1979
Vol. XVI
No.1
1 Helge Hveem: MUltllrlzetlon of Neture: Conflict end Control
over Streteglc Re8Ource. end 80me Impllcetlon. for PNce
Pollcle.
27 Ekkehert Krlppendorff: Mlnorltle., Violence, end Peece Re·
..erch
41
Steven I. Jeck8On: CepltlIllet Penetretlon: Concept end Mee·
.urement
57 Vegerd Bye: Netfonellzetlon of OUln Venauele. Re-deflned
Dependence end Legltlmlzetlon of ImperleU.m
79 Wllllem Eckherdt: Globel Compe••lon end Compul.lon
87 Book Note.
91 Booke Received
I S S N 0022-3433 Journal o f P e a c e R e s e a r c h , N o . 1 , V o l . X V I , 1979
Militarization of Nature:
Conflict and Control over Strategic Resources
and Some Implications for Peace Policies*
HELGE HVEEM
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
Military consumption of natural resources is o n e of the p r o b l e m s which figure p r o m i n e n t l y
in the United Nations' action p r o g r a m m e on disarmament and development. Reporting on
a s t u d y t h a t w a s i n i t i a t e d i n 1975 a n d w h i c h h a s m e t w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e p r o b l e m s i n g e t t i n g
access t o i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e a u t h o r p r e s e n t s o r i g i n a l d a t a o n m i l i t a r y - r e l a t e d c o n s u m p t i o n o f
energy and minerals in t h e U n i t e d States a n d elsewhere. After t h e so-called 'oil crisis',
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a n d strategists h a v e s h o w n i n c r e a s e d c o n c e r n o v e r e x t e r n a l s u p p l y o f
strategic resources a n d h a v e c o m e up with proposals on h o w to deal with vulnerable supply
lines. These a n d other options a r e surveyed. It is c o n c l u d e d that t h e m a j o r powers, w h i c h
a r e a l s o t h e p r i n c i p a l a r m s p r o d u c e r s a n d e x p o r t e r s , still m a y s e c u r e s u p p l i e s b y m e a s u r e s ,
including imperialist practices, at t h e international level. At the s a m e time, d e p e n d e n c e on
strategic resources domestically n o t available m a y be r e d u c e d by m e a s u r e s internal to t h e
importing country. Technological innovations have reduced the relative d e m a n d for m a n y
minerals and are increasingly making composite materials available for military purposes.
Still, t h e a r m s r a c e c o n t i n u e s t o a b s o r b g r e a t q u a n t i t i e s o f a n u m b e r o f n o n - r e n e w a b l e
materials.
D u e to t h e close integration of state interests with those of private capital, co-ordination
between t h e m is the rule rather t h a n the exception. Purely military-strategic interests m a y
sometimes not coincide completely with those of state or private capital, but usually the
latter is 'collecting' the necessary foreign resources for the former through the process of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . T h e s e facts m a k e c o n t r o l o f s u p p l y , f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f r e s t r i c t i n g o r
d i v e r t i n g m i l i t a r y c o n s u m p t i o n , difficult — b o t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l a n d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l .
S o m e such measures of control are presented a n d discussed, ranging from imposing taxes
through regulating t r a d e to supervising a r m a m e n t s industries in t h e arms-producing countries.
1.
Introduction
The militarization of the international system
and the mobilization of support for a new
world order are contending and largely contradicting processes. In this contest, the p r o cess of militarization has been getting the
upper hand. One reason is that the interpenetration between the military and the
political-economic spheres of the international system is highly advanced. D u e to a
strong trend towards internationalization of
the process of interpenetration, it now encompasses the whole global setting.
Obviously, there are many ways of accounting for interpenetration processes. In
the tradition of Leninist imperialism theories, the globalization of the military is a
necessary outgrowth of the internationalization of capital. According to this tradition,
the military system follows the logic of
monopoly capital in its pursuance of profit
world-wide, as an integral part of the profit
strategy, or perhaps more importantly as
its security guarantee. T h e close integration
or subordination of the military with the
economic sphere is, however, recognized not
only in the Leninist tradition. In the words
of the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
O u r current (military) c o m m i t m e n t s to fortyo n e foreign countries are entirely consistent with
a n d reflect o u r d e p e n d e n c e o n f r e e - f l o w i n g i n t e r national trade, and the forward deployment of
our military forces continues to support these imp o r t a n t e c o n o m i c interests. ( B r o w n , 1975)
In the Schumpeterian tradition, at the
other extreme, the military system per se
expands beyond national boundaries into imperialism, waging war as a manifestation of
2
Helge
Hveem
national aggressiveness, contrary to the
interests of capital. Positioned somewhere
between those two poles, a more open-ended
and less unilinear explanation is found, represented by Hobson and Galtung among
others. While accepting a certain inter-penetration of the spheres, this explanation proposes that inter-penetration and internationalization — notably in the form of imperialist behaviour — may originate in any
one of the respective spheres. In other
words, capitalist accumulation and profit
interests do not a priori take pre-eminence
over purely military-strategic interests that
may follow from the logic of warfare under
conditions of modern world-wide military
apparata.
I believe there is much to be said in
favour of the last argument. However,
I propose here to view the question of causal
explanation in a somewhat different perspective. As pointed out in an earlier contribution (Hveem, 1973) the military has
played a decisive role in setting up global
dominance relationships over centuries: in
some periods and/or in certain geographical
areas with seemingly little economic justification, in many others with such justification. To disentangle political-economic
justifications for foreign penetration from
military-strategic ones would seem less relevant when an overall historical perspective
is chosen, a perspective which emphasizes
patterns of evolution at the global level and
over long periods. It may, however, be relevant in a more limited perspective and for
important specific cases. T h e Cold War and
the US national security doctrine with respect to many Latin American countries
would be cases in point.
My assumption is that the causal relationship is complex and that simplistic unilinear
reasoning usually is unsatisfactory. It is not
my intention to deal with the problem exhaustively in this paper, nor to elaborate on
theory. Rather, my purpose is to cover a
particular aspect of the complexity discussed: military penetration of the ecological sphere, or more correctly the military's
expropriation of non-renewable natural resources, and its economic and political
implications. Then I want to discuss what
can be done to limit or stop this form of
expropriation.
2. On the militarization of the world
economy
First, a few assumptions and some hypotheses regarding the causation problem. The
first assumption follows from the interpenetration thesis: the 'world economic
order' and the 'global military order' both
must be analyzed as parts of a system of
dominance on a global scale. This system is
managed through the power of a few units
capable of making authoritative decisions
for the system. They organize other units
according to an imposed value-hierarchy,
in a vertical division of labour and unequal
sharing of wealth, all structured around
world-wide centre-periphery relations. My
second assumption is that the inter-penetration of the military system with the economic, cultural, social, and other 'subsystems' takes place at different levels of
social organization: at the personal level, at
the level of class belongingness through the
co-incidence of particular group interests,
and through the state and the character it
assumes, particularly in the dominant centre(s) of the system.
T h e concepts militarization and militarism
refer to these twin processes: respectively
the tendency for military-strategic interests
and military-industrial apparata to grow
and to take on an increasing scale and influence, expanding globally; and the tendency for these phenomena to manifest themselves in ideas and value systems throughout
society, notably in the political decisionmaking process, and at various levels of
social organization.
T h e state assumes an important and complex role in this context. Besides its operative and integrative role, it also has a legitimizing function. Whereas the state certainly
has no monopoly on the exercise of force,
domestically or abroad, it still claims to be
1
Militarization of Nature
the one institution vested with a legitimate
right to use force. The same goes for those
fields of activity that cover production and
distribution of the instruments of force.
Concretely, this means that international
deals in e. g. weaponry normally have to be
sanctioned by the state, even if private corporate agents — at least under conditions of
capitalism — are the operating force. This
has certain policy implications that will be
dealt with later.
In these capacities, the state seldom acts
as a monolithic institution. It may act out
as the agent of a class, of corporate interest,
of big business as a whole. But it will frequently have to reconcile these with varied
other interests such as those of the military
leadership, diplomatic considerations, of
industrial workers, or even take into account protest movements. Moreover, state
bureaucracies are characterized by internal
cleavages. This is a function of the orchestrating role of the state in a society of contradicting interests where strict dictatorship
or other types of rule by the few is either
not possible or insufficient.
2.1
Some hypotheses
There are several possible explanations of
militarization of the periphery at the international level, many of which reflect these
tendencies of sectoral and state-capital
inter-penetration. These explanatory factors include:
a) The exponentially growing arms p r o duction which is increasingly resource-consuming and which continues unabated by
the economic crisis. It has to expand in
order to sustain the growth and profit rates
of the military industry.
b) The dominant military apparata (i. e.
those of the superpowers), for reasons of
their own strategic and other needs, must
globalize their lines of operation for both
strategic and defensive purposes, through
the establishment of bases, communication
infrastructure, alliance, patrolling of foreign
waters and territory, war-waging assistance,
etc.
2
3
c) Partly opposed to this tendency, partly
as an alternative to it, there is a trend towards de-centralizing war-waging to become
the responsibility of periphery agents, though
there is still a basic dependency on the
dominant centre through arms trade or aid
training and other assistance programmes,
subcontracting of weaponry production, etc.
This tendency may occur for military-strategic reasons, for instance because of technological, organizational or logistical factors, but is as likely to result from political
factors such as mounting opposition to
direct centre involvement in periphery wars,
opposition which may occur both among
allied forces outside the centre as well as
domestically (the popular protest or 'Vietnam effect').
Technological changes have reduced the
need for globalizing centre-based military
apparata — what was referred to under
(b) — to be extended to the periphery,
making war-waging assistance by these apparata more important. T h e main technological changes behind this new trend are
increased speed and the advance of satellite
communication and observation systems.
d) On the other hand, centre 'interventionism' in the periphery may increase, due
to mounting opposition against the dominance relationship from non-allied forces
outside the centre. Such opposition is
directed not only against the centre actor,
but also against its 'bridgehead' agents in
the periphery or semi-periphery; it thus responds to calls from such agents for p r o tection against domestic challenges (the
master-client or 'Latin America' effect).
e) The military becomes a commodity,
entering 'normal' exchange relations between nations. This may be due to one or
several of the following factors:
— t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r e c o n o m i e s of s c a l e in a r m s
p r o d u c t i o n d u e t o h i g h initial R & D o u t l a y s a n d
o t h e r f a c t o r s , cf. ( a ) , l e a d s t o i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c tion b e y o n d domestic requirements in the a r m s p r o d u c i n g n a t i o n . T h e excess p r o d u c t i o n h a s t o
b e offset a b r o a d , t h o r u g h e x p o r t s o r l i c e n s e d s u b contracting production;
— i n c r e a s i n g l y difficult b a l a n c e - o f - p a y m e n t s p r o b -
4
Helge
Hveem
l e m s w i t h a m o u n t i n g deficit i n t h e t r a d e i n n o n m i l i t a r y g o o d s i n p r a c t i c a l l y all a r m s - p r o d u c i n g
countries lead t h e m to maximize use of military
goods exports in order to balance their payments
position;
— in o r d e r to secure vital non-military goods,
particularly t h o s e vital for t h e military sector
itself, m i l i t a r y g o o d s a r e o f f e r e d f o r w h a t m a y
b e b a r t e r d e a l s o r o t h e r tie-in a r r a n g e m e n t s .
