United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to the Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Financial
Management, the Budget, and
International Security, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
August 2003
MISSILE DEFENSE
Additional Knowledge
Needed in
Developing System
for Intercepting
Long-Range Missiles
GAO-03-600
August 2003
MISSILE DEFENSE
Highlights of GAO-03-600, a report to the
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee
on Financial Management, the Budget,
and International Security, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
A number of countries hostile to
the United States and its allies have
or will soon have missiles capable
of delivering nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons. To counter this
threat, the Department of Defense’s
(DOD’s) Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) is developing a system to
defeat ballistic missiles.
MDA expects to spend $50 billion
over the next 5 years to develop
and field this system. A significant
portion of these funds will be
invested in the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD)
element. To field elements as soon
as practicable, MDA has adopted
an acquisition strategy whereby
capabilities are upgraded as new
technologies become available and
is implementing it in 2-year blocks.
Given the risks inherent to this
strategy, GAO was asked to
determine when MDA plans to
demonstrate the maturity of
technologies critical to the
performance of GMD’s Block 2004
capability and to identify the
estimated costs to develop and
field the GMD element and any
significant risks with the estimate.
GAO is recommending DOD
(1) explore options to demonstrate
effectiveness of the Cobra Dane
radar and (2) establish procedures
to help ensure data are reliable
from MDA’s monitoring system.
DOD concurred with GAO’s first
recommendation and partially
concurred with GAO’s second.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-600.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Robert E. Levin
at (202) 512-4841 or levinr@gao.gov.
Additional Knowledge Needed in
Developing System for Intercepting
Long-Range Missiles
GMD is a sophisticated weapon system being developed to protect the
United States against limited attacks by long-range ballistic missiles. It
consists of a collection of radars and a weapon component—a three-stage
booster and exoatmospheric kill vehicle—integrated by a centralized
control system that formulates battle plans and directs the operation
of GMD components. Successful performance of these components is
dependent on 10 critical technologies.
MDA expects to demonstrate the maturity of most of these technologies
before fielding the GMD element, which is scheduled to begin in
September 2004. However, the agency has accepted higher cost and
schedule risks by beginning integration of the element’s components before
these technologies have matured. So far, MDA has matured two critical GMD
technologies. If development and testing progress as planned, MDA expects
to demonstrate the maturity of five other technologies by the second quarter
of fiscal year 2004.
The radar technologies are the least mature. MDA intends to demonstrate
the maturity of an upgraded early warning radar in California in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005 and a sea-based radar in the Pacific Ocean in the
fourth quarter of that year. Although MDA does not plan to demonstrate
the maturity of the technology of the early warning radar in Alaska, which
will serve as the primary fire control radar, through its own integrated
flight tests, it may be able to do so through the anticipated launch of foreign
test missiles.
MDA estimates that it will spend about $21.8 billion between 1997 and 2009
to develop the GMD element. This estimate includes $7.8 billion to develop
and field the GMD Block 2004 capability. For example, the funds will be
used to install interceptors at two sites, upgrade existing radars and testing
infrastructure, and develop the sea-based X-band radar. We found that MDA
has incurred a greater risk of cost growth because for more than a year the
agency was not able to rely fully on data from its primary tool for monitoring
whether the GMD contractor has been performing work within cost and on
schedule. In February 2002, MDA modified the prime contract to reflect an
increased scope of work for developing GMD. It was not until July 2003 that
the agency completed a review to ensure that the data was fully reliable.
Contents
Letter
1
Results in Brief
Background
MDA Expects to Demonstrate the Maturity of Most GMD
Technologies before September 2004
MDA Has Risked Cost Growth Because It Could Not Fully Rely on
Data from Its System for Monitoring Contractor Performance
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
3
4
18
24
25
25
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
28
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense
29
Appendix III
Technology Readiness Level Assessment Matrix
32
Appendix IV
Importance of Earned Value Management
35
Appendix V
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
40
Table 1: Technology Readiness Levels of GMD Critical
Technologies
Table 2: Estimated Cost to Develop and Field GMD
Table 3: 32 Criteria for Earned Value Management Systems
11
19
35
8
Tables
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Figures
Figure 1: Components of GMD
Figure 2: Notional GMD Concept of Operations
Figure 3: Tasks GMD Plans to Accomplish for the GMD Block 2004
Project
6
7
19
Abbreviations
BMDO
CPR
DCMA
EVM
GMD
IBR
IFT
MDA
NMD
TRL
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
Cost Performance Report
Defense Contract Management Agency
Earned Value Management
Ground-based Midcourse Defense
integrated baseline review
integrated flight test
Missile Defense Agency
National Missile Defense
technology readiness level
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Page ii
GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548
August 21, 2003
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Financial Management,
the Budget, and International Security
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Dear Senator Akaka:
Hostile states, including those that sponsor terrorism, are investing
significant resources to develop and deploy ballistic missiles of increasing
range and sophistication that could be used against the United States, our
deployed forces, and our allies. At least 25 countries now have, or are in
the process of acquiring, missiles capable of delivering nuclear, biological,
or chemical weapons. To counter this threat, the President of the United
States in December 2002, directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to
begin fielding a ballistic missile defense system in 2004.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) within DOD is responsible for
developing this system, including the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) element,1 which is being developed to protect the United States
against long-range ballistic missiles. MDA is also building an integrated
testing infrastructure—or “test bed”—with the newly designated GMD
element as its centerpiece. MDA expects to spend nearly $50 billion in
research and development funds between fiscal years 2004 and 2009 to
develop and field a ballistic missile defense system. A significant
percentage of the $50 billion will be invested in the GMD element.
GMD is a sophisticated weapon system that will rely on state-of-the-art
technologies that have been under development for a number of years.
GMD will use space-based sensors to provide early warning of missile
launches; ground-based radars to identify and refine the tracks of
threatening warheads and associated objects; ground-based interceptors
1
In January 2002, the Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency and
consolidated all ballistic missile defense programs under the new agency. Former missile
defense acquisition programs are now referred to as elements of a single ballistic missile
defense system.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
(each consisting of a three-stage booster and exoatmospheric kill vehicle)
to destroy warheads; and a centralized control system that formulates
battle plans and directs the operation of GMD components for carrying out
the missile defense mission.
To meet the technical challenge of developing both the integrated
system and the GMD element, MDA has adopted a “capabilities-based”
acquisition strategy and is implementing it in 2-year development blocks.
This approach is designed to field elements as soon as practicable and
to improve the effectiveness of fielded elements by upgrading their
capability as new technologies become available or as the threat warrants.
Block 2004 will be the first block fielded, followed by Blocks 2006 and
2008. Although GMD’s Block 2004 capability is expected to be fielded
beginning in September 2004, MDA plans to upgrade that capability
through the end of 2005.2
Because development and fielding of GMD involves substantial technical
challenges and a major investment, you asked us to review technical and
cost issues related to the GMD element. Specifically, we determined when
MDA plans to demonstrate the maturity3 of technologies critical to the
performance of GMD’s Block 2004 capability. We also identified the
estimated costs to develop and field the GMD element and any significant
risks associated with the estimate.
Our scope and methodology are included in appendix I. Although we
assessed the maturity of specific GMD critical technologies, the scope of
this review did not include an evaluation of MDA’s test plans for
demonstrating GMD’s ability to operate as a system overall. Our detailed
assessment of GMD system-level testing is included in a classified report
that we issued in June 2003 to other congressional requesters.
2
The intended performance of the Block 2004 capability is described in a classified annex
to this report.
3
Technological maturity for starting product development or systems integration is
achieved when prototype hardware with the desired form, fit, and function has been
proven in a realistic operational environment. See U.S. General Accounting Office,
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon
System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 1999).
