Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of
International Position*
HELGE HVEEM
International Peace Research Institute,
Oslo
Hveem, H. Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of International Position, Cooperation
and Conflict, VII. 1972, 6 5 — 8 6 .
T h e main thesis of this paper is that the world images and foreign policy attitudes of
the leading foreign policy and opinion-making strata of a given national actor are a
I unction of the position which that actor enjoys in the international system. This thesis
is based on a structural-sociological approach to the functioning of the international
system and the ways in which the images and attitudes of elites and other social strata
are formed. It proposes a way of classifying national actors according to their position
in the international structure along a center-periphery dimension. It emphasizes the
importance of symmetry vs. asymmetry in the relationship between actors and the role
of penetration and external dominance of national polities. T h e paper also discusses the
potential influence of various factors in the formation of images and attitudes and
shows how factors other than the external, 'systemic' one may play a role under certain
conditions. It ends up with a discussion of where Norway fits into the model and makes
certain propositions concerning images and attitudes held by Norwegian foreign policy
elites, being 'centrist' and in certain respects of an 'over-centrist' type.
Helge
Hveem,
International
Peace
Research
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a large body of theory on what
factors determine the foreign policy of
national actors. Much may be adapted for
our purpose of describing and evaluating
what factors determine or shape the images
and attitudes of our units of analysis. The
basis for doing so we find in the assumption of a relatively strong positive correlation between the policy or behavior of a
given national actor and the international
images and foreign policy attitudes of the
leading strata of that actor.
Images and attitudes, studied here as
dependent variables, are used by many
authors as determinants of policy and thus
as independent variables of the type we
shall now explore. This, however, should
not confuse anyone as long as the choice
we have made, which is quite 'legitimate'
theoretically and methodologically, is kept
in mind by the reader and adhered to by
the author.
The author carried out a survey on non5 Cooperation and Conflict 1972: 5
Institute,
Oslo.
random samples representing what may be
referred to as the foreign policy milieu of
Norway: those who form public opinion
and contribute to the decision-making on
questions of world politics and foreign
policy. An 'elite' sample consisting of
close on 1 0 0 respondents was interviewed
during spring 1 9 6 7 . At the same time some
1 3 0 persons representing a partly random
sample of 'opinion-makers' responded to
a mailed questionnaire. The two samples
were asked to state their opinions on a
large number of questions. Comparisons
between them were, according to tests that
were carried out, found possible.
The survey focused on issues such as the
structure of the international system and
great power politics; questions and causes
of conflict; priorities for peace-making;
less developed countries and the problems
of development; international cooperation
and alliance policies; the United Nations;
disarmament and arms limitations, and
others.
As a partial and preliminary test of the
66
Helge
Hveem
Foreign
theory which is developed below, comparisons with corresponding samples of
foreign policy 'elites' in West European and
other countries were carried out. Further,
extensive comparative analyses were carried out on relations between elite, opinion
makers and general public opinion as representative of different levels of the Norwegian opinion- and decision-making
structure. These analyses were based on
a set of hypotheses concerning variations
in image* and attitudes between different
groups and categories of Norwegian society. They were concentrated on variables
like party affiliation, age, institutional
background (being an important criterion
in the sampling process), center-periphery
position, and others. The purpose of this
part of the study was threefold: to see to
what extent and in what respect there is
deviation among the samples from the
main line of thought stemming from the effects of the international position of the
country; to explore into the form and the
extent of consensus within and among the
social groups under study; and to present
new information on the Norwegian polity
and the structure of decision-making.
The study is also future-oriented in the
sense that it tries to explore what the likely
future thinking on world issues and the
attitudes of the coming Norwegian elites
will be. At the end some methodological
and statistical problems are analyzed, and
the report gives detailed accounts of the
techniques used in the study.
ranging from the individual to the supranational; while Galtung employs an even *
more refined scheme. Others, putting less
emphasis on the individual-to-international continuum, utilize a classification of
determinants following other dimensions
or no specific classification system at all.*
There are two inter-related problems to
which different solutions have been offered. One is whether the list of causal
variables should be 'inclusive' or all-encompassing (include a whole lot of possible
variables on each level or within each
category, a detailed catalogue) or more
'exclusive' or selective. The other is which
factors should be considered of greatest
causal importance — one single group of
variables, or a whole range of variables in
a certain ranking order. This is the problem which will occupy us here. Let us,
however, first state our preference for the
exclusive approach: in our opinion the
detailed list of Snyder et al. is quite inapplicable. The kind of research we are
attempting needs a map of factors accurate
and concise enough to guide the researcher
to the important points, not a map overcrowded with details, unsystematic, and
largely untheoretical.
2
4
The problem of the relative influence of
factors, however, is the most important.
The map may very well be detailed as long
as we know reasonably well what factors
are important (causally) and which are
not. Up to now theory has been extremely
reluctant to take this challenge seriously,
and we quite agree with Rosenau's criticism of this state of affairs.
We may analyze our problems in the
light of a set of different variables, ranging
from the idiosyncratic to the systemic level.
Singer emphasizes the importance of integrating this whole set of variables in a
single theoretical framework. We fully
agree with the argument that no category
or level of variables should be left out of
consideration, neither in a general theory
nor in the specific case study. Much of the
research so far has not adhered to this rule,
but instead advocated a single-level approach. In many cases such an advocacy is
5
II. DETERMINANTS OF IMAGES
A N D ATTITUDES: THE RELATIVE
INFLUENCE OF FACTORS
The 'level-of-analysis problem', in particular that raised by Singer, is a question
of how many levels of foreign policy
determinating factors one should distinguish between. Singer roughly introduces
two levels: the intra- (domestic) and the
extra-national (or international, foreign);
North et al. present six levels of analysis,
1
6
based on an evaluation of the importance
or causal relevance of different categories
or levels, and a choice of or preference for
one specific category. In fact, such a
choice is sometimes necessary; the question
is on what basis it is made. We have the
impression that very often preference for
causal relationships are held on an intuitive basis, because of the research school
or tradition of the individual researcher
(psychologists take the idiosyncratic or
personality approach to foreign policy
attitudes, at least some political scientists
the 'national interest' approach, etc.) or
because of the personality or political preferences of the researcher.
Several arguments can be raised against
these research traditions. One is that they
leave a number of possibly important
variables out of discussion a priori. Another is that, as already indicated, there is
really no theory behind the assumptions of
causal relationships and the choice of variables. A third argument is that they do not
discriminate.
By this we mean that there is no attempt
to see the actors or units under study in the
light of actual or possible differences between them. There is an a priori rule — a
convention which has not been questioned
or discussed according to empirical observations — that all actors may be studied
using the same instruments, categories, and
concepts. One of the few to criticize this
state of affairs is Rosenau. While we share
his critical observations, we shall have some
objections against the research scheme he
proposes. At the end we will present our
own alternative scheme.
Rosenau's 'pre-theory' of foreign policymaking distinguishes between influences at
five levels of variables: the idiosyncratic,
role, governmental, societal, and systemic.
He then constructs a tentative classificatory scheme for various types of national
actors. This scheme is built on three —
with an elaboration, four — dichotomies:
great vs. small actors; developed vs. underdeveloped economies; open vs. closed polities; and penetrated vs. non-penetrated
societies.
7
8
9
10
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Policy
Opinion
67
This scheme yields eight (sixteen) different types of actors. Rosenau goes on to
present a number of hypotheses about the
relative potency of each of the five categories of variables for each class of actor.
Although the rationale behind these hypotheses is not elaborated very much, the
hypotheses are relatively concrete and may
be subjected to empirical testing. They
are, briefly:
12
systemic: varies inversely with the size of
a state (the larger states, having
greater resources, are less dependent
on the international system than the
smaller ones are)
societal: more potent in open than in closed
polities (there is less need for the officials in the latter to heed non-governmental demands than in the
former)
governmental: more potent than societal
variables in closed polities than in
open ones (there is less need for the
officials in the latter to heed nongovernmental demands than in the
former)
role: more potent than idiosyncratic variables in developed economies (because
the bureaucracy and the large-scale
organizations impose more restraints
in the developed than in the less-developed economies)
idiosyncratic: more potent in less-developed economies than role variables
(for the same reason as mentioned
above)
Rosenau develops this list into a quite
exhaustive list of hypotheses. While we
believe that the list could be made more
fruitful by more systematic reasoning and
by some chalnges in the hypotheses proposed, there is no doubt that testing of
the classificatory scheme and of the concrete hypotheses would be of considerable
interest to foreign policy-making theory.
On the other hand, the fruitfulness of such
work could be much enlarged if some of
the concepts employed and the exemplifi13
14
68
Helge Hveem
Foreign
cations used, e.g., the cases chosen for
study, were improved.
The fourth dichotomy introduced by
Rosenau is in many respects the most important: the penetrated vs. non-penetrated
dichotomy. According to Rosenau a penetrated political system is
15
one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively,
through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of
its values or the mobilization of support on
behalf of its goals.
16
From this it should follow that systemic
variables are particularly influential within penetrated, small, less-developed, and
'open' systems. We return to this problem
later on.
The concept of issue-area, important in
Rosenau's theory, suggests that foreign
policy behavior and policy-making structures are different from one issue-set
to another and should be analyzed differently. While it seems well substantiated (although Rosenau and others use
impressionistic data on this point) that
some such differences do make themselves
felt, we do not think that they deserve any
prominent place in theory-building. In the
first place, the issue-area approach is based
very much on the findings of Dahl, and
these should not be adapted uncritically to
the global system. Secondly, even if there
is a good point for the approach in general
theory, in the case of a small, homogeneous
national actor like Norway, the foreign
policy elite or milieu is not that specialized
and pluralistic.