3
f) Finally, and related to the factors just
mentioned, production and sales of the instruments of force is a highly oligopolistic
business, both at the level of countries and
at the corporate level, leading to oligopolistic competition at the international level.
(Väyrynen, 1977)
These are some of the most important
push and pull factors in the process of
periphery militarization at the international
level. This paper deals with one particular
aspect of the process — the ways and means
whereby dominant centres may gain access
to supply or resources vital to their military
apparata, and the ways and means of limiting or stopping this tendency as part of arms
control and disarmament measures.
I will first describe the type and extent of
resource consumption by the military. Then
I discuss the question of access to supplies
of natural resources, problems of dependency, and the nature and extent of integration between state and private capital in
securing access. Thirdly I will discuss
various possible ways by which present consumption patterns may be changed by the
dominant centre actors. Some policy implications will be drawn. Finally, I will suggest possible ways by which military consumption may be controlled internationally
or otherwise, for the treble purpose of limiting resource depletion, halting the arms
race, and meeting demands for periphery
development.
3. Consumption of natural resources by the
military
3.1 The data problems
There is a considerable problem in getting
information on military consumption of
natural resources. No systematic data sources
are available even approaching those existing for military production and consumption
of hardware final products. There are relatively complete and accurate data for the
United States and some very few and highly
incomplete data for the other major capitalist
weapon-producing countries. Attempts by
this author to get comparable data for France
proved futile. T h e Soviet Union and China
PR are also blank spots in the data matrix.
Data for dominant centre countries other
than the United States may be inferred from
various other information such as the size
of the national military apparata, arms industry output, aggregate national economic
and industrial statistics, and so on. As my
observations are not necessarily dependent
upon the extent by which global military
consumption of resources can be correctly
assessed, information on the United States
will usually suffice. However, it could be
rather important, not least for the purpose
of proposing policy, to have such data made
available.
T h e term 'military consumption' raises
some methodological problems. It is not
only a matter of consumption by the armed
forces and their equipment, or what may be
called 'direct military consumption'. Three
more categories should be considered: First,
that part of the economy directly related to
the military system; it would consist of the
strategic stockpile, military R & D programmes, that part of industry which is both
devoting much of its productive capacity to
arms production and which also represents
the backbone of the armaments industry in
terms of R & D skills, size, and overall capacity. Secondly, that part of the economy
which is indirectly related to the military
system and which would consist of goods
and services daily consumed by the military
other than the crucial hardware and infrastructure, of essential transport facilities; it
would also consist of the industry which is
supplying the military with marginal equipment and which also produces for the military system only marginally. Thirdly, there
is the support economy, the rest of the
Militarization of Nature
economy in terms of goods, services, and
production facilities essential to the normal
functioning of the nation and vital under
conditions of strain.
Levine and Yabroff (1975) have suggested a simpler way of classifying consumption of natural resources. They define
'direct military consumption' as 'the material
that an industry uses to manufacture the
product it sells to D o D ' . * 'Indirect military
consumption' covers 'the material consumed
by a given industry to manufacture products
that are sold to other industries for input
to the manufacture of products that are in
turn sold to D o D ' .
This and several other sources report data
on military consumption based on extensive
input-output analyses of the US economy.
There is a certain error margin in the data,
but the margin is assumed to be acceptable.
Estimates are also made for E u r o p e and
Japan. USSR consumption may be roughly
assessed from various other sources, but
constitutes a problem. This is even more so
for China.
According to the US Department of D e fense, current US military consumption of
energy, estimated at about 6 % of total US
consumption, will treble in the event of
major war. (Senate Hearings, FY 1978.)
According to the Council on International
Economic Priorities (1974), US consumption of critical materials required for military-related production and services is
generally regarded as between 10 and 20 %
of total US consumption in the event of
war, and half of that 'in peacetime'. West
European consumption is estimated at between 7 and 15 % and about half of that,
respectively. This estimate is arrived at by
assuming that military consumption of
natural resources corresponds to the ratio
of military expenditure to total G N P for
these countries. If the same measure is ap-
* Refers to D e p a r t m e n t of Defense a n d inc l u d e s all m i l i t a r y sales i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e m i l i t a r y g o o d s w h i c h a r e finally e x ported.
5
plied to China, the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact countries, it is reasonable to
assume that Soviet consumption of natural
resources for military purposes lies somewhat below that of the United States but
relatively higher than that of Western
E u r o p e . It is also assumed that the consumption of China and the Eastern E u r o pean countries is relatively lower than that
of Western Europe.
Huisken has estimated that the militaryrelated consumption of natural resources of
the United States, in terms of volume, is
more than half the total world consumption
for military purposes (1975). This obviously
relates to the production level, not the level
of final demand for military hardware, and
included exports. If exports of the final products were deducted, the share in militaryrelated natural resource consumption of
arms-importing countries logically would
increase. This type of input-output analysis,
however, is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
4
5
3.2. Energy
One source estimates direct energy consumption of the US military system worldwide at 2460 trillion Btus in 1971. In that
same year, 'military-related' consumption
(that is the energy consumed by those industries which supply the military system
with goods and services) was 1870 trillion
Btus (Mow & Ives, 1974). This means that
between 4 and 7 % of the total US consumption of energy by industry and by
utilities producing energy, is consumed by
the military sector. By comparison, US
direct military consumption of petroleum
equalled 2/3 of all of Africa's total consumption in 1974. If private and governmental consumption of energy is included in
the total, direct military consumption of
energy accounts for some 3 % of total
energy consumption in the United States
(early 1970s) or 7 % of total consumption
of petroleum (Westing, 1977). If 'direct military' and 'military-related' consumption of
energy are added, they then would probably
6
Helge
Hveem
account for some 7-8 % of total energy use
in the United States.
3.3.
Raw materials
Several studies report on US military-related
consumption of raw materials, especially
non-energy minerals, in great detail. A l though these sources do not always agree
(one example is titanium) they give a fairly
accurate picture of military consumption by
material and end-use (Hughes et al., 1975;
Dresch, 1972; Levine & Yabroff, 1975; US
Congress, Joint Committee on Defense P r o duction, 1975 and 1976). In fact, most of
them base their statistics on US Bureau of
Mines data.
F o r a number of minerals, consumption
by the military in the 1970s turns out to be
far in excess of the 5-10 % figure reported
as average above. F o r individual years, military consumption accounted for more than
40 % of total US consumption of titanium
metal and thallium, more than 30 % of
germanium and thorium, and more than
20 % of garnet, cobalt, and copper. T h e
Vietnam W a r obviously must have increased
consumption, but it seems not to any great
extent.
Hughes et al. (1975) report time-series
data for military consumption of 74 minerals
over the period 1963-1972. I selected 32 of
these for closer scrutiny. They were the
minerals which, relatively speaking, were
most demanded by the military system or
were highly demanded in absolute, though
not as much in relative terms (such as iron),
or both. T h e military's share of US consumption is reported in the Appendix,
Table 1, along with trend data to show
variations in relative demand over time, and
finally
the
most
important
end-use.
Throughout the period, military consumption accounted for more than 20 % of total
US consumption of thallium, germanium,
garnet, and thorium; and between 15 and
20 % of economically important minerals
like cobalt and copper. Military consumption of some important minerals, however,
was in relative decline over the period; this
is true for copper (from 19.3 % share in
1963-66 to 15.5 % in 1969-72), cobalt
(21.8 to 15.5 %, respectively), aluminium
(8.3 to 5.8 % ) , thorium and beryllium.
Minerals that were increasingly consumed
by the military include mica sheet, molybden, mercury, antimony, and germanium.
4.
Security of supplies: the strategic
imperative
Generally speaking, secure access to needed
supplies of energy and raw materials is the
overriding concern of both private capital
and the military. In importance it overshadows the cost concern. This even holds
for the petroleum economy, except perhaps
for a brief period just after 1973, when a
shock wave caught many state and business
leaders and made everybody, from President to consumer, look to prices. What
most of them seemed to have overlooked
was the fact that higher prices can be absorbed by powerful and rich economic units,
particularly able to make up for increasing
outlays by loading the burden on others,
internationally as well as nationally. But as
we shall see later, certain parts of the military system were seriously affected and
thus rightly concerned by increased oil
prices. As far as non-energy minerals are
concerned, technological development and
the increasing emphasis on ever more sophisticated weaponry have lowered the cost of
materials relative to other costs in arms
development and production.
All the major capitalist military powers
are dependent on imports of resources, according to trends of the past few years increasingly so. (For some comparisons, see
Appendix, Table 2(2).) The Soviet Union
and China are not, or only in small measure.
To state leaders and strategists, the fact
that the discrepancy in national self-sufficiency follows ideological divisions gives
reason for concern. But how serious is the
threat really?
Militarization of Nature
by maintaining imperialist supply lines
globally.
Let us start with the worst assumption:
that of a very high vulnerability. It is
estimated that a 5 to 10 % shortage of
energy could have 'large effects' on the US
economy. (Levine &Yabroff, p. 79.) Energy
is the most critical resource in this respect.
Material resources shortages are somewhat
less dramatic in their impact on the economy, but a 15 to 30 % cut in the supply
of a dozen of the 32 materials referred to
above could have serious effects on the economy and create stagnation or reduced production. (See Fig. 1.) Those materials most
likely to reduce G N P under shortage conditions are, in decreasing order of impact,
non-metallic titanium, platinum, cobalt, tin,
chromium, aluminium, copper, silver, nickel
and tungsten. F o r instance, a 20 % aluminium shortage would mean about 3 % reduction in US G N P . (Levine & Yabroff, p. 9.)
4 . 1 . Vulnerability
In order to approach the question, we may
adopt a distinction suggested by Keohane &
Nye (1977). An economy is sensitive to the
extent it is open to costly effects imposed
from outside before policies can be introduced to change the situation. One measure
of sensitivity would be import dependency,
or the percentage of consumption that has
to be imported. An economy, on the other
hand, is vulnerable to the extent it can suffer costs imposed by external actors even
after policies to change the situation have
been introduced.