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Results in Brief
MDA expects to demonstrate the maturity of most of the ten technologies
critical to GMD’s initial performance before fielding of the element begins
in September 2004. However, the agency has accepted a higher risk of cost
growth and schedule slips by beginning the integration of the element’s
components before these technologies have been demonstrated. So far,
MDA has matured two critical GMD technologies—the infrared sensors
of the kill vehicle4 and the fire control software of the battle management
component.5 But if development and testing progress as planned, MDA
expects to demonstrate the maturity of five others—resident in the kill
vehicle, interceptor boosters, and the battle management component—by
the second quarter of fiscal year 2004. MDA intends to demonstrate the
maturity of an upgraded early warning radar—located at Beale Air Force
Base, California—in the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 and a sea-based Xband radar, located in the Pacific Ocean, in the fourth quarter of that year.
MDA does not plan to demonstrate through its own integrated flight tests
the maturity of a technology resident in the Cobra Dane radar located in
Alaska, which will serve as the element’s primary radar when GMD is first
fielded. Agency officials told us that they may be able to test the radar
through the anticipated launch of foreign test missiles. However, it is not
clear that testing Cobra Dane in this manner will provide all of the
information that a dedicated test provides because MDA will not control
the configuration of the target or the flight environment.
MDA estimates that it will spend about $21.8 billion between 1997 and
2009 to develop the GMD element. This estimate includes $7.8 billion to
develop and field the GMD Block 2004 capability and to develop the GMD
portion of the test bed between 2002 and 2005. For example, the funds will
be used to install interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California; upgrade existing radars and the test bed
infrastructure; and develop the sea-based X-band radar.
MDA has incurred a greater risk of cost growth because for more than a
year the agency was not able to rely fully on the data from its primary tool
for monitoring whether the GMD contractor was performing work within
cost and on schedule—the prime contractor’s Earned Value Management
4
The kill vehicle is the weapon component of the GMD element that attempts to detect and
destroy threat warheads through “hit-to-kill” impacts.
5
The battle management component is the integrating and controlling component of the
GMD element. The fire control software plans engagements and tasks GMD components to
execute a missile defense mission.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
(EVM) system.6 In February 2002, MDA modified GMD’s contract to bring
it into line with the agency’s new capabilities-based acquisition strategy. It
took several months to establish an interim cost baseline7 against which to
measure the contractor’s performance and 13 months to complete
revisions to the baseline. Also, MDA and the contractor did not complete a
review until July 2003 to ensure that the revised baseline was accurate and
that contractor personnel were correctly using it to measure performance.
This review was of particular importance because an earlier review
revealed significant deficiencies in the contractor’s development and use
of the initial contract baseline. Until this review was completed, MDA did
not know for sure whether it could rely fully on the data from its EVM
system to recognize and correct potential problems in time to prevent
significant cost increases and schedule delays.
We are making recommendations that MDA (1) consider adding a test of
the effectiveness of the radar in Alaska; and (2) ensure that procedures are
in place that will increase MDA’s confidence in data from its EVM system.
DOD concurred with our first recommendation and partially concurred
with the second. In commenting on the draft report, DOD stated that the
feasibility of these procedures will be determined and that a portion of the
work is already being accomplished.
Background
The concept of using a missile to destroy another missile (hit-to-kill) has
been explored since the mid-1950’s, but it was not until 1984 that the first
such intercept achieved its objective. Between the mid-1980’s and
late-1990’s the United States conducted a number of experiments designed
to demonstrate that it was possible to hit one missile with another. In
1997, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) established the
National Missile Defense (NMD) Joint Program Office. The program office
was directed to demonstrate by 1999 a system that could protect the
United States from attacks of intercontinental ballistic missiles and to
be in a position to deploy the system if the threat warranted by 2003. The
6
The EVM system is a management tool widely used by DOD to compare the value of
contractor’s work performed to the work’s actual cost. The tool measures the contractor’s
actual progress against its expected progress and enables the government and contractor
to estimate the program’s remaining cost.
7
An interim baseline is often established by the contractor when the government has
authorized work, but the requirements and terms of the work have not yet been negotiated.
Until negotiations are completed, the contractor develops a baseline using proposed cost
that has been divided among work packages with associated budgets and schedule.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
initial system consisted of space- and ground-based sensors, early warning
radars, interceptors, and battle management functions.
The program underwent additional changes as the new decade began.
In September 2000, the President decided to defer deployment of the
NMD system, but development of the system continued with the goal of
being ready to deploy the system when directed. This action was followed
in 2001 by BMDO’s redirection of the prime contractor’s efforts from
developing and deploying an NMD system to developing an integrated test
bed with the newly designated GMD system as its centerpiece. The
Secretary of Defense, in January 2002, renamed BMDO as MDA and
consolidated all ballistic missile defense programs under the new agency.
Former missile defense acquisition programs became elements of a single
ballistic missile defense system. These changes were followed in
December 2002, by the President’s directive to begin fielding in 2004 a
ballistic missile defense system, which included components of the GMD
element already under development.
The GMD element is intended to protect the United States against longrange ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of their flight. This is the
point outside the atmosphere where the motors that boost an enemy
missile into space have stopped burning and the deployed warhead
follows a predictable path toward its target. Compared to the boost and
terminal phases, this stage of flight offers the largest window of
opportunity for interception and allows the GMD element a longer time to
track and engage a target.
As illustrated in figure 1, GMD will rely on a broad array of components
to track and intercept missiles. Figure 2 provides a notional concept of
how these components will operate once they are fully integrated into the
GMD element.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Figure 1: Components of GMD
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Figure 2: Notional GMD Concept of Operations
Note: The concept of operations assumes weapons release authority has been previously granted by
the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense. Missile flight times may be too brief to
ask for permission to launch interceptors and engage the enemy.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
MDA Expects to
Demonstrate the
Maturity of Most GMD
Technologies before
September 2004
MDA is gaining the knowledge it needs to have confidence that
technologies critical to the GMD Block 2004 capability will work as
intended. Two of the ten technologies essential to the Block 2004
capability have already been incorporated into actual prototype hardware
and have been demonstrated to function as expected in an operational
environment.8 Other technologies are reaching this level of maturity. If
development and testing proceed as planned, MDA will demonstrate the
maturity of five additional technologies by the second quarter of fiscal
year 2004 and two critical radar technologies during fiscal year 2005. MDA
believes that its best opportunity to demonstrate the maturity of the tenth
technology, technology critical to GMD’s primary radar, may come
through the anticipated flight tests of foreign missiles.
Our work over the years has found that making a decision to begin system
integration of a capability before the maturity of all critical technologies
have been demonstrated increases the program’s cost, schedule, and
performance risks. Because the President directed DOD to begin fielding
a ballistic missile defense system in 2004, MDA began GMD system
integration with technologies whose maturity has not been demonstrated.
As a result, there is a greater likelihood that critical technologies will not
work as intended in planned flight tests. If this occurs, MDA may have to
spend additional funds in an attempt to identify and correct problems by
September 2004 or accept a less capable system.9
Importance of Maturing
Technology
Successful developers follow “knowledge-based acquisition” practices
to get quality products to the customer as quickly and cost effectively as
possible. As a part of meeting this goal, developers focus their technology
programs on maturing technologies that have the realistic potential for
being incorporated into the product under consideration. Accordingly,
successful developers spend time to mature technology in a technology
setting, where costs are typically not as great, and they do not move
forward with product development—the initiation of a program to fully
8
An operational environment is a real-world environment (e.g., flight demonstration)
that addresses all of the operational requirements and specifications demanded of the
final product.
9
U.S. General Accounting Office, Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Being
Adopted, but Risks Remain, GAO-03-441 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2003). This report
presents our analysis of MDA’s new approach for developing missile defense technology.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
design, integrate, and demonstrate a product for production—until
essential technologies are sufficiently mature.
An analytical tool—which has been used by DOD and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, called technology readiness levels
(TRLs),10 —can assess the maturity level of technology as well as the risk
that technology poses if it is included in a product’s development. The nine
readiness levels are associated with progressing levels of technological
maturity and demonstrated performance relative to a particular
application—starting with paper studies of applied scientific principles
(TRL 1) and ending with a technology that has been “flight proven” on an
actual system through successful mission operations (TRL 9). Additional
details on TRLs are shown in appendix III.
