United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Addressees
January 2011
BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE
DOD Needs to
Address Planning and
Implementation
Challenges for Future
Capabilities in Europe
GAO-11-220
January 2011
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Accountability • Integrity • Reliability
DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation
Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe
Highlights of GAO-11-220, a report to
congressional addressees
Why GAO Did This Study
What GAO Found
In September 2009, the President
announced a revised approach for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) in
Europe. The European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is
designed to defend against existing
and near-term ballistic missile threats
and build up defenses over four
phases as threats mature and new
BMD technologies become available.
Although the approach will include
capabilities such as radars and landand sea-based BMD assets, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has
not yet established EPAA life-cycle
costs. EPAA is DOD’s first
implementation of its new, regional
approach to BMD.
DOD has initiated multiple simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA but faces
three key management challenges—the lack of clear guidance, life-cycle cost
estimates, and a fully integrated schedule—which may result in inefficient
planning and execution, limited oversight, and increased cost and
performance risks. Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA,
stakeholders throughout DOD—including U.S. European Command, the
Missile Defense Agency, and the military services—as well as the State
Department, have taken steps to implement this policy, including considering
options for the deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing,
and analyzing infrastructure needs. However, effective planning requires clear
guidance regarding desired end states and key BMD stakeholders, including
the combatant commands and military services, believe that such guidance is
not yet in place for EPAA. Further, key principles for preparing cost estimates
state that complete and credible estimates are important to support
preparation of budget submissions over the short-term as well as to assess
long-term affordability. DOD has not developed EPAA life-cycle cost estimates
because it considers EPAA an adaptive approach that will change over time.
However, best practices for cost estimating include methods for developing
valid cost estimates even with such uncertainties. These estimates could serve
as a basis for DOD to assess its goal of fielding affordable and cost-effective
ballistic missile defenses as well as determine if corrective actions are needed.
Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not fully integrated with acquisition,
infrastructure, and personnel activities that will need to be synchronized. As a
result, DOD is at risk of incurring schedule slips, decreased performance, and
increased cost as it implements the phases of EPAA.
GAO was asked to evaluate DOD’s
plans for implementing EPAA. GAO
reviewed the extent to which: (1)
DOD has developed guidance and
addressed management of cost and
schedule for EPAA, and (2) DOD
planning for EPAA is informed by
operational performance data. GAO
reviewed key legislation, policy and
guidance, and initial plans for
implementation and asset allocation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD provide
guidance on EPAA end states;
develop EPAA life-cycle cost
estimates; and integrate its phase
schedule with acquisition,
infrastructure, and personnel
activities. GAO also recommends that
DOD adopt operational performance
metrics and include them in the BMD
test program. DOD generally
concurred with GAO’s
recommendations.
DOD also faces planning challenges for EPAA because DOD has not yet
established key operational performance metrics that would provide the
combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational capabilities
and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ. DOD is
incorporating some combatant commands’ requirements into BMD testing, in
part, by having U.S. European Command participate in the test design
process. However, the system’s desired performance is not yet defined using
operationally relevant quantifiable metrics, such as how long and how well it
can defend. The combatant commands are attempting to define operational
performance metrics to enable credible assessment of operational
performance gaps. However, these metrics have yet to be finalized and
implemented. Without a more complete understanding of BMD operational
capabilities and limitations, the combatant commands face potential risk in
EPAA operational planning.
View GAO-11-220 or key components.
For more information, contact John Pendleton
at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
1
Background
DOD has Initiated Efforts to Implement EPAA but Faces Key
Management Challenges Due to Incomplete Guidance and the
Lack of Life-Cycle Cost Estimates and an Integrated Schedule
Although Combatant Commands’ Involvement in BMD Testing Has
Increased, Limited Visibility of BMD Operational Capabilities
and Limitations Creates Challenges in Integrating BMD into
Operational Plans
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
30
35
36
36
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
39
Appendix II
Potential BMDS Elements for EPAA
42
Appendix III
BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities,
Integration, and Location on Defended Areas
44
Appendix IV
U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO Support for BMD in
Europe
45
Appendix V
Comments from the Department of Defense
50
Appendix VI
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
54
Related GAO Products
3
7
55
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Tables
Table 1: General Description of EPAA
Table 2: Key DOD Stakeholders Involved in Planning and
Implementing EPAA
Table 3: DOD Rationale for EPAA Flexibility, Limitations, and
Implications for Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
Table 4: System Development Risks May Be Exacerbated by EPAA
Schedule Compression
4
5
19
24
Figures
Figure 1: Current Status of DOD’s BMD Assets That May Be Part of
EPAA
Figure 2: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities,
Integration, and Location on Defended Area
16
21
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
January 26, 2011
The Honorable Michael R. Turner
Chairman
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Jim Langevin
House of Representatives
On September 17, 2009, the President announced a revised approach for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe, with significant implications for
the Department of Defense’s (DOD) BMD program. In response to this
guidance, DOD cancelled the previously-planned European missile
defense program—a fixed interceptor site in Poland and a fixed radar site
in the Czech Republic—intended to defend against future long-range
Iranian ballistic missiles. 1 Instead, DOD now will deploy in phases
increasingly capable elements and interceptors in Europe to defend
against the growing ballistic missile threat. 2 This “European Phased
Adaptive Approach” (EPAA) to BMD is designed to defend against existing
and near-term threats posed by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles,
as well as build up defenses against longer-range ballistic missile threats
1
GAO previously reported that DOD’s $4 billion estimate that included the European
Interceptor Site in Poland and the European Midcourse Radar in the Czech Republic was
incomplete. See GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European Sites,
GAO-09-771 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2009).
2
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defines many of its major BMD systems as “elements,”
including the ship-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD), the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense, and Upgraded Early Warning Radar. An interceptor is a component of
some ballistic missile defense elements that is used to destroy an adversary’s ballistic
missile. For example, MDA is currently building the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) to be used as
a ballistic missile defense interceptor as part of the Aegis BMD element. For a further
listing and description of the elements that may be included as part of the revised approach
to BMD in Europe, including any associated interceptors, see appendix II.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
over time as those threats mature. 3 The Administration stated that the new
approach will augment current protection of the U.S. homeland against
long-range ballistic missile threats and will use more flexible and
survivable systems to provide for the defense of U.S. deployed forces, their
families, and our allies in Europe sooner and more comprehensively than
the previous approach.
The President’s announcement, further elaborated upon several months
later in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 4 lays out the most
comprehensive shift in U.S. BMD policy since 2002 when the Secretary of
Defense created the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the President
directed fielding of an initial set of missile defense capabilities by 2004. To
assist Congress in its review of this policy shift and its implications, we
were asked to assess DOD’s efforts to implement the phased adaptive
approach for BMD in Europe. In December 2010, we issued a
correspondence on acquisition management and near-term development
risks related to EPAA. 5 For this report, we assessed:
(1) the extent to which DOD has developed guidance and addressed
management of cost and schedule in the planning and implementation of
EPAA, and (2) the extent to which DOD planning for EPAA is informed by
operational performance data.
To address these objectives, we reviewed key legislation related to
ballistic missile defenses in Europe and DOD’s overall approach for
planning, implementing, and preparing to support BMD. To review the
extent to which DOD has developed guidance and addressed management
of EPAA cost and schedule, we interviewed DOD and State Department
officials and reviewed documents and briefs that specifically described
3
Ballistic missiles are classified by the distance they can fly as follows: Short-Range
Ballistic Missile (SRBM)—up to 1000 km; Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)—
between 1000 km and 3000 km; Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)—between
3000 km and 5500 km; and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)—range over 5500 km.
4
Congress mandated in the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 234 (2008) that the Secretary of Defense review and report
on United States BMD policy, strategy, plans, and programs. In response to this direction,
and guided by a presidential directive, DOD conducted a review and issued the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review Report in February 2010, referred to in this report as the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review.
5
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach
Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges,
GAO-11-179R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2010).
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
DOD efforts to plan for and implement EPAA and assessed their
implications for managing EPAA cost and schedule. To review the extent
to which DOD planning for EPAA is informed by operational performance
data, we interviewed DOD officials and reviewed DOD documents on
policy and guidance needed for military planning. To address these
objectives, we also conducted site visits and interviewed officials from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. European Command and its
components, as well as officials from U.S. Strategic Command, U.S.
Northern Command, the Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Test
Agency, and various Navy, Army, and MDA offices.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to January
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our
scope and methodology are discussed in more detail in appendix I.
Background
DOD revised its approach to BMD in Europe as part of the department’s
comprehensive review of BMD strategy and policy, which culminated in
the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. In that report, DOD
set out to match U.S. BMD strategies, policies, and capabilities to the
requirements of current and future threats and to inform DOD planning,
programming, budgeting, and oversight. Judging that the current and
planned defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles will protect the
United States against such threats from North Korea and Iran for the
foreseeable future, DOD is refocusing its resources to defend deployed
forces and allies against regional threats. Each region will have a phased
adaptive approach to BMD tailored to the threats and circumstances
unique to that region, with a principal focus on Europe, East Asia, and the
Middle East. DOD’s goal is to enable a flexible, scalable response to BMD
threats around the world by incorporating new technologies quickly and
cost-effectively and concentrating on the use of mobile and relocatable
BMD assets instead of fixed assets. In addition, DOD expressed a
commitment to testing new assets before fielding to allow assessment
under realistic operational conditions. Finally, DOD is emphasizing
working with regional allies to strengthen BMD and its deterrent value.
The European Phased Adaptive Approach to BMD is the first
implementation of this revised strategy and policy. EPAA currently
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
consists of four phases of increasing capability that spans to 2020. Table 1
summarizes DOD’s proposed time frames and capabilities for the four
phases of EPAA. For a further description of the various BMD assets that
may be part of EPAA, see appendix II.
Table 1: General Description of EPAA
Time frame
Planned capability (capabilities are cumulative)
Phase 1
2011
Deploy existing missile defenses to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Planned
BMD assets to include deployment of:
•
An existing sensor (the AN/TPY-2 radar),a
•
BMD-capable Aegis ships (Aegis BMD),b and the currently fielded Standard Missile-3 interceptor
(SM-3 Block IA).
Phase 2
2015
Field enhanced capability to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Planned BMD
assets to include:
•
One Aegis Ashore—a land-based version of the Aegis BMD weapon system—in Romania and the
more advanced SM-3 Block IB interceptor.
Phase 3
2018
Field enhanced capability to defend against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Planned
BMD assets to include:
•
One additional Aegis Ashore in Poland and the upgraded SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.
Phase 4
2020
Field enhanced capability to defend against potentially longer-range threats, including intercontinental
ballistic missiles. Planned BMD assets include:
•
Further upgraded SM-3 Block IIB interceptors.
Source: GAO summary of DOD information.
Notes: DOD plans for all four phases to include upgrades to the missile defense command and
control system, known as the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications
(C2BMC).
a
DOD intends to use the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system (AN/TPY-2) both for
defense against regional threats and for homeland defense.
b
Aegis BMD is a ship-based system that (1) provides a forward-deployed sensor capability for other
BMD elements and (2) employs its own sensor and interceptors. The element is based on a
modification to existing Navy Aegis ships and utilizes the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor. For
further details on the phases and elements, see figure 1 and appendix II.
A number of stakeholders within DOD play a role in the developing,
building, fielding, and governing of BMD. MDA is responsible for the
acquisition of the elements that comprise the integrated Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS). MDA continues to be exempted from DOD’s
traditional joint requirements determination, acquisition, and associated
oversight processes and retains its expanded responsibility and authority
to define BMD technical requirements, change goals and plans, and
allocate resources. Although not required to build elements to meet
specific operational requirements as it would be under traditional DOD
processes, MDA is required to work closely with the combatant commands
when developing BMD capabilities. DOD reported in the Ballistic Missile
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Defense Review that it would maintain its existing policy of developing,
building, fielding, and governing BMD as it had prior to the EPAA
announcement. Table 2 identifies some of the key DOD stakeholders that
are involved in the implementation of EPAA.