Both aspects of dependency are reflected
in the Appendix, Tables 2(2) and 3. F o r a
realistic appreciation of the problem, however, we need to go much further than the
Keohane-Nye concept of 'vulnerability dependency'. They mostly treat the problem in
terms of domestic policies, such as substitution, increased recycling, stocking, and increased domestic production. All of these
are relevant measures. What is overlooked
is the potential for controlling against vulnerability through internationalization and
Stockpiling. This would be a dramatic
situation if no measures could be taken
immediately to cover the shortage presum-
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Fig.I: Effect! of Energy and Materi_l Sbortages on (U.S.) GNP.
Source: Levine & Y_broff.
45
Gas
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8
Helge
Hveem
ably resulting from an embargo on supplies
by exporting countries. A look at the US
government stockpile balance, however,
shows that there is such 'instant defence'
against
vulnerability.
Stockpiles
cover
months and years of national consumption.
Only in the case of cobalt and possibly
nickel does there seem to be reason for concern. A n d if government and industry stocks
are collapsed, the reason for concern is even
further reduced. Import dependency is
practically 100 % for such vital minerals as
manganese, tin, chromium, and tungsten,
but stockpiles may sustain consumption of
up to several years under conditions of no
major war, and may be around one or oneand-a half years under conditions of a major
war. (Cf. App., Table 2(2))
T h e situation is probably considerably
less favourable for other key N A T O countries and Japan. (Japan Economic Council,
1970). Thus, policies of stockpiling materials have been stressed in several countries
and may in fact have resulted in decreased
vulnerability. But vulnerability for the whole
N A T O area still is considerable on this
score and is reason for concern in military
circles (Broekmeijer, 1963; Zeiner-Gundersen, 1978). In a study of N A T O dependency
on strategic raw materials, commissioned
by the US A r m y Command, Kevitz proposes
a N A T O stockpile of such materials (1975).
He recommenels either a common stockpile run by N A T O centrally, or nationallyheld stocks according to quantities and time
for fulfilment to be jointly decided upon.
T h e second option, which because it is more
realistic also seems to be the favoured one,
would be to create institutions similar to the
International Energy Agency (IEA) for
non-oil minerals and other raw materials.
T h e N A T O Charter provides, in its A r ticle 3, for collective measures to secure
supplies of strategic materials for military
but not for overall economic purposes. This
limitation seems to have been put aside in
the newly created Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). T h e
committee is sponsoring efforts for joint
programmes in energy and raw materials.
T h e situation in the Warsaw Pact in this
regard is not known, but as the Soviet
Union guarantees supplies of natural resources within the Pact, it can be assumed
that she keeps these supplies under strict
control.
4.2.
Imperial (external) measures
Stocking is the most readily available defence against vulnerability. As regards the
external, international setting, there are
basically four possible main lines of action:
(a) to rely on internationalization, through
operations of transnational corporations, to
provide sufficient quantities of and acceptable prices for raw materials;
(b) unilateral or multilateral action by the
centre economy state, through diplomacy,
aid or trade policies etc. with the aim of
securing supplies from abroad;
(c) to establish and maintain protectorates
abroad by taking direct or indirect control
over supply areas and sea routes so that
supplies can be safely counted upon;
(d) establish international regimes whereby
regular supply of materials is guaranteed by
mutual agreement or through international
law.
Multilateral regimes are insufficient. Option (d) is the Havana Charter and the
G A T T model which is, in a somewhat new
structure, also what U N C T A D negotiations
are about. T h e G A T T regime, according to
Article X I , prohibits imposition of export
control except in cases where there is an
international agreement, where national
security interests are at stake, where the
purpose is to assist domestic price-control
programmes, or to prevent a critical shortage of foodstuffs or other products essential
to the exporting country. The Atlantic
Charter is the basis for the post-war 'free
trade' regime in stating, in its Title IV, that
a major goals is 'access on equal terms to
the trade and the raw materials of the world'
for all countries.
T h e main intention of the United States
and other centre economies was to open up
Militarization of Nature
markets. After 1973, there has been an increasing emphasis on open access to supplies of resources. Thus, the US Congress
introduced an amendment to the trade bill
that resulted in the T r a d e Reform Act of
1974. The act instructs the US government
to enter into agreements with foreign countries to assure supplies of essential articles at
reasonable prices and to include rules
against denial of equitable access to supplies of materials. T h e President is also
given wide authority to retaliate in case
agreements are violated. (Hultman, 1976)
The US government thus has introduced a
system of sanctions unilaterally.
On military-business relations.
From a
strategic-military point of view, a regime
such as G A T T is not a sufficient guarantee
of access to supplies. A guarantee can be
obtained only through options (b) or (c);
but for practical organizational purposes,
either option would have to be combined
with one of the others. Again, from a
strategic-military point of view, option (a)
is the preferred one among these, but (d)
could be tolerated in the event that option
(a) might no longer be sufficient or realistic
— e. g. because of nationalizations of corporate interests in the periphery supply
area.
It should be kept in mind that the statemilitary establishment for some time after
1973 was making complaints about the oil
companies concerning what they considered
unfair pricing of products which the military required. (US Congress, 1975.) T h e
administration vs companies quarrel over
company compliance with A r a b governments also indicates that the state-business
relationship is not always an eye-to-eye
matter when it comes to foreign policy. Still,
state and military interests generally coordinate with private capital and let the corporations collect the required resources with
their support.
The case of energy illustrates this well.
Three-fourths of US military consumption
falls on petroleum. F o r the Navy, which accounts for 1/3 of all US military energy
9
consumption, reliance on petroleum is 86 %.
In 1976, the Navy procured close to 40 %
of all its petroleum from foreign sources;
in the Pacific and in E u r o p e almost all from
foreign sources. US oil companies handled
these procurements. (US Congress, 1977.)
T h e same holds for the Air Force and the
Army. If procurement of jet fuel is a valid
indicator for energy supplies to the military
and in general, there is a high degree of
concentration. Exxon alone supplies 30 %
of all U S A F jet fuel consumption, with
Socal (12 % ) , Mobil (10.5 %) and Phillips
(8.6 %) following next. Seven companies
supply 80.5 % of all the jet fuel consumed
by U S A F . (US Congress, 1975 II)
6
The 'protectorate' strategy: the need for
being tough. Option (c) is both a more permanent and tougher measure than option
(b). T h e former is exemplified by French
relations to a number of African neocolonies such as Gabon, Niger, and the Central African Republic (N'Dongo, 1972) all
of which are rich in some strategic mineral.
And it is exemplified by Soviet policy t o wards Eastern E u r o p e (Stehr, 1977, and
Galtung, 1976) and US policy towards a
great number of countries. In these relations, there is a range of ties that link the
periphery to the centre in subordination.
These links may be intercepted by third
parties, but there is little probability that
they will be broken by the periphery part,
or be allowed to be broken by the centre.
One obvious form of interference is direct
military intervention in the territory concerned; another form is interference with
land or sea routes over which mineral supplies travel. T h e former is still a possibility,
but may seem less likely in the form of
direct, open intervention. There may, however, have been elements of this in the
French operation, M a y 1978, in Shaba, so
vital for copper and cobalt supplies to
Western Europe. M o r e likely now is indirect
great power support through providing experts and arms and by other forms of behind-the-scene support. Or by using a bellicus vicarius: the military forces of a client
10
Helge
Hveem
country. T h e Soviet-Cuban and the proposed NATO-protectorate African military
force are cases in point.
Interference with extended sea routes has
been pointed out as a major concern in military and political circles. Supplies to
Western E u r o p e and Japan are considered
particularly vulnerable. (Wu, 1975) Here,
the global strategy of US and Soviet military systems, in particular the deployment
of important naval units in the Pacific, the
Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean, has a geo-political reason.
Option (b) is to be regarded as a softer
line of action with respect to the means
employed to secure supplies. Economic aid
has been used extensively for the purpose,
as has food aid under PL 480 (Wallensteen,
1976). T h e link to trade policies is close.
Over the years, delivery of food has been
linked to supply of some mineral(s) or
other goods in return. T h e link to trade
packages, however, may have gone much
further. Thus, big deals between major
arms-exporting
and
resource-exporting
countries over the last few years have probably reduced considerably whatever element
of vulnerability there might have been in
those inter-state relationships concerned.
Particularly noticable are the French-Saudi
and the West German-Brazilian trade agreements involving nuclear reactors, plutonium
technology, jet fighters for oil and other
minerals. Include South Africa and Iran,
and the big dealers of the periphery have
been mentioned. These are the semi-peripheries, the aspiring sub-emperors or regional
hegemonial powers in the periphery.
In some cases, there are several countries
involved in these tie-in arrangements, directly
or indirectly. As an example, Iran and
South Africa both import nuclear technology from France and West Germany,
supply in return oil and uranium, respectively, but the two sub-emperors also exchange these minerals between themselves.
In most cases, such tying-in seems to be
more indirect and informal than direct.
Also, there are strong elements of competi-
tion. T h e strong resource position of a
country like Saudi Arabia sometimes gives
an image of the world turned upside down:
A country of the periphery, previously subordinated to the feudalism of the global
centre-periphery system where peripheries
compete for a market in the centre which
in turn plays split-and-rule tactics against
the periphery, suddenly finds itself in a position to play on fierce competition between
centre actors over its resources.
A new 'First World'? This scenario, however, should not be carried too far. The
sub-emperors are still dependent and can
be controlled. Also, the centres or the emperors are still able to control their competition from escalating into a conflict
reaching unmanageable levels. The fragility
of the old hegemonial order and the need
for coping with mutations have, however,
led to strategic rethinking in some important circles.
In N A T O circles, there seems to be increasing pressure to engage N A T O forces
militarily and permanently in vital supply
areas, notably the Persian Gulf - Atlantic
and the Indian Ocean routes. (Zeiner-Gundersen, 1978.) The argument is that increasing Soviet naval presence in these waters represents a threat to N A T O supplies of vital
materials and energy. This w o u l d — d e facto
if not formally — mean a joint military
venture with South Africa, eventually even
Saudi Arabia.
A second option that has been put forth
is a retreat to a continental 'Fortress
America'. It would be based on the rich
resources both in the North and the South,
including the continental shelf, and be
defended by US military power (Ott, 1975).
This proposal, put forth in National Defense,
breaks with the belief in an inter-continental imperial necessity advocated by state
and military leaders (cf above), but only
partially since it falls back on a deepening
of the M o n r o e Doctrine. T h e main argument is that a continental supply area is
easier to defend than supply lines involving
extra-continental areas.
Militarization
A third proposal is more in line with both
the official doctrine and the imperial-subimperial system described above. It advocates the formation of a new 'First World'
grouping which would consist of the strong
industrial power-houses of the old First
World (United States and West Germany
plus Japan), nations that combine some industrial power with natural resource abundance (Canada, Australia, Brazil, South
Africa), and finally resource-rich but nonindustrialized countries that will be vital for
filling the energy equation (Saudi Arabi and
Iran) (Harrigan, 1976). Its formation would
require building-up strong global military
systems 'capable of assuring the flow of
strategic materials and preventing Communist intimidation of resource areas.'
