INTERNATIONALISM
UNDER STRAIN
The North-South Policies
of Canada,
the Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden
EDITED BY CRANFORD PRATT
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
Toronto Buffalo London
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Norway: The Hesitant Reformer
HELGE
HVEEM
In a comparative perspective, Norway appears to have earned a reputation
for being supportive of Third World needs in its foreign economic policy.
Judged by development assistance as a percentage of gross national product ( G N P ) , it is consistently at the head of the ranking of member countries
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ( O I - C D ) .
Norway thus appears to be altruistic. Having supported the demands for
a N e w International Economic Order, in particular the call for an Integrated Programme for Commodities in the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development ( U N C T A D ) , it also appears to be reformist.
Neither of these characterizations is entirely correct, even if N o r w a y ' s
actual position and policies are viewed in comparative international perspective. This paper examines both the validity and the inadequacy of
this popularly accepted image of Norway. Official policy also includes
a tendency that could be termed conformist. It is partly a consequence
of political and other pressures from fellow O K C D countries, N o r w a y ' s
closest allies in the international political and economic systems, to have
Norway conform to the line adopted by the O K C D collectively. It is partly
a product of perceptions in Norway itself that it ought to follow the U E C D
line in its own self-interest, a self-interest often nurtured by specific and
concrete economic interests. When such economic interests take a rather
shortsighted view or are motivated simply by profit or other interests
specific to domestic Norwegian actors, yet another strand appears in
Norwegian policy - economic self-interest.
The politics of international development is an interplay of these four
tendencies: altruism, reformism, conformism, and self-interest. Their respective strengths on any issue are a function of the resources which the
different groups are able to mobilize for this specific issue. These resources include the support they are able to draw both domestically and
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from abroad. The development policy arena is thus to a large extent a
negotiating organization in which a system of tight or loose alliances
operates. However, there is not always a single bargaining process in
which all the tendencies mentioned are necessarily represented, or in
which everybody with a legitimate claim to participate is automatically
present. On the contrary, bargaining is sometimes replaced by hierarchical
and compartmentalized decision-making. Access to the arena is a function
of the power which a specific group can mobilize. Policy-making on
development is thus fragmented, not integrated.
The most important cause of this fragmentation lies in the character
of the development policy-making system which differs from those systems that have developed around well-established public policy sectors
or around specific branches of industrial or economic policy. The policies
of the industrialized developed West can be broadly analysed in terms
of either numeric pluralism (parliamentary representative democracy) or
corporatist policy-making. The latter appears to have grown considerably
in importance over recent decades, and there is wide support for the
proposition that this is certainly true of Norway. Sectors in which corporatism is particularly strong include agriculture, fisheries, and the iron
and steel industries.
Tendencies toward corporatist policy-making have evolved in tandem
with the process of sectoral segmentation. Several important economic
and public policy sectors have developed into segments in which members, problem definitions, values, and standard policy outcomes are well
defined and agreed upon among participants. A segment may also be
defined according to its rules and its routines of problem-solving and
conflict resolution. A segment, finally, cuts across institutions and organizations to which its participants belong. Segment participants often
come to agree more among themselves on how to view problems than
they agree on these issues with members of the institutions to which they
belong or with people who are not members of any segment. The development policy area does not constitute such a segment; rather it appears
to be constantly invaded by other segments. This situation, probably more
than any other, accounts tor the fragmentation of policy-making in regard
to Third World development issues.
As a small and open economy, Norway is naturally strongly influenced
by market fluctuations, by changes in the organization and structure of
world industries, and by the policies and actions of other countries and
of transnational corporations. Aggregate economic calculations that some
three-quarters of the Norwegian GNP is to some extent shielded from the
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impact of the international environment appear to underestimate the
impact, including indirect effects, of that environment. International and
domestic processes are thus to be seen as mutually interdependent, not
separate, in the case of Norway.
As a result of the prevalence of corporatist decision-making, the fragmentation of the arena, and the impact of an open economy (here is
almost by necessity a certain diversity, even inconsistency, in N o r w a y ' s
policy on development and Third World issues. There is not one, but
several policies. Nevertheless Norwegian political culture is, relatively
speaking, based on consensus politics. Thus bargaining in a fragmented
decision-making situation promotes positive-sum games, for care is taken
to ensure that divisions do not become too conflictual. The cake is made
bigger so that all the tendencies that demand a bite are able to have one.
Another possible result of such fragmentation is that decision-making in
sub-arenas may become the monopoly of certain interest groups. The
relative strength of the various tendencies and the different fractions is
not, however, constant. It is my belief that the tendencies which I have
named conformist and self-interested have gained strength during recent
years at the expense of the reformist and altruist tendencies. The reformist
mood of the 1970s has ebbed, probably reflecting an international trend
which stems from the perception of economic crisis and the protectionist
mood in the developed industrialized countries. However, factors particular to Norway have also played an important role in changing the political
profile of the country on Third World policy issues.
T H E N E W I N T E R N A T I O N A L DIVISION O F LABOUR
A quick look at N o r w a y ' s economic history in the 1970s and early 1980s
presents a country that has fared well by international standards throughout a decade that many have described as one of general crisis. That
picture could be doubly erroneous. The view that the economic crisis is
a general one has been overemphasized, and the image of Norway as one
of a lucky few is somewhat misleading.
The international crisis is first of all a crisis of institutions and of
policies. This is a period of great instability, most dramatically illustrated
by the immense problems confronting those who attempt to bring even
minimum order to the world's financial and monetary affairs. Moreover,
it is a period of industrial restructuring with the consequent effect, inter
alia, that the already highly inegalitarian distribution of wealth among
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and within nations is exacerbated. Only for a few Third World countries
has this change led to rapid industrialization and a narrowing of the gap
between their economies and those of the developed countries. These are
the newly industrializing countries (NICS). Finally, this is a period of
considerable threat to complex social systems, a threat that arises not
least from the danger of nuclear holocaust and serious ecological pressures.
In the long view, the stagflation of the 1970s appears to have arisen
largely from the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime, from inflationary pressures stemming from the economic policies of the United
States government, and from higher oil prices and the political reactions
(sometimes overreactions)' to those price increases. As isolated factors,
it was the second 'oil shock' that had a serious economic effect on the
world; the first 'shock' was more psychological than economic in its
impact.
Along with these trends there have been some remarkable changes in
the industrial relations among and across nations. An international restructuring race is in progress: all the industrialized countries and several
newly industrializing ones are attempting to secure and consolidate positions in the growth branches of the manufacturing and service sectors.
In the process, the goal - or the effect - is that the stagnating branches
are wound down as much and as quickly as possible. The chief actors in
the transformation are financial and industrial capital, generally aided by
government and blocked, to varying degrees, by labour or other types of
interests. There does not appear to be any general lack of investment in
new and promising activities, such as computerization, biotechnology,
and luxury consumer goods. But there has been a lack of resources for
investment in efforts to maintain full or close to full employment during
the transition.
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Whether or not such resources have been available is a function of
government policy, of the strength of the labour movement, of the resilience of a nation's capital-labour consensus and co-operation, and of
such factors as organizational skills, know-how, and the strength and
variety of the productive structure. In many concrete cases, economic
resources strictly speaking have not been nationally available even though
the political will has been there. This has led to serious strains on political
institutions and has threatened reformist policies in particular. However,
the most important reason for rising social conflict within countries would
appear to be the lack of political consensus on the maintenance of employment, particularly in parties in government. At the international level.
108 Helge
Hveem
the explanation most frequently offered is the lack of co-ordination arising
from a widening gap between national economic policies. Schumpeterian
explanations have, in my opinion, a lesser role.
This is not the proper place for a comprehensive analysis of the implications of these macro-political patterns for the future of the international system. Sutlice it to say that the present high degree of competition.
which is in part a result of challenges to United States hegemony, could
very well lead to a partial breakdown in the capacity of the international
system to regulate itself. In this particular context, competitive restructuring is combined with gross imbalances in the national economic and
financial postures of countries; internationalization coexists with strong
protectionist pressures. Regulatory tendencies do exist. Negotiated trade
agreements, mostly bilateral, and a variety of short- or medium-term
contractual arrangements proliferate; they include countertrade, offset,
orderly marketing, and voluntary export restraint agreements. The transnational corporations continue to organize their activities worldwide in
ways and to a degree that make them dominant players in a number of
branches of the world economy. The state plays a role, not primarily
through multilateral institutions, but by affecting the international competitiveness of national industries. The organization of competitive national capabilities and of selective alliances on the international level
takes precedence over multilateral negotiation and co-ordination. This
appears to be particularly true of the economic great powers in such
important sectors as steel, automobiles, and electronics.
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This pattern of change has some obvious and some less obvious implications for Norway. As a late industrializer in the Gerschenkronian
sense, and endowed with some particular natural advantages especially
hydro-electric power, the logical choice of national entrepreneurs, foreign
investors, and the state's leaders was to establish and develop processing
industries. Along with shipping and the fishing industry, the paper, metallurgical, and chemical industries became the backbone of Norway's
economic development. The strategy, particularly after World War II,
was export-led industrialization. Shipping has not been integrated with
the industrialization process to any great extent. Although this sector
nominally contributes substantially to the national economy, more than
90 per cent of its business in recent decades has related to trade between
other countries and much of its income has been reinvested abroad in
new ships and, more recently, in internationalizing the sector overall.
In Norway, as in most other industrialized countries, there has also
been a steady transfer of labour from the primary to the secondary and
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tertiary sectors. At the same time, there has been a comparatively strong
emphasis on the interests of peripheral regions of the country, in part
because they house the fishing population and many of the processing
industries. 'Tertiarization' and urbanization of society have been tempered
by a relatively strong decentralization policy. This has meant a considerable lianslci of income between regions as well as between economic
sectors. Egalitarianism and welfare state policies have been combined
with policies of full employment and export-oriented growth.
During the 1 9 7 0 s . Norway became a petroleum-producing country in
the course of a very few years. The manufacturing industry stagnated
and even receded during the late 1 9 7 0 s , both in terms of its share of G N P
and in terms of employment. Huge foreign loans in anticipation of
oil income buffered the society against the effects of these dramatic
changes. From the end of the 1970s until 1 9 8 6 , net oil income has been
so substantial that it has been possible to finance the employment,
mostly in the public tertiary sector, of those who were laid off in the
process of recession and restructuring as well as new entrants in the
labour force.
Petrodollars thus saved an economy hit by a recession-plagued industrial sector and a stagnating shipping sector. The story is not, however,
that simple. In international comparative terms, Norway appears to be in
good shape with its comparatively low unemployment rate and a surplus
on the current account balance until the fall in oil prices early in 1 9 8 6 .
There are, however, structural weaknesses. Even if Kaldor's law no
longer applies, manufacturing is still a strategic sector in any developed
economy. And N o r w a y ' s role as a processor has left it with a comparatively large share of its industry in low-growth, low-profitability branches.
Two-thirds of total manufactured exports are derived from these branches.
In 1981 only 7 per cent of exports of manufactures were technologyintensive products compared to an average of 12 per cent for the newly
industrializing countries. Some recent examples, including the success
of Norsk Data, indicate that this situation may be changing, but Norway
is bound to face certain handicaps for years to come.
Norwegian industries are also late comers in another sense: they are
late internationalizers. In a small and open economy, internationalization
- the process whereby national firms establish and/or control production,
marketing, and/or financial or other services in a foreign country - is a
two-way affair. Traditionally. Norwegians have been reluctant internationalizers as far as their domestic economy was concerned; foreign firms
have not been encouraged to establish themselves in Norway. This may
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be because Norway is also a Mate comer nation,' at least among the
industrialized countries. It won its political independence only in 1 9 0 5 .
During the decades that followed it was preoccupied with consolidating
its newly won autonomy and passed strict concession laws to regulate
the activities of foreign firms in the Norwegian infrastructure and industry.
Economic 'nationalism' was eased after World War II when Norway
received Marshall Plan aid and access to foreign markets in exchange for
deregulation of its foreign economic relations. The principle of reciprocity
was not, however, generally applied; foreign banks and insurance companies were not allowed to enter Norway even though Norwegian banks
and insurance companies started to operate affiliates abroad several decades ago. This has only begun to change recently.
The return from Norwegian affiliates abroad was only one-quarter of
the value of all exports in 1981. Norway has been a traditional exporter
in contrast to Sweden and some other small industrialized countries. But
outward internationalization has grown more rapidly than exports over
the last few years. Shipowners in particular and bankers have become
eager internationalizers. Whereas only a few years ago practically no
ships were registered abroad, in part because Norwegian shipowners were
critical of the increased use of convenience flag countries, by 1986 onethird of the Norwegian-owned fleet, or some 300 ships, was under a
convenience flag or otherwise registered abroad. Similarly, the capital
of Norwegian banks has grown much faster abroad than at home, with
some 25 per cent of total assets at present in foreign affiliates.