17
18
Brecher et al. have employed Rosenau's
issue-area approach in a content analysis
study of elite images in situations of foreign policy decision-making. Employing
only his developed vs. developing economies dichotomy for actor classification,
they arrive at findings which, however interesting, will be of limited value to a
broader theory construction; some of them
will, however, be kept in mind throughout
this report.
Following Rosenau's scheme, Norway
19
would fall into the class of a small, developed, and open-policy actor. The relative
potency of the five categories of variables
will, according to the theory for this class,
be: (1) role, (2) systemic, (3) societal, (4)
governmental, and (5) idiosyncratic.
Then the question is whether that actor
constitutes a penetrated or non-penetrated
system. If penetrated, the systemic variables move to the top of the ranking list
and role variables to second place; if nonpenetrated, the ranking remains the same.
Rosenau himself gives no indications toward an exemplification of actors after this
fourth dichotomy is introduced. We shall
leave the question open in order to present
an alternative, partial theory, which will
include parts of the Rosenau pre-theory in
modified form.
20
21
a number of which may be said to correspond fairly closely with those employed
in the 'national index'.
This procedure raises the very important
question whether or to what extent one
may assume isomorphism between the international, global and the national community (or between parts of them). Another question is the validity of the variables
(or the whole index) we have chosen for
the assignment of an actor's position in the
community of nations.
The isomorphism question is particularly
important in the cases where micro-sociological theory is used as a reservoir for the
theory construction at the international
system level. Many of the attempts in this
direction should no doubt be subject to
criticism. Some others evidently stand on
safer ground, particularly as they have received backing from empirical data.
Galtung, who has used small group
theory as a basis for elaborations on international relations theory, stresses the importance of the former as a reservoir of
fruitful hypotheses to be tested at the level
of the latter. At the same time, he emphasizes the danger of making too easy inferences from one level to another.
While these questions are also relevant
to our study, our problem in this context is
not the same since we are not dealing with
units (nations) interacting with each other,
but with one unit (Norway represented by
its foreign policy milieu) looking at other
units and the relations between those units
and itself, and with the different sub-units
(groups, categories and individuals within
the two milieu samples) in varying support
of this 'looking at' other units. The problems mentioned certainly apply to our general theory, but as we are not in a position
to test it thoroughly here, the more thoroughgoing discussion may be left out.
What we shall have to address ourselves
to, however, is the validation of the index
employed for assigning international social
positions.
23
24
III. W O R L D PERSPECTIVE: THE
CASE FOR A CENTER-PERIPHERY
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
The world perspective of the foreign policy milieu is a combination of the fundamental images and attitudes, the main
values or wants of the totality of the members of the milieu. It is a rough, singleconcept description of how the foreign
policy milieu of an actor relates itself, and
consequently the national actor it represents, to the environing world.
This perspective is the focus of analysis.
What makes, and what is the basis of the
perspective, is largely the international
social position of the national actor, the
foreign policy milieu of which is under
study.
The theory of foreign policy opinion as
a function of social position is now well
known from the study of national societies.
It is based mainly on socio-economic and
communication structure variables.
In the index constructed by Galtung,
there are altogether eight variables. For
our purpose, we have constructed an additive index comprising eight variables.
22
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Policy
Opinion
69
An obvious question in the construction
of the index is to what extent the variables
in the national social position index should
be transferred to the international index.
The national index consists of three types
of variables; both 'ascriptive' and 'achievement' variables as to social background,
and communication structure variables. We
chose not to transform the variables used
in this index directly, but to pick out variables representative of the three types at
the international level.
The three types of variables in our context may be termed attributive — 'ascriptive', attributive — 'achievement', and
relational or interactional variables. Obviously, international center or periphery are
not only characterized by the latter type,
which would more or less correspond to
depicting positions only horizontally. Neither is international social position determined only in terms of the former two
types, as it would if we had been investigating stratification or ranking systems
within the world community. Studies of
this latter type are now becoming quite
numerous.
Another major problem is the relative
weight to attach to these three types of
variables. Our choice here parallels the
one made in the case of the national index,
as the three types mentioned above in the
order they appear, are given the weight
3/8, 3/8 and 2/8, respectively. One may
argue that this weighting is arbitrary: we
must admit that we have no theoretical
defense for it other than that given for the
national index.
As to variables to be used as indicators
in the index, power or size variables are
obviously the best measure of the attributive 'ascriptive' cluster, while development
level indicators would best indicate the
attributive-achievement one. The variables selected are thus the following (with
the national index variables to which they
would most closely correspond listed in
parentheses):
26
27
28
70
Helge
Hveem
Foreign
Attributivc-ascriptive:
Age
GDP
Population
(Age)
(Income)
(none)
Attributive-achievement:
Industrialization
Literacy level
GDP per capita
(Sector of occupation)
(Education level)
(none)
Relational:
Geographical
centrality
Memberships in
international
organizations
(Place of residence:
geographical)
(none)
Objections may be made, e.g. as to the
classification of variables: GDP is very
much an 'achievement' indicator, whereas
memberships in international organizations
may be seen as indication of both ascriptive and achievement attributes, being
highly correlated with rank or power.
Distinctions between the variables in terms
of proper classification should not be seen
as particularly rigid.
Another — and in our opinion much
stronger objection — is the one that dismisses statistical expressions of 'reality'
such as GDP, GDP per capita, etc. as bad
or even misleading indications of development. There is no other answer to such an
objection that the type of analysis employed here seems to demand an indicator
which is better than none; there are, e.g.
no statistics for the whole of our universe
on distribution of development patterns.
The index (cf. Appendix A) was validated by a variable indicative of the international behavior of national actors: their
tendency to be absent from voting in the
UN General Assembly, in 1962 and
1963. According to our theory, center
actors would tend to be present, while those
on the periphery would tend to be absent.
This measure offered a Spearman's rank
correlation between rank on the international social position index and absence
scores of 0.65 for the 1962 and 1963 data.
This coefficient was obtained from index
scores and absence data for 110 countries,
i.e. the then member states of the world
organization. That the index data and
information on voting absence are not
29
30
31
wholly synchronic should not make any
great difference.
In three of the total 110 cases, international position and absence ranks differed
widely: South Africa, Portugal (both high
on the index, low on presence), and Mongolia (low on the index, but very high on
presence). If these three 'odd' cases are
excluded, rank correlation obtained for the
remaining 107 cases is only 0.71. This
means that some cases of low presence are
due to factors other than international position; in the cases mentioned, the explanation seems obvious. On the whole, we find
that the index has been given at least sufficient validation.
What then are the implications of the
center-periphery structure of the international system to the system itself? What
makes it relevant and not only a theoretical construct?
By this structural approach we focus on
how the foreign policy milieu of national
actors — the representatives of these actors
— perceive, feel, or generally behave, as
a function of the position of the national
actor they represent in the international
system.
This implies, for one thing, that what
Rosenau calls systemic and idiosyncratic
variables act together: the international
position of the actor is consequential or
influential insofar as it is cognitively present to the persons constituting the milieu,
through their own perception or as it is
perceived and taught them by others (other
milieus). However, this systemic-idiosyncratic combination is not the same for all
actors under all circumstances. Its strength
relative to other variables may vary, and
the strength of either of the two variables
relative to the other will change from one
actor to another, both because of varying
international position, and because of, e.g.
variations in the stability of the values on
the variables.
That Rosenau's concept of penetration is
useful is true only with some important
modifications. First of all, its usefulness
lies in the strong attack it makes possible
against the prevailing tradition of distinguishing sharply between the international
and the national system. As Rosenau says,
the two go very much over in each other.
What he fails to emphasize is that this will
most probably vary from one part of the
system to another, and from one type of
actor to another. More importantly, the
content, direction of, and the consequence
of the penetration or internationalization
of national polities will vary from one set
of actors to another.
One important aspect of the internationalization is the built-in asymmetry in
the relationship between two or more national actors. This asymmetry may exist
between center and periphery, between the
big power and the small power, between
geographical neighbors, between dominant
and dominated within specific groups of
actors, etc. Domination is one aspect of the
internationalization: one actor penetrates
another, but not vice versa. Another aspect
is what Russett calls responsiveness.
A third factor would be whether and to
what extent the internationalization is accepted or rejected — whether it is legitimate in the penetrated system.
Domination may be seen as legitimate
for varying reasons: the dominated may,
while losing policy-making sovereignty,
benefit from the domination in other respects. And in the case of asymmetric
responsiveness, one actor tends to respond
favorably to demands or wishes from the
other and thus lend himself to the other
actor's penetration into his own policies.
An actor may be responsive toward another
for ideological, strategic, or economic reasons.
32
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Policy
Opinion
71
That internationalization or penetration
may take different forms has great potential importance when influence stemming
from the systemic level is considered. It is
not enough to discriminate between penetrated and nonpenetrated, but between
degrees and forms of penetration and nonpenetration.
Indications of the form or the content of
penetration are given by variables like
state ideology ('communist' versus 'capitalist-liberal'), culture (language family.religion), military alliance, economic dependency (aid, investments).
The last theoretical problem we shall take
up relates to the concept of rank disequilibrium. An actor who ranks high on some
variables or sub-dimensions but low on
others is rank-disequilibrated, while an
actor who ranks almost equally high on
most or all variables is said to be rankequilibrated. The types of and the consequence of rank-disequilibrium are different. China is an example of the big (measured by power-criteria), but less-developed and not centrally located actor.
Another example of the disequilibrated
type of actor is Luxembourg: small but
developed, and centrally located. These
are extreme cases. Between them is a whole
range of more or less disequilibrated actors.
34
IV. I N T E R N A T I O N A L POSITION
A N D T H E IMAGES A N D ATTITUDES
OF THE MILIEU: A THEORETICAL
MODEL
Our task is to present a model or a theoretical framework which integrates the dimensions presented and discussed in the foregoing: the international position or the
center vs. periphery dimension; the penetrated vs. nonpenetrated dichotomy; the
open vs. closed dichotomy; and the rankdisequilibrium factor.