(ibid.) As the resource problem develops,
the primary task of the military apparatus
'after physical defense of the homeland will
be to support access to needed resources
against constraints, interruptions, or denials,
whether imposed by military force, by
governmental actions, or by economic effects' (Lee, 1974).
Evidence as to whether such a new First
World is developing is as yet unsystematic.
There has been a remarkable increase in the
relative share of arms purchases from centre
suppliers by especially Iran and Saudi
Arabia, and a noticeable increase in the size
and number of trade arrangements related to
arms transfers.
(SIPRI Yearbook, 1978)
Most new investments by centre corporations and state bureaus in mineral exploration and exploitation take place within the
New First World, particularly in Australia,
Canada, Brazil and South Africa or South
Africa-dominated regions (Namibia and
Botswana). Saudi Arabia's new role as a
world bankier has led it into the inner circles
of the monetary system. And Iran's industrial potential has given that country a
special treatment by centre corporations, viz
the shares in the Krupp concern, in E u r o dif, and in North Sea explorations. The
political upheavals in Iran do not seem to
have broken this pattern, but they may o b -
of
Nature
11
viously change the picture as far as that
country is concerned.
These scenarios and policy proposals reflect widespread thinking in US industrial
and military circles. Yet they may be too
much coloured by over-reactions on the
1973 'oil crisis' in these same circles. T h e
question therefore is whether developments
actually indicate that one or the other of
the new 'vertical ordering' of the world is
underway. If so, it would run contrary to
attempts to create a New International E c o nomic Order. It would also eventually mean
increased conflict and possibly the breakdown of old orders like the N A T O alliance.
Both the proposals mentioned are aimed
at securing unrestricted supply of vital resources in 'outreach' control schemes under
US hegemony. T h e second option, however,
is clearly the most outreaching one; it is
also most in line with current trends in
international diplomatic relations and with
the process of internationalization. South
Africa's natural resources give the country
a strong protective shield against the demand on Western great powers for economic and military sanctions against the
apartheid regime. As yet, there is little evidence that this protection is becoming inefficient. On the contrary, it is more likely
that the Shaba incidences, the mounting
African pressure on the apartheid regimes,
and the failure of the counter-revolutionary
campaign against M P L A in Angola make
not only South Africa, but the whole of
Southern Africa, more vital to Western interests.
We pointed out above that platinum, cobalt, and chromium were among the most
critical materials because they represent the
highest level of vulnerability. These are also
materials which the Western economies get
primarily from Southern Africa. F o r cobalt,
chromium, manganese, platinum, copper,
and, in a different way, for gold, uranium,
and diamonds, these economies are vulnerable to drastic changes in the political regime in Southern Africa.
T h e vulnerability of Western countries is
12
Helge
Hveem
even better reflected when one realizes that
the major alternate supplier to the West of
platinum, chromium, titanium, industrial
diamonds, and a few other strategic minerals
is the Soviet Union. O n e fourth of chromium
and titanium and almost half the platinum
consumption of the United States was in
1972 covered by imports from the Soviet
Union. T h e same more or less holds for
Western Europe. (Council on International
Economic Policy, 1974)
A revised 'vulnerability' concept.
Geopolitics is important, but should not be
overestimated. T h e percentage of consumption imported is but one indicator of externally-caused vulnerability. Another is the
reliability of the supply sources. This reliability is a function of geography, of political-ideological factors, and of the probability that the supply area may be taken over
by antagonists. Conflict over sources of
strategic minerals is a matter not only of
Soviet-US confrontations, but of fierce competition within the capitalist camp as well.
(Marshall, 1973; North & Choucri, 1974)
A revised typology of vulnerability dependence may thus be introduced:
( 1 ) Highly vulnerable supplies a r e t h o s e w h i c h
either come from a strong cartel controlling a
decisive share of e c o n o m i c a n d available resources
a n d w h i c h i s less l i k e l y t o g i v e i n t o p r e s s u r e ,
threats of retaliation etc.; or w h i c h a r e t r a n s p o r t e d
over long sea routes susceptible of being interfered with by antagonists, against which retaliation is n o t automatically feasible; or both. T h e
O P E C e m b a r g o is a case in point.
( 2 ) Relatively
vulnerable supplies
are resources
w h i c h a r e less s u b j e c t t o t h e s e a n d s i m i l a r f a c t o r s ,
a n d for which there are better options for avoiding rupture of supplies. S h a b a copper a n d cobalt
are examples.
( 3 ) Relatively
secure supplies w o u l d be t h o s e
c o m i n g typically from sources which are politically close, b u t at s o m e geographical distance
f r o m t h e i m p o r t i n g u n i t a n d less l i k e l y t o b e e x posed to threats of third party intervention. Examples would be Australian bauxite to North
America.
( 4 ) Secure supplies w o u l d b e t h o s e i m p o r t e d
from politically a n d geographically close areas,
e x a m p l i f i e d by C a n a d a vis a vis t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
I have made a rough estimate of what
may be termed 'critical import dependency'
again mainly using US data for the period
1973-75. In doing so, categories (1) and
(2), (3) and (4) were collapsed, respectively,
into two broad categories. In most cases,
'critical' imports are imports from the Third
World and from Socialist countries. This is
clearly an over-simplification of the distinction between critical and non-critical imports: many Third World countries presently are well-guarded protectorates. The
right term would rather be potentially critical imports. T h e results are presented in
the Appendix, Table 2(2). Particularly 'critical' minerals — bearing in mind the qualifications just made — are in order of import
dependency and for the United States:
mica sheet (97 % from potentially critical
areas), graphite, tin, columbium, bauxitealumina, fluorine, chromium, and cobalt.
Increasing nationalism in the Third
World, increasing exposure of sea transports
of vital materials to third party presence —
and I repeat that the two factors are not a
priori related — would tend to move the
supply situation from category (4) towards
category (1). T h e internationalization process no longer guarantees supplies in these
cases. Some Caribbean countries (bauxite),
certain O P E C countries and Southern
Africa are areas where decreasing centre
reliance on secure supplies is the dominant
trend. Here, various measures such as reduced production (bauxite in Jamaica), the
tying-in strategy (OPEC), and political and
para-military intervention (Southern Africa)
are being adopted and/or considered. Also,
geographical diversification from less to
more secure supply areas is actively being
sought by corporations and governments
(Hveem, 1977).
It also should be kept in mind that some
of the minerals concerned are highly monopolized. This is true for nickel (INCO), platinum (Rustenburg), diamonds (de Beers),
zirconium (Wah Chang), and aluminium
(the cartel of Six). If the production and
first-level transformation are nationalized,
Militarization of Nature
monopolistic control over the market outlets still may make the difference and eventually make aggressive nationalizers bow
after some time. (Hveem, 1977; Helleiner,
1978.) An indication that monopolistic
internationalization still is a means to power
is the fact that the Soviet Union sells much
of its diamonds through a sales affiliate of
de Beers, South Africa. (Business Week,
9 May, 1977)
4.3. Domestic measures
A country with a strong reserve base in
crucial minerals may be faced with three
obstacles to supply security: time, technology, and commercial viability of production. As noted above, time and technology
may be more important than costs. Ecological considerations may represent another
obstacle, because these make it difficult to
expand domestic production where important ecological interests with considerable
popular support are threatened. Increased
domestic production nevertheless is a goal.
Time and technology are obviously
linked. The potential for manipulating with
these factors lies chiefly in substitution, recycling, and reduced absolute consumption
through saving. Stockpiling as a measure
against vulnerability dependency has already
been mentioned. All the other measures
mentioned are also being re-emphasized, not
least by military-strategic planners. Let us
therefore deal with each of them, assessing
the potential for reduced vulnerability which
they represent. Also, the inter-relationship
of these factors must be kept in mind. Often,
increased domestic production lies in substitutability at the level of industrial processes and products.
Substitution. This combined strategy of
substitution and increased domestic production to attain greater self-sufficiency comes
out both in the field of energy and in that
of materials. In energy, military-sponsored
research on alternative energy sources is
now being intensified. T h e goal is to cut
petroleum consumption by developing synthetic fuel that will become commercial be-
13
fore 1985, first based on shale oil, later on
coal and tar sands. Compared to the Soviet
Union, the United States is extremely well
endowed with these energy sources. (US
Congress, 1977)
Successful experiments have already taken
place. Thus, the US destroyer USS Johnston
was operated for 24 hours on coal liquids
in November, 1973. Successful coast-tocoast jet flights have also been carried
through on synthetic fuel. (Ibid.) T h e goal
is to reduce military consumption of energy
by 40-50 % by 1985 through savings of
various forms. (Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 8 Sept. 1975, p. 23) As indicated above, energy costs have been worrying military and state leaders as fuels for the
military services quadrupled in price from
1974 to 1976. (AW & ST, 26 Jan. 1976)
In materials, much the same pattern is
seen. However, material consumption as a
share of total financial outlays, globally and
per unit, may be on the decline due to technological innovation, an increased relative
share of electronical equipment, etc. T h e
US Air Force is emphasizing the use of
composite materials as a substitute for traditional single-metal materials, saving weight
and costs by about 25 %. (AW & ST, 26
Jan. 1976) The A r m y is emphasizing use of
the more abundant metals such as silicon,
magnesium, aluminium; while the new materials from the viewpoint of aircraft corporations are boron and graphite, also among the
most aboundant materials in the earth's crust.
Graphite-epoxy, developed by Alcoa in cooperation with the major aircraft producers,
is said to be the material of the 1980s. It is
weight-saving and will make structures last
longer. It has the further strategic advantage
of not reflecting as much under radar surveillance as aluminium and steel alloys do.
On the negative side is the fact that the
United States is highly dependent on imports of graphite. T h e US could, however,
improve self-sufficiency and/or get relatively
secure supplies from neighbouring Mexico.
Composite structures are being tested or
already being flown in the General Dy-
14
Helge
Hveem
namics F-16, McDonnell/Northrop F-18,
Rockwell's B - l bomber, and other aircraft.
Metals will continue to play a major role,
in that the composite aircraft will contain
30 % or more metal by weight because of
temperature and curvature limitations of
composites. T h e search is no longer for new
alloys, as in the past, but for improving the
properties of existing alloys. (Ibid., pp. 4 4 45.) To the extent this prediction also is
valid for the Army and the Navy, where
metals seem b o u n d to play a larger role
compared to non-metal materials, and compared to the Air Force, we may conclude
that strategic minerals have a somewhat reduced but secure future position in the
armaments industry.
Substitutability of materials is referred to
as an important trump card for corporations
that handle the technology and have access
to many materials and sources. This is often
an exaggeration. Modern industrial processes are rigid, because much capital has been
invested in them. They are technically
complicated, and considerable time and
capital is needed if changes are to be made.
