Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
16-030-DEV
Title
Southall Station Platform 3 Canopy support
columns.
GKRT0075
Four
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
16-029-DEV
Braking distance for PSR on the Down Slow 3.2.3.3 a)
line at Woking Junction.
GKRT0077
One
Ground Frames and Shunters' Releases
16-028-DEV
Severn Beach single line working system
including SERC ground frame connection
not including track circuit detection
indications at the control point.
2.2.1.4
GMRT2473
Two
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
16-026-DEV
Signal Buzzer Functionality and Texture.
B8.4.2
GMRT2466
Three
Railway Wheelsets
16-025-DEV
Axle Standards.
2.1.1
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
6.5.2
Scope
Southall Station Platform 3 canopy - the
existing canopy columns (4Nos) are the only
element affected by this work; the canopy
does provide Mechanical and Electrical
routes, but these are not impacted and are
not considered as part of this deviation.
Southall platform 3 view towards country,
columns 3 and 4Southall platform 3 view
towards London, columns 1 and 2
Woking Junction down slow line on the
BML1 Line.
Nature and Degree
As part of the Crossrail surface works, the
Down Relief track is slewed, this encroaches
into the existing non-compliance area on
platform 3, further reducing the distance
between the canopy supporting columns
and the platform edge. The track slew is to
be undertaken in May 2016; however, the
new compliant canopy will not be in place
until December 2017. A temporary deviation
is sought until the existing canopy is
removed and replaced with a permanent
compliant canopy which, as per current
programme, is December 2017. The
planned track slew of the Down Relief
cannot be achieved without narrowing
Platform 3 at the country end with a
maximum reduction of 171 mm. The
reduction in platform width at the other
column positions is shown in the following
table. Table showing existing existing and
proposed dimensions between the columns
and platform edge The greatest narrowing
distance is recorded at the country end of
Platform 3, between the last canopy support
column 4, and platform edge is 171 mm
(Image 2). The amount of narrowing
decreases gradually towards the London
end, down to 113 mm. The temporary
deviation will provide sufficient time to
To provide the PSWI at compliant position
incurs excessive alteration to the interlocking
(SSI), which is at its capacity limit.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
A Health and Safety risk assessment has
Network Rail
been conducted in collaboration with the
stakeholders in order to identify mitigation
measures to address the temporary
deviation. The temporary deviation will take
effect from 01/05/2016 and remain in place
until 12/01/2018.
Certificate Issue Date
31/03/2016
Certificate End Date
12/01/2018
Lead SC
Infrastructure
Lead SC Approval Date
N/A
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
14/04/2016
N/A
Control Command and Signalling
17/03/2016
Current
Network Rail
14/04/2016
N/A
Control Command and Signalling
17/03/2016
Current
Bombardier Transportation on
behalf of, MTR Corporation
(Crossrail) Ltd
04/05/2016
N/A
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
This combination of standards has recently Bombardier Transportation on
been used for other FLEXX Eco projects
behalf of, MTR Corporation
such as ICx in Germany and C30 metro for (Crossrail) Ltd
Stockholm. Similar standards were applied
to Class 172 and Class 22x units, which also
had FLEXX Eco bogies. However, standard
BS8535 was not published at the time of
authorisation for these units. BS8535
explicitly addresses inboard bearing bogies
and references EN 13261, which shows it is
intended to be used as part of the EN suite
of wheelset standards.
11/04/2016
N/A
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
At the time of commissioning the signalling
system at Woking (circa 1997), there was a
speed reduction from 90 mph to 60 mph for
routes towards Basingstoke on the BML1
line (due to track curvature across the
junction). Following the Woking Junction
remodelling circa 2008, excessive side wear
has been noticed on 2234 points across the
junction, so a 40 mph TSR was imposed to
prolong the life of the points and keep them
safe and reliable. The TSR has been in
service since 2008. The speed shown on
the PSWI at 1188 m will be changed from 60
to 40 mph, on the basis that the vast majority
of trains conform to Table C braking and that
anything else will not or is not permitted to
exceed 75 mph and would brake within 1188
m, which is inside the Appendix X braking
distance of 1307 m. It should also be noted
that the Appendix X braking rates are
historic and do not reflect the reality of
current rolling stock. The proposal is to
convert the current TSR to a 40 mph PSR
but retain the current PSWI signage board
location which is currently placed at Table C
braking distances and not for Table A and B.