Table 2: Key DOD Stakeholders Involved in Planning and Implementing EPAA
Organization
Primary role in EPAA
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Develops and integrates U.S. missile defense policy within the broader framework of
national security strategy and ensures consistency between missile defense policy and
development and acquisition plans and approaches.
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics
Provides acquisition policy direction, program guidance, and overall management
oversight of MDA. Chairs the Missile Defense Executive Board, provides program
guidance, and makes recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on missile
defense issues.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Provides advice on desired BMD system capabilities and characteristics. Through the
Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization, directly supports U.S. Strategic
Command—the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority and operational
proponent for global BMD.
Missile Defense Executive Board
A senior-level body that reviews DOD’s BMD efforts and provides the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or Deputy Secretary of Defense,
as necessary, with a recommended BMD strategic program plan and feasible funding
strategy for approval.
U.S. European Command
The geographic combatant command whose area of responsibility includes all of
Europe (including Russia and Turkey), Greenland, Israel, and surrounding waters. It is
the primary geographic combatant command responsible for planning and
implementing EPAA. It is assisted in this effort by its service components—principally
U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Army Europe, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe.a,b
U.S. Central Command
The geographic combatant command whose area of responsibility includes parts of the
Middle East. Coordinates with U.S. European Command to defend against ballistic
missile threats originating from their area of responsibility.
U.S. Strategic Command
Functional combatant command with responsibilities to integrate global missions and
capabilities that cross the boundaries of the geographic combatant commands, such as
planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense, including missile
defense advocacy for the combatant commands.c
Missile Defense Agency
Responsible for the research, development, testing, and acquisition of the integrated
BMDS, comprised of individual BMD elements.
Military Services
Responsible for providing forces and resources to support fielding of the BMD assets,
and assisting in planning for and managing the operations and maintenance and
infrastructure needs of BMD assets.
Army Corps of Engineers
Perform site studies for EPAA installations, help identify infrastructure requirements,
and oversee construction to meet MDA and service requirements.
Source: GAO summary of DOD information.
a
The six geographic combatant commands are U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern
Command.
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b
A service component command is a command consisting of the service component commander and
all those service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations
under the command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command.
c
The four functional combatant commands are U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Special Operations
Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.
In previous reports on BMD, we have identified challenges associated with
MDA’s BMD efforts and DOD’s broader approach to BMD planning,
implementation, and oversight. For instance, we concluded in a February
2010 report that although MDA had shown progress in demonstrating
increased performance, its cost estimates could not be thoroughly
assessed and some planned capability could not be verified due to target
shortfalls and modeling limitations. 6 In addition, in September 2009, we
reported that DOD had not identified its requirements for BMD elements
and interceptors and had not fully established units to operate the
elements before making them available for use. 7 For additional GAO
reports on BMD, see the Related GAO Products section.
6
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to
Strengthen Acquisition Approach, GAO-10-311 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2010).
7
GAO, Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and Establish
Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities, GAO-09-856 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 16, 2009).
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DOD has Initiated
Efforts to Implement
EPAA but Faces Key
Management
Challenges Due to
Incomplete Guidance
and the Lack of LifeCycle Cost Estimates
and an Integrated
Schedule
DOD has initiated multiple simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA,
including considering options for the deployment of assets, requesting
forces, preparing for testing, analyzing infrastructure needs, and gaining
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for BMD in Europe.
DOD manages its BMD efforts by individual program elements and
considers EPAA a flexible approach, not a program. However, the
department faces three key management challenges—lack of clear
guidance, life-cycle cost estimates, 8 and a fully integrated schedule—that
may result in inefficient planning and execution, increased cost and
performance risks, and limited oversight of EPAA. First, DOD has not yet
established clear guidance to help direct and align its EPAA efforts.
Without such guidance, DOD faces uncertainty in planning and
implementing this revised approach. Second, DOD has not yet developed
EPAA life-cycle cost estimates and has indicated that it is unlikely to do so
because EPAA is considered a policy designed to maximize flexibility. As a
result, DOD does not have a basis from which to assess EPAA’s
affordability and cost-effectiveness and is missing a tool with which to
monitor implementation progress. Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not
fully integrated with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities.
As a result, DOD does not have the information it needs to assess whether
the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify potential problems,
or analyze how changes will impact the execution of this effort, and
therefore is exposed to increased schedule, performance, and cost risks.
Without addressing these three management challenges, DOD will likely
face difficulties in planning for and implementing EPAA, potentially
resulting in significant cost increases.
DOD and the State
Department Have Taken
Multiple Steps to
Implement EPAA
Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA, stakeholders
throughout DOD—including U.S. European Command (EUCOM), MDA,
and the military services—as well as the State Department, have taken
steps to implement this policy, including considering options for the
deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, analyzing
infrastructure needs, and gaining NATO support for BMD in Europe. For
example, EUCOM initiated EPAA planning efforts and submitted an
official request for some of the BMD assets it determined are needed for
Phase 1, including the personnel to operate them. EUCOM, with the
8
Life-cycle costs are the total cost to the government for a program over its full life,
consisting of research and development, production, operations, maintenance, and disposal
costs and are helpful in assessing whether a program’s cost is affordable.
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assistance of its service components, has been developing an operation
plan for EPAA. 9 DOD officials told us that this plan, covering Phase 1, is
expected to be approved in the spring of 2011. EUCOM officials told us
that their efforts have been informed by the command’s close
collaboration with MDA, which has provided it with information on the
capabilities of BMD assets the command intends to employ in its
operational plan. In order to facilitate the information exchange, MDA has
located representatives at EUCOM headquarters. EUCOM has also been
working with MDA to develop test designs for the BMD system that may
be fielded in EUCOM’s area of responsibility. In particular, EUCOM
designed notional EPAA architectures 10 that will be used in testing. The
results of these tests are intended to provide the command with greater
visibility into the performance of the BMD system it will be responsible for
employing.
MDA has also taken a number of steps to implement EPAA. As we
reported in December 2010, 11 MDA has made progress in acquisition
planning for EPAA, including integrating and aligning its test planning
efforts with EPAA phases through its semiannual Ballistic Missile Defense
System Integrated Master Test Plan. 12 MDA has collaborated with the
combatant commands and members of the testing community to develop
an Integrated Master Test Plan to support planning and execution of all
BMD testing for the phased adaptive approach. Additionally, according to
MDA, its Global Deployment Program Office has been actively engaged in
an effort to align the acquisition activities of EPAA with the EPAA efforts
of other stakeholders, such as the State Department, host country embassy
personnel, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
EUCOM, the Joint Staff, and the military services.
9
Operation plan refers to any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in
response to actual and potential contingencies.
10
Architecture is a framework or structure that portrays relationships among all the
elements of the subject force, system, or activity. See Joint Publication 1-02. For BMD, this
would include the type, number, and location of elements and their linkages to each other.
11
GAO-11-179R.
12
The Integrated Master Test Plan is a semiannual MDA document that establishes the
executable test program for the BMDS. The Integrated Master Test Plan is an overarching
document that describes the BMDS test environment, supporting test organizations,
developmental and operational test programs, and management of MDA test resources. The
Integrated Master Test Plan is the definitive source for detailed BMDS test planning and
execution guidance.
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Officials from the military services and EUCOM’s service components told
us they are also pursuing activities to support EPAA planning, as the
following examples illustrate.
•
•
•
•
•
The Navy has established the Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise, which is
an effort aimed at coordinating all Navy BMD activities to support EPAA
as well as other BMD missions. 13
The Army Corps of Engineers is working with MDA and the Navy on the
preliminary stages of a technical analysis related to Aegis Ashore site
options.
U.S. Naval Forces Europe is analyzing its Aegis BMD ship presence
options and requirements as well as planning for Aegis Ashore.
U.S. Army Europe is conducting resource planning for potential basing
concepts and manning requirements of Army BMD assets that may be
allocated for EPAA, such as the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) element and the AN/TPY-2 radar.
U.S. Air Forces in Europe is drafting a concept of operations 14 that, when
approved by the EUCOM Commander, will establish the command and
control relationships for conducting BMD operations for EPAA. Similar
efforts are in progress within NATO.
The State Department, in coordination with DOD, has also made
significant progress in achieving NATO support for BMD in Europe. NATO
recently adopted the territorial missile defense mission—to protect its
populations and territories in Europe against ballistic missile attack—but
now must undertake the challenging task of reaching agreement on how to
implement this new mission. Poland and Romania have agreed to host U.S.
BMD assets although the U.S. has not yet found a host nation for a critical
sensor planned for deployment in 2011. Finally, NATO members may
provide BMD assets to assist in the defense of Europe. However, the U.S.
currently is the only NATO member with BMD assets designed to provide
territorial defense. See appendix IV for more details of NATO support for
BMD in Europe.
13
The Navy Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise effort allows missile defense experts from
across the Navy to meet regularly to discuss EPAA implementation issues and challenges,
develop analyses of alternatives, and work to identify courses of action and solutions.
14
A concept of operations expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish
and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an
overall picture of the operation. It is also called commander's concept. See Joint
Publication 1-02.
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DOD’s Guidance for EPAA
Is Not Yet Complete
DOD has initiated many efforts to implement EPAA, but the department
has not yet established clear guidance to help direct and align its efforts.
According to DOD, effective planning requires clear guidance on desired
end states. 15 In the context of BMD, this could include information such as
the purpose and duration of the mission and areas to be defended, as well
as priorities within a region and between regions. While senior DOD
officials stated that the President’s EPAA announcement and the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review provide sufficient guidance to begin planning and
implementation, a recent DOD study recommended planning guidance be
further refined. Further, key BMD stakeholders, including those from the
Joint Staff, combatant commands, and military services believe that
additional guidance is needed for EPAA.
Senior DOD officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, the Joint Staff, and MDA told us it was their
view that the President’s announcement and the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review 16 provide sufficient guidance to enable the Joint Staff, combatant
commands, and services to begin planning and implementing EPAA. The
officials also noted that some additional guidance would be forthcoming
through the regular updating of DOD’s high-level policy and planning
documents. 17 According to these officials, EPAA is a policy framework for
the evolutionary development and fielding of missile defenses in Europe to
defend against ballistic missile threats. They further indicated that the
EPAA framework does not establish or dictate a specific architecture or
force structure requirement. Additionally, the officials stated that the Joint
Staff and the combatant commands are responsible for translating the
15
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 26, 2006).
16
See the Background section and footnote 4 for more details on the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review.
17
The high-level DOD policy and planning documents the officials referred to include the
Guidance for the Employment of the Force, the Defense Planning and Programming
Guidance, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Guidance for the Employment of
the Force is a DOD policy document signed by the Secretary of Defense that provides,
among other things, comprehensive, near-term planning guidance and overarching policy
for global posture, force allocations, and contingency planning. The Defense Planning and
Programming Guidance is a DOD policy document signed by the Secretary of Defense that
provides investment guidance to services and agencies. The Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan is a Joint Chiefs of Staff document that translates the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's overarching policy and planning guidance into combatant command direction to
prepare specific contingency plans.
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overarching policy into specific requirements to allow military forces to
execute the policy. Moreover, the senior officials also stated that the
specific requirements for EPAA, including architecture, would be
developed by the combatant commands and Joint Staff in consultation
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense using standard DOD planning
processes and that any policy gaps that may emerge would be addressed
as plans are iterated through the normal planning process.
DOD examined the need for policy guidance in the Global Force
Management Development Project, a study to clarify and more fully assess
the scope and implications of the decision to adopt EPAA and the phased
adaptive approach in general. This effort was led by the Joint Staff and
included participation from U.S. Strategic Command, EUCOM, U.S. Pacific
Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Joint
Forces Command, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
and technical assistance from MDA. The study was tasked with developing
the plan and facts to be used to allocate limited BMD assets among the
combatant commands as regional situations and national strategies
require. The classified study was unable to fully address this task but
concluded, among other things, that DOD needed to refine its BMD
planning guidance, identifying 14 BMD-related general planning guidance
questions that DOD needed to answer. According to Joint Staff officials,
the study’s findings were briefed to and endorsed by several senior DOD
boards, including the Missile Defense Executive Board in May 2010.
Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Policy told
us that it takes time to fully develop all of the strategic planning and
investment guidance necessary to implement a significant policy shift like
EPAA. Further, the officials added that some of the guidance questions
identified in the study could not be addressed immediately because they
had to be sequenced with other events. They gave the example that some
of the guidance would rely on decisions made by NATO, which has only
recently adopted the territorial missile defense mission. 18
Consistent with the study’s findings, officials from the Joint Staff,
combatant commands, and services told us that DOD needed to provide
more clarity on desired EPAA end states to ensure that they were
appropriately executing their responsibilities. For example, Army officials
told us that the Army’s primary concern with EPAA was the lack of clear
18
For further discussion of EPAA and NATO, including NATO’s adoption of the territorial
missile defense mission, see appendix IV.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
guidance on end states and said that the Army could not be certain that it
was appropriately preparing to support EPAA assets without knowing
what assets would be deployed when, where, and for how long. In
addition, the Navy created a new organization to help coordinate the
service’s BMD efforts and also developed its own set of EPAA facts and
assumptions so that it could support EPAA requirements. However, Navy
officials told us that although they coordinate with other BMD
stakeholders regularly, they did not know if everyone was operating under
the same end-state assumptions, including assumptions about force
allocation and deployment deadlines. Combatant command officials also
told us that existing guidance did not provide clarity on desired end states,
including prioritization of regions to be defended. By contrast, other BMD
policy decisions, such as the 2002 decision to deploy BMD and the later
decision to deploy an AN/TPY-2 radar to Israel, were based on clear and
formal policy guidance, according to Joint Staff officials. The officials told
us that the lack of clear guidance for EPAA was leading different
organizations to make different assumptions about desired end states and
that this was resulting in inefficient planning and execution.
A reason that BMD stakeholders throughout DOD may be seeking further
planning guidance is that there is a lack of clarity on both the relative
priority of EPAA to other BMD missions around the world and the extent
to which BMD assets will be deployed forward. Although the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review presents the phased adaptive approach as
pertaining to all geographic combatant commands, EPAA was a
presidential policy decision, implying a certain priority for European BMD
needs. However, this priority has not yet been formally codified through a
presidential directive or memorandum. Additionally, statements by senior
DOD officials have detailed potential EPAA plans that, if carried out,
would consume a significant portion of DOD’s BMD assets, depending on
the amount of physical presence required. For example, depending on
interpretation of existing guidance for EPAA, Aegis BMD ships could be
tasked with maintaining a continuous physical forward presence; only
needing to be available to surge into the theater in response to heightened
threat situations; or be available for a mixture of forward presence and
surge capability. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review also discusses the
need to have a strategic approach to regional BMD and tailor the
requirements to the unique and varied needs of each region, including
Europe. DOD is undertaking several studies related to regional BMD led
by the Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command that should help to better
define force allocation and quantity needs for both surge and forward
presence BMD forces. Additionally, senior officials from the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and MDA said that
there is a draft presidential directive that will help clarify EPAA policy.
However, DOD has not yet issued formal guidance clarifying the EPAA
mission, including its relative priority among the regions identified for the
phased adaptive approach. DOD officials told us that combatant
commands responded to the EPAA announcement and the uncertainty
about priorities with a surge of requests for BMD forces to ensure that
their requirements would be met. Without establishing guidance to more
fully align understanding throughout the department on what the desired
end states are for EPAA, including its relative priority to other regional
BMD architecture requirements, the department faces uncertainty in
planning and implementing this revised approach.
DOD Has Not Established
EPAA Life-Cycle Cost
Estimates
DOD has not established life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA and therefore
is missing an important management tool for preparing budgets,
monitoring progress and assessing long-term affordability of its revised
approach to BMD in Europe. DOD has stated two main reasons for not
establishing life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA. First, DOD officials told us
that DOD does not intend to prepare separate life-cycle cost estimates for
EPAA because DOD views it as an approach, not a program, and so
funding is provided through the individual BMD elements that make up
EPAA. However, in introducing the revised approach to BMD, the
department emphasized that it would be fiscally sustainable and
affordable. Additionally, in referring to EPAA in prepared testimony before
Congress, the MDA Director stated that DOD was “committed to fully
funding this program.” 19 Although DOD reported that the acquisition cost
estimates and annual BMD budget request for individual elements include
EPAA costs, we found that such information does not include full lifecycle costs. 20 Further, this budgeting method is fragmented and so does
not provide decision makers with a transparent and holistic view of EPAA
19
Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Missile Defense
in Europe, statement for the House Armed Services Committee (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 1, 2009).
20
We have previously reported that we were unable to assess MDA’s actual costs against a
baseline for total acquisition costs for BMD elements for 7 years in a row because MDA had
not baselined such costs (GAO-10-311) and that DOD lacked independently verified lifecycle cost estimates for BMD elements (GAO-08-1068). GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile
Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition Approach,
GAO-10-311 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2010) and GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed
to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile
Defense GAO-08-1068 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2008).
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
costs. Second, DOD has emphasized that the inherent flexibility of EPAA
makes developing life-cycle cost estimates for the approach difficult.
However, without life-cycle cost estimates DOD may not be able to
determine whether its revised approach to BMD in Europe is fiscally
sustainable and affordable.
We have found that key principles for managing major investments such as
EPAA include that an organization should understand the financial
commitment involved and ensure appropriate transparency and
accountability. 21 Further, according to the GAO cost estimating guide, 22 a
credible cost estimate is required in order to assess a program’s
affordability and cost-effectiveness and to serve as a basis for a budget. 23
The guide identifies 12 steps necessary for developing credible cost
estimates. 24 Following these steps ensures that realistic cost estimates are
developed and presented to management, enabling them to make informed
decisions about whether the program is affordable within the portfolio
plan. Providing decision makers with a program’s updated cost estimate
helps them monitor the implementation of the program and ensure that
adequate funding is available to execute the program according to plan.
Finally, credible cost estimates serve as a basis for a program’s budget and
validate that a program’s strategy has an adequate budget for its planned
resources.
21
GAO-11-179R.
22
GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and
Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
23
The GAO cost estimating guide (GAO-09-3SP) refers to programs broadly to include not
only a specific acquisition program but also projects or investments. The guide’s
applicability includes an investment or project that requires special management attention
because (1) of its importance to the mission of the agency or component of the agency;
(2) it supports financial management and obligates more than $500,000 annually; (3) it has
significant program or policy implications; (4) it has high executive visibility; (5) it has high
development, operating, or maintenance costs; or (6) it is defined as major by the agency’s
capital planning and investment control process. The cost guide is therefore applicable to
EPAA.
24
The 12 steps for developing credible cost estimates are: (1) defining the estimate’s
purpose; (2) developing the estimating plan; (3) defining the project’s characteristics;
(4) determining the estimating approach; (5) identifying ground rules and assumptions;
(6) obtaining data; (7) developing the point estimate and comparing it to an independent
cost estimate; (8) conducting sensitivity analysis; (9) performing a risk and uncertainty
analysis; (10) documenting the estimate; (11) presenting the estimate to management for
approval; and (12) updating the estimate to reflect actual costs and changes. See
GAO-09-3SP.
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Part of the challenge in determining EPAA life-cycle costs results from
uncertainty about what elements and interceptors will be included in
EPAA. According to the GAO cost estimating guide, the final accuracy of
cost estimates depends on how well a program is defined. In order to
develop credible estimates, an organization needs detailed technical,
program, and schedule descriptions from which all life-cycle cost
estimates can be derived. Some of these details would include system
architecture, deployment details, operational concepts, personnel
requirements, and logistics support. DOD’s phased schedule for EPAA is
comprised of multiple elements and interceptors to provide everimproving integrated BMD capability, but many aspects of the approach
have not yet been determined. For example, DOD has thus far committed
to using two Aegis Ashore facilities and at least one AN/TPY-2 radar.
Additionally, each EPAA phase could have as many as three Aegis BMD
ship patrol areas, but DOD has not yet committed to a specific number of
ships or SM-3 interceptors for each phase. As we reported in December
2010, 25 DOD also has not yet committed to the specific type or number of
the other elements and interceptors that will be part of the EPAA phases.
Figure 1 summarizes the current status of DOD’s BMD assets that may be
part of EPAA.
25
GAO-11-179R.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Figure 1: Current Status of DOD’s BMD Assets That May Be Part of EPAA
Phase 1
(~2011)
Element
Phase 2
(~2015)
Phase 3
(~2018)
Phase 4
(~2020)
1 AN/TPY-2 sensor
(location not established)
Aegis BMD ships
SM-3 interceptors
PAC-3
THAAD batteries
THAAD interceptors
1 Aegis Ashore (Romania)
SM-3 interceptors
1 Aegis Ashore (Poland)
SM-3 interceptors
Additional
AN/TPY-2 sensor
PTSS
ABIR sensor
EPAA assets and their quantities known
EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined
Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be determined
ABIR (Airborne Infrared sensor); AN/TPY-2 (Army Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance - Model 2)
PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3); PTSS (Precision Tracking Space System)
SM-3 (Standard Missile-3); THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense)
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data; Missile Defense Agency (images).
For a further description of the various BMD assets that may be part of EPAA, see appendix II.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Despite the current lack of detail on the implementation of EPAA policy,
best practices for cost estimating include methods by which to develop
valid cost estimates when a program’s details are limited and thus still
provide markers for measuring progress and assessing affordability. The
cost guide makes special mention of spiral development efforts that, like
EPAA, do not have clearly defined final requirements. 26 In such cases, valid
cost estimates can be developed as long as they clearly state the
requirements that have been included and account for those that have
been excluded. The Congressional Budget Office and the Institute for
Defense Analysis have completed such analyses for the previous approach
to BMD in Europe and the Institute for Defense Analysis also completed a
cost estimate for EPAA. 27 As the types and quantities of elements and
interceptors needed for EPAA become better defined over time, cost
estimates should be updated to ensure that managers understand the
impact of any changes.
DOD has also emphasized that the inherent flexibility of EPAA makes
developing life-cycle cost estimates for the approach difficult. According
to senior DOD officials, the department could develop a life-cycle cost
estimate for the phased adaptive approach but they were unsure of the
relevancy of characterizing unique costs for EPAA. The officials said that
DOD places significant emphasis on flexibility in its new approach to
regional BMD, calling EPAA flexible by nature. The officials also stated
26
In spiral development, a desired capability is identified but the end-state requirements are
not yet known. These requirements are refined through demonstration and risk
management, based on continuous user feedback. This approach allows each increment to
provide the best possible capability. Spiral development is often used in the commercial
market because it significantly reduces technical risk while incorporating new technology.
The approach can, however, lead to increased cost and schedule risks. Spiral development
can also present contract challenges due to repeating phases, trading requirements, and
redefining deliverables. See GAO-09-3SP.
27
Congressional Budget Office, Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2009), Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA Paper P-4359:
Independent Assessment of the Proposed Deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Systems in Europe (Washington, D.C.: July 2008), and Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA
Paper P-4660: Independent Assessment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach:
Follow-on Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2010). The Congressional Budget Office study
was prepared at the request of the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Armed
Services Committee’s Strategic Forces Subcommittee. The first IDA study was undertaken
in response to section 226 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-181 (2008). The second IDA study was undertaken in response to section
235 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84
(2009). We did not assess these estimates and have not yet obtained the latest IDA report
from DOD.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
that DOD’s focus on using mobile and relocatable BMD assets for EPAA
and in other regions means that the mix of elements and interceptors in
each region could be adjusted to adapt to changes in threat. The result of
this flexibility, according to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, is that
the actual life-cycle cost of the missile defense system is difficult to
determine because there is no final configuration for the system. However,
an organization can develop estimates for a range of possible scenarios. A
cost estimating best practice in developing technical baselines includes
defining deployment details for various scenarios, such as peacetime,
contingency, and war. By presenting a range of scenarios, decision makers
can better understand the short-term and long-term cost implications of
different options and better evaluate their choices. While we recognize
that life-cycle cost estimates will have increased levels of uncertainty for
the later phases compared to the near-term phases, the level of flexibility
inherent in EPAA needed to respond to changes in threat or technology
over the four phases of this approach is bounded and cost estimating
practices are adaptive enough to allow for the development of valid cost
estimates. Table 3 describes our assessment of DOD’s rationales for EPAA
flexibility, factors limiting flexibility or the need for it, and their impact on
DOD’s ability to develop life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA.