Nickel is used in more than 300 alloys;
manganese still is absolutely necessary for
steel fabrication; and cobalt, wolfram, and
a number of other materials are not readily
substitutable even in the medium-term perspective. A N A T O study has estimated the
percentage of the most strategic materials
which cannot be readily substituted (and
which therefore are indispensable both for
the civilian and the military sector) at between 30 and 40 % on the average. ( N A T O ,
1976) In another study by US researchers,
the materials' substitutability is evaluated
from the point of view of civilian economic
usage. (Hughes et al.) T h e two studies differ
considerably in their assessment of substitution possibilities, cf. Fig. 2 and Appendix,
Table 3. There is agreement, however, that
platinum, cobalt, and copper — to a lesser
degree silver — are quite indispensable
materials. This further stresses the geopolitical importance of Southern Africa.
Recycling. Recycling requires a political
will to promote it and economic incentives
to invest in it. These motives are not always
present. Thus, there has been a stagnation
or decrease in the share of recycled material
in national consumption over the last decade, according to information on the United
States (Mighdoll & Weisse, 1976).
Yet, the potential is there. Data on actual
recycling rates are available for some materials for the United States, France, and West
Germany. Three different data sources show
considerable discrepancies in their estimates
of actual and potential recycling. Hence, it is
not possible to draw a clear picture of the
situation and the potential. T h e information
presented is only indicative.
In a N A T O study, theoretical recycling
levels of indispensible materials have been
estimated, cf. Fig. 2. The study stresses that
these are rough estimates that cover great
variations among N A T O countries and are
made with considerable uncertainty. Comparison with figures given in App. Table 3
and with those presented in another study
(Hveem, 1977) underlines this. F o r several
alloy metals, recycling is dependent on recycling of steel. One military source believes
that there is great potential for steel recycling, especially in the military sector. In
practice, however, recycling does not seem
a major weapon for import-dependent economies. Becoming one would probably require considerable state intervention. Private
capital would have important vested interests
in the present structure which gives primacy
to raw materials processing, and would thus
not be inclined to escalate recycling.
Saving through conservation and changed
design. Around 7/10 of the metals mined
each year are lost. At this rate, less than
0.001 % remains after ten use cycles. At
present growth rates of metal consumption,
recycling at current levels extends the life
of the resources by less than 10 years. If
recycling became twice as effective as at
present, this would extend the life of resources by another 10 years. If, however,
growth of consumption were reduced to
Militarization of Nature
100 %
~
80 %
.---
60 $I
40 %
20 %
.----
e-
ff-
r-
l.-
-
I.-
I.-
-
f--
o%
f-
r-
f--
f-
Ag Cd Co Cu Hg Pb PI Sb So \V Zo
E
~
u
>
"
~
~
;;
.D
u
0.
0.
~
"uu
~
'"
•0
~
"
•.~ ,5
'".:l 0:: ~ ~ ~~0 N•u
E
'"'" a 8 8 ::!1
Essential
(indispensable)
~
Fig. 2.
and theoretical rates of recycling
total consumption
(NATO area)
use of materials
as percentage of
Shaded area = fraction
recyclable.
The results are subject to much uncertainty and
argument. Not only is there considerable variation
between counrties but also the criteria for essential
use are open to dispute depending on vested interests. Furthermore, substituting for one metal may
throw an added burden on another. Nevertheless
they indicate the broad scale of possible improvements.
Source: Rational Use of potentially scare
Report of a N A T O Science C o m m i t t e e
Group, Brussels, 1976, p. 30.
metals.
Study
0.5 % per year, the life of the resource base
— given present recycling rates -— would
be extended by over 100 years. ( N A T O ,
1976)
This shows the crucial impact that saving
on absolute consumption would have. A
similar impact could be obtained in energy,
where waste through losses is another major
problem besides high absolute demand. R e duced weight, changed design, and more
efficient use of a given volume of a mineral
are all theoretically possible. T h e official
goal of the Pentagon as regards energy was
formulated recently. Primary conservation
measures would be to
(a)
develop
and
implement
operational
15
practices that will eliminate losses now incurred without losing effectiveness; and
(b) develop new propulsion and auxiliary
machinery technology with higher basic efficiency expectations than the present
system. (US Congress, 1977)
Considerably increased funds are now
being made available for R & D efforts in
these fields. T h e same holds for non-energy
minerals. According to a N A T O study,
chances for materials conservation should
be better for state and military applications
than for private consumer ones, because the
former puts more emphasis on performance
and prestige, less on costs, thus facilitating
conservation through improved design. This
assumption does not seem totally convincing. But it may be true, as the study assumes, that designers and engineers hold
the key to the problem of resource conservation, because they make the first and thus
vital decision on products. Military R & D
institutions may play a marginally positive
role in this respect to the extent their innovations offer civilian spin-offs. However,
great leaps forward cannot be expected.
Moreover, a continued arms race with ever
shorter life-cycles for new weaponry — even
if it stresses quality over quantity of arms —
will mean continued growth of absolute consumption that may make up for any savings
per unit.
4.4.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper I have illustrated and analyzed
military appropriation of natural resources
as an important part of the process of world
militarization. This appropriation follows
the logic of the internationalization of capital, which is both the main instrument by
which resources are made available and at
the same time a force necessitating and demanding the support of the state through its
military apparatus. Although there are
clearly elements of conflict in the relationship between state and private capital —
with the military even at times acting as a
pressure group on its own — the relationship is basically one of co-ordination and
16
Helge
Hveem
integration. I assume that this is particularly
true in times and areas of crisis or perceived
threat against targets of common interests.
Access to and control over energy and raw
materials is such a target.
Various propositions on possible reasons
for the increasing militarization of global
centre-periphery relations are set forth. Only
a few of these are explored here. In particular, the link between the internationalization of capital and various forms of trade,
aid and interventionist policies by the state
has been pointed out. Conflict over resources
is assumed to be on the increase along
nation-state divisions. However, Cold War
type interpretations of e. g. conflicts in
Southern Africa are much exaggerated.
International regimes based on multilateral agreements between governments are
insufficient as a guarantee of access, particularly from the viewpoint of the military.
Tougher measures by the state, bilaterally
or multilaterally through alliance formations, are necessary; these may supplement,
not rule out, international regimes. Here,
certain measures seem favoured over others,
like advanced military patrolling of extended sea routes and overseas areas,
packaging of strategic minerals to delivery
of other goods and services, military goods
and services assuming a more and more
important role.
Such trends go counter to efforts for a
N I E O . Insofar as the 'New First World'
consisting of the dominant centre economies
and resource-rich periphery 'subemperors' is
becoming a reality, the N I E O is undermined. To the same extent, new dimensions
of conflict arise; other periphery countries
follow a policy of resource nationalism, and
they bargain with the centre — two of the
main elements in the claim for a N I E O .
These are not new trends: periphery disunity
is as old as imperialism and its divide-andrule tactics. But the realization of subsystems of secure resource supplies involving important parts of the periphery will
inevitably weaken the potential bargaining
power of periphery raw material exporters
working together in producer associations.
Such a potential is there for bauxite, which
by US military research institutions is ranked
as the single most vulnerable strategic
mineral for the United States. To a lesser
extent the potential also exists for tin, iron
ore, copper and some of the economically
less important but industrially vital minerals.
(Hveem, 1977.)
Weighing external vs domestic measures
to reduce vulnerability against each other,
the best solution would be self-sufficiency.
This is largely unrealistic. An optimal solution would be to strengthen the imperial
grip on foreign resources while preparing
better against potential counter-action by
taking domestic measures. This would gain
time and would maintain the interests of
capital abroad, while making it possible to
maintain global military interests in the
name of the 'freedom of the seas', the 'free
flow of goods', etc. A less than optimal
strategy would be to rely even more on imperial supplies: this might be politically possible because of a break-down of periphery
unity and because there will be periphery
regimes willing to play the centre's game.
Indeed, it may be politically and economically necessary because increased selfsufficiency may prove ecologically unfeasible
and economically too costly, at least from
the viewpoint of private capital.
This picture may vary from one mineral to another and from one country or
region to another. But the closer co-ordination of state and business interests in dealing with foreign economic policy proposed
here makes the sub-optimal solution realistic, at least as an option for the 1980s.
A major shift to relying on domestic measures could be possible only after a series of
state interventions and technological breakthroughs. These are possible but seem less
likely in that period.
5. Implications for peace policies: diversion
and disarmament
I have emphasized the strong current tendency to protect privileged access to natural
Militarization of Nature
resources under the assumption of unlimited growth of the military apparatus and
its international spread. In major capitalist
countries, the relative autharky of the Soviet
Union and China is in fact used as an argument in favour of such a tendency. The
arms race thus has a direct impact on the
depletion rate of the world's resources,
particularly resources located in Third
World areas. This assumes particular importance as it become clear that the consumption of natural resources for military
purposes is even more concentrated in the
main military powers than is resource consumption generally.
From the above conclusions it follows
that policies aiming to increase chances for
peace must work from two angles. They
must reduce or restrict ecologically and
economically
unjust
appropriation
of
natural resources and redress unequal o p portunities for growth and development in
the present global dominance system. They
must also improve chances for disarmament
and arms control, thereby diverting resources, in a wide sense, to more justified
political and social aims. Although these
two goals are aspects of the same problem,
they may be attacked independently, in
various ways, and at various levels of social
organization. In fact, successful implementation of military resource conservation
programmes like those described above
would help achieve the first-mentioned goal:
but its explicit purpose would be to preserve
the military system and the arms race, rather
than halt it.
Military systems are abnormal institutions. Ideally, their purpose is to guarantee
personal security through national and/or
international defence arrangements. T h e
organization and scale of the modern military apparata are far out of proportion to
this purpose: they threaten, not guarantee,
personal and collective security. There is
thus a great need for a thorough discussion
of how much is enough: how much resource
utilization is necessary, at the basic level,
for guaranteeing security. This question
17
would not only necessitate a discussion of
the security concept. It would change perspectives radically and provide a priority
ranking of resource utilization: first comes
basic needs satisfaction; then the social and
physical organization necessary to provide
such satisfatcion, including if necessary military defence institutions; finally and lastly
comes additional (luxury) needs satisfaction.
At the extreme end of the continuum is resource utilization which is socially and ecologically destructive in character and consequence.
Quantitative restrictions on and political
and economic costs of resource utilization
should be progressively increased according
to such a continuum of end-uses, from basic
needs satisfaction, to use for destructive
purposes. One might also discriminate between various military end uses. T h e main
point 'however' is diversion from military to
civilian purposes according to a priority
ranking which starts from the necessity of
development with the fulfilment of basic
needs and other human rights.