Another new element in the Norwegian foreign economic polity is the
preoccupation with economic competitiveness in a narrow sense. One
consequence of the industrial recession has been a relative deterioration
in productivity. Moreover, N o r w a y ' s anti-inflation policies were put in
place later than those in the countries with which it competes. During
the 1 9 8 0 s , N o r w a y ' s inflation rate has been above the O E C D average.
However, competitiveness in the narrow economic sense is not the only
problem and perhaps even not the main one. The transition to an 'oil
economy' during the 1970s had an inflationary effect. Moreover Norw a y ' s position in the international division of labour made it particularly
vulnerable to recession internationally and to stiff competition from the
NICS. About half of the loss of foreign markets in manufactures during
the last ten years has occurred in the shipyard and the paper and pulp
s e c t o r s . N o r w a y ' s relatively weak export marketing programme is also
a factor of some importance.
N o r w a y ' s exports to and direct investment in the Third World are
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characterized by relatively low processing levels. Imports from the Third
World are primarily raw materials. As Norway has become increasingly
self-sufficient in oil, its overall imports from the Third World have decreased; if oil is excluded, they have stagnated. Exports to the Third
World have increased in recent years mainly because of the sale of ships.
This has led to an imbalance in Norway's favour in trade relations with
the Third W o r l d . Direct investment has been concentrated in the OECD
countries. On average, only about 30 per cent of new direct investment
abroad went to the Third World during the period from 1 9 7 9 to 1 9 8 3 .
Moreover, some four-fifths of this investment was in shipping, mostly
in convenience Hag countries.
17
The implications of the changing position of Norway in the international
division of labour appear to be the following:
1 As a 'late comer adjuster," Norway trails most of its competitors in
international markets, with the notable exception of the shipping sector
where Norwegian firms have made a very rapid adjustment to protect
market shares.
2 The processing bias of Norway's industry makes low-cost countries,
in particular the N I C S , its most likely competitors in some of the most
'problematic' sectors of the global economy.
3 To maintain its competitiveness, Norway has to readjust its industrial
structure towards high-technology production. This has led to pressure
to soften or change its social welfare policies and a need to make major
regional resource transfers to avoid having to require greater geographic
mobility of its working force. Up to 1986 oil income made it possible
to reduce these pressures and new technologies may provide similar
assistance. However, the pressures are real and will continue.
4 The need for rapid adjustment puts increased pressure on the sociopolitical cohesion of Norwegian society and weakens the ability of
corporatist national organizations to take decisions that are fully endorsed by labour and employer alike. Thus, there may, in future, be
more conflict within the Norwegian polity over broad economic and
industrial policies. The dramatic fall in oil prices during the first part
of 1986 and the consequent considerable income loss to the state have
made such friction more likely.
5 The pressures for structural readjustment and the fall in oil income will
put increasing strain on the political consensus and make it even more
difficult to combine welfare policies at home with pro-Third World
trade and aid policies.
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T H E
THIRD
W O R L D
POLICY
S Y S T L M
The reformist trend of the 1970s arose from the gradual spread of tiersmondist world-views combined with traditional radicalism and the widespread perception of a new balance of power between the First and the
Third Worlds. Those who united around ihe call lor a New International
Economic Order ( N I E O ) thus formed a rather heterogeneous alliance. B y
linking the reformist alliance to the two polarities set out in my introduction - reformism-conformism and altruism-self-interest - it is possible
to draw a picture of all the major Norwegian positions and schools of
thought on the Third World. The most visible schools, on the whole,
combine elements of the thought or values of more than one of these four
positions. For example, the missionaries, who in some respects were the
first Third World-ists in the Norwegian polity, combine altruism with
values which are close to those of the conformist tendency. They conform
to certain basic Christian values in Western culture and act as transmitters
of those values, but at the same time they act as altruists in socio-economic
settings and thus are not really conformists in an economic sense. It
should be noted that the people who live in the Norwegian periphery and
belong to the lower wage and income groups also are those who most
readily support activities in the Third World by private contributions.
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The Christian lobby has a background in long-time and relatively extensive missionary activity in areas which are now part of the Third World.
The lobby includes several nationwide missionary associations, but it also
operates through organizations linked to the state church. Den Norske
K i r k e , notably Church Emergency Aid (Kirkens Nødhjelp) and a consultative institution, the Inter-Church Council (Mellomkirkelig Råd), the
channel for Norwegian representation in the influential World Council of
Churches whose current secretary-general is a Norwegian. The Christian
lobby has become more heterogeneous over the past few decades. The
traditional emphasis on missionary goals is still present, but is now combined with newer emphases on development aid and even on trade reform
including some quite radical changes.
Another and perhaps cleuner example of this combination of values
from the two polarities is what has been called social democralic Third
World-ism.
Internationally, its most celebrated expression is the report
of the Brandt Commission. Its basic assumption is that it is in the selfinterest of rich societies to transfer resources to the poorer countries to
help them grow and become wealthier. In this way the North-South gap
will be narrowed and a mounting tension that could eventually lead to
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open conflict will be reduced. It will also create greater demand for goods
and services from the First World. Social democratic Third World-ism
thus combines reformism and self-interest.
The reformist-altruist tendency is found in youth organizations and in
groups associated with radical postures on Third World policy. They
range from anti imperialists to ecologists of the fundamental or 'deep'
school of thought which holds that the achievement of conservation and
other ecological goals requires radical changes in the social and economic
structure rather than merely superficial measures for the preservation of
nature. These groups sometimes act in common, usually on a single issue
or for a single event, but on occasion they have organized in a more
permanent way such as when the Idea Group on the N I E O was f o r m e d .
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Finally, there are the economic interests associated with capital and
labour, which most often organize around a particular economic segment.
In some cases, capital and labour, employers and employees, stand together on an issue. When that happens, a formidable alliance is at work
in the political system. As a separate entity, the business community,
even when only the manufacturing industry is considered, is by no means
homogeneous and fully united on the question of Third World policy.
Some fractions of it supported the idea that a new international division
of labour should mean a gradual transfer of industrial production to developing countries. Some made the distinction clearer by saying that the
new division ought to be between technology-intensive production in the
North and labour-intensive production in the South. But the national
industry organizations have had to accommodate differing interests, especially those of the processing industries which are quite labour-intensive. Even relatively small sectors, such as the textile and clothing industries,
are able to influence overall policy if they are well organized.
As far as the political parties and public administration are concerned,
there may be particular interests and there most certainly are different
policies within their ranks. In the democratic-pluralist model of the polity,
parties act as channels of representation and perform the function of
aggregating interests. The public administration, according to this same
v i e w , acts at arms length from lobbies and executes the policy decided
upon in the democratic-pluralist process. The truer image of the Norwegian polity is, however, the corporatist model presented above. Even
that model falls short when an attempt is made to explain the processes
behind Norwegian Third World policies. The corporatist system organizes
the various interested parties into a single decision-making system which
governs the bargaining in the issue-area concerned. The outcome of this
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negotiation is binding on all parties. There are many illustrations of
corporatist decision-making in Norway - in the agricultural, fisheries,
and manufacturing sectors, for example, and in some service branches.
But there is no comparable 'development sector'; there are no corporatist
structures relating to Third World economic policies in which interested
parties negotiate from a common background, delining problems similarly
and sharing the same evaluations and performance criteria. While almost
everybody agrees on what is needed in agricultural production, for e x ample, there is no agreement on why societies are underdeveloped or on
what development is, or ought to be.
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On the whole, however, the Norwegian political system is characterized
by strong pressure for consensus. This is expressed in the various sectors
and issue-areas, in organizations, and in several general-purpose umbrella
institutions. The latter perform the aggregation function as do national
political institutions, the Church, and the unitary educational system.
Culturally, Norway has traditionally been a rather divided and in some
periods conflictual society. Cultural differentiation is, however, becoming
less and less obvious under the impact of secularization and materialism.
Still, the political culture contains elements of pre- and post-materialism
as well as simple materialist values. Nor is there one cosmopolitan outlook, but several 'internationalist' currents.
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The 1 9 7 2 referendum on Norwegian entry into the European C o m munity ( E C ) revealed how conflictual the polity is when cultural differentiation and socio-economic contradictions are put to a serious test.
Nevertheless, to portray the referendum process as a battle between internationalist (pro-entry) and nationalist values is a gross misrepresentation of political cleavages. Nationalist sentiment does of course play a
role in these divisions and so it did in 1 9 7 2 . But among the internationalists there were very different currents: on the one hand, 'Third Worldists' admonishing the EC for its imperialism and, on the other, private
business interests anxious to internationalize their activities in order to
increase their profits.
I have identified two sets of structural factors that act to co-ordinate
policy: corporatism and alliance formation. In addition, the strong urge
for consensus has been pointed out. I have also identified the processes
and structures of differentiation and fragmentation. The latter processes
are particularly visible in the area of Third World policy because neither
a corporatist structure nor a corporatist ethos is present. Their absence
can be explained in some degree by the issue's relative newness, but is
also due to the lack of a Third World constituency within the Norwegian
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political system - no work force that will go on strike for the Third World
nor any capitalist fractions that will exert strong pressure on its behalf.
There has thus been no compelling need to arrange for the bargaining
that would generate corporatist processes or for a single decision-making
system.
The pressure for consensus and the unitary tendencies within the Norwegian polity interact with fragmented bargaining in ways which largely
fall outside normal mediating procedures. With fragmentation every major
interest group is involved in the processes that relate to matters of direct
concern to them, but neither they nor anyone else is required to ensure
thai the various decisions produced by the separate processes are integrated harmoniously into a coherent policy towards the Third World. These
interests bargain with their respective counterparts in political institutions
and public administration. They all attempt to influence the various segments of policies that touch Third World interests closely: export promotion, industry subsidies, the development assistance budget, and other
public support mechanisms such as research and development budgets.
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tax relief, and supportive or protective measures of various kinds. To
avoid too much noise in the system overall, the various interests and their
political administrative counterparts in each segment of policy-making
tend to be given a fair measure of autonomy - at some cost to the overall
unity of N o r w a y ' s Third World policies.
Figures 1 to 3 depict the distribution of the major interest groups within
the two-dimensional mapping of positions introduced above. The hardline realists are composed of business interests and labour groups; they
work with the industry and trade committees in the Storting (parliament)
and the relevant ministries. Among the political parties the Conservatives
(Høyre) come closest to this category. The enlightened realists are represented in the Norwegian Labour party (Arbeiderpartiet) and in the political centre-left, but they also draw support from public servants and
from employers and employees in the more capital- and technologyintensive sectors of the industrial community. This group includes many
aid administrators. After the establishment of a separate ministry for
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development aid in 1 9 8 3 , it seemed easier to organize this fragment than
before. However, that was not everyone's perception. The Labour party
wanted development administration to remain under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and opposed the establishment of a separate ministry, apparently because it feared a fragmentation of N o r w a y ' s overall Third
World policy.
The evolutionaries comprise church organizations and voluntary organizations such as the Red Cross. They command quite strong sympathies among the general public, partly because of their 'non-political'
character, but they are dominant within no particular part of the public
administration. The special role of the Christian People's party (Kristelig
Folkeparti) in the governing coalition may help to explain the ascendancy
of this group or fragment as a channel for development aid. But these
private organizations also benefit from a general belief that they are more
efficient than public assistance, a belief which has been strengthened by
the strong trend towards privatization that has characterized Norway dur-
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ing the last few years. This trend also partly explains the increase in
private sector claims on the development budget. Between 1 9 8 0 and 1 9 8 5
the share of the total aid budget going to private aid organizations quintupled.
The radicals command much attention but have practically no impact
on policy. Their more or less clearly expressed Third World-ism has some
influence on public attitudes and provides a reference point lot other
groups which tend to oppose it. Naturally, their antagonists are most often
the hard-line realists. During the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , the influence of the radicals
was at its peak and even had some effect on official decision-making.
With the coming of the international economic crisis, however, their
influence over public opinion has receded, to a large extent to the benefit
of the hard-liners.
The shifts in the comparative strengths of these various currents of
thought are largely explained by external economic pressures and the
demands for adjustment that they create. At the moment, conforming
means adapting to the policies of the countries with which Norwegian
business competes in international markets and which Norway trails behind in important respects.
I have suggested that the corporatist model is the more realistic portrayal
of the Norwegian polity, but that it is less representative when applied
to Third World policy. Let me now describe the evolution of N o r w a y ' s
Third World policies against this background.
A G E N E R A T I O N OK E V O L U T I O N A R Y C H A N G E
For many decades, Norwegian missionaries and seamen opened up contacts with what are now Third World countries. The effect of these
contacts on later policy formation was indirect and is difficult to assess.
At most it may have created a paternalistic attitude, at least in those
Norwegian communities where missionaries and seamen were recruited
(and in many parts of the country they were in fact the same communities).