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Table 3: DOD Rationale for EPAA Flexibility, Limitations, and Implications for Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
DOD rationale for flexibility in EPAA
Limitations
Implications for EPAA life-cycle cost
estimation
Preserves ability to respond to changes Large and growing numbers of threat
in quantity of threat missiles.
missiles and relatively low numbers of BMD
assets for the foreseeable future mean that
high demand for BMD assets for EPAA is
essentially a constant.
Year-to-year change in numbers of threat
missiles is relatively predictable, according
to DOD officials.
The marginal change in the already high EPAA
demand for BMD assets caused by an
unexpected increase in threat missiles should
be limited and therefore should not impede the
development of cost estimates. The Joint Staff
is leading a study, expected to be completed in
the spring of 2011, that should help identify the
specific BMD assets needed to address this
high demand.
Preserves ability to respond to crises
A surge strategy assumes a baseline BMD
by surging mobile and relocatable BMD capability as well as defined capabilities
assets wherever needed.
that could be surged to a given region as
threats change.
A developed surge strategy should include
details on assumed baselines and surged
assets and so would provide details that could
improve the quality of a cost estimate. U.S.
Strategic Command is leading a force
allocation study, expected to be complete in
the spring of 2011, that should help to better
define DOD’s surge strategy.
Preserves ability to integrate new BMD
technology that has been proven
effective through operationally realistic
a
testing.
Taking new BMD technologies from
concept to fielding, including testing them,
can take many years. We have previously
found that BMD testing schedules have
tended to slip.b
Given DOD’s commitment to deploying only
proven BMD capabilities means that timelines
for deploying new technologies as part of
EPAA should be relatively predictable, allowing
for the updating of cost estimates.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
a
The Ballistic Missile Defense Review lays out how DOD currently uses its testing approach to
evaluate operational effectiveness. In sum, the Integrated Master Testing Plan identifies a number of
ground and flight tests that an asset must participate in to obtain data needed to validate models and
simulations that, in turn, are intended to provide further visibility into the asset’s operational
performance. DOD has also added additional operational test events controlled by the testing
community and combatant commands that include additional ground and flight tests. According to
DOD, it is the information gathered from this combination of efforts that can be used to evaluate an
asset’s operational effectiveness.
b
See for example, GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to
Strengthen Acquisition Approach, GAO-09-338 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2010).
There may be occasions when DOD, in response to more rapid than
projected quantitative and qualitative developments in the existing threat
or the emergence of new missile threats from an unexpected location, will
need to adjust to those threats. Good life-cycle cost estimates are equipped
to deal with such unforeseen circumstances because they clearly list the
facts and assumptions on which they are based. In such circumstances, a
life-cycle cost estimate would provide additional information to decision
makers in DOD and Congress as they evaluate their options. Until DOD
develops EPAA life-cycle cost estimates—which could potentially be part
of a larger phased adaptive approach life-cycle cost estimate—the
department will not have an accurate basis from which to determine the
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
financial sustainability and affordability of the revised approach to BMD in
Europe and is missing a tool with which to monitor its implementation.
DOD’s EPAA Phase
Schedule Does Not Fully
Integrate Key Acquisition,
Infrastructure, and
Personnel Activities
DOD established the EPAA phase schedule without fully integrating it with
key acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities and, as a result, the
department does not have an important management tool with which to
assess whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify
potential problems, or analyze how changes will impact the execution of
this effort. As a result, the program may be exposed to schedule,
performance, and cost risks. Implementing EPAA will require the
synchronization of numerous efforts, including acquisition, infrastructure,
and personnel activities. For example, DOD must develop and produce the
BMD elements and interceptors for EPAA and must be able to integrate
them into a system. The performance of a fielded BMD architecture,
including the size of the area defended, is dependent on several factors,
including the types and numbers of elements and interceptors fielded, the
extent to which fielded elements are linked together operationally, and the
geographic location of the elements (see fig. 2). Further, DOD must also
have the appropriate infrastructure in place—such as needed power,
water, roads, facilities, and security—in time to support not only the EPAA
elements and interceptors it intends to field as part of EPAA but also the
personnel necessary to operate and maintain them. DOD must also have
these trained personnel available in time to carry out those duties. The
department is working to implement EPAA, but EPAA timelines may not
match the time needed to integrate and execute the necessary acquisition,
infrastructure, and personnel activities.
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Figure 2: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities, Integration, and Location on Defended Area
Interactivity
instructions
F172
BMD-capable ship
BMD sensor
Click on each option
to see the results.
Integrated
Option 1
Defended area
Option 2
Option 3
For print version, see
appendix III.
NOTIONAL
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: The defended areas shown are for illustrative purposes only.
This graphic is interactive in the electronic version of this report. For the print version, the graphic is
broken out by the different options in appendix III.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Our past work shows that a program’s success depends on the quality of
its schedule. 28 If it is well-integrated, a schedule clearly shows the
relationships between program activities, activity resource requirements
and durations, and any constraints that affect their start or completion.
The schedule shows when major events are expected as well as the
completion dates for all activities leading up to them, which can help
determine if the schedule is realistic and achievable. When fully laid out, a
detailed schedule can be used to identify where problems are or could
potentially be. Moreover, as changes occur within a program, a wellintegrated schedule will aid in analyzing how they affect the program. For
these reasons, an integrated schedule is key in managing program
performance and is necessary for determining what work remains and the
expected cost to complete it.
According to officials from MDA, the Navy, the Army, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and EUCOM, a principle
challenge for implementing EPAA is meeting its schedule. DOD
established the EPAA phase schedule based on a top-level evaluation of
the implementation activities that could impact or be impacted by that
schedule and, as a result, DOD may face challenges executing it. EPAA is a
policy framework and not a fully developed architecture or program,
according to senior DOD officials responsible for developing the policy.
Further, the schedule for EPAA was largely based on the alignment of the
changes in the threat to availability of new technology, including the
various SM-3 interceptor variants. These officials said that they relied
upon acquisition feasibility and affordability information for various
options that was provided by MDA and that the Joint Staff represented
service and combatant command concerns during the development of the
phased schedule. However, they also stated that the military services and
combatant commands began examining the specific implementation
requirements of EPAA after the policy’s announcement.
Phases Not Yet Integrated with
Supporting Acquisition
Activities
EPAA’s phases are not yet integrated with key acquisition activities and so
are exposed to risk of schedule slips, decreased performance, and
increased cost. As we reported in December 2010, 29 EPAA policy calls for
DOD to deliver BMD capabilities on a timeline that requires concurrency
28
GAO-09-3SP. As noted earlier, the GAO cost estimating guide refers to programs broadly
to include not only a specific acquisition program but also projects or investments, such as
EPAA.
29
GAO-11-179R.
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among technology, design, testing, and other development activities; this
concurrency introduces risk of increased costs, schedule delay, or
performance shortfalls that must be addressed. A sound acquisition has
firm requirements, mature technologies, and a strategy that provides
sufficient time for design activities before the decision is made to start
development and demonstration or to transition to production. As we
reported, it is questionable whether DOD’s approach allows sufficient time
for these activities. Schedules for the individual elements are highly
optimistic in technology development, testing, production, and integration,
leaving little room for potential delays.
Additionally, DOD has not formally or fully aligned acquisition
programming to support EPAA or set acquisition decision points for each
phase, including production decisions. An integrated schedule defines
major decision points at which to review demonstrated progress and
follow-on plans. It establishes exit and entrance criteria to show that
components are ready to move from one developmental step to the next,
and that the component fits within the context of the bigger system to
which it contributes. While individual BMD elements have a schedule,
DOD has not developed an integrated schedule for EPAA that aligns the
necessary acquisition activities. As a result, decisions about production of
individual elements, risks associated with individual elements and
interceptors, overall BMD system interoperability and integration, and
assessment of the integrated system do not appear to be fully linked to the
phases. Additionally, the Missile Defense Executive Board, which is
responsible for overseeing missile defense portfolio developments, has
thus far focused program reviews solely at the element level, not the
broader EPAA level. 30 According to DOD, the department is developing an
integrated acquisition schedule for EPAA. Without such a schedule, DOD
acquisition managers, stakeholders, and Congress lack an integrated
EPAA-level view of BMD development. Table 4 summarizes some
development risks for the individual BMD assets as well as the integrated
system that may be exacerbated by the EPAA schedule compression.
30
According to a DOD official, the Missile Defense Executive Board has performed a
program review of the THAAD system and plans to do a program review of Aegis BMD.
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Table 4: System Development Risks May Be Exacerbated by EPAA Schedule Compression
Command, Control, Battle Management,
and Communications
(C2BMC)
The C2BMC element, which is designed to integrate the BMDS capabilities and provide
planning, situational awareness, sensor management, and battle management, may
present an incorrect picture of the battle space because it may not accurately group
threat missile tracks to reduce multiple cues from sensors about the tracks.
Aegis Ashore
The Aegis BMD weapon system currently in service on ships will require modifications for
use on land as Aegis Ashore.a
According to Navy officials, overall system design has not been selected. Also, detail
design has not yet begun. The contract for a portion of Aegis Ashore is scheduled for
award prior to preliminary or critical design reviews for Aegis Ashore; we have reported
that such sequencing can lead to costly modifications later in the process.b
Integration of Aegis Ashore with C2BMC, which links Aegis Ashore to cueing forward
sensors, is critical and has not been demonstrated.
Testing of Aegis Ashore has been reduced from four flight test intercepts to two intercept
tests, eliminating opportunities for DOD to learn about the performance of the system.
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) IB
Technology development of a key subsystem is following a high-risk path. According to
the Director, MDA, a flight test was recently rescheduled to allow time to complete all
qualifications prior to the test.
Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD)
Some production risks for THAAD batteries—including incomplete system and some
component qualification, potential design changes, and demonstrated production rates for
interceptor components not supporting production needs—have caused more than a sixmonth delay in production. The program has now addressed most of these risks and has
mitigation plans in place for those remaining.
Interoperability and Assessment of
Integrated System Performance
As a system-of-systems, the BMDS is expected to perform as a whole, not just the sum of
its individual parts; thus technical interoperability and integration among individual
systems is key to whole system performance.
Ability of testing and assessment plans to fully demonstrate BMDS capabilities in a
regional context is constrained by existing limitations in models and simulations. These
limitations include incorrect representations of how BMDS elements are linked in the real
world and can result in overstating integrated system performance.
Interoperability with friends and allies is uncertain; who will contribute, how, and the
degree of technical feasibility and investment to interoperate with other nations has yet to
be determined.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: This table is based on the findings of GAO-11-179R. For additional information and findings
regarding EPAA acquisition issues, please see that report.
a
Modifications necessary for converting the Aegis BMD weapon system for shore use include design,
integration, and fabrication of a new deckhouse enclosure for the radar, modification of the interceptor
vertical launching system, and suppression or disabling of certain features used at sea, such as
software for a ship’s pitch and yaw.
b
GAO, Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding
from Navy Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009).
