3 Mini-NIEO and
national vulnerabilities
in Southern Africa
HELGE HVEEM
When the idea of a mini-NIEO was first time introduced, it was mainly as a response to the
then evident decline of the NIEO negotiating process. (Hveem, 1980) For several reasons, it
was felt that the SADCC countries were particularly suitable candidates for a scheme. Among
such reasons were that they were located in the same region, many of them were among the
Least Developed Countries, and most of them were falling behind in terms of socio-economic development compared to a number of other developing countries.
Among the many dependencies that plague the world is that of dependent imagination.
The non-discrimination principle is a strong determinant in thinking on international development policies - and there are some good reasons why it should be. But in the case of the
SADCC region, one may say that most people and societies there are discriminated against
by a hostile international economy, ecological crises and - not least - a very hostile neighbour. The striking vulnerability of these countries vis-a'-vis the Republic of South Africa
(RSA) was and is another good reason for targeting a mini-NIEO on them. For that same reason, the issue is a highly political one - and the case for discriminating in favour of these
countries a very strong one.
The SADCC region is a collectivity of countries which, perhaps more than any other region it may be compared to, is a collectivity in parts. It is extremely fragmented, with very
little economic integration of the various constituent national economies. The present dependency structure is illustrated in the economic-political field by these facts: whereas on
average some 4-5 per cent of all foreign trade of the nine SADCC countries takes place within the collectivity, some 30 per cent of imports originate in the RSA. .The amount of foreign
economic and technical assistance received by the nine countries in the mid 1980s was seven
times higher than the value of intra-SADCC trade. Practically all the nine experience serious
problems, and many of them a deteriorating capability to generate investment funds and basic
goods. Their structural dependency on the outside world therefore appears to be great and
growing.
As is well known, the lack of intra-trade is partly caused by lack of means of transportation
and of infrastructure. But these déficiences are mostly a function of the structural dependency
of the countries concerned, a function of their colonial past, imbalanced linkages with the
RSA and their inferior position in the international division of labour. With the possible
exception of Zimbabwe, they all face a long perspective when they consider options for
escaping from their structural dependencies. These may, however, be reduced by political
changes, of which two are more important than others: majority rule in the RSA. and the
construction of a viable system of coordinated economic policies and cooperation among
the Nine.
Having said all this, it would be unrealistic only to conceive of the region as a system of
nation-states. In fact, the presence of a number of large transnational corporations (TNCs)
represents a structure that goes across national economic and political boundaries. In many
respects, this structure represents a network whose operation is only partially decided upon
by the states concerned. More concretely, for example the analysis ought to include the
Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) network. Its internal and external financial, industrial
and political links are at the same time vastly complex, weigh heavily on the economic
position of the RSA and some key SADCC countries, and represent a strong political agent
in the region. It could thus be said that the way the AAC handles its multiple and complex
dependency relationships is a key to understanding the pressures on the system, to future
change - and to the true meaning of respective vulnerabilities. More specifically: if the AAC
leadership feels that its highly internationalized corporative network is vulnerable to the
mounting conflicts in the region, then the RSA is in important respects vulnerable too.
The Vulnerability Concept
Two dimensions of the vulnerability concept are of particular interest in the present context.
First, the distinction between absolute and relative vulnerability; second, the distinction
between personal (actor- related) and impersonal (systemic) vulnerability.
Absolute vulnerability occurs when an actor is unable to adapt to his environment and
has to pay the costs imposed by it, no matter what they are, no matter how much he tries
to modify them. Nuclear holocaust is the extreme example of this type of vulnerability.
Relative vulnerability is a spectrum where an actor, A, does possess the means to reduce
or control his vulnerability, but has to activate those means and reckon with carrying some
costs, even after he has taken action to that effect.
The distinction between an origin of vulnerability which is personal (man-made) or
impersonal (non-man-made, or structural) simply reflects the difference between, on the one
hand, a situation where A's vulnerability is caused by some other actor, B, and, on the other
hand, one where the source of A's vulnerability cannot be linked with any particular actor
or group of actors. The ecological crisis that has hit South of the Sahara during recent
years may be partly man-made, but is perhaps more of the latter category: an impersonal
source of vulnerability: or it would represent a mixed source.
One aspect of vulnerability that has been particularly featured in the literature is the
exchange or relational aspect, which is commonly referred to under the term "interdependence". Basically, it says that if two actors, A and B, are both experiencing vulnerability, and
the origin of that vulnerability is the other actor, then they are part of a structure of mutual
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and related vulnerability. If both are aware of this situation, then they may find incentives to
cooperate in order to control their respective vulnerabilities.
While cooperative strategies are certainly feasible in practice, and there is a good case for
them in general, theoretical terms, we should also include the possibility of conflict strategies
or outright aggression as an option for coping with vulnerability. This, obviously, is particularly realistic in the case which is considercdjiere.