TRLs provide a gauge of how much knowledge the program office has
on the progress or status of a particular technology and are based on
two principal factors: (1) the fidelity of demonstration hardware,
including design maturity and level of functionality achieved; and
(2) the extent and realism of the environment in which the technology
has been demonstrated.
MDA recognizes the value of beginning system integration with mature
technology and of using TRLs to assess the maturity of technology
proposed for a block configuration. In particular, MDA prefers to include
new technology in a block configuration only if the technology has
reached a TRL 7; that is, only if prototype hardware with the desired form,
fit, and function has been proved in an operational environment. However;
MDA retains the flexibility to include less mature technology in a block
configuration if that technology offers a significant benefit in performance
and the risk of retaining it is acceptable and properly managed.
Readiness Levels of GMD
Element Technologies
Through technical discussions with the GMD joint program office and
its prime contractor, we identified ten critical GMD technologies and
jointly assessed the readiness level of each. The critical technologies
are resident in the exoatmospheric kill vehicle, the boosters, the battle
management, command, and control component, and in the element’s
10
U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Management of
Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162
(Washington, D.C.: July 1999).
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
radars. In 7 of 10 cases, we agreed with the program office and the
GMD prime contractor on the maturity level of the element’s critical
technologies. The differences in the remaining three cases, as discussed in
detail below, were primarily due to interpretation of TRL definitions. The
program office and its contractor rated the two booster technologies and
one radar technology at higher readiness levels than, in our opinion, MDA
had demonstrated.
Most critical GMD technologies are currently at TRLs 5 and 6. At TRL 5,
the technology’s development is nearing completion, but it has not been
applied or fitted for the intended product. At this point, the technology has
been incorporated into a high-fidelity breadboard11 that has been tested in
a laboratory or relevant environment 12. Although this demonstrates the
functionality of the technology to some extent, the hardware is not
necessarily of the form and fit (configuration) that would be integrated
into the final product. A new application of existing technology is usually
assessed at a TRL 5, because the technology has not been demonstrated in
the relevant environment for the new application. TRL 6 begins the true
“fitting” or application of the technology to the intended product. To reach
this level, technology must be a part of a representative prototype that is
very close to the form, fit, and function of that needed for the intended
product. Reaching a TRL 6 requires a major step in a technology’s
demonstrated readiness, that is, the prototype must be tested in a highfidelity laboratory environment or demonstrated in a restricted but
relevant environment.
Two of the ten GMD technologies were assessed at a TRL 7, the level that
successful developers insist upon before initiating product development.
To reach this level, a pre-production prototype of the technology must be
demonstrated to its expected functionality in an operational environment.
If development and testing proceed as planned by MDA, we judge that
most of the technologies (7 of 10) will be at a TRL 7 after the completion
11
A breadboard is a collection of integrated components that provide a representation of
a system/subsystem that can be used to determine concept feasibility and to develop
technical data. A breadboard is typically configured for laboratory use to demonstrate the
technical principals of immediate interest.
12
A relevant environment is defined as a testing environment that simulates key aspects of
the operational environment.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
of integrated flight test (IFT)-14,13 which is scheduled for the second
quarter of fiscal year 2004. Table 1 summarizes our assessment of the TRL
for each critical technology as of June 2003 and the date at which MDA
anticipates each technology will reach TRL 7. A detailed discussion of
each critical technology follows.
Table 1: Technology Readiness Levels of GMD Critical Technologies
Critical technology
TRL (as of June 2003)
Anticipated event/date for achieving TRL 7a
Exoatmospheric kill vehicle
Infrared seeker
7
Achieved
On-board discrimination
6
IFT-14 (2nd quarter FY04)
Guidance, navigation, and control subsystem
6
IFT-14 (2nd quarter FY04)
BV+
6
IFT-13A (1st quarter FY04)
OSC Lite
6
IFT-13B (1st quarter FY04)
Fire control software
7
Achieved
In-flight interceptor communications system
6
IFT-14 (2nd quarter FY04)
Cobra Dane radar
5
Unknown
Beale upgraded early warning radar
5
Radar certification flight (1st quarter FY05)
Sea-based X-band radar
5
IFT-18 (4th quarter FY05)
Boosters
Battle management command, control, and
communications
Radars
Source: GAO analysis of GMD data.
Note: Information provided in the table—the configuration of flight test events and associated date—is
as of June 2003 and is subject to change.
a
Assumes technology development and demonstrations will have been successful.
13
Integrated flight tests of the GMD element are real-world demonstrations of system
performance during which an interceptor is launched to engage and intercept a mock
warhead above the atmosphere.
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Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle Technologies
The exoatmospheric kill vehicle is the weapon component of the GMD
interceptor that attempts to detect and destroy the threat reentry vehicle
through a hit-to-kill impact. The prime contractor identified three critical
technologies pertaining to the operation of the exoatmospheric kill
vehicle. They include the following:
•
•
•
Infrared seeker, which is the “eyes” of the kill vehicle. The seeker is
designed to support kill vehicle functions like tracking and target
discrimination. The primary subcomponents of the seeker are the infrared
sensors, a telescope, and the cryostat that cools down the sensors.
On-board discrimination, which is needed to identify the true warhead
from among decoys and associated objects. Discrimination is a critical
function of the hit-to-kill mission that requires the successful execution of
a sequence of functions, including target detection, target tracking, and the
estimation of object features. As such, successful operation of the infrared
seeker is a prerequisite for discrimination.
Guidance, navigation, and control subsystem, which is a combination
of hardware and software that enables the kill vehicle to track its
position and velocity in space and to physically steer itself into the
designated target.
All three kill vehicle technologies have been demonstrated to some extent
in actual integrated flight tests on near-production-representative kill
vehicles. The infrared seeker has reached a TRL 7, because a configuration
very much like that to be fielded has been demonstrated in previous
integrated flight tests, and only minor design upgrades are planned to
reach the Block 2004 configuration. The remaining two kill vehicle
technologies are at a TRL 6, because their functionality is being upgraded
and the technologies have yet to be incorporated into the kill vehicle and
demonstrated in an operational environment.
The on-board discrimination technology has not yet reached TRL 7
because MDA has not tested a “knowledge database” that is expected to
increase the kill vehicle’s discrimination capability. The purpose of the
database is to enable the kill vehicle to distinguish characteristics of
threatening from non threatening objects. MDA expects to test the
database for the first time in IFT-14.
As a software-intensive technology, on-board discrimination performance
under all flight conditions can only be evaluated through ground testing,
but flight-testing is needed to validate the software’s operation in a real
world environment. The discrimination capability that will be tested in
IFT-14 is expected to be fielded as part of the Block 2004 capability.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Therefore, IFT-14 should demonstrate the technology’s maturity if the test
shows that the kill vehicle achieves its discrimination objective.14
Similarly, the guidance, navigation, and control technology will also
increase to a TRL 7 if the technology achieves its objectives in IFT-14.
The inertial measurement unit, an important component of the guidance,
navigation, and control subsystem that enables the kill vehicle to track its
position and velocity, has not yet been tested in the severe environments
(e.g., vibrations and accelerations) induced by the operational booster.
This will be first attempted when one of the new operational boosters
is used in IFT-14. In addition to testing the inertial measurement unit,
IFT-14 will also test the upgraded divert hardware (used to actively
steer the kill vehicle to its target) that is expected to be part of the
Block 2004 configuration.
Booster Technologies
The integrated booster stack is the part of the GMD interceptor that is
composed of rocket motors needed to deliver and deploy the kill vehicle
into a desired intercept trajectory. For all flight tests to date, a two-stage
surrogate booster called the payload launch vehicle has been used.
In July 1998, the GMD prime contractor began developing a new
three-stage booster for the GMD program, known as the “Boost Vehicle”,
from commercial off-the-shelf components. However, the contractor
encountered difficulty. By the time the booster was flight tested in
August 2001, it was already about 18 months behind schedule. The first
booster flight test met its objectives, but the second booster tested drifted
off course and had to be destroyed 30 seconds after launch.
Subsequently, MDA altered its strategy for acquiring a new booster for
the interceptor. Instead of relying on a single contractor, MDA authorized
the GMD prime contractor to develop a second source for the booster
by awarding a subcontract to another contractor. If development of the
boosters proceeds as planned, both boosters will be part of the Block 2004
capability. One booster is known as BV+ and the other as “OSC Lite.”