Phases Not Yet Integrated with
Supporting Infrastructure
Requirements
Furthermore, the EPAA phase schedule is not yet integrated with key
infrastructure activities and therefore is also exposed to risk of schedule
slips, decreased performance, and increased cost. BMD assets, such as the
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
AN/TPY-2 radar and Aegis Ashore, require infrastructure to support and
secure the assets. Designing, funding, and building military infrastructure
can take years. Officials from MDA, the Navy, EUCOM, U.S. Naval Forces
Europe, and the Army Corps of Engineers 31 stated that having the
necessary infrastructure in place to support the scheduled 2015
operational date for the first Aegis Ashore could be challenging. There
were some early design questions about how relocatable Aegis Ashore was
supposed to be, which had direct implications for infrastructure
requirements. According to officials from MDA and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, initial design options included a modular construction option
that allowed for placement or removal of Aegis Ashore from a site within
120 days. Infrastructure needs for the initial modular design option would
have been minimal. Nevertheless, DOD decided not to pursue the initial
modular design because of technical challenges that may have impacted
performance and driven up the Aegis Ashore development and acquisition
costs, as well as potentially increasing costs for operating and sustaining
the element. However, there was disagreement among the officials to
whom we spoke about the impact of pursuing a new design on
infrastructure needs—ranging from no change to requiring significant
additional infrastructure.
Although DOD is beginning to narrow its design approach for Aegis
Ashore, DOD is operating under a compressed schedule to meet the 2015
operational date for Phase 2. Construction, and therefore funding, for all
of the necessary Phase 2 Aegis Ashore facilities and associated
infrastructure needs to begin in fiscal year 2013, according to officials
from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Navy, and U.S. Naval Forces
Europe. However, MDA reported to us and a senior DOD official testified
to Congress that Aegis Ashore site construction will take approximately
1 year. According to officials from the Navy and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Aegis Ashore infrastructure costs remain unknown because the
designs have not yet been finalized for the system itself or the supporting
infrastructure. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials said that they are
working closely with the Navy and MDA to reach basic agreement on the
design of the infrastructure in March 2011, which is in time for MDA to
31
The Army Corps of Engineers is assigned as the construction agent for most of Europe,
including Romania and Poland. DOD Directive 4270.5, Military Construction, para. 3.2;
4.4.1, enc. 1 (Feb. 12, 2005). As such, the Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for
awarding and monitoring construction contracts to build Aegis Ashore sites in Romania
and Poland by 2015 and 2018, respectively. It is also involved in the design of the
infrastructure.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
budget for the needed facilities in fiscal year 2013. However, Army Corps
of Engineers officials said that the Romania Aegis Ashore site design and
construction estimate will not be as mature as those of typical military
construction projects, which may expose the Aegis Ashore construction
site to increased risk of design modifications, increased costs, and
possible delays. As we have previously reported, DOD underestimated its
BMD support infrastructure requirements and military construction costs
for the prior plan for BMD in Europe when it did not follow the traditional
military construction requirements. 32 Army Corps of Engineers officials
noted that DOD is accepting this extra risk with Aegis Ashore, because
waiting for a more complete design for Aegis Ashore in Romania would
result in missing the 2015 deadline.
A significant infrastructure-related schedule risk to EPAA over which DOD
and the U.S. government in general has limited control but which can have
significant implications for implementation is the entry into force
requirements of agreements, such as ratification, with nations to host
,
EPAA assets and personnel. 33 34 Delays in ratification could impact the
schedule for infrastructure because U.S. law prohibits DOD from
constructing land-based BMD interceptor facilities in Europe until after
the host nation ratifies the agreements it has reached with the U.S. 35 State
Department officials stated that the host nation negotiations and
32
GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information
on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European Sites, GAO-09-771
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2009).
33
According to DOD, it is longstanding DOD policy to make best efforts to conclude a
binding international agreement documenting the host nation’s permission for the presence
of DOD personnel and equipment in its territory as well as adequate status protections for
such personnel.
34
According to the State Department, an agreement enters into force when the parties
consent to be bound by the agreement, at which point the parties are legally obligated to
comply with the agreement’s provisions. Depending on the form of the agreement and the
parties’ domestic requirements, entry into force may require any number of events,
including signature, ratification, exchange of notes, or some combination of these.
35
Section 223 (a) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383 (2011) restricts the obligation or expenditure of funds for Fiscal
Year 2011 and beyond for site activation, construction, or deployment of missile defense
interceptors on European land as part of the phased adaptive approach to missile defense
in Europe until certain conditions are met, including host nation signing and ratification of
basing agreements and status of forces agreements authorizing deployment of such
interceptors. Section 223(c) allows the Secretary of Defense to waive the restrictions seven
days after the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees written
certification that the waiver is in the urgent national security interests of the United States.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
ratification process for the Aegis Ashore facilities in Romania and
Poland—to be completed as part of Phases 2 and 3 respectively—are in
progress and, though they do not anticipate any significant delays, they
also cannot predict when negotiations and ratification will be complete or
when agreements will enter into force. For example, the U.S. government
ran into unexpected delays in host nation agreement ratification when it
was attempting to implement the previous approach to BMD in Europe.
According to DOD, its schedule assumption in 2007 was that both Poland
and the Czech Republic would complete the necessary ratification of host
nation agreements by the end of fiscal year 2008. However, as we
previously reported, delays in the ratification of key host nation
agreements presented challenges to DOD’s planning and implementation
of its prior approach to BMD in Europe. 36 In that report, we also noted that
the ratification votes were delayed, in part, because of a desire on the part
of both the Polish and Czech parliaments to wait for an indication from the
current U.S. administration on its policy toward ballistic missile defenses
in Europe. In the end, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic ratified the
necessary agreements before September 2009 when the U.S. decided to
take a new approach to BMD in Europe. 37 Similar delays in host nation
agreement ratification for Aegis Ashore could also impact EPAA and result
in schedule slips, decreased performance, or increased cost. Additionally,
the U.S. must also reach agreement with nations to host other land-based
BMD assets that may be part of EPAA. For example, DOD’s plans for
EPAA Phase 1 include an AN/TPY-2 radar intended to provide early
warning data to engage short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats
and provide additional tracking information for homeland defense.
According to a senior Joint Staff official, the AN/TPY-2 will significantly
increase the capability of Aegis BMD that is also intended to be part of
Phase 1. However, the U.S. has not reached agreement with a country to
host the AN/TPY-2. If such an agreement is not reached soon, there may
not be enough time to construct the necessary facilities for the AN/TPY-2
and deploy it by the end of 2011, thereby diminishing DOD’s expected
EPAA Phase 1 performance.
36
GAO-09-771.
37
According to the State Department, after the current administration came into office in
January 2009, the U.S. government advised both the governments of Poland and the Czech
Republic that the U.S. was reviewing its approach to European BMD. From that point
forward, neither the Czech Republic nor Poland moved their ratification process forward
while they awaited the U.S. decision regarding its approach to BMD in Europe that was
announced in September 2009 and with the completion of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review in February 2010.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Phases Not Yet Integrated with
Supporting Personnel Needs
The EPAA timeline is not yet integrated with key activities to ensure
personnel needs are met. The military services are responsible for
organizing and training personnel, a process that typically takes years
once requirements are identified. DOD generally requires that major
weapon systems be fielded with a full complement of organized and
trained personnel. As we previously reported, DOD has in the past put
BMD elements into operational use before first ensuring that the military
services had created units and trained service members to operate them
and, as a result, combatant commanders sometimes lacked certainty that
the forces could operate the elements as expected. 38 DOD concurred with
our recommendation that it require, in the absence of an immediate threat
or crisis, that operational units be established with the organizations,
personnel, and training needed to perform all of their BMD responsibilities
before first making elements available for operational use.
DOD’s aggressive EPAA schedule runs the risk of deploying assets without
the full complement of trained personnel needed to carry out the mission,
which could lead to issues with operational performance. For example,
Navy officials told us that they will likely have to extend sailors’ rotations
beyond the standard deployment length to meet possible EPAA ship
requirements for Phase 1, thus placing a strain on the force and possibly
affecting performance. The Navy is already dealing with manning issues
that may affect BMD asset capabilities. In 2010, separate reports by the
Navy found Aegis radar manpower and performance in decline. The
reports stressed that the Navy’s Aegis crews are already overextended and
they lack sufficient numbers of qualified people to meet its radar
maintenance requirements. Additional requirements for Aegis presence
because of EPAA could contribute further to this problem. Reducing
EPAA deployments to address these concerns would result in a decrease
in expected capability.
Moreover, DOD has yet to make key decisions that will affect its personnel
needs and so does not yet know how these needs will affect the EPAA
schedule. For example, Navy officials told us that they lack some crucial
information such as the required Aegis ship presence for the early phases
of EPAA or the design of Aegis Ashore for later phases. This hinders their
ability to fully plan and develop the necessary organizations, personnel,
and training requirements. Navy officials said that the Navy expects to
keep training requirements for the personnel operating the Aegis Ashore
38
GAO-09-856.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
weapon system very similar to the training needed for the Aegis weapon
system on the ship, thus simplifying training requirements. However, Navy
officials said that some support infrastructure jobs unique to Aegis Ashore
are difficult to assess, and training for these will have to be developed as
Aegis Ashore designs mature. The Navy has not yet been able to establish
training requirements for maintaining the land-based vertical launch
system that is part of Aegis Ashore, for instance, because design has not
been finalized. Further, Navy officials told us that the personnel required
for Aegis Ashore could differ significantly if it is required to operate at full
readiness at all times or if it is required to operate at some lower level of
readiness. A requirement for maintaining high readiness could increase
personnel costs and challenge the service’s ability to provide sufficient
personnel. Also, Army officials told us that they need more guidance on
what Army systems will be part of EPAA and when these systems will
need to be operational. DOD is working to clarify many of its EPAA needs
and doing so will help inform personnel needs and allow the services to
prepare the necessary organizations and training for personnel. We have
already mentioned several of these efforts, such as EUCOM’s operational
plan expected to be completed in spring 2011, the plan by the Navy, MDA,
and Army Corps of Engineers to reach agreement on Aegis Ashore
facilities needs in March 2011, and the U.S. Strategic Command-led force
allocation study that will inform DOD’s decisions on force distribution.
However, service processes to ensure that the full complement of trained
personnel is in place will take time. Without an integrated schedule, DOD
is missing a management tool with which to assess the effects of emerging
personnel needs on the execution of the phased adaptive approach in
Europe.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Although Combatant
Commands’
Involvement in BMD
Testing Has
Increased, Limited
Visibility of BMD
Operational
Capabilities and
Limitations Creates
Challenges in
Integrating BMD into
Operational Plans
DOD has not yet established key performance metrics that would provide
the combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational
capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ,
creating potential challenges for EUCOM as it integrates BMD into its
operational plans. DOD has already incorporated some combatant
commands’ testing needs into BMD testing; however, as of January 2011,
the combatant commands’ more detailed, operationally-relevant,
quantifiable metrics had not yet been incorporated into DOD’s BMD
testing plans. Lack of such metrics inhibits EUCOM’s understanding of the
operational capabilities and limitations of the integrated BMD system they
would have to employ. As a result, the combatant commands will lack key
information they need to plan for the phased adaptive approach and so
may face challenges in integrating BMD into operational plans. The
combatant commands recognize this issue and are currently attempting to
establish these metrics; however, they have yet to be finalized and
implemented.
DOD Has Taken Steps to
Increase Combatant
Commands’ Visibility into
BMD Performance
Following the establishment of MDA in 2002, initial BMD system designs
did not formally consider combatant command requirements because of
MDA’s exemption from DOD’s requirements process; however, DOD has
since taken multiple steps to increase combatant commands’ visibility into
BMD operational performance. According to U.S. Strategic Command,
MDA initially achieved the rapid deployment of BMD capabilities because
it was unconstrained by operational requirements. Moreover, its testing
did not focus on verification of operational BMD system performance
against combatant command requirements. The BMD development and
assessment process presented challenges for the combatant commands
because MDA’s criteria for declaring a BMD element technically capable of
performing some tasks did not always allow the combatant commands to
thoroughly assess how the element could be operationally employed. For
example, after DOD fielded the AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan in 2006, the
combatant commands realized they did not have a good understanding of
the operational capabilities and limitations of the radar that would allow
them to fully employ it.
