce ration change as proposed.
{M/F., F.O. & Ty. to consider method of
{ makg. a new approach.
[Exit M.W.
2.
Korea.
K.Y.
……………….
Press for delay. Then i) how do we follow up discns with China?
ii) if we fail on that, how do we vote?
Various points in resolution:a) We shd. support good offices clause.
b) Aggression clause. Shd. alienate U.S. if we opposed it.
Effect on Chinese: Indians think it wd. slam the door:
we & Canada doubt that.
c) Wdn’t wish to support Coll. Measures Cttee & sanctions.
P.M.
P.M.M. started initiative for settlement.
Ch. reply – we said we shd. consider. U.S. jumped in against.
We shd. keep that door open.
328
W.E.
Mil. sitn is better.
P.M.
Indians think Ch. don’t want genl. war. They may be holding off.
We shd. continue our earlier policy. We didn’t like U.S. resoln &
urged them to put it in 2 parts. We can’t deny Ch. has commd
aggression: but we don’t want sanctions etc.
Continue to urge divn of resoln.
This vote must have steadied U.S.
A.
Must vote v. clause notg. tht. Ch. have rejected proposals.
K.Y.
Jebb’s suggn: Chairman to ask Peking wtr. elucidn replaced original
reply. Or refer to Cease Fire Group. Neither was adopted.
P.M.
There shd. be some positive proposal to replace U.S. resoln.
J.G.
Last Ch. reply will be taken by publ. opinion as a new approach.
Mustn’t carry on discn on basis of U.S. resoln.
H.McN.
Why did Rau not favour tabling Peking note? He favours settlemt. by
negotn. He must have some other view re handling it.
H.D.
Jebb shd. talk further on this with Rau & Pearson.
P.M.
In principle support any effort designed to promote negotiation with
Ch. Support anythg. to get that discussed before U.S. resoln. In last
resort, disagree with some clauses of U.S. resoln. Can’t yet decide how
we shd. ultimately vote.
H.G.
Ch. reply = demand for 2 things wh. we know U.S. won’t concede.
Forthcomg. only on cease-fire proposal.
Somethg. in St. Bennett’s argument tht. purpose of Ch. reply is to
divide Asiatic & W. powers.
We don’t want break with U.S. either.
What do F.O. believe Ch. really means – in long term, what
prospect of ultimate settlemt.
K.Y.
If Ch. cd. get some satisfn on recognn & Formosa, they might accept
settlement.
Elucidn means they are still makg. 2 long-term demands.
But some readiness to agree to timetable on negotns wh. wd.
be in line with Principles.
Of course they also have in mind splitting Allies.
H.G.
Any discn with State Dpt. on elucidn?
K.Y.
Not yet. Franks is now to make strong repns.
A.
Explain also to U.S. Amb. here?
329
P.M.
He can’t influence Acheson.
A.B.
Fight for better climate of U.S. opinion (thro’ ceasefire) to discuss
long-term issues re F/East.
H.McN.
Austin’s statemt. – inconsistent with P.M.’s W’ton talks.
Can we not ask W’ton (because of that & also Gross) to admit tht.
this is not helpful.
K.Y.
We were going to ask Franks to do so. Also re MacA.’s speech
comparing Ch. aggression with Pearl Harbour.
P.M.
Statement in Parlt?
A.
Salisbury doesn’t press for one, if we think it embarrassing.
K.Y.
We cd. only say in light Ch. reply pressing for time to consider.
That might help.
A.B.
Chronicle of events: might help.
P.M.
What of supplementaries.
K.Y.
Can Jebb say now tht. he won’t vote for U.S. resoln.
P.M.
Urge delay: say there will be amendmts on resoln: can’t say how he
will vote until seen how resoln emerges.
Support condemnn Ch. action: he can say that. But reserve right to
dodge word “aggression”. Tho’ in last resort we may have to
accept it.
P.M.
Other Comm. Govts. to be kept informed.
330
25th January, 1951.
C.M. 7(51).
1.
Parliament.
[Enter Att.G., Taylor,
K.Y.
H.M.
Business for next week.
S of S. War & Att. Gen: spokesman on Ct. Martial (Appeals)
Bill: 29/1. – if E.Sh. is still away.
P.M.
Defence statement as early as poss. I prefer 29/1. Debate can follow
a week later.
H.M.
Opposn also want debate on Steel. Agreed: resist that. Suppls
debated already.
H.G.
Form of Defence Debate – how work in economic side: to be
considered by H.M. May need a day for this aspect.
P.M.
They may press for S. Session. Case for it may be stronger now.
A.B.
Risk of causing undue alarm – greater now. Danger of war hysteria.
P.M.
Public statement: but might accept Secret Session as well,
subsequently.
H.M.
Early statement on Z. reservists – in advance of general announcemt.
P.M.
Wait for Monday.
H.M.
Opposn demand for debate of Coal next week.
H.W.
Wait 2 wks. until we know wtr. we shall have allocn scheme for
industry.
[Exit Taylor.
2.
Korea.
K.Y.
On U.S. resoln, we shall be deserted by all white Comm.
Jebb’s telegram. Expects, at end, to have to vote on resoln as it stands.
If he votes against, prob. will have few but Arab Asiatics with
him.
P.M.
Vote on Asian resoln?
K.Y.
Unlikely to get much support. (Jebb).
Australian did make suggn re rejection by Peking: but not v. forceful.
Peking’s further elucidation. i) assurance tht. Ch. volunteers will be
w’drawn. ii) cease-fire to be arranged, & period, at outset of
confce . iii) confce shd. fix principles on wh. Korean internal
set-up shd. be determined. iv) Taiwan: come down now to
w’drawal of U.S. troops. v) recognition: to be affirmed by
331
conference – i.e. not a pre-condition. Finally, Peking willing to
accept prelimy conference.
Rau will presumably announce all this to-day.
A.B.
Bit advance i) admit conference w’out pre-condns.
ii) admit conference, not Koreans, shd. settle future
set-up in Korea.
Shd. we not urge course of getting them in to conference.
P.M.
It is important change: have informed Jebb: must wait.
K.Y.
Doubt if U.S. will in fact stop short of sanctions after branding.
H.G.
We are mtg. aggression, militarily, in Korea. No gt. harm in branding.
Cd. stand on that, & go no further.
[Enter 3 Serv. Ministers, C.O.S.
G.S., Wheatley.
3.
Courts-Martial: Other Ranks Representation.
P.M.
On this, I advise v. advocatg. “other ranks” representn.
J.
B’burn’s plan: not to take part in sentence. Hopeless.
A.B.
Will all courts contain offr. who have bn. thro’ ranks.
C.A.S.
All do 6 months.
C.N.S.
Discipline is for officers. Can’t bring ratings in on that.
C.A.S.
Officer trained from outset in mil. law. Has to have 2 yrs. service
before sitting on ct. martial.
Officer must be responsible for discipline, judgment etc. Must not
lower his status.
A.H.
My views stand: but I won’t press them.
Att.G.
V. well: but don’t use C.O.S. arguments – certainly not tht. other
rank repve wd. be friend of accused ranker.
H.McN.
Political merit in makg. this gesture.
Not impressed by C.O.S. arguments. Shd. not be a strain on
discipline.
H.D.
Need this point be in Wh. Paper? Was only minority recommn by
Blackburn.
Present White Paper: but don’t mention this point in it.
[Exit L.O.’s.
332
4.
Defence Programme.
P.M.
As in brief.
Invited genl. discn of scale of p’mme.
We offered £3.600 m. on basis of U.S. aid. No aid now likely. But
we’ve agreed to increase. Must consider impact – on economy
& on morale. On need: must give a lead to W. Europe.
We don’t know R.’s intentns: but clear they cd. over-run Europe
now, unless defences strengthened. I don’t think they will
because cdn’t win long war.
This plan means: Naval defence v. R. subs.
Army support to W. Europe.
Large increase in R.A.F., wh. is too weak on
turnover to new types.
H.G.
My memo. discusses economic consequences, at some length.
Main points. Excldg. stock-piling (transfer of assets) £500 m. more =
£800 m: £1.000 m. – increases in the 3 years – excldg. cost of
new capacity.
This burden comes when we face a) worse terms of trade for ’51.
b) raw material shortages. c) no dollar aid assumed – tho’ we
may get a little in kind.
Direct effect of engineering, bldg. & textiles. First 2 are producg.
for investmt & export – both must be affected.
What can we afford on exports? Surplus of £200 m. on b/payments
this year. Adopt new target of balance – excldg. stock-pilg.
This prob. means accumuln of sterling balances. But can wear
that so long as we don’t get adverse balance.
Investmt: must try to limit effects because damage to industry.
Try therefore to carry most on consumptn. Higher exports consumer
goods.
Drawg. new labour fr. consumptn industry. Put defence orders
into durable consumer goods part of engineering industry.
Need to put max. orders in Europe for defence prodn. Urge this on
Supply Dpts.
Double switch: first to defence & then to export, vice home
consumptn. Must therefore a) discourage consumer expendre –
Budget b) physical controls reducg. supplies to home market.
i) Mat. allocns: ii) direct controls over prodn – prohibitg. certain
manufactures & LIMOSA.: iii) some labour controls in due
course. (Tho’ big pol. problem: T.U.C. members of E.P.B.
advise no public statemt. yet because workers not prepd for it.)
iv) Dirns to firms. v) Requisition of factory space, when
necessary: machinery being reviewed. v) Priority: no
over-riding priority. Genl. statemt. of its importce & machinery
for settling disputes. vi) Delays in civil bldg. p’mmes. Must
be no increase in total bldg. labour force. May affect housing
locally in some areas. vii) Re-phasing of this p’mme on
textiles (uniforms) is essential. For we need more exports from
333
them to replace engineering exports. viii) Civil Service manpower.
Effects:
B/payments. Let us decide new target.
S/living. Increased productivity: assume 4%. Depends
on r. materials. Many think it optimistic. On this basis,
some redn in real investmt: supplies of manufd consumer
goods will be reduced – 5% redn by end/3rd year. Total
cosumptn won’t be affected to this extent. Fall of
10-15% in cloth for home market: might involve
rationing. May be increase in savings also.
Over whole field of consumptn this isn’t much. But people expect a
rise in consumer standards, esp. if incomes rising.
This apprecn includes a rise in c/living. Diff. problem of distribn.
Fixed income groups (pensioners etc.) will be in diffies.
Conclns:
i) Several enquiries still to be made: cf. memo.
ii) If we accept p’mme, we must accept its implicns –
fiscal, controls, redn in consumptn.
iii) Service & Supply Dpts. must not think they can spend
all they wish. They must be even more austere in
standards. E.g. in their use of man-power.
All Ty. scrutiny of detailed expre will continue.
iv) Publicity: diffy. in puttg. this across.
Phasing. Heaviest burden about 2nd year. Before that, stocks in shops
to be run down. In 3rd year, rate of expre declines. Autumn ’51 to
spring of ’53 wd. be worst period.
A.B.
T.U.C. opposed any announcemt. of labour controls. But I can’t have
heroic p’mme & appear cowardly in w’holding labour control.
Yet shan’t want that control in 1st year.
V. diff. therefore Cab. shd. ask if this scale of p’mme is necessary.
One good feature: shift mainly w’in engineering & textile indies.
Avoids problems of movemt.
But on this in 1952 there will be need of stiff powers.
Accommn diffies limits mobility.
If you don’t enlarge bldg. industry (& I agree you shdn’t.) but have this
p’mme, you can’t get 200.000 houses. Labour will be drawn
away fr. housing, wh. is {least profitable/not attractive form
of bldg. Better to say p’mme is being scaled down than face
failure.
You can’t tie labour to housg. vice other forms of bldg.
This p’mme involves £35 m. more bldg. at once: bound to be at
expense of housing.
We must either reject the bldg. elements in this p’mme }
Or cut down the housing p’mme.
P.M.
We must look at this.
A.B.
There are new methods by wh. to increase house bldg. in particular
334
areas. Also factories in unorthodox materials.
Fall in woman-power. Over next few years men will have to take
their place. Generally 24-40 age group is smaller.
Do assumptns in this p’mme conflict with our earlier aim of not
crippling our economy. I believe this p’mme wd. impair our
economy.
Consequences of r. mats shortages will be more serious than is here
assumed.
Concln: this is over-accelerated p’mme. Impact excessive.
Moral will be undermined. Nothg. in internatl sitn to call for
increase on that scale.
C.N.S.
Diff. to forecast future. But sitn can be dangerous. For 150 yrs. R. has
recoiled when opposed by strength. Has happened – e.g. Berlin
air-lift.
We now know R. was behind Ch. moves in Korea.
R. has moved 4 Divns into M’churia. Has secret treaty with R.
Eur. satellites have increased forces by appr. 30%.
In E. Germ. ? R. troops 300.000 above normal. Empty “flats”
going back to R. - ? for A.F.V.’s.
Is all this prompted by fear of attack, or by planning of a new
adventure? Korea doesn’t imply fear: rather the opposite.
Persia & Yugosl. threatened.
At present, we haven’t the strength to meet any further probes, still
less genl. attack.
P.M.
Invited detail…….
Why is ’52 more dangerous than ’54.
C.N.S.
Betwn. 52 & 54 they will prob. be ready to take on a fairly long war.
C.A.S.
Korea has shown readiness of Comm. Powers to take more risks than
we thght. They didn’t disarm after ’45. If we remain in hopeless
inferiority, they will continue to nibble until we are finally faced
with major sitn.
K.Y.
Inter-action of U.S. & R. policies. Attitude of U.S. – acceleration all
round. R. realise that. Know they have advantage for next 2 or
3 yrs. Korea shows R. ready to play with fire. Diff. to restrain
U.S. – unless we are strong enough to deal with R. on local
basis. We must therefore be readier to meet small incidents.
J.S.
Endorse that fr. Service angle.
But we have to decide precise scale.
Consider basis on wh. this acceleration was arrived at. Hypothesis
given. “War possible 1951: prob. 1952.” The 2nd part of this
must have meant war inevitable in ’52. This p’mme, above the
£3.6, results from that. Everythg. physically possible wd.
therefore be brght. in
335
J.
No need to put it like that. Our weakness relatively is obvious.
Can’t be too big for mil. reasons. Only for econ. reasons. Can only
conclude it’s too big if it makes us not viable economically.
P.M.
We have not accepted “inevitable” or “probable”. We recognise
periods of special risks.
C.N.S.
We thght. 1952 R. cd. go to war. In 1951 war merely “possible”. But
betwn. 1952-5. R. cd. go to war with some prospect of not being
defeated.
G.S.
C.O.S. asked us to increase existg. p’mme as rapidly as poss., assumg.
man-power & r. materials. This is result.
H.W.
Economic possibility. Believe sights are set too high.
Man-power: 650.000 more into def. prodn. Almost size of ‘40
turnover. (H.G. This = 3 years.)
Materials: believe defence p’mme will get what it needs, tho’
others go short.
Capacity: may aim too high on certain items & as result get less.
Some prodn too high: & other not nearly enough.
Machine tools: dangerous bottle-neck.
Exports. Don’t believe we shall keep a balance in b/payments.
Accept target: but doubt if we’ll reach it.
a) Clash with U.S. on dollar-export drive. Tho’ we shall fight
them.
b) Engineering can’t make anythg. like same contn to exports as
before. Memo. therefore proposes substitute consumer
goods. We must try: but won’t do the trick. SEA. want
capital goods. Comm. countries don’t want more consumer
goods.
c) Clothing: consequence wd. be (cotton only) ¼ of
availabilities in 1950, if all this p’mme were adopted,
incldg. export targets.
Stricter & more detailed control over investment will be required.
Private sector must come under more control.
Building: need to revive Mobile Buildg. Squads in M/W.
G.S.
If we accepted this p’mme we cd. carry it out.
But effects on economy haven’t bn. realised.
Even £3.6 p’mme wd. have bn. serious, esp. in 2nd year. It assumed
only 250.000 more labour. Later raised to 375.000.
This = 650.000.
Raw material shortages. How assume 4% increase prodivity?
V. serious effect on exports.
And, anyhow, all depends on machine tools.
A.
Not over-large scale qua need.
But 12-18 mos. before it gets into stride.
No alarm over 1st part of p’mme. Time to grapple with diffies as
336
p’mme develops.
Reserve of productivity in U.K.
H.D.
Can’t accept new bldg. part of p’mme w’out more detailed examinn.
Is this claim reasonable?
Can’t prodn be done in existg. factories – by switching over.
Don’t at this stage i) agree to any redn in housg. p’mme.
ii) be commd to increasg. bldg. labour force.
In general: aren’t we over-doing this? £3.6 was a lot. Now more.
Impact on morale. Can’t sustain that if people lose consumer
goods they had bn. counting on.
A.
They must have more food, whatever the cost.
H.W.
Can’t be sure we’ve set our sights too high until examd industry by
industry. Therefore, accept this genl. target but keep flexibility.
P.M.
Don’t want announce unrealistic target.
We shall be asked for a figure – here & by U.S.
I don’t want to announce £4.500. Don’t mind giving this year’s
figure.
H.G.
NATO pressures. Diff. to avoid indicn of future.
H.M.
3 year p’mme necessary for planning.
Public must be warned & got into right mood.
On labour control, when asked, we shd. say we don’t rule it out if it
becomes necessary.
n
F. sit . Risks are v. gt. Our responsibilities are v. heavy.
Suppose R. slipped into war. ADGB. posn is v. thin.
Even commns system isn’t ready.
Believe tht., with diffy, we cd. just about stand this p’mme.
And I’m sure it’s necessary.
A.B.
Are we going to tell R. – thro’ Parlt. or N.A.T.O. – tht. by ’52 we shall
have this weight of armament.
R.’s economic & industrial potential.
P.M.
Their economy was geared to war. And they haven’t disarmed.
A.B.
Why not put out a p’mme beyond 3 years & say that, with m. tools &
r. mats, we shall bring that fwd. as much as poss.
C.E.
A.B.’s view – fallacious. For public in U.K. don’t think we are at
peace. And will expect Govt. to face their responsibilities.
Shocked by what I’ve heard this morning e.g. fr. B/T.
Doesn’t affect my view. We must face sitn & not run away from
implications. Not afraid of stating a figure, with some qualificns.
337
H.G.
a)
b)
c)
On textiles, my figures are quite difft. from B/T.
10-15% redn, as I said. V. diff. picture from H.W.’s.
Global consumptn: this means all increment in prodn & surplus
in b/payments. No more. Tho’ w’in it, pattern will be
diff. Mainly a ques. of holdg. consumptn where it is.
My concln: we can’t take risk of paring this down. Nor can we
now start another enquiry into what is practicable.
G.S.
Doubts about m. tools.
H.G.
What can we say?
How, at this stage, can we avoid giving a figure? We can qualify.
Or difft. years – first 2 firmer.
P.M.
Give p’mme total: may get it in so many years or not: shall try to
reach it as quickly as possible.
Firm on total. But elasticity on timing.
Genl. concln: pledged to increase & accelerate.
not sure we can reach this p’mme in 2 years.
announce p’mme, but not related to a date: have
flexibility on timing.
338
25th January, 1951.
[5 p.m.]
C.M. 8(51).
1.
Korea.
[Same invitees as for a.m.
K.Y.
Jebb must know what to do on a vote, when it comes. U.S. resoln
substantially as it stands will be put to vote before end/week.
Issues
a) “rejected all U.N. proposals.” No longer true.
b) “has itself engaged in aggression in K.”
c) “Coll. Measures Cttee to consider addl measures &
report.
Voting first by paras. Then as a whole. Unlikely any paras. will be
voted out.
We can’t vote now for a) as it stands. U.S. might alter
it.
Vote against.
On b) P.M. used a difft. and deliberate phrase. But is
diffce substantial? We thght. U.S. phrase wd. import
sanctions & ours wdn’t. On reflection I doubt if any
save a lawyer wd. understand the difference.
Accept that.
n
On c) diff. to oppose consid of measures. But we know
U.S. want to get some measures applied – at least
dipl. & econ. sanctions.
Vote against.
On vote as a whole: can’t vote for it at this stage if
a), b) & c) all stand. Must be one further attempt at negotn.
If, however, they alter a) to meet us, more diff. choice.
Shd. we insist on follow-up of Ch. reply before we vote.
Or shd. we vote for it, but make it clear we want negotns to
continue & tht. we don’t favour genl. sanction.
We shd. then follow with positive proposal for followg. up with
negotns.
P.M.
Can., Austr. & N.Z. will support. Tho’ Austr. will say they disagree
with it.
K.Y.
Yes: & S.A. & France. Tho’ all agree with our policy & not with U.S.
resoln.
P.M.
V. diff. choice. Aggression has bn. commd. But U.S. have insisted on
putting it in worst light – e.g. refusal to divide resoln.
K.Y.
Asian resoln unlikely to get much support.
P.M.
Cd. we support that & if it fails vote for U.S. as pis-aller.