The formal process of development policy formation dates back to the
establishment of the India Fund and the first assistance project, a hospital
in South Korea, in the early 1 9 5 0 s . The considerations which prompted
this decision were chiefly related to security policy rather than to a preoccupation with the social and economic situation in distant parts of the
world. Norway began to formulate policies on Third World issues because
others wanted it to, not for reasons of its own, and, even then, the reasons
related to the escalation of the Cold War and not to the problems of the
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South. Norwegian policy was a response to an agenda which others set
and which international events shaped.
The first steps were motivated partly by vague perceptions of conflicts
to come because of the poverty of the southern parts of the globe, and
partly by Norway's decision to abandon its traditional neutrality and take
sides in the Cold War by entering the Western military alliance. Conflict
avoidance was still very much the dominant mood in the country, however, if not always a practical choice. With the Korean War, decolonization, and the emergence of non-alignment, Norway reluctantly developed
a policy on Third World issues, less because it wanted to than because
it had to.
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A desire for conflict avoidance naturally resulted in compromises.
During the 1950s and even later, Norway had sought to combine the
pursuit of certain ideals - a strong United Nations and the protection of
the interests of small states - with an avoidance of conflict with its closest
friends and allies. These objectives were not easily combined. In this
period, for example, Norway struggled uneasily with the need to choose
between supporting decolonization and backing those allies, such as France
in Algeria, which sought to maintain colonial rule. In many cases where
Norway had to take a position, if only as a member of the United Nations,
it chose, to use Hirschman's words, loyalty, not voice - if exit was not
feasible. '
The first steps towards a truly national policy on the Third World were
taken at the beginning of the 1960s. During the 1 9 5 0 s , Norway had run
two assistance projects, one in Kerala, India, and another in Seoul, South
Korea. These two projects were clear-cut expressions of the predominance
of security considerations rather than development assistance in policymaking. Development assistance was one of the easier w a y s , politically,
for the government to pursue security considerations, for it helped it to
satisfy groups opposed to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the predominance of military policy, particularly those
within the Labour party itself which was in power for practically all the
1 9 4 5 - 6 5 period. These fractions were the forerunners of today's radicals. They were idealists with a distaste for the Realpolitik which governments must address; they were the proponents of the moral imperative.
But their influence on policy remained marginal until international circumstances created a breakthrough for a perspective which the government, supported by other groups (see figure 1 ) , had earlier opposed:
namely, that structural reform was more important than aid.
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27
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While Norway could move closer to Third World positions on decolonization during the 1960s, mainly because the developing countries
themselves became more moderate on that issue, it opposed their demands
for reforms to international trade. Free trade was the first principle in
N o r w a y ' s foreign economic policy. In principle - and for a long time in
practice
Norway was not willing to make exceptions In that rule in
order to help the developing world. Charges that the international system
was a cause of underdevelopment were squarely rejected. The PrebischSinger-Myrdal critique was not taken seriously, even though a Norwegian
was secretary-general of the United Nations from 1946 until 1 9 5 2 . The
issue was not thought salient enough to warrant a change of policy.
Moreover, the principle that all trading partners must be treated equally
(the most-favoured-nation principle) was the guiding precept, it was said,
for the more open international trading system that was of primary importance to Norwegian decision-makers. Saliency of issues, intensity of
perceived national interests, and the extent of international (and national)
disagreement over issues are the three factors that have determined Norw a y ' s political behaviour on Third World policy.
During the 1960s, there was a gradual shift in perceptions of development problems. The change in view led to the formulation of a set of
principles for development policy at the beginning of the 1 9 7 0 s . The
policy of 1962 was reformulated in 1 9 7 2 . The security motive was now
de-emphasized, quite probably under the impact of détente. The achievement of economic growth, which in 1962 had been assumed to require
massive transfers of capital and technology, was now thought to depend
on structural reform in the developing countries. Economic self-interest
in aid programmes was de-emphasized. Aid should not be tied to Norwegian business interests. Several factors may have caused these shifts.
Among the most important, however, were a certain pressure from the
O E C D ' S Development Assistance Committee ( D A C ) and domestic pressures from youth and Christian organizations, independent intellectuals,
and the media.
When N o r w a y ' s policy towards the New International Economic Order
was formulated in 1 9 7 4 - 5 , most of these principles were retained. What
was new was the recognition, openly rejected in earlier rounds of public
debate, that underdevelopment was caused in large measure by international structures. A report to parliament from the development agency in
1 9 7 4 stated that 'developing countries still find themselves in a position
of economic dependence on the rich part of the world through a system
of ownership control, division of labour and power which effectively
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prevents them from attaining full economic and social independence."
The dependencia thesis had finally made its way into government policy.
The report even stated as an official view that 'the free market mechanism
has not led to equitable results, but has on the contrary served to widen
the disparity between the rich and the poor countries.' When the N I E O
negotiations started in 1 9 7 4 . the Labour parly was in power. Popular
support for the N I E O agenda was strong in Norway, both by historical
and by international standards. There was widespread agreement, which
even included the Norwegian Association of Industries (Norges Industriforbundet), that the N I E O programme ought to be carried through. A
great number of organizations and professions held N I E O meetings. It
was the most frequently discussed issue in the foreign policy debates in
the Storting during 1 9 7 6 and 1 9 7 7 . Then came a change.
24
30
Policy is naturally sometimes of a declaratory nature: principles are
not followed in practice. This is certainly true of elements of N o r w a y ' s
Third World policy. One may even speculate that N o r w a y ' s relative
reformism arose from a rather cynical calculation that since the opposition
of the great powers to N I E O principles guaranteed that they would never
be implemented, there was no risk in supporting them. However, it is
probably truer to liken Norway to Ibsen's Peer Gynt who, having professed a different and more ethical view than that of his fellows, follows
the group 'protesting for the whole world.' But the thesis I have advanced
- that there has been deliberate fragmentation of policy-making on Third
World issues, accomplished through separate channels of decision-making and implementation - is the best explanation. This certainly appears
true for the politics surrounding N I E O issues.
Norway had consistently supported the Integrated Programme for C o m modities ( I P C ) since the U N C T A D secretariat introduced it in 1 9 7 6 . It was
the first of the industrialized countries to pledge a contribution to the
Common Fund which was the central and most important innovation in
the I P C . Norway was active at the 1 9 7 6 U N C T A D conference in Nairobi
in organizing the coalition between the majority of O E C D countries and
the developing countries that launched negotiations on the I P C against
opposition from the major economic powers in the O E C D . However,
Norway did little save support in principle Third World industrialization
and the build-up of independent national research and development capacities as called for in the declaration of the United Nations Conference
on Science and Technology for Development and the Norwegian national
submission to that conference. This clearly reflects the fragmentation
process.
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Helge Hveem
Following the two special sessions of the United Nations in 1 9 7 4 and
1 9 7 5 and the 1 9 7 5 conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization ( U N I D O ) , Norwegian authorities issued statements
in support of industrialization targets for the developing countries. However, reports to parliament on both export policy and manufacturing policy
strongly supported almost across-thr board expansion or preservation of
existing Norwegian industries. Moreover, while Norway has supported
international regulation of trade in raw materials, it has been sceptical
about the value of international producer associations except in very
general terms. Norway has also hesitated to support developing countries'
demands for stricter and binding control of transnational corporations and
has only conditionally accepted the right of these countries to nationalize
mining and other industries under foreign control. Until the change of
government in 1 9 8 6 , it never seriously considered seeking closer coordination with the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries
( O P E C ) , even though its petroleum production was greater than that of
several middle-sized O P E C countries by the mid-1980s and thus could
have had an impact on market developments. In all these instances, then,
policy decisions taken by different structures within the fragmented decision-making process ignored or undermined the broad commitments
made by Norwegian representatives at U N C T A D , U N I D O , and the United
Nations. But conflict avoidance has also led Norway to choose associated
status in the International Energy Authority, the least that was expected
of it as a Western ally, in order to avoid full membership.
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33
Finally, N o r w a y ' s merchant shipping policy - its most important area
of bargaining vis-å-vis the Third World - has until quite recently been
one of strong opposition to developing countries' demands. Norway worked
actively at liner conferences against the new market-sharing arrangements
sought by the Third World because regulations limiting access of third
country shipping companies would obviously be contrary to its own shipping interests. Then Norway changed its position, moving towards a
compromise and towards setting up affiliates abroad. It even negotiated
an agreement with one developing country whereby one of N o r w a y ' s
shipping companies would carry all that country's share of trade under
the new market-sharing agreement (Leif Høegh's contract with the People's Republic of the Congo).
Norway has been moderately conservative as far as demands for reform
of international institutions are concerned. It has usually gone along with
common O E C D policies on International Monetary Fund and World Bank
matters. This conservatism has also meant that Norway has consistently
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supported United Nations institutions against attacks from those seeking
to weaken them. Thus, the United States withdrawal from the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization has not found much support in Norway.
N o r w a y ' s profile on N I E O issues is multifaceted and has changed over
the past ten years Its most consistent reformist stand is thai on the IPC.
the raw materials issue, perhaps because the international stabilization of
commodity prices would benefit some branches of Norwegian industry
as well. During the years when the I P C was debated, the government
spent several hundred million kroner on a domestic price stabilization
fund for a dying copper industry. Nevertheless if the U N C T A D proposal
had been carried through, the net effect on the Norwegian economy of
an across-the-board price stabilization during the years of depressed world
prices would have been to increase the import bill significantly more than
the revenues from the export of the affected commodities.
In other respects, N I E O policy was as much take as give. With respect
to the strong pressure from developing countries for market access, Norwegian policy was no more liberal than that of other O E C D countries. It
created a new institution, N O R I M P O D , to promote imports from the Third
World, but the agency has been weak and the political and economic
resources behind it are very small compared to the support given to export
promotion. In fact, at the same time as the government voted for the first
N I E O resolutions in the United Nations, it also introduced a battery of
incentives for export industries. The amount of export credit was greatly
increased, as were guarantee schemes for both exports to and direct
investment in developing countries. These measures were introduced even
though many questioned the usefulness of such activities for development.
The government had - as we have seen - legitimized the dependency
critique at the same time as it took these trade and investment initiatives.
Was it not inconsistent to seek to increase the very kind of trade and
investment relationship that had created dependency in the first place?
Or is this another example of either declaratory policy. Peer Gynt tactics,
or fragmentation of policy? I favour the latter hypothesis, but it cannot
be denied (hat there was and still is many a Peer Gynt in N o r w a y ' s Third
World polity.
During 1 9 7 7 - 8 government policy changed dramatically. In the two
preceding years, the public authorities had borrowed large amounts in
the international capital markets into which petrodollars were flooding.
Most of this borrowed liquidity was used to finance increased consumption; relatively little was invested. Revenues from oil were just starting,
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and there was no danger of becoming overly indebted; but, as one would
expect, the inflation rate went up, an increase exacerbated by exceptionally high wage increases. Then, suddenly, the brakes were applied in
1 9 7 7 - 8 : a complete wage freeze was imposed (with the consent of labour)
in an attempt to beat back inflation. At the same time, more and more
people realized thai the oil industry was not going to give the mainland
economy as much of a stimulus as was first expected. Mainland industry
continued to lose markets abroad. It was time for Norwegian industry to
concentrate on its competitiveness and to strive to reconquer its markets.
This 'go-stop-go' policy reinforced a basically self-interested mood that
was contrary to international reformism. The business community was
also able to point to what was happening in other O E C D economies and
in the N I C S - increasing protectionism, monetarism or supply side economics in some important places, and less emphasis on full employment
policies. The pressure for Norway to conform with these trends was high.
Increased attention was also directed to those economies that were both
N o r w a y ' s competitors and biggest markets. The self-interest-conformist
tendency was clearly in the ascendant. How did this affect relations with
the Third World?
T H E F R A G M E N T E D S Y S T E M AT WORK
The renewed emphasis on export promotion was accompanied by growing
internationalization, although the drive for internationalization has only
become particularly strong in the past few years. Before that, there was
a major export drive directed towards the Third World in an attempt to
sell ships constructed in Norwegian shipyards which had suffered during
the 1 9 7 0 s from the combined effect of reduced global demand for new
ships and stiff competition from the so-called low-cost producers, especially Japan and South Korea. After reviewing an aborted attempt to
create a restructuring fund for industry, I shall assess this campaign. Then
I will look at the Norwegian policy on the Multi-fibre Arrangement ( M F A )
and offer a short review of the relationship between business and development. Finally, I will examine the new relationship between the Norwegian shipping lines and the Third World.
The
First
NIEO Failure:
A
Fund for Industrial Restructuring
In response to the Second General Conference of U N I D O in Lima in 1 9 7 5 ,
the Norwegian government pledged to work for a transfer of manufacturing to developing countries. A working group was set up in the Ministry
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of Foreign Affairs, thus giving the impression of a serious will in government to take practical steps to fulfil the U N I D O goal. Prime Minister
Nordli set out this intention quite strongly in a speech in November 1 9 7 6 .