The BV+ Booster
The prime contractor ultimately transferred development of the boost
vehicle to a subcontractor who is currently developing a variant—known
as “BV+”—for the GMD element. The program office and GMD
14
See classified annex for further details.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
contractor rated the BV+ at a TRL 7. The prime contractor reasoned
that the extent of the legacy program and its one successful flight test
should allow for this rating. However, given the limited testing to date, we
assessed the BV+ booster currently at a TRL 6; that is, the technology has
been demonstrated in a restricted flight environment using hardware close
in form, fit, and function to that which will be fielded in 2004. We believe
the contractor’s assessment is too high at this time, because the step from
TRL 6 to TRL 7 is significant in terms of the fidelity of the demonstration
environment. However, the first test of a full configuration BV+ booster
will occur with IFT-13A, which is scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal
year 2004. In our opinion, the BV+ booster will reach TRL 7 at this time if
the booster works as planned.
The “OSC Lite” Booster
The second booster under development is referred to as “OSC Lite”. This
booster, which is essentially the Taurus Lite missile that carries satellites
into low-earth orbit, will be reconfigured for the GMD element. Despite the
fact that the booster was recently tested under restricted flight conditions,
GMD’s prime contractor believes that the legacy development of the
Taurus Lite missile is sufficient to prove that the OSC Lite has reached
TRL 7. However, in our opinion, because the test was conducted with
hardware configured as it was in the Taurus missile, not as it will be
configured for GMD’s Block 2004, the booster’s maturity level is
comparable to that of the BV+. The first flight test of a full configuration
OSC Lite booster is scheduled for IFT-13B in the first quarter of fiscal year
2004. We believe that if the booster performs as intended in this test, it will
reach TRL 7.
Battle Management Command,
Control, and Communications
Technologies
The battle management component is the integrating and controlling
component of the GMD element. Prime contractor officials identified and
assessed the following sub-components as critical technologies:
•
•
GMD fire control software, which analyzes the threat, plans engagements,
and tasks components of the GMD element to execute a mission.
In-flight interceptor communications system, which enables the GMD
fire control component to communicate with the exoatmospheric kill
vehicle while in flight.
The two battle management technologies have been demonstrated to some
extent in actual integrated flight tests, and both are near their Block 2004
design. We determined that the GMD fire control software has currently
achieved a TRL 7 and the in-flight interceptor communications system has
reached a TRL 6. Prime contractor officials concur with our assessment.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
The fire control software is nearing expected functionality and prior
software builds have been demonstrated in GMD flight tests. Only minor
design changes will be made to address interfacing issues (linking the
fire control component with other GMD components) before the
software reaches the operational configuration of Block 2004. As a
software-intensive technology, the performance of the fire control
software throughout the entire “flight envelope” can only be evaluated
through ground testing. Ground testing is well underway at both the Joint
National Integration Center at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and at
the prime contractor’s integration laboratory in Huntsville, Alabama.
The second technology associated with the battle management component
is the in-flight interceptor communications system. Even though the
pointing accuracy and communications capability of this technology
were demonstrated in previous flight tests, the operational hardware to
be fielded by 2004 is expected to operate at a different uplink frequency
than the legacy hardware used in these past flight tests.15 Accordingly, we
assessed the in-flight interceptor communications system at a TRL 6.
The first integrated flight test to include an operational-like build of this
technology is IFT-14, and if the technology meets its objectives in this
flight test, TRL 7 would be achieved.
Radar Technologies
The GMD contractor initially identified the sea-based X-band radar as
the only radar-related critical technology. Since its initial assessment in
September 2002, the contractor has now agreed with us that the Beale
upgraded early warning radar and the Cobra Dane radar are also critical
technologies of the GMD element. The contractor and the GMD program
office assessed the Beale and Cobra Dane radars at a TRL 5, because the
technology, especially mission software, is still under development and
has not yet been demonstrated in a relevant flight environment.16 The
contractor assessed the sea-based X-band radar at a TRL 6. As discussed
below, we agree with their assessment of the Beale and Cobra Dane radars
but rated the sea-based X-band radar as a TRL 5.
15
See classified annex for further details.
16
The hardware of the Beale and Cobra Dane radars is mature since both are currently in
operation for other missions, namely, integrated tactical warning and technical intelligence,
respectively. Adding the ballistic missile defense mission to these radars requires primarily
software-related development and testing.
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The early warning radar at Beale Air Force Base has participated in
integrated flight tests in a missile-defense role using legacy hardware
and developmental software. Design and development of operational
builds of the software are progressing, but such builds have only been
tested in a simulated environment. Therefore, we assessed the Beale radar
technology at a TRL 5—an assessment driven by software considerations.
The conversion of the early warning radar at Beale to an upgraded early
warning radar, which consists of minor hardware and significant software
upgrades, is planned for completion sometime during the middle of fiscal
year 2004. After this time, the Beale radar can take part in flight-testing
in its upgraded configuration. MDA currently plans to demonstrate the
upgraded Beale technology in a non intercept flight test, known as a
radar certification flight,17 in the first quarter of fiscal year 2005. The Beale
radar will be demonstrated at a TRL 7 if the objectives of this flight test
are achieved.
The Cobra Dane radar is currently being used in a surveillance mode
to collect data on selected intercontinental ballistic missile test launches
out of Russia and does not require real-time data processing and
communications capabilities. To achieve a defensive capability by
September 2004, the Cobra Dane radar is being upgraded to perform
both of these tasks. This upgrade, which requires a number of software
modifications, is designed to enable Cobra Dane to detect and track
enemy targets much as the Beale upgraded early warning radar does.
Although the hardware component of the Cobra Dane radar is mature and
will undergo only minor updating, Cobra Dane’s mission software is being
revised for this application. The revision includes reuse of existing
software and development of new software so that the Cobra Dane radar
can be integrated into the GMD architecture.
Upgrades to the Cobra Dane radar are due to be completed at the
beginning of 2004. After the software is developed and ground tested, the
radar can reach a TRL 6, but it is uncertain when the radar will reach a
TRL 7. Because of other funding and scheduling priorities, MDA has no
plans through fiscal year 2007 for using this radar in integrated flight tests;
such tests would require air- or sea-launched targets that are not currently
part of the test program. Unless the current test program is modified, the
only opportunities for demonstrating Cobra Dane in an operational
environment would come from flight tests of foreign missiles. MDA
17
Ground testing of interim software builds to be mounted on the Beale radar is ongoing.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
officials anticipate that such opportunities will occur. However, it is not
clear that testing Cobra Dane in this manner will provide all of the
information that a dedicated test provides because MDA will not control
the configuration of the target or the flight environment.
The sea-based X-band radar is being built as part of the Block 2004
capability and scheduled for completion in 2005. It will be built from
demonstrated technologies—a sea-based platform and the prototype
X-band radar currently being used in the GMD test program. Prime
contractor officials told us that they consider the risk associated with
the construction and checkout of the radar as primarily a programmatic,
rather than technical risk, and believe that the sea-based X-band radar has
reached a TRL 6. The contractor also stated that the initial operational
build of the radar software is developed and currently being tested at the
contractor’s integration laboratory. We assessed the sea-based X-band
radar as a TRL 5 because the radar has not yet been built and because
constructing a radar from an existing design and placing it on a sea-based
platform is a new application of existing technology. For example, severe
wind and sea conditions may affect the radar’s functionality—conditions
that cannot be replicated in a laboratory. As a result, developers cannot be
sure that the sea-based X-band radar will work as intended until it is
demonstrated in this new environment. However, both we and the
contractor agree that the maturity level of the sea-based X-band radar will
increase to a TRL 7 if it achieves its test objectives in IFT-18 (scheduled
for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005).