H.McN.
Cd. Indians be asked to move U.N. to invite Ch. elucidn?
K.Y.
U.S. wdn’t listen. Stone-wall to our repns in W’ton. Austin has said
door is shut, after being told that further elucidn was recd.
H.McN.
On a) we shd. seek amendmt. e.g. by omitting “all”. That wd. make
339
it easier for us to vote against clause if our amendmt failed.
Preferable to put fwd. a clearer amendmt.
J.G.
This resoln might lead to major war. Drafted before events of last
week. Depends on 1st clause.
H.D.
Are we to be led by stages to war v. China? It wd. be grave error
in strategy (COS). Inconsistent with P.M.’s statemt.
Unacceptable to publ. opinion. Plays into hands of R.
We must therefore prevent it.
2) Must try to restrain U.S. Diff. to do. Tel. fr. Franks: U.S. will
hate our voting against resoln: but that feeling will pass.
H.M.
Cd P.M. approach Truman.
P.M.
He can’t now go v. Congress. He has allowed them to go too far.
J.
Means splitting, not only with U.S., but all our friends.
A.B.
But if we vote for it & say we don’t believe in it, we proclaim
ourselves as satellites of U.S.
We were ready to go as far as agreeing to ‘brand’ if other clauses
were out.
Surely U.K. cd. give a lead to the world, as against U.S.
H.McN.
Not so simple. U.S. publ. opinion thinks our choice is betwn. India
& U.S. India has given this lead. We wd. be followg. it.
Franks says storm will blow over. We had one over Pal. - & it
blew over in the main.
Dilemma: Soviet plan: if it splits us fr. U.S., it succeeds: if we
support U.S. on this, it has relative success.
Conclude: make our posn clear: push Ch. further to negotiate.
Vote against a) unless amended. Also against c). But for b).
Then, after explanns, vote for resoln but go on trying for negotn.
H.W.
Not unimportant to keep India in good heart. She is vital in Asia.
P.M.
Vote v. a) and c) – not against b).
[If a) stands unamended – vote v. whole resoln.]
If all our amendmts rejected, abstain.
K.Y.
We shall have made our posn clear on each para.
Criticism of Gt. Power for abstaining on major issue.
If we can’t vote for, we ought to vote against – self-respect.
E.B. up to week-end favoured standg. with U.S. in last resort.
If we vote with U.S. when everyone knows we oppose the policy our
internatl standing & influence is destroyed for ever.
If ever we are to stand v. U.S., this is the time. For all our friends
agree with us on the merits.
340
H.M.
On balance, agree with K.Y.
C.E.
Agree. If we vote, we wd. feel bound to support coll. measures.
But our people wdn’t stand for that.
A.
Agree.
J.G.
Quite wrong to abstain or vote for.
H.G.
If we vote against: shall seem to oppose those paras. we do support.
Therefore, I wd. prefer to abstain.
K.Y.
Qua troops in Korea I don’t like refusing to vote for b).
C.N.S.
Abstain on that a/c.
H.G.
What do you lose by abstaining?
P.M.
We asked for separation. Consistent to abstain.
H.McN.
We cd. abstain in Cttee & consider then wtr. we shd. vote against in
Assembly – when we see if vote wd. be effective.
J.G.
If we don’t vote against, we shall surrender our moral leadership.
K.Y.
We won’t vote for because closes door on negotns. How then can we
justify not voting against it.
H.D.
It’s c) I most object to. That’s why I favour clear vote against.
By a majority: Agreed to instruct Jebb to vote against.
[Exit K.Y.
2.
Defence Programme.
Man Power.
P.M.
Def. Cttee endorse plan for 15 days’ call-up. But doubt 3 months’
proposal. This applies to Army.
R.N. No objn.
R.A.F. Bulk have reserve oblign.
A.H.
10.000 Z. reservists.
P.M.
But only wanted for 15 days.
V.C.I.G.S.
15 days’ plan: needed to stiffen T.A. – until in 3 yrs. Nat. Ser. men
come along. To get T.A. Divns. more ready to go to NATO
defence & to M/E.
341
[Exit H.McN.
A.B.
Assurance tht. good use will be made of them in the 15 days.
Otherwise v. bad publicity.
J.S.
Shall do our best. But they are going to T.A. camps. Better than last
year because of nos. But it’s mobilisation exercise, purpose of
wh. is to detect faults & errors. Agree: tell them this when they
arrive: it’s a rehearsal.
C.E.
Make Cab. views known to offrs. at unit level.
H.D.
Selection?
J.S.
Those already earmarked as requd for these Divns.
H.D.
Needs to be explained in P.M.’s statement.
J.
Age?
V.C.I.G.S.
A few over 40: none above 45.
P.M.
Must try to avoid men over 40: as you are implying that these men
will be embodied in these T.A. Divns. on outbreak.
H.M.
Enough to give assurances tht. these over 40 will be few & for jobs
like AA Batty.
P.M.
M/L. can look at this ques. again.
*Consider White Paper on this, for details, as soon as poss. after
statement.
[Re-enter K.Y.
Agreed: 15 days’ plan approved in principle.
P.M.
Three months’ plan.
V.C.I.G.S.
More important qua readiness for war. Stiffens BAOR. & Strat.
Reserve. Those Divns. – now 60% strength. Shd. rise to 75% in
summer: then fall.
They have 60% young N.S. men.
In emergency they wd. have to fight at 70% strength & mostly
youngsters. In ’39, 120.000 Reg. Army Reserve. To-day, none
U.S. Divns. in Korea were in same state & took a knock.
P.M.
Partial mobilisation for a period. Implies specially dangerous
period. Wd imply risk of war in summer.
H.G.
C.O.S. think there is a risk this summer. Dangerous to reject it if it
wd. materially strengthen B.A.O.R. this year.
A.B.
M/D. & Serv. Ministers don’t support this.
342
J.S.
Didn’t lightly w’hold our support. Wd be advantageous militarily.
If we thght. we cd. thereby hold R. attack this summer, we might
support. But it wd. do no more than give BAOR a better
chance to get out. We decided tht. on balance we cdn’t
recommend it.
P.M.
I think we must reject this 3 months’ plan.
V.C.I.G.S.
In that case wd. want to call 10.000 for 15 days’ under 11(iv).
Also want 5.000 for AA Command for 3 months.
P.M.
* Try to get this stiffening by volunteers. - Agreed.
Para. 11.(vii) Korea – reinforcemts. Rejected.
R.A.F. Plans. Approved.
P.M.
Para. 14(iv) Try to get this voluntarily.
C.A.S.
They expect call-up – in Ldn. anyhow. They wd. understand.
I wd. prefer to call them up.
These are 40% of 1st line Fighter strength.
Agreed: Do para. 14(iv) by embodiment, not volunteerg.
Pay for 15 days’ men.
H.G.
Regular rates + bounty. Much higher than N.S. pay. V. big
precedent. They shd. receive N.S. rates.
H.W.
Conscripts get that pay after 18 months. These will all have served
18 mos. or more.
H.G.
That was to persuade them to stay on.
J.S.
T.A. will be getting regular pay.
P.M.
N.S. men: untrained. These and trained men coming up for service.
Can’t equate them with 18 yr. old N.S. men.
Publicity is to be on basis tht. these are men needed for Army.
V.C.I.G.S.
Everyone of these men will have had at least 2 years’ service.
Agreed:
Pay as proposed by C.O.S. Make it clear
{ tht. this is because they are trained men:
{ & this is not therefore a precedent.
Call-up (Numbers).
P.M.
As in his memo.
T.W.
On behalf of Scotland & self – inexpedient to do this anyway.
343
But we are doing expansive p’mme. Our lack of manpower
will become more pronounced. We are losing labour. E.V.W.’s
are going. German PoW.’s qualifying for natn, after wh. they can
go. W.L.A. abolished. Ty. have abolished our pool labour, by
end/51. L.e.a.’s increasingly reluctant to supply children.
W.A. Cttees apprehensive of labour for lifting potatoes.
¾ of all farms – only one or two workers. Dislocn therefore is
disproportionate.
y/ Industry wd. assume we aren’t backg. expansionist p’mme any longer.
If Agric. must make a contn, let M/L. & ourselves to devise scheme to
get 7.000 a year fr. farms wh. cd. let them go.
Or: if deferment is w’drawn, wait until after harvest of 1951.
P.M.
Yet you can’t tie agric. workers to the land. And they will go where
we don’t want them. Let’s have these where we do want ‘em.
A.B.
Can’t accept y/. Other industies have expansion p’mmes.
Exchanges report men going into agric. to escape N.S. V. serious.
Like the income tax farmers. Suppose they keep their sons out
of N.S. also.
H.G.
Blanket imposed when we had to run autarchic policy re imported
food. Don’t need to do so now.
A.B.
Para. 13. – exceptional hardship can be looked after. We shan’t take
men who absence wd. close down the farm.
A.
i)
ii)
A.B.
Safeguard only sons.
I opposed abolition of W.L.A. I wd. now revive it. }To be
}considered.
n
N.F.U. cd. run such an organ . Don’t let Ty. pay for it. }
Agreed: Def. Cttee conclusions endorsed.
Agric. deferment. Announce at once. Fix
suitable date some time ahead.
Production.
P.M.
Clothing.
Works Services.
A.B.
All this depends on formula – to avoid worst impacts on economy.
Can’t endorse all that’s in this memo. e.g. in para. 53.
P.M.
Much will have to be worked out later.
Civil Departments Plans.
P.M.
D(T) Cttee report approved apart from black-out equipmt. & materials.
344
Civil Defence.
P.M.
As in his memo.
C.E.
Phasing. Shdn’t work to 2 dates. Military workg. to 1952.
Country unprepared for air attack if it comes. V. little in the
£150 m. wh. is c. defence for ordinary public.
P.M.
That is a fair statement.
We must either break our backs with prepns or choose priorities.
We are preventg. war. Active def. more likely to do that than
passive defence. Provn of much public shelter wdn’t be a
deterrent.
The risk must be accepted.
C.E.
Let it be a Cab. decision – if so, I can’t dissent from it.
I shd. wish to say it’s a Cab. decn to concentrate on active defence
in pursuance of policy of preventg. war.
345
26th January, 1951.
C.M. 9(51).
Korea.
P.M.
Our repns have had some effect. Para. 2 will be amended in a
sense acceptable to us.
Comes down therefore to sanctions. If that were subordinate to
further discns, that wd. meet us. Our objn is to procdg. direct
to sanctions w’out considerg. further negotn.
It might be better to reverse order of U.S. final paras. – puttg. good
offices Cttee first & puttg. sanctions in terms tht. they wd. be
considered only if good offices fail.
C.E.
Israelis are looking a long way ahead. Examples: Burma etc.
Their resoln will be read as applying to nearer sitns.
P.M.
Explanatory only – justifn for some mention of contingent sanctions
at this stage.
A.B.
Not necessary to say it: our membership of U.N. alone commits us
to consider sanctions v. aggressor.
H.G.
Want if poss. to avoid breach with U.S. & Comm.
Points of diffy were 2 & 8. 2 is now met. Leaves us only with 8.
Israel’s suggn gives us best way out of that diffy that we can
expect. If it were accepted by U.S., we surely shd. vote for
resoln.
I myself wd. still urge re-considn even if 8. is not amended. We
shd. at least abstain. I wd. have preferred to vote for: & believe
that wd. have bn. E.B.’s view.
Cd. we not conclude: in view of amendmt of 2, abstain. If 8 amended
as now, vote for. In neither event, vote against.
J.
Support – voting for, if 8 is amended.
A.B.
Don’t re-open y’day’s decision.
U.N. disregarding Peking’s elucidns: unreal.
Exhaust possibilities of conciliation before we go further.
Why look fwd. to remote possibilities, as Israelis do?
Effect on Chinese: they will feel door is slammed.
P.M.
Don’t put Chinese case too high. They have aggressed. They are
fighting.
A.B.
I have accepted para. 3. But we are anxious to get peace.
Not to conciliate U.S. opinion.
P.M.
Not merely U.S. opinion.
T.W.
This amendmt of para. 8 entitles me to change my mind.
346
Only if Cttee fail in basic U.N. policy are they to consider
sanctions.
A.
Favour voting for, if Israeli amendmt accepted.
H.D.
Para. 8 was basis of my objn. Amended 8 still contemplates sanctions.
| Econ. wd. hurt us. Mil. wd. involve us in major war with Ch. –
y | wh. opinion here wdn’t tolerate. Posn has not changed since last
| night enough to warrant change of view.
H.G.
This means, no matter how intransigent Ch. are, we won’t contemplate
sanctions. If we take this line now, can’t expect others to support
us if Ch. attack H. Kong & we change our tune.
J.G.
Split between e. & w. in Comm. is even more dangerous than split
betwn. U.K. & U.S.
If we are driven into ec. sanctions v. China, how do we stand with
Asiatic members of Comm.
Why allude to sanctions at all, at this stage?
P.M.
Be realistic. We have opposed this. Ch. answer isn’t completely
satisf. Can’t throw over all our friends for fear of Asian
attitude – don’t know yet for certain what India’s attitude will be.
A.
This Israeli plan must be more acceptable to India.
P.M.
Quite unrealistic to suppose you can get all refce to sanctions deleted.
If we cd. get this, gt. triumph. Don’t risk losing all by pressing for
too much.
K.Y.
F.O. want to support Israeli amendmt.
Good offices Cttee wd. be much better than Cttee of Peace Observn
x/
Group. For that includes “China”. Tremendous dispute as to
which China.
General support for x/.
C.E.
Doubtful about “in case …” clause. But if J.’s interpn of it is right,
resoln wd. be improved.
What can we say to our people about our efforts to improve it?
P.M.
Surely I made that plain in my statement in H/C. Will be inferred fr.
that tht. our efforts got it changed.
W.S.
E.B.’s views on Mon. In last resort we shd. support U.S. resoln – more
esp. if it were supported by Comm. & NATO. Powers. “I can’t
let a pal down when I’m in a fight with him.”
Israeli plan. We shd. be able to get support of old Doms. We shd.
press it v. strongly on U.S.
Generally agreed: as above (incldg. x/).
347
P.M.
But diff. to decide in advance what to do if amendmts put fwd.
My preference wd. be to abstain in that event.
H.D.
I’m not happy at anything re sanctions. Repeat y/. Remains my view.
P.M.
Doesn’t commit us to sanctions. I’ve already told Truman I won’t
support mil. measures: & that econ. measures are futile.
A.B.
If our public think we have bn. dragged into voting for resoln we don’t
believe in merely to keep in with U.S., we shan’t get Labour
Party to accept our defence p’mme next week. They will support
that only if we preserve our independence.
P.M.
If we get this, vote for.
If we get somethg. less, I shall have to decide wtr. to abstain or vote
against. And we were prs. a little hasty in decidg. y’day tht. abstentn
was weak.
H.D.
I agree tht. Labour supporters will link this with receptn of defence
p’mme.
348
29th January, 1951.
C.M. 10(51).
1.
Statement of Defence P’mme.
Approved – subject to drafting amendmts.
2.
Korea.
3.
Supplementary Pensions.
4.
Malta: Constitution in War.
(Notes not taken).
349
1st February, 1951.
C.M. 11(51).
1.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W., N.B., K.Y., J.S.
H.M.
Opposn ready to give Service Supplies & Cons. Fund Bill
on the nod, late at night.
Supply Day on Thursday for meat.
Iron & Steel: 7/2: M/Supply & Parly. Secy.
P.M.
If beaten to-day (coal) I wd. not resign: I wd. say the fate of a
Govt. shd. not depend on incidence of influenza.
H.G.
Wd. you feel the same about Steel on 7/2?
P.M.
I will wait & see.
H.M.
Defence Debate: 14 & 15 Feby.
2.
Govt. Buildings.
A.
Trouble in H/L. over F.O. bldg.
P.M.
I have never agreed to elevation.
H.D.
I don’t think F.O. proposn is nearly so doubtful as C.O. bldg.
J.
Don’t spoil facade.
G.T.
Decn taken years ago. Related to Govt. occupn of flats, hotels etc.
P.M.
I will re-consider F.O. project – with plans. (Presumably at Cab.)
[Exit W.W.
3.
Coal. Release of Miners from Forces.
N.B.
Recruitg. going well; but Wiles Cttee say it can’t be m’tained.
On their estimate, we shall have 10 m. tons deficiency on coal
for domestic use. Exports seriously down: affects prices, F.O.
interests, b/paymts.
Scheme for releasg. miners fr. Forces is practicable. Done in both
wars. Done in 1947. On my plan, we shan’t get more than
3.000. But that = 20.000 t. p. wk. And, more important, a big
psychol. effect: in keepg. men in mines, recruitg., & absorbg.
Italians.
We shall have to do it in the end. T.U.C. are keen on it & miners are
pressing for a reply. “Considered view of Genl. Council.”
P.M.
N.C.B. are v. inconsistent on man-power.
350
A.B.
I support N.B.’s view. I don’t support proposal to import Italians.
I don’t support Wiles.
W’drawal of miners fr. Forces wd. enhance “status” of miners.
But Forces will run into man-power diffies because age-groups are
diminishg. But balance is in favour of w’drawal.
J.S.
M/D. opposes this. Psychol. reasons. For admit nos. are small.
There are only 6.000. Wd. as many as 3.000 be willing to go?
n
Dec must be taken on psychol. reasons – both ways.
Argument against: measures now being taken: retaining time-expired
regulars – re-calling reservists etc. Damage to our recruitg.
campaign. Ques. therefore of priorities.
H.G.
Both parties to this dispute exaggerate their case.
Nos. will be quite small.
We are accustomed to w’drawg. miners fr. Forces – on form, almost
an index to gravity of mil. situation.
Psychol. argument is stronger on miners’ side. On balance therefore
I favour w’drawal.
Italians: NUM have agreed.
J.G.
Ask A.B. not to express his view on this publicly for I persuaded NUM
to accept it – after P.M. had put it to them at No. 10 mtg.
A.B.
V. well. But let’s be careful how we go about it.
N.B.
I agree with that.
My plan won’t apply to reservists already called up.
G.T.
Restrict this to underground workers.
A.B.
I agree with that.
Remainder of 6(a) approved.
Para. 6(b) approved.
J.S.
Period in mines cd. not be counted for pension w’out legn.
Agreed: look into this.
Control system in paras. 4-7 approved (Annex)
Para. 6(c) approved on that basis.
4.
Price of Coal.
N.B.
Explained the various losses of N.C.B.
Prodn Cttee agreed no alternative but to increase price.
Ques: wtr. I shd. mention it into-day’s debate? If I don’t, must
p’pone it for 2 wks. – it shd. date for 1/2.
P.M.
You must tell H/C. Can’t let it dribble out 2 wks’ later.
351
H.M.
And must give reasons.
But I’m disturbed at inefficiency of socd industries.
Burden on consumer.
Set-back to principle of public ownership.
A.V.A.
£15½ m. to improve miners’ condns. And how does absenteeism
stand.
A.B.
But don’t overlook rising costs of their purchases.
H.G.
Big increases in private industry for same reasons – rising costs of
labour & imported materials.
T.W.
P’pone to 1/5? We are now at bottom of pol. trough.
H.G.
That means a still higher price then.
H.McN.
Support T.W. Housewife’s worries now at peak. She wd. take it
better later, when she cd. do w’out coal.
H.G.
If you leave it until 1/5, N.C.B. will make a loss this year.
For you wdn’t stand the much bigger increase requd on 1/5 to
balance their accounts.
A.B.
Involves .25 increase in c/living index.
Agreed: announce to-day & explain.
[Exit: J.S. and N.B.
[Enter: H. and Strang.
5.
German War Criminals.
P.M.
Why hadn’t we heard of this? Speech by Kirkpatrick.
H.
In accce with Govt. policy.
He excluded Nuremburg prisoners.
H.M.
Why need he have said it? Just when we have this trouble (with
Party) over G. re-armament.
Labour members are restive over K’patrick.
Confce in Paris?
K.Y.
i) On Europn Army: we are there only as observers.
ii) Discns with Germans: w’out commitment: only soundings.
P.M.
Play it slow. We have accepted only principle.
Att.G. says K.’s speech cast doubt on justice on Nuremburg trials.
P.M.
Also Times to-day – U.S. handing back Krupps’ property “after
consultn with Br. & French colleagues”.
Shd. we not have bn. consulted on that too?
352
H.McN.
3 Power Mtg. decns re limited & prohibited indies. Presumably
arises from that?
P.M.
A different thing.
A.B.
Cab. didn’t follow my lead when I pressed for natn of these
industries.
H.
Indies are in hands of trustees.
P.M.
Let us have a report.
6.
Meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers.
K.Y.
Any conclns wd. have to go wider than Germany. Wd have to cover
disarmament more generally……
A.B.
Pacification is first condn for disarmament. Can’t hope for genl.
disarmament in a world afraid. If therefore genl. disarmt is put
to this C.F.M., it invites breakdown.