Our general proposition is that the international position of an actor determines
the main tendency in the world perspective
of its milieu. Russet contends that
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Helge
Hveem
Foreign
i f w e i m a g i n e a p a i r o f c u r v e s f o r the distrib u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l attitudes in a n a t i o n a n d
in the entire i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m , that f o r
the w o r l d has both a w i d e r r a n g e a n d a lessp r o n o u n c e d central t e n d e n c y — the c u r v e is
flatter.
35
In terms of our center vs. periphery dichotomy, explorations of the dichotomy
within national societies seem to indicate
that there are at least less pronounced central tendencies in the periphery than in the
center; the range of images and attitudes
found, on the other hand, will tend to be
greater than in the periphery.
These
trends would probably be found even in
the international community, between center and periphery nations.
Dimensions or factors mentioned other
than international position provide variations on the main tendency created by international position. In some cases, however, such factors may even outweigh the
international position factor in importance;
in others, they will tend to modify its influence. Instead of presenting a complete
and exhaustive theory at this stage, we
shall attempt to specify how and why these
different factors or dimensions relate to
the influencing of the image-building and
attitude-formation of different national
actor milieus.
The penetration dimension has relevance
as to whether the relationship between two
actors is asymmetric or symmetric. In the
relationship between two actors who are
both center nations, the penetration — if
any — will by definition be symmetric; this
will generally also be true in a periphery
relationship. There may, however, be
rather strongly asymmetric penetration
even in cases where one of the center
(periphery) nations is big (in terms of size),
while the other is small. However, asymmetry ceteris paribus should be greatest in
the center (big) — periphery (small) relationship.
36
37
The center nation is comparatively better off than the periphery nation in
avoiding strong asymmetric penetration. It
is more centrally located in the communication structure and can 'make its voice
better heard'. It can interact more on an
equal footing with other actors. At the
same time, however, the center nations will
penetrate each other (i.e. penetration takes
place within the center category of nations)
more than the periphery will generally, as
its single units will be more isolated. But
again the important question is the form
and the content of the penetrative activity:
is it legitimate or not, and to what extent
is there consensus on fundamental values
between the penetrator and the penetrated?
The center nation has more values to
defend than the periphery nation. It is
'aware' of being a center nation, and this
awareness creates a feeling of 'responsibility' as well as 'we-ness', a feeling of
community with other center nations. This
'we-ness' may make the center nation view
the periphery nations as an out-group, possibly a negative reference group. And it
may make it especially responsive to other
center nations.
Responsiveness may stem from other
factors as well. Russett has shown for instance that extensive trade relations make
traders (especially those whose trade
amounts to an important part of their total
economy, or GNP) more responsive toward
each other. Furthermore, common culture,
ideological links, geographical proximity,
etc., may create greater responsiveness.
However, even when responsiveness is
discussed, differences in international position, particularly on power, make for
important distinctions between actors. In
a relationship between two actors, the reactions of the one toward the other will
depend on the relative position and/or
power between them, and on the degree of
responsiveness. This is illustrated in Table
1, which attempts to present a typology of
penetration where the three dimensions
discussed so far under this heading, are
included. It may seem an unnecessary
doubling of dimensions to include both
symmetric vs. asymmetric and dominance
versus non-dominance. But there may be
asymmetric relationships between two actors which are penetrated into each other
where there is no dominance by the one
over the other.
Table I.
Opinion
73
A typology of international penetration relationships;
B's reactions to actor A.
Symmetric
Asymmetric
Actor A:
Non-dominance
Dominance
Non-dominance
Actor B:
Responsive
Cooperative
Respectful
(mutually)
Dependent:
domination
accepted out
of expediency
(UK toward
USA)
Following:
Respectful
(Norway toward
Denmark)
Non-responsive
Policy
'Strictly formal'
Retreating:
(mutual interests) trying to
or
isolate from
or cut off
domination
Antagonistic
(USSR toward
(China toward
US in East-West USSR in early
relations)
60s;
France toward
during the Cold
War
USA in
middle 60s)
Dominance
Servile:
(Small/periphery
allies toward
USA;
(Norway toward developing
West Germany) countries toward
France, USA)
Avoiding
(non-aligned
toward blocs)
or
Protesting
Revolting
Reacting
or
Antagonistic
(Cuba toward
USA; Yugoslavia toward
USSR)
Tacitly
adhering to
(CSSR toward
USSR)
38
39
The cases chosen to exemplify the different types of relationship are somewhat
arbitrary and might be discussed. The types
of reactions proposed could also be discussed or modified. Important, however, is
that there is a basis in 'the real world' for
a classification of relationships between
different actors according to the principles
introduced here.
To be responsive toward (the elite or
milieu of) another national actor or a
group of such actors means that one perceives this or these actors as a positive
reference group. To be non-responsive does
not necessarily mean that one is antagonistic and perceives the other as a negative
reference group: one may also be more or
less affectively neutral or indifferent.
Generally, we believe that the responsiveness is potentially higher among center
actors than among periphery ones, and
clearly higher between center actors than
in a periphery actor toward the center one.
There are exceptions, probably quite numerous (cf. Table 1). At the same time,
there is evidently a large amount of nonresponsiveness among center actors where
ideological and strategic differences come
in. But in the concrete case of East-West
relations we believe that responsiveness on
the whole has increased on both sides toward the other in recent years, despite
evident setbacks. And what has created
this greater responsiveness is not only (in
a negative sense) the détente itself, but the
growing feeling on both sides of 'we-ness':
that both East and West have power over
the rest of the world (despite the fact that
they also compete for dominance), that
they are more developed, constituting the
rich countries' club (despite quite clear
differences in attitudes and approaches,
for instance in U N C T A D ) , and that they
are technologically superior, etc.
40
74
Helge Hveem
Foreign
What then are the world perspectives
characteristic of center and of periphery
nations, respectively? A list of hypotheses
on what constitutes the typical center and
periphery perspectives is given in Table 2.
To a large extent, hypotheses are
adapted from the national center-periphery
theory; some of these have already received empirical backing and are thus
put forth as propositions.
On system activity, we see from the fact
41
that the center is better placed in the communication network, that it should also be
participating more in international affairs
generally, and be more active in sending
information (i.e. its perspective and policies) than the periphery nation.
The modes of thought of the center nation milieus are believed to be characterized — in much the same way as the center
individual or small group — by the bothand type of evaluation, a pragmatic more
than a moralistic way of looking at problems, high consistency and high stability
in their perspective. Now, the proposed
differential or both-and way of evaluating
questions seems incompatible with the indication made above that we should find
a stronger tendency toward consensus in
the center than in the periphery. However,
the two hypotheses are not necessarily or
logically incompatible, as the both-and approach may be working over several items
or issues, not only one single: the milieus
may pick one value on one item, another
on the second, etc., and thus on each single
item still maintain high consensus scores.
This may in turn be incompatible with the
hypothesis that the center shows more consistency in its perspective than the periphery, but not necessarily so.
On the perspective itself, the proposed
differences in attitude towards existing
world order and towards change, are due
to the fact that the center nations are the
'have's' and that nations as well as individuals strive to preserve what they have.
The center nation perspective is very much
the modern conservative 'change in order
to preserve' approach, while that of the
periphery nation either stresses 'preserve'
only, i.e., complete acceptance, or takes the
'change in order to change' approach, a
more truly radical approach.
In other words, the center perspective on
the international system is that present
trends of development should merely be
extrapolated into the future. It will accept
deviations from these trends and from the
behavior found compatible with them only
insofar as these deviations do not threaten
the values or the position of the center
nation.
Clearly there should be strong positive
correlations between the perspectives of
center and periphery actors on a range of
different issues which do not primarily
stem from penetration of the two (or one of
the other) creating correspondence in perspectives between them. Some values would
be common to all or most actors: 'peace' as
absence of war, 'development' socio-economically, self-preservation, etc. But in a
Policy
Opinion
75
number of concrete relationships we believe that such correspondence, particularly
on the dimensions listed in Table 2, is primarily due to penetration (by center nations of periphery ones, mostly) as would
be the case, e.g. with the former French
colonies in Africa in their present relationship to France under the common heading
of 'la francophonie': here it is exactly the
elites of the African periphery actors
which have been penetrated by the
French.
And in the cases where perspectives are
largely shared between a center and a
periphery actor, the correlation between
their actual behavior — their foreign policies — may tend to be negative due to
other factors (geographical context, strategic location, etc.). On the other hand,
negative correlations between world perspectives would not exclude positive correlations between the policies of two given
actors. Due to the domination of the one
by the other, the dominating part may be
able to make the other behave like himself, but the latter may still uphold a different world perspective (possibly as an
underlying protest against the political
domination). Thus, the positive correlation
between policy and perspective which is
assumed in the case of Norway does not
imply that such a correlation generally or
most often exists. Moreover, it has to be
explained and tested.
42
V. THE POTENCY OF
T N T R A - N A T I O N A L ' FACTORS
The open-closed polity dimension as most
commonly used, is conceived of as unproblematic: Western democracies or regimes defined by Western scholars as
democratic are open polities; other polities
(Communist states, certain 'radical' and/or
socialist states in the 'Third World') are
closed ones. These conceptions are not only
scientifically incorrect and often politically
misleading: they also fail to consider
certain basic problems.
76
llelge
Hveem
Foreign
First of all, polity may be 'open' in the
sense that there are working channels of
communication and formal rights of free
speech; it may still be 'undemocratic' in
the sense that most communication goes
one way only — from top and downwards;
and that the right of speech is used by a
small group only — those at the top: the
elite and the milieu. The main question
then is not whether or not open channels
of communication exist (in most present
societies they do. to some extent) but the
patterns of communication which exist and
direct the content of the communication.