Power resources, and the ability to transform such resources that represent potential power
into actual power, are decisive variables in any discussion of interdependence relations. If or
when such resources and ability are relatively evenly distributed, there is scope for an exchange of power and thus the ability to mutually affect one another. This situation gives the
best opportunity for institutionalizing co-operative solutions to the vulnerability problem.
When, on the other hand, power in these respects is extremely unevenly distributed, there is
correspondingly less scope for co-operative solutions. If the relationship is extremely skewed,
and conflict is not manifested, then there is clearly domination by one party over the other.
This is illustrated by the relationship between some black sections in the RSA, historically
and at present, on the one hand, and the apartheid regime on the other.
Leaving for the moment this co-operation vs. conflict dichotomy, we may consider the options that actors face in a structure of mutual vulnerability under two headings: the concept
of control and the concept of interest. The source of, or the reason for, actor A's vulnerability
is that B either possesses some element of interest to A (strategic mineral, market, essential
food production, etc.) or controls some element in A that is of interest to B. In this simple
model, A may reduce his vulnerability by manipulating either the control or the interest variable, and by either increasing or reducing his transactions with B.
This gives us the following typology of strategies that may theoretically be pursued by A:
I. Maintain or increase transactions:
1.1. Increase his own control over those elements in B that is of interest to himself (exemplified by occupation, direct investment, licensing of monopoly technology, excluding third
parties from access to those elements by bilateralizing trade).
1.2. Increase B's interest in some element that A controls (improve quality of transacted
products or innovate new ones, provide incentives, offer safe supplies through long-term
agreements).
II. Reduce transactions:
II. 1. Reduce his own interest in some element in B that is controlled by B (through increasing self-sufficiency, adaptation, diversification of suppliers of that element).
II.2. Reduce B's control over those elements in A that B controls (by nationalization, increasing the number of trade partners, co-operation with other suppliers of B for that element).
As we rum to the Southern African situation, it ought to be stressed that we talk about a
system of extraordinary vulnerabilities. Is there any possibility at all for co-operative
strategies to control mutual vulnerabilities in the relationship between the RSA and the Nine?
Could the Nkomati Agreement of 1984 be said to fall into such a category? Is it at all possible
to apply our conceptual framework to a situation where the imbalances between the parties
to the conflict are in many respects so glaring?
I believe conditionally that the answer to the last of these questions is "yes". I share, in
other words, the perspective chosen by Hanlon (1984; 19861). The situation in the Southern
African region is unbalanced in several respects, among others in that the apartheid regime
appears to have a much clearer strategy than its opponent neighbours. The strategy is at the
same time complex and targeted on very concrete goals. The overriding goal is to maintain
the apartheid system by holding the neighbouring countries hostage to the RSA in the economic and military fields. In so doing, the RSA may fight off two of the threats that she faces
and that make her vulnerable: first, black resistance and opposition movements organizing
the struggle inside the RSA, with the support of their organization in neighbouring countries;
and secondly, the mobilization in Western countries in favour of economic sanctions against
the RSA.
The Regional Hostage System
Absolute Vulnerability: the BSL States
Over several decades, the region has been organized to serve the economic needs of the RSA
or the European colonial system, or both. These were the centres of decision-making in the
SADCC economies, and to a large extent they still are. It is definitely hard to imagine that
the so-called BSL states - Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho - could play an autonomous
role under any serious challenge from the RSA hegemony. Their location, and the fact that
for several decades they have been integrated into the economy of the RSA (the Rand zone,
the customs union) speak against such a possibility. Thus, geopolitical, economic and infrastructural as well as purely institutional factors mean that the BSL states are absolutely vulnerable to the actions of the RSA.
The apartheid regime, for its part, appears to be potentially vulnerable to developments in
the BSL states only in the security area. In the rather unlikely event that these states, and especially Swaziland and Lesotho, should become sources of military or parliamentary action
against the RSA, the latter would feel threatened by them. It is in order to preempt such threats
that raids like the one on Maseru on 9th December 1982 and another one in January 1986,
are carried out. The latter led to the downfall of the leader. Chief Jonathan, and the fall of the
government in Lesotho.
The dependence of the BSL states on the RSA is further illustrated by the migrant labour
factor: more than half of the work-force of Lesotho, at least 30 per cent of that of Botswana,
and some 15 per cent of that of Swaziland work in the RSA. Whether or not these 250.000
or so workers would be a potential threat to the economic stability of the RSA in the event
that they all went on strike, appears to be mostly an academic question. Such an event appears highly unlikely, as these workers are badly organized and represent a very needed - in
the case of Lesotho the most important - source of income for their national economies. (Tostensen, 1982; Hanlon. 1984 and 1986II).
Relative Vulnerability - and Mutual?