K.Y.
You must ask: what is cause of their fright. And if it is armaments,
it’s not illogical to start with that.
A.
To put it first is to begin at the wrong end. You will get bogged
down in it for months.
T.W.
But cd. we discuss demiln of G. w’out reference to disarmament.
At least the 2 things shd. go together.
H.M.
Is this philosophy v. relevant? And is 1931 a helpful analogy?
Things were v. difft. then.
“Pacification.” Who is to pacify whom?
I want C.F.M. to succeed. Don’t pack agenda with a lot of
hopeless stuff.
Demilitn of G. cd. go on Agenda: but we wdn’t discuss it w’out
refce to genl. armament sitn.
P.M.
Annex B. para. 2. is in fact a pretty realistic list.
H.G.
Para. 15 of Annex A is powerful statement.
On that basis I’m sceptical of disarmament pact – for difft. reasons.
Awkward re-actions here. Unlimited opporties for twisting by R.
Gt. danger of R. making specious offer & we shd. look
suspicious in rejectg. it.
Subject to that I favour Annex B. para. 2.
Danger of agreement wh. jeopardises our interests. I’m inclined to
think best hope of peace is thro’ a stalemate rather than
agreement.
353
H.W.
Para. 15 is cynical approach.
Suggests tht. we don’t want a settlement. “False feeling of relief” wh.
wd. follow an agreement.
But if public think we’re not trying they won’t support our defence
p’mme.
Attitude of French. Surprised by Parodi W’ton 317 of 31/1. Shd.
have thght. mass of French wd. feel differently.
Memo. suggests mil. occupn will end almost at once. Surely it will go
on for years, even if agreemt. reached – before Treaty finally
concluded.
Ques: are we to urge G. re-armament as card to play in attempt for
general détente. Or are we going for it for its own sake.
J.
Shd. we breakdown on agenda or after confce.
To preserve moral leadership, we must choose the second.
Corollary: don’t stand too firm on agenda lest you lose conference.
A.B.
That goes too far. Remember our original reply on Prague
communiqué. We can’t have agenda narrowed down to that.
Subject to that, I don’t dissent from genl. attitude of J.
I’m in gt. diffy. Distrust U.S. over this as much as over Korea.
They are dragging us along on basis tht. 3rd War is inevitable.
I do not accept Annexes A & B. Para. 15: cynical & defeatist.
Assumes tht. R. wd. only use agreemt. as basis to exploit G.
further. This is based on assumptn tht. R. is determined to have
war. A 3rd war wd. end “B. civilisation as we know it”(!).
If we can get agreemt. with R. on anything, it wd. be big step fwd.
If G. is re-armed, war will be on us at once. V. naïve to assume tht.
re-armed G. will support us.
Unificn & demilitn of G: if we cd. get it, we shd. go for it.
H.McN.
If G. is unified, you can’t assume it will remain disarmed.
Moral bankruptcy of this memo.
H.D.
Don’t believe E.B. wd. have passed this memo.
He wdn’t have courted b’down on agenda.
He never liked G. re-armament: was reluctant to accept it even in
principle. Believe he wd. have tried to trade it, in a C.F.M.,
for some solid advantage. R. fears re-armamt. of G.
He wd. have tried hard at C.F.M. to get success.
Thght. we were in favour of unified Germany.
We can’t accept view tht. unified G. wd. be a prey to Commn.
W. Germany doesn’t tolerate Commn: don’t believe E. Germany
wd. tolerate it if elections were free.
Try for agreed agenda. Reject philosophy of Annex A.
Chuck out some items fr. 2 of Annex B. e.g. Para. 2(a).
Don’t discuss genl. disarmament.
H.M.
This = change of policy.
354
K.Y.
Cab. of 14/12. E.B. not prepared to attend……
Suggd now we shd. be elastic on agenda. Are we to agree, if
necessary, to meet on G. alone? Hope we shall at least stand
to our insistence on more than Germany.
P.M.
I wd. say: ready to discuss Germany in context of genl. situation –
e. & west.
J.G.
Don’t decide at W’ton what our attitude is to be before R. reply recd.
C.E.
Don’t decide to-day – before we see R. reply.
K.Y.
But surely wise to exchange views with the other 2 – some idea
what we wd. adopt as agenda.
Then we must give our repves some instructions.
P.M.
Give O.F. b’ground of our attitude.
We can’t accept U.S. view of inevitable war.
U.S. may look at G. re-armamt. on basis of inevitable war.
We must approach, not with unreasong. optimism, but with
some hope.
Don’t believe Stalin wants war. Our aim must be to get change in
internal system behind Iron Curtain wh. will make for peace.
Use G. re-armament as card to swop in return for a settlemt.
H.G.
Agree with that.
We want CFM. to succeed.
Can’t discuss G. alone. Then what else? Genl. disarmamt. (if not
first): Austria. What else?
Cd. F.O. run thro’ points of disagreemt. with R. & select the least
troublesome. Try & get somethg. small agreed first.
Too much wool.
A.V.A.
Is para. 15 – tho’ prs. a bit starkly stated – not wholly justified by
facts from 1945 onwards.
R. has bn. consistent & clear for years. Gobbling them up one by
one. Sitn to-day is v. diff. fr. 1945.
I want negotn. But on realistic basis.
P.M.
Believe that over-estimates R. part in Ch. adventure. Due rather to
Ch. nationalism – wh. may not always be cats-paw of Moscow.
A.B.
Pact of non-aggression incldg. Yugoslavia. Helpful to suggest that.
H.McN.
Who is trying to get a breakdown on agenda now?
K.Y.
Send telegram:
i)
genl. views of Cabinet, as gloss on Annexes.
ii) we reject agenda confined to G.
iii) other items: for discn. Cab. not to be commd until they
355
see Sov. reply.
On tentative list in Annex B. Cab. don’t want genl.
disarmament taken first: too dangerous.
Discuss other subjects with others & report to Cab.
Diff. to think of specific non-controversial items to add.
H.M.
G. re-armament.
V. diff. to accept view tht. G. will remain disarmed indefinitely.
As it stands, unfair to have w.G. unarmed while e.G. is armed.
Czecho. Healthiest Parly democracy in Europe. Yet R. coup.
Where wd. we stand if same happened to G.
V doubtful about arguments now used v. re-armamt. of G.
H.D.
Content to leave G. re-armament on basis tht. it is played v. long.
But if CFM. offers chance for a deal, we shd. be ready to trade it.
7.
Korea.
P.M.
Suggd I might make announcemt. in H/C.
K.Y.
Might be helpful if we made it clear tht. our vote is not intended to
exclude negotns with Peking.
For domestic purposes – might have connected statemt.
H.G.
Cd we get more permanent publicity for Jebb’s speeches – e.g. in
Wh. Paper.
P.M. & H.D. Favoured that.
K.Y.
It wd. be v. long.
H.G.
Make Gladwyn’s 2 main speeches available in some form.
P.M.
Read out draft prepared by F.O.
356
8th February, 1951.
C.M. 12(51).
1.
Parliament.
[Enter K.Y., M.W., W.W.
H.M.
Congrats. to Whips on Divn on Steel Bill debate.
H.M.
Business for next week.
Defence Debate: to be on a Motion, approvg. terms of P.M.’s
announcemt. Speakers: M/D., Ch/Ex., M/Labour. M/D. to open
1st day; and Ch/Ex. to open 2nd day: M/L. to reply to debate.
P.M.
White Paper on Defence. Haven’t had enough time to consider it to
get publn before the debate. Is it really necessary to have it.
W.W.
Will suffice to leave it over until later. Opposn warned.
E.Sh.
Not sure we can get a Wh. Paper bringing Estimates fully into line
with new p’mme. Probably a short Paper will suffice – giving
M/D. Estimate & referring briefly to Service Estimates. Can
settle final form after Defence Debate.
A.
Defence Debate 21/2. F. Affairs Debate 28/2. – in H/Lords.
To confirm with H/C. time-table.
2.
Meat.
H.G.
Since last Cab. 2 talks – one with Dpts. concerned & second with
Balfour. At 1st mtg. decided to pay £120 – if reasonable condns
re chilled & deliveries. 50% overall of chilled in agreemt.
of 15 mos./to 30.6.52 – was understandg. previously – on
that basis we wd. now pay £120. Trouble now: avoid higher
price still because Press agitn weakeng. our bargaing. posn.
Decided to send to Arg. Govt. a vague note indicatg. readiness
to resume negotns (wh. technically are only suspended).
Note delivered in Ldn. y’day. M/F. will mention this in to-day’s
debate. A. expert, now in Switzerland, returning to Ldn. at
end/week. Must await A.’s response.
M.W.
Believe I can satisfy H/C. reasonable opinion tht. we have a case.
Past history (at length): no. of detailed points: ending with
indicn of fresh approach to A. Govt.
If agreemt. reached we cd. dig into reserves – as soon as shipments are
moving.
G.T.
What about high prices of fish & rabbits.
M.W.
Considg. adding a passage re diffy of price control for those foods.
H.G.
Real answer to that: are you ready to pay this higher price for meat,
357
not for 6 wks., but for ever.
G.T.
Not a feasible political answer.
J.G.
Don’t say we can’t impose control on prices of alternatives.
A.B.
Don’t say anything to stress diffy of controls over prices. This is what
T.U.C. are most concerned about in genl. situation. We have
controlled fish prices before, with success.
H.M.
Say we won’t hesitate to apply control if public interest so requires.
H.G.
And say we are expectg. more fish when restns on trawling are
removed.
E.Sh.
Can we promise higher ration of meat if we get early agreemt. with
Argentine.
M.W.
Dare not. Playing into hands of A. Govt.
[Exit M.W. and W.W.
[Enter J.S., H., A. Crawley &
Solr. Genl.
3.
Call-up of Reservists.
E.Sh.
a)
May be necessary to repeat this in 1952 - & indeed up to 1954,
which time supply of N.S. men will suffice.
This applies to 15 day men only.
The 3 months or 18 months men: they are not to be called up
again.
P.M.
V. diff. to convince H/C. tht. the same selected men shd. be called
up again.
E.Sh.
May have to call up some of them again.
P.M.
They will think they are all liable.
J.S.
Avoid raising the point in the Bill: leave it to be renewed for
another year by affirmative resoln?
P.M.
Can’t avoid making a clear statement of your intentions.
Not practical politics to call on same men twice.
E.Sh.
Then take power to do it in subsequent years but say you won’t call
same men twice.
A.B.
That destroys basis of selection. We have said that this plan is to slot
the men needed in the places in T.A. Divns. where they are
needed.
358
P.M.
This year it is to fit up 4 T.A. Divns. When you do it next year, will
you move on to other Divns? There are other T.A. Divns?
E.Sh.
Planning for another 8 Divns.
P.M.
Then they will be different men. We can say they will be.
A.B.
x/ Then say: it may be necessary to repeat this next year with diff. men
and in diff. Divns.
Agreed.
P.M.
AA Command: you want more key men. But same principle must
apply.
Agreed: take the powers: statement as above.
A.C.
And exclude call-up of individuals in R.A.A.F.
fighter squadrons.
E.Sh.
b)
A.B.
We agree.
E.Sh.
c)
C.E.
Penalty for disregarding training notice: is it enough?
J.
Consider in Legn Cttee.
H.M.
Incitement: D.R. 39 A is pretty serious.
S.G.
Safeguard of search only on authority of High Ct. Judge.
J.
Let all these points be considered in Legn Cttee.
d)
Medical Examination. Before sending the men away.
Penalties: no comment.
Protection for Employment.
A.B.
Don’t like this. Up to now, employers have co-operated well. If this
is imposed by statute, employers will do only what they are
requd to do. Will damage good atmosphere over T.A. training.
I must at least consult employers & men.
E.Sh.
V. well: if consultn can be done quickly.
J.S.
We think it wd. do more harm than good, qua T.A.
H.
We want safeguards on volunteers for 18 months.
A.B.
Better case for it there.
Agreed: Legn Cttee to clear up outstanding points.
359
4.
Germany: Re-armament.
K.Y.
Commd to principle: not to timing.
Discns at Bonn a) mil. condns & requiremts.
b) pol. condns required.
No commitmt until Govt. have considered again.
T. of r. (para. 12) suggest agreemt. on a) shd. be secured as soon
as poss. Not their fault if Cab. now think they’re going too fast.
But no risk: for i) Germans pressg. for (b) as condn ii) U.S. are
relaxing some of their pressure. Acheson at Brussels:
Eisenhower’s statement: attitude of Germans also.
Weekly rept. from I.K. E.’s statement (no hurry for G. contribn)
eagerly endorsed by many shades of G. opinion. Any sense
of urgency re re-armamt. has largely disappeared.
In accord with Cab. decn of 14/12.
Reasons for caution i) didn’t want put G. into strong bargaining
posn. Now clear they will pitch their demands v. high.
ii) fear of quick R. re-action. They refer to
this in latest note as ‘intolerable’.
Timing: para. 6.
Para. 4. If C.F.M. broke down, that might be decisive moment
in R. eyes.
W’out reversg. decisions taken since Sept. & commd to Allies:
only ques. now is wtr. we shd. suggest to U.S. or French
positive action to slow down these negotns.
Pleven accepted (W’ton) principle & made no condns re timing.
Parodi deprecated early crystallisation: U.S. thght. this
differed fr. Pleven & didn’t like it.
Para. 9. After gettg. Acheson’s view, we might talk to French.
P.M.
I have always wanted this played slow.
E.B. always wanted w. Eur. forces stronger first.
U.S. pressed for more: but they seem now less keen.
Also bargaining counter in C.F.M. I want honest attempt to seek
a settlement. If it’s true R. are really afraid of G. re-armament,
we might get somethg. out of it.
Don’t therefore emphasise G. re-armt as the essential. It’s only one
feature of bldg. Eur. defences.
K.Y.
U.S. view still linkg. G. re-armt tightly with strengthening of Eur.
defence.
In Pleven talks U.S. thght. R. concession wd. have to justify
slowing of Eur. def. as a whole – not takg. anything in return for
delaying G. re-arm. alone.
A.
Endorse P.M.’s view.
A.B.
This developmt. has incensed a good deal of sound opinion v. us.
Eisenhower’s statemt. reflects views I have put.
Proof tht. we shdn’t yield so quickly to U.S. pressure. Keep friends
360
with them, but don’t do their bidding f’with.
Why frighten our people by going on with these talks with G.? If, as
E. now says, it will be so long before we are ready to absorb G.
units.
Don’t go back on principle: but suspend the talks.
J.
Endorse P.M.
E.Sh.
Remember tht. when E.B. was in N. Yk., he referred it back to Cab.
who accepted G. contn in principle. That was starting-point.
Not true tht. U.S. then expected (even if Fr. agreemt. were secured)
G. re-armamt. wd. take place under 2 yrs. I used that in
argument v. France. Can’t build Brigade Group fr. scratch in
less than 2 yrs. Thus, E. is not saying now anything diff. fr. what
U.S. meant at outset in N. Yk. Marshall’s 10 points: not one
item re G. contn: Moch accepted them. They were
confined to labour units etc.
Later, at W’ton, U.S. had decided to go fwd. with G. contn. They said
either accept this principle & seek to apply it in due course, or
you won’t get any help fr. U.S.
Decision to fight e. of Rhine was essential because attitude of Denmark
& Holland. And decision in principle to re-arm G. followed
from that.
Endorse P.M.’s view. Delay conversations: don’t break them off.
And approach U.S. (para. 9) with v. gt. care & tact.
In the end we can’t defend Eur. w’out the Germans.
Talks will be long: for safeguards & condns necessary.
C.F.M. There is militarism in E. Germany. Is it to be matched by
somethg. in W. Germany? If not & if we can’t reduce it in E.,
what will happen? Are we to fight it. Or the Germans?
It is not possible to root out G. militarism. Be realistic.
H.D.
Welcome P.M. & E.Sh.
Cab. never favoured G. re-armament before E.B. went to N. York.
E.B. said on arrival he was against it. We agreed to the principle
v. reluctantly ( after 3 mtgs) in deference to v. strong U.S.
pressure.
I wd. prefer to say we are against it. Agree we can’t because U.S.
views. Say therefore we continue to accept principle, but delay
it. I hope principle will never be applied.
Can’t hope to prevent worse Germans joining such a Force – or
emergence of Genl. Staff.
Uneconomic for us now to give arms to Germans. Give them to our
friends first.
Grim risk to push this fwd. in face of R. declaration. In point of
time nonsense to say can’t defend Eur. w’out G. contn: for we
may provoke attack before G. contn can be ready.
Proceed as in para. 9.
H.M.
We were not pushed into this by U.S. I favoured it much earlier.
361
Accept P.M.’s view. But be careful to stick to one line.
Don’t be pushed around on this, as result of impudent Comm.
campaign.
R. says you mustn’t arm G. – but all the time they are arming G.
What shall we say in mtgs. Can’t say accept principle but shan’t
apply it.
G. must have arms some day. Bound to be slow, anyhow.
Don’t give way to argument: you mustn’t provoke R. That was
N.C.’s attitude to Hitler.
Do a deal with R. if they are ready for it.
But let’s hold opinion steady. Say we favour it in principle: don’t
be afraid to say why.
H.G.
One of our diffies: ‘twixt public & private diplomacy. Pity anything
had to be discussed in public.
Equally, unable to tell whole story to public. Prs. we cd. now say
more.
Endorse Para. 9.
Card at C.F.M. What do we want to get out of Russians?
Nothg. concrete in pp. save prs. Australian Treaty.
My worry was lest we shd. get a bogus “settlement” thro’ C.F.M.
J.G.
Trouble is juxtaposition of events.
How justify to our supporters U.S. release of Krupp? Our people can’t
understand we aren’t responsible with U.S. Govt. jointly. And
we have suffered fr. Germany (twice) as U.S. haven’t.
C.E.
Agree with J.G. These things are bound up together in people’s minds.
Can we be assured tht. no G. war criminals will be released in Br. Zone
w’out concurrence of Cabinet.
A.B.
Will you say something re Krupp in Monday’s debate.
K.Y.
We were not consulted on merits of this case.
Only consultn was: if I revoke confiscn order, will it affect our joint
operation of Law 27 re deconcentn of industry. Answer given
was: no, neither one way nor another.
Ques. of control over his industrial property is not affected by this.
P.M.
Get all available information and I will make statement on Monday.
H.McN.
Wd be v. helpful if P.M. cd., in consultn with U.S., say tht. in view of
G.’s statemt. we are re-considg. whole sitn.
A.B.
Don’t throw away in advance our card for C.F.M.
K.Y.
Para. 9. prob. O.K. Trouble will prob. be tht. U.S. won’t agree to
play that card for de-militarisation of E. Germany only but
only in return for a wider concession by R.
362
[Enter G.S. Exit H. & W.Str.
5.
Sulphur.
H.M.
…….. Why appoint Knollys?
D.S.I.R. etc., give this first priority.
H.W.
There is a report going to R. Materials Cttee.
A.
Deplore Knollys’ appointment.
Sorry to see tht. industry isn’t going faster on pyrites.
More energy shd. go into this.
H.W.
Sulphur is cheaper & we’ve bn. trying to reduce costs.
There may be shortage of pyrites.
Better to rely on our own anhydrate - & extraction as by-product.
A.B.
This is not due only to U.S. stock-piling. It is due to extravagant
waste of natural resources by capitalist U.S.
Ministerial drive on Raw Materials. Offl. Cttee is not enough.
x/ No adequate geo-physical survey made. Vital now, here and in
Africa.
P.M.
Put in a memo. on x/: & we’ll have a full discussion.
G.T.
Deplorable effect on re-deploymt. of labour in Lancs. Followg. U.S.
demand for it – study groups etc. Then it is U.S. which denies
the raw materials.
[Exit G.S. Enter N.Edw.
6.
Post Office Staff Associations.
N.E.
A new association of motor-drivers. Recognition of it wd. weaken
Cab. posn. Tho’ it is isolated & doesn’t spread over grades.
Unions warn me tht. recognn will encourage break-aways.
I propose an advisory Commn to examine staff assocn posn in G.P.O.
with particular regard to breakaways & advise both on genl.
principle & on current applns.
Terrington, Miss Hancock & Ralph Glyn.
T.U.’s are in favour.
H.G.
i)
ii)
iii)
A.B.
Ty. shd. see wording of t. of r.
Nat. Staff Side shd. also be sounded informally as well as
P.O. T.U.’s.
Shd. like time to think about membership: effect on C. Service
generally.
Agree in principle: I also shd. be consulted.
Agreed in principle: A.B. & H.G. to be consulted
on details.
363
12th February, 1951.
C.M. 13(51).
1.
Korea.
[Enter C.O.S., K.Y., Ogmore, Strang.
K.Y.
We advised caution (to U.S.) & recd re-assuring replies fr. State Dpt.