In response to these problems, U.S. Strategic Command, in its role as
warfighter advocate for missile defense, began efforts to incorporate
combatant command needs into BMD testing and evaluation in order to
assess the operational utility of the elements being fielded. In 2008, U.S.
Strategic Command published the Force Preparation Campaign Plan,
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
which laid out a framework designed to help manage risk to the
combatant commands’ operations by identifying the information
combatant commands need about BMD operational capabilities and
limitations. For instance, the plan describes the need for designing BMD
tests around combatant command operational plans and testing against
validated scenarios and threats, 39 since the integrated BMD system level
performance is heavily threat, environment, and scenario-dependent. U.S.
Strategic Command stressed that combatant commands need this
information to develop flexible operational plans and assess BMD
capabilities for supporting a command’s missions.
MDA has also taken steps to revise its testing program to incorporate
combatant command needs, but testing continues to be driven by
collection of data points needed to verify the models and simulations used
to characterize BMD performance. 40 MDA has integrated many combatant
command testing needs into the Integrated Master Test Plan. For instance,
MDA has added three Operational Test periods, each aligned with the first
three phases of the phased adaptive approach, which, according to U.S.
Strategic Command officials, allow the combatant commands to use the
BMD system configuration unique to the particular phase for training and
operational system evaluation. These ground tests 41 are based on
combatant command-developed architectures and the relevant validated
threats. EUCOM has been involved in the test design process, including
providing input regarding where BMD assets should be located for EPAA.
According to EUCOM officials, the test designs were then vetted through
EUCOM intelligence and operations experts. Officials also said that the
results of the tests will be used by the command to inform its EPAA
planning.
39
The Defense Intelligence Agency is responsible for validating threats and combat
scenarios for DOD.
40
Models and simulations are tools used by DOD to represent potential BMD
configurations, scenarios, and missile threats which are difficult to live test because of
numerous possible combinations of BMD system configurations. Models and simulations
allow demonstration of BMD system performance and communications without the need to
expend interceptors and targets. However, to work effectively these models and
simulations need to be anchored to data from ground and flight tests and validated by
independent evaluators—the BMDS Operational Test Agency—in order to have confidence
in their results.
41
Ground tests are tests designed to demonstrate element and BMD system-level
capabilities in a lab environment or assess element communication networks between
fielded assets. According to MDA officials, MDA obtains the vast majority of its information
on BMD performance through ground tests.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Combatant Commands
Lack Visibility into Key
Operational Capabilities
and Limitations of the
BMD System That Is
Important for EPAA
Operational Planning
Although combatant commands are increasingly involved in BMD testing,
they have expressed the need for additional metrics that can be used to
assess the durability (how long it can defend) and effectiveness (how well
it can defend) of the BMD system, which are important for planning the
phased adaptive approach. For instance, one of MDA’s metrics for
effectiveness 42 is based on a “one-on-one” engagement between a given
element or group of elements and a single threat missile. According to
DOD officials, it therefore has limited applicability to a more realistic
operational scenario where combatant commanders employ an integrated
BMD system against multiple threat missiles.
The combatant commands have concluded that they need to understand
BMD system effectiveness and durability in quantitative terms so that, as
they prepare their operational plans, they understand BMD’s contribution
to the overall mission and appropriately balance it with other options.
BMD is part of the defensive capabilities, and in combat operations, it
alone cannot achieve or maintain effective defense against an adversary
ballistic missile attack. DOD planning doctrine emphasizes that integrated
and interoperable military forces improve the ability to not only defend
against a ballistic missile attack with defensive counterair, such as BMD,
but also ensure that offensive counterair can strike potential ballistic
missile threats. 43
As more ballistic defense assets are deployed into the EUCOM area of
responsibility, creating a more complex BMD system, insight into the
capabilities and limitations of the system and its overall contribution to
42
One of MDA’s effectiveness metrics is the Probability of Engagement Success (Pes), which
is the probability that the BMD system will prevent an adversary warhead from carrying
out its mission.
43
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 5, 2007). According to Joint Publication 3-01, defensive counterair
is defined as all defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or
negate enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace. Offensive
counterair is defined as offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy
aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both
before and after launch, but as close to their source as possible. The goal of offensive
counterair operations is to prevent the launch of enemy aircraft and missiles by destroying
them and their overall supporting infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean
preemptive action against an adversary. The goal of defensive counterair operations, in
concert with offensive counterair operations, is to provide an area from which forces can
operate, secure from air and missile threats. Although offensive counterair and defensive
counterair are considered separate operations, they must be mutually supporting to
facilitate unity of effort.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
EUCOM’s operational plans will become more important. The balance
between offensive and defensive options, and therefore the need for a
clear understanding of the operational capabilities of the BMD system, is
further complicated for EPAA since it requires coordination between two
geographic combatant commands—EUCCOM and U.S Central
Command—given where the threats may originate. A threat originating
from the Middle East, which is primarily U.S. Central Command’s area of
responsibility, could be directed at Europe, which is in EUCOM’s area of
responsibility. Therefore, these two commands must work together to
balance BMD with other options. Without metrics to credibly quantify
BMD system performance, EUCOM, and other combatant commands will
not be able to thoroughly analyze performance gaps. Moreover, without
the full understanding of their BMD system capabilities and limitations,
they will be limited in their ability to develop comprehensive plans that
integrate defensive and offensive options.
The combatant commands, led by U.S. Strategic Command, created a
process in 2006 to provide them with additional understanding of the
operational utility of the BMD system but this process does not provide
the specific performance information the combatant commands seek.
Specifically, this BMD assessment process was initially intended to
enhance visibility into BMD element capabilities by using subjective
assessment criteria expressed in terms of yes or no judgments rather than
quantified performance parameters. For example, the effectiveness
criteria for the AN/TPY-2 radar includes whether that sensor possesses the
ability to detect, classify, track and discriminate ballistic missile threats
targeting U.S. defended areas. Thus, rather than assessing the extent to
which a capability can perform a certain mission-essential function, the
assessment focuses on whether or not a BMD component can perform a
certain task. When the combatant commands first implemented this
process, they concluded they would need to later introduce quantifiable
mission-essential performance goals that would enable more complete
operational assessments of BMD system capability in relation to their
operational needs.
To address the effort of developing quantifiable mission-essential
performance goals, the combatant commands, led by U.S. Strategic
Command, are currently attempting to introduce quantifiable operational
performance metrics into the testing program through an effort called
“Assess-to.” The combatant commands are defining metrics to measure
BMD system effectiveness (how well it can defend) and durability (how
long it can defend) against threats projected by the intelligence and
operational communities. More specifically, as defined in a draft Assess-to
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
criteria document, the metric used to measure effectiveness of a BMD
system is expressed mathematically as the ratio of threats defeated to total
threats launched. As such, this metric is designed to allow assessment of
BMD system effectiveness against multiple ballistic missile threats.
Durability, on the other hand, is defined as the length of time that an
established BMD system can provide and sustain defensive capability at a
specific level of protection against projected threats.
U.S. Strategic Command officials agree that developing Assess-to criteria
would help to quantify BMD system capabilities and limitations and
thereby provide better data to the combatant commands as they develop
their operational plans. The combatant commands have articulated the
need for BMD system effectiveness and durability metrics since 2008 and
developed a draft Assess-to document that describes them, but there are
two main barriers that have prevented DOD from adopting Assess-to. First,
various DOD officials stated that MDA is reluctant to have Assess-to
metrics established due to concerns that these types of metrics could
effectively turn into requirements to which MDA will be held accountable.
As stated previously, MDA is exempt from formal acquisition requirements
and the BMD elements it developed were not built to operational
requirements. U.S. Strategic Command officials and documents describing
Assess-to are sensitive to this concern and characterize Assess-to criteria
in terms of communicating testing needs to MDA as well as goals to “build
towards” rather than strict requirements. Second, an additional obstacle to
Assess-to implementation is that current limitations in system-level
modeling may limit DOD’s ability to test against the identified metrics.
Assess-to metrics are geared towards system-level assessment, and
currently ground tests—the primary venue for such assessments—rely on
models and simulations, many of which continue to lack operational
realism. Although MDA is working to validate models and simulations,
they currently have technical limitations associated with their ability to
represent system-wide operationally realistic scenarios. However, MDA
officials told us that, while there are challenges associated with coming to
agreement on how to quantify BMD effectiveness and durability, MDA
believes that it is possible to do so. While various DOD officials told us
that MDA and U.S. Strategic Command are collaborating to develop
solutions to these issues, until quantifiable operational metrics for BMD
system-level assessment are in place, the combatant commands will lack
key information they need to plan for the phased adaptive approach and
so may face operational risks should a conflict arise.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Conclusions
DOD’s revised approach to BMD in Europe reflects the Administration’s
desire to focus on threats currently facing the United States and allies
while maintaining the flexibility to adapt the approach as threats change
and new missile defense technologies become available. Since the
September 2009 announcement of EPAA, DOD has taken steps to
implement this policy, including considering options for the deployment of
assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, analyzing infrastructure
needs, and gaining NATO support for BMD in Europe. However, this
approach creates significant planning and implementation challenges
that—if left unaddressed—could result in significant management issues
and unforeseen costs. First, as a result of the lack of guidance on EPAA’s
desired end states, including its priority compared to other BMD missions,
the department faces uncertainty in planning and implementing its revised
approach, particularly in how it will allocate limited assets among multiple
geographic regions. Second, without cost estimates for the life cycle of
EPAA, DOD will be unable to judge whether it is meeting its goal that
EPAA be fiscally sustainable and affordable. The department will also
have difficulty in monitoring the implementation of the program and
ensuring that adequate funding is available to execute the program
according to plan if it does not develop life-cycle cost estimates. Third,
DOD does not have an EPAA schedule that integrates key acquisition,
infrastructure, and personnel activities. As a result, the department does
not have the information it needs to assess whether the EPAA schedule is
realistic and achievable, identify potential problems, or analyze how
changes will impact the execution of this effort, and therefore is exposed
to increased schedule, performance, and cost risks. Finally, without
incorporating operationally quantifiable metrics—such as how long the
system can defend (durability) and how well the system can defend
(effectiveness)—into its test program, DOD will not be able to fully
understand the capabilities and limitations of the BMD system and
EUCOM will not have the most relevant performance data it needs to
thoroughly assess the extent to which BMD capabilities support its
mission objectives and judge how to best plan for and employ BMD assets.
Unless the department addresses these challenges, DOD will likely face
implementation risks that ultimately may increase the cost for this
approach in Europe and potentially beyond as it expands this BMD
approach to other regions of the world.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Recommendations for
Executive Action
•
•
•
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four
actions:
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide guidance on EPAA that describes desired
EPAA end states in response to concerns raised by key stakeholders.
Direct the Missile Defense Executive Board to oversee and coordinate the
development of:
• life-cycle cost estimates that would provide for the management and
oversight of EPAA and allow the department to assess whether its
plans for EPAA are affordable and determine if corrective actions are
needed, and
• an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition, infrastructure, and
personnel activities that would help identify EPAA implementation
risks that need to be considered.
Direct U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with the Missile Defense
Agency, to adopt BMD operational performance metrics for durability and
effectiveness and include these metrics into the BMD test programs.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with two of
our recommendations and partially concurred with two others. The
department’s comments are reprinted in appendix V. DOD and the State
Department also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to provide guidance on
EPAA that describes desired end states in response to concerns raised by
key stakeholders. In its comments, DOD stated that it recognizes the need
to provide policy guidance on the decision to pursue the EPAA. The
department also noted that it has taken steps to provide guidance in the
2012 Guidance for the Employment of the Force and that this would
provide detailed guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant commanders and
other DOD components on end states, strategic assumptions and
contingency planning, including for EPAA. However, since this guidance
has not yet been approved by the Secretary of Defense, we cannot
determine if the concerns raised by key stakeholders will be addressed.