Oligarchic tendencies within the Western democracies have been stressed by several authors. They seem particularly predominant in the field of foreign policy,
although recent developments may seem
to indicate the contrary. To the extent
that such a situation exists, however, the
potency of societal factors is reduced, while
the two remaining classes of variables —
role and governmental — are made, to the
same extent, more potent.
The potency of societal factors on foreign policy-making — interest groups, public opinion generally, etc. — is very much
determined by the extent to which society
or public opinion is mobilized for foreign
policy activity or activism. When this
activism is relatively high, polity will become more open vertically (provided the
activism does not lead to breakdown of the
communication structure). When communication about foreign policy matters goes
mainly or almost exclusively between the
units within the milieu or the elite, polity
is truly open only at the top level of the
society: it is horizontal 'openness' within
an oligarchic structure. Then we have to
look for the potential influence of role and
governmental variables.
Rosenau assigns a relatively high potency to role variables, without really
saying why. It is evident that being foreign minister of a national actor entails
some extra 'burdens' not attached to most
other roles. The question, however, is
whether the fact of being foreign minister
(or foreign policy-maker) in the Nether43
44
45
46
lands (Rosenau's) is more important than
the fact that the Netherlands are part of
the 'Western community' (within the group
of center nations) and that the images,
attitudes and behavior of the foreign minister of that country will to a very large
extent be a function of this position. We
shall propose that the latter is the more
important.
It should be added that role variables
are probably more potent in policy-making
than in image-building and attitude-formation. One important consequence of this
is that the occupation of a specific role
may make the occupying individual carry
out policies which he does not really prefer.
As we have said before, to what extent
this is true depends among other things on
the type of actor that individual represents, on the issue concerned, and on the
probability that the individual will reduce
the dissonance or discrepancy between behavior and preferences.
The potency of governmental variables
is a function of the formal and informal
structure of the elite, and the relationship
between those in position and those in
opposition vis-à-vis official policy at any
given time. When differences in images
and attitudes between different parts of
the structure, within the elite milieu, or
within the whole polity, are great, and
when the differences between position and
opposition are great, then the potency of
governmental variables is great.
The potency of all these categories of
intra-national variables — treated in more
detail in another context — is strongly
dependent on the relative potency of other
factors. We propose that the potency or
influence of such intra-national factors is
greatest on the whole in a center/big, nonpenetrated,
and open/upwards-communicating actor, while it is probably at a minimum in the periphery/small, dominated,
and closed actor.
This holds as long as we are talking of
the top levels of the polity structure.
The perception or cognitive awareness of
the international position of 'one's actor' is
most strongly held at the elite level or
47
Policy
Opinion
77
within the milieu, and the penetration
The functions of rank disequilibrium
from outside is also most strongly felt at may be quite numerous, as shown by studies
these levels. The potency of extra-national
on the micro- and the macro-level. Genfactors is then less within the public opinerally, it is assumed that a disequilibrated
ion in general, although parts of it may be actor will tend to equilibrate his position,
strongly penetrated.
i.e., achieve equal ranks on the dimensions
This means that the milieu of an actor
he himself or the system of actors deems
where both extra- and intra-national facimportant.
tors make themselves felt, will be exposed
As will be evident, some ranks are given
to opposite or at least different tendencies — ascriptive statuses — as for instance the
of influences — to a situation of crossrank on dimensions as geographical space
pressure. Where there is much upward
(size), geographical centrality, etc. These
communication in an open polity and peneranks cannot be changed unless by occupatration is high, cross-pressure is potentially
tion or annexation. But most other rank
greatest. Here the elite or the policydimensions may be changed, as they are
makers will compromise between the two achievement statuses.
and choose one of them, or escape into a
The equilibrating of ranks will naturally
situation of no choice.
aim at higher rank on the dimensions on
But this cross-pressure situation of course which the rank profile 'dips' low. When
such striving is unsuccessful, it may result
will not materialize and make itself felt
in frustration which again may produce
to the same degree where the consensus of
reactions like aggression, isolation, comthe penetrating elite of a foreign actor and
pensation, etc., depending on the type of
the public opinion (or the whole polity) of
actor and its position.
the actor concerned, is high. In this situaWe believe that the position of rank distion of external internal harmony, the
equilibrium makes the disequilibrated (e.g.
elite or the policy-makers of the actor conthe one large on power criteria but uncerned will not be faced with great difdeveloped, or vice versa) more mobilityficulties either in shaping its images and
oriented than the equilibrated, even the
attitudes or in making its policy (i.e. if
actor ranking low on the relevant dimenother factors may be held constant).
Where this consensus is not predominant sions (small, undeveloped). The idea is
that the state of disequilibrium is creating
and the elite of the actor concerned is exequilibrating activity.
posed to some cross-pressure, in a situation
However, the rank-disequilibrated actor
of relatively high penetration the elite will
may also 'satisfy' itself with its position.
incline toward sharing images and attitudes with the foreign elite. International This will be the case especially when it is
low on ascriptive criteria (with which it
demands (e.g. towards supra-nationalization of decision-making), strategic neces- can do very little) and relatively high on
sities, or dominance from outside will thus achievement criteria. Indeed, the latter is
tend to create a unity of elites — a per- the kind of status one can do something
spective shared by elites which is contrary about. The small but centrist (developed,
to or different from that of the respective white, and relatively old) actor may then
public opinions. The very structure of the be satisfied with the fact that it has
international society, dominated by the achieved a. lot — has reached the position
interaction of elites in a variety of ways, it can hope to obtain — and may consemakes this even more likely. The elites are quently play out its high statuses (and
play down, or repress its low ones). An
more exposed to each other or to elites of
example of such an actor may be Norway.
actors other than their 'own'. In this reNorway's international position is not
spect we should stress, as Deutsch and
in the top center group, but in the next-toKelman do, the importance of international
the top group: it is a moderate center nacommunication structures.
50
48
49
78
Foreign
Helge Hveem
tion. Measured by scores on the additive
index (top score 16), Norway has a total
score of 13, placing it among four countries
receiving international position rank of
23.5. As shown in Appendix A, it ranks in
the same position as Argentina, Bulgaria,
and Finland, while the positions of some
of Norway's closest associates is one step
higher in the case of Denmark (14 on the
index), two steps in the case of Sweden
and the US (scoring 15), and three steps
or positions higher in the case of Great
Britain and Western Germany (scoring the
top 16 score).
From this we may hypothesize that the
world perspective of the Norwegian foreign policy milieu is also of the moderately
centrist type. We hesitate to do so because
Norway is extremely rank-disequilibrated
both when the index variables and particularly when many attribute variables
are taken into consideration. From what
has been said above on the possible consequences of rank disequilibrium, we assume that the question of compensations is
relevant in the case of Norway. Although
the Norwegian public ranks relatively high
on degree of aggressiveness, in certain
aspects of the concept, this has little
relevance to our problem as Norway lacks
the resources with which to act aggressively
toward other nations.
More relevance should probably be attached to the fact that Norway may suffer
from a certain 'partial inferiority' complex, the feeling of being a periphery nation within the center. Comparing her international position with that of her N A T O
colleagues, we see that she ranks lower
than nine (out of fourteen), higher than
only five. And these five are Iceland and
Luxembourg (extremely low on size), and
Greece, Portugal, and Turkey (all low on
development). Norway then receives the
lowest rank among the not too small and
developed N A T O countries.
What is left then is a basis for compensation. Three hypotheses may be put forth
here. One is that the Norwegian milieu is
playing down its lack of power — that it
is a medium sized country — and playing
51
52
53
up its high rank on development. The
second hypothesis would be that Norway
actively tries to intermix as much as possible with the actors with which she shares
a number of high ranks (on e.g. development) or with a higher total international
position rank than Norway (e.g. the nine
N A T O countries). These countries may
'lend' some of their high-ranking status to
Norway through a network of interaction
which associates Norway to them.
The third and last hypothesis on this
point will be simply that Norway because
she receives a somewhat lower international position than her positive reference
group, i.e. her closest associates, will tend
to be 'over-centrist': she will be more centrist in her perspective than the objective
center actors, at least on some issues being
'more Catholic than the Pope'. The perspective of Norway's foreign policy milieu
is made more 'truly centrist' as an effect
of her rank disequilibrium.
The compensation-by-intermingling hypothesis also means that the Norwegian
milieu will put a great value on international cooperation or organization as such,
or as a means of achieving national goals.
According to Terhune, this is exactly the
definition of 'internationalism', one of the
most confused concepts in international
relations theory.
It seems necessary to distinguish between
at least three different types of 'internationalism': supra-nationalism, cross-nationalism, and trans-nationalism.
We shall
relate these concepts to our data later on.
Let us say here something of the dimension
globalism vs. regionalism, which is related
to the concepts mentioned.
Globalistic attitudes are shown by a
preference for cooperation at the global
level and for a global foreign policy in
general; regionalistic attitudes are preferences for cooperation with or a foreign
policy directed toward a limited number
of national or multinational actors (limited
primarily by geographical criteria). We
would say that globalism means a willingness to tackle problems or phenomena at
the global level, or in the (geographical or
54
55
56
functional) areas outside the closest and
"those most naturally preoccupying oneself, into one's perspective, becoming internalized and essential to one's attitudes on
relevant issues and the policy one is
making.
Generally, 'internationalism' means willingness to take the interests of other actors and their perspectives into account;
and, in situations where the interests (perspectives) of one's 'own' actor and those
of others are in conflict, not necessarily
and a priori place own interests before
those of others. Moreover, the concept is
related to responsiveness.