& Bradley. We now seek a more formal assurance. Para. 4.
But this a.m.’s Press says S. Koreans have crossed 38th Parallel.
Draw attentn to 6(4). Alternatives are v. grave.
C.N.S.
Militarily, may be necessary to deviate a little from 38th. Both on
a line. And in tactical opns may have to counter-attack across
38th: also bomb beyond it.
Must hold in Korea. U.S. thinkg. of w’drawg. S. Koreans &
re-equipping them.
P.M.
Can’t go into 6(4) to-day. The rest of recommns seem sound.
H.G.
Public statement re 38th? You may be pressed. If you cd say we
aren’t going beyond, it wd. re-assure public.
P.M.
I’m inclined to say tht. it’s our view tht. it wd. be unwise to go beyond
line of 38th subject to such adjustments as tactical sitn may
require.
General agreement.
E.Sh.
Make it clear tht. it’s U.N., not U.S., business.
Inadequate contact betwn. MacA.’s H.Q. & Govts of U.N. Forces.
C.A.S.
U.S. C.O.S. are keeping us in touch with their views.
O.
Inform Doms.
2.
Agreed.
Defence in Pacific.
K.Y.
….. paras. 4-5 summarise Dulles’ views.
Para. 4 d-f = our strongest objns.
Tels. fr. W’ton 418, 419 suggest U.S. may be thinkg. better of
Dulles’ plan. Suggn of 3-Power Pact: we are seekg.
elucidn: no ques. of final decns on that to-day.
P.M.
Does this island chain include Formosa? May be a trap to get
A. & N.Z. support for U.S. claim to that.
Most unsatisf. to us. Omission of H. Kong, Malaya & Indo China
won’t suit us.
J.G.
Agreed.
A.B.
A mere formula to exclude us. No sound strategy in it.
We cdn’t be indifferent to a war in wh. A. & N.Z. were engaged.
364
H.M.
U.S. rushing this. Case for study-group includg. U.K.
A.V.A.
Stress McIntosh comment on para. 3 of W’ton 418. A. are
lookg. for means of limiting their liabilities in advance.
Doubtful re Menzies.
P.M.
Are you right. When here, M. was stout in A.’s part in M/E.
C.A.S.
Pacific = U.S. commitment: M/E. = Commonwealth.
A. & N.Z. reluctant to commit themselves in M/E. before knowg.
U.S. intentns in Pacific.
Real need is simple U.S. guarantee of security of A. & N.Z. They cd.
give it, on basis of sea-power. Then A. & N.Z. wd. be ready to
talk turkey on M/E.
P.M.
We must resist this U.S. plan.
K.Y.
In reply to H.M., there will be chance for more formal discn when
Dulles gets back to W’ton.
H.M.cN.
Island chain conceptn is politically disastrous.
But don’t rush into opposn. A. & N.Z. anxious for some guarantee.
Dulles is 1st word not last. We shall have plenty of chances to
get this right.
Agreed: seek to check this in limine.
[Exit C.O.S. & Ogmore
[Enter H.
3.
Meeting of C.F.M.
K.Y.
Soviet evidently want a limited agenda: but there are some openings.
Alternative in 7, somewhat stiff & not recommended.
Prefer proposals in 8 & 9.
Later informn: W’ton telegram. U.S. want to propose tht. offls. shd.
prepare agenda incldg. at least – causes existg. tension in
Europe incldg. level of armaments: sitn in S.E. Europe:
Austria: problems affectg. Germany: genl. relations. And
have power to settle order. But understandg. in advance tht.
these subjects shall be on agenda.
We think this goes too far: let reply be more general: reserve that
detail for mtg. of offls.
French also want more precision because they fear b’down of offls
mtg. unless made clear tht. we shall insist on wider agenda. On
that, we still prefer our approach.
P.M.
Exclude para. 7. because we want a mtg.
Agreed.
I shall say in H/C. to-day we want a mtg: but G. disarmament is
not only ques. to discuss.
In reply to R. make it clear tht. we shall want a wider agenda, but
365
don’t be too stiff.
H.M.
Jessup’s formula O.K. save for last phrase?
H.G.
I think so, too.
W.S.
Doubt re competence of C.F.M. First para. refers to peace-settlements.
And R. regards those words as decisive. Even “other matters”
(later in t. of r.) is covered by opening clause.
H.G.
All U.S. items cd. be brght. under “peace-settlements” formula:
except the last, wh. in any event is v. vague & useless.
H.McN.
Don’t think R. wd. accept first or last item as w’in CFM. t. of r.
H.D.
Prefer paras 8 & 9. Put them on spot by firm suggn for place &
date of mtg. Indicate agenda v. generally.
K.Y.
As at x/ in para. 9. That’s enough to safeguard our posn.
Want more time to discuss specific agenda.
Approved: paras. 8-9 plan.
4.
Call-up of Agricultural Workers.
A.B.
Met last week. On basis tht. Cab. had decided in principle to remove
protn & we had only to discuss means & timing.
First point at issue: as in memo.
Second point: remote areas as well as small farms. But adminve
discretion not hardship tribunals.
Third: timing of announcemt. Must get ahead, to let men know
where they stand.
Generally: 15.000 in all fr. industry employg. nearly 1 m. can’t
involve real diffy for the industry.
T.W.
Want Cab. to re-open whole ques. Three objns:
i)
15.000 p.a. = 80.000 over 5 years. Wd they all be called
up in war? If not, why waste money on training them.
ii) End 49 to end 50 lost 20.000 fr. industry. Wastage
serious, esp. to new industrial undertakgs.
P.M.
Are they going from small farms or large?
T.W.
ii) contd. 15.500 Eur. workers, whom we can’t keep on farms.
Tho’ admit there is at moment a balance of labour in
agric.
iii) Meat debate. Is this the moment to do anything to
weaken agriculture.
366
P.M.
Defence comes 2nd to agric., acc. to you. You allow men to drift out
of agric. to less essential industry: but want to stop them going
into Forces.
T.W.
Control of Engagement, if Cab. ready for it.
P.M.
You haven’t proposed it.
T.W.
But I don’t want to ban volunteering fr. farms to Forces.
A.B.
Argument at i) is fallacious: wd. apply to all reserved occupns.
Must have reserve of trained men: & decide on strategy at time.
What propn are to be called-up.
E.Sh.
N.S. Act ends in ’54. (?) Only 45.000 to be called up in all.
Not 80.000.
Real argument: how can you justify leavg. these men in agric. at a
time when we are takg. exceptional steps re reservists.
Thght. timing was main diffy: we met tht. by avoidg. call-up in
planting & harvesting seasons.
H.McN.
We do make exceptions. We have done so re coal-mining.
We are criticised for exceptl measures helping agric. – e.g. emplt. of
school-children. For we have prodn targets to meet.
A.
A.B.’s concessions help: but is the gain worth the pol. trouble.
H.M.
I have sympathy with agric. pt. of view.
H.G.
Exemptn for coal-mining because coal shortage now. That’s the diffce.
I support A.B. on the ques. of principle.
But on the detail. a) Defer call-up until autumn. For we don’t
get many men before.
b) By adminn.
c) Wd. not be diff. if announcemt. was on
basis of a).
Make that amount of concession because pol. diffy of iii) in T.W.’s
speech.
A.V.A.
High propn of old men in agric. This wd. increase their costs.
Support A.B. on principle: but must have some sugar on pill.
E.Sh.
Diff., under H.G.’s (a), for Services to absorb 15.000 fr. Nov. onwds.
Too many in short remaing. period. 3/4.000 only in 1st period
can’t hurt agric. & wd. spread load on Services.
P.M.
That argument cuts both ways.
H.M.
Pol. advantages of a) are decisive in my view. Services must accept
inconveniences.
367
E.Sh.
A.B.
Let’s accept principle & invite T.W. to discuss with industry how it
cd. most conveniently be applied.
Don’t take all political odium & get no men for Services.
If you p’pone until after harvest, Services can’t get 15.000.
x| But then you needn’t announce at once, anythg. but decn of
|
principles tht. protn is going to be w’drawn.
E.Sh.
Can’t then give figure of N.S. call-up this year.
T.W.
I wd. accept x/.
Agreed: as at x/.
[Enter Att.G.
5.
War Crimes.
K.Y.
As in memo.
Powers of clemency have bn. delegated.
Public misgivings caused v. largely by timing. i) K.’s statement
ii) McCloy’s independent action re Krupp etc. iii) G. rearmament.
On i). D. Herald was inaccurate. Not a speech: replies to ques.
by Press-men. F.O. Intell. was not wholly accurate: went out
before we had K.’s report: tho’ diffces are not in fact v. serious.
Form of statemt. was unfortunate: “hatred & revenge” unhappy
words to use, but in context did not refer to Nuremburg court.
He meant tht. he in his review wd. not be so actuated.
A.V.A.
Views of “Germans”. Are we being advised fr. Berlin about a repve
cross-section of G. views. Para. 10.
H.M.
Same point.
H.D.
The people we like in G. aren’t pressing for release of these criminals.
K.Y.
Repns mainly fr. church-leaders.
J.
Have seen K. i) He admits his choice of words was unfortunate.
No intn to imply “revenge” as motive of Judges in any trial.
He meant these words to apply to his review.
ii) McCloy’s hand was forced. He had a body of
Judges fr. U.S. & had to accept their recommns. K. was not
consulted on merits of decn re Krupp.
iii) Responsibility for clemency has bn. delegated to K.
He can’t therefore avoid reviewg. on basis of repns recd – even
tho’ Genl. Wade made a review only 18 months ago. He will,
however, keep now in mind climate of opinion in U.K.
Att.G.
I’m not opposg. G. re-armament. Merely juxtaposn of this & release
368
of Nazis e.g. Krupp. Even tho’ it was U.S. error, F.O. shd. have
taken initiative to stop it.
K. has also said “no case he won’t review”. Surprised tht. he shd.
e.g. Manstein. “changed circs”… I see none.
“hatred & revenge” I still think we must refer to some courts.
Wade’s review: v. careful and good. Recent. No case for a general
review.
H.M.
V. serious view – both on merits & on our Parly. diffies.
Offls. must remember they serve H.M.G.
U.S. consulted K. on Krupp. K. must have known U.S. were about
to release him. He shd. have warned F.O.
Two reasons for Party uproar:- a) or B. offl. out of control.
b) impn tht. sympath. consn is to be given to release of Nazis
d
conv of serious crimes.
Can’t leave this where it lies.
P.M.
K. has bn. given delegated responsibility to review. On that he is
not officer of H.M.G.
H.M.
Surely he shd. seek guidance on cases involvg. pol. considns.
Anyhow: I think K. must be sacked: & P.M. must say so to-day.
K.Y.
Read terms of delegn to H.C: mitigate or remit penalties etc.
There was a specific delegation.
Att.G.
Why promise to “review”?
P.M.
That doesn’t promise “mitigation”.
E.Sh.
Respons. transferred to F.O. Before that W.O. consulted F.O.
H.D.
How came it tht. K. came into posn tht. he is to decide these pol.
ques. w’out refce to F.O. On all other matters he wd. refer
home for guidance. Surely, there must be a mistake. He ought
at least to have checked up with F.O.
P.M.
When did F.O. realise tht. K. took this view of his responsibility?
K.Y.
He hasn’t done anything yet.
W.S.
I believe K. has bn. given this responsibility. I don’t think he shd.
have bn. given it.
H.McN.
Douglas was instructed, on a capital sentence, to refer home on a
case where pol. consns were involved.
A.B.
The words are clear. E.B. gave K. that responsibility. He shd. not
have done so.
W’draw this delegn of powers, and say so. Before he acts.
369
Don’t make K. a scapegoat.
H.
Responsibility tranfd to F.O., who at once delegated it to Robertson.
H.M.
Revise terms of delegn vice w’drawg. it.
P.M.
Para. 5 of C.P. 38. Were those cases decided in G., or referred to
F.O. or what?
K.Y.
Doubt if they were referred to F.O. – certainly not to Ministers.
Att.G.
Anyway: this doesn’t excuse what K. said re Nuremburg cases.
K.Y.
K. has asked to be relieved of these delegated powers.
P.M.
E.B. made the delegation: wd. like to know why: also wd. like to
know by whom they wd. be exercised in future: before the
powers are w’drawn.
H.G.
Decision re K. must rest with P.M.
But a) what does P.M. say to-day.
b) shd. we not approach U.S. Their words & actions are much
more damaging than K.’s.
K.Y.
Don’t rush into saying delegn will be w’drawn. Will suggest we
shall settle in future solely on basis of political considns.
C.E.
Nature of jurisdn – personal, not political. I don’t refer to my
colleagues ………..
370
15th February, 1951.
C.M. 14(51).
1.
Parliament.
[Enter E.S., W.W., G.A.I., K.Y.
H.M.
Tory vote of Censure on Defence Debate.
We shd. be able to get a majority.
P.M.
Will affect course of debate. But H.G. shd. reply v. shortly to
W.S.C. & then get on with the speech he had planned.
H.M.
Agreed.
2.
War Pensions.
H.M.
Head’s Motion on 16/2. Legn Cttee thght we shd. be non-committal,
tho’ not too cold. They invited discn with Ty.
G.A.I.
Ex-service Assocns divided on what shd. be done. Br. Legion want
increase in basic rate. Sc. Legion & Limbless Assocn
want more on supplements.
Better case for the latter.
Parly Secy. to start, non-committal. Then let debate run. For Fraser
& some others are discussg. with M/P. and won’t like Head’s
interventn. I won’t speak until nearly 4 p.m.
Read terms of his proposed peroration. Discussg. that with Ty.
H.G.
Agree we must accept the Motion. But M/P. must be careful what he
says because of repercussions. Avoid also raising false hopes.
But I will be reasonable in checkg. language wh. M/P. wishes
to use.
E.S.
Keep constantly in mind tht. any increase will have repercussions on
ind. injuries rates.
[Exit E.S., G.A.I.
1.
Parliament (resumed).
H.M.
Business for next week.
H.D.
Thursday 22/2. Prayer on M/H. M/L.G. split. Tory line will be tht.
I shall put homes on good agric. land. They will argue tht. I shd.
not responsibility for Housing: probably tht. it shd. go
to M/W. An independent Minister shd. reply – e.g. L.P. Agreed.
A.
H/Lords.
On 14/2. Salaries of Co. Court Judges. V. strong case developed.
Chorley was prayed in aid. Persuaded Simon tht. it was improper
as involvg. charge on Consol. Fund. But was bound to accept a
Motion askg. for earnest considn. If I hadn’t, they wd. have
371
carried the other.
Transport Bill (private member) carried in H/L. against the Govt.
H.M.
This must now be blocked in H/C.
[Enter G.S. Exit W.W.
3.
Sulphur.
H.W.
Nothing new from W’ton. Nothing to raise.
U.S. seem however to be workg. on it. – inter-agency.
H.G.
Tel. on Balt’s points. We shd. deal with these.
We mustn’t over-play our hand. I think we did on cotton – and were
found out.
H.W.
Don’t agree on that. But agree we must square Balt.
4.
Germany: Proposed Meeting of C.F.M.
K.Y.
U.S. draft reply received. First blush: seems as good as we’ll get.
Shall have to settle before Monday.
Copies of W’ton tels. 473 & 474 handed round.
P.M.
Separate but identical replies fr. the 3 Powers?
K.Y.
Yes.
First 4 paras. are harmless, subject prs. to some drafting points.
Paras. 5 and 6 are more worrying. Suggn of W’ton venue: and
Acheson’s reasons for suggesting it. Pressure of U.S. opinion
is not all encouraging.
J.
Why mention venue at this stage.
E.Sh.
Discuss in Paris talks.
A.B.
Para. 3 of 474. x/. Unnecessary to say that. Omit whole sentence.
P.M.
It is necessary: for we are refuting Soviet claim.
Better to insert “main” before “cause” – or “sole cause”.
K.Y.
We will suggest either omission or insertion of “only”
before “cause”.
E.Sh.
Necessary to mention Austria?
P.M.
We want it on agenda.
K.Y.
Try to get venue discussed in Paris talks.
372
E.Sh.
W’ton is not good climate for this mtg.
H.D.
At end para. 2., is it necessary so to whitewash Germ. leaders.
K.Y.
Might water it down: but must answer allegns in Soviet note.
P.M.
[Exit C.E.
y/ Stop at “Republic” if any change is to be made.
H.D.
Para. 4 “for own survival”. Too hysterical. Omit: or suggest
“safety”, or “security”.
K.Y.
In general, it strikes me as a bit too stiff.
H.G.
It gives us most of what we want.
K.Y.
On y/ we shan’t be popular if we press it too far.
H.D.
Ques. of fact.
P.M.
Put the point, but don’t die in last ditch over it.
5.
Yugoslavia.
A.B.
Head & others raised ques. of assurances to Yugoslavia, on Monday.
I may be pressed.
Can I say: “Yugosl. has same protn as any other nation v. aggressn
under U.N. Charter: and if any further assurances are
required it is for considn [by C.F.M.] not for unilateral action.
P.M.
By or in consultn with other Govts. vice [ ].
“matter for discn with our friends.
Not for N.A.T.O. or for C.F.M.
Ques. of acceptg. any more specific obligns is clearly one for
discussion with our friends & not to be undertaken unilaterally.
Agreed: F.O. to provide formula to A.B. on the lines
indicated above.
6.
Korea.
P.M.
P.N. Ques. re landing of S. Korean troops nr. Wansan (?).
Fenner Brockway.
E.Sh.
No offl. informn available.
P.M.
Then I can say so.
H.M.
Anyway, limited raids to north of 38th is consistent with P.M.’s
373
general statement.
K.Y.
A mere raid is no more than strategic bombing.
7.
Re-sale Price Maintenance.
[Exit K.Y.
[Enter W.M., H.H.M., Att.G.
Wheatley.
……….. not heard ………..
A.
Danger that prices might rise.
H.W.
Manufacturers wd. stop that. And in last resort we cd. impose price
control.
Agreed: B/T. to prepare White Paper for Cabinet’s consn.
Adopt para. 18(a), if Att.G. can find means.
H.H.M.
Para 21. Order under Monopolies Act is in train.
Presume no objn to that.
H.D.
Certainly not. Welcome it.
[Re-enter C.E.
[Exit: M.W., H.H.M., Att.G.
8.
Nationalisation of Water Supplies.
H.D.
As in memo. Action as proposed in para. 3.
Draw attn to Annex of earlier pp. on effects on rural prices. V. striking.
In Norfolk: only authority to pay more wd. be Norwich.
Re-distributive justice to rural popn benefit.
H.G.
i)
ii)
H.D.
Expect no burden on Exchequer. See para. 3(3).
The charges shd. ensure there is no deficit.
A.B.
Addl charges in any area wd. reflect inefficiency of local board; and
this wd. be incentive.
P.M.
This will increase burden on our urban supporters for benefit of Tory
supporters in rural areas. Tho’ I support it on merits.
A.B.
Ty. shd. consider makg. grants to ease posn over first few years.
They now make grants for capital costs.
Especially in Scotland, to wh. Ty. has bn. over-generous.
J.G.
This scheme helps rural areas w’out undue centralisation.
Compensation – as for gas & electricity?
Yes.
Management – area boards, l.a. composed, who will find deficits
on their working.
374
H.D.
Equalisation w’in areas. But corrected by national adjustment.
H.G.
iii)
iv)
A.
Is iii) right? New works – cost shd. be distributed over whole country.
Can’t be committed to iii).
A.B.
Diff. to defend equalisn in E. & W. and none in Scotland.
to ease this, Ty. will have to continue grants.
H.G.
Not seeking to w’draw those.
Wh.
Reserve posn of Scotland. No suggn of incorporatg. Scotland in this.
C.E.
Grave misgiving.
What is meant by “water-works”. Appln includes all capital assets,
incldg. Mains. All future extensions will be respons. of
M/L.G.
What is left for l.a.’s to do – beyond collectg. rates?
A.B.
They wd. carry out (?) works as agents of Minister: manage the
service as his agents.
C.E.
Not much in that. I wd. have preferred “municipilisation” of water
services. This is another case of depriving l.a.’s of trading
services. Experience in gas & electricity doesn’t encourage me
to believe area boards will be better than l.a.’s.
Hope M/L.G. will listen to l.a. representns for a greater share of
responsiby. cf. County Fire Brigade Cttee organn – bringing
smaller authies into work by larger authies.
80% of water is supplied already under public control.
Act of 1846 was for water & sewerage.
G.T.
But that Act has never met the interests of rural popn.
Approach to l.a.’s is v. important.
They ought to have more share than in gas & electricity.
H.M.
Support C.E.
Can’t be sure we shall get results fr. this. Figures only for E. Anglia.
What of W. Riding or Lancs. – how wd. they be affected.
Fear that this undermines l.a. govt. Lost gas, electricity, transport,
hospitals, rating & evaluation. The big cities won’t lightly give
up water: & are getting desperate about this encroachment.