The Existing PSWI for 60 mph is currently at
1188 m from the PSR. A Compliant PSWI
for 40 mph would need to be at 1307 m from
ELR AMB - Severn Beach single line
In order to to comply with the requirement,
The new and revised controls will be
working system from Hallen Marsh Jn to
costs and risks of the significant alterations designed such that track circuit failure
Severn Beach Station, including SERC
to line side circuits, interlocking and the
cannot result in an inadvertent release of
ground frame connection. Controlled by the panel in St Andrews Signal Box (SB) for the interlocking. A robust train exit sequence is
St Andrews Signal Box panel.
provision of three track circuits are too high. proposed for the new shut in arrangement,
which will include the requirement for the
local operator to manually confirm that the
train has cleared the main line complete with
tail light and the signaller to confirm to the
operator that all signalling has returned to
normal before the operator may leave.
Remote Condition Monitoring (RCM)
facilities will be available to monitor track
circuit performance as required. The
interlocking will prevent section signals from
clearing unless track circuits are clear.
Provision is being made for the
implementation of remote condition
monitoring for the new track circuits.
Medium-voltage Direct Current (MVDC)
track circuits, with track feed relays, to be
utilised for improved reliability of train
detection.
This deviation applies to all Class 345 units. The Class 345 signal buzzer is not textured The proposed functionality is suitable for the
and does not comply with the functionality
operation of Class 345 units. The majority of
specified in the standard. It is not
the operation will be driver-only operation,
considered appropriate to provide a textured and so the signal bell will not be required.
button for the signal buzzer, because the
When the units are operated with a guard,
adjacent 'doors close' pushbutton is also
the only remote place the guard can close
textured. The other highlighted parts of the the doors from is the rear cab. Therefore,
clause are not complied with to enable a
both cabs will be occupied and it is
simpler design of circuit. The Locomotives
appropriate to sound the buzzer in both
and Passenger Rolling Stock (LOC and
cabs. There is no scenario when the buzzer
PAS) Technical Specifications for
would be used with only one cab occupied.
Interoperability (TSI) places no requirements Linking the buzzer functionality with the
on signal bell functionality.
bodyside door status is not considered
necessary, since bodyside doors are already
interlocked with traction. If the buzzer is
sounded too early during platform duties, the
driver will not be able to leave the station. A
number of similar deviations have been
raised for Turbostar and Electrostar units
(14/087/DEV, 12/126/DEV, 08/113/DGN,
09/046/DGN) owing to inconsistency
between GMRT2473, the Rule Book, and the
operation of these units in service. The
operator (MTR Crossrail) has been engaged
throughout the design review process with
the design of the cab and the operation of
the train by the driver and guard, and is
satisfied with the proposed design.
The deviation will apply to all Class 345
The implementation of the Technical
units. All vehicle types will have FLEXX Eco Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs)
bogies.
mandated through a series of European
Union Directives has resulted in a review of
all requirements mandated in Railway Group
Standards.
Page 1
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2100
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
Certificate Number
16-024-DEV
Title
Fire Extinguisher Position
RGS Clause
6.7.6.3
GMRT2044
Four
Braking System Requirements and
Performance for Multiple Units
16-023-DEV
Emergency Brake Application Deterrent.
5.4.2
GMRT2473
Two
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
16-022-DEV
Loss of Door Interlock Response.
B7.6
The deviation will apply to all all new vehicle The Class 345 door interlock is linked with
designs.
the traction system (as required by the
Locomotives and Passenger Technical
Specifications for Interoperability ( LOC and
PAS TSI), Clause 4. 2. 5. 5. 7) and is not
linked with braking control. Therefore,
opening a bodyside door would not cause
an emergency brake application. The
bodyside door design selected for the Class
345 means that a link with the emergency
brake is no longer necessary, as explained
in section 8 - 'Demonstrate that what you are
proposing to do instead is reasonable'.
GMRT2185
Two
Train Safety Systems
16-021-DEV
Isolation Switch Design
B5.1, B5.3
This deviation will apply to all Class 345
units.
The Class 345 will have simple isolation
switches which do not require a key for
operation of the switch itself and do not have
a visible seal or similar. The switches can
be reset by the driver. The benefits of this
solution are that, unlike some previous
designs, the isolation switches do not
require the driver s key to move the
switches to 'isolated'. This means that the
driver s cab does not require de-activating
/ re-activating to isolate a system (which can
take several minutes), and so the process of
responding to a fault is quicker. The
isolation switches can be re-set by the
driver, which removes the risk that the driver
inadvertently isolates the wrong system and
then is unable to resolve the situation.
GMRT2141
Three
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over
16-018-DEV
Roll-over Cant Deficiency.
2.4.1.1
The deviation will apply to all Class 345
units. The units will be delivered as 7-car
and 9-car formations, but all units will
ultimately be 9-car formations and the same
design. All vehicle types are considered as
part of this deviation.