Regionalism logically means a tendency
to identify oneself first of all with those
areas which are close. This raises one important question: in the case of a small or
medium small actor with limited capacity
in terms of resources, and capability in
terms of power, does such an actor really
have any choice? Whether it wants it or
not — will it not simply have to limit itself to activities within and thus identification toward the closer areas, i.e. to regionalistic perspectives and policies?
This is the problem of domain vs. scope.
And the problem posed for the small actor
in particular is whether it can afford to
participate as a full member of the society
of national actors in both domain and
scope. Instead of trying to match both
these demands, it may be more rewarding
to try to concentrate on one of them, thus
maximizing one's output and possibly one's
influence there. Or, the question may even
be whether to choose both limited domain
(regionalism) and limited scope (e.g. only
functional cooperation).
Although we may find examples of small
state influence in global politics (where
great powers are involved), the general
hypothesis would be that the small state
will usually choose regional policies. This
does not mean, however, that there may
not be strong globalistic feeling within the
foreign policy milieu or elite of that actor,
or that it necessarily has to make this
choice on the policy side. On scope, the
small state — at least if it is a relatively
Policy
Opinion
79
centrist one, and not a 'mini-state' (like
Andorra) — will in a sense have no real
choice. Because the different fields of activity are so intermingled and overlapping,
participation in one field leads to or presupposes participation in another or several
others. There is a 'partout' ticket which
all actors have to buy if they want to be
an accepted member of the international
society. Thus the small state has to divide
its resources, its capacity on a number of
different fields of activity.
In the case of Norway, however, at least
one major factor might be expected to
make the perspective and 'internationalism'
of her milieu more globalistic: her global
shipping business, which is considerable,
both in absolute and in relative terms.
This fact together with the 'special' Norwegian affiliations toward the UN point
to a large degree of globalistic orientation
within the milieu, although the practical
policy — the behavioral side — is supposed
to lean toward regionalism.
Going back to the center-periphery dimension, one might argue that an actor like
Norway, which on the basis of scarce resources not only plays up the importance
of development variables, but has also
objectively maximized or 'over-achieved'
on these variables will be most eager to
maintain what it has, which means that it
will demand stability, peace, and security
from the international society.
At this point, we must distinguish between achievement in the past and achievement in the present. The former, the already achieved actor, will in particular
tend to take the attitude just mentioned:
it was upward mobile in the past; at present when its rates of growth are not particularly high, it first of all wants to maintain what it has achieved.
The achieving actor will tend to take
an attitude more favorable toward change,
mobility, even toward taking risks. Its position is not settled yet, it is still on the
move because of high rates of growth. Its
attitude or acts may even take the form of
aggression.
Another distinction which may be useful
57
Foreign
Policy
Opinion
81
82
Helge
Hveem
Foreign
* I n d e x : 1. A g e of n a t i o n . 2. P o p u l a t i o n
( t o t a l ) . 3 . M e m b e r s h i p s (total n u m b e r o f ) i n
I G O ' s and I N G O ' s . 4. G e o g r a p h i c a l centrality.
5. L i t e r a c y l e v e l . 6. G D P at f a c t o r c o s t . 7.
G D P p e r c a p i t a . 8. Industry's o u t p u t as "It of
total G D P .
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : E a c h o f the
has b e e n t r i c h o t o m i z e d .
eight
indicators
a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n w h a t d e g r e e o f latitude,
i n d i v i d u a l m e n , d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s and o t h e r s /
e n j o y in world politics.
W e a r e t h i n k i n g o f , e.g. the s o - c a l l e d ' n a tional interest' s c h o o l in international relations,
o r the m a n - c e n t e r e d a p p r o a c h o f certain p s y c h o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l traditions
(cf. T h e U N E S C O p r o c l a m a t i o n that p e a c e
starts w i t h the s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l ) .
O n e e x a m p l e of this is the w o r l d federalist
f o c u s o n s u p r a - n a t i o n a l f a c t o r s . F o r a n interesting,
q u a n t i t a t i v e study
o f the d i f f e r e n t
' s c h o o l s ' i n international relations, see B r u c e M .
Russctt,
'Methodological
and
Theoretical
Schools in International Relations' M o n o g r a p h
N o . 1 o f the A m e r i c a n A c a d e m y o f P o l i t i c a l
and S o c i a l S c i e n c e P h i l a d e l p h i a ( O c t . 1970)
pp. 87—105.
7
8
NOTES
* T h i s is a s o m e w h a t rewritten v e r s i o n of
C h a p t e r 2 in my b o o k entitled, International
Relations and World Images. A Study of Norwegian Foreign Policy Elites. U n i v e r s i t e t s f o r l a g e t , O s l o 1972. T h e b o o k is a r e p o r t on a
s u r v e y o f elite a n d o p i n i o n - m a k e r s a m p l e s c a r r i e d out in 1967. T h e p a p e r w a s presented at
the N o r d i c C o n f e r e n c e o n F o r e i g n P o l i c y
Decision-making held at T a m p e r e , Finland, on
26—28 N o v e m b e r 1971, b y the T a m p e r e P e a c e
R e s e a r c h Institute. T h e article c a n b e i d e n t i fied a s P R I O P u b l i c a t i o n N o . 16—10.
1
J. D a v i d Singer, ' T h e L e v e l s - o f - A n a l y s i s
Problem
in
International
Relations',
World
Politics XIV: 1, O c t . 1961. p p . 7 7 — 9 2 .
2 S i n g e r , i b i d . ; R o b e r t C . N o r t h , e t al.. Content Analysis, N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y Press,
E v a n s t o n 1963, p p . 5 — 7 ; J o h a n G a l t u n g , Theories of Peace, U n i v e r s i t e t s f o r l a g e t , O s l o , f o r t h coming.
3 Cf. R i c h a r d C . S n y d e r , H . W . B r u c k , a n d
B u r t o n S a p i n , Decision-Making as an Approach
to the Study of International Politics, P r i n c e t o n
U n i v e r s i t y Press, P r i n c e t o n 1954; J o s e p h F r a n kel, The Making of Foreign Policy, O x f o r d
U n i v e r s i t y Press, L o n d o n 1963: R o y C . M a c r i dis
(ed.),
Foreign
Policy in
World Politics.
P r e n t i c e - H a l l , E n g l c w o o d C l i f f s 1962; G e o r g e
M o d e l s k i , A Theory of Foreign Policy, P r a e g e r ,
N e w Y o r k 1962.
4
Cf. S n y d e r et al.. i b i d , a n d o t h e r m o r e
recent w o r k s r e l y i n g h e a v i l y o n c o n c e p t u a l i zations i n the f o r m a t i o n o f t h e o r y , a m o n g them
those r e f e r r e d to in the p r e c e d i n g n o t e . It is
s e l f - e v i d e n t that the q u e s t i o n o f e x c l u s i v e n e s s
versus inclusiveness s h o u l d first of all be d e c i d e d e m p i r i c a l l y . I n o u r o p i n i o n , the v e r y f e w
e m p i r i c a l studies i n the S n y d e r t r a d i t i o n h a v e
n o t b e e n a b l e t o p r o v e its fruitfulness.
Cf. J a m e s N . R o s e n a u , ' P r e - T h e o r i e s a n d
T h e o r i e s o f F o r e i g n P o l i c y ' , i n R . B a r r y Farrell
(ed.),
Approaches to
International and
Comparative
Politics,
Northwestern
University
Press, E v a n s t o n 1966, p p . 2 7 — 9 2 .
5
6
Cf. J. D a v i d Singer, ' M a n and W o r l d
P o l i t i e s ' . S i n g e r stresses t h e n e e d t o c o m b i n e
p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d societal p h e n o m e n a f o r the
purpose of explanation. A n d we have to c o m bine macro and micro phenomena in order to
9
R o s e n a u , i n Farrell ( e d . ) , o p . cit. c a l l s his
contribution a 'pre-theory' of foreign p o l i c y m a k i n g : it is less than a f u l l - f l e d g e d t h e o r y ; it
is tentative. R o s e n a u d e f i n e s it '— an e a r l y step
towards
explanation
of
specific
empirical
e v e n t s , a p o i n t o f v i e w o f p h i l o s o p h y a b o u t the
w a y the w o r l d is. — ' C f . n o t e 41, p . 41.
10
O n this p o i n t . R o s e n a u seems t o c o n f u s e
two different axes or dimensions as one. T h e
f i v e l e v e l s he is p r o p o s i n g in fact are n o t f o u n d
along one single continuum, but are both l o g i c a l l y a n d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y to be seen in the
c o n t e x t o f a t least t w o d i m e n s i o n s : the p u b l i c
vs. p r i v a t e , a n d the i n t r a - n a t i o n a l v s . international. T h u s , instead o f the linear c o n t i n u u m ,
a f o u r - f o l d o r a n e i g h t - f o l d t a b l e seems t o o f f e r
a m o r e c o r r e c t p r e s e n t a t i o n of the c a t e g o r i e s .
11
I b i d . , p . 43. T h e idiosyncratic v a r i a b l e s
are p a r t i c u l a r to the i n d i v i d u a l (his talents,
p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e s , his v a l u e s ) ; role v a r i a b l e s
a r e p e c u l i a r t o the p o l i c y - m a k e r ' s r o l e , a n d
work irrespective of or independent of i d i o s y n c r a t i c v a r i a b l e s ; governmental v a r i a b l e s a r c
p e c u l i a r t o the g o v e r n m e n t a l structure ( e x e c u t i v e vs. l e g i s l a t i v e relations, e t c . ) ; social or
n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l v a r i a b l e s are, e.g. the m a j o r
v a l u e o r i e n t a t i o n s o f a s o c i e t y , the d e g r e e o f
n a t i o n a l unity, the e x t e n t o f i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,
etc.; a n d systemic v a r i a b l e s a r e ' a n y n o n - h u m a n
aspects of a s o c i e t y ' s external e n v i r o n m e n t or
a n y a c t i o n s o c c u r r i n g a b r o a d that c o n d i t i o n o r
o t h e r w i s e i n f l u e n c e the c h o i c e s m a d e b y its
officials . . . ' .