Little for l.a.’s to do under this scheme but collect the rates.
Must avoid situation where others spend Ty. money.
Wd prefer M/L.G. to get the l.a.’s together & put it to them tht.
there’s a problem: must have 100% public control: anxious to
preserve as much l. govt. as poss: have they any ideas.
No addl burden on Exchequer.
Financial responsibility shd. rest with the boards – essential to
efficiency.
375
P.M.
E.Sh.
M/L.G. has the middle way in his memo.
But he shd. find some means of retaing. their interest in the
capital works.
Can’t ignore results of other natn schemes. Haven’t turned out so
well yet. Need for great care.
Favour M/L.G. ascertaing. views of l.a.’s. Don’t face them with
fait accompli.
Agreed: M/L.G. to talk to l.a.’s on these general lines.
H.M.
I dissent from x/ in C.P. 50.
J.
Talks shd. be exploratory.
P.M.
Shd. not be commd to this scheme.
H.D.
I want to say these are my ideas: what are theirs:
and I will inform the Cab. of their views.
9.
P.M.
Full Employment Bill.
Time is not propitious.
Agreed.
376
22nd February, 1951.
C.M. 15(51).
1.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W., K.Y.
H.M.
Transport Bill (23/2) – will need good whipping. Conservatives
are active in its support.
Business for next week.
A.
Morris: Ques. re Tourist Agency, saying in U.S. tht. visitors to
F/Britain will have plenty of food. Allegns: untrue. No power
in H/L. to refuse such a Ques, as there wd. be in H/C.
H.W.
We have a good answer.
Defence Debate to-day. European Army will be a considerable point.
Layton is to speak.
A.V.A.
We can say “sub judice” because confce sitting in Paris.
E.Sh.
Can’t attack the conception, for it wd. offend French: nor cd. we
support it. We are sending an observer – H.M. Amb. in Paris.
If Fr. plan succeeded, that Army cd. come into N.A. Force.
H.D.
Also tilt at Europ. M/Defence.
P.M.
The mongrel force, if formed, cd. come into N.A. Force.
K.Y.
We must be neutral to it, tho’ we won’t join it: as with Schuman Plan.
Federation by a side-wind.
H.M.
W.S.C. wants F.A. debate round 13/3. Seems a bit soon.
[Exit W.W.
[Enter N.B., R.R.S., B. & G.S.
2.
Economic Report.
H.G.
Sitn satisf.
Unemplt. falling.
H.D.
40% still in special areas. Not therefore a sign of inflation yet.
H.W.
Mersey is worst. But plans maturing wh. will wipe out all unemplt.
H.D.
It is to sp. areas tht. addl. defence prodn shd. go.
H.G.
Is going. New defence work goes there where poss. Where not,
firm puttg. balance of displaced civil work there.
H.G.
Coal. Output rising. Shd. now get thro’ w’out industrial trouble,
377
unless v. cold weather v. soon.
N.B.
Output has bn. better. 700.000 t. better in last 6 wks. than 1950 –
6 wks. fr. end of 1st wk. in Jan.
Absenteeism high: but mainly due to ‘flu.
Opencast 300.000 t. down because rain, as cpd. 1950.
Imports below expected average. O.K. if balance comes in Mar/Apl.
Stocks rising in last 3 wks.
If imports improve, & output m’tained, shall end coal year with
satisf. stocks level (? 9 m. tons).
But rlway. strike wd. bring crisis condns in 1 or 2 weeks.
P.M.
Improvemt. in man-power is v. good.
A.B.
It is return to pits of ex-miners. Can’t therefore expect it to continue at
this rate.
1) Don’t commit ourselves this year to output figure.
2) Stock posn shd. rank with exports throughout the year. We are
running on too narrow a margin. Need higher sticks, for
pol. reasons – vulnerable to Commn in coal-fields.
H.G.
Agree with 2). Will consider 1).
J.G.
The target set by P.M. for winter drive was valuable psychol.
B.
No further chartering of ships for coal imports. We shd. go on thro’
summer, if we want the coal.
N.B.
N.C.B. want to go on importg. I doubt this, politically.
H.M.
Economy in coal consumptn. Cd. this be included in future reports.
H.G.
Better to have a memo. For this can’t be quantified.
Steel Production.
H.G.
Jan. output lower than ’50 – as also textiles. Is this sickness?
Lack of sheet. Short-time on cars.
G.S.
We shall have to cut genl. steel allocns. Increased demand, & less
scrap fr. G. – cut of 5% seems inevitable.
Cut of 15/20% made already in sheet. Because can’t buy abroad.
That will continue until Margam comes in at end ‘/51.
Total annual for 1951 likely to fall by up to ¾ m. tons because
shortage of scrap.
H.G.
Will knock our assumptn of 4% increase in productivity.
H.M.
In the 1st year of natn.
378
G.S.
Scrap shortage in G. Everyone wants more, incldg. Germans.
H.M.
Grave pol. and econ. consequences.
A.B.
Industry is ill-balanced under private industry – not enough pig-iron
and overmuch dependence on scrap imports.
H.M.
Prodn Cttee must consider. V. important.
Agreed.
Textiles Production.
H.W.
‘Flu has affected cotton output. Also r. materials shortages – unusual
types of cotton having to be used.
Wool. Short-time & unemplt. soon. Because of high prices.
Stocks won’t be carried by merchants. Think they are wrong:
prices won’t drop.
H.G.
They also find diffy in financg. holdg. of large stocks.
G.T.
Finer types of cotton are better: but coarser are more profitable
to workers & owners.
Bricks.
H.G.
Low stocks.
R.R.S.
Survey made. By Oct. prodn at rate of 7.2 thous. mill. cpd. under
6 in ’50.
With Ital. labour – accepted by Unions. If labour available,
trade can reach target.
Stock posn shd. improve fr. May onwds.
Timber.
H.W.
Stocks low for next 3 mos. Strike in Finland. Shipping moved over
to coal. Recovering now. Licensg. will revert to normal fr.
March. But stocks won’t be much above 200.000 st.
vice 300. Shall be a month behind in stock-bldg.
Private buyers have done well in France & Austria.
From July we shd. be better off than for years.
H.D.
M/W. & I aren’t happy. Shortfall of 10.000 st. for 2 mos. was
suffered & that shd. be made good. Can’t we get it now fr.
Pacific coast.
H.W.
Have promised to consider in March makg. up that cut.
Can’t ship fr. there in less than 3/4 months. We have chartered as
much as we cd. w’out wreckg. freight market. All we’ve bght.
will be shipped – with one month lost because coal.
In March (2 wks. ahead) will consider wtr. I can accept this redn in
379
stocks thro’ makg. up cut. Must wait until I can gauge stock posn
on basis of private buying.
R.R.S.
Pushg. bldg. industry to do more. Shortage will develop just when
weather improves. Must have 20.000 cut restored in Apl/June.
No good bringing it in later.
H.G.
Three ques.
i)
Shd. you allocate more, on basis of shipmts. expected.
Doubtful if we’ll be able to w’out endangering stocks.
ii) Accelerate shipments. Too many Dpts. are holding off
because think prices will fall. I wd. favour bringing this
in, quick.
H.McN.
Will M/W. also buy bricks?
P.M.
Let Prodn Cttee consider all this.
H.M.
Form of report. Section on raw Materials in future.
Stock Position.
H.G.
Internl sitn is worst factor. Not sure wtr. even so, Dpts. are buying
enough. Prodn Cttee will consider all this.
Wages.
H.G.
A.B.
x/ Near end of 1st round, save for rlways.
Seen T.U.C. – not in favour of our ideas, but were aware tht. somethg.
will have to be done.
Agree with x/. And increases modest. Sometimes too modest –
& industrial unrest caused in consequence.
But further applns if price increases continue.
Balance of Payments.
H.G.
V. heavy adverse balance in Jan. Higher prices & heavier quantities
of imports.
H.D.
Germany are exploiting E.P.U.
H.G.
They haven’t carried out promises. We must stop keeping them.
May have to do export licensing.
H.D.
They shd. be exporting more: & cf. what was said of scrap.
H.W.
Raw Materials generally. No chance of gettg. 1950 prodn
on present prospects. Prodn Cttee.
380
E.Sh.
Makes nonsense of U.S. attitude towards our defence effort.
[Exit R.R.S. & G.S.
3.
Railway Strike.
A.B.
Rpt. of enquiry provoked sharp re-action fr. men. Saw R.E.C. on
Fri. p.m. & later Unions. R.E.C. accepted report: Union
rejected it. Stalemate. Pity they announced posns: for was
report not award.
Asked my opinion. I said rept. was mistaken in attachg. condns of
work to wages. First can only be secured by co-opn. I therefore
suggd sepn of the two things. Relns betwn. R.E.C. & Unions too
poisoned.
R.E.C. have now adopted formula (agreed with Unions) tht. as soon
as wages settled, they will discuss condns of work with Unions.
Good line.
Unions said discns going on in good spirit.
We may be over the hump.
When last nght. negotns on wages broke, R.E.C. wanted to announce
it. I urged them not to. Preferred to say “discns adjourned”.
To avoid ques. of face. R.E.C. behaved v. foolishly in so
slamming the door.
Rpt. recommended average increase of 5%. Court bound to look at
profits: so statute requires. Break-down on £2¾ m. Unions
want only 7½% - dockers got that. Folly to risk b’down of our
economy over £2¾ m. N.U.R. specially anxious for 7½%.
If R.E.C. hadn’t announced what they did last night, I cd. have got a
settlement. Unions want to “adjourn”.
Shall meet R.E.C. this p.m. & seek renewal of negotns.
B.
There are further facts. When Unions made their demands, & ques.
of efficiency raised, Unions rejected latter & ran to M/L.
before mtg. R.E.C. And M/L. set up court – incldg. 2 responsible
T. Unionists. Read its report, wh. was unanimous: it said R.E.C.
was enough. Unions repudiated it publicly, at once. And refused
to urge members to observe restraint while discns were going on.
This is first time in rlway. history tht. T.U. leaders have allowed
this strike pressure to be applied while discns procdg.
True, public opinion (despite report) don’t like some men being under
£5 p. wk. R.E.C. have indicated readiness to re-open that ques.
Linked, remember, to agric. wages & road-men. And further
£2¼ m. offer was made.
This only covers conciliation grades. When the 9¼ m. is worked thro’
it will be £14 m. And 7½% means £17 m. And re-actions on
other transport – road.
A.B. told me he thght. his report was wrong. It’s his procedure:
I conformed to it.
A.B.
I only expd a personal view, in private conversation.
381
B.
A.B.
Managemt. has offered maximum they are justified in offering.
With this wage increase, on top of increased costs of coal &
petrol, 15% increase in freight rates wd. be necessary.
And because of last night’s public statement, any concession by
R.E.C. will seem to be deferring to Govt. pressure or strike.
The shop-men depends on engineering rates, not this.
N.B.
Agree N.U.R. shd. have called for restraint.
But I support A.B. There is unrest among the men. This is like the
Porter award last summer: Govt. had to put that right.
Most unwise to have a strike for sake of £2¼ m. Cost of that wd. be
v. much greater.
In natd indies we ought not to insist on less for workers because we
have more control.
H.M.
Disturbed at Union’s attitude re efficiency. Don’t agree tht. it’s
unreasonable to link that with wages. Esp. in view of their
deficit.
Gt. redundancy of labour on rlways.
H.G.
Disaster of genl. rail strike. Both genl. & immediately on coal.
We are up against that. Can’t afford genl. stoppage or even work by
rule.
C.E.
Emergencies Cttee. We cd. do virtually nothg. to mitigate effects of a
genl. rlway. strike. Short of calling for volunteers on basis of
Genl. Strike.
B.
Cab. decision, if any, shd. be made to-day.
H.M.
Try & get them talking. Cab. shdn’t decide how much the men shd.
have.
H.G.
Tho’ R.E.C. shd. have a tip.
P.M.
Get the 2 sides together.
[Exit N.B. & B.
4.
Immigration of Br. Subjects into U.K.
C.E.
Not so acute as to warrant action. If it becomes so, shall come to Cab.
J.
May be in trouble over this sort of thing because Human Rghts.
Convns.
Memo. approved.
382
1st March, 1951.
C.M. 16(51).
1.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W., K.Y. & H.
H.M.
Business for next week.
P.M.
Thursday: Navy Estimates. Motion on Fechteler. E.Sh. will have
to speak.
2.
N.A.T.O. Commands.
H.
Proposed tht. I shd. make statement in H/L. debate to-day (f. affairs) –
after Templewood’s opening speech.
A.
T. will ask for White Papers on i) duties of Supreme Commr.
ii) 38th Parallel.
P.M.
Promise i) when settled. Not yet decided.
A.
ii) can be rejected as unnecessary.
E.Sh.
Urging U.S. to decide allocn of other Commands esp. in Atlantic
& Med.
Doubt if we can get decn before Thursd.
Will press Eisenhower to move on.
P.M.
F. shdn’t have bn. publd in advance: leaked in Denmark.
Can’t therefore show a reasonable balance.
E.B.
Mil. pressure (in U.K.) for U.S. Commrs. – for some months past.
E.Sh.
Principle of U.S. Naval Commr. for Atlantic (w’out names) was
settled in A.V.A.’s day: & went thro’ at Brussels mtg. (w’out
our noticing it.
P.M.
C.O.S. all in favour. Decided in principle in 1948.
E.Sh.
Approved by last Brussels mtg. But neither E.B. nor I spotted it.
Accepted as “agreed reports” betwn. Govts.
H.
C.O.S. recommn in 1948. Before N.A.T.O. establd. Confirmed in
1949; and again in 1950 – in both Council & Def. Cttee of
N.A.T.O. I first heard of it when leak occurred & was told tht.
P.M. & E.B. had agreed & approved.
The Sea Lords support it.
A.B.
Not concerned with their views: this is political.
Shdn’t certain subjects be reserved in N.A.T.O. for Ministers.
383
E.B.
I shd. probably have made a report on Brussels – as W. Paper or as
report to Cabinet.
I think tht. even now I shd. present a considered rept. on Brussels
putting this ques. into perspective.
P.M.
This wd. help – to inform our own minds.
H.M.
With a diagram showing chain of command.
E.Sh.
May not be able to do that.
H.McN.
a)
b)
E.B.
Diff. to decide what is political & what is technical, esp. in these
international affairs.
Need for closer collaboration betwn. military & political. Can there
be a guide to this – to ensure mil. don’t forget to bring these
things to notice.
A.B.
M’while H. shd. take line in H/L. tht. judgmt. shd. be suspended
until whole Command picture is seen.
P.M.
P’pone Navy Estimates? To give further time.
H.M.
Ch. Whip shd. consider later. That wd. inconvenience W.O.
Ask W.S.C. to raise command issue on (?) Civil Vote on A/C.
issues involvg. pol. considns shd. come to Ministers.
care in presenting such decisions to U.K. public opinion.
Agreed. H.M. to talk to A.E.
3.
Reserve Forces Bill.
[Exit H.
E.Sh.
Objns in H/C. to Cl. 6. Penalties excessive: offence too wide:
encroached on free speech.
Promised consn. Discussed with Service Ministers. Proposed now to
w’draw this sub-section and to substitute another (as described).
This wd. apply only to persons actually selected for call-up, not
to all “liable” to call-up.
Snag (Att.G.): liability to call-up “until emergency is at an end.” If
you don’t extend this to all “liable” it may imply you have no
power to call up anyone.
J.
Act of 1934 applies to “H.M. Forces”. The offence thereunder is in
much the same terms as here proposed. If new clause, limited
to persons served with notice: what is posn of those not so
covered? Do they come under Act of ’34. This clause wd.
create legal doubt. Att.G. wondered wtr. clause shd. do no more
than declare ’34 Act applies. That wd. be politically weak,
however.
384
H.M.
If we don’t need the clause: can’t we say tht. this is because we have
now decided to limit offence to persons on whom notices have
bn. served.
Discussion adjourned.
[Enter C.O.S. & Ogmore.
[Exit W.W., A.H.
4.
Pacific Defence.
P.M.
Our objns to “island chain” conceptn convinced Dulles. Now on basis
of tri-partite guarantee.
Recommend acceptance, tho’ U.K. not included. Prefer tht.
Philippines shd. not be included.
C.I.G.S.
Our interest: get A. & N.Z. into M/E. This Treaty helps qua
re-assuring them re own security. Don’t mind U.K. being
excluded. Want to exclude Phil.
K.Y.
We agree.
Spender is sensitive re our attitude. If we make any reservations,
make them separately: following a document statg. broad
agreemt.
O.
Agree – with K.Y.
A.V.A.
Don’t play down by that means our objn to Philippines.
E.Sh.
Danger (political) of U.K. not being in. Leavg. Pacific defence to U.S.
A.
Support that view. H. Kong: an old & important commitmt.
Our naval forces in Pacific will be much larger than Australian.
V. gt. pol. disadvantages.
A.B.
Pol. dynamite – esp. after Fechteler. After surrendering U.K. interest
in Atlantic, we are now surrendering Pacific Comm. to U.S.
J.
Support. Sacrificing Comm. to U.S.
H.G.
But, if we insist on coming in, we are back on island chain conceptn.
Can we go in, w’out saying anythg. re Malaya & H.K.
Wd it commit A. or U.S. to help in defence of Malaya etc.
J.G.
But if our Colonies included, what of Indonesia, Indo-China etc.
Alternative must be comprehensive Pacific pact.
E.Sh.
Memo. on Global Strategy: we agreed it shd. be discussed with U.S.
Ques. of security in Pacific shd. have bn. considered in reln to
that.
Premature to determine now what shd. be done in Pacific.
Plenty of time for discussion.
385
Nervous also of effects of this on M/East. Divert A. & N.Z. strengths
to Pacific.
A.B.
Can’t we discourage A. – on basis tht. this cuts right across conceptn
of Comm.
P.M.
We can’t come in w’out incldg. Malaya etc.
We can’t get the others to guarantee those.
A. & N.Z. will say: why stop us fr. gettg. protn you can’t provide.
O.
a)
b)
c)
d)
A. & N.Z. don’t think this inconsistent with Comm.
U.K. has its place in N.A.T.O. We didn’t ask to come into that.
We will look after yr. interests in Pacific.
If you stop us gettg. this Treaty, it will disturb Comm. relns.
This was not U.S. initiative: but Australian. They raised it
with Dulles.
A.B.
At least suspend – until we have taken further soundings.
If A. & N.Z. really want it, they must guarantee to gag W.S.C.
H.McN.
We all agree we cdn’t enter into Pact not covering Malaya etc.
Austr. [& N.Z.] have for years bn. hankering after U.S. naval
guarantee: both sides of Austr. public opinion. Indeed, we
favoured it: & complained tht. Evatt wrecked our chance of it.
They believe this = best they can get as offset to Jap. Peace Treaty.
If we oppose this we shall estrange Austr. opinion.
E.Sh.
Want U.K. associated in some way – e.g. w’out necessarily bringing
in Malaya etc.
E.B.
What of the bill. How cd. we afford to guarantee Pacific as well as
anything else.
H.D.
Look at Pacific situation realistically.
Try to get ourselves associated – w’out bringing ourselves fully in
qua Colonies.
K.Y.
When we are associated, we get into diffy about our own Colonies.
don’t want Pact wh. wd. get A. Commd to defence of Japan.
T.W.
Cd F.O. & C.R.O. discuss means of associatg. U.K. otherwise as full
partner.
E.B.
Cd we get back to my original idea of Br. Comm. + U.S. together
joining in Pacific Pact.
C.E.
This, if we are excluded, wd. give impn we are disinterestg. ourselves
in Pacific.
Discussion Adjourned, for further considn
386
by F.O., C.R.O. & M/Defence.
5.
Falkland Islands Survey.
H.G.
No strategic or econ. advantage. Cab. decided not to assert our claims
by force. Others refuse to go to internatl court..........
E.Sh.
Do we wish to remain at all? Even C.O. agrees we shd. Ques.
therefore is shd. it be 4 bases or 6. We favour 6. For if we are
going to stay at all we must do it effectively. Not merely Chile
& Argentine. R. have experience in Arctic. Politically, we shd.
support F.O.
H.G.
Thought there was no strategic argument. Only prestige.
A.V.A.
Falklands is vital strategically. Argentines have claimed them as well
as dependencies. We shall weaken that, if we weaken our posn
in the dependencies.
H.G.
Two more huts won’t affect that issue.
H.McN.
The huts are symbol of our struggle with Argentine. Support F.O.
E.Sh.
I wd. rather find the money myself for the other two.
E.B.
Have saved equivalent by agreeing with A. not to have naval expedns.
I want flag to fly there. Huts are cheaper than H.M. ships.
P.M.
Must have bases there. No good having ineffective bases.
Agree in principle - £100.000.
[Exit C.O.S.
[Enter Davies & H.
6.