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MDA Has Risked
Cost Growth Because
It Could Not Fully
Rely on Data from Its
System for Monitoring
Contractor
Performance
From the program’s inception in 199718 through 2009, MDA expects to
spend about $21.8 billion to develop the GMD element. About $7.8 billion
of the estimated cost will be needed between 2002 and 2005 to develop
and field the Block 2004 GMD capability and to develop the GMD portion
of the test bed.19 However, MDA has incurred a greater risk of cost
increases because for more than a year MDA was not sure that it could
rely fully upon data from the prime contractor’s Earned Value
Management (EVM) system,20 which provides program managers and
others with early warning of problems that could cause cost and schedule
growth.
GMD Development Costs
Before the restructuring of the GMD program in 2002, about $6.2 billion
was spent (between 1997 and 2001) to develop a ground-based defense
capability. MDA estimates it will need an additional $7.8 billion between
2002 and 2005 to, among other tasks, install interceptors at Fort Greely,
Alaska, and at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California; upgrade existing
radars and test bed infrastructure; and develop the sea-based X-band radar
that will be added in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005. In addition,
MDA will invest an additional $7.8 billion between fiscal year 2004 and
2009 to continue efforts begun under Block 2004, such as enhancing
capability and expanding the test bed. Table 2, below, provides details on
the funding requirements by block and by fiscal year, and figure 3 provides
examples of specific Block 2004 tasks.
18
We calculated program cost from 1997 forward because the National Missile Defense
program was established at that time.
19
The cost to develop and field the initial GMD capability and the ballistic missile defense
test bed is funded in MDA’s budget within the Defense Wide Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation appropriation. MDA is not requesting any procurement, military
construction, or military personnel funds for this effort.
20
The EVM system is a management tool widely used by DOD to compare the value of
contractor’s work performed to the work’s actual cost. The tool measures the contractor’s
actual progress against its expected progress and enables the government and contractor
to estimate the program’s remaining cost.
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Table 2: Estimated Cost to Develop and Field GMD
Then-year dollars in billions
Fiscal years
1997-2001
Sunk Cost
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2009
6.2
GMD Initial Capability and
Block 2004 Test Bed
3.1
2.6
1.2
.9
1.6
1.8
7.8
1.4
1.2
GMD Block 2008
6.2
Subtotal
6.2
GMD Block 2006
Total
2008
3.1
2.6
2.8
2.7
1.4
1.2
6.0
.9
.9
1.8
.9
.9
21.8
Source: Ballistic Missile Defense Budget, Midcourse Defense Segment, February 2003.
Figure 3: Tasks GMD Plans to Accomplish for the GMD Block 2004 Project
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MDA did not include the following costs is its Block 2004 estimate:
•
•
•
The cost to recruit, hire, and train military personnel to operate the initial
defensive capability and provide site security at various locations, which
MDA estimates to be an additional $13.4 million (half in fiscal year 2003
and half in 2004 each), will be needed to operate GMD and provide
physical security. Additional costs to cover these personnel throughout
the life of the program beginning in 2005 and beyond were also omitted.
The cost to maintain equipment and facilities was not included.
Systems engineering and national team costs—which benefit all elements,
including GMD and cannot be divided among the elements—were not
included in MDA’s budget.
MDA’s Insight into
Potential Cost Growth Was
Limited by the Agency’s
Inability to Rely Fully on
Data from Earned Value
Management System
Because a significant portion of MDA’s Block 2004 GMD cost estimate is
the cost of work being performed by the element’s prime contractor,
MDA’s ability to closely monitor its contractor’s performance is critical to
controlling costs. The tool that MDA, and many DOD entities, have chosen
for this purpose is the EVM system. This system uses contractor reported
data to provide program managers and others with timely information on a
contractor’s ability to perform work within estimated cost and schedule. It
does so by examining variances reported in contractor cost performance
reports between the actual cost and time of performing work tasks and the
budgeted or estimated cost and time. While this tool can provide insightful
information to managers, MDA’s use of it has been hampered by several
factors. Principally, although major contract modifications were made in
February 2002, it took until July 2003 for MDA to complete a review to
confirm the reliability of data from the EVM system. An earlier review of a
similar nature revealed significant deficiencies in the contractor’s
formulation and collection of EVM data. Until a new review was
completed, MDA could not be sure about its ability to rely fully upon this
data to identify potential problems in time to prevent significant cost
growth and schedule delays.
Baseline Revised over
13-Month Period
An accurate, valid, and current performance management baseline is
needed to perform useful analyses using EVM. The baseline identifies and
defines work tasks, designates and assigns organizational responsibility
for each task, schedules the work task in accordance with established
targets, and allocates budget to the scheduled work. According to DOD
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guidance,21 a performance management baseline should be in place as
early as possible after the contractor is authorized to proceed. Although
the guidance does not define how quickly the contractor should establish
a baseline, experts generally agree that it should be in place, on average,
within 3 months after a contract is awarded or modified.
About a year before the Secretary of Defense directed MDA to adopt an
evolutionary acquisition strategy, the agency awarded a new contract for
the development of a National Missile Defense system. In February 2002,
MDA modified this contract to redirect the contractor’s efforts. Instead of
developing a missile defense system that met all of the requirements of the
war fighter, as the initial contract required, the modification directed the
contractor to develop the first GMD increment, or block, which was to be
a ballistic missile test bed with GMD as its centerpiece.
Following the contract’s modification, the contractor in June 2002
established an interim baseline. This baseline was developed by adding
budgets for near-term new work to the original baseline. Because the cost
of the work being added to the baseline had not yet been negotiated, the
contractor based the budgets on the cost proposed to MDA, as directed by
DOD guidelines. The contractor implemented the baseline almost within
the 3-month time frame recommended by experts. In the time between the
modification and the development of the interim baseline, MDA authorized
the contractor to begin work and spend a specified amount of money, and
MDA paid the contractor about $390 million during this period.
An option that MDA could have used to help validate the interim baseline
was to have the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)22 verify
contractor work packages and track the movement of funds between the
unpriced work account and the baseline. However, neither MDA nor
DCMA initiated these actions. In its technical comments on a draft of this
report, DOD pointed out that during the negotiation process, MDA reviews
prime and subcontractor proposal data that include engineering labor
hours, material, and cost estimates. DOD further noted that these
estimates eventually form a basis for the work packages that make up the
data for the performance management baseline. We agree that these costs
21
Department of Defense, Earned Value Management Implementation Guide
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1996, as revised, p. 10).
22
DCMA is the agency that DOD has given responsibility for validating contractors’
Earned Value data.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
will eventually be associated with the work packages that make up the
baseline. However, a joint contractor and MDA review of the initial GMD
baseline concluded that even though these costs were otherwise fair and
reasonable, some work packages that the contractor developed for the
original contract’s baseline did not correctly reflect the work directed by
MDA. An independent review of work packages included in the interim
baseline would have increased the likelihood that the work packages were
being properly developed and that their budget and schedule were
appropriate.
The contractor completed all revisions to the baseline for the prime
contractor and all five subcontractors by March 2003, 3 months
after negotiating the cost of the modification and 13 months after
authorizing the work to begin. The contracting officer explained that it
took until December 2002 to negotiate the 2002 contract change because
the additional work was extremely complex, and, as a result, the
modification needed to be vetted through many subcontractors that
support the prime.
Baseline Review Completed in
July 2003
The DOD guidance states that an integrated baseline review (IBR) is to be
conducted within 6 months of award of a new contract or major change
to an existing contract.23 The review verifies the technical content of the
baseline. It also ensures that contractor personnel understand and have
been adequately trained to collect EVM data. The review also verifies the
accuracy of the related budget and schedules, ensures that risks have been
properly identified, assesses the contractor’s ability to implement properly
EVM, and determines if the work identified by the contractor meets the
program’s objectives. The government’s program manager and technical
staff carry out this review with their contractor counterparts.
Completing an IBR of the new baseline has been of particular importance
because the July 2001 IBR for the initial contract identified more than
300 deficiencies in the contractor’s formulation and execution of the
baseline. For example, the contractor had not defined a critical path for
the overall effort, many tasks did not have sufficient milestones that would
allow the contractor to objectively measure performance, and contractor
personnel who were responsible for reporting earned value were making
mistakes in measuring actual performance against the baseline.