12
Cf. f o o t n o t e 4 5 o n p . 47, i b i d . T h e author
criticizes ( p p . 3 4 — 3 5 ) that m a n y attempts at
t h e o r y - f o r m a t i o n d o n o t m a k e e x p l i c i t the
r a t i o n a l e b e h i n d h y p o t h e s e s o n causal relations
a n d that t h e y a r c rather u n s y s t e m a t i c o n this
p o i n t . It seems to us that R o s e n a u to a l a r g e
extent is subject to his o w n criticisms.
13
C f . p . 48, i b i d . ; the list o f h y p o t h e s e s i s
e x h a u s t i v e in that all c a t e g o r i e s of v a r i a b l e s
( r e p r e s e n t i n g p o t e n t i a l l y i n f l u e n c i n g factors)
a r e related t o e v e r y o n e o f the eight classes o f
a c t o r s . A further e l a b o r a t i o n of the list, inc l u d i n g the fourth d i c h o t o m y o f p e n e t r a t i o n -
n o n p e n e t r a t i o n a n d thus m a k i n g the n u m b e r o f
classes 16, is m a d e at the e n d of his a r t i c l e (sec
pp. 90—91).
A s far a s w e k n o w , a t e a m o f p o l i t i c a l
scientists f r o m several A m e r i c a n research institutions are p r e s e n t l y c a r r y i n g o u t a w o r l d w i d e c o m p a r a t i v e study b a s e d o n the R o s e n a u
p r e - t h e o r y . O n the basis o f v o t i n g patterns i n
the U N , B r u c e Russett o f f e r s a v a l i d a t i o n o f
the p r e - t h e o r y , cf. B r u c e M. Russett, International Regions and the International System:
A Study in Political Ecology, R a n d M c N a l l y ,
C h i c a g o 1967, p . 94. H e c o n c l u d e s that w h i l e
i d i o s y n c r a t i c a n d r o l e v a r i a b l e s o n the m a j o r
issues i n the U N s e e m e d t o b e o f a slight sign i f i c a n c e , the t y p e o f g o v e r n m e n t a l system
o c c a s i o n a l l y but not o f t e n h a d a d i s c e r n i b l e
effect. Societal a n d s y s t e m i c influences, h o w e v e r , a p p e a r e d either o f t h e m o r b o t h t o b e
m o r e i m p o r t a n t than the others. T h e l i m i t a tion o f this v a l i d a t i o n lies i n the fact that R u s sett makes n o d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t
types o f actors.
14
A n o t h e r w e a k p o i n t i s p r o b a b l y the e x a m p l e
o f C z e c h o s l o v a k i a . F o r o n e thing, subsequent
events s h o w e d that this c o u n t r y , by d e f i n i t i o n a
closed one, was 'open under a cover of
c l o s e d n e s s ' : the J a n u a r y 1968 r e v o l u t i o n in fact
w a s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the latent o p e n n e s s of
the C z e c h o s l o v a k i a n s o c i e t y . A n o t h e r t h i n g i s
that later events again h a v e c l o s e d this s o c i e t y
f r o m the t o p t h r o u g h s y s t e m i c i n f l u e n c e , w h i c h
s h o u l d be a c c r e d i t e d m u c h m o r e w e i g h t than it
is in the Rosenau s c h e m e : in fact o n l y the short
' C z e c h o s l o v a k i a n 1968 S p r i n g ' g a v e c r e d i t t o
his s t r o n g e m p h a s i s on intra-national factors,
w h i l e the s y s t e m i c i n f l u e n c e s c l e a r l y b o t h p r i o r
to a n d after this p e r i o d h a v e p l a y e d a p a r a m o u n t role.
16
R o s e n a u , o p . cit., p . 65. C f . a l s o F r e d W .
R i g g s , ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s as a P r i s m a t i c
S y s t e m ' , World Politics XIV: 1 O c t o b e r 1961,
p p . 144—81.
R o s e n a u , i b i d , distinguishes b e t w e e n f o u r
d i f f e r e n t issue-areas: the territorial, the status,
the h u m a n resources a n d the n o n h u m a n res o u r c e s areas, ' — each o f w h i c h e n c o m p a s s e s
the d i s t i n c t i v e m o t i v e s , a c t i o n s , and interactions
e v o k e d b y the clusters o f v a l u e s that are l i n k e d
t o , r e s p e c t i v e l y , the a l l o c a t i o n o f territorial
j u r i s d i c t i o n , the a l l o c a t i o n o f status w i t h i n
h o r i z o n t a l p o l i t i c a l systems o r w i t h i n n o n p o l i t i c a l systems, the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d a l l o 17
Opinion
83
c a t i o n o f h u m a n resources, a n d the d e v e l o p m e n t
and allocation of nonhuman resources' pp. 8 2 —
83.
D a h l i n his c o m m u n i t y s t u d y f o u n d a n
o v e r l a p a m o n g ' l e a d e r s ' a n d ' s u b l e a d e r s ' i n the
three issue-areas i n v o l v e d i n the study o f o n l y
3 "In of his s a m p l e , w h i l e o n l y 1.5 %> w e r e
l e a d e r s in all three areas ( D a h l , o p . cit., p. 175).
Similar findings have been reported by Miller
a n d Stokes: they f o u n d statistically h i g h l y sign i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n the o p e r a t i o n o f
representation processes in three m a j o r issueareas — s o c i a l w e l f a r e , f o r e i g n i n v o l v m e n t , a n d
c i v i l rights — a m o n g c o n g r e s s m e n . ( W a r r e n E .
M i l l e r a n d D o n a l d E . Stokes, ' C o n s t i t u e n c y
Influence
in
Congress',
American
Political
Science Review LVI1: 1, M a r c h 1963, p p . 4 5 —
56). I n o u r o p i n i o n , their f i n d i n g s a r e c o m patible with what we have p r o p o s e d ourselves,
a s they d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y , n o r l o g i c a l l y , s u p p o r t the thesis that there are s e v e r a l issueareas w i t h d i s t i n c t l y separate p r o c e s s e s o f p o l i c y - m a k i n g within the a r e a o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y .
18
15
W e are p a r t i c u l a r l y r e f e r r i n g t o his use o f
the d i c h o t o m y open vs.
closed p o l i t i e s , w h i c h
is n o t o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d , b u t seems to f o l l o w a
rather c o n v e n t i o n a l use of the c o n c e p t s , i.e. a
W e s t e r n , ' i d e o l o g i z e d ' o n e . T o take t w o e x a m p l e s o f the d e b a t a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f this:
K e n y a is c l a s s i f i e d as ' o p e n ' , G h a n a as ' c l o s e d ' ;
t o u s i t seems that e v e n p r e c o u p , N k r u m a h ' s
G h a n a w a s n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y less ' o p e n ' (in the
m e a n i n g that p a r t i c i p a t i o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s , t o l e r a t e d o p p o s i t i o n , etc. e x i s t e d ) than K e n y a .
Policy
19
Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and
J a n i c e Stein, ' A F r a m e w o r k f o r R e s e a r c h o n
F o r e i g n P o l i c y B e h a v i o r ' , Journal of Conflict
Resolution XII, 1, 1969, p p . 7 5 — 1 0 1 .
R o s e n a u uses the N e t h e r l a n d s as an e x a m p l e o f a n a c t o r f a l l i n g i n t o this class.
O u r o b j e c t i o n s to his t h e o r y a r e b o t h
theoretical a n d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l . First, w e find
that the d i m e n s i o n s he has c h o s e n , a l t h o u g h
r e p r e s e n t i n g b a s i c traits o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s o c i e t y , d o n o t tap the interesting a n d i m p o r t a n t aspects of that s o c i e t y r e l e v a n t in this
c o n t e x t . E s p e c i a l l y his use of t h e p e n e t r a t e d —
nonpenetrated d i c h o t o m y leaves much to be
desired.
20
21
M e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y , his s c h e m e — w h e n all
f o u r d i c h o t o m i e s are i n c l u d e d , p l u s three o r
f o u r issue-areas — is t o o d e t a i l e d , t o o o v e r l o a d e d : as l o n g as the u n i v e r s e consists of less
than 150 f o r m a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t n a t i o n a l actors,
the n u m b e r o f units f a l l i n g into e a c h o f the
classes m a y b e t o o small f o r e m p i r i c a l analysis.
M o r e i m p o r t a n t , instead o f the use o f d i c h o t o m i e s w e think that a n i n d e x w o u l d b e the
a p p r o p r i a t e thing, as it w o u l d a l s o e s c a p e the
d i f f i c u l t y j u s t m e n t i o n e d , and as it w o u l d g i v e
a m o r e r e l i a b l e p i c t u r e of the international
s o c i e t y a n d its c o m p l e x i t y . W h i l e w e m a y h a v e
t o d i c h o t o m i z e e a c h s i n g l e v a r i a b l e g o i n g into
the i n d e x , w e m a y a r r i v e a t a m o r e r e f i n e d
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n b y u s i n g t h e ' e n d result' o f the
a d d i t i v e i n d e x f o r r a n k i n g , etc. B y such a n
o p e r a t i o n , w e shall g e t a f l e x i b l e m e a s u r e o f
i n t e r - a c t o r d i f f e r e n c e s , w h i c h s h o w s degrees
o r shades o f p r o p e r t i e s characteristic o f the d i f ferent classes, n o t the c l e a r - c u t ( a n d unrealistic)
0,1 c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f the m e t h o d R o s e n a u e m ploys.