For the rest of the Nine SADCC Countries keeping the military threat apart, the provision of
essential goods through imports from the RSA appears to be the most important dependencycreating factor. These imports concern not only essential foods, but even a range of manufactured consumer goods. The infrastructure of the region acts as a protective barrier against
competition for these markets from the outside, e.g. from Europe or South East Asia. The
RSA-led customs union supplements this barrier. So docs military action which protects the
infrastructural dependence on the RSA by repeatedly hitting at and destroying the extra-regional channels represented by railway networks and ports in Angola and Mozambique.
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Despite the fact that the military superiority of the RSA is overwhelming, one cannot exclude the possibility that several of the remaining six states represent potential security threats
to the RSA in and by themselves and as bases - actual or potential - for ANC and SWAPO.
For that reason, the RSA has found it necessary to bomb areas, destroy physical installations
and kill thousands of people in these countries. In so doing, however, the economy of the
RSA is itself hurt in the process.
The reverse of the import dependence of the Six is dependence of South African manufacturing industry on selling its products on the markets that these countries represent. These
may be comparatively small. But the manufacturing industry in the RSA is both cost- and
quality-inefficient when compared to rnanufacturing industry that would represent its theoretical competitors. This relative vulnerability may be one of the reasons why industrial leaders
in the RSA have opened up for negotiations with ANC leaders, apparently in order to prepare a political settlement. (Sampson, 1987).
Most signs of respective dependence positions indicate that the RSA vulnerability vis-a'vis the neighbouring countries does not at all compare with the vulnerability of these countries to the policy of the Republic. They have been made dependent on the RSA. In addition
to those sectors already mentioned, this holds for energy and a number of different services.
(Hanlon. 1986 II).
The vulnerability aspect of dependence is, however, not only a matter of economic structures, communication infrastructure or physical threat. It also refers to a mood, an attitude in
people, and to how they perceive themselves and opponents. It is therefore possible to locate
an important source of vulnerability in how people - individuals in key positions as well as
groups, classes or segments - react to changes in the situation, including threats, but also to
promises of reward. Thus, the RSA may play on the open or tacit support of "clients" in the
Nine. But the Nine may also, in theory at least, attempt to take advantage of the support which
they enjoy among the white opposition to apartheid in the Republic. If the former fact has
been more of an asset to the RSA government than has the latter to the Nine, then may this
perhaps be changing in the reverse direction?
The general picture of respective vulnerability is rather obvious. The RSA is only selectively vulnerable in certain economic aspects, and conditionally in security dimensions - the
conditionality having primar ily to do with the efficiency of ANC in conducting its struggle
from within the RSA itself. The RSA is able, due to historical developments that have been
strengthened recently, to hold the Nine, or most of them, hostage because of their own vulnerabilities to the actions of RSA.
The weaknesses in the position of the apartheid regime are at the same time the positions
of strength for the SADCC countries. These weaknesses are basically:
- the fact that the RSA enjoys a trade surplus with the SADCC countries running at about
1 billion US dollars per annum, a surplus which finances much of her deficit with for instance
oil exporting economies;
- a change of mood within the RSA that leads to a shift in the "political psychology" prevailing in the region in favour of majority rule;
- effective economic sanctions against the RSA by practically all Western countries, provided that the sanctions do not do more harm than good to the SADCC countries;
- the cracking of the apartheid regime from within itself, under the effect of these two
changes, or more specifically due to urban terrorism affecting the morale of the apartheid
forces;
- the total untenability of the position of apartheid in regard to international law and morale.
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The best hope for the SADCC countries in the short term therefore appears to lie in events
largely beyond their control. There is probably little hope in trying to play on whatever relational vulnerability may exist between them and the RSA, that is, exchanging vulnerabilities
by making mutual concessions, etc. There is simply not enough symmetry in the respective
vulnerabilities of the two sides to make such an outcome likely. The Nkomati Agreement has
been interpreted by some as an example of such exchange of vulnerability. But again, relations between the two parties are too asymmetrical to support such an interpretation. The Republic's open support of the guerilla forces fighting the FRELIMO government within Mozambique is concrete proof that the optimistic interpretation is misplaced. President Machel's
death may tum out to be another proof of this.
The SADCC option : Alternative and Diversified Expendence
An essential element in the SADCC countries' vulnerability is their relative lack of alternatives to the RSA relationship. We may add this element to the theoretical and conceptual outline offered above by making the following two observations: to the extent that an actor is
dependent on outside actors for essential items, his vulnerability is determined by the availability of similar or subsritutable items from other actors; and the more alternative relationships he may effectively avail himself of, the less vulnerable he is.