23
Earned Value Management Implementation Guide, pp. 34 and 36.
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MDA began a review in March 2003 of the contractor’s new baseline,
which reflected the contract modification,. Completing this IBR took
until July 2003 because of the complexity of the program and the many
subcontractors that were involved. Although the review team found fewer
problems with the contractor’s formulation and execution of the new
baseline, problems were identified. For example, the IBR showed that in
some cases the baseline did not reflect the new statement of work. Also,
both the prime contractor and subcontractors improperly allocated budget
to activities that indirectly affect a work product (known as level of effort
activities) when they could have associated these activities with a discrete
end product. Because of the way these activities are accounted for, this
designation could mask true cost variances.
Management Reserve
Used to Offset Expected
Cost Overruns at
Contract Completion
Before the IBR was underway, DCMA recognized another problem with
the contractor’s EVM reports. In its December 2002 cost performance
report, the contractor reported that it expected no cost overrun at
contract completion. This implied that the program was not experiencing
any problems that could result in significant cost or schedule growth.
However, DCMA stated that October 2002 was the second month in a row
that the contractor had used management reserve funds to offset a
significant negative cost variance.24 DCMA emphasized that this is not the
intended purpose of management reserves. (Management reserves are a
part of the total project budget intended to be used to fund work
anticipated but not currently defined.) DCMA officials told us that while
this is not a prohibited practice most programs wait until their work is
almost completed, that is 80 to 90 percent complete, before making a
judgment that the management reserve would not be needed for additional
undefined work and could be applied to unfavorable contract cost
variances.
24
Defense Contract Management Agency, Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Monthly
Assessment Report Contract No. HQ0006-01-C-0001 for Missile Defense Agency (Seal
Beach, Calif.: Dec. 2002, p. 10). DCMA reported that cost performance reports were giving
“… a misleading feeling that everything in the program is OK. For the 2nd month in a row,
[the prime contractor] has covered up a significant Variance-at-Completion (-$107,800K) …
by taking money out of Management Reserve (MR). This is not the intended purpose of
using MR funds. [The prime contractor] is reporting a $0 Variance-At-Completion [VAC] by
subtracting $107,800K from MR to reduce VAC to $0. Based on prior performance to date,
this could be an indication of a trend for growth of the EAC [estimate-at-completion].”
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Conclusions
Because of the President’s direction to begin fielding a ballistic missile
defense system in 2004, the MDA took a higher risk approach by beginning
GMD system integration before knowing whether its critical technologies
were mature. If development and testing progress as planned, however,
MDA expects to have demonstrated the maturity of 7 of the 10 critical
GMD technologies before the element is initially fielded in September 2004
and 2 others during fiscal year 2005. If technologies do not achieve their
objectives during testing, MDA may have to spend additional funds in an
attempt to identify and correct problems by September 2004 or accept a
less capable system.
Because of other funding and scheduling priorities, MDA does not plan
to demonstrate through integrated flight tests whether the Cobra Dane
radar’s software can process and communicate data on the location of
enemy missiles in “real time.” Although tests using sea- or air-launched
targets before September 2004 would provide otherwise unavailable
information on the software’s performance, we recognize those tests
would be costly and funds have not been allocated for that purpose. We
also recognize that the most cost efficient means of testing the Cobra Dane
radar is through launches involving foreign test missiles. However, we
believe it would be useful for MDA to consider whether the increased
confidence provided by a planned test event outweighs other uses for
those funds.
MDA is investing a significant amount of money to achieve an operational
capability during the first block of GMD’s development, and the agency
expects to continue investing in the element’s improvement over the next
several years. Because MDA is also developing other elements and must
balance its investment in each, it needs an accurate GMD cost estimate.
If it is used as intended, the EVM system can be an effective means of
monitoring one of GMD’s largest costs, the cost of having a contractor
develop the GMD system. It is understandable that the dynamic changes in
MDA’s acquisition strategy led to major contract modifications, which
made it more difficult for the contractor to establish a stable baseline.
However, in this environment, it is even more important that MDA find
ways to ensure the integrity of the interim baselines and to quickly
determine that revised baselines can be fully relied on to identify potential
problems before they significantly affect the program’s cost.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Recommendations for
Executive Action
To increase its confidence that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
element fielded in 2004 will operate as intended, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Missile Defense Agency, to
explore its options for demonstrating the upgraded Cobra Dane radar in its
new ballistic missile defense role in a real-world environment before
September 2004.
To improve MDA’s oversight of the GMD element and to provide the
Congress with the best available information for overseeing the program,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Missile
Defense Agency, to:
•
•
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
ensure that when a contractor is authorized to begin new work before a
price is negotiated that DCMA validate the performance measurement
baseline to the extent possible by (1) tracking the movement of budget
from the authorized, unpriced work account into the baseline, (2) verify
that the work packages accurately reflect the new work directed, and
(3) report the results of this effort to MDA; and
strive to initiate and complete an integrated baseline review (IBR) of any
major contract modifications within 6 months.
DOD’s comments on our draft report are reprinted in appendix II.
DOD concurred with our first recommendation. DOD stated that MDA is
exploring its options for demonstrating, prior to 2004, the upgraded
Cobra Dane radar in a real-world environment. However, DOD noted that
because it takes considerable time to develop and produce targets and to
conduct safety and environmental assessments, completing a Cobra
Dane radar test before September 2004 would be very challenging. DOD
concluded that “targets of opportunity” (flight tests of foreign missiles)
and ground testing may provide the best means to demonstrate the radar’s
maturity in the near term.
DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation. In responding
to the first part of recommendation two, DOD stated that MDA and the
DCMA will jointly determine the feasibility of tracking the budget for
authorized, unpriced work into the baseline and will concurrently
assess work package data while establishing the formal performance
measurement baseline. DOD also stated that a selected portion of this
work is already being accomplished by DCMA. We continue to believe in
the feasibility of our recommendation. DCMA officials told us that they
could monitor the movement of budget into the baseline and verify the
work packages associated with the budget. In addition, the guidelines
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
state that surveillance may be accomplished through sampling of internal
and external data. We believe that if DCMA sampled the data as it is
transferred into the baseline, the implementation of this recommendation
should not be burdensome.
In responding to the second part of recommendation two, DOD stated that
MDA will continue to adhere to current DOD policy by starting an IBR of
any major contract modification within 6 months. MDA correctly pointed
out that DOD’s Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook only requires a
review be initiated within 6 months (180 days) after a contract is awarded
or a major modification is issued. However, DOD’s Earned Value
Management Implementation Guide states that such a review is
conducted within 6 months. Similar language is found in the applicable
clause from the GMD contract,25 which states that such reviews shall be
scheduled as early as practicable and should be conducted within 180
calendar days after the incorporation of major modifications. While we
understand the difficulty of conducting reviews within 180 days when the
contract is complex and many subcontractors are involved, we believe
that it is important for the government to complete an IBR as soon as
possible to ensure accurate measurement of progress toward the
program’s cost, schedule, and performance goals.
DOD also provided technical comments to this report, which we
considered and implemented as appropriate. In its technical comments,
for example, DOD expressed particular concern that our draft report
language asserting MDA’s inability to rely on the EVM system was
unsupported and misleading. DOD also stated that its prime contractor’s
EVM system is reliable. It stated, for example, that MDA has reviewed, and
continues to review on a monthly basis, the contractor’s cost performance
reports and that the prime contractor’s EVM system and accounting
systems have been fully certified and validated by DCMA. We modified our
report to better recognize MDA’s ability to use and trust the EVM system.
However, we still believe that MDA would benefit from taking additional
measures to increase its confidence in the accuracy of its interim
baselines. Also, when the revised baseline is in place, a review of its
formulation and execution is necessary before MDA can confidently and
fully rely on data from the EVM system.
25
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement clause 252.234-7001, EVM System
(March 1998).