T h e world as it is is a system with a tremendous over-capacity for self-destruction.
Do moderate restriction schemes make
sense in such a situation? Does it really
make any difference? T h e huge stockpiles of
arms and strategic materials to be used for
arms production call for radical measures
not marginal ones. Yet, it may be feasible
to start with the first steps. What follow are
some initial suggestions in that spirit.
5.1.
International measures
The principle of equal access set down in
the Atlantic Charter was non-interference
with the self-determination of nations. It
was implied that equality of access was not
valid in the case of aggressors (prohibiting
the rearmament of the Axis powers) or, in
general, arms build-up beyond that necessary for legitimate defence purposes. O b viously, these principles have been flagrantly violated. Nor were the 'mineral sanctions' advocated by the League of Nations
and others ever carried out. (Eckel, Lathe,
18
Helge
Hveem
& Cook, 1935.) Mineral sanctions that have
really worked are those enforced unilaterally
by great powers, such as the sanctions imposed by the United States against the Soviet
bloc during the Cold War. T h e O P E C embargo was rather ineffective in comparison,
as were also the Rhodesia sanctions.
Concrete questions which arise include:
— Since the arms race or the overall relationship between the superpowers is the
force moteur of the spiralling military consumption of natural resources, does a balanced arms reduction scheme also require
special guarantees to the US and N A T O
for access to materials in which they are less
self-sufficient or deficient? Whether the US
gets its deficit covered by imperialist or
voluntarist means, or is deliberately playing
on continued imports to spare own available
resources, it can argue from an status quo
position.
— What are the implications of such an
access guarantee for N I E O demands like
the quest for national self-determination
over resources? Disregarding the possibility
that they can be reconciled bilaterally —
which would be contrary to the purpose of
an international agreement — is reconciliation of the two possible?
— In a highly integrated and internationalized system such as the present international
system and the military-industrial network
within the major powers, which control
measures are feasible and at the same time
effective?
— Considering the increasing role of technological innovations in weaponry and their
implications for material usage, can international measures be devised which control
for rapid changes in military demand for
materials, due to substitution and other
domestically
developed
and
controlled
measures?
Periphery 'opecizatiori"? Political
decolonization and later the claim for selfdetermination over national resources of
decolonized areas have to be in contradiction
to the strategic need of major military
powers to control these resources as closely
as possible. (I am here referring to real selfdetermination, not more or less neo-colonial
forms of 'economic nationalism'.) That this
is a sensitive area is clear from the fact that
'cartellization' of uranium by Third World
countries exporting this highly strategic resource has been characterized as politically
'too aggressive' by one Third World representative who otherwise greately favoured
such action in other raw materials.
7
There are strong political barriers and
disincentives to 'opecization' of periphery
resources. However, chances in bauxite and
a few other minerals (cf. above) do exist.
This does not necessarily mean that the
periphery will for economic reasons be disinclined to participate in measures aimed at
restricting military consumption of natural
resources, although there may be some
reasons to believe so (Leitenberg, 1976).
Reduced demand due to restrictive measures can be compensated for partly by increased civilian consumption made possible
by diversion of funds from military to civilian production (UN, 1972), and partly by
higher prices. What this means, however, is
that under present conditions the Third
World will see few incentives in policing a
restriction scheme on and by its own, nor
will the major powers be willing to tolerate
such policing. With present highly uneven
distribution of power internationally, the
sole chance seems to lie in some multilaterally agreed upon and directed control
scheme.
Multilateral schemes.
In their classical
study of the problem of resource control,
Leith, Furness, and Lewis developed a
radical approach in the form of an ambitious
control scheme (1943).
Their premises were inter alia that
— t h e s c h e m e m u s t be e s t a b l i s h e d in a d v a n c e of
a r m e d conflict;
— it m u s t i n c l u d e all or m o s t of t h e w o r l d ' s r e source areas;
— it w o u l d h a v e to i n c l u d e a s y s t e m of supervising resource use at the international and national levels;
— supervision w o u l d have to cover the various
b r a n c h e s o f i n d u s t r y t h a t a r e directly, b u t a l s o
Militarization of Nature
those i n d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n a r m s p r o d u c t i o n
(which potentially means most of the m a n u f a c turing and metallurgical i n d u s t r y ) ;
— it w o u l d l o g i c a l l y h a v e to i n c l u d e a l l a r m s producing nations;
— a c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n free e n t e r p r i s e a n d n a t i o n a l state c o n t r o l w o u l d h a v e t o b e f o u n d ,
a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s m u c h t o b e said i n f a v o u r o f
state i n t e r v e n t i o n a s t h e o n l y effective w a y o f
exercising a c o n t r o l s c h e m e , p r o v i d e d p o l i t i c a l
goals a r e set r i g h t a n d a r e b e i n g f o l l o w e d ;
— a s y s t e m of s a n c t i o n s f o r a n y b r e a k i n g t h e
scheme would have to be established.
Their proposal was much inspired by the
control schemes set up during World War I,
and especially the one run jointly by the
US and the UK during World War II. This
scheme gave the state, through special
boards, complete control over the imports
and distribution of materials.
In hindsight, the Leith proposal was in
many respects completely unrealistic. Still,
on several points it touched on necessary
conditions for a control scheme to be operative. Also it reflected thinking in important
political circles in the Allied Powers at
that time. It would not be sufficient, for
instance, to impose quantum regulation on
imports. The importing arms-producing nation would normally be able to switch
material consumption from civilian to military use. There would be no important obstacle to this in terms of a time-lag, which
may be the case with regard to measures
like substitution or increased recycling of
materials. For import controls to be effective, some degree of supervision of national industries is necessary. This impinges
on the right of self-determination. It would
require some sort of an international production authority vested with the power to
allocate quotas of materials usage, and to
supervise that this takes place according to
agreed rules.
5.2. Measures at the national level
If internationally agreed control schemes
and multilaterally run institutions to direct
them do not seem very likely, neither does
the probability that the state in major armsproducing countries will be able or even
19
willing to exercise the control over private
capital necessary for such a scheme to be
operative. And how could the state control
the military industry when, as in the Soviet
Union, the two are completely integrated?
In the capitalist countries, with more
public concern over militarization and its
consequences, a more independent role for
the state vis a vis private capital is conceivable, if not very likely. Theoretically, the
decisive role of the state in financing military R & D programmes gives it the key to
such factors as the rate and extent of substitution, recycling, and other measures
discussed above.
Action by concerned groups organizations
and individuals may be more promising than
direct action by the state. If key scientists
walk out on military R & D institutions, this
may be at least as important as a mass rally.
Some of the most promising action yet taken
is the diversion campaign of the Lucas workers (Elliott, 1977). Similar types of action
might be considered by e. g. metal workers
or dock workers handling strategic minerals.
Such action may arise out of increased consciousness. In many periphery countries, the
problem with consciousness-raising lies in
the relative affluence of the mineral working class. Everywhere, and with the economic crisis increasingly so, there is the
problem of lack of alternative employment.
5.3.
Summary: some proposals
Despite these obstacles, there are a number
of concrete measures that could be considered within the framework of international
and nationally binding action in particular.
T h e following suggestions are offered as
examples.
a) An open military information act for the
international community, showing not only
the consumption of military hard-ware (end
product), but also consumption of inputs
such as raw materials and energy, R & D ,
manpower, etc.
b) A progressive tax on the use of materials
for military purposes. T h e case for a tax on
all use of natural resources, particularly on
20
Helge
Hveem
non-renewable minerals and ocean resources, has been made elsewhere (Pisani,
1977). A first tier of the tax could be imposed progressively according to certain
criteria, the most important of which would
be renewability of the material, its rareness,
and its particular relevance to Third World
countries. A second tier would relate to its
importance as a raw material to the military
industry. Thus, titanium would be heavily
taxed, natural rubber moderately. T h e tax
ought to be levied on production/extraction,
exports and imports in order to distribute
the burden as widely and equally as possible among nations. T h e capital finally
would be made available for development
purposes through UN institutions.
Except for obvious political opposition
that it would encounter, there do not seem
to be insurmountable difficulties in administering such a tax. Production and trade
figures are usually known; consumption of
stockpiled and recycled materials might
create more of an information problem. The
tax should not, on the other hand, be made
unnecessarily complicated by applying too
many and too specific criteria when the tax
level is determined. It might take into account the processing level at which the
material enters military-industrial production and the substitutability of the material
used.
c) Quantum regulations on use of natural
resources for military purposes. Such regulation would require that states adhering
to the control scheme be willing to be
supervised, even if supervision need not be
so detailed as the Leith proposal suggested.
Problems of implementing this proposal
would probably not be any greater than in
implementing an arms control scheme. T h e
problem might be considerable, however, if
some international organ were to assess and
continuously check technologically determined changes in material usage without the
voluntary assistance of national state and
industry institutions.
d) An agreed upon level of 'security': minimum
consumption
standards.
Such
a
scheme would somehow have to tackle the
intricate problem of 'what is enough': what
quantities of materials consumption are
necessary for legitimate national defence
purposes. One initial approach might be to
impose restrictions in proportion to the
amount of arms produced which is exported
as compared to the amount used for the
national military apparatus. This might then
also contribute to restricting exports of
arms.
e) Unpackaging and prohibition of arms-formaterials deals and the like. This proposal
implies that it will be formally prohibited to
arrange for material supply through some
quasi barter deal, in particular where sales
of arms, military know-how etc. are involved. The aim would be to attack a trend
which at present seems to be strongly on the
increase — in the nuclear field, clearly, but
also with regard to other materials.
f) Offer a premium to countries/firms diversifying from production and sales of
natural resources for military purposes. The
main purpose here would be to disincline
periphery governments not completely integrated into some centre country protectorate, from continuing exports of resources
because of short-term economic and employment needs.
These proposals are aimed at reducing the
economic incentives for arms-producing
countries to continue the internationalization of militarization. Countries mainly exporting natural resources should find an
incentive to support and comply with international agreements for measures of type
(f), on the implicit premise that capital accumulated through taxing, tariffs, and so on
would be channelled to development purposes through the U N . Throughout this
paper I have stressed that proposals like those
suggested here are confronted with a world
of strong vested interests. This calls for
rigid analysis of those interests and for
realism. Many of the proposals would seem
completely unrealistic today. Yet, action is
possible. A first prerequisite is that the intimate link between state and private capital
Militarization of Nature
interests, the role of international rivalry
over access to resources and the trend towards militarization of the periphery be recognized. Thereby, it will also become possible to recognize the link between armaments and development.