The alternative to the RSA in the economic field has been and still is the former colonial
powers. After political independence, the nature of the relationship between these powers and
the respective SADCC countries has no doubt changed. Do the latter, however, still face a
situation that is not very different from the classical Scylla vs. Carybdis choice as they consider alternatives to economic dependence on the RSA? In other words, is a change towards
increasing economic exchange with the Western capitalist - or for that matter the Eastern socialist - countries going to improve the control they have over their own position?
The answer depends on the nature of these North-South relations, and of course on the reactions of the RSA if or when the SADCC countries decide to shift towards increasing their
dependence on these relations. If we assume for a moment that the threat of RSA intervention will by and large be neutralized by the intervention of Western powers, we are back to
the question: what sort of relationship is feasible in the North-South context of S ADCC's external relations?
Grants and other aid are a major source of foreign currency for most of the SADCC countries. Aid therefore appears to be one important channel of political influence; trade is another such channel. Above, it was pointed out that there are very considerable differences between SADCC countries when it comes to the part played by foreign trade, aid and investments in the capital formation of the countries. The BSL category is totally dependent; the
remaining six are dependent to varying but considerably lesser degrees.
If SADCC countries are not only highly dependent on. but even receive economic resources from, one or very few sources, there is a concentration of their external alternatives that
represents another potential vulnerability - one that is greater the more the alternative relationship does not oppose the RSA politically by following sanction policies and intervening
against the destabilization policy of apartheid.
Among the Nine, Tanzania is the one country most dependent on foreign aid, but at the
same time the one that has the least concentrated donor structure. She receives her aid from
many, not one. The German Federal Republic is her greatest donor, with some 15 per cent of
all aid disbursed to Tanzania (1980-82 figures). For other SADCC countries, the concentra-
tion ratio is between 16 (Botswana from Germany and the UK, about equally much) and 30
(Angola from Sweden; the figures do not include aid from Socialist countries).
The trade relationship in the context of North-South relations is, as one would expect,,
similarly concentrated on the Western countries, particularly on the EC. Colonial economic
ties have been cut or reduced as far as volume is concerned in some individual cases: the processing level of products before trade has been increased. But North-South trade with the
SADCC countries on the whole remains the classical division of labour. Imports from the
North consist predominantly of capital goods and other input factors. This explains why the
dependence of the Nine on South African consumer goods supplies - with the partial exception of Zimbabwe - is so high. It certainly also explains why the terms of trade of the SADCC
countries, with the periodic exception of Angolan oil, have developed negatively.
As far as geopolitical concentration of trade is concerned, Angola and Tanzania appear to
have the most concentrated foreign trade structure. In the case of Angola, her export dependence on the USA (60 per cent of total exports in 1983) reflects the control over her oil distribution network held by a US oil company. Whereas Lesotho is totally dependent on the
RSA for both imports and exports, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi are placed in an in-between position that again shows the extent of vulnerability of these states.
Such comparisons reflect only part of reality. Low import dependence may mean nothing
but low purchasing power, which would be a reflection of the international economic crisis
and the way it has hit the SADCC region. Or it may reflect problems of productivity, leadership or organization at home. Let us therefore end our exercises in statistics and turn to the
more fundamental issues: which options are the SADCC countries facing?
Practically all SADCC countries will remain dependent on imports of resources for their
development for a long time to come. Secondly, this dependence is even more obvious as the
RSA is manifestly hostile to the SADCC countries and wants to prevent, or at least control,
their development. The economic and ecological crises, thirdly, add to the weaknesses of
these countries. They do not seem to be in a position where they can reduce their own interest in external actors. An autarky strategy, in other words, is out of the question. This appears
to hold both for the countries individually - again less for Zimbabwe than for others and more
for the BSL countries than for the rest - and it holds for SADCC as a whole.
The region appears to be in a weak bargaining position as it turns to the West for an alternative to the RSA. From the perspective of the big powers, the SADCC countries do not possess elements that are of comparative importance or are exclusively theirs. Candidates for
such a category would be inter alia natural resources, military-strategic importance or the
general political weight that nine votes in the international voting system may carry. Depressed world mineral demand and reduced importance of the Third World bloc vote in international politics appear to make the first and the third among these unlikely bargaining assets. The SADCC group thus appears largely unable to play on, or create, any great interest
in itself on the part of the West.
Some of the Nine have developed trade relations with other Third World countries, mostly NICs or large countries with a relatively strong manufacturing sector. Illustrations of this
are Tanzania with India and China, and Angola with Brazil. These relations may be developed
and their number multiplied within the framework of greater South-South cooperation. But
the NICs' strategy towards other Third World, less developed countries does not appear to be
appreciably different from the aggressive sales policies with an emphasis on national economic interest which they pursue in relations with industrialized countries. Thus, attempts to
increase relations with other Third World countries would be blocked not only by the vulnerability of the regional transportation network, but also by the fact that SADCC has little leverage vis-a'-vis the NICs either.