22
G a l t u n g , ' F o r e i g n P o l i c y O p i n i o n as a
Function of Social Position'. His index e m p l o y e d the f o l l o w i n g v a r i a b l e s : Age; Income;
84
Helge
Hveem
Foreign
ternational P e a c e R e s e a r c h Institute, O s l o for
Occupation by position ( l e a d i n g or s u b o r d i n a t e ,
the use of his data on UN b e h a v i o r .
e m p l o y e r or e m p l o y e e ) ; Occupation by sector
I n the c a s e o f the n a t i o n a l c e n t e r - p e r i ( p r i m a r y , s e c o n d a r y , t e r t i a r y ) ; Place of resip h e r y i n d e x , i n d i c a t o r s used f o r v a l i d a t i o n o f
dence (as by g e o g r a p h i c a l l o c a t i o n ) ; Place of
the i n d e x i n c l u d e d d e g r e e of k n o w l e d g e (in g e n residence ( i n t o w n s o r i n rural, s p a r s e l y p o p e r a l ) , p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d the d e g r e e t o
ulated a r e a s ) ; Education; and Sex. A l l v a r i w h i c h p e o p l e e x p r e s s e d a n o p i n i o n o n a n issue.
ables w e r e d i c h o t o m i z e d a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n
A n o u t s t a n d i n g e x a m p l e o f this t r a d i t i o n
standards.
is Richard A. Snyder and James A. Robinson,
T h e s e p r o b l e m s are taken u p i n m o r e
National
and
International
Decision-Making,
detail in N i l s P. G l e d i t s c h and H e l g e H v c c m ,
Institute f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r d e r , N e w Y o r k
' O n an International Center-Periphery I n d e x '
1961. T h e o p p o s i t e s c h o o l i s r e p r e s e n t e d b y , e.g.
(forthcoming).
K e n n e t h W a l t z , Man, the State, and War, C o l W e a r e r e f e r r i n g to, e.g. the s o c i o - m e t r i c
u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, N e w Y o r k 1959, a n d
study b y J . D a v i d S i n g e r a n d M e l v i n S m a l l .
J o h n H e r z , International Politics in the Atomic
' T h e C o m p o s i t i o n a n d the Status O r d e r i n g o f
Age, C o l u m b i a P a p e r b a c k s , N . Y .
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l System, 1815—1940', World
B r u c e M.
Russett, Community and ConPolitics 1966, p p . 2 3 6 — 2 8 2 , w h e r e the authors
tention: Britain and America in the Twentieth
d e t e r m i n e the rank o f states b y m e a n s o f the
Century, M . I . T . Press, C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . 1963.
rank a n d the n u m b e r of d i p l o m a t i c l e g a t i o n s a
O n theories o f d i s e q u i l i b r i u m , see J o h a n
state r e c e i v e s f r o m o t h e r states. C f . also S i m o n
G a l t u n g , ' A Structural T h e o r y o f A g g r e s s i o n ' ,
Schwartzmann and Manuel M o r a y Arauja,
JPR, 2, 1964, p p . 9 5 — 1 1 9 ; and N i l s P. G l e ' T h e Images of International Stratification in
ditsch, ' R a n k and I n t e r a c t i o n : A G e n e r a l T h e Latin A m e r i c a ' . JPR, 3. 1966, p p . 2 2 5 — 4 3 ; and
o r y with some A p p l i c a t i o n s to the InternationH e l g e H v e e i n . ' I m a g e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Stratial S y s t e m ' , Proceedings of the 1PRA Third
f i c a t i o n : T h e R a n k i n g o f A f r i c a n States', p a p e r
General Conference II, V a n G o r c u m , A s s c n
p r e s e n t e d t o the U n i v e r s i t y S o c i a l S c i e n c e
1970, p p . 1—21.
C o n f e r e n c e , N a i r o b i , 8—13 D e c e m b e r , 1969.
Russett, International Regions and the InJohan Galtung, 'Small G r o u p T h e o r y and
ternational System, p. 2 1 9 .
the T h e o r y o f International R e l a t i o n s ; A S t u d y
T h e s e two p r o p o s i t i o n s may seem to coni n I s o m o r p h i s m ' , i n M o r t o n A . K a p l a n , ed.,
tradict each o t h e r , as w i d e r r a n g e and c o n s e New
Approaches
in
International
Relations,
quently wider dispersion logically w o u l d lead
St. M a r t i n ' s Press, N e w Y o r k 1968, p p . 2 7 0 —
to less p r o n o u n c e d t e n d e n c i e s . H o w e v e r , it is
303.
b e l i e v e d that the w i d e r r a n g e makes itself felt
A p a r t from those cited in note 24 a b o v e ,
o v e r a n u m b e r o f v a r i a b l e s o n a c e r t a i n issue
we may mention Per O l a v Reinton, 'Internaarea, and thus s i n g l e - v a r i a b l e central t e n d e n tional Structure a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n :
c i e s may be m a i n t a i n e d .
T h e C a s e o f L a t i n A m e r i c a ' , JPR, 4 , 1967, p p .
Symmetric penetration means practically
2 3 4 — 6 5 ; a n d Kurt J a c o b s e n , ' V o t i n g B e h a v i o r
e q u a l l y m u c h p e n e t r a t i o n o f e a c h o t h e r ' s como f the N o r d i c C o u n t r i e s i n the G e n e r a l A s s e m munities or p o l i t i c s by b o t h partners in a relab l y ' , Cooperation and Conflict, 1967, p p . 139—
t i o n s h i p o f two (dyad).
57.
Cf. Russett, C o m m u n i t y and C o n t e n t i o n .
C f . G a l t u n g , ' F o r e i g n P o l i c y attitudes a s
In this case there is little or no i n t e r a c t i o n
a Function of Social Position'.
b e t w e e n the two a c t o r s , o r little a c t i o n b y the
S o m e o f the v a r i a b l e s i n the n a t i o n a l inb e t t e r - p l a c e d t o w a r d the i l l - p l a c e d (in terms
d e x w h i c h have not been 'matched' in our
of international position).
index might of course have been represented
I n fact, this i s the i m p r e s s i o n h e l d b y most
i n t h e latter a s w e l l , e.g. p l a c e o f r e s i d e n c e :
o b s e r v e r s of E a s t - W e s t relations in the 60s
u r b a n or rural at the international l e v e l m a y
w h e n they use the c o n c e p t detente; it may e v e n
b e r e p r e s e n t e d b y u r b a n i z a t i o n ; sex ( m o r e o r
be related to U n i t e d States — F r a n c e r e l a t i o n less) b y p r e d o m i n a n t r a c e .
ship u n d e r G a u l l i s m .
T h e n u m b e r o f m e m b e r s h i p s i n internaCf. Galtung, 'Foreign P o l i c y Attitudes as
tional
organizations, global
and 'regional',
a Function of Social Position'; Nils H. Halle,
governmental and non-governmental, of A f r i 'Social Position and Foreign Policy Attitudes',
c a n states c o r r e l a t e s (1965 figures) by .75
JPR, 1, 1966, p p . 4 6 — 7 4 .
( S p e a r m a n ' s rank c o r r e l a t i o n ) with the r a n k i n g
" An a l r e a d y classical and s t r o n g l y critical
o f A f r i c a n states m a d e b y a s a m p l e o f A f r i c a n
a c c o u n t o f this p r o c e s s o f p e n e t r a t i o n i s Frantz
students, c f . H v c e m , o p . cit. n o t e 2 4 a b o v e .
F'anon, Les damnes de la terre, M a s p e r o , P a r i s
P o p u l a t i o n , w h i c h w a s s e l e c t e d a s o n e o f the
1961
( a l s o in E n g l i s h translation. P e n g u i n
size v a r i a b l e s , t o s o m e e x t e n t m a y b e seen a s
Books).
a potential for interaction or for ' e x p o r t i n g '
C f . R o b e r t M i c h e l s , Political Parties, T h e
the v a l u e s , attitudes a n d i m a g e s etc. of a n a a
31
32
23
24
33
34
35
2 5
36
26
37
38
27
Studies, P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , 1968), m i m e o .
R o s e n a u s h o w s that p u b l i c interest a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y matters i n the U S has
increased d u r i n g the last f e w years. T h i s most
p r o b a b l y i s true e v e n w i t h N o r w a y , a l t h o u g h
the V i e t n a m debate m a y make it particularly
true o f the U n i t e d States.
Karl W . Deutsch and Richard L . Merritt,
'Effects of Events on National and International I m a g e s ' , in K e l m a n ( e d . ) , International Political Behavior, s h o w that e x t e r n a l e v e n t s m a y
m o b i l i z e the g e n e r a l p u b l i c into strong i n v o l v e m e n t a n d a f f e c t , b u t that this i n v o l v e m e n t
tends t o fluctuate, t o d r o p after s o m e t i m e d o w n
to a 'natural' l e v e l a n d then rise a g a i n with
s o m e n e w d r a m a t i c e x t e r n a l event, w i t h similar
shifts in attitudes h e l d .
4 5
46
Cf. J a m e s N . R o s e n a u , ' P r i v a t e P r e f e r ences and Public Responsibilities', in J. D a v i d
Singer,
Quantitative
International
Politics:
Insights and Evidence, F r e e Press, N e w Y o r k
1968. R o s e n a u h e r e p r o v i d e s e m p i r i c a l s u p p o r t
f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that r o l e v a r i a b l e s are m o r e
p o t e n t than i n d i v i d u a l , i d i o s y n c r a t i c v a r i a b l e s .