Four Power Meeting.
K.Y.
Soviet reply expected to-day.
Opening date 5/3 was suggested.
3 Power talks in W’ton re an agenda with some precision. Want a
short one, w’out detail.
Haven’t put detail into memo: for had hoped for later news.
Only suggns: Austrian Treaty shd. come early, as test of R.
sincerity.
Fr. want satellite Peace Treaties on.
First item: causes of intern. tension, incldg. level of
armaments etc. (U.S. formula). So as to avoid being
bogged down on Germany.
Can’t give more def. instns as yet.
E.B.
We shd. find means of raising ques. of R. technique of provoking
387
civil war vice foreign war. Cab. might. think how to do this.
Even if we can’t get settlement, we might. make it clear we wd.
regard such actn as tantamount to war. Might have effect of
checking it v. Yugoslavia.
A.V.A.
A.B.’s statement in Def. Debate was helpful.
Spkers. in H/L. have asked us to go further – declare in advance it wd.
be casus belli.
J.
Can’t say more than tht. “we shd. have then to take counsel with our
friends.”
A.B.
I suggd for agenda pact of non-aggression incldg. Yugoslavia.
This cd. now be carried a point further. R. wd. be in diff. moral
posn if they refused it. Let us press it at the C.F.M. mtg.
E.B.
Ventilate this in H/L. today. You’ve gone so far now, you cd. make
it clear to R. tht. this game can’t be played with impunity.
No harm in mentioning Pact.
Later – better perhaps leave it to me to seek another opportunity.
E.B.
Representation at preliminary mtg.
Davies.
Reserve Henderson for later discn. Also H. identified with Germany.
H.M.
Must be paired.
A.B.
Para. 4. Final sentence. I don’t accept posn tht. we can’t have an
agreemt. limited only to German re-armament.
H.D.
Follows on para. 3., wh. I approve.
P.M.
Also that we must be able to put R. in dock over their armaments.
[Exit H. and E.D. and O.
[Enter Att.G., Wheatley & Att.
Solr. Genl.
3. (resumed)Reserve Forces Bill.
E.Sh.
Alternatives – re-stated as before.
Att.G.
1934 Act & common law apply to all in reserve forces, wtr. calling
up notices served or not. Tho’ public don’t realise it – even
reservists themselves.
Cl. designed to make it clear & remove doubt.
Alternatives now
a) leave clause, adding “maliciously & advisedly” wh. have
no effect.
b) w’draw altogether: explaing. why we had included it.
388
c)
d)
substitute provn declarg. 1934 applies to all.
amend cl. so as to restrict it to men recvg. notices. That
wd. exclude 1934 Act, poss. in respect of a reserve forces.
It wd. cut down stringency of existg. law.
P.M.
Wd a) satisfy H/C.
Att.
Tories but not our chaps.
H.M.
Our chaps wd. be content with b). That wd. be simplest.
E.Sh.
Wd it help to do a) plus w’drawal of sub-sectn (2).
H.M.
Cd we say: Govt. have sought means of meeting views of H/C.
Thght. of (d). Found tht. at this point no new provn needed
at all. Can rely on existg. law.
Att.G.
Object of clause was to make it clear law applied to reservists.
E.Sh.
H/C. didn’t object to 1934 provn. Cd we have clause relatg. that to
Z. reservists.
J.G.
Remember French strikes were broken by calling up strikers as
reservists.
Att.G.
Whatever course you adopt, you are bound to make it clear tht.
reservists are members of Forces.
E.Sh.
Let us have a) plus d): which is what Service Ministers want.
Att.G.
Then net result is to reduce stringency of existing law.
A.B.
Which is what I want to do.
J.
No lawyer cd. defend that. For reasons given……
E.Sh.
Then best concln = drop clause altogether. (b) above.
A.B.
Then we must say we rely on 1934 Act & it applies to all reservists.
Att.G.
Real alternatives are between a) and b).
E.Sh.
Prefer (a). Take a chance on it.
389
Agreed.
5th March, 1951.
C.M. 17(51).
1.
Offices of Profit.
[Enter 3 L.O.’s
C.E.
Questions for decision:a) Paras. 8-9: renunciation of remuneration. If this shd.
disqualify, escape shd. not be provided by renouncg.
remuneration: might prevent person of limited means from
serving.
S.G.
Many offices for wh. M.P.’s needed: this prevents their services
being used. E.g. membership of Advisory Councils where
paymt. can be made.
A.B.
E.g. Local Emplt. Cttee: Advisory Cttee on Disabled Persons.
S.G.
Also: not easy to say wtr. M.P. is disqualified. Wd be helpful in
case of doubt if M.P. cd. remove the doubt by renouncg.
remuneration.
H.M.
Dislike general provn for renunciation.
Some exceptions already – where clear tht. expenses don’t permit
“profit”.
Awkward if we offer posn to 2 M.P.’s: & Tory accepts but Labour
can’t afford to.
I wd. prefer to continue to make specific statutory provisions in each
(new) case. Or dare we say it can be done by aff. resolution.
Att.G.
Bill will allow travelling & subsistce at top C. Service rates – but no
“loss of remunerative time”.
P.M.
Doesn’t that cover most cases?
A.B.
No: for the office permits a claim for “loss of remunerative time”.
Att.G.
I think it wd. be dangerous to allow renunciation, as a general
proposn. A man apptd Director of B/E., even if he renounced
remuneration, wd. be thereby in favourable posn to get other
directorships etc.
C.E.
Cl. 2(3) a) and b) set out reasonable provision. If desired to exempt
particular office, it shd. be done in the Bill creating the office.
We can’t foresee the need in advance, in genl. legn. May create
more problems than it solves.
A.B.
Do we need to go on with this Bill at all: Tendentious speeches &
headlines – even if “official” concurrence of Tories were secured.
Don’t trust Tory back-benchers.
P.M.
Are we pledged?
390
Solr.G.
4 Indemnificn Bills in this Parlt: & on each occasion Govt. has
accepted view tht. law shd. be clarified.
C.E.
This shd. be cleared up. Negotns in my last para. will take some time.
A.B.
But do we have to proceed in this Parlt.
H.M.
There’s nothg. to be ashamed of – no muck to rake.
Bill must be completed: then consultn with Opposn: can’t pass this
Session anyway – at most, publish.
A.B.
That wd. be maladroit.
And 18 cases hanging about for wh. Indemnity Bills wd. be needed.
General view: we must go on with this, w’out prejudice
to later discn of wtr. Bill shd. be introduced
in current Session.
P.M.
Renunciation of remuneration: Endorse C.E.’s recommendation.
After further discn: Agreed:
i) No general provision for renunciation of remunn.
ii) M.P. may serve on a Cttee whose members may claim loss of
remunerative time, but he may not claim for loss of
remunerative time.
b)
Emoluments in Kind.
J.
Goes too far. E.g. my tea as Govr. of Tate Gallery.
Sol.G.
Endorse that: we were sure you cdn’t cover every possible abuse.
We therefore limited remuneration to money payment.
To introduce ambiguous phrases like C.E.’s makes nonsense of
attempt to clear up this jungle.
Att.G.
“Significant benefit in kind”
Solr.G.
Prestige is convertible to money. Stick to plain language, if our
object is to make the law intelligible.
H.M.
Principle is right. Surely we can find words.
A.B.
Can’t find water-tight formula.
C.E.
This is even more important than money payment.
Att.G.
“Any material & tangible benefit in kind”
J.
Gt. need here is for certainty. Must leave no scope for interpretn –
“substantial” or “material” are impossible.
391
Solr.G.
If you try to stop all evasion, you will get a Bill like a Finance Bill.
Do avoid ambiguities.
Agreed: See wtr. a formula can be devised.
c)
d)
e)
Office or Place.
Number of Ministers in H/C.
Contractors.
No comment.
..
P.M.
G.P.O. case?
S-G.
Led to 1931 Act. It’s illogical. We have re-enacted it: as it hasn’t
led to any controversy.
J.
One-man company.
S-G.
See Cl. 6.
Att.G.
I shd. wish existg. law to be enlarged to cover services.
Sol.G.
A v. large task.
f)
C.E.
Enforcement.
No comment.
g) Relief from Disqualification. This = substantial change. A
simpler procedure. Means (because no Bill) tht. H/L. will have no say
in it.
Agreed.
h)
Local Authority Staffs.
C.E.
Present sitn anomalous. Employee of co. council can’t be elected.
My Cttee recommends as in para. 18.
H.M.
Not sure. If you disqualify any, mustn’t you cover all the chief
offrs? A M.O. or Edn Offr. may have as strong a pol. influence
as the Deputy Clerk. Much to be said for repealing existg. law
and leaving it to good sense of l.a.’s.
P.M.
Why prevent them fr. standing outside own area?
Att.G.
Support S.G.’s Cttee. Wrong for M.P. to be in posn to advise a l.a., as
senior officer, e.g. on housing.
H.D.
Disqualifn shdn’t be limited to constituency. Agree with C.E. on that.
But on range of officers, I agree with H.M.
But sure you can’t leave it to good sense of l.a.’s.
Endorse therefore C.E.’s recommn but go to all chief officers.
A.B.
Where do you draw the line? Accountants, Ch. Engineers etc.
392
I wd. limit disqualifn to Town Clerk.
P.M.
Is this a practical point. Do such people want to stand.
C.E.
Must amend Co. Council’s Act, wh. disqualifies any officer of
co. council.
I incline to view tht. you can’t go beyond Clerk and, at most, Deputy.
P.M.
Base it on returning officer duty.
H.M.
I wd. prefer to repeal the co. council provision, as archaic; but leave
the rest to adminn – after a Govt. declaration of view.
Agreed: (provisionally) limit to Town Clerks & Deputies.
i)
Directors of Steel Companies.
S.Genl.
Bill applies to directors of Corpn but not of companies.
Conflicting considerations – as in memo.
C.E.
My Cttee endorses this, unanimously.
H.G.
I agree: comparable to senior officials of Boards of socialised indies.
Wtr. they can be M.P.’s is matter for Board, not for Parlt.
A.B.
These men shd. not be M.P.’s.
P.M.
Place-men.
Sol.G.
Yes: but diff. to disqualify scores of existg. Members.
J.G.
Steel Corpn surely cd. handle this – by saying their directorship wd.
not be renewed.
H.M.
Wd prefer to deal with it by statute (because place-men argument)
even tho’ we give longish period of notice e.g. the life of
[present] Parliament in wh. this Bill is passed.
J.
You wd. have to extend to all employees of these companies.
A.B.
No. Can distinguish betwn. directors & employees.
H.McN.
Future apptmts, made by Minister, are indefensible.
But existg. apptmts, not so made, are different. Views of M/S. shd. be
ascertained.
To be considered further.
Agreed: Revised Bill to be considered further by Legn Cttee.
Any further points of principle to come again to
Cabinet.
393
[Exit 3 L.O.’s
2.
Korea.
E.B.
Franks told tht. ques. of crossing 38th has bn. reviewed, in light of
opinions of “joint” C.O.S.; and expression of U.S. Govt. views
has bn. promised. Tho’ not received.
A.
Para. 3(?) of F.O. memo. Have we had a guarantee of consultn?
E.B.
Don’t think so. Only an understanding at desk level.
A.B.
Surely we must get it.
P.M.
We await it, in Acheson’s reply.
E.Sh.
Isn’t it U.N.? If so, can’t conclude it betwn. U.K. and U.S. Govt.
E.B.
Good Offices Cttee. Message fr. President of U.N. has elicited no
response. Sitn hardened, after Stalin interview in Pravda.
R. peace offensive will prob. start off now in new direction. 4 Power
Mtg. will prob. be scene for resoln roping in China. Also a new
anti-U.N. offensive will prob. be launched by R.
E.Sh.
This emphasises need to make it clear tht. U.N. controls action in
Korea.
E.B.
Diff. – when no-one save U.S. and Comm. is doing anything.
E.Sh.
Signs tht. China are mounting a spring offensive. May start in
3 wks. or so. They are getting new supplies of armaments.
3.
Japanese Peace Treaty.
H.G.
Discussed betwn. Dpts. No comments.
P.M.
Para. 8. What happens to the money?
H.W.
That is still being considered, with Ty.
H.D.
Make it clear before statement is made.
H.M.
Written answer?
H.G.
Matter of public concern. Many P.Q.’s.
J.G.
Want opportunity to consult Col. Govts.
G.W.
And Comm. Govts. too.
394
}
}If oral, make it shorter.
}
H.McN.
Wd help us, if we cd. say so in H/C.
{
Clarify (e.g. para. 8)
{
Consult other Govts.
{
Do it in writing or, if oral, much shorter.
After discussion, - is it necessary to make a statement at all?
Adjourn for further discussion.
4.
University Education in Dundee & St. Andrews.
H.M.
Waste of time of 1st class industrialist.
H.D.
And doesn’t sound like a Scot.
H.McN.
Not a matter for conciliation – it’s for a finding.
A.
Support H.McN.
H.G.
May we suggest other names.
H.McN. & H.G. to discuss & consult H.M.
395
8th March, 1951.
C.M. 18(51).
1.
Matrimonial Causes Bill.
[Enter W.W., Att.G.
H.M.
Amendment tabled for rejection of Bill, wh. wd. enable divorce
sitn to be presented on basis of 7 years’ separation. Raises
religious ques. We cd. be neutral, as Govt. was on Herbert’s
Bill: and everyone (incldg. Ministers) cd. have a free vote.
Promoter wd. prefer that.
Or we cd. propose a R. Commn & we cd. then defeat the
Bill. Objectn: some day Commd wd. report & Govt. wd. have
diffy.
P.M.
Let it take its course.
J.
If the Bill were carried, there wd. be stronger case for Commn.
P.M.
The Bill wdn’t get through. H/L. wd. throw it out.
Ministers to be free to vote as they pleased.
H.McN.
If 2nd Rdg. is carried, Party pressure both for & against facilities for
further stages.
P.M.
No reason why we shd. give facilities.
A.B.
They were given for Herbert’s Bill. I favour this Bill.
H.D.
Time is now v. giving facilities.
E.Sh.
Ques. of divorce laws is much wider than this Bill. We cd. refuse
facilities on that ground. Wiser course (some day, not now) wd.
be to appoint R. Commn.
P.M.
We shd. delay that until more experience of legal aid system.
Att.G.
If we say we are neutral & Bill gets 2nd Rdg. diff. to avoid Herbert Bill
precedent of giving further facilities.
Diff. to go on refusing either to legislate or to appoint R. Commn.
P.M.
Can’t accept view tht. because Bill gets 2nd Rdg. we must give
facilities.
H.D.
If it takes its place in queue, it surely won’t get thro’.
It will be behind Transport Bill – wh. we must obstruct.
A.B.
R. Commn wd. only pile up worse trouble for the future.
No fact-finding. This is principle. R. Commn wdn’t help.
J.
Function of R. Commn is to prepare public opinion for change – by
hearing evce & ventilatg. arguments.
396
H.M.
Favour, on balance, a R. Commn.
P.M.
Bound to be composed of partisans: & likely to have various
minority reports.
Preponderant view in Cabinet: in favour of apptg. R.
Commn.
Agree: announce this in Friday’s debate.
Get promoters on that basis to w’draw Bill.
If they are ready to w’draw it, movers of
Amendmt won’t press it.
H.McN.
Then, if that line is taken by Govt. spokesman, Ministers can’t
vote for the Bill.
A.B.
I disagree. This is Private Members’ Bill. I’ve said I wd. vote for it:
pledged to promoters.
E.Sh.
Govt. are now involved if they decide to appoint R. Commn.
H.G.
Not unless Att.G. argues tht. piece-meal legn on this subject is wrong.
Att.G.
And that is the reason for a R. Commn.
T.W.
Att.G. cd. say no promise of further time.
A.B.
That means tht. vote on 2nd Rdg. is merely demonstration. And no
reason why Ministers shd. not be free to vote as they wish.
P.M.
x/ Say we will appoint R. Commn: tht. we won’t therefore provide
provide further time: but H/C. can express an opinion on
2nd Rdg. – free vote.
J.G.
Better try to persuade promoters & opponents to scratch the match
on basis of R. Commn.
H.G.
P’pone announcg. R. Commn until after the vote?
A.B.
I agree with x/.
A.B. to see promoters.
Att.G. & W.W. to see movers of amendment.
2.
Parliament.
}
N.A.T.O. Command Organisation.}
H.M.
Business for next week.
12/3: Navy Estimates. Fechteler may be raised. Our idea was to
397
wait until wider announcement cd. be made.
E.Sh.
Separate Iberian command can be kept out of debate.
Admy view: command ques. shd. emerge after Mulvey’s Motion
has bn. put (not in opening speech). And I can follow on
W.S.C.
W.W.
But when we saw Opposn, it was understood tht. in p’poned debate
we shd. make statement early. We ought to do that.
H.M.
Then original statement shd. be made by P.M.
H.D.
Callaghan cd. do it.
E.Sh.
Much wider than Admy ques. – N.A.T.O.
P.M.
If he wishes wd. be appropte.
E.B.
Public opinion needs to be satisfied i) on this particular appointmt
ii) tht. steps have bn. taken to ensure this won’t happen again.
E.Sh.
Will Speaker allow genl. discn of command structure (incldg. air &
land) in debate on Navy Estimates?
P.M.
Surely.
E.Sh.
Then not by Callaghan.
H.M.
Statement by P.M. after Ques., re command structure.
P.M.
No: because it’s argument not announcement.
E.Sh.
Indicated course of discn on other commands. Not ready to announce.
A.
Temper in H/L. suggests tht. you wd. get away w’out that in H/C. on
Monday.
H.G.
M/D. must make the statement in 2nd part of debate. Get an agreement
tht. debate will be in 2 parts: & tht. Opposn won’t raise this
ques. in 1st part of debate.
E.B.
* Promise W. Paper on command organn as a whole, when all is settled.*
E.Sh.
Agreed.
3.
H.M.
Parliament.
Business for next week.
Tuesday 13/3.
398
Durham County Council.
W.W.
In makg. new appointmts l.a. has bn. askg. what Union applicant
belongs.
In all appointmts so far, all save one have declined to say. And that one
has bn. appointed. A new h’master will take office on Monday,
and the other masters will then walk out.
G.T.
If they do, I can act.
H.D.
N.U.T. are mtg. Co. Council, and sound hopeful.
H.M.
Budget 10/4.
} I propose to announce these dates
22/3 to 3/4 Easter Recess. } to-day.
A.B.
Driving the H/C. too hard.
H.McN.
Tories want longer. Cd. you not make a deal with them.
H.D.
Ministers over-worked; and Members faded.
H.M.
If we give extra week, we must drop some Ministerial Bills.
A.
Ministers must be more reasonable in Legn Cttee.
Agreed: extend Recess by one week.
4.
E.B.
E.Sh.
Korea.
Am circulatg. a long memo – in 24 hrs’ time. | Meant memo. on
| Germany (Wilford
n
Confirm of Chinese offensive.
| F.O.)
399
12th March, 1951.
C.M. 19(51).
1.
Durham County Council.
[Enter N.B., B., W.W.
H.D.
Tory Motion. Our posn is clear, but tactics are diff. Our supporters
won’t vote v. Durham. Suggest reasoned amendmt. which
approvg. attitude adopted by Govt. hoping tht. discns will lead
to useful result.
E.Sh.
Support this plan. Otherwise v. awkward for Durham members –
who wd. otherwise abstain.
J.G.
Not illegal to make such a condition.
G.T.
Original resolution – involved dismissal of existg. employees:
I told them if it was enforced I wd. have to act. And employees
didn’t send in the forms. Resoln thus became dead letter. Now
active again because attitude of Council in makg. new
appointments. Direction ready for issue.
Endorse H.D.’s plan.
W.W.
Sitn not same as J.G. illustration. T.U.’s have not met Co. Council.
Latter have taken it in own hands. We must stand by our
declaration.
H.M.
Public opinion will be solid against Co. Council.
On merits I would vote for Tory motion.
Co. Council is likely to bring Labour movemt. into disrepute.
H.D.
Stiffer amendment: to be moved by back-benchers. Let a few
Ministers meet to settle terms of amendment. C.E., H.D., A.B.,
G.T. and W.W.
Agreed.
2.
Gambia Egg Scheme.
J.G.
Motion tabled. Shd. we table reasoned amendmt?
I am awaitg. further rept. fr. Corpn - & have said so.
T.W.
But you have acted on interim report.
J.G.
Extent of modifn of scheme has yet to be recommended.
C.E.
Prefer a straight vote.
W.W.
So do I.
400
3.
J.G.
Deportation Powers of Colonial Governors.
Bill under 10 min-rule by F. Brockway, on Wed., on deportn powers
of Col. Govrs. Recent debate on adjournment. I’ve said all I
can say. Cd. whip tell him tht., in view of this, he shd. not go
on with his Bill. I can only repeat what I said in adjournment
debate.
4.