NOTES
* T h i s is a s e c o n d a n d e n l a r g e d r e p o r t on a
project which analyzes t h e relationship b e t w e e n
t h e p r o c e s s o f m i l i t a r i z a t i o n a t t h e g l o b a l level
and the control and use of natural resources. T h e
p r o j e c t is an offspring of a l a r g e r p r o j e c t on r a w
m a t e r i a l politics a n d d o m i n a n c e t h e o r y s u p p o r t e d
by the Norwegian Research Council for Science
and the Humanities. This sub-project on militariz a t i o n a n d r e s o u r c e conflict h a s r e c e i v e d s u p p o r t
from
the Norwegian
Government's
Advisory
Council on A r m s Control and D i s a r m a m e n t .
Morten Andersen and Tor-Arne H a u g have helped
i n collecting a n d a n a l y z i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a n d i n o r ganizing t h e statistical m a t e r i a l . I r e c e i v e d v a l u a b l e c o m m e n t s a n d criticism o n a n e a r l i e r d r a f t
from Klaus-Jurgen Gantzel, Peter Lock, and Jan
0 b e r g . A preliminary version was published in
t h e Bulletin of Peace Proposals, n o . 1, 1978 u n d e r
u n d e r t h e title ' A r m s C o n t r o l t h r o u g h R e s o u r c e
C o n t r o l ' . T h e p r e s e n t p a p e r c a n b e identified a s
P R I O P u b l i c a t i o n n o . S-13/78.
1. F o r a m o r e d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n w i t h p r e c i s e
definitions of t h e s e c o n c e p t s , see A l b r e c h t , 1977
a n d K l a r e , 1978.
2 . See i n t e r a l i a A l b r e c h t e t al, 1 9 7 5 ; K a l d o r ,
1975; L u c k h a m , 1977; K l a r e , 1978; L o c k & Wulf,
1977; a n d T h e e , 1978 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s e a n d
other factors.
3. Such arrangements usually are not m a d e
formally and hence not recorded publicly. This
means they cannot normally be documented.
T h e r e i s w i d e s p r e a d belief i n p o l i t i c a l a n d b u s i n e s s
circles, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e y n o t o n l y a r e p r a c t i s e d ,
but are also on the increase. US a n d F r e n c h
deliveries o f a r m s t o s o m e k e y O P E C a n d M i d d l e
E a s t c o u n t r i e s t h u s a r e said t o h a v e b e e n m a d e i n
e x c h a n g e for oil s u p p l i e s . T h e S o v i e t U n i o n p r a c tises b a r t e r d e a l s as a n o r m a l w a y of d e a l i n g w i t h
periphery countries, and quite probably also has
m a d e deals involving a r m a m e n t s .
4 . T h e basis f o r t h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s a d m i t t e d l y
n o t v e r y solid. I t i s k n o w n t h a t e x p e n d i t u r e s o n
a r m a m e n t s i n t h e t w o s u p e r p o w e r s differ c o n s i d e r a b l y b e c a u s e Soviet p e r s o n n e l costs a r e m u c h
lower than US ones. On the other hand, a counting o f h a r d w a r e i t e m s ( w e a p o n r y a n d i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ) m i g h t give a c l u e to t h e a n s w e r and w o u l d
probably show m u c h m o r e similarity between the
two with respect to absolute consumption of
21
natural resources for military purposes. It m a y
well be that the difference, m a k i n g Soviet cons u m p t i o n a b s o l u t e l y a n d r e l a t i v e l y less t h a n t h e
US one, is d u e to higher US levels of a r m a m e n t s
exports.
5. In a recent study, Leontief a n d others present
a m o d e l f o r m a k i n g s u c h a n a n a l y s i s . Cf. V a s i l y
Leontief, 1978.
6 . M i l i t a r y c o n s u m p t i o n o f jet fuel a c c o u n t s f o r
a b o u t 1/3 of a l l c o n s u m p t i o n of jet fuel in t h e
U n i t e d States (Sivard, 1974).
7 . A n A l g e r i a n official i n p r i v a t e c o n v e r s a t i o n
with the author.
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at the US Naval W a r College, June, quoted in
H a r r i g a n 1976.
L e i t e n b e r g , M i l t o n , 1976. ' O n t h e d i v e r s i o n o f r e sources for military purposes in developing nat i o n s ' , Journal of Peace Research, n o . 2.
L e i t h , C . K., J . W . F u r n e s s , & C l e o n a L e w i s , 1943.
World Minerals and
World Peace.
Washington
D . C , T h e Brookings Institution.
L e o n t i e f , V a s i l y e t al, 1978, ' P r e l i m i n a r y s t u d y o f
world-wide e c o n o m i c and social implications of
limitation on military spending ( A n input-output approach)'. New York: New York University, D e p t . of E c o n o m i c s , m i m e o .
L e v i n e , M. D . , & I. W. Y a b r o f f , 1975. Department
of Defense Materials Consumption
and
the Impact
of
Material
and Energy Resource Shortages.
Stanford Research Institute, M e n l o Park, N o vember, microfiche.
L o c k , P e t e r , & H e r b e r t Wulf, 1977, ' T r a n s f e r of
T e c h n o l o g y a n d t h e D e v e l o p m e n t P r o c e s s ' , Bulletin of Peace Proposals, n o . 2.
L u c k h a m , R o b i n , 1977, ' M i l i t a r i s m : A r m s a n d t h e
Internationalisation
of C a p i t a l ' , IDS Bulletin,
U n i v e r s i t y o f Sussex, v o l . 8 , n o . 3 , M a r c h .
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1940-41',
Pacific
Research,
March-April.
M i l e s , E d w a r d , 1978, i n a s e m i n a r a t t h e F r i d t j o f
Nansen Foundation, Polhøgda, Oslo, in April.
M o w , C. C, & J. K. Ives, 1974. Energy Consumption by Industries in Support of National Defense:
An
Energy
Demand
Model,
a
report
p r e p a r e d for Defense A d v a n c e d Research P r o jects A g e n c y , b y R a n d C o r p o r a t i o n .
N A T O , 1976, Rational Use of Potentially Scarce
Metals, R e p o r t of a N A T O S c i e n c e C o m m i t t e e
Study G r o u p .
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1972. La 'coopération
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in
Conflict:
National
Growth
and International
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March-April.
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1978,
World Armaments and Disarmaments
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&
Wiksell;
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of t h e
Secretary-General,
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the
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and
Its
Harmful Effects
on
World Peace
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Report of the Secretary-General, N e w York.
1
US C o n g r e s s , 1973. 22nd Annual Report of the
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of
the
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19 January, G P O .
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United
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FY
1978,
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P a r t 8:
Research and Development.
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interview
with
Halvor
Elvik
in
Dagbladet,
Oslo, 17 June.
APPENDIX
Table 1. Military share in the US national consumption of natural resources and major enduses, i n p e r c e n t .
Mineral
thallium
germanium
garnet
thorium
cobalt
copper
beryllum
cadmium
silicon
tantalium
zinc
lead
mica
molybdenum
iron
manganese
tungsten
chromium
antimony
nickel
columbium
lithium
fluorspar
aluminium
tin
graphite
ytterium
mercury
platinum
silver
asbestos
rank
no.
1963-72
1
2
3
4
5
24.2
23.3
22.0
20.4
19.5
17.6
14.3
11.2
11.1
10.8
10.1
10.1
9.8
9.5
9.1
8.9
8.8
8.2
8.1
7.9
7.7
7.3
7.3
7.3
7.2
6.9
6.8
6.5
6.4
6.0
3.3
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
20
21
22
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
36
41
55
1963-66
1969-72
—
24.5
26.8
21.8
15.8
15.5
15.5
10.5
10.8
10.9
9.0
9.3
10.0
10.8
9.8
8.5
8.0
8.5
8.0
8.8
8.3
5.8
18.0
20.8
24.5
21.8
19.3
17.3
10.5
—
—
8.7
—
7.7
8.0
9.2
9.0
8.5
7.8
7.2
8.3
—
—
7.3
8.3
6.5
7.3
—
5.3
—
5.8
3.0
23
—
6.8
5.8
7.5
6.3
4.5
6.8
6.2
6.0
3.5
Most important military
end-use by sector
aircraft (78)
aerospace engines (62)
electroplating general (45)
electronics (67)
transportation (43)
electrical appliances (72)
transportation (40)
machinery (43)
transportation (33)
batteries (40)
aircraft (54)
transportation (45)
fluor, o r g a n i c s ( 3 1 )
electrical e q u i p m e n t (32)
transportation (34)
foundries (39)
electrical e q u i p m e n t (28)
electronics/telecomm. (31)
p h o t o g r a p h i c supplies (26)
construction (60)
S o u r c e s : H u g h e s et al., 1974. Strategic Resources and National Security. An I n i t i a l A s s e s s m e n t . S t a n f o r d R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e , M e n l o P a r k , A p r i l , m i c r o f i c h e , f o r first f o u r
columns.
Annual Report of the Joint Committee on Defense Production.
Congress
of t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r F i s c a l Y e a r 1975, f o r final c o l u m n .
24
Helge
Hveem
T a b l e 2 ( 1 ) , G e o p o l i t i c a l data:
Mineral
Thallium
Germanium
Garnet
Thorium
Cobalt
Copper
Beryllum
Cadmium
Silicon
Tantalium
Zinc
Lead
Mica
Molybdenum
Iron
Manganese
Tungsten
Chromium
Antimony
Nickel
Columbium
Lithium
Fluorspar
Aluminium
Tin
Graphite
Yttrium
Mercury
Platinum
Silver
Asbestos
Concentration o f w o r l d reserves and exports.
R e s e r v e s in % of t o t . w o r l d r e s .
(main three
reserve countries)
(A)
Surplus disposal:
E x p o r t s in % of t o t . w o r l d e x p o r t s
( M a i n three exporting countries)
(B)
(Canada, USSR, Australia)
(Zaire, USA, USSR)
(USA, India, U S S R )
(India, Canada, Australia )
( Z a i r e 34, N e w C a l e d o n i a 19, Z a m b i a 1 7 )
( U S S R 22, U S A 2 1 , C h i l e 1 6 )
(Brazil, Argentina)
(Canada, Australia)
(USSR, USA, Norway)
(Zaire, Nigeria, C a n a d a )
( N o . A m e r i c a 36, E u r o p a 2 5 , A s i a 1 8 )
( U S A 28, O c e a n i a 13, C a n a d a 11)
(Brazil, India, M a l a g a s y )
( U S A 58, C a n a d a 17, S o . A m e r i c a 1 2 )
( C a n a d a 15, B r a z i l 1 1 , A u s t r a l i a 6 . )
( S o u t h A f r i c a 46, U S S R 46, B r a z i l 2 )
( C h i n a 5 3 , U S S R 12, C a n a d a 1 2 )
(South Africa 63, Rhodesia 33, U S S R 1)
( C h i n a 5 5 , B o l i v i a 10, S o u t h A f r i c a 8 )
( U S A 72, C a n a d a 2 1 , A u s t r a l i a 4 )
( B r a z i l 6 7 , C a n a d a 13, K e n y a 6 )
1
70
59
1
79
52
1
87
32
94
77
97
73
97
86
1
1
63
64
2
4
(Mexico, Thailand, Africa - )
(Australia, Guinea, J a m a i c a )
( I n d o n e s i a 2 5 , C h i n a 16, T h a i l a n d 1 3
(Malagasy, Mexico, Austria )
(USA, Australia, USSR)
(Spain, Yugoslavia, I t a l y )
( U S S R , S o . A f r i c a , Canada3)
(Mexico, Canada, P e r u )
( C a n a d a , So. A f r i c a )
Notes and sources: See T a b l e 2 ( 2 ) .