The working group in turn stressed O E C D reports that rejected the widespread notion that increased imports from the Third World would result
in a direct loss ol jobs in ihe industrialized countries; it noted what were
then seen as the concrete results of the Netherlands' restructuring scheme
which had been adopted in 1 9 7 4 . The working group identified three
situations in which public support for restructuring should be provided:
when the import trade from developing countries was liberalized; when
production facilities were moved from Norway to a developing country;
and when there were considerable fluctuations in the market situation
faced by Norwegian manufacturing industries. The new fund, to be administered through the existing Industrial Fund, would have a first-year
budget of 1 0 0 million kroner (about U S $ 5 . 4 7 million).
The fund proposal did not see the light of day. It should have been
made public at the end of January 1 9 7 7 , when a government decision to
launch it was expected. There are several accounts of what happened.
Some suggest that the project was not well enough prepared and/or that
other schemes were preferred by the decision-makers. Perhaps therefore
the project was simply cancelled. Another version is that industrial leaders
believed that the proposed scheme had insufficient financial backing to
warrant their active support. A third account is the most compatible with
the model of corporatist decision-making. It holds that the Federation of
Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen) acted directly on the Labour government with which it has close links. The federation demanded that the
project be cancelled because it would mean a loss of jobs in Norway.
The Labour government had been in a precarious position: its electoral
support in the 1 9 7 3 election had been the lowest since the 1 9 3 0 s and it
badly needed labour's support in the 1 9 7 7 election if it was to stay in
power. The negative reaction of the federation was sufficient to put the
project in a drawer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Having investigated
the case carefully, I am convinced that this third version is the soundest.
Lack of active support for (he project from business leaders made it easy
for labour to veto the fund. However, the primary reason for shelving
the proposal was trade union opposition.
The Ship Export Campaign
When the NIEO process was set in motion internationally, the shipping
crisis was already having serious effects on employment in the world's
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shipyards. In Norway the industry consists of a large number of small
and medium-sized yards and a few big ones. The shipyard workers belong
to one of N o r w a y ' s most influential unions, the Metalworkers' A s s o ciation (Jern-og Metallarbeiderforbundet). Many of the yards are located
in small communities along the coast which offer few alternative sources
of employment. The demand for public support of the shipyards was very
strong and the government and the Storting acted quickly to save them.
Special measures of economic support were introduced. Economic
subsidies were given, apparently on the condition that they be used not
only for immediate needs but also to support measures to readjust production to new products and higher productivity. Many looked to the
Third World as a potential market for Norwegian ships. Shipowners had
requested and received a guarantee scheme whereby the state would
prevent second-hand ships from being dumped by Norwegian shipowners
facing bankruptcy. Measures were now taken to support the yards in ways
that broke several of the accepted 'rules of the g a m e ' in Norway.
First, a group of shipyards got a 450-million-kroner contract for delivery of ships to Indonesia in 1 9 7 6 . Associated with this contract was a
further 70 million kroner in direct aid to the country. The contract had
been negotiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in competition with
several other governments (particularly, it appears, the Dutch), with the
Industry and Commerce Ministries organizing the domestic link, including getting the aid funds to secure the contract. The aid component of
the contract was strongly opposed by the aid bureaucracy. It saw the deal
as a purely commercial one and argued that this type of aid was a contradiction of a long-standing Norwegian principle. Moreover, aid to Indonesia was a negation of the concentration principle. A n d , finally, the
continued harshness of Indonesia's rule in East Timor had caused criticism
of Indonesia in the m e d i a . Those who organized the contract, in contrast,
claimed that it was within the rules set by the O E C D . They also said it
would be a one-time occurrence. An official investigation of the use of
the aid money later showed that one-third had been a simple ' g i v e - a w a y , '
while the rest had been used for relatively acceptable purposes such as
training in Indonesia. "
The largest commercial bank in Norway was apparently instrumental
in setting up the initial contacts and the financial package lor the contract
with Indonesia. The successful negotiation of this aid/trade promotion
package led the government to launch a major campaign to obtain similar
contracts. The political and administrative head of the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping was the lead actor. Its trump card was a scheme that
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used development assistance funds to offer interest subsidies, nominally
a grant element up to 25 per cent of the contract amount, but in reality
even more than that. Several billion kroner in credits and guarantees
were allocated between 1977 and 1 9 8 0 . At first, the aid agency, the
Direktoratet for utriklingshjelp ( N O R A D ) , was required formally to evaluate and approve the contracts. Later, most ship sales assisted in this
way were exempted from N O R A D evaluation. Attempts to allocate aid
money to cover future defaults on repayments of the credit led to conflicts
that were settled by a compromise. As defaults at present amount to
several hundred million kroner a year, there is still much controversy
about whether they should be covered by the aid budget or that of the
Ministry of Commerce. This conflict reflects a clear and open split between the altruistic and the realist tendencies in the Norwegian polity, a
split that has divided the post-1977 governing coalition.
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37
The shipyards maintained employment, but these special arrangements
postponed rather than facilitated a restructuring of the shipbuilding industry. The political-administrative leadership felt that they had probably
broken normal rules of risk-avoidance, offended desirable procedures for
the proper administrative handling of contracts, and at best had worked
at the margins of what O E C D rules allowed. According to a junior member
of government at the time, Norwegian negotiators went out of their way
to secure contracts with developing countries, even though many were
uneasy about the negotiating practice and fearful of the risks associated
with the outcome. The strong influence of the industry and its corporatist
structure of bargaining prevented these doubts from surfacing, however.
For the realist, practically any export contract with a Third World
country is a sort of development assistance. For the altruist, there is no
such easy equation; the question must be carefully considered according
to the criteria set down for Norwegian development aid, notably the
targeting of aid to the poorest groups of the population and to the least
developed countries. The conflict over which budget should cover the
risk of default on export credit contracts therefore gave a rather representative picture of the contradictions within the Norwegian Third World
policy system.
38
39
The
Multi-fibre Arrangement:
Norway
as Free
Rider
40
There has always been a relatively strong coalition of political, administrative, and business leaders in Norway that favours multilateral solutions over unilateral action or bilateral deals. The rationale has been
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simple: as a small and open economy, Norway is best served in the long
run by resisting the temptation to be a free rider. To adopt such a role
would mean that Norwegian interests benefited from international arrangements worked out and sponsored by others without having to share
in defending the arrangements or carrying a part of the costs. Such games,
according to the official view, are bound to be won by larger countries
with greater resources; small countries must seek a game regulated by
binding rules. Nonetheless, N o r w a y ' s policies over the past ten years
give some clear illustrations that the temptation to be a free rider has
been irresistible. Policy on the Multi-fibre Arrangement, the agreement
on trade in textiles and clothing, is particularly illustrative.
The Norwegian textile industry has been one of the branches of the
economy most affected by imports following the opening up of the economy. Its share of the domestic textile and clothing market has fallen from
some 70 per cent in 1 9 6 0 to less than 30 per cent in 1 9 8 0 . The industry
is still relatively labour-intensive, it employs a large number of women,
and it is to a large extent located in regions of the country which are on
the periphery and always threatened by unemployment. The proponents
of national protection for the industry have pointed to all these factors
and have also argued that national military preparedness requires a substantial local textile industry.
While the Norwegian industry has lost significant market shares in
Norway, this loss has arisen from the free-trade arrangements under the
European Community and the European Free Trade Agreement. Markets
have not been lost primarily to Third World producers. To maintain the
industry at its present level of employment, the government and the
Storting have appropriated funds to subsidize the industry's wage bill.
These measures have not been considered sufficient by the industry's
lobby which has demanded and obtained sufficiently broad protectionist
measures that Norway was unable to sign the first M F A in 1 9 7 3 . Industrial
policy thus overruled foreign policy.
In 1 9 7 6 , a local unit of the textile workers' union ran an advertisement
in the press stating that it opposed N o r w a y ' s implementing the N I E O .
Since then employers and employees in the textile and clothing sectors
have formed a united front which has commanded the almost unwavering
support of the Ministry of Industry, especially under the Labour government. The sector, in other words, appears to provide a perfect example
of corporatism in action. It managed to keep Norway outside the M F A ;
Norway was the only industrialized country not to join. It alone introduced
bilateral and unilateral quotas to cope with 'problematic export countries'
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alongside and in addition to the global quotas that were allowed by the
rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( G A T T ) . Six southeast Asian countries were allocated special quotas. Hong Kong at that
time ( 1 9 7 7 ) had some 55 per cent of all 'low-price exports' of textile
products to Norway and had increased its volume of exports to Norway
by 40 percent annually from 1 9 7 3 lo 1 9 7 b . N o r w a y ' s demand that Hong
Kong reduce its exports by 40 per cent was promptly rejected, and Hong
Kong brought the case before the G A T T council.
Earlier, Norway had been instrumental in having G A T T accept the right
of small importing countries to protect 'minimum viable production' in
a domestic industry (the so-called Nordic clause). Nevertheless, and despite considerable pressure from other Nordic countries and from the
United States, Norway also resisted appeals to join the second M F A . This
was a source of some embarrassment, particularly for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, because it contrasted starkly with the p r o - N I E O profile
that ministry representatives were attempting to promote.
The domestic bargaining over the M F A and Hong Kong issues attracted
a good deal of public attention. Formally, it was up to the Ministry of
Commerce and Shipping to decide policy on these issues, and the ministry
appears to have been firmly behind the industry's refusal to join the M F A
II until about 1980. At that time, the chairman of the Labour party was
appointed minister of commerce and shipping. That party's leaders had
been influenced to a considerable extent by the Brandt Commission both directly and indirectly through the Socialist International which had
been penetrated by its ideology. Under the new minister, the ministry
amended its active protectionist stance and attempted to mediate between
the reformist coalition on the one hand and the industrial hard-line realist
lobby on the other by exploiting the preference for consensus which is a
feature of Norwegian politics. Other factors also favoured a change of
policy. There was the need for Norway to conform to the dominant
international trend while it occupied the chair of the North-South C o m mittee of the O E C D . Moreover, Norway was losing its case in the G A T T .
The ministry, therefore, sought an agreement with Hong Kong and moved
to make Norway a member of MFA II . It failed in both projects.
The textile and clothing lobby (in which the textile and clothing workers
and the manufacturers co-operate closely) is considered one of the most
effective pressure groups in the Storting. It had succeeded in getting the
Industry Committee unanimously to oppose the agreements. It had also
worked so effectively on the Foreign Affairs Committee, normally a firm
supporter of the Foreign Ministry's point of view and often more refor-
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41
mist-altruist than the rest of the Storting, that the committee supported
the lobby's view. The lobby's influence on politicians is of long standing,
but it was helped by the fact that the decision was taken only months
before a parliamentary election. Moreover, the Labour party supported
the lobby and the Association of Industries did not oppose it. It was left
to fractions of the evolutionaries and the radicals to support the p r o - M F A
v i e w , as the support of enlightened realists dropped away under the
pressure of the lobby and upcoming elections. Another factor was that
the pro-Third World coalition was not firmly convinced that Hong Kong
and the other cheap-labour textile and clothing exporters in Asia were a
particularly good cause to defend. Nor was it a natural ally for the Foreign
Ministry or the textile and clothing importers' organization which also
supported M F A membership. The Foreign Ministry's strongest card was
the advantage to be gained from conformity with the United States and
other O E C D countries, and officials pointed to the hazards of being left
alone and outside 'the club' of industrialized countries to which Norway
otherwise clearly belonged. But the segmentation of corporatist decisionmaking worked against those who supported the M F A . The firmness of
the 'core' coalition - the textile and clothing employer-employee lobby,
the Ministry of Industry, and the Industry Committee in the Storting was invincible. It was even able to force the Ministry of Commerce and
Shipping back into the fold when the latter sought to abandon the position
supported by the corporatist coalition.
Norway finally did join the M F A during 1 9 8 4 - 5 after securing a compromise solution in G A T T negotiations over the Hong Kong complaint.
This does not, however, mean that the lobby has had to give in. Rather,
the M F A had become so protectionist that joining it involved little concession towards more open trading. At the same time, the Norwegian textile
and clothing industry has finally begun adapting to new technology and,
more important, to product innovation, making it more competitive. It
is thus conforming to the international trend: restructuring towards the
higher value-added levels of the product chain and letting low-cost producers take a larger share of the lower level products.