Reserve Forces Bill.
C.E.
Venue of prosecn – where a man shd. have reported. Administratively
v. awkward. Arrest likely at his home. Police witnesses.
In H/L. amendmt enabling trial at place of arrest or home.
E.Sh.
I agree.
Agreed.
5.
Meeting of C.F.M.
H.M.
R. have sought to make G. main issue. We are now willing to make
a specific refce to G. re-armament. U.S. are not. Told Davies
to adhere to our view, despite U.S. objns. If it came to a break,
we shd. have to present our case to public.
E.B.
Might be easier to refer in terms of enabling G. to preserve her
security. Viz., positive approach. Use the Italian
phraseology.
Agreed.
6.
P.M.
N.A.T.O. Command Organisation.
Ques. not being raised on Navy Estimates. Must come on later, before
Easter.
I will issue a note, for Ministers’ informn, on case for the appointment.
[Exit W.W.
7.
B.
Transport: Finance.
£25 m. increase in working costs. Need also to build up reserves &
liquidate earlier losses.
Proposals as in memo.
Charges scheme: can’t be solved quickly. Want to ask Tribunal
to give quick 10% increase.
Passenger charges are going to Tribunal in a week or so. On London
scheme Tribunal gave less than B.T.C. needed: & B.T.C. will
ask for more for Ldn.
Pressure from our supporters (against increased fares) for subsidy.
401
F.B.I. are suggestg. subtler form of subsidy – Govt. to subsidise
‘strategic’ rlways as defence measure.
H.G.
Must be some increase in fares & rates. How much? Inclined to
accept B.’s view because we are in period of increasg. costs &
they shd. have somethg. in hand. We treat rlways toughly: statutory
regn of charges beyond anything applied to socialised indies.
Methods. Endorse 10% plan. But L.P.T.B. plan seems a bit
extortionate. Another £8/9 m. from Ldn. is a good deal.
B.
Earlier scheme was mainly to adjust anomalies rather than increase
revenue.
H.G.
On monthly returns: keenest competn with charabancs. Is it wise?
A.V.A.
Earlier: they didn’t ask for this on that a/c.
B.
But now they see no other way of getting the money.
H.G.
On subsidy. I’m against revenue subsidy. Arguments for capital
subsidy aren’t v. strong: they wd. apply equally to other
industries: even coal argument wd. But, even more, v. strong
political objns. Give impn to T.U.’s tht. we will give subsidies
whenever there’s a wage increase. No cash problem: they
inherited £150 m. If we ever do this, don’t do it immed. after
a wage increase.
Rlways still carry cost of reduced Service fares. Ready to carry that
on the Exchequer.
They also get this year £3 m. fr. end of Freight Rebate scheme.
B.
There are other burdens – e.g. bridge m’tenance – wh. I wd. like to
discuss with Ty.
H.G.
I will discuss such measures of easement – vice straight subsidy.
H.M.
Press for increased economies thro’ efficiency.
N.B.
They have discharged 54.000 staff.
Their reguln turned on monopoly – they haven’t now got it.
Subsidy: some day we shall have to clear this up. Slow pace of
freight trains.
A.B.
What are cash reserves?
B.
Started with £150 m. at end/war. Still v. large.
A.B.
Then, shdn’t we spend it before we increase fares? Political
disadvantages of increased fares. See what other reliefs H.G.
can afford. £10 m. asked for to liquidate deficiencies of
operations over last 3 yrs. Need this be wiped out?
402
Consider also some help on permanent way.
I told R.E.C. they had no authority to assume tht. wage increases
wd. carry increased fares. Yet Elliot at once announced fares
wd. have to be increased.
P.M.
Increase in fares will diminish traffic. Is this the right policy?
A.
Endorse that. Agree with A.B. Certainly, no subsidy.
H.D.
New points raised. Further examn needed: esp. H.G.’s offer. And
m’while no increased charges.
H.G.
£5 m. at most. And charges will have to rise. Can’t go on
indefinitely running at a loss. Last time, 3 mos’ delay in
decidg. And deficit corresp. larger. A lot of heavy traffic
can’t be diverted. Costs rising – even road transport costs are.
Increased petrol last year didn’t please M/T.
B.
It put £6 m. on our costs.
H.G.
Then road/rail competn is w’in power of M/T.
A.B.
Ready to accept increase in freights (para. 7). And that shd. suffice,
while we review fares ques.
H.M.
Somethg. v. yielding to B.T.C. full wage increase plus a little more.
Put them up against it.
H.W.
Support A.B.’s idea. But continuing erosion of earning-power of
rlways. Increasing creaming-off of more lucrative traffics.
We shd. have M/T. proposals on ques. of loss of traffic to roads,
esp. C. licences.
B.
A year ago, all these arguments were raised: & Cab. asked for a
review.
They had it – H.G. & I reported.
Anyhow we can’t stop B.T.C. from takg. their case to Tribunal.
Fares: only £3 m. on monthly returns. And Tribunal may reject
them.
H.McN.
Support H.W. True we had a review. But many of us were not
convinced. And it looks now as tho’ our then fears re loss of
traffic were realised. We ought to know what happened in
volume of traffic because 16⅔% increase.
E.Sh.
Support H.W. Make some departure from capitalist economics.
We encouraged wage increase because we feared strike. We must
therefore accept consequence of raising fares or re-examining whole
problem. I am unwilling to agree even to freight increases
w’out further report.
403
Moreover, Londoners shd. not have to pay the economic fares:
because we made the place so large.
E.B.
This has bn. developing for 30 yrs., because rationalisn of industry
& change of location. Rlways depended on long haul: & that
is disappearing.
Must in the end look at road/rail on integrated basis. In London,
buses contributed £3 m. p.a. to tubes: wd. never have had
tubes w’out that contn.
Shall never solve this problem by reference to Tribunal.
Can B.T.C. or M/T. look far enough ahead on change of transport
pattern.
No quick or simple answer. Need for clear thinking – to advise
B.T.C.
Agreed.
8.
{ Approve Para 10(a).
{ Reserve remainder pending further review.
{ Invite M/T. to discuss fares ques. with B.T.C. in light
of Cabinet’s discussion.
Ty. to consider “reliefs”.
[Exit B. & N.B.
[Enter Att.G. & W.W.
Council of Europe.
H.D.
This body must remain consultative. Para. 5.
Important mtg: chance to get sense into people.
Endorse para. 17. We can avert worst because solid group on whom
we can rely. Shd. work on Sforza & Schumann.
Defence: v. diff. Must get understandg. with “+”.
So long as clear it’s consultative, we cd. make some concessions
re defence discn.
B.
V. dangerous to allow defence to be discussed. Can’t trust Sforza on
that. We shd. have to w’draw if they discussed defence – public
discn ranging over N.A.T.O. field.
H.W.
Econ. affairs also in danger. Swedes were nibbling at merger of
O.E.E.C. in C/Europe.
H.G.
Para. 28. 3(c) is in brackets, presumably because not agreed. We must
stand firm on that.
H.McN.
Our repve must now say tht. we shall be forced out of the organn
if para. 5 isn’t held. Time now to dig in our toes.
Att.G.
Para. 13 – shall we get ⅔rds if France & Italy vote with us?
H.D.
Yes: for “clients” will vote with principals.
404
E.Sh.
We must take firm line on consultative function.
Can’t allow C/Europe to discuss defence in any form.
Agreed { as in memo.
{ Doms. to be informed.
9.
Divorce Reform.
Att.G.
I spoke in debate against a divn. Promoters & amenders had agreed
with me in advance. It went to a vote, in unfortunate
circumstances. Said, we shd. have to re-consider.
P.M.
We didn’t put R. Commn conditionally on no vote on Bill. We must
go on.
J.
And there must be enquiry into Scotland as well as E. & W.
Agreed: Confirm (this week) tht. there will be R. Commn.
S. of S. Scotland to consider wtr. Scotland shd.
be separate Commn.
* P.M. to answer P.Q.’s.
[Exit W.W.
10.
Salaries of Town Clerks.
A.B.
As in memo.
We are bound to refer to arbitn. But individual l.a.’s can deny they are
bound by assocn decision.
J.
You cd. let mandamus be argued.
E.B.
Moral issue: Govt. shdn’t refuse arbitration, or appear to be doing so.
H.M.
But wrong in principle tht. 1305 shd. apply to Town Clerks: or that
all Clerks shd. be paid the same. Many Labour l.a.’s will be
annoyed if we voluntarily allow this to go to arbitn.
Better be “mandamus – cd.”
A.B.
I don’t want to be left with a discretion.
All we have to consider therefore is wtr. T. Clerks come under 1305.
I’m *advised they do. I can’t therefore avoid referring to arbitn.
There are other remedies l.a.’s can apply individually.
J.
* “almost certainly.”
Att.G.
I can’t argue in this case there is a discretion.
Memo. – approved.
405
[Exit Att.G.
11.
Pacific Defence.
G.W.
Austral. Govt. are v. annoyed with us. Delay resented. Further
repns made. We are thght to be trying to frustrate a thing
they want, they believe is in their interests & ours, and a thing
we have h’to encouraged them to get.
Annex A. is v. dangerous.
Proper to allow A. & N.Z. to look after Comm. interest in Pacific.
Also to our interest (C.O.S.).
Annex B., however, raises 2 points we can make. i) Philippines and
ii) public outcry in U.K.
If we delay longer, or send Annex A., A. will go ahead in anger &
will drag a (reluctant) N.Z. with her.
E.Sh.
What is meaning of [ ] on p. 11.?
G.W.
That traditional Comm. obligns won’t be affected.
*P.M.
Omit [ ].
E.Sh.
G.W. case based largely on M/E. Tel. 179 to A. and N.Z. refers to
commitment by A. & N.Z. in M/E. There is no commitment.
*Add words indicatg. tht. U.K. has “vital interest” in the area.
V. gt. political risks, otherwise.
Effect on Pakistan. We want them in M/E. If they think this Pact
doesn’t admit their interests…….
Therefore press for *.
E.B.
Won’t oppose this Pact. I wd. have thought U.K. shd. underwrite it,
to avoid pol. diffies but won’t press the point.
J.G.
Addn of Philippines wd. high-light our exclusion.
H.M.
Support Annex B. Refer back to Cab. if Philippines can’t
be excluded.
406
[Exit P.M.
15th March, 1951.
C.M. 20(51).
1.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W.
C.E.
Business for next week.
Silverman’s point. No need to have a Govt. view.
H.G.
We shd. win this debate. Improper for M.P. to send a constituent’s
letter to his superior officer.
A.B.
Clerks at Table think it is breach of privilege, as undermining
authority of Parlt. Our supporters wd. be anxious tht. we shd.
support Silverman.
C.E.
But a ques. of privilege shdn’t be made a Party matter.
Not even ques. of referring it to Cttee.
Tory M.P.’s who receive any “Left” lr. (e.g. on G. re-armament) send
them on to me qua security.
T.W.
Lr. fr. tenant of Council house: shd. it be fwded to Council. Be sure
a general ruling doesn’t trip you up.
J.
What of lrs. to me complaining re Magistrate.
E.Sh.
Only ques. for Cab. is wtr. members of Govt. shd. support reference
to Cttee of Privileges. Tellers won’t be on.
W.W.
We can secure this.
A.V.A.
Normal for Front Bench to support Speaker. Leader of House
shdn’t support Silverman’s motion.
P.M.
No oblign to support Speaker’s ruling on a matter of this kind.
2.
Reserve Forces Bill.
A.
Tories will press to a divn two points.
A.V.A.
a)
b)
E.Sh.
Cab. view was against a). In H/C. we said T.A. Assocns consulted
& genl. view was tht. it shd. be left to good will of employers.
On b) I argued we cdn’t foresee future circs.
A.B.
a) was discussed with J.I.C., who unanimously agreed men wd. be
better off w’out this statutory requirement.
Cl. 7. Repeat H/C. amendmt to give T.A. same protn as Class Z.
Cl. 12. Power to continue by O-in-C. from year to year.
Agreed: resist both amendments.
407
E.Sh.
Govt. amendment. Claim to exemption may be made, on hardship
grounds, w’in 7 days.
3.
N.A.T.O. Command Structure.
E.Sh.
Statement might be made on Business re W. Papers on command
structure.
E.B.
Don’t get into way of W. Papers on personal apptmts.
P.M.
Opposn are content to p’pone debate until after Easter.
C.E.
i)
ii)
A.B.
Better avoid discn to-day if you can. Wd provoke a series of
interrogns. Wd suffice to say merely that apptmts aren’t complete.
P.M.
Keep it short and say as little as you can.
4.
Ike’s appointmts: recommns now under consn by S. Group.
Med. command: must go to N.A. Def. Cttee & Council.
Council of Europe.
H.M.
Germany has tabled request for full membership.
They are there as observers. Has bn. agreed they shd. have
For. Secy.
I favour admn. Possible French wd. agree.
But shd. we adjourn to May mtg. – because if we admit them now,
R. might re-act v. it in prelimies to C.F.M., as we wd. admit as
“Germany”. We cd. be sympathetic.
H.McN.
V. inexpedient to do it this week-end.
A.V.A.
If you get a C.F.M., they’ll say don’t do it because of that.
H.McN.
You will at least have an agenda by then.
Agreed: Postpone.
[Enter Barnes.
[Exit W.W.
5.
B.
Transport Charges.
Seen Hurcomb. He agrees to w’hold increase of monthly returns.
On submn of other fares to Tribunal, no alternatives but to go fwd.
Doesn’t follow Tribunal will accept B.T.C. proposals: & will
take time.
I can announce 10% increase of freights – under Cab. decision.
I want decision on fares to be clearly for Tribunal, not for me.
408
H.G.
Ques: can we do more to prevent B.T.C. fr. going to Tribunal.
We have no power to stop them. Shd. we argue again with them?
My alleviations are found to be only £2-3 m.
I think they are askg. too much for Ldn. Prob. because they expect to
be whittled down.
We cd. advise them to ask for £5 m. vice £10 m. But no more.
A.B.
No new facts. Why vary decision.
B.T.C. are seekg. revenue (not to get current finance right) but
to wipe out old arrears.
We natd transport. Public will think it’s Govt. wh. raised fares.
Headlines while Tribunal is sitting: will damage us even if
Tribunal rejected appln. Leave it alone, and let B.T.C.
economise.
H.G.
Under the Act the decn on fares rests with Tribunal, not with Govt.
Can be a long-run enquiry into road/rail ques., as H.W. asked.
No profit by B.T.C. on roads: £3 m. on other activities: nothg. to
off-set against rlway. losses.
B.
Always being pressed to introduce charges scheme as soon as poss.
Everyone knows 10% on freights won’t meet deficit.
Will be apparent we are flouting Act.
C.E.
a)
b)
H.McN.
Thought we had deferred even decn of freights until known what effect
16⅔rds increase had on traffic.
In political fact we are responsible, even tho’ Tribunal is theoretically.
A.V.A.
Then we must also take responsibility for sound finance by B.T.C.
Over £40 m. deficit already. No suggn fr. A.B. that this will be met.
Responsibility cuts both ways.
G.T.
Support C.E. Also the headlines during Tribunal’s hearing.
Set off £40 m. against £150 m. reserves.
A.
Support C.E. and A.B.
Fundamental weakness. Public not satisfied with B.T.C. efficiency:
why shd. consumer pay more. Efficiency is the answer.
Increased fares will only lose traffic. We shd. not countenance
appln unless linked with effective improvemt. on service.
“No profit fr. roads.” What about Pickford’s profits.
P.M.
Increased fares won’t increase revenue. Must consider more broadly.
Always a national asset. What do we pay to m’tain them.
Socd indies when in diffies shdn’t at once raise charges.
B.T.C. & similar bodies mustn’t make exaggerated bids in
expectn of being whittled down. Will undermine confidence
in such (public) bodies.
409
B.
J.G.
Deficit partly due to increased wages – imposed on B.T.C. by Cab.
decision against sense of responsibility of management.
x/ No-one will use rlways who can avoid it. Burden will be laid on
v. small section of industry (freights) and public (fares).
They can’t even capture the market for cup-ties – fr. coaches.
H.G.
Don’t forget genl. background of increasg. prices & costs (incldg.
wages).
Rlways did not lose traffic from 16⅔ increase.
E.Sh.
Can’t expect every wage increase to be followed by price increase.
Must have greater efficiency.
On short-run: support B. We authorised the wage increase. We can’t
deny B.T.C. the consequential increase in charges.
But in long run, we can’t go on like this. Continuing spiral.
P.M.
x/ shd. be examined.
B.
R.E.C. are reluctant to increase fares. Timber, steel, coal – prices go
up with Cab. approval: increases rlway costs. But no sympathy
fr. Govt. - & no facilities to modernise their services. B.T.C. are
frustrated.
Economy. Steady pressure for it. But managemt. can’t do it alone.
Staff co-opn is just as important. Integration of road/rail is
held back by antipathies of men. And Cab. have made it clear
to me tht. one thing they won’t risk is transport strike.
R.E.C. see no chance of paying their way w’out wholesale
electrification.
A.B.
Our fault: as good Socialists we shd. have prevented manufacture of
lorries & coaches. Can’t afford a rlway system & coaches.
H.D.
When we did this, we expected quick natn on roads with its profits
to off-set losses on rail.
B.
Reason: all area schemes stopped because Parly situation. Can’t carry
them.
T.W.
And any such scheme involvg. municipal transport wd. cause Labour
pol. diffies.
H.D.
Act contemplates transport wd. pay its way because road profits. Act
can’t be carried out on road side: we shd. therefore announce
we have abandoned aim of Act & subsidise rail loss.
H.G.
No. Rlways carrying much more than pre-war – not less. But charges
are v. low. Fares only 55% above pre-war: and freights only
80%(?). Error was in not raisg. charges during war.
[Exit A. & A.V.A.
410
Argument: lose traffic because increased costs operates only at
margin.
H.W.
Want more figures etc. Tribunal was the mistake.
H.M.
Wd have bn. diff. to avoid Tribunal. Also good Socialist principle tht.
consumer shd. be heard on prices.
And C. licences was Cabinet’s fault. We gave way on this.
And it was our fault tht. excessive nos. of lorries & coaches were
made.
Only course now: we are in a jam: their fare proposals are excessive:
their publication now wd. give us political diffies. No increase
in fares, or only a modest one.
Ministers are too gentle with Board Chairmen. I wd. like to compel
them to increased efficiency. And if they get into trouble with
unions…………
T.W.
We have covered all running deficit but £2 m. - £3 m. Must we not
enable B.T.C. to cover that. And tell them their remaining
£30 m. must come from economy.
A.B.
Mistake to put industry in surplus or too heavy a deficit. A small
deficit (£2-3 m.) will be best climate in which to drive for
greater efficiency.
B.
On what we decided 12 mos. ago, B.T.C. wd. have had balanced
budget.
But circs. have changed – by increased wages & costs (largely coal).
Cab. discn really turns on their desire for £10 m. margin.
The £40 m. must be liquidated by Govt. or be covered in charges
scheme.
E.B.
By efficiency you can’t get more than 2½% p.a. You can’t expect
them to achieve 10-12% in a year.
In L.P.T.B. it took 6 years to work thro’ an efficiency scheme.
Have we got right basis of calculation? Is 55% over pre-war right.
Fare-paying passenger/earning per car mile/cost of commodities
carried. What does 55% represent p. car. mile.
Ty. shd. not be adamant v. any further grant on post-war settlement.
We were never sure the £43 m. under Rlway Agreemt. wd. yield
enough to put rlways on their feet post-war.
H.G.
Say to B.T.C. { costs have risen in Ldn. area by £3 m.
{ they got poor deal from Tribunal last time.
{ Say £4-5 m. instead of £10 m. or £12 m.
E.B.
Unless you clear their deficit, they will be back again.
Moral oblign on Govt. because war-time settlement.
M/T. and Ty. to put detailed proposals to Cab. on Monday.
411
19th March, 1951.
C.M. 21(51).
1.
C.E.
Parliament.
[Enter W.W.
a) Mr Speaker: and Tory tactics in H/Commons.
Speaker cannot preside until after Easter because illness.
Announcement to-day. W.S.C. informed. Expns of regret
to be made in H/C.
Due in part to Tory tactics. Intend on first Prayer to-night, to move
that debate be adjourned: and deploy the arguments against
these tactics. At any hour after 10 p.m. Govt. can put
adjournment as Ques. w’out Debate. Then the Prayers wd. not
be taken.
Tuesday’s business. 1st Order is out of order qua sub judice.
Att.G. is prosecuting. Tories want Egypt, in lieu, - on
adjournment: may be a division at 7 p.m.
H.M.
We mustn’t appear to be limiting right to pray v. delegated legisln –
e.g. by p’poning opportunities until time for praying is past.
W.W.
We are ready to stay late one night a week for this purpose.
C.E.
Govt. must force a crisis on this. Members won’t go on staying up
all night.