Additionally, since EPAA is a flexible approach, DOD will need to continue
to refine its guidance over time.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Missile
Defense Executive Board oversee and coordinate the development of lifecycle cost estimates that would provide for the management and oversight
of EPAA and allow the department to assess whether its plans for EPAA
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
are affordable and determine if corrective actions are needed. In its
comments, DOD stated that EPAA is an approach, not an acquisition
program, and that it is designed to be flexible and match resources to the
combatant commander’s requirements. The department believes a more
effective approach is to prepare BMDS program element-specific life-cycle
cost estimates and use them to inform the management of ongoing
acquisition programs and senior-level oversight of the phased adaptive
approach as BMDS systems are applied to the defense of Europe. We
recognize that life-cycle cost estimates for individual elements will provide
decision makers with information on DOD’s BMD efforts; however, we
believe that DOD should also develop life-cycle cost estimates for its
overall EPAA effort and that doing so will not impede flexibility. Without
cost estimates for the life cycle of EPAA, DOD will be unable to judge
whether EPAA is affordable and sustainable. The department will also
have difficulty in monitoring the implementation of EPAA and ensuring
that adequate funding is available to execute the program according to
plan.
In its response to our third recommendation, DOD concurred that the
Missile Defense Executive Board oversee and coordinate the development
of an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition, infrastructure, and
personnel activities that would help identify EPAA implementation risks
that need to be considered. DOD stated that MDA includes the anticipated
phased adaptive approach requirements into the broader BMDS
acquisition program and uses an integrated BMDS schedule for the
emerging EPAA requirements, ensuring they are included in appropriate
detail and timing within the BMD element-level schedules. DOD further
indicated that MDA has a strict process to manage and integrate the
acquisition of discrete BMDS elements which make up the capability to be
delivered in each of the EPAA phases. While the department has an
integrated BMDS acquisition schedule comprised of element-level
acquisition schedules, we found that the schedules for the individual
elements are highly optimistic. Additionally, DOD has not developed an
integrated schedule specifically for EPAA so that EPAA-related acquisition
activities as well as EPAA-related infrastructure and personnel activities
can be synchronized directly within that schedule. As a result, we continue
to believe that the department does not have an important management
tool with which to assess whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and
achievable, identify potential problems, or analyze how changes will
impact the execution of this effort.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to adopt BMD operational
performance metrics for durability and effectiveness and include these
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
metrics into the BMD test programs. In its comments, DOD stated that it
recognizes the inherent value of measurable BMDS performance metrics
and that, once provided with the warfighter’s operationally defined
metrics, DOD will crosswalk these metrics to the BMD System
specification values assessed to be achievable, and determine whether the
specifications meet the operational requirements. Taking such actions
would meet the intent of our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of State; the Director, Missile Defense Agency; the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the
Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix VI.
John H. Pendleton
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
During our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) plans for
implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), we
reviewed relevant documentation and met with representatives from
numerous agencies and offices. To assess the extent to which DOD has
provided guidance for the force structure requirements, identified costs,
and established an integrated schedule for EPAA we reviewed relevant
documentation and spoke with cognizant DOD, State Department, and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials. The documents we
reviewed relating to guidance for force structure requirements included
the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the President’s announcement
from September 2009, and testimony from senior DOD officials. We also
reviewed U.S. Strategic Command’s 2010 Military Utility Assessment and
2009 Prioritized Capabilities List. We spoke to senior-level officials from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA),
and the Joint Staff about the presence or absence of a firm architecture for
EPAA, any guidance that would be provided to the services, and how force
structure for EPAA would be determined. Officials from U.S. Strategic
Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Northern Command
informed us about the typical processes for determining ballistic missile
defense (BMD) force structure. We spoke to service representatives from
the Army and Navy, including the Army Space and Missile Defense
Command and the Naval Air and Missile Defense Command, about the
kind of guidance they will need to prepare cost and force structure
estimates for EPAA. We also reviewed intelligence documents and threat
assessments and met with intelligence officials from the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
National Air and Space Intelligence Center to become familiar with the
threats that EPAA is intended to defeat and the type of force structure that
might be required to accomplish this mission. To determine the extent to
which DOD has identified the costs of EPAA, we reviewed the budget
requests for some of the elements DOD stated would be part of EPAA and
also met with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation). In evaluating whether DOD
has an integrated schedule that considers the factors that may impact
EPAA, we relied on policy documents such as the 2010 Ballistic Missile
Defense Review and the statements made by the President and the
Secretary of Defense about the timelines for EPAA. We reviewed MDA’s
Integrated Master Test Plan and the President’s budget requests and
justifications for BMD elements. We also met with service representatives
to discuss the kinds of schedules they typically follow when preparing
infrastructure, training personnel, and preparing force structure to be
fielded. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers provided information
related to the efforts involved with constructing facilities in foreign
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
countries and the types of challenges they face with such construction.
Further, State Department officials provided us with information about the
activities and schedule involved in establishing government-to-government
agreements for hosting U.S. BMD assets. We also spoke with NATO
representatives about that organization’s schedule for adopting the
territorial missile defense mission and the process of making assets
interoperable with U.S. missile defense assets. We also relied on our
recent work dealing with the acquisition risks related to the EPAA
schedule, contained in GAO-11-179R.
To assess the extent to which the combatant commands are involved with
testing for EPAA-related assets and understand the capabilities and
limitations of the BMD system, we reviewed the Integrated Master Test
Plan as well as U.S. Strategic Command’s 2010 Military Utility Assessment,
and the Force Preparation Campaign Plan. We also spoke to officials at
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. European Command about their
understanding and confidence in the BMD system as a whole and the
individual assets that comprise it. Officials from these same commands
provided information about efforts to establish “Assess-to” criteria for
durability and effectiveness of the BMD system. We met with officials from
the office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation and the
Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Test Agency to discuss the
status of models and simulations for the BMD system and elements.
To understand DOD’s and the State Department’s plans for cooperation
and coordination with NATO, friends, and allies in implementing EPAA,
we conducted site visits to numerous installations both in the U.S. and in
Europe. We met with State Department officials to discuss their ongoing
efforts to negotiate agreements with countries that may host U.S. BMD
assets and received updates on the progress of negotiations. We
interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy to discuss DOD’s role in negotiating these agreements. We also met
with MDA officials to discuss the efforts to make EPAA interoperable with
the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system of NATO. We
also attended the Nimble Titan 2010 wargame in Suffolk, Va., where we
talked to the representatives of foreign governments and militaries and
learned about the efforts already under way that may affect the
collaboration and coordination amongst allies, as well as points of conflict
that could hinder cooperation. In Europe, officials with the U.S. mission to
NATO informed us of the process whereby NATO would decide whether
or not to adopt the territorial BMD mission, the likelihood of such an
adoption, and next steps following adoption of the mission. We also met
with the European representatives from U.S. Naval Forces Europe and
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
U.S. Air Forces in Europe to discuss their perspective on the efforts and
challenges to cooperating with NATO and foreign allies on BMD.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to January
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
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Appendix II: Potential BMDS Elements for
EPAA
Appendix II: Potential BMDS Elements for
EPAA
BMDS element
Projected for
operational availability
in EPAA phases
Element description
Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (Aegis BMD)
1, 2, 3, 4
A system that (1) provides a forward deployed capability
to search, detect, and track ballistic missiles of all ranges
and transmit track data to the BMDS and (2) employs its
own sensors and interceptors or exploits off-board
sensors to protect deployed forces, large regions, and
population centers. The element is based on a
modification to existing Navy Aegis ships to provide these
capabilities. The interceptors include the Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3), designed to defend against short- to
intermediate-range ballistic missile threats in the
midcourse and ascent phases, and a modified Standard
Missile-2 (SM-2) designed to defend against short-range
threats in the terminal phase.
Command, Control, Battle
Management, and
Communications (C2BMC)
1, 2, 3, 4
A networked computer and communications element
developed by MDA to integrate the BMDS by providing
deliberate planning, situational awareness, sensor
management, and battle management capabilities.
Army Navy/Transportable Radar
Surveillance - Model 2 (AN/TPY-2)
1, 2, 3, 4
A transportable, land-based radar, similar in design to the
THAAD radar, which provides advance warning of ballistic
missile launches to the BMDS from forward-based
locations.
Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD)
1, 2, 3, 4
The THAAD element employs the THAAD Interceptor and
the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance - Model
2 (AN/TPY-2) (THAAD Mode) to engage ballistic targets
in the late mid-course and terminal phases of their
trajectory. THAAD can act as a surveillance sensor,
providing sensor data to cue other elements of the BMDS.
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
1, 2, 3, 4
PAC-3 provides simultaneous air and missile defense
capabilities as the Lower Tier element in defense of U.S.
deployed forces and allies against short-range ballistic
missiles.
Aegis Ashore
2, 3, 4
Land-based element designed by MDA to provide
capability to detect, track, and intercept threats. Aegis
Ashore will leverage the Aegis BMD capability and deploy
it at shore-based sites in Europe starting in 2015. DOD
intends for it to employ the SM-3 for exoatmospheric
defense against short- to medium- and some
intermediate-range ballistic missile threats in the later
stages of flight. Use of the SM-3 at shore-based sites will
broaden the BMDS use of the SM-3 from its current seabased applications and DOD plans for Aegis Ashore to
employ SM-3 IIB in Phase 4 against intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
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Appendix II: Potential BMDS Elements for
EPAA
BMDS element
Projected for
operational availability
in EPAA phases
Airborne Infrared Radar (ABIR)
3, 4
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-based sensor in development
designed to acquire and track large ballistic missile raid
sizes. The sensor is also intended to provide tracking
data of high enough quality to be used for launch-ona
b
remote and early intercept engagements.
Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS)
3, 4
Space-based sensor system, in early development,
designed to provide end-to-end intercept quality tracking
of ballistic missile threats.
Element description
Source: GAO summary of DOD data.
a
Launch-on-remote is a future capability designed to sense a threat remotely, transmit tracking
information to the interceptor’s flight computer, and launch the interceptor earlier and farther down
range than other radars would allow. According to MDA, investments are also being made to develop
an “engage-on-remote” technology that includes not only launching on data from a remote sensor
track but also the ability to uplink data from assets other than the Aegis radar. This will allow the
interceptor to engage the threat missile at greater ranges.
b
Early intercept is the concept of intercepting missiles early in their flight using currently planned
interceptors and sensors. Early intercept is achieved by reducing the timelines associated with early
sensor tracking and rapidly developing fire-control solutions so that today’s missiles can intercept
threat missiles much earlier in their flight. Early intercept should provide an additional opportunity to
shoot at incoming threat missiles.
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Appendix III: BMD Architecture Performance:
Impact of Quantities, Integration, and
Location on Defended Areas
Appendix III: BMD Architecture
Performance: Impact of Quantities,
Integration, and Location on Defended Areas
Option 1
Option 2
The size of the area defended
depends on the capabilities and
numbers of the BMD elements
deployed. In this notional case, the
defended area of two BMD-capable
ships is additive.
Integrating BMD elements into a
system can increase their capability,
including expanding the defended
area. In this notional case, the
defended area of the same two
BMD-capable ships is vastly
expanded when integrated with a
sensor.
F172
F172
F172
F172
NOTIONAL
NOTIONAL
Option 3
F172
BMD-capable ship
BMD sensor
The geographic location of the BMD
elements can impact their
performance. In this notional case,
the defended area of the same
integrated elements from option 2 is
vastly expanded by changing the
location of the sensor.
Integrated
Defended area
F172
F172
F172
NOTIONAL
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: The defended areas shown are for illustrative purposes only.