42
Commercialization
of Aid: Altruism
vs Self-Interest
One of the more important battlefronts in the Norwegian Third World
policy system has been the issue of tied aid. Since 1 9 6 7 , the stated
principle in government documents has been that there should be no tying
of aid to Norwegian commercial interests. Both moral and practical eco-
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nomic reasons have been given in defence of the principle against the
inevitable attempts of industrial lobbies to gain special advantage through
the tying of Norwegian aid to Norwegian goods and services. The tying
of aid in this way has been opposed by a loose coalition, with ethical
evolutionaries siding with Third World-ists of various kinds to lobby the
Foreign Affairs Committee to maintain the principle set down most firmly
in the 1 9 7 2 report to parliament. The altruist coalition has seen its moral
and political arguments supported by macro-economic arguments such
as those O E C D studies which concluded that tying aid increased real costs
of projects for recipients. A number of public servants, notably in N O R A D ,
have adopted its view and even become outright members of the alliance.
The embryo of a segment - a development-oriented alliance - has emerged.
To widen and consolidate this support, the altruists have not totally opposed a linking of commercial interests with the aid sector. Their openness
to bargaining has led to compromises, but it has also enabled them to
defend some territory for a Third World-ist policy with an emphasis on
targeting poor groups and countries, the satisfaction of basic needs, and
self-help.
43
The p r o - N i E O position of the Norwegian government in 1 9 7 4 - 5 was
accompanied by a battery of incentives meant to induce industry to become involved in the Third World, mainly through investments, joint
ventures, and similar activities. These incentives were largely in conformity with O E C D and World Bank standards and rules. They did not
result in any major increase in Norwegian direct investment, joint ventures, or other forms of activity. The considerable internationalization
effort that did occur, as noted earlier, has been directed towards the other
O E C D countries and a few N I C S , not towards the great majority of L D C S .
Before proceeding, it may be useful to clarify the concept 'commercialization of aid.' It occurs when an actor consciously appropriates public
funds that have been allocated for development aid according to specific
publicly known guidelines in such a way that the specific commercial
interests of that actor take precedence over those guidelines. But where
is the line to be drawn? When is an aid project commercialized (according
to the definition offered here) and when is it development-oriented? Are
there circumstances and conditions under which commercial interests and
development goals can be combined to yield both a development effect
and a profit to some Norwegian commercial interest? The public debate
over these questions in Norway has split into three positions: the altruists
who oppose the tying of aid; the position of many industrialists and labour
spokesmen that all projects with participation by Norwegian industry in
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and by themselves would yield a development effect and that there is no
conflict between the tying of aid and the pursuit of development; and a
middle position which accepts that there is a potential conflict between
development concerns and commercial interests but believes that the
conflict can be resolved by setting detailed conditions for the participation
of private business.
I would suggest that the business position has been gaining ground
despite attempts by some altruists to defend their view by advancing
compromise solutions supporting the middle position. Three recent developments provide evidence of the rising force of economic self-interest
in N o r w a y ' s Third World policy.
The first concerns what may be termed the geopolitical location of
publicly aided business activities in the Third World. At intervals since
1 9 7 2 this issue has provoked controversy. The altruist-reformist coalition
has attempted to encourage the private business community to locate
some of its activities in those countries which are the main recipients of
Norwegian development aid. Most of these are classified as least developed countries. A great number of feasibility and preparatory studies,
wholly or partly financed by N O R A D , have been carried out in these
countries by Norwegian firms, but Norwegian business has rarely decided
to invest in them or to commit itself in other permanent w a y s . There are
three main reasons for this. First, the N I C S are more attractive commercial
prospects because of their potential as markets - a view Norwegian business shares with the international business community at large. Second,
Norwegian business decision-makers are on the whole risk avoiders - in
contrast to the average international business leader who is relatively
more of a risk taker. The poorer L D C S often exhibit weak infrastructures,
monoculture economies, and unstable political and social conditions; in
other words they are countries in which the risks are greater. Finally,
Norwegian investors have been relatively less inclined to make vertical
investments either to ensure their supply of crucial inputs or to control
the processing, further manufacturing, and distribution of Norwegian
products; their investments instead are mostly horizontal, that is, Norwegians tend to establish abroad the same type of activity they are carrying
on in Norway.
This difference in the priorities of the development aid constituency
and the business community has blocked attempts in the Storting to make
the various investment guarantees and other incentive schemes applicable
exclusively to the least developed countries or to the main recipients of
Norwegian aid. It is fair to conclude that if the more restricted option
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had been adopted, it would have been easier to implement aid goals in
any given project involving private commercial interests. The aid administration would in that case have been in a better position to manage the
project as it would have better background knowledge, the experience
gained from existing aid programmes, and an on-the-spot organization.
And, of course, a more restricted option would have ruled out any channelling of funds for trade and investment promotion to less needy countries.
The second development is the way in which a special facility to
guarantee exports to Third World countries has evolved. Initiated in 1 9 6 3 ,
the facility was gradually expanded after 1 9 7 5 until its financial volume
'exploded' in 1 9 7 7 - 9 . The financial commitments voted by the Storting
increased from a maximum of 69 million kroner in 1 9 7 4 to a maximum
of 6.3 billion kroner in 1979 (from U S $ 1 2 . 5 million to U S $ 1 . 2 8 0 million).
By the end of 1 9 8 3 , the guarantees linked to these commitments amounted
to more than 4.8 billion kroner. The main reason for this colossal increase
was the ship export campaign, with those contracts alone accounting for
3.2 billion kroner in guarantees at the end of 1 9 8 3 .
The issue was whether the guarantee scheme, which would refund
losses if purchasers were unable to service their debt obligations, would
be covered by the aid budget. Initially, it was. The basis for this position
had been that any project financed by export credits under the facility
had the explicit approval of N O R A D , that is, had been assessed as having
a favourable development effect. As the credit volume soared after 1 9 7 6 ,
the procedure changed. Either projects could not be handled fast enough
by the N O R A D process or those interested in facilitating the extension of
credits, in particular in response to the evolving shipyard crisis, wanted
to avoid asking for N O R A D ' S approval, apparently anticipating that applications might well be turned down. The interests which were promoting
the ship export campaign - the shipyard industry in co-operation with
the Ministries of Industry and Commerce and supported by the Federation
of Trade Unions - succeeded in convincing the government to withdraw
the requirement for N O R A D approval before credits could be given.
Parliament, however, reacted in 1 9 7 9 by limiting the total amount of
losses which could be covered by aid funds in any one year to 20 million
kroner. Only the Conservative and Centre parties voted in favour of an
unlimited coverage by aid funds. The minority Conservative government
revived the proposal of unlimited coverage in 1 9 8 2 , but the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Storting unanimously (that is, with the support
of its Conservative members) rejected the proposal. It came up once again
18 months later under the new coalition government. After a compromise
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Helge Hveem
in 1 9 8 5 between the Conservative and Christian People's parties, the limit
was set at 200 million kroner a year. It would appear that this new limit
may be expanded as the need arises. That need - a function of the foreign
currency position of purchasing countries, many of whom are heavily
indebted - appears bound to rise.
That this outcome is further evidence of the commercialization of aid
does not lie primarily in the fact that money for guaranteed coverage has
been increasingly assigned to the aid budget. That decision, seen in
isolation, may have been caused as much by the need of the political and
administrative leadership, in particular in the Ministry of Finance, to
balance a tight budget. Formally speaking, the coverage of the guarantees
could have been as easily located under the Ministry of Commerce or
Industry, but to do that would almost certainly have required the allocation
of additional funds to the ministry concerned. By assigning the guarantees
to the aid budget, the Ministry of Finance was able, in effect, to raid the
aid programme. It did not need to allocate additional funds for this purpose; instead the funds spent would be counted as aid. The proof of the
commercialization thesis lies in the fact that the original preconditions,
both for the way applications for credits should be handled and for the
criteria under which they would be given, were dropped. This was mainly
the work of the industry lobby operating within and through corporatist
procedures and structures.
The third development is the introduction of a scheme of mixed credits
to help finance exports of capital goods, consultancy services, and contract
work and technology to Third World countries. While the volume of
funds involved has been set at a modest level for the three-year trial
period starting in 1 9 8 5 , and the mixed credit scheme was modelled on
O E C D standards,
at least three elements in the scheme represent a turning
away from previous Norwegian practice and a victory for the commercialization tendency. First, grant aid is to be blended with private sector
finance; previous policy had been to keep the two as separate as possible.
Second, the scheme envisages that at least 70 per cent of the goods and
services under any project financed by it would be purchased within
Norway. Third, the facility will be directed to 'financially sound projects'
in 'creditworthy' Third World countries. In practice, this means that most
if not all the least developed countries will be excluded and that the
system will apply primarily if not exclusively to N i c s o r t o middle-income
countries.
The mixed credit facility was originally proposed in the government's
1984 white paper on development a i d . The debate on that document.
44
4S
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which was meant to determine aid policy for the years to come, was
postponed indefinitely. However, the mixed credit facility proposal was
rushed through the Storting as a separate bill in 1 9 8 5 . The facility is
supposed to make Norwegian firms more competitive, by helping to lower
Norwegian tenders for capital projects in the Third World. As all competing countries offer the same facility to their industries, the assumption
that Norwegian firms will now win more contracts is rather questionable.
What may be said is that Norway has joined the subsidization race that
has been accelerating internationally in recent years. For the industry
lobby, this is no small gain. Their argument has been that Norway is a
late comer in that particular race and that Norwegian aid policies should
be adjusted to the competitive conditions that actually prevail internationally. The lobby has described as utterly naive what it sees as a Norwegian idiosyncracy - the 'keep O D A free of commercial interests' ideology
that is best represented by the altruist position.
If this analysis is correct, the commercialization that has taken place
may have narrowed the gap between Norway and other O E C D countries,
but perhaps not closed it altogether. It is, however, difficult to assess this
accurately. According to the O E C D , the formal tying of aid declined quite
considerably in all the large and in most of the smaller member countries
between 1 9 7 3 and 1 9 8 2 , while Norway's rate of tying remained constant.
In 1982 formal tying of aid was higher in Norway than in its Nordic
neighbours and in the Netherlands. Nevertheless the reported figures
suggest that Norway ties its aid proportionately less than any other O E C D
country does.
Aid and trade can be linked to national interests in various informal
ways and any statistical comparisons of the involvement of national selfinterest should also incorporate these factors. Again, such comparisons
are hard to arrive at. In a research project co-ordinated by the present
author, all bilateral and multilateral aid projects financed by Norwegian
aid during the 1 9 7 4 - 8 period were scrutinized. It was found that between
35 and 40 per cent of all Norwegian assistance recirculated to the Norwegian economy, in the form of payment for deliveries of Norwegian
goods and services or for Norwegian experts and for the aid administration
abroad. Thus although little of this aid was formally tied, the recipients'
tact in the spending of Norwegian aid and their choice of projects resulted
in a significant return flow to Norway. It seems safe to say that this
percentage has increased since then as a result of the changes described
above. It may increase even further if the industry lobby is successful in
its quest for Norwegian multilateral aid allocations to become the subject
46
47
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Helge Hveem
of more tying, a request that met with an initial favourable response from
the government in mid-1986.
The changing political climate was well illustrated in 1 9 7 9 when Thorvald Stoltenberg, then deputy minister of foreign affairs (Labour)' and
chairman of the United Nations North-South Committee, stated that he
had changed his mind on forms of aid. Economic cooperation on a
commercial basis was of greater value to poor countries than the traditional
grant a i d . Objective analysis of this issue is incomplete and therefore
mostly inconclusive, but the research which has been carried out does
indicate that the deputy minister had come to a faulty conclusion if he
meant to imply that greater Norwegian investment in the Third World
would be of substantial value to the host countries. In one study of
Norwegian private industrial investment in the Third World, it was found
that the Norwegian affiliates
48
- did not provide a great number of new jobs;
- carried out extensive training programmes but practically no research
and development;
- had relatively few locals in leading positions even though the Norwegian firms on the average owned fewer shares in the affiliates than
does the average transnational corporation;
- purchased relatively smaller amounts of their inputs locally than the
average affiliate in a Third World country;
- paid higher wages and offered better social services than do local firms
(thus conforming with the average transnational corporation);
- contributed negatively to host countries' foreign currency balances and
did not contribute decisively to value added in the host countries they
served.
49
While these conclusions are not definitive and more research is needed,
they are certainly not compatible with N O R A D criteria " and do indicate
that the suggested conflict between altruism (development orientation)
and sclf-interosi (commercialization) is real and that the increasing element of commercialization in N o r w a y ' s Third World policy is a serious
problem.
The latest official statement of policy of a more comprehensive nature,
the white paper of 1 9 8 4 , does not seem to agree, at least not explicitly.
It is characterized by a strong effort to re-emphasize the policy orientation
towards the eradication of poverty among the poorest social strata but at
the same time to give a more unreserved support for using the private
5
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sector, including export promotion among Norwegian firms, to solve
development problems in the Third World. The paper carries all the
normal signs of a compromise statement. Both the emphasis of the Christian People's party on poverty and the Conservatives' orientation towards
industry and exports have been accommodated. After the change of government in April 1986, (he new. minority Labour government announced
that it would produce a new document without withdrawing the former.