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We conducted our review from December 2001 through August 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As
arranged with your staff, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier,
we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue
date. At that time, we plan to provide copies of this report to interested
congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director,
Missile Defense Agency. We will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO
Web site at http://www.gao.gov/.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
Robert E. Levin
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine when MDA plans to demonstrate the maturity of
technologies critical to the performance of GMD’s Block 2004 capability,
we reviewed their critical technologies using technology readiness levels
(TRLs) developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and used by DOD. We did so by asking contractor officials at the Boeing
System Engineering and Integration Office in Arlington, Virginia, to
identify the most critical technologies and to assess the level of maturity of
each technology using definitions developed by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. We reviewed these assessments along with
program documents, such as the results of recent flight tests and
discussed the results with contractor and agency officials in order to reach
a consensus, where appropriate, on the readiness level for each
technology and identify the reasons for any disagreements.
In reviewing the agency’s current cost estimate to develop the first block
of the GMD element and its test bed, we reviewed and analyzed budget
backup documents, cost documents, and selected acquisition reports for
the GMD program extending over a period of several years. We also met
with program officials responsible for managing the development and
fielding of the GMD Block 2004 capability. For example, we met with
officials from the GMD Joint Program Office in Arlington, Virginia, and
Huntsville, Alabama; and the Office of the Deputy Assistant for Program
Integration at the MDA, Arlington, Virginia.
To determine whether there were any significant risks associated with the
estimate, we met with agency officials responsible for determining the
cost of the GMD element to find out if there were costs that were omitted,
but should have been included, in the estimate. We also analyzed data
from cost performance reports that the GMD contractor developed for the
MDA. We reviewed data from the GMD element and contracting officials
and conducted interviews to discuss the data. Although we did not
independently verify the accuracy of the cost performance reports we
received from MDA, the data were assessed independently by DCMA.
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Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Defense
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Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Defense
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Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Defense
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Appendix III: Technology Readiness Level
Assessment Matrix
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Level
Assessment Matrix
Technology readiness level (TRL)
Description
1. Basic principles observed and
reported.
Lowest level of technology None (paper studies and
analysis)
readiness. Scientific
research begins to be
translated into applied
research and development.
Examples might include
paper studies of a
technology’s basic
properties.
None
2. Technology concept and/or
application formulated.
Invention begins. Once
None (paper studies and
basic principles are
analysis)
observed, practical
applications can be
invented. The application is
speculative, and there is no
proof or detailed analysis to
support the assumption.
Examples are still limited to
paper studies.
None
3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/or characteristic proof
of concept.
Active research and
development is initiated.
This includes analytical
studies and laboratory
studies to physically
validate analytical
predictions of separate
elements of the technology.
Examples include
components that are not
yet integrated or
representative.
Analytical studies and
demonstration of nonscale
individual components
(pieces of subsystem).
Lab
4. Component and/or breadboard.
Validation in laboratory
environment.
Basic technological
components are integrated
to establish that the pieces
will work together. This is
relatively “low fidelity”
compared to the eventual
system. Examples include
integration of “ad hoc”
hardware in a laboratory.
Low fidelity breadboard.
Integration of nonscale
components to show
pieces will work together.
Not fully functional or form
or fit but representative of
technically feasible
approach suitable for flight
articles.
Lab
Page 32
Hardware /software
Demonstration environment
GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Level
Assessment Matrix
Technology readiness level (TRL)
Description
Hardware /software
Demonstration environment
5. Component and/or breadboard
validation in relevant environment.
Fidelity of breadboard
technology increases
significantly. The basic
technological components
are integrated with
reasonably realistic
supporting elements so that
the technology can be
tested in a simulated
environment. Examples
include “high fidelity”
laboratory integration of
components.
High fidelity breadboard.
Functionally equivalent but
not necessarily form and/or
fit (size, weight, materials,
etc). Should be
approaching appropriate
scale. May include
integration of several
components with
reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to
demonstrate functionality.
Lab demonstrating functionality but
not form and fit. May include flightdemonstrating breadboard in
surrogate aircraft.
Representative model or
prototype system, which is
well beyond the breadboard
tested for TRL 5, is tested
in a relevant environment.
Represents a major step up
in a technology’s
demonstrated readiness.
Examples include testing a
prototype in a high fidelity
laboratory environment or
in simulated operational
environment.
Prototype. Should be very
close to form, fit, and
function. Probably includes
the integration of many
new components and
realistic supporting
elements/subsystems if
needed to demonstrate full
functionality of the
subsystem.
High-fidelity lab demonstration or
limited/restricted flight
demonstration for a relevant
environment.
Prototype near or at
planned operational
system. Represents a
major step up from TRL 6,
requiring the demonstration
of an actual system
prototype in an operational
environment, such as in an
aircraft, on a vehicle or in
space. Examples include
testing the prototype in a
test bed aircraft.
Prototype. Should be form,
fit and function integrated
with other key supporting
elements/subsystems to
demonstrate full
functionality of subsystem.
Flight demonstration in
representative operational
environment such as flying test bed
or demonstrator aircraft.
6. System/subsystem model or
prototype demonstration in a
relevant environment.
7. System prototype demonstration in
an operational environment.
Flight-qualified hardware
8. Actual system completed and “flight Technology has been
qualified” through test and
proven to work in its final
demonstration.
form and under expected
conditions. In almost all
cases, this TRL represents
the end of true system
development. Examples
include developmental test
and evaluation of the
system in its intended
weapon system to
determine if it meets design
specifications.
Page 33
Technology ready for detailed
design studies.
Integration of technology is well
defined.
Technology is well substantiated
with test data.
Developmental test and evaluation
in the actual system application
GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Appendix III: Technology Readiness Level
Assessment Matrix
Technology readiness level (TRL)
Description
Hardware /software
Demonstration environment
9. Actual system “flight proven”
through successful mission
operations.
Actual application of the
technology in its final form
and under mission
conditions, such as those
encountered in operational
test and evaluation. In
almost all cases, this is the
end of the last “bug fixing”
aspects of true system
development. Examples
include using the system
under operational mission
conditions.
Actual system in final form
Operational test and evaluation in
operational mission conditions
Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data.
Note: GAO information based on U.S. General Accounting Office, Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based
Decision Making Needed to Reduce Risks in Developing Airborne Laser, GAO-02-631 (Washington,
D.C.: June 2002).
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Appendix IV: Importance of Earned Value
Management
Appendix IV: Importance of Earned Value
Management
Pulling together essential cost, schedule, and technical information in a
meaningful, coherent fashion is always a challenge for any program.
Without this information, management of the program will be fragmented,
presenting a distorted view of program status. For several decades, DOD
has compared the value of work performed to the work’s actual cost. This
measurement is referred to as Earned Value Management (EVM). Earned
value goes beyond the two-dimensional approach of comparing budgeted
costs to actuals. It attempts to compare the value of work accomplished
during a given period with the work scheduled for that period. By using
the value of completed work as a basis for estimating the cost and time
needed to complete the program, the earned value concept should alert
program managers to potential problems early in the program.
In 1996, in response to acquisition reform initiatives, DOD reemphasized
the importance of earned value in program management and adopted
32 criteria for evaluating the quality of management systems. These
32 criteria are organized into 5 basic categories: organization, planning and
budgeting, accounting considerations, analysis and management reports,
and revisions and data maintenance. The 32 criteria are listed in table 1. In
general terms, the criteria require contractors to (1) define the contractual
scope of work using a work breakdown structure; (2) identify
organizational responsibility for the work; (3) integrate internal
management subsystems; (4) schedule and budget authorized work;
(5) measure the progress of work based on objective indicators; (6) collect
the cost of labor and materials associated with the work performed;
(7) analyze any variances from planned cost and schedules; (8) forecast
costs at contract completion; and (9) control changes.
Table 3: 32 Criteria for Earned Value Management Systems
Categories of Criteria
Criteria
Organization
1. Define the authorized work elements for the program. A work breakdown structure, tailored
for effective internal management control, is commonly used in this process.
2. Identify the program organizational structure, including the major subcontractors responsible
for accomplishing the authorized work, and define the organizational elements in which work
will be planned and controlled.
3. Provide for the integration of the company’s planning, scheduling, budgeting, work
authorization, and cost accumulation processes with each other and, as appropriate, the
program work breakdown structure and the program organizational structure.