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Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO
Support for BMD in Europe
Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving
NATO Support for BMD in Europe
Since the President’s announcement of EPAA in September 2009, the U.S.
has made significant progress in advancing cooperative efforts with NATO
allies on BMD in Europe. Increasing international cooperation on BMD is a
major focus of the Administration’s new approach to BMD. According to
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a benefit of EPAA is that it offers
increased opportunities for allied participation and burden sharing. The
U.S. intends to make EPAA its national contribution to a future NATO
BMD capability and is therefore not asking NATO for financial support for
EPAA assets. However, the U.S. is seeking allied participation and burden
sharing for EPAA that may be demonstrated in various ways. According to
DOD and the State Department, burden sharing may come in the form of
support for EPAA, including adoption of a NATO territorial BMD mission;
expansion of NATO’s command and control system for territorial missile
defense; bilateral agreements for hosting U.S. BMD assets; and
contributions of allied BMD assets toward an expanded NATO BMD
system capability.
NATO’s adoption of the territorial BMD mission at the Lisbon Summit in
November 2010 fulfilled a major U.S. goal. NATO’s prior BMD mission was
limited to the protection of deployed troops and so was focused on
defending smaller areas. The shift to a territorial defense mission means
that NATO’s BMD efforts will now focus on protecting much larger
geographic areas, including population centers and countries.
Additionally, DOD and State Department officials noted that the
agreement at Lisbon will help facilitate cooperation with NATO allies on
hosting U.S. BMD assets and provides justification for allies to pursue
additional BMD efforts. NATO allies had expressed their support for EPAA
prior to the Lisbon Summit. At the December 2009 NATO Foreign
Ministers Meeting in Brussels, NATO welcomed the U.S. adoption of EPAA
and declared that this approach would further strengthen European
missile defense work in NATO. Further, the NATO Secretary General
stated in October 2010 that building a missile defense for Europe was
important, because missiles are increasingly posing a threat to European
populations, territory, and deployed forces.
Although the political endorsement at Lisbon was a significant
accomplishment, the U.S. and its NATO allies must now overcome the
difficult task of reaching consensus on how to carry out this new BMD
mission, including prioritizing what areas to defend and establishing
command and control relationships. According to DOD, State Department,
and NATO officials, reaching agreement on these issues will be a challenge
facing NATO’s new territorial missile defense mission. DOD and State
Department officials told us that reaching such an agreement on a bilateral
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Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO
Support for BMD in Europe
basis can be extremely challenging and time-consuming and that reaching
consensus with all 28 NATO member nations is therefore expected to be
even more challenging and time-consuming.
The U.S. and its NATO allies have already taken steps to address the
political challenges inherent in multilateral BMD operations by beginning
to explore and outline potential command and control relationships. One
venue in which the U.S. and its allies have been examining BMD command
and control challenges is the biennial U.S. Strategic Command-led
wargame called Nimble Titan. In 2010, this wargame involved notional
ballistic missile attack scenarios occurring a decade in the future against
fictional adversaries. Nimble Titan 2010 participants came from around the
world including representatives from many NATO member nations, such
as Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom and
observers from Belgium, Italy, Romania, Turkey, NATO, and Russia. 1 One
of the outcomes of the Nimble Titan 2010 wargame was the development
of a document that described notional command and control relationships
and established a framework for coalition BMD concept of operations.
Additionally, the U.S. has participated in a Dutch-led BMD exercise that,
according to EUCOM officials, is also helping them to understand and
overcome command and control challenges. EUCOM officials also told us
that their command has begun drafting a concept of operations as well.
However, they emphasized that NATO agreement on a final command and
control concept of operations would remain a challenge and require
significant effort.
At Lisbon, NATO also agreed to expand its missile defense command,
control, and communications program to incorporate the territorial missile
defense mission, thereby fulfilling another burden sharing goal established
by the U.S. The NATO system, called Active Layered Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense (ALTBMD) is currently designed to link allies’ missile
defense assets together to protect deployed forces. Prior to the Lisbon
Summit, NATO commissioned technical studies that concluded it was
feasible to expand ALTBMD capabilities to include the territorial missile
defense mission. As a result of the agreement reached at Lisbon, NATO
plans to modify ALTBMD to be the command and control backbone into
which allied BMD assets will link and through which NATO will conduct
1
Nimble Titan 2010 participant countries were Australia, Denmark, France, Germany,
Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Nimble Titan 2010 observers
were Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, EADTF (Extended Air Defense Task Force), Italy,
Israel, NATO, Norway, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, and Turkey.
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Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO
Support for BMD in Europe
territorial BMD planning, tasking, engagement coordination, and share
situation assessment. MDA and ALTBMD program officials estimated that
an expanded ALTBMD for territorial defense would be operational and
interoperable with the U.S. command and control system, C2BMC, by
2018. NATO and DOD officials stated that they do not see major technical
challenges in meeting the 2018 operational target date for the territorial
missile defense mission and interoperability with C2BMC. However, GAO
did not assess the technical feasibility, cost, and schedule of ALTBMD,
including interoperability with C2BMC. According to NATO, expanding
ALTBMD capabilities to include the territorial missile defense mission
would cost less than €200 million or around $260 million over 10 years, to
be paid for through NATO common funding. The Secretary of Defense and
NATO Secretary General stated that, as such, expansion of ALTBMD to
include the territorial missile defense mission is not a significant financial
burden to the alliance.
The U.S has made progress in negotiating key bilateral agreements for
allies to host EPAA BMD assets. Romania and Poland have each agreed in
principle to host an Aegis Ashore facility by 2015 and 2018, respectively.
The U.S. must reach agreement with Romania and Poland on a
supplemental Status of Forces Agreement and the Ballistic Missile Defense
,
Agreement prior to construction of Aegis Ashore. 2 3 The U.S. already has
supplemental Status of Forces Agreements with Romania and Poland that
have been ratified by the host nations and therefore only lacks ratified
Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements with both countries. According to
State Department officials, the U.S. and Romania are in the process of
negotiating the terms of their Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. Poland,
having negotiated a prior Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement for the
previously planned European fixed interceptor site, has completed
negotiations with the U.S. on an amended agreement that adjusts the
existing agreement’s language to accommodate the new plan of
2
Section 223 (a) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
Pub. L. No. 111-383 (2011) restricts the obligation or expenditure of funds for Fiscal Year
2011 and beyond for site activation, construction, or deployment of missile defense
interceptors on European land as part of the phased adaptive approach to missile defense
in Europe until certain conditions are met, including host nation signing and ratification of
basing agreements and status of forces agreements authorizing deployment of such
interceptors. Section 223(c) allows the Secretary of Defense to waive the restrictions seven
days after the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees written
certification that the waiver is in the urgent national security interests of the United States.
3
The supplemental Status of Forces Agreements supplement the multilateral NATO Status
of Forces Agreement, originally signed on June 19, 1951.
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Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO
Support for BMD in Europe
establishing an Aegis Ashore facility. This revised agreement is now
awaiting Polish parliamentary ratification. 4 The U.S. has not yet reached
agreement with a nation to host the AN/TPY-2 radar, which is a significant
component of the first phase of EPAA and scheduled to be in place by the
2011 time frame. Although State Department officials expressed
confidence that the U.S. could reach agreement with the yet to be
determined host country for AN/TPY-2 in 2011, they also acknowledged
that the U.S does not have control over how long it will take to reach
bilateral agreements with foreign countries or how long it will take foreign
countries to bring those agreements into force. Additionally, since the U.S.
has not yet identified where other potential EPAA BMD assets will be
based, it is unknown what kind of bilateral agreements will be necessary
with future BMD asset host countries.
A way in which NATO allies can share the burden in providing territorial
missile defense of NATO is by contributing their national BMD assets;
however, the U.S. is thus far the only NATO member nation developing
BMD assets designed to provide territorial defense. BMD capabilities
currently envisioned for a NATO territorial defense mission include point
defenses using assets such as Patriot and area defenses such as THAAD
and Aegis BMD. BMD assets that provide point defenses are designed to
protect a relatively small area, such as an airport or port, primarily against
short-range ballistic missiles whereas area defense BMD assets are
designed to protect much larger swaths of territory and usually against
medium-range or greater ballistic missiles. Territorial defense is thereby
provided much more efficiently by area defenses than point defenses. For
example, in a 1999 report to Congress, 5 DOD reported the same territorial
area could be protected by either 6 THAAD batteries or more than 100
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) batteries. The report concluded
that the Patriot option was impractical for territorial defense. Further, a
senior DOD official testified that territorial defense of Europe cannot be
done using point defenses and requires area defenses. Several NATO
member nations have BMD point defense assets and, should they choose
to contribute them to the NATO mission, these could be used to defend
strategic assets primarily against short-range ballistic missiles.
4
The revised Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement was officially submitted by the Polish
Prime Minister to the Polish Parliament on December 28, 2010, initiating the ratification
process.
5
DOD, Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the AsiaPacific Region (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 1999).
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Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO
Support for BMD in Europe
Additionally, several NATO allies could also contribute sensors to the
BMD mission that, if compatible and appropriately interoperable, could
provide early warning data to tracking data that enhances the capability of
area defense assets. 6 However, the U.S. remains the only NATO member
nation with BMD assets designed to provide area defense needed for the
NATO territorial BMD mission.
Although NATO has adopted the territorial defense mission, the current
fiscal situation of many NATO allies makes it less likely that they will start
expensive new BMD development programs for area defense. Many NATO
countries are trying to cut down on government spending due to current
instability in the European economy, which could cause decreases in
defense expenditures. In a June 2010 speech, the NATO Secretary General
recognized the major defense cuts being made across NATO nations due
to the current fiscal climate and asked allies not to make drastic defense
budget cuts that would compromise NATO’s collective security missions.
The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have also expressed their
concern about defense budget cuts in NATO nations and the potential
impact on NATO. Additionally, NATO and DOD officials stated that
European countries are not likely to begin developing new area defense
BMD programs in the near future.
6
We did not assess the technical feasibility of NATO member nation BMD systems or these
systems’ interoperability with U.S. C2BMC or NATO ALTBMD.
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Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Defense
Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Defense
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Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Defense
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Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Defense
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Appendix V: Comments from the Department
of Defense
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;
Nicolaas Cornelisse, Analyst-In-Charge; David Best; Cristina Chaplain,
Laurie Choi; Tana Davis; Gregory Marchand; Wiktor Niewiadomski; Karen
Richey; Matthew Spiers; Amie Steele; Alyssa Weir; Erik Wilkins-McKee;
Gwyneth Woolwine; and Edwin Yuen made key contributions to this
report.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products
Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face
Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges.
GAO-11-179R. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects
Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. GAO-10-676. Washington,
D.C.: July 14, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and
Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities.
GAO-09-856. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2009.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European
Sites. GAO-09-771. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.
Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When
Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency’s Roles and Missions.
GAO-09-466T. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense
Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.
GAO-09-338. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2009.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost
Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense.
GAO-08-1068. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for
Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities.
GAO-08-740. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but
Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. GAO-08-448. Washington, D.C.:
March 14, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency’s Flexibility Reduces
Transparency of Program Cost. GAO-07-799T. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2007.
Page 55
GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
Related GAO Products
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting
Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements. GAO-07-430.
Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between
Flexibility and Accountability. GAO-07-727T. Washington, D.C.: April 11,
2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates
Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. GAO-07-387. Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 2007.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning
and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. GAO-06-473.
Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability
but Falls Short of Original Goals. GAO-06-327. Washington, D.C.: March
15, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for
Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.
GAO-05-817. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment
Approach. GAO-05-962R. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment
Approach. GAO-05-540. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in
2004. GAO-05-243. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve
Transparency of DOD’s Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514.
Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability. GAO-04-409. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
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GAO-11-220 Ballistic Missile Defense
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Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing
Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. GAO-04-254.
Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for
Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. GAO-03-600. Washington, D.C.: August
21, 2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and
Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington,
D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but
Risks Remain. GAO-03-441. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce
Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. GAO-02-631. Washington, D.C.: July
12, 2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National
Missile Defense Flight Test. GAO-02-124. Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New
Patriot Missiles to Buy. GAO/NSIAD-00-153. Washington, D.C.: June 29,
2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be
Revised to Reduce Risk. GAO/NSIAD-00-121. Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2000.
(351407)
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