One of the purposes of this document will be to make a clearer distinction
between public aid and private contributions.
Norwegian
Shipping:
Dramatic
Adjustment
The Norwegian shipping sector has been internationally oriented to a
substantial degree for many decades. Roughly 90 per cent of the merchant
fleet has been engaged in traffic between third countries during recent
decades. In terms of tonnage the fleet ranked between fourth and eighth
among world fleets. Over the past decade, however, its share of world
freight markets has decreased considerably.
Shipping policy towards the Third World was not subject to much
public debate for a long time. The shipping sector was largely selfmanaged. It was bound by the labour, currency, and tax regulations of
the state, but otherwise not much subject to political or administrative
control. In fact, shipowner interests were often directly represented on
official negotiating teams when international shipping matters were discussed. To this day the shipowners' association, the Norges Rederiforbund, still produces all the statistics on shipping affairs for both the state
and the private sector.
This relative autonomy changed gradually after Norway became active
in international development policy forums, especially U N C T A D . In these
forums Norway systematically supported the principle of free trade. This
strong ideological commitment to free trade was clearly motivated by the
continuing dependence of the Norwegian shipping industry on carrying
the trade of other countries As a consequence, Norway opposed the
proposal of a new code lor the liner conferences in shipping. This proposal, introduced by the Third World in the early 1 9 7 0 s , adopted in 1 9 7 4 .
and finally made operational at the beginning of the 1 9 8 0 s , was meant
to open up the often highly cartelized liner conferences to Third World
shipping. The code reserved (after a compromise) 80 per cent of the trade
between two countries to ships from those countries (40 per cent each),
the remaining 20 per cent being left for ships from third countries. When
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Helge Hveem
other industrialized countries came to accept the code - some of them
having already practised bilateralism in shipping for some time - Norway
also gradually changed its position and finally ratified the code. A contributing factor may have been that the industrialized countries - the
O E C D opposing, the Eastern countries abstaining - prevented a similar
regulatory device from being applied to bulk and tank cargoes during and
after U N C T A D V in 1 9 7 9 . Fear that this might happen had probably
contributed to the strong Norwegian opposition to the liner conference
code; the liner trade by itself was not of very great importance to Norwegian shipowners.
51
As one of the biggest shipping nations in the world, Norway has been
far more important in North-South trade as a shipper than as a trader.
Moreover, many shipments from the Third World (in particular oil and
ores) were in Norwegian ships. These facts were the subject of quite
varied comments over the years. To radicals they meant that Norway
played a quite important role in the global imperialist s y s t e m . To shipping protagonists it meant that Norway served the economic development
of the Third World well since its shipping services were competitive and
therefore economically advantageous to developing countries. The other
side of this coin was that Norwegian commercial interests were highly
dependent on a functioning international system that promotes economic
growth in the Third World. Economists estimated that net freight incomes
accruing to Norwegian shipowners from transporting goods financed by
development aid (worldwide) were 'considerably greater than those amounts
that we ourselves transfer as development aid.'
52
53
This assessment led to a lively debate which reinvigorated the radical
versus conservative controversy. More candid radical analyses developed
the fact that shipping in countries like Norway played a role within an
international division of labour. That role was challenged in much the
same way and for the same reasons as the international division of labour
(industrialized versus raw material exporting countries) was under challenge from Third World governments. References to free trade were
not sufficient. The Norwegian shipping world was not persuaded. It kept
to its conviction that it would continue to hold its own because of its
relative competitiveness. It also felt that its best contribution to the Third
World would be to contribute to some modernizing efforts such as harbour
development and transfer of skills in order to make national fleets in those
countries more competitive. It was mostly sceptical towards more farreaching development assistance. On one much-debated issue, however
- convenience flag countries - the Norwegian view coincided with that
54
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of the great majority of Third World countries. As late as 1 9 8 1 , the
government, echoing the views of the Norwegian shipping system, stated
that 'it would be desirable in principle that the system of convenience
flag I registration I be abandoned.
The main reasons offered were the
low security and the relative lack of control over the treatment of seamen
on convenience Hag ships. As an alternative, the government advocated
more joint ventures between Norwegian lines and state or private shipping
companies in Third World countries.
55
Then, in the course of a very few years, the Norwegian shipping scene
changed dramatically. Shipowners have adjusted very rapidly to new
conditions of competition. They have invested heavily abroad and have
set up affiliates and, where necessary, joint ventures. They have concluded agreements with some Third World governments to transport portions of their 40-per-cent share of their international trade. They have
made arrangements with O P E C governments. And they have registered a
rapidly growing share of their own fleets in convenience flag countries.
In short, the Norwegian flag is being taken off Norwegian-owned ships
at high speed. Whereas some 2 per cent of all Norwegian-owned ships
were registered under a foreign flag in 1 9 7 9 , the percentage was 34 at
the end of 1 9 8 5 . Some 55 per cent of all ships registered abroad were
registered in convenience flag countries. At the end of 1 9 8 6 , it was
estimated that close to two-thirds of all Norwegian-owned tonnage was
registered abroad. In an attempt to stop this trend, the government proposed to set up in Norway an international register with practically no
regulatory power.
56
Government policy and opinion in the Storting have in the main followed the wishes of the shipowners. The shipping system, however,
appears to represent a special type of corporatism. Shipowners have been
the dominant group of actors. Many of them, however, operate quite
independently, thus creating divisions within the powerful Shipowners'
Association from time to time. The Seamen's Association has been a
junior partner all along, at least according to its own assessment, even
under Labour governments. It has attempted to cope with this inferior
position by playing both co-operative and conflictual games with the
shipowners.
There has been no lasting co-operation between the two
parties such as characterized the textile and clothing industry or other
manufacturing sectors like steel.
The shipping sector in Norway does more than merely operate ships.
It encompasses brokers, financial institutions, the classification firm Veritas, and an offshore supply and platform component which has mush57
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Helge Hveem
roomed with the coming of the oil economy. If Norwegians have lost
ground in tank and bulk cargoes, they have become the world's largest
operators of cruise ships and the second largest operators of drilling
platforms. This means that the sector has several branches on which it
can base its activity, although these branches are closely linked and quite
vulnerable to changes in the world economy at large The number of
Norwegian seamen has dropped by more than 50 per cent over the last
twenty years and will decrease even more in the future. In other branches
of the sector, employment has been maintained for the time being, but
it may be reduced in the future.
The Norwegian shipping sector has adjusted very rapidly to international pressures and a new international division of labour has emerged
in shipping. Shipowners are responding to pressures from shrinking and
unstable markets, to competition from well-protected foreign fleets of the
First and Second Worlds, and to new aggressive competitors from the
N I C S of the Third World. Their main response has been to reduce costs.
Extensive mechanization has been introduced. Seamen from Third World
or southern European countries have replaced Norwegians, because the
former cost the owner as much as 50 per cent less than the latter. Salary
differentiation has been legalized. Those Norwegians who remain in the
industry are capital owners, specialists in the various shipping branches,
consultants, service people, ship's officers. Norway is climbing to a
higher position on the ladder which the international division of labour
represents. Gone are the sentiments attached to which flag waves from
the sterns of ships carrying Norwegian names. The shipping sector, in
other words, is doing what the manufacturing industry is only partly
willing or able to do: it is adjusting rapidly to a fast-changing international
system. When it could not beat Third World competitors and convenience
flag countries it joined them.
The political implications of this revolution could be far-reaching.
Municipal taxes, and state taxes as well, fall as seamen return to shore
and ships register abroad. Norwegian shipping becomes less visible, but
for some time at least its powerful position in the country remains. In
some respects the shipowners appear It) slick to their old convictions.
They did not welcome economic sanctions against Eastern Europe in the
1 9 5 0 s or Cuba in the 1 9 7 0 s . Nor do they heed the demands of radicals,
Christians, and others that they stop transporting crude oil to South Africa.
In mid-year 1986 that particular trade was seen as necessary to the financial survival of several Norwegian shipping firms. And Norwegian
ships carry one-quarter of all the supplies which reach the apartheid regime
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Norway
by sea. Under strong public pressure, the government introduced a register
of ships servicing South Africa, but it did not impose a ban as many
major national organizations including several political parties wished.
The shipping scene may even witness yet another development that
has hitherto been unfamiliar to Norwegian politicians and the public: an
open registry of ships based in Norway. Such a venture is the equivalent
of a tax haven of the Caribbean type or an export-free zone in the manufacturing sector. Once more, the government is having to swallow an
elephant: it states that the aim would be to make the open register 'as
close as possible' to a convenience flag country as far as conditions of
operation are concerned. The new Labour government hesitated under
pressure from the seamen's organization, but finally accepted the prop o s a l . " The Storting enacted it in 1 9 8 7 . The proposal assumes that
international security norms will be followed by ships on the register,
but that Norway will not tax the ships or regulate working hours, social
conditions, or wages. The introduction of the open register is telling proof
of the continued political influence of the shipping industry as well as
evidence of the continuing appeal of a symbol that seemed to have been
forgone - a Norwegian merchant fleet flying the Norwegian flag in all
corners of the world.
58
T H E D E M O C R A T I C - P L U R A L I S T P E R S P E C T I V E : A LOOK AT
PUBLIC OPINION
The theoretical framework employed throughout this article has focused
on fragmented segmentation. It emphasizes the tendency to monopolization of decision-making within certain segments of the Third World
policy arena and the trend towards more corporatist types of decisionmaking. The previous section gave some support for the proposition that
corporatism is increasing. In this section, I shall turn to what I term the
ad hoc control factor - the role and influence of public opinion.
In Katzenstein's interpretation of corporatism in small, developed countries like Norway, the corporatist and the democratic-pluralist systems of
decision-making are seen to have combined or merged to a large extent.
Strong, centralized organizations which negotiate with the state and between themselves on economic policy matters have become accepted and
approved by the public. Public opinion and public will as expressed
through elections and the parliamentary system are thus not opposed to
corporatist channels. They are rather meshed with these channels, often
operating through them and relating closely to them.
60
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Helge Hveem
In a policy area characterized by segmentation, the situation may be
a little different. In a period of economic strain, overproduction, stagnation, restructuring, and shrinking markets abroad, pressures increase
on scarce resources at home. The system may become more conflictual,
less stable. To put it more simply: popular support for development aid
may shrink during times of economic hardship, the demand for protectionism may increase, and the consensus on policy may weaken and
conflicts increase.
The extent to which this may happen largely depends on the images
that the public holds of the international environment and the Third World
as well as on their expectations of their own country. There has been a
good deal of research on images and attitudes on the issues considered
here. Several polling agencies and research institutions have surveyed
public opinion on the volume of development aid for more than two
decades. The Central Bureau of Statistics (Statistisk Sentralbyrå) surveyed
opinion on an even wider range of issues related to Third World policies
at the height of the N I E O period. Thus, comparable time-series data are
a v a i l a b l e . After summarizing the data I will discuss whether the information and data confirm or contradict the hypotheses presented in the
previous paragraph. What sort of role does public opinion actually play
in policy-making in this area: is it a stumbling-block to corporatism or
does it support it?
61
First of all, only a small minority of the Norwegian populace is really
concerned about - or interested in - Third World matters. Many of those
interested - by virtue of their higher education and status - are more
likely to be members, perhaps even leading members, of organizations
active within corporatist channels. Those who are less interested are
probably passive organization members or not members at all. It would
thus appear that a small minority occupies policy-formulating positions
in both the corporatist and the democratic-pluralist channels. To the extent
that this is true, one would expect public opinion to have no particular
effect on policy-making, but let us look at the data on attitudes to substantive issues.
The dependencia, or external, structural interpretation of the causes of
underdevelopment has some support among the Norwegian public. In
1 9 8 3 about one-quarter of those surveyed believed that international or
external factors are the most important cause of underdevelopment. But
interpretations which relate the cause to factors internal to the Third World
countries themselves - lack of education, skills, and other deficiencies have much more support. This appears to contrast with the public inter-
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pretation of socio-economic problems in Norway: they are to a larger
extent seen to be structural. Does this imply that there is really little
public support for reform internationalist proposals such as the N I E O ?
On commodity price stabilization ( I P C ) , a majority believed that world
raw material prices ought to be determined by market forces. A majority
opposed tariffs and other barriers to imports from the Third World, whereas
a majority accepted such measures vis-a-vis other industrialized countries.
This is a striking finding as it is in direct opposition to actual policies;
the free trade agreements with E F T A and the E C make trade with those
countries freer than do the M F A and other restrictive arrangements that
deal with the Third World. However, to complicate the picture further,
a majority in a 1 9 7 7 survey opposed imports of manufactured goods
which might threaten Norwegian industrial employment. By 1 9 8 3 opinion
on such imports was about evenly split, opposition thus having declined
marginally. But the number who thought that world commodity prices
should be determined by market forces not by regulation had increased
between 1977 and 1 9 8 3 , a result which contrasts with the official government support for the Integrated Programme for Commodities.