4. Identify the company organization or function responsible for controlling overhead (indirect
costs).
5. Provide for integration of the program work breakdown structure and the program
organizational structure in a manner that permits cost and schedule performance measurement
by elements of either or both structures as needed.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Appendix IV: Importance of Earned Value
Management
Categories of Criteria
Criteria
Planning and Budgeting
6. Schedule the authorized work in a manner that describes the sequence of work and
identifies significant task interdependencies required to meet the requirements of the program.
7. Identify physical products, milestones, technical performance goals, or other indicators that
will be used to measure progress.
8. Establish and maintain a time-phased budget baseline, at the control account level, against
which program performance can be measured. Budget for far-term efforts may be held in
higher-level accounts until an appropriate time for allocation at the control account level. Initial
budgets established for performance measurement will be based on either internal
management goals or the external customer-negotiated target cost including estimates for
authorized but undefinitized work. On government contracts, if an over target baseline is used
for performance measurement reporting purposes, prior notification must be provided to the
customer.
9. Establish budgets for authorized work with identification of significant cost elements (labor,
material, etc.) as needed for internal management and for control of subcontractors.
10. To the extent it is practical to identify the authorized work in discrete work packages,
establish budgets for this work in terms of dollars, hours, or other measurable units. Where the
entire control account is not subdivided into work packages, identify the far term effort in larger
planning packages for budget and scheduling purposes.
11. Provide that the sum of all work package budgets plus planning package budgets within a
control account equals the control account budget.
12. Identify and control level of effort activity by time-phased budgets established for this
purpose. Only that effort which is unmeasurable or for which measurement is impractical may
be classified as level of effort.
13. Establish overhead budgets for each significant organizational component of the company
for expenses that will become indirect costs. Reflect in the program budgets, at the appropriate
level, the amounts in overhead pools that are planned to be allocated to the program as
indirect costs.
14. Identify management reserves and undistributed budget.
15. Provide that the program target cost goal is reconciled with the sum of all internal program
budgets and management reserves.
Accounting Considerations
16. Record direct costs in a manner consistent with the budgets in a formal system controlled
by the general books of account.
17. When a work breakdown structure is used, summarize direct costs from control accounts
into the work breakdown structure without allocation of a single control account to two or more
work breakdown structure elements.
18. Summarize direct costs from the control accounts into the contractor’s organizational
elements without allocation of a single control account to two or more organizational elements.
19. Record all indirect costs which will be allocated to the contract.
20. Identify unit costs, equivalent units costs, or lot costs when needed.
Accounting Considerations
21. For EVMS, the material accounting system will provide for: (1) Accurate cost accumulation
and assignment of costs to control accounts in a manner consistent with the budgets using
recognized, acceptable, costing techniques. (2) Cost performance measurement at the point in
time most suitable for the category of material involved, but no earlier than the time of progress
payments or actual receipt of material. (3) Full accountability of all material purchased for the
program including the residual inventory.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Appendix IV: Importance of Earned Value
Management
Categories of Criteria
Criteria
Analysis and Management
Reports
22. At least on a monthly basis, generate the following information at the control account and
other levels as necessary for management control using actual cost data from, or reconcilable
with, the accounting system: (1) Comparison of the amount of planned budget and the amount
of budget earned for work accomplished. This comparison provides the schedule variance.
(2) Comparison of the amount of the budget earned and the actual (applied where appropriate)
direct costs for the same work. This comparison provides the cost variance.
23. Identify, at least monthly, the significant differences between both planned and actual
schedule performance and planned and actual cost performance, and provide the reasons for
the variances in the detail needed by program management.
24. Identify budgeted and applied (or actual) indirect costs at the level and frequency needed
by management for effective control, along with the reasons for any significant variances.
25. Summarize the data elements and associated variances through the program organization
and/or work breakdown structure to support management needs and any customer reporting
specified in the contract.
26. Implement managerial actions taken as the result of earned value information.
27. Develop revised estimates of cost at completion based on performance to date,
commitment values for material, and estimates of future conditions. Compare this information
with the performance measurement baseline to identify variances at completion important to
company management and any applicable customer reporting requirements including
statements of funding requirements.
Revisions and Data Maintenance
28. Incorporate authorized changes in a timely manner, recording the effects of such changes
in budgets and schedules. In the directed effort prior to negotiation of a change, base such
revisions on the amount estimated and budgeted to the program organizations.
29. Reconcile current budgets to prior budgets in terms of changes to the authorized work and
internal replanning in the detail needed by management for effective control.
30. Control retroactive changes to records pertaining to work performed that would change
previously reported amounts for actual costs, earned value, or budgets. Adjustments should be
made only for correction of errors, routine accounting adjustments, effects of customer or
management directed changes, or to improve the baseline integrity and accuracy of
performance measurement data.
31. Prevent revisions to the program budget except for authorized changes.
32. Document changes to the performance measurement baseline.
Source: Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, app. 4.
Note: In the Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, DOD states that these guidelines are reproduced
from the American National Standards (ANSI) Institute/Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA) EVM
System Standard (ANSI/EIA-748-98), Chapter 2 (May 19, 1998).
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Appendix IV: Importance of Earned Value
Management
The criteria have become the standard for EVM and have also been
adopted by major US government agencies, industry, and the governments
of Canada and Australia. The full application of EVM system criteria is
appropriate for large cost reimbursable contracts where the government
bears the cost risk. For such contracts, the management discipline
described by the criteria is essential. In addition, data from an EVM system
have been proven to provide objective reports of contract status, allowing
numerous indices and performance measures to be calculated. These can
then be used to develop accurate estimates of anticipated costs at
completion, providing early warning of impending schedule delays and
cost overruns.
The standard format for tracking earned value is through a Cost
Performance Report (CPR). The CPR is a monthly compilation of cost,
schedule and technical data which displays the performance measurement
baseline, any cost and schedule variances from that baseline, the amount
of management reserve used to date, the portion of the contract that is
authorized unpriced work, and the contractor’s latest revised estimate to
complete the program.
As a result, the CPR can be used as an effective management tool because
it provides the program manager with early warning of potential cost and
schedule overruns. Using data from the CPR, a program manager can
assess trends in cost and schedule performance. This information is useful
because trends tend to continue and can be difficult to reverse. Studies
have shown that once programs are 15 percent complete the performance
indicators are indicative of the final outcome. For example, a CPR
showing a negative trend for schedule status would indicate that the
program is behind schedule. By analyzing the CPR, one could determine
the cause of the schedule problem such as delayed flight tests, changes in
requirements, or test problems because the CPR contains a section that
describes the reasons for the negative status. A negative schedule
condition is a cause for concern, because it can be a predictor of later cost
problems since additional spending is often necessary to resolve
problems. For instance, if a program finishes 6 months later than planned,
additional costs will be expended to cover the salaries of personnel and
their overhead beyond what was originally expected. CPR data provides
the basis for independent assessments of a program’s cost and schedule
status and can be used to project final costs at completion in addition to
determining when a program should be completed.
Examining a program’s management reserve is another way that a
program can use a CPR to determine potential issues early on.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Appendix IV: Importance of Earned Value
Management
Management reserves, which are funds that may be used as needed,
provide flexibility to cope with problems or unexpected events. EVM
experts agree that transfers of management reserve should be tracked and
reported because they are often problem indicators. An alarming situation
arises if the CPR shows that the management reserve is being used at a
faster pace than the program is progressing toward completion. For
example, a problem would be indicated if a program has used 80 percent
of its management reserve but only completed 40 percent of its work. A
program’s management reserve should contain at least 10 percent of the
cost to complete a program so that funds will always be available to cover
future unexpected problems that are more likely to surface as the program
moves into the testing and evaluation phase.
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Barbara Haynes (256) 922-7500
Acknowledgments
In addition to the individual named above Yvette Banks, Myra Watts
Butler, Cristina Chaplain, Roger Corrado, Jennifer Echard, Dayna Foster,
Matt Lea, Karen Richey, and Randy Zounes made key contributions to this
report.
(120109)
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GAO-03-600 Missile Defense
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