This is done by analyzing Congressmen's beh a v i o r t o w a r d the f o r m e r U S S e c r e t a r y o f
State, J o h n F o s t e r D u l l e s a n d his p o l i c i e s . W h a t
R o s e n a u s h o w s is that the r o l e of a partisan,
i.e. m e m b e r o f o n e o f the parties i n the C o n gress, is m o r e d e t e r m i n a n t to a p e r s o n ' s b e h a v i o r than his p e r s o n a l i t y or his personal
p r e f e r e n c e s . T o us, i t seems that R o s e n a u g o e s
t o o far i n g e n e r a l i z i n g o n the r e l a t i v e p o t e n c y
o f the factors m e n t i o n e d f r o m such f i n d i n g s
o n l y . D u l l e s p r o b a b l y w a s n o t the S e c r e t a r y o f
State w h o w o u l d b e m o s t i n c l i n e d t o c r e a t e the
t y p e o f bipartisan b a c k i n g o f the f o r e i g n p o l i c y
w h i c h i s s o o f t e n f o u n d i n U . S . p o l i t i c s . O n the
o t h e r h a n d , these f i n d i n g s are in a c c o r d a n c e
w i t h w h a t w e shall p r o p o s e o u r s e l v e s : that
p a r t y a f f i l i a t i o n is i m p o r t a n t in e x p l a i n i n g
i n t r a - m i l i c u v a r i a n c e s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y attitudes.
Policy
Opinion
85
5 1
T h e r e a s o n w h y t h e U n i t e d States d o e s
n o t s c o r e 16, i.e. fall w i t h i n the v e r y t o p center
c a t e g o r y , i s that they r e c e i v e o n l y m e d i u m
rank on g e o g r a p h i c a l centrality, a f a c t o r w h i c h
gives Europe a preeminent position. This fact o r has b e e n u s e d b y G l e d i t s c h , ' T h e Structure
o f the International A i r l i n e N e t w o r k ' , (unp u b l i s h e d magister thesis) O s l o 1968.
Cf. Galtung, ' N o r g e i verdenssamfunnet',
i n R a m s e y , o p . cit., p p . 4 5 0 — 1 , O v e r a n u m b e r
of 71 different variables, data on w h i c h are
taken f r o m B r u c e Russett et al., World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators, Y a l e
U n i v e r s i t y Press, N e w H a v e n 1964, N o r w a y
s h o w s a n e x t r e m e l y u n e v e n rank p r o f i l e , m e a sured by her p o s i t i o n in a d e c i l e g r o u p on a n y
o n e variable. C o m p a r e d with Great Britain and
S w e d e n , the t w o t o p - r a n k i n g c o u n t r i e s i n N o r w a y ' s r e f e r e n c e g r o u p , her p r o f i l e i s e x t r e m e l y
u n e v e n : w h i l e S w e d e n a n d G r e a t Britain tend
t o w a r d s the e x t r e m e d e c i l e s (i.e. the highest
a n d the l o w e s t o n e s ) N o r w a y distributes herself v e r y e v e n l y o n all d e c i l e s .
G a l t u n g , ibid., p p . 470 ff. sees a g g r e s s i v e ness a s a n a t t e m p t t o c h a n g e ( o n e ' s e n v i r o n ment, i n the case o f a n o v e r - a c h i e v e d ) . H e c o n tends that N o r w a y m a k e s this attempt, a n d thus
spells o u t h e r a g g r e s s i v e n e s s , t h r o u g h international c o o p e r a t i o n a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n , w h i l e she
probably h a d been m o r e aggressive in a physical o r v i o l e n t m e a n i n g o f t h e c o n c e p t , h a d she
b e e n m o r e p o w e r f u l , h i g h e r o n size, m o r e r e sourceful.
52
53
54
I n H v e e m , ' I m a g e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Strati f i c a t i o n ' , the a r g u m e n t that i n t e r a c t i o n g i v e s
p r e s t i g e is g i v e n an e m p i r i c a l b a c k i n g . It is
s h o w n that those c o u n t r i e s w h i c h rank l o w o n
d e v e l o p m e n t ( a c h i e v e m e n t ) , h i g h o n size are
the o n e s w h i c h t e n d t o b e i n t e r a c t i n g p a r t i c u larly m u c h , i.e. seeking i n c r e a s e d rank t h r o u g h
interaction w i t h others ( a n d w i t h those w h i c h
rank h i g h e r than o n e s e l f ) .
39
28
40
29
41
47
Rosenau and w e are p r o b a b l y m o r e i n
a g r e e m e n t w h e n the c o n c e p t o f p e n e t r a t i o n i s
b r o u g h t in. F o r a n e v a l u a t i o n o f the r e l a t i v e
i m p o r t a n c e o f inter- a n d intra-national factors
o n f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k i n g , see D e u t s c h a n d
E d i n g e r , o p . cit. T h e y c o n c l u d e o n the basis
o f their e m p i r i c a l m a t e r i a l , that i n t e r n a t i o n a l
o r e x t r a n a t i o n a l factors w e r e the m o r e i m p o r tant up to the m i d - 5 0 s , i n t r a - n a t i o n a l factors
f r o m that time o n .
49
T h i s w o u l d b e true i n the c a s e w h e n e.g.
m i n o r i t y g r o u p s in a c t o r A ' b e l o n g t o ' , or is of
the s a m e n a t i o n a l i t y as, a c t o r B.
C f . D e u t s c h , The Nerves of Government:
and Herbert C. Kelman, 'Social-Psychological
A p p r o a c h e s : the Question of Relevance', in
Kelman
(ed.),
International Political Behavior,
pp. 565—605.
49
43
tion-state; as such it is related to the r e l a t i o n al d i m e n s i o n .
I
a m i n d e b t e d t o Kurt J a c o b s e n o f t h e I n 30
F r e e Press, G l e n c o e , 1958.
C f . J a m e s R o s e n a u , The Attentive Public
and Foreign Policy. ( C e n t e r for International
44
5 4 )
See references in note 34 above, as well
a s H v e e m , ' I m a g e s o f International Stratification'.
T h a t this h o l d s true e.g. f o r t r a d e d a t a , m a y
be seen f r o m the fact that the e i g h t c o u n t r i e s
ranking o n t o p , b o t h i n 1963 a n d 1966, a s N o r w a y ' s p r i n c i p a l t r a d i n g partners, a r e all r a n k i n g
h i g h e r than N o r w a y o n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o sition i n d e x f o u r o f t h e m i n fact b e l o n g i n g t o
the t o p s c o r e g r o u p .
55
F o r attempts at c l a r i f y i n g it, see H e r b e r t
M c C l o s k e y , in J a m e s R o s e n a u , ( e d . ) Domestic
Sources of Foreign Policy; a n d K e n n e t h W.
Terhune,
'Nationalistic Aspiration,
Loyalty,
a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ' , JPR, 3, 1965, p p . 2 7 7 —
87.
56
J o h a n G a l t u n g , ' O n the F u t u r e o f the I n ternational S y s t e m ' , JPR, 4. 1967, p p . 3 0 3 — 3 3 .
O t h e r c a t e g o r i e s o f attitude sets a l o n g this d i mension is nationalism, sub-nationalism, and
extra-nationalism, the latter r e p r e s e n t i n g the
c a s e w h e r e a n i n d i v i d u a l feels s t r o n g e r l o y a l t y
t o a n a c t o r o u t s i d e his o w n c o u n t r y than t o this
c o u n t r y itself.
I n 1968, N o r w a y ' s s h i p p i n g i n terms o f
57
86
Helge
Hveem
total size o f her s h i p p i n g fleet (in tons d e a d
w e i g h t ) w a s the third highest r a n k i n g i n the
world, only 'convenience flag' Liberia and
J a p a n r a n k i n g h i g h e r . I n the last y e a r s N o r w a y
has a l w a y s b e e n a m o n g the f o u r o r f i v e largest
s h i p p i n g c o u n t r i e s i n the w o r l d .
F o r the p e r i o d 1 9 6 0 — 6 6 , N o r w a y h a d a n
a v e r a g e annual "In g r o w t h rate ( f o r g r o w t h in
G D P per c a p i t a , real G D P a t m a r k e t p r i c e s ) o f
4.2, w h i l e countries l i k e the U n i t e d States ( 3 . 5 ) ,
C a n a d a ( 3 . 7 ) , a n d S w e d e n (3.9) s c o r e d l o w e r .
T h e highest a c h i e v i n g c o u n t r i e s , o n the o t h e r
hand, are Japan (8.7), G r e e c e (7.4), T r i n i d a d
and T o b a g o (7.3), and T a i w a n (6.7). Source:
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1 9 6 7 .
58
59
I n the p e r i o d 1 9 4 6 — 4 9 , e.g.
average annual percentage g r o w t h
Norway's
rate (real
G D P p e r c a p i t a ) w a s 10.7 "la, w h i c h o f c o u r s e
to a l a r g e extent is d u e to the ' n e c e s s a r y ' s t r o n g
a c h i e v e m e n t s after a m a j o r w a r .
S c h w a r t z m a n n a n d M o r a y A r a u j o , o p cit.
r e p o r t that N o r w e g i a n students, w h e n e v a l u a t i n g criteria o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l stratification o f
L a t i n A m e r i c a , stressed achieved d e v e l o p m e n t
as of particular importance.
A m o n g the a c h i e v e d , resourceful o p p o nents, W e s t e r n G e r m a n y a n d F r a n c e m a y b e
m e n t i o n e d (at least p r e - B r a n d t i a n W e s t e r n
G e r m a n y and G a u l l i s t F r a n c e ) . T h a t o p p o s i tion a n d s u p p o r t o f this m e a s u r e o f c o u r s e w i l l
b e d u e t o o t h e r f a c t o r s a s w e l l , e.g. i d e o l o g i c a l ,
strategic, a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l - e c o n o m i c , i s e v i dent, but d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e j e c t the v a l u e o f
our argument.
60