The relative scepticism towards industrial and trade policies favouring
the Third World is, as indicated already, not paralleled by attitudes on
aid. But the stable and positive attitude to high levels of development
aid throughout the last twenty years is not particularly exceptional when
placed in a comparative international perspective. It is also somewhat
fragile. Moreover, favourable attitudes to aid are not salient. When people
were asked which political goals they would wish to be given priority in
Norwegian politics, increased development aid ranked at the bottom of
the list.
Nevertheless, aid issues attract far more interest among the public than
do other Third World policy issues. Large percentages of those interviewed had no opinion on N I E O questions. This supports the belief that
issues which are relatively recent and in many ways more complex have
not yet captured as much public attention as issues, such as aid, which
are older and more easily understood. The latter also fit more easily into
simple categories of thought based on moral perceptions. However, the
survey shows that positive attitudes to aid correlate strongly with reform
attitudes toward trade measures. In other words, favourable attitudes
toward the relatively new, structurally oriented proposals included in the
'trade-not-aid' package would normally derive from the same cluster of
world-views, values, and norms that generate support for aid.
Using an additive index, Ringdal found that between one-fifth and one-
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Helge Hveem
quarter of the sample could be classified as interested in Third World
issues. Those factors, largely of equal weight, that appear to have the
greatest overall positive effect on attitudes toward these issues were: the
level of education of the respondents; the degree to which they believed
that development in the Third World affected Norway (the interdepend-
ence factor); the degree to which the respondents had embraced post
62
materialist v a l u e s ; and the comparative absence of what he refers to as
'rationalization,' that is, the tendency to explain away Third World problems as irrelevant or non-existent. Religious values, ideology, and party
preference had a lesser effect, although there are significant differences
between supporters of leftist and rightist parties while supporters of the
Christian People's party had a distinct profile on aid issues.
What may we derive from these brief excursions into the public opinion
surveys? In particular what may we conclude with respect to the assumptions and hypotheses we have presented?
There is little to say about the actual role of public opinion in influencing
policy-making at the government level. Public opinion appears to be
relatively but not particularly supportive of policies on aid. On trade and
industrial restructuring issues, however, it is somewhat inconsistent. This
last observation appears to be correct even though positive attitudes to
aid correlate with liberal attitudes toward trade measures. The apparent
inconsistency on some of the NIEO and related issues is probably largely
explained by the rather low interest of most people in these issues and
by their relative lack of information on them. If this supposition is valid,
then one would expect that attitudes would have become more positive
to Third World positions over the period reviewed, for more exposure
normally means more interest and insight and, consequently, more positive attitudes. This appears to be only partly true in this instance. Developments in the international markets and in the Norwegian economy
condition people's attitudes on trade issues. Growing unemployment and
less growth at the beginning of the 1980s may not only have checked an
increasingly positive attitude but have also turned popular attitudes in a
negative direction. In addition, the N I E O faded from the scene, first
internationally and subsequently to a large extent in Norway. There were
therefore fewer major issues around which to mobilize supportive attitudes. There are strong indications that this analysis is correct. However,
positive attitudes on aid have clearly not been much affected negatively
by the perceived economic crisis. One may therefore conclude that morality is a strong factor in forming public opinion and, through it, influencing foreign policy. In terms of my own terminology, the altruist
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tendency is strong and, at least on the question of aid volumes, has made
public opinion resistant to the pressure of other tendencies.
How do I reconcile this conclusion with the indications of negative
public attitudes on industrial restructuring and its consequent trade policies? A more detailed answer requires more in-depth research. A simple
and preliminary answer can nevertheless be offered.
On economic issues where particular interests are at stake, people
normally respond to change by seeking a solution through established
corporate channels. An example is the response of textile workers to the
perceived threat to their jobs from low-cost imports. The more general
and abstract the issues, the more people are inclined to respond in general
and non-specific ways or to show no interest at all. General trade issues
are therefore treated with less engagement and may produce generous
responses, whereas on those issues which specific groups or persons
perceive as a direct challenge the engagement is immediate and the response less positive. In such cases the grass-roots will react and may
initiate action.
Aid requires public expenditure which ultimately requires taxing. For
many years Norwegian politicians feared that increases in aid would not
be tolerated by their constituencies, which the politicians perceived to be
lagging behind them and which they felt must be led towards more positive
attitudes, but could only be so led step by step. This fear appears to have
been much exaggerated and the strength of popular altruism underestimated. The results of twenty years of polling justify this conclusion, yet
even it is conditional on, among other things, the assumptions that the
majority of people hold about the causes of underdevelopment. Attitudes
towards aid might quickly become less generous if the majority came to
believe that Third World poverty was largely due to correctable but
unattended problems internal to Third World societies.
S U M M A R Y
A N D
C O N C L U S I O N S
The hypotheses I set forth in the beginning can be summarized as follows:
1 The political culture of Norway requires the government to seek a large
degree of consensus on policy issues that may raise sensitivities among
large sections of the population. The Norwegian political culture favours positive-sum games.
2 Third World policy is not an area in which the definition of problems
and the design of solutions is guided by firmly established and widely
146
Helge Hveem
shared beliefs and values. If decision-making in this area is to function
according to the requirements of a consensual culture, then it must be
fragmented. Fragmentation offers participants a large degree of autonomy in the sub-areas of special interest to them.
3 Three aspects of N o r w a y ' s economic development in the 1970s and
1980s and its international context, mote than any oilier sets of butors,
determine Norwegian policies: first, the fact of being an open economy
in a world of stagflation; second, the need to restructure the Norwegian
economy rapidly in response to changing international comparative
advantages; and, third, the exponential growth and subsequent dramatic
decline in net incomes from petroleum production and exports. Because
of petroleum incomes, Norway could afford to be the 'blue-eyed'
altruist to a greater extent than most other countries. But because public
assets have expanded so fast, piling up a huge currency reserve, a lot
of private, commercial attention was attracted to aid and to export
credit funds.
This article has not supplied a final, empirical test of the hypotheses
formulated, but considerable support for them has been offered. Support
has also been offered for a fourth hypothesis:
4 Self-interest and conformist tendencies in N o r w a y ' s Third World policy
system have gained in influence within the bargaining processes and
in terms of the shares of budgets allocated to the various fragmented
processes at the expense of the influence of altruist and reformist
tendencies.
The strength of the latter tendencies, however, should not be underestimated. Altruist-reformist alliances have at points moved Norwegian
policy towards pro-Third World outcomes. The most visible proof is the
increased volume of aid. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting,
the new Ministry of Development A i d , and, in some cases, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs have been the more active of the public sector institutions to promote altruistic and reformist policies. The brief review of
public opinion showed that these policies command the support of an
important part of the electorate.
However, so do self-interest and conformism. When a majority of
public opinion accepts restrictions on imports of manufactures which
threaten employment in Norway, while continuing to believe that improvements in their commercial opportunities are the best way of assisting
147
Norway
the development of Third World countries, the public is reflecting and
no doubt in turn contributing to the fragmented political process that takes
place at the level of decision-making.
The increased volume of aid is therefore to some extent also a function
of a polity that is seeking to avoid having to play a zero-sum game and
of the fragmentation of decision-making in the relevant policy arena. To
accommodate conflicting interests all demanding a share of the cake, the
cake is made bigger.
Adjustment to a changing international environment was presented as
a major concern and one that has motivated the swing toward more selfinterested policies. It should be stressed, however, that adjustment is not
one and the same policy in all circumstances. The shipping sector is the
clearest illustration of adjustment as restructuring - an aggressive type
of adjustment. The textile and shipyard cases are examples of adjustment
not as restructuring, but as defensive protectionism, involving a postponement of long-term restructuring. The case of the aborted readjustment
fund would seem to indicate that it is this defensive policy that has
dominated N o r w a y ' s response to the new international division of labour
during the last ten years.
There are indications that the politics of adjustment is now swinging
toward more active adjustment policies. Restructuring to create employment based on new technology has come later and is still on a somewhat
smaller base than in other small industrialized countries. However, unemployment has come down to approximately 2 . 5 per cent of registered
job seekers in 1986. If it should rise again while tougher restructuring is
taking place which adds to unemployment, then Third World policy will
also be affected, perhaps more profoundly than in past years. The fall in
world oil prices has already led to cuts in public spending. The aid volume
is stagnating.
The government white paper on development aid policies published in
1984 invites a continuation of fragmented decision-making by simultaneously re-emphasizing the poverty orientation of aid programmes and
the export-oriented, commercial aspect of aid expenditures. The change
of government during 1986 is unlikely to reduce this fragmentation. The
Labour party seems to have given up its former opposition to the separate
aid ministry, an opposition that had been given a political defence in a
book written by the present foreign minister. Nor is the new government
reversing the swing to a more self-interested and conformist Third World
policy, although the extent of that swing may be reduced. Change is
unlikely while the government lacks a secure majority in the Storting.
61
148
Helge Hveem
Reformism, however, has not been halted completely. The 1 9 8 3 government supported an idea that the present author had taken up a few
years earlier: to negotiate a ' m i n i - M E O ' between some of the smaller
industrialized countries and a selected number of Third World countries,
preferably the least developed countries. In my exposition of such a
programme considerable emphasis was placed on co-operation among the
countries of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
( S A D C C ) and on Nordic support for that co-operation. A major motive
behind that goal would be to strengthen the S A D C C countries in their
present weak position vis-a-vis South Africa. The government secured
cross-party support for the idea, which it first intended to propose to the
so-called Like-Minded Group of middle powers that had sought to moderate the opposition of the major O E C D countries to the N I E O . Simultaneously, the Finnish prime minister, Kalevi Sorsa, launched a similar
initiative aimed at Nordic co-operation with the S A D C C member-countries.
The purpose of the Sorsa Plan was to develop existing trade relations,
which are relatively modest, and aid relations, which are important, into
a more comprehensive co-operative programme.
6 4
The Sorsa initiative is backed by all Nordic governments and the Norwegian government is publicly promoting it as an important part of its
Third World policy. It is too early to say what may eventually come of
it. So far, the level of precision associated with the specific proposals is
not great enough to invite true a n a l y s i s . The scheme still awaits concrete
implementation but negotiations have progressed during 1 9 8 6 - 8 . Should
it proceed to implementation, political events in the Southern African
region may have changed some of the premises of the scheme. Or perhaps
reinforced them. The Nordic countries have gradually, although somewhat hesitantly, come to accept that an economic boycott of the Republic
of South Africa is warranted and that they themselves ought to initiate
one. The Danish parliament and the Norwegian Labour government initiated concrete boycott measures during 1 9 8 6 , but the Swedish Social
Democratic government was opposed to t h e m . In addition, one must
anticipate that the mini-NiEO programme will not escape the processes
of bargaining and the influences that have been reviewed which are so
prominent in regard to the other components of N o r w a y ' s policies towards
North-South issues.
It is these processes and in particular the politics of consensus and the
fragmentation of policy-making related to North-South economic issues,
operating within a political culture in which humane internationalist sentiments have many roots and an economy in which major economic
65
66
149
Norway
interests have much influence, that have given shape and substance to
the economic policies of Norway towards the Third World.
NOTES
Stein Rokkan. 'Numerical dcmocracy and corporate plumlism,' in Robert A.
Dahl. cd. Politicol Oppo.\·;timl.'l in W(',\'tern Democracies (New Haven: Yale
University Press 1966),70-115, and Johan P. Olsen, cd. Poli,i.. .k organisering
IPolitical organization I (Oslo: lJnivcrsitctsforlagct 1978), chapters
and 2 (with
M. Egeberg and H. S<etrcn)
2 Olscn. cd. Politisk orgal/i.\'(·riug, 122
3 Sec. t"or instance, Valtcr Angcll. 'The case of Norway" in Gerald Hellciner, cd.
The Other Sitlt' orlllfernatiol/al Development Policy: The Non-Aid Economic
Relations with Developing Countries (~I Canudtl. Dt'nmark. the Netherlands,
Norwo.'V, and Sweden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).
4 I refer, in particular, to the deficit budgeting of the Johnson and Nixon administrations in the United States.
5 One example of an academic overreaction would appear to be C. Fred Bcrgsrcn's
'The threat from the Third World,' Foreign Policy, no r r Irq73),
6 I refer to Schumpcler'S well-known theory about cyclical changes in the
cconomy.
7 For details, see Hcl1:!C Hvccm, 'Institutionalization and crisis management: the
emergence of bilateral protcclionism, . paper presented at the xth World Congress
of the International Political Science Association. Paris. July
8 See UNCTAD Secretariat. Trade and Development Report. for the last few years
for details.