A.B.
Worth waiting until after Recess?
H.D.
No: Party morale has bn. low, is rising & shd. be confirmed.
P.M.
Also challenge Boothby & W.S.C. now.
E.Sh.
Modern rest-rooms for Labour M.P.’s in all-night sittings?
C.E.
I will go into this.
C.E.
b)
H.W.
I’m thinking of going slow on Price Orders. Manufrs. will then bring
pressure on Tories to stop these tactics. Cabinet approved (!).
A.B.
This counter attack of C.E.’s is not v. Tories but v. H/C. procedure.
P.M.
Closures, Kangeroo, guillotines etc., were called into existence to limit
abuses.
C.E.
I shall instance these as precedents & say we must find some way of
modifying procedure to prevent this new kind of abuse. I favour
one night a week for Prayers.
Business for 1st wk. after Recess. I’m not ready. May I settle
with Ch. Whip & P.M.?
Agreed.
412
A.B.
Wd that be wise – in these days of heavy delegated legn?
C.E.
Spker. allows only 1¼ hrs. for a Prayer: & will accept closure after
that.
H.M.
Wait at least 24 hrs. Think of promises we have given re freedom to
pray v. our gt. increase in delegated legn. V. serious to limit
those rights unduly.
At this moment Tories have put themselves wrong with public
opinion. Don’t lose that advantage.
Limit yourself to-night to general argument & threaten action
(ousting a Prayer) as from to-morrow.
C.E.
Govt. supporters wdn’t follow us on that. They wdn’t let me w’draw
adjournment motion after the general debate.
J.G.
Don’t tie Leader of House. Leave him with discretion to handle it in
light of temper of House to-night.
A.B.
Beware of come-back tht. real trouble is Govt. majority is only 6:
& Govt. are trying to cure that by altering procedure of H/C.
Leave final decision to Leader of House.
P.M.
I’m not afraid of argument being turned against us.
C.E.
I am content to leave it tht. I will adjust my tactics to-night in light
of response from Front Opposn Bench.
W.W.
I support that.
A.
I support C.E. as against H.M.
A.
c) Reserve Forces Bill.
H/L. is mtg. to-day – in hope of agreed amendmt.
A.V.A.
Swinton offered compromise – provn for O-in-C. to deal with this
point re T.A. if need found for it. On promise to consider, he
w’drew his 2 amendmts.
M/D. willing to accept this compromise subject to small adjustment.
E.Sh.
Tories in H/L. are asking now for delegated legn.
2.
Farm Price Review.
[Exit W.W., C.E.
[Enter M.W.
A.
Folly to quarrel with farmers over issue of wool prices.
H.G.
Diff to decide. Issue is not wool: it’s another £5 m. on food. Issue
is primarily political. On merits M/F. is probably right. But
413
this is no moment to take on addl row with farmers. Must
make agric. interests in H/C. feel tht. we have made a generous
settlement.
A.B.
Haven’t had time to work out effects on c/living index. If there is a
rise on that, another round of wage increases will be inevitable.
Is it politically bad to have a row with farmers? In this industrialised
community. Presented as a matter of holding down prices, it
wd. be popular.
Too high a reward doesn’t bring in more food. They are getting too
much already for their effort.
A.V.A.
Dangerous to break – with current Parly majority.
And what wd. you break on? If you m’tain control, you must take
a/c (in prices) of rising costs.
P.M.
Farmers always get more than we calculate they will. Any error is
always on their side.
Agreed: break only at £40 m.
E.B.
I’m against the whole method.
3.
Retail Food Prices.
M.W.
£107 m. additional costs.
Milk is issue betwn. me and Ty. We both recommend the rest.
E.Sh.
Meat increase of 3d a lb. if we get it fr. Argentine. Surely we cd. let
price rise v. much more – publ. opinion reconciled to it. And
save price increases on other things. Better to put a big increase
on meat than spread increases widely all over the place. V. bad
to increase tea prices by 8d.
A.V.A.
Only brings tea to 4/2 whereas in S. Doms. it’s over 6/=.
M.W.
3d a lb. for meat is only average price. Better cuts will go up by 7d.
T.W.
What margin for home-killed.
M.W.
None.
E.B.
Go for a differential on quality – gives hope of tapering off subsidies.
J.G.
Bread/tea/margarine: staples for our people.
H.G.
We took a/c of absolute amounts: and pared off the big figures. If
that’s right approach, we can’t unload £30 m. on marg. & tea on
to other things. Are you ready to put meat up by 6d?
414
M.W.
Don’t ignore para. 9.
A.B.
More on meat & less on tea.
H.G.
Milk.
T.W.
I don’t believe it wd. affect consumption.
Agreed: shd. be considered.
I want increase over short period mainly as experiment
e.g. a 4 month period. Doubt if consumptn will be affected.
A v. small increase per pint.
Agreed: Re-adjust.
[Exit M.W.
[Enter P.M.G.
N.E.
4.
Post Office Tariffs.
i)
Suppl. for £8 m. next Feb., if we don’t do
this now.
Telephones only.
All charges suggd in memo.
ii)
iii)
[Re-enter C.E.
H.G.
I have assumed for Budget tht. these increases wd. be made. If not,
we’re £10 m. down.
A.B.
Must be presented as trading increase ………….
E.B.
Cab. is handicapped by methods of adjustmt.
H.G.
On that, accept para. 11. procedure.
Agreed: Endorse para.11: not to come back [Exit N.E.
to Cabinet.
[Enter R.R.S.
5.
Festival Gardens.
H.M.
Quite exceptionally bad weather: labour troubles, bought off with
extra pay. Strain on management. But, even so, disappointing
situation. Company form of organn preferred by Ty: a good
Board. But direct adminn (for S. Bank) has in fact done better.
Had always wanted this to go on for 5 years. Hope it will – almost
permanent.
Fin. Executive Director to be added to Board.
H.G.
Must be announced to-day. P.A.C. will make awful trouble if we
don’t.
H.McN.
How much of loss due to bad weather?
H.M.
About 50% due to circs. wh. cd. not have bn. foreseen.
J.
On 6/3 they led you to give quite misleading answer. Only 2 days
415
later tht. French gave quite a diff. figure to P.A.C.
R.R.S.
If another director, not a finance man: someone with expce of fun
fairs.
[Exit M.W. Enter B.
6.
Transport Charges.
B.
B.T.C. will be puttg. their charges scheme to Tribunal v. soon:
Tribunal will therefore agree to my adding 10% to freights.
On other issues, I can find no reason to prevent B.T.C. fr. going to
Tribunal.
If Ty. will arrange for £2 m. relief on Service travel, it will
obviate increase in early morning fares & suburban season
tickets & Green Line. These together add up to £2 m.
V. advantageous politically to avoid this. The rest of the
charges scheme shd. then go to Tribunal.
H.G.
I support this approach to the problem.
On Ldn. fares, B.T.C. made out reasonable case. Satisfied me.
Anyhow this is technical point for Tribunal.
Must plan on basis of getting these t’port undertakgs. out of the red.
E.Sh.
Must have discn re Service fares.
B.
There wd. be time for those discns. All I need is to assure B.T.C. of
rough amount of relief to them.
A.B.
Not much better in general. Statemt. will frighten public. Need
M/T. say B.T.C. are going to Tribunal?
B.
Ques. bound to be asked. I shall have to answer in Suppl. Ques.
anyhow.
P.M.
Why not say it in less detail.
H.D.
Why accept increased fares at all. Politically v. dangerous.
P.M.
Why is it urgent?
B.
I can’t get Tribunal to accept 10% on freights w’out promising them
opportunity of genl. review.
A.B.
Can’t you say B.T.C. are not ready with fares scheme?
Agreed
C.E.
{P.M.
{
{B.
Say B.T.C. are preparing to submit schemes ……
V. well. I can settle wording with H.G. & P.M.
Still want B.T.C. to pursue economics.
416
22nd March, 1951.
C.M. 22(51).
1.
Public Expenditure.
[Enter G.A.I., H.H.M., E.Summ.
H.G.
Vote on Account, despite all pruning, shows a rise. Mainly due to
defence etc. But £135 increase on Social Services. Will be
pressure on o.a.p.’s & I have worked out scheme with M/N.I.
Basic for over 70 – fr. 26/- to 30/- for men: & 42/- to 50/- for
both. Also increased increment for staying on after 65 –
1/6 vice 1/- p. 6 months. Giving £3.15.0 p. wk. for married
couple, man havg. worked until 70. Part of policy to get
people to work to later age. Permitted earnings limit shd.
equally go up to £2 p. wk. Child allowce to 7/6 – for widowed
mother: not yet agreed. This wd. all cost £40 m. in full year
(20 in 1st). Makes rise in S.S. expre next year to £50/60 m.
N.H.S. Last year £393 m. This year: estimate was £423. I asked
Dpts. to get below 393. Came to concln this was unattainable…..
After deadlock, E.B. suggd ceiling on N.H.S. as for food
subsidies – at £400 m. I’m ready to accept that, if a final ceiling.
Health Ministers wd. then make charge for teeth & specs. but not
for prescriptions.
H.M.
P.M. advises Cabinet to accept this position.
E.B.
Believe this will command genl. public support.
H.M.
General power to charge wd. be wise.
J.G.
I wdn’t make charges variable by Regns.
H.M.
Promised to save £10 m. on hospitals this year. Can’t do it next year.
If ceiling is to be m’tained, I shd. rely on charges to provide addl
money needed for hospitals.
Principle: people shd. pay when well. Charges ought not therefore to
fall on cases where people are ill i.e. g.p. or hospitals. Glad
therefore tht. prescriptn charge has bn. dropped. Specs. & teeth
are in the main needed by people in health. Charge for dentures
wd. shift emphasis to conservation work. That wd. be a good
thing. Specs: no positive argumt. in favour of charge but
children will be exempt, and free provn in hospitals will continue.
O.A.P. Hope existg. supplemn will be m’tained over & above
new rates.
Final decn re charges needed to-day if charges to be introduced after
Budget. 12/4 = date for introdn of Bill: & charges come into
force from then.
A.B.
Prof. advice has bn. v. N.H.S. throughout. Ignore such advice (e.g. fr.
dentists).
Early diffies of estimatg. All resolved by 1950/51: when exp’re came
w’in estimates – despite the decision not to apply charge for
417
p’scriptn & despite increased wages due to Whitley awards.
When I left M/H. there was surplus in hand. V. remarkable
accomplishment.
In period of rising costs, ceiling will be a drag.
It’s re-armament, not o.a.p. scheme, which makes this cut necessary.
Must we do this thing for £23 m. – in a Budget of £3.000 m. or so.
Better far to cut Defence Estimate: for the money won’t be
spent because shortage of raw materials. You will end with a
surplus, & sacrificed N.H.S. m’while.
Politically v. unwise. I’m not satisfied tht. reasons behind this attack
on N.H.S. is financial. 3rd attack on it. I can’t support Budget
on this basis. Nor the Bill – wh. wd. have to be carried by
Tory votes. Violation of every pledge to Party: re-armament
was to mean foregoing new advantages, not giving up existg.
ones.
H.M.
P.M. supports H.G. and E.B. on this.
We must recognise H.G.’s diffies. We all want o.a.p. improvements.
I don’t accept view tht. charge for some facilities is breach of Socialist
principle.
Ministers concern concur. I think we shd. back H.G.
J.G.
This will be a set-back. Will have pol. repercussions. Another
principle will be breached – uniform rate of benefits, i.e. no
increase in o.a.p. w’out increases in other benefits. This means
o.a.p. can in future act as pressure group.
i) For this year £400 m. ceiling wd. be accepted by me. But don’t
want Govt. to be committed to such a ceiling for years ahead
because rising costs.
ii) Legn on charges will be awkward. And we don’t want to do it by
way of Regn making power. What use wd. a future govt. make of
such a power?
E.S.
I was against prescriptn charge. A.B. adopted it.
N.H.S. is best propaganda for Labour. Mustn’t spoil it. But people
will not be upset by charges for teeth & specs. I don’t support
A.B. on this.
O.a.p. 4¼ m. qualified. Only 900.000 supplemented. Increases will
apply to 3¼ m. Widowed mother allowce to go to 40/- (one child)
and 2/6 for each further child.
C.E.
My views are those of J.G.
H.W.
Diff. to accept view tht. N.H.S. cut is necessary to secure o.a.p.
concessn.
It is really due to re-armament. We accepted £4.7 defence p’mme
w’out much financial thght. Doubt wtr. we shall spend the
money effectively. The £4.7 was not related to need or to what
we cd. afford.
This is an issue of principle. I agree with A.B. U.S. headlines will be:
418
“Britain throws over Welfare State”. And will play into Tory hands.
E.Sh.
“Light-heartedly accepted re-armament” (H.W.) V. serious statement.
Can’t say afterwards tht. Cab. didn’t take considered decision.
A.B.’s attitude i) assumes ceiling can never be imposed on N.H.S.
Suppose defence still at £780 m., shd. we never have queried N.H.S.
expenditure. We were doing so.
A.B.’s warnings of pol. reactions are overdone. Wolf, wolf.
H.G. has to find money in v. diff. circs. Are we to say to him: not
a penny off the N.H.S.
T.W.
Accept H.G.’s plan: so long as it’s presented in such a way as not to
breach our principles.
H.D.
I support H.G.’s plan. O.a.p. advantage will outweigh disadvantage
of these 2 charges – in public opinion.
A.
Agree with H.D. Must be a limit for time being – not necessarily
for ever.
G.A.I.
Believe there is a case for increased w. pensions. But I agree not to
press that, in view of natl need & circs. Some small concessns
made.
J.
Agree with H.D.
G.T.
I have had to add 1d to school meals – to avoid cutting into education
standards, by modifying stat. duties of l.a.’s.
Accept need to find the money. These 2 charges cd. be defended.
A.V.A.
Support H.G.
H.M.
Genl. view of Cabinet: in favour of H.G.
[Part in concln, not heard.]
[Exit H.H.M., E.S. G.A.I.
[Enter P.M.G.
2.
Post Office Charges.
N.E.
Have reached agreemt. with H.G.
Cash a/c diff. fr. commercial a/c. Latter shows £4 m. surplus.
£8 m. wage increases likely this year. Can only raise part of
that in this year.
H.G.
There will be cash loss w’out these increases. Can’t have that.
Diffy. only in presentn.
E.Sh.
Will increased charges lose any traffic?
419
N.E.
Taken into a/c.
G.W.
Consider retaing. differential betw. Gift & other parcels fr. Commonw.
N.E.
Will consider: no promise.
A.B.
P.M.G. will be in gt. diffy. because increasg. charges in anticipn of
wage award.
P.M.G.
Shall relate increases to increased costs. Tel. rentals will meet the
wage cost: can prob. avoid therefore appearance of
anticipation.
[Exit P.M.G.
3.
Japanese Peace Treaty.
H.M.
U.S. hope to circulate draft Treaty by end March.
i) Chinese Participn. I prefer to take line tht. Peking Govt must be in.
ii) Formosa. As in memo.
E.B.
Endorse that view.
China on F.E. ques. is as much a Gt. Power as U.K. or France on
European.
We can’t go back on Peking.
J.G.
For Malays etc., Japan is their Germany. Can’t let Japan, after Treaty,
be free to recognise Nat. Govt./China.
H.M.
I don’t advocate that.
J.
Legal analogy: rest property in trustees. Might be applied to Formosa.
To be held under trusteeship until title of 2 competg. Govts.
settled.
H.McN.
V. risky to assume tht. Peking govt. wd. refuse invitn to participn.
All these theories get us nowhere.
We shd. re-affirm our posn: no negotns w’out effective Govt./China.
But why hurry into negotns at all? V. unreal: Korea. Gt. diffies
with Colonies & Doms.
H.M.
May be conference will be delayed. But U.S. are moving: we must
put U.K. view to them quickly.
H.McN.
Then why add [ ] in 13(a)? They evade v. real issues.
H.M.
Don’t need to say [ ] at same time. Let me consider timing.
G.W.
Diff. views by Doms. Make our posn clear re Peking. But for the rest
I prefer delay.
Must inform Doms. as soon as we instruct W’ton. And Franks
420
might spk. to Dom. repves in W’ton before spkg. to U.S. Govt.
E.B.
More attentn will have to be given to India than in memo.
A China/India axis seems more likely than Soviet/China. On
this, India is more important & helpful than U.S.
H.McN.
V. doubtful about 13(b).
H.M.
How can I be more specific? Play it all slowly.
[Enter H., N.B., G.S.
4.
Integration of German & French Coal & Steel Industry.
H.
We are under strong pressure to agree because effect on Schuman
Plan. Asked to agree to 16-17% integration. Much less than
pre-war.
German T.U.’s, at first hostile, now favour plan (holding company).
Central Sales Agency: we wd. leave it to Germans to decide its future.
But Fr. & U.S. have urged them agree disappce by ’52.
We think all this inconsistent with Law 27. But if we go on resistg. we
shall be represented as hampering Schumann Plan.
G.S.
No need for excitement on our part.
A.V.A.
1) Effect on U.K. steel industry. 2) Attitude of Luxemburg.
H.M.
Unless it really matters to us, we mustn’t be holdg. Europeans
back fr. federalism.
G.S.
Some separation is desirable: but that is here proposed.
N.B.
Doubts re central Sales Agency. On our experience we wd. favour
retaining it.
We want G. coal output m’tained. Also an agreemt. re rational price
& sales structure. Try therefore to keep it, if we can.
J.G.
Apprehensive because effect on U.K. miners. Dangerous concentn of
power.
Memo. approved: Dom. Govts. to be informed in good
time.
5.
H.M.
German Coal & Steel – Ownership.
I stand by U.K. view. Our High Commr. shd. insist on refce to Govts.
if he is over-ruled. V. important tht. this ques. be settled by
democratic decision of Germans. I shall insist on this. Otherwise
the G. Socialists wd. have a grievance.
Agreed.
[Exit H.
421
6.
Korea.
H.M.
Ch. resistce has weakened for some time.
But 1) we are at 38th 2) Ch. not offerg. v. strong resistance,
shd. we let opportunity slip of taking stock (U.S./U.K. and
Ch/R.) & stopping the thing. Otherwise: either MacA. will
be tempted to go further north, or Ch. may come down s.
Big responsibility if we don’t try for somethg.
E.Sh.
C.O.S. strongly opposed, as ever, to going n. of 38th.
Tho’ Ch. haven’t mounted spring offensive: negotns wd. be
prejudiced by any substantial crossing of 38th. But also
militarily unsound. They favour stabiln on waist s. of 38th –
incorporatg. Seoul & Inchon.
H.M.
Possible course. Declare aims: send to others: consult Doms. etc.
See what happens.
E.Sh.
If U.S. dissent, we shd. go to U.N.
G.W.
Consult India specially: possibly after going to U.S. Shan’t get
China along otherwise.
A.B.
x/
First need: let war die down – to re-assure China re Manchuria.
M’while, unwise to try to by-pass U.N. Good Offices Cttee.
Wait for x/.
J.
I agree.
H.M.
Good Offices Cttee are not doing anythg. Our duty to take an
initiative.
E.Sh.
Unless we do take some action with U.S. Govt. MacA. will go
n. of 38th.
Agreed: i) Re-affirm our view on 38th.
ii) Consider what further initiative cd. be taken
now to get a settlement.
E.B.
No “notes”. Verbal approach via Franks.
C.E.
Don’t take this out of U.N. framework
7.
H.M.
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.
Wd like to have this discussed at Cab. after Easter. (It can wait
10 days.)
With a genl. memo. on M/E.
422
8.
H.M.
Economic Survey.
Accepted by P. Cttee.
[Enter M.W.
9.
Farm Prices.
T.W.
Argument at stand-still. Settlement will cost another £2 m. – on
food prices. Wd be wholly on milk.
M.W.
Much v. any further increase.
T.W.
¼d p. gallon on milk.
And rise of shortage next winter, w’out it.
Culling of dairy cows.
1947 fuel crisis – we gave 7 m. credit to farmers.
This year’s rain is [worse &] more general in its effect.
A break in negotns wd. be disastrous.
Agreed: H.G. to settle, in consultn
with M/F. & M/Ag.
10.
Parliament.
C.E.
Our tactics have heartened our supporters.
We shd. not create the disorder.
W.S.C. has sized on H.W. statemt. as reason for not negotiatg.
I am grateful for that action by H.W. – given us tactical
advantage. But Govt. (& trade) must be carried on. H.W. shd.
promise no further diffies if we can get agreemt. on Parly
tactics.
H.W.
This is war. Legitimate to incite trade v. Tories.
Work is going on in B/T. No delay in makg. orders when Parly
agreemt. reached. Mtgs. with trade on technical level are
conting.
????? wd. resent my w’drawg.
Ready however to find conciliatory form/words.
End my by stand when Parly talks begin w’out assurance
of makg. orders unless Parly agreemt. reached.
423