The SADCC countries probably have two assets which they may use in bargaining with
the Western countries. The first is the military- strategic importance attached to the whole of
the Southern African region by NATO governments. This importance includes the strategic
minerals that the region as a whole - including the RS A - suppliesto the West. A serious conflict and a deterioriaiion of the govemability of the RS A and the other countries will be contrary to the interests of Western decision-makers as they themselves perceive these interests.
(Hvcem and Malnes, 1980; Maull, 1985)
The other bargaining asset of SADCC right now is political ethics. That asset is a function
of the intensity and strength with which political opinion in the West manifests itself against
the RS A under apartheid. The more the aggressive and exploitative nature of RSA's external
and internal policies is manifested, the more likely it is that moral pressure will be put on
Western governments to act in the neighbourhood of the RSA as well as inside her.
Morale is, however, only a potential bargaining chip; its potential has to be transformed
into concrete bargaining strategy and supported by political arguments and organizational
means. In order for moral arguments to play a decisive role in a world of realpolitik and a
system of very asymmetrical power relationships, three mechanisms will have to be put into
force: first, implementation of effective sanctions against the RSA; secondly, a build-up of
growing cohesion among the SADCC countries; and thirdly, construction of a North-South
system with a clear development or Southern orientation.
All these mechanisms, if put into force, should increase the ability of SADCC countries
to control their own development. Apart from the exceptions that once more have to be made
for the BSL countries, there is, however, another possible weakness in the argument just offered.
There is a very distinct possibility that sanctions against the RSA, if or when effective, will
result in negative spill-over effects on SADCC. The nature of the regional hostage system
makes this rather likely. One of the crucial and certainly most difficult questions with respect
to the two other mechanisms, therefore, is how and to what extent they may be insulated from
the first mechanism. Taking into account the present integration of most SADCC societies
into the RSA economy and her "spheres of interest" strategy, it is rather unlikely that such insulation can in fact be effected. The question is rather how effects on the first mechanism can
be economically compensated for and at all politically controlled by third parties.
Alternative Systems
The argument developed above is briefly the following: The SADCC countries are vulnerable to the RSA in an asymmetrical relationship, some countries under conditions of absolute vulnerability; only a few are under conditions approaching relational vulnerability of a
symmetrical and reciprocal nature. If there were majority rule in the RSA tomorrow, military
vulnerability would no longer apply. But for important aspects of economic relations, vulnerability vis-a'-vis the RSA may very well remain. Most of the SADCC countries are-underdeveloped and non-industrialized, having very small economies compared to the RSA. Moreover, some of them are characterized by weak political institutions. These differences would
remain and would most probably create strains in any cooperative efforts that would result
out of majority rule in the RSA.
The dominant existing alternative system is the post-colonial system, predominantly that
of the European Community. Increased cooperation with other Third World countries and
with Socialist ones are two alternative options. The alternative to be considered here, however, is a new type of North-South system. It would implement NIEO principles for a reor34
ganizauon of the international division of labour and a moderate regulation of world markets
in primary commodities. It has been termed as a mini-NTEO, and linked to the Nordic countries and possibly other small and medium-sized industrialized countries.
The mini-NIEO concept is, simply put, a flexible response to the breakdown of the global
NTEO process. It will be limited in domain, and it could be limited in scope as well. The idea,
however, is that it would cover several of major sectors of the original NIEO package. And
it should be an innovation compared to existing North-South systems; if it were not, it would
not be "new" in the sense envisaged here.
Transnational Corporate System
Another important international system that may dominate the one just mentioned, sometimes transcend it and sometimes even pose as an alternative to it, is the transnational corporate system. The interests of this system in the SADCC region lie primarily in the traditional mineral extracting industries, largely established during colonial times. Over the decades, transnational West European and North American capital has merged with groups of
corporate capital based in the RSA. The Anglo-American Corporation is the most influential
expression of this merging process. Does the position of this particular group modify, or in
fact control, the vulnerability factor and thereby also the choice of alternative options for
SADCC countries?
During the mid-1980s, a number of Western corporations decided to divest from their operations in the RSA. Some of them have set up affiliates in SADCC countries, a few of them
apparently as a response to the request of governments of these countries. Does this indicate
that SADCC countries do have some leverage vis-a'-vis the corporations? If that is the case,
one reason would appear to be that the corporate strategists, apart from becoming aware of
the political pressures against apartheid, sec the SADCC region as a future market of some
potential. We do not, however, know what will be the trend and the future effect as far as divestment of foreign capital from the RSA is concerned. If there is a general exodus, then this
will certainly affect the RSA seriously. But will it affect the SADCC region and corporate
presence in the region in any profound sense?