9 Hvecm, 'Institutionalization and crisis management'
10 Calculations made by the Centre d'Etudcs prospcctivcs ct d'informations internationales. Paris, and quoted in Frode Strand-Niclsen. 'Norgcs industricllc
stagnasjon' |Norway's industrial stagnation I (Oslo 1983). mimco, 30 pp.
II Nnrgcs Bank |Norwcgian Central Bank|. 'Norskc in\'cslcringcr i utcnlandsk
nceringsvirhomhct' INorwegian investments in foreign busincssl (Oslo 1983).
mimco, 166 pp
12 Norges Kcdclllorbund |Norwegian Shipowners' Assoclatiun). 19K5
I) The most common dclinition includes labour cosls. sometimes capital and other
costs as well. related to productivity, and frequently includes changes in currency rates.
14 Among other things. the oil industry attracted skilled personnel at all levels
largely because of much higher salaries than mainland industries could offer. It
led also to strong pressure on some branches during the I 97()S through the
50
Helgc Hveem
)udden demand for contract work on the offshore sector. and thus contributed to
higher prices. Finally. the huge transfers of income to workers during the mid1970s also had a strong inflalionary effect.
'5
Norway is a substantial producer of raw materials because of its important
metallurgical industry and. especially in earlier periods. paper and pulp. Moreover, it faces increasing competition in industries such as lextiles. shipyards.
and other manula(lUrlllg areas.
16 European Free Trade Area I EFT A) Secretariat. 'Export performance of the f . f t a
countries. '97()-8" (Geneva. April 19H.:U. mimco
'7 See Valter Angell, 'The case of Norway'
,8 The Christian People's party (Kristclig Folkcpartil, which was part of the bourgeois coalition government until April 1986. stands for this combination of
altruist and conformist values; it is almost as strongly pro-Western in its foreign
policy as the major coalition part ncr. the Conservatives iIJ~yrcl.
Asbjørn
ltlvbnek and Arve Ofstad. 'The role of Like-Minded Countries in the
'9
North-South contradiction: the case of Norway's policy towards a NIEO. mimco,
'979
20 This group was formed at the time of u n c t a d III in 1976. by persons engaged
in development research. in the media. in voluntary organizations and political
panies. and in the public service. mainly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later.
even trade unions and the Church became represented in it. The coalition has
a secretariat and organizes meelings. circulates information bullelins. and makes
public comments on matters within its liclds of interest. Although funded to a
great extent from public sources. the coalition has maintained a certain distance
from official government policy, except perhaps in the Held of commodities
where it has. for the most part, supported Norwegian policy in u n c t a d .
21 For examples see Knut Dahl-Jakobsen. 'Infonnasjon og Iikebchandling (den
offentlige virksomhct' Information and equal treatment in the public M:ClOr I.
Tid.\.\/';'riji for samfunnsforskning 6 (1965). 147--{)(l, and also Maktutredningen:
Slul1mpporl. Norges offentlige utredninger 82:3 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget
1982).
22 Norway is used as an example of a polity characterized by such tendencies in
Mancur Olson, Jr. The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University
Press ll~lS2). and in Peter Kalzenstcin. Small Slates in World Markets (Ithaca:
f'orn"l1 'Iniv(·r.. iIY Pre.... Il)H4)
23 A possible exception IS the transport workers' association which has several
times boycotted ships accused of mistreating or proven to have mistreated seamen
from I'hord World countries.
24 Sec Paal Rcpslad. 'M isjoncn sur på u-Jandu' IMissionary organizations' view of
the developing countries I (Oslo: InslituU for slalsvitenskap. Hovcdoppgavc.
'973'· mimco. and H. Hveem. S. Lodgaard. and K. Skjclsbcrk. Det moe/erne
15 1
Norway
Var r/w",\" i i'erlle" IModern Norway: our role in (he world I (Oslo:
Gyldenal Norsk Forlag 19841.
Helge Pharo. 'Norge og den tredje verden" Norway and (he Third World I. in
Trond Bergh and Helge Pharo. eds. Vekst og \'(".\'!wu/: Norsk politisk historie
1945-65 |Growth and welfare: Norwegian political history 1945-651 (2nd cd;
Oslo: Universitetsforlaget IqKI)
Sec Alliert ('. n ll~dll11t1l1. 1:.\11. V(lIn' f",rt Loyoll\' (l' i.Hnhru..l!!c: Harvard Una Vct~
sity Press 1970). and for the data on United Nations vOling. see Kurt Jacobsen.
The General Assembly (~I the United NallOI/S (Oslo: Univcrsitctsforlagct 1978).
Pharo, .Norge og den tredje verden'
For more detail. sec Olav Stokke. "The determinants of Norwegian aid polley.in Stokke, cd. Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid
Po/ides 01 Canada. Dnw1lIrk. the Netherlands. Norway and Sweden (Upp>ala:
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 1988).
Norges økonomiske samarbeid med U!\'ikfl1lKs/muh'IU' I Norway's economic relations with developing: countriesl. Stortingsmelding 94 (1974-75'79> (Oslo:
Nor~(':
1h
27
28
29
N O R A D 1974). 26
30 For a fuller account, see Hclgc Hvccm. ·Scandinavia. the Like-Minded Countries
and the New International Economic Order.' in Erwin Laszlo and Joel Kurtzman, cds. Western Europe and the NIJ::O (New York: Pergamon 1980).
Norway,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 'Norwegian position paper to the UN
)1
Conference on Science and Technology for Development. Vienna.' 1~79
32 /,Idu.\' Ir ipi,/ir;.\'/.:.1' retningslinjer for de nærmeste Clr fremover I Industrial policy
guidelines for the coming years|. Stortingsmelding 54 (198(H) (Oslo 198 0)
33 Full membership would have created serious opposition for, among other things.
it was perceived as incompatible with national sovereignty over petroleum
resources. The fact that the lEA decision was taken only a few years after the
referendum on Ec entry may also have led decision-makers to proceed cautiously
and not to opt for full membership.
34 East Timor. a former Dutch colony. was forcibly annexed by Indonesian military
units in '975· The annexation was (and still is) disputed by a local independence movement.
35 Shipping in ImJollf.'",ia. NOKAO Evaluation Report 2
(Oslo: n o r a d
was a member of the evaluation team and had the opportunity to carry out
interviews with a number of fill' persons involved
30 Odd Joslel" Sil:h.'.-. ·l~)..sJ>0nllltl·r+.·SSL'S og u-h.lclp· lI:x"tun lI1(cn':'1ls and develup
ment aid| (Oslo: Institutt for statsvitenskap. Mellomfagsoppgave. 1977). mimco
37 Under the I.:OmpnIIHISC. only a small amount of the aid budget (to a maximum
of 20 million kroner) could be used annually to cover defaults on export credits
and interest subsidies.
38 Private conversation with the author.
.<1\2
Helge Hveem
39 Cf a ~ries of interviews in recent years in Nor~(',\' Inc/lU/ri, the bi-weekly of the
Association of Industries
40 Much of this section is based on conlidential information made available through
interviews with officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Commerce and Shipping. For an oflicial account sec Norges irnporlpolitikk
for I"k\lil- og £'OI1'd,,\/Ol/ll'lIrt'r' SfJ(JrJmalt'l om norsk 'if.~/tlmi'tK Iii "AI' rwn'wltom i n'('r"tl~jont" handel med tekstiler (MFA). Stortingsmelding 60 (I9M3-4)
(Oslo 19M4)·
41 This has been particularly lrue on development aid issues: sec SlOkke. 'The
determinants of Norwegian aid policy.' for more detail.
42 Cf Vinod Aggarwal, 'The unravelling of the Multi-Fiber ArrangeffiCnt. 1981: an
examination of international regime change•• International Or~lInizll1;on 37
(autumn 19M3), 597~23·
43 Stortingsmelding 29 (1971-2)
44 They involve. inter alia. a grant clement of 25 per cent. The system of mixed
credits has been the cause of some controversy within the DAC The United
States government has opposed it as a contradiction of the principles of free
competition.
45 Om enkelte hO\'el/'\p(Jnm(11 i norsk utviklingshjelp IOn some main issues in
Norwegian development aidl. Stortingsmelding 36 (19 H4-5) (Oslo
46 As quoted in ibid. 28. Norway's formal tying amounted to 22 per cent in 1973
and 21 per cent in
whereas that of the Netherlands declined from 56
per cent to 13 per cent and that of Sweden was constant at I) per cent.
47 Jon Strand. 'Utviklingshjelpcn og norsk økonomi i I970-areoe . I Development
aid and the Norwegian economy in the 1971lS i (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute 19Mo). mimco. 86 pp
48 As
reponed in Aftenpo.\·len. 3 October 1979
49 'Norsk industris internasjonalisering rettet mot utvikling.sJandenc· |Norwcgian
industry's internationalization in developing countries I. Working Papers A274
(Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute 19th). mimeo. 58 pp. and Bjørn P. Saga.
'Norsk n.eringslivsengasjement i u-land i form av hedriftsetableringe og eksportlevcnm"-Cr - er det utviklingsfremmendcT Forum for tII\'ikli"R.\".\1udj('r. nos
5-6 (19M2)
50 n o r a d crileria arc that the project concerned: (I) cllntributes to production of
useful products and/or services in the host country; (2) creates remunerative
employment which improves social and economic conditions in the host country;
(3) is located in relatively economically weak districts; (4) includes systematic
training of local employees; (5) constitutes a basis for related economic activity;
(6) makes use of and processes local raw materials; (7) employs a technology
that is adapted to the needs of the host country; (8) contributes to improving the
technological level of the host country: and (9) contributes to an improvement
Norway
of the foreign economic position of the host country by saving imports or
increasing exports. See also Bjørn P. Saga. 'Virkningcr av norskc industrietableringer i u-land: en easc-slUdic fra Sri Lanka' IEffcets of Norwegian industrial
investment in developing countries: a case study from Sri Lanka |, Forum for
ull'iklinx,\,..a uditr. nos 1-3 (1986), Saga employs the so-called effect method developed by French rl"l'arrhl'rs His study reaches no dclimll' conclusion with
regard to the development effect of Ihc project in Sri Lanka.
Jkip,~l("I,\'mf'r;"Ren
IOn the shipping sector). Stortingsmelding 52
(Oslo IqX!). According to this report the liner trade accounts for a
small share of total tonnage. but some one-third of total freight incomes and a
51 See Om
(lqXO-!)
large share of employment in the shipping sector.
52 Lars Alldcn. U·hjelp og imperialisme |Dcvclopmcnt aid and imperialism) (Oslo:
Pax Iq6X)
53 Just Faaland and Magne Skaar. 'Norskc skipsfartsintcTCsscr i kapitaloverføringer
til u-Iand' [Norwegian shipping intcrcsls in capital transfers to developing coun-
trics). Sos;alfbkonomen, no
('96X). IX
54 Dag Tressclt. The Controversy over the Division of Labour in International
Seaborne Transport (Bergen: Institute of Shipping Research 197°)
55 Om
56 Ibid. 4; and data from the Norgcs Rederiforbund
57 Knut Langeland, Utflagging som kilde til1)(1Iil;,\'/';'(' ;lIlere.'i.'ie.lamfUkter: Skipsfarten fra segment til kamparena | Registration abroad as a source of political
cool1ier of interest: the shipping industry from segment to battleground I (Oslo:
Institutt for statsvitenskap. Hovedoppgavc. (986). mimco. 12 I pp and appendices
58 Om skipsfartspolitikken IOn shipping policYI. S.ort;npmcld;ng 36 ('9XS-6)
(Oslo 19X6)
59 Tillcgg til no. 36 |Supplcmcnt to no. 36, ihidl, Srnrtingsmelding 50
60 Kall.enstein. Small Slates
61 Kristen Ringdal. 'Folkcmcininga og den tredje verda: Ein analyse av norske
meiningar om u·landssp0rsmal· IPubl ic opinion and the Third World: An analysis
of Norwegian opinion on development issues). master's thesis in political science. I 979. mimco. 404 pp. See also several reports on survey data from the
Statistisk Scnlnalbyra.
62 Cf reports from the Statistisk Sentralbyrå.
63 Knut Frydenlund. Lille land - hva Wt." ILillie country - now what?1 (Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget 19K2)
64 Cf Hveem. 'Scandinavia. the Like-Minded Cuunlries. and the
65 am referring to the report made by Nordic civil servants in
at the request
of Nordic governments, for example. and to later documents that have been
presented by Norwegian authorities. For details. see Forum for
nos 5-9
(special issue on 'mini-NIEo·).
154 Helge Hveem
66 The Swedish prime minister. Ingvar Carlsson, declared at (he end of July
that Sweden would not approve economic sanctions unless a United Nations
decision to introduce mandatory sanctions was made. There has. nevertheless,
been signiticanl progress towards a common Nordic boycott.