1
48
73
99
74
81
45
1
73
68
89
( C a n a d a 2 5 , A u s t r a l i a 13, P e r u 1 0 )
( Z a i r e 46, N a m i b i a 17, C a n a d a 1 0 )
( I n d i a 60, U S A 38, A u s t r a l i a l )
( A u s t r . 30, I n d i a 2 9 , M a l a y s i a 1 5 J
( Z a i r e 66, Z a m b i a 9 , M o r o c c o 6 )
( C h i l e 17, Z a m b i a 14, C a n a d a 1 4 ) 2
(Brazil, A r g e n t i n a )
(Canada, Australia)
( N o r w a y 15, S o . A f r i c a 3 , I n d i a 2 )
( T h a i l a n d 36, N i g e r i a 2 1 , Z a i r e 1 0 )
( C a n a d a 30, A u s t r a l i a 17, P e r u 1 5 )
( A u s t r a l i a , P e r u 12, C a n a d a 1 2 )
( I n d i a 6 1 , B r a z i l 15, M a l a g a s y 5 )
( U S A 63, C a n a d a 2 1 , Chile l )
( A u s t r a l i a 22, B r a z i l 20, C a n a d a 1 1 ) 2
( S o . A f r i c a 2 8 , G a b o n 18, Brazil 1 3 ) 2
( C h i n a 24, T h a i l a n d 12, Boliv. 1 0 )
(So. Africa, Rhodesia, U S S R )
( S o . A f r i c a 2 9 , Bolivia 2 7 , C h i n a 1 7 ) i
( C a n a d a 4 3 , N e w C a l e d . 18, A u s t r . 7 )
( B r a z i l 74, C a n a d a 9 , N i g e r i a 6 )
42
64
59
( M e x i c o 2 7 , T h a i l a n d 10, S o . A f r i c a 5 )
( A u s t r . 26, G u i n e a 22, J a m a i c a 1 6 )
( M a l a y s i a 37, B o l i v i a 12, I n d o n . 1 0 )
66
52
74
64
62
( U S A 40, A u s t r . 18, M a l a y s i a 8 )
( S p a i n 34, C a n a d a 10, A l g e r i a 8 )
( S o . A f r i c a 62, U S S R 8 , C a n a d a 4 )
( C a n a d a 24, P e r u 2 1 , M e x i c o 1 9 )
( C a n a d a 50, S o . A f r i c a 1 2 J
1
1
1
1
1
1
20
67
62
46
81
85
53
59
46
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Militarization of Nature
25
Table 2(2), Geopolitical data. Import dependency: absolute and 'critical'.
US
Import dependency of
Mineral
major powers
AI
(% of current consumption US
FRGermany<'
import
France6 USSR8 'Critical
dependency'
imported) (el
Thallium
Germanium
Gamel
Thorium
Cobalt
Copper
BeryJlum
Cadmium
Silicon
Tantalium
Zinc
Lead
Mica
Molybdenum
Iron
Manganese
Tungsten
Cromium
Antimony
Nickel
Columbium
Lithium
Fluorine
Aluminium
Tin
GrapbHe
Yttrium
Mercury
Platinum
Silver
Asbestos
(%) (0)
1132
35'
0
1()()4
79
16
27
41
1()3
99
101
70
76
84
90
49
18
94
0
27
68
55
69
48
81
84
na
81
88'
69
80
41
69
83
51
90
100
93
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
N o t e s t o tables 2 ( 1 ) and 2 ( 2 )
99
30
90
100
467
28'
103
na
0
na
na
0
0
0
na
na
na
na
0
na
na
0
0
35
0
na
0
oa
na
na
30
20
na
na
na
0
0
na
371
19 2
0
na
54
7
25
18
2
44
16
11
94
0
14
49
28
57
22
10
662
na
61
63'
67
75'
10
32
34
23
1
o f M i n e s , W a s h . , D C , Jul. 75.
Estimated f r o m data in U n i t e d N a t i o n s
Negotiating Conference on a C o m m o n Fund
under the Integrated P r o g r a m m e for C o m modities: Statistics of International T r a d e in
C o m m o d i t i e s c o v e r e d b y the Integrated P r o g r a m m e for C o m m o d i t i e s , 1970-1975. P u b l .
n o . T D / I P C / C F / C O N F / M i s c . 5 G e . 77-70465,
Oct. 1977.
2
( A ) Sources: a ) U S D e p a r t m e n t o f C o m m e r c e ,
N a t i o n a l T e c h n i c a l Information Service, D o c u m e n t n o . A D A 0 1 7 7 9 2 .
K. H. Abbott:
Army
Utilization
Management
of
Metallic
Materials.
A r m y Materials and M e c h a n i c s R e search Center, Oct. 75.
b ) Congressional R e s e a r c h Service,
Library of Congress. A l l e n F. A g new:
Brief Backgrounder on Mineral Commodities in the US Stockpile, 1975.
free w o r l d except U S A
five countries in Africa
platinum group
ore
( B ) Estimated f r o m production data in N T I S
d o c u m e n t no. P B 2 5 2 9 9 4 . Minerals in the US
Economy:
Ten-Year
Supply-Demand
Profiles
for Mineral
and Fuel
Commodities.
Bureau
1
2
3
4
1
(C)
1
Estimated average for 1972 ( s o u r c e : E. E.
H u g h e s , e t al.: Strategic R e s o u r c e s and N a tional Security: A n Initial A s s e s s m e n t ( e t c . )
Stanford R e s e a r c h Inst., M e n l o Park, Calif.
N T I S d o c . n o . A D A 0 1 0 6 2 4 ) , 1973 ( s o u r c e :
( A ) a ) ) and 1975 ( s o u r c e : ( A ) b ) ) .
2 1972
3 1973
4 1975
bauxite o n l y ( U S A : 1973 data on metal,
a l u m i n a and b a u x i t e g i v e an import d e p e n dency of 79 % ) .
5
26
Helge
Hveem
6
source:
Thomas
Bertelman:
Politik
och
råvaror,
Liber
forlag,
Stockholm,
1977.
Mi meo.
ferro-nickel and nickel metal.
George
S.
Brown,
Statement
before
the
Senate
Armed
Services
Committee
regarding
7
8
D o D Appropriations, Fiscal Y e a r 1976.
( D ) Estimated average for 1972 and 1973. Sources
N T I S doc. n o . A D A 0 1 0 6 2 4 and ( A ) b ) .
1 1972 data o n l y
1973 data o n l y
estimated average 1972, 1973, 1975.
2
3
T a b l e 3 . E c o n o m i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l data
'0
~~'"
EO
...
Supply in percent of consumption. 1974. (USA)
release (net,)
Consumption
~ ;) ~
Stockpile
Total
Consumption
~ ~~
e~ i
Consumption
Own prod.
Imports
Consumption
Consumption
Imp.-Exp.
Consumption
o.c.ri
e
u
~
c
-0.=
~
~-s8
Thallium!
Germanium
Gamet
Thorium
Cobalt
Copper
Beryllum
Cadmium
Silicon
Tantalium
Zinc
Lead
Mica
Molybdenum
Iron2
Manganese3
Tungsten
Chromium 4
Antimony
Nickel
Columbium
Lithium
Fluorspar
Aluminium
Tin
Graphite
Yttrium
Mercury
Platinum
Silver
Asbestos
3,000
43,000
18,772
80
9,400
2.3 mill.
350,000
6,940
660,000
0.93 mill.
350,000
1.5 mill.
3,100
73 mil\.
135 mill.
1.8 mill.
8,060
1.42 mill.
42 mill.
210 mil\.
2.0 mill.
na
1.32 mill.
17.3 mill.
69,300
68,000
20.209
59,600
1.9 mill.
178.4 mill.
874,000
p
Ibs
51
51
5t
$t
sl
sl
5t
Ib'
sl
sl
sl
Ibs
sl
st
sl
5t
sl
sl
Ib'
st
Idl
sl
51
5t
nasks
t.OZ.
I.oz.
sl
na
86
121
100
3
161
oa
50
88
0
129
133
0
158
78
0
48
0
89
30
0
na
15
12
29
na
124
18
20
91
13
na
35
0
100
77
27
19
31
11
105
211
13
113
35
-21
100
na
21
0
78
-38
-9
61
-4
na
na
-23
-2
32
-24
na
27
-26
18
20
14
-10
na
30
16
-10
5
1
27
63
94
7
66
20
19
30
8
105
211
7
-15
-110
30
56
51
75
49
88
120
na
91
88
50
26
-25
85
116
65
84
90
0
32
67
71
88
51
102
120
na
91
88
63
46
118
86
153
75
89
0
3
21
5
5
43
24
5
10
41
15
7
15
17
20
40
N o t e s and sources:
1
2
3
4
5
1972, estimate,
1973,
Mn ore ( F e M n : 1,1 m i l l , s t ) ,
C r 0 ( F e C r : 0.58 mill, s t ) ,
bauxite
p l a t i n u m group,
v a l u e 1 indicates g o o d subs, possibility, v a l u e 10 indicates small subs, possibility,
rare earth e l e m e n t s and yttrium.
st: short tons, t. oz..: troy o u n c e s , lbs: p o u n d s , mill.: m i l l i o n , ldt: l o n g dry tons. E. E. H u g h e s et al.:
Strategic R e s o u r c e s and N a t i o n a l Security. N A T O , 1976.
Projektgruppen 'Ressurser o c h råvaror', Sekretariatet for framtidsstudier: Substitution — att byta ut
resurser. Liber forlag, S t o c k h o l m , 1977.
A g n e w , A l l e n F.: Brief Backgrounder on Mineral Commodities in
the
US Stockpile, 1975. C o n g r e s sional R e s e a r c h Service. 16 M a y , 1975.
M o r g a n , J o h n D . : World Distribution and Flow of Major Mineral
Commodities,
Bureau
of M i n e s ,
2
6
8
7
3
?;>
:;
.c'
~~
;:::I:'::'
.~
:s
~·Vl
~&
5
3
2
4
7
6
6
4
6
6
2
5
4
3
8
7
7
5
7
4
4
6
6
6
3
5
0
7
8
8
5