Ii falls outside the scope of the present paper to answer these last questions in any detail. I
shall confine my remarks to two observations. Fust, the minerals of the SADCC region do
not represent any decisive or indispensable source of supply for the West. They represent an
important source for specific corporations such as the AAC. Western mineral vulnerability is
possible in the case of chrome and, if the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) area is included, cobalt (Zaire). It is only under the "worst case scenario", whereby both the RSA and
the SADCC would cease to supply the Western powers with strategically important minerals,
that the region would make a real difference. Such a scenario appears highly unlikely. (Hveem
and Malnes, 1980 and Hveem, 1986 I).
The second observation is simply that it is not very likely that there will be any great change
either way in the importance thaiTNCs attach to the SADCC region. The prospect of SADCC
becoming an important market is a long-term prospect. But from other integration efforts in
Third World regions, one has learned that TNCs rapidly develop an interest in and an ability
to profit from the opening up of geographically bigger markets.
Among the factors that make a prediction difficult is the close integration of the AAC with
both British and US corporate capital, and with both the fate of the RSA and that of several
of the SADCC countries. This close and two-sided integration makes it possible for foreign
firms to maintain a position on the RSA market by using AAC affiliates as entrepots, while
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at the same time divesting from the RSA and even setting themselves up in the SADCC region. This position of apparent strength is at the same time a position of potential weakness
for the AAC. More than most if not all other capital interests in the region, AAC is dependent on an outcome of the mounting conflict that prevents it from becoming total and longlasting. The fact that the new AAC director participated in the Lusaka meeting with ANC
leaders could be a tslimony to this, and the fact that he had to partly retract afterwards because of strong criticism in the RSA is an illustration of the dilemma in which the AAC leaders
find themselves.
There are no signs to this moment that those SADCC countries which may be expected to,
do in fact wish to expel or nationalize RSA-based companies. The reason, probably, is simple:
they cannot afford to. The RS A-based companies and the allied TNCs in the West may therefore be less squeezed in between the RSA and the SADCC than they appear in a superficial
analysis of their position.
New EC-SADCC Relationship?
After the first rounds of decolonization, the European Community created a system of association agreements with former colonies. This system has developed to become a blend of
neo- or post-colonial relations on the one hand and a new regulatory regime on the other. All
SADCC countries are at present members of the ACP. The EC-SADCC relatisonship is primarily a bilateral one. There are also, certainly, elements of competition between EC countries and corporations over markets and influence in the region. The Lome Convention does,
however, coordinate national and corporate policies to some extent, primarily in the trade
sector.
Three aspects appear to be of interest here. First, EC financial and technical aid to the region appears to be much based on traditional channels and institutions which are not very
different from those operating right after decolonization. Bilateral and multilateral aid combined are relatively less important in quantitative terms than aid from for example the Nordic countries.
Secondly, the trade policy appears to follow an international trend in imposing more tariffs and quotas the more processed are the goods concerned. Thirdly, the STABEX scheme's
sectorial approach to compensation of export shortfalls has led to distortions of the principle
of equal treatment of nations, and resulted in a transfer of concessional resources which has
benefited those countries that are relatively better off. (Ravenhill, op.cit.)
As far as the second and third aspects are concerned, EC-ACP system is not significantly
different from other existing regional or sectoral arrangements of the past and present, or for
that matter bilateral arrangements in the trade area, cf. the GSP system. It is thus possible that
one option for the SADCC is to work for an improvement of the EC- ACP system. They may
do that either by asking for a general revision, which would demand the consent of other ACP
states; or they may ask for a special arrangement under the ACP system, or an extension of
it, that would involve special measures in favour of the SADCC. The rationale behind such
measures would be that the region is particularly severely affected by the combination of
economic crisis, ecological crisis and the aggression of the RSA. The latter option requires
the consent of the EC countries and may result in conflict between SADCC and other ACP
members.
Nordic-SADCC Cooperation: Mini-NIEO or More Aid?
My arguments for suggesting a mini-NIEO would first of all be related to the decline of the
North-South dialogue and the need to meet political expectations in the Third World and important sections of the public in several industrialized countries. These expectations were
partly a result of a rather wcll-publiciztM-crjtique of the prevailing international economic
system, and partly a response to what was perceived by many decision-makers as a mounting countervailing power of the Third World ("Opecization"). But the expectations of reform
were also to some extent a product of perceptions of self-interest: many opinion-makers felt
that in order to preserve international peace, one would have to design a more equitable economic order.
When reformism started to peter out and it became more and more clear that there would
be no global agreement on a New International Economic Order, there was an apparent need
to call for new initiatives in order to keep reformist processes alive. Seen in this perspective,
the mini- NIEO concept represented a way to save or revitalize the NIEO process, rather than
posing as an alternative to it.
The Nordic group has been selected for the reason that these countries are perceived as
relatively development-oriented in their Third World policies. The choice of the S ADCC region as counterpart has been explained above. Questions remain as to whether the Nordic
countries really are more development-oriented than other industrialized countries. The quantitative element in their aid practice does not necessarily correspond to a superior qualitative
element. Attempts to export manufactured food products from the SADCC region to Norway were met by blank refusal some years ago. Some of the pro-NIEO posture of the Nordics may be of a purely declaratory kind; it costs nothing to vote for principles that are not
likely to be implemented, or whose implementation at best takes a long time. (Anell and Nygren, 1979; Holm, 1979; Bergesen ct al.. 1980; Hveem 1980, 1987)
From the point of view of the nine SADCC countries, the reason for selecting the Nordic
countries as their partners may be related to their size and their position in the international
system that appears less liable to exert power over SADCC than with other partners. To develop interdependence with them would therefore be to develop a relationship that 1) could
be a useful alternative to ones with the RSA, the EC and the USA, and 2) would represent a
more symmetrical relationship than those just referred to.
The Nordic-SADCC relationship at present is aid, not trade. Trade transactions are very
modest in absolute and relative terms, whereas Nordic aid is considerable according to both
criteria. In the case of Angola and Mozambique, Nordic countries account for over 50 per
cent of all bilateral Western aid. Practically no Nordic aid goes to Lesotho, Swaziland and
Malawi. In the case of Tanzania and Zambia, the Nordic countries account for some 30 per
cent of all bilateral Western aid. Nordic aid to the region represents a bigger gross transfer of
capital than does all intra-SADCC trade. This means that the Nordic countries can play an
important role and are able to exert influence over the SADCC region through the aid channel. A steadily growing Nordic aid to Zimbabwe, the "core" country of SADCC, underlines
this point.
5
The implications of the "aid, not trade" situation appear to be the following:
1. It will take a long time to develop trade relations between the two regions from the present modest state. This calls for a selective, not an overall trade strategy in the Nordic-SADCC
case. In other words: Nordic imports, due to the small size of the Nordic market, can do little
to improve the position of the SADCC region in general, that is, in terms of its overall balance of trade. Their future growth would most probably presuppose an innovative attitude
among Nordic traders, politicians and public servants. They will have to lay aside their almost ritual insistence on free trade - which they themselves rather often do not practise in
North-South relations - and accept "new" forms such as countertrade, industrial cooperation
with state involvement, etc.
2. The alternative is for the Nordic countries to direct their contributions to such sectors
and targets that improve and expand intra- SADCC exchanges, which are manifestly the weak
spot in the foreign economic position of the SADCC countries.
3. In practice, this means to support the productive capacity of individual countries. The
ecological crisis and the crisis in food production make support of the latter, and substituting
deficits by food relief, logical priorities in the short run. In the longer run, however, food selfsufficiency and industrialization are priority goals for economic development in the region.
Together with increased security in the military field, they are the single most important
measures for reducing vulnerability vis-a'-vis the RSA. A policy that aims to increase and
improve the value added content of goods and services appears to be the single most important measure to increase intra-trade and the benefits from it.
4. Neither industrialization nor intra-trade will result automatically from the setting up of
production facilities as such. A necessary condition is that appropriate institutions are set up.
The present situation is characterized by institutions that split SADCC by linking some countries to the RSA, neo- and post-colonial structures of asymmetrical exchange, and for the rest
by several barriers to increased exchange among the SADCC countries themselves. Intratrade is not only impeded by lack of transport facilities. These do exist, although their functioning is threatened by RSA or RSA-sponsored aggression.
Intra-trade is also hindered by lack of institutions that facilitate trade, such as convertibility
of currencies, by poor organizational infrastructure and by lack of effective coordination of
economic and industrial policies. A host of new institutions appears to be necessary: countertrade, clearing and payments arrangements, preference systems, etc. SADCC's industrial coordination programme of 1982 is a beginning. SADCC may draw upon the experience of
several other regional groupings in the Third World, such as ALADL that show the potential
for trade cooperation under conditions of external pressure and lack of currency to finance
trade.
The most important mechanism for reducing the vulnerability of the SADCC countries is
thus to increase their capacity to produce and exchange among themselves. It is only to the
extent that a Nordic-SADCC scheme contributes to this end that it will represent an alternative.
6
Feasibility of the Mini-MEO Alternative
The miru-NDEO initiative has become official government policy in the Nordic countries.
Plans to implement the idea in the SADCC region have been adopted and negotiations are
being conducted. When brought to a preliminary conclusion, they should give us the answers
to some of the most urgent questions:
Will the scheme in fact offer an alternative North-South system from the point of view of
the SADCC? How much will it depart from a mere extension of the present bilateral aid relationship and become a comprehensive programme whereby several sectorial and countryspecific measures are coordinated - from the Nordic end and among the SADCC countries?
38
Strong political and public support does represent an incentive for giving priority to the
SADCC programme in the Nordic countries. Another possible impetus for joint Nordic action is the evolution of a common policy on introducing economic sanctions against the RSA
during 1987. But these sources of support do not offer much guidance as to what sort of programme should be set up and implemented. That question will to a large extent be decided
by: 1) the outcome of bargaining between-various political tendencies in the Nordic countries themselves, 2) the ability and the strength of SADCC's bargaining with the Nordic countries, and 3) the extent and type of pressure from third parties, including of course the RSA
and the big powers.
The Nordic countries have to some extent been able to coordinate their Third World policies
in the past. They have not, however, gone very far in implementing aid programmes jointly.
Coordination is a matter of policy principles, not practice. They were, for example, divided
on the issue of economic sanctions against the RSA until quite recently. Those differences
that exist are explained by differences in foreign policy, by Denmark's integration into the
common policies of the EC, and by internal economic structure and resulting political cleavages.
Nordic political coordination in the field of Third World and international development
policies is probably as much a function of OECD coordination as it is a result of inter-Nordic coordination. This means that there are limits to how far the Nordic countries may go "on
their own". Not least, strong economic interest groups in the various countries represent a
pressure to conform with the OECD norm. In a study on Norway. I reported that conformist
tendencies have gained in influence relative to, and at the cost of, reformist (pro-NIEO) ones
during the last few years. This is partly related to a corresponding shift away from relatively altruist tendencies towards more sclfinterestcd ones. In other words, the economic crisis
and an increased emphasis on intemarionalization have made Norwegian development policy more commercialized. Since there is still pressure for an altruist and reformist policy,
from Church, youth and left-centre organizations in particular, these tendencies still have to
be accommodated within the total range of policies implemented. This makes the Norwegian practice in the field appear fragmented and sometimes even inconsistent to outsiders.
Hveem, 1987)
A similar situation and parallel trends may probably be observed in the case of the other
Nordic countries as well. For our purpose, this means that a Nordic-SADCC scheme of the
altruist type that is presumed here, will need the political support of strong organizations such
as labour unions and even sections of industry. Such support may be possible, but still hard
to mobilize and maintain, as rather few persons or institutions in the Nordic countries feel
dependent on the SADCC region for vital goods or services. There is thus an asymmetry in
the Nordic-SADCC relationship. In order to make the scheme feasible and viable, there also
appears to be a need for more political and organizational coordination between the Nordic
governments than is taking place at present.
At the SADCC end of the relationship, there is obviously a much stronger need for coordination than in the Nordic case. Now, theories of integration appear to be of limited value,
since they mostly deal with situations where there are already a certain number of transactions going on (functional integration) or some strong hegemonic power that is able to command the will of the collectivity (core actor integration). Experiences from other integration
attempts in the Third World appear to speak against both types as models in our case: the
functional type is hindered by circumstances; the core state type (which would mean Zimbabwe taking the lead) is politically unacceptable.
There remain two theoretical options: multilateral or federal integration, and stale-based
coordination of policies. SADCC has so far voted for the latter. There can be no question that
39
this is the optima] choice. Its obvious weakness lies first of all in the fact that some of the
states are too dependent on the RSA.or other external actors, to be able or willing to go far
in terms of effective coordination. Internal socio-political processes that divide the population according to regional, class or ethnic differences add to the problem, or are part of it.
This means that the fate of the SADCC effort is and will be decided by internal developments in the countries concerned. External factors do, however, play an important role, acting as a centrifugal force on the cooperation effort. The idea of an altruist Nordic-SADCC
scheme would be to work against such forces, not to exploit them. That is truly a challenge.
Notes
I wish to thank Claes Brundenius, Margaret Doxey, Reginald H. Green and Kimmo Kiljunen
for useful comments and criticisms on the first draft. Several participants at the symposium
in Helsinki, November 1986 also gave useful comments. The responsibility for any errors,
as well as the whole product as it is, rests as usual, however, entirely with the author.
1. This is being discussed in Hveem. 1986 0.
2. See Keohane and Nye, 1977 for the original presentation.
3. Mention could be made of e.g. the Southeast Asian countries.
4. An example is CARICOM, the Caribbean Community; see Girvan and Jefferson, 1977.
5. See OECD. 1984; figures are for 1982 and 1983. For another very detailed and useful source of information, see DERAP. 1986.
6. According to Countertrade Outlook no. 27, 1986. the Latin American group managed to finance all but 13
per cent of its intra-trade during the first part of the year through clearing arrangements. There was, in other words, a net trade creation effect of the arrangement. For some details, see Hveem, 1986 Uj.
7. Reference is made to the ongoing negotiations between the SADCC and the Nordic countries resulting from
the initiative taken by Prime Minister Kaievi Sorsa in 1983.
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