The Class 345 unit has been designed to
minimise mass while achieving a high
passenger capacity. To achieve this, the
unit has in-board bearing bogies, and open
saloons with longitudinal seating in most
areas. This means that the unit has a
relatively high centre of gravity in under
exceptional payload conditions, and so does
not comply with the 21° cant deficiency
requirement.
GMRT2461
One
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and On-Track Machines
16-017-DEV
Sanding positions.
9.1 and9.3.1
The deviation will apply to all Class 345
units. The deviation applies equally to both
seven-car and nine-car formations.
Crossrail units will be nine-car fixed
formations (with some units initially
operating as seven-car units). The Crossrail
technical specification required sanding at
multiple locations. This requirement aligns
with Bombardier s experience with London
Underground (LUL) S-Stock that a single
sanding position will be insufficient to
effectively apply sand for a long unit.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
Nature and Degree
The deviation will apply to all Class 345
units. The units will be delivered as sevencar and nine-car formations, but all units will
ultimately be nine-car formations and the
same design. The fire extinguisher is stored
in a cupboard that is present in both
formations.
The deviation will apply to all Class 345
The Class 345 units do not include the
units.
function to latch the emergency brake until
the low-speed signal is detected. Therefore,
an emergency brake application can be
cancelled before the unit has come to a stop.
While it is technically possible to achieve
this function, it was not considered
necessary. Removing this function
simplifies the brake control functionality.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The cupboard installation will mean that
even if the fire extinguisher comes out of its
restraints, it will still be constrained by the
cupboard door. This design reduces the
risk to passengers compared to a low-level,
open installation.
Applicant Organisation
Bombardier Transportation on
behalf of, MTR Corporation
(Crossrail) Ltd
Certificate Issue Date
04/05/2016
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Rolling Stock
Lead SC Approval Date
11/03/2016
Deviation Status
Current
Guidance notes for Clause 2. 2. 2. 1 of the
new draft of GMRT2045, which will replace
GMRT2044, gives an explanation of the
source of the requirement. It states that the
requirement was written to reduce the risk of
mechanical failure of bogie or friction
braking equipment due to the higher forces
from emergency braking for which it was not
designed. The requirement is now only
applicable to 'ex-BR' units. This is not
applicable to new-build units, where brake
equipment is designed to withstand the
forces associated with emergency braking.
The Locomotives and Passenger (LOC and
PAS) Technical Specification for
Interoperability (TSI) does not specify this
function and envisages that an emergency
brake command could be cancelled (see
clause 4. 2. 4. 4. 1 (4)).
The Class 345 bodyside doors differ from
those on previous multiple units in that it is
not possible to open the door in any way
while the unit is in motion. (For example,
when the egress device is activated on
Electrostar vehicles, the doors unlock and
then are held closed by the door motors until
sufficient time has passed for the train to
come to a stop. ) On the Class 345,
activating the egress device triggers a
latched switch but further movement of the
egress device is limited by a physical bolt.
The bodyside doors are not unlocked and do
not move. The traction interlock is not
broken. The switch in the egress handle
informs the driver that the handle has been
activated via the Trains Control and
Management System (TCMS). The driver is
told which door is affected on the Human
Machine Interface (HMI) screen. The driver
can use this information and the status of the
door interlock to determine the next safe
place for the unit to stop - in the Central
Operating Section, this will normally be the
next station. When the train has slowed to
less than 1 km/h, the bolt in the egress
handle will release, and the egress handle
can be fully moved. Only at this stage will
the door unlock. This means that the
Rule Book Module TW5 contains the
instructions for isolation of safety systems.
The driver must stop, if not already stopped,
and contact the signaller to receive
instructions. There is no operational
scenario where the driver should isolate
systems while the train is moving. Although
isolating a system while the train is moving
is technically possible, it would require the
driver to leave the driving position, unlock
the isolation switch panel, and isolate the
system while facing away from the direction
of travel. The Class 345 design includes
monitoring of switches by the Train
Diagnostic System, which is clearly visible to
the driver. This is considered to be
sufficient deterrent to the driver miss-using
the isolation switches. The Train Diagnostic
System and the Train Data Recorder both
log use of the isolation switches so it can
clearly be determined if and when a system
has been isolated. The operator (MTR
Crossrail) has been engaged throughout the
design review process with the design of the
cab and the operation of the train by the
driver, and is satisfied with the proposed
design.
The 21° limit has been subject to a number
of deviations: 14/048/DEV Class 700
(Thameslink)14/126/DEV Mk. 3 Galley
cars15/047/DEV Class 465/9 TOSL
car15/067/DEV Class 321 trailer vehicle.
Through these deviations, it has been
established that a lower cant deficiency limit
is acceptable. As with the vehicles quoted
above, the lowest value for the Class 345
unit occurs on an intermediate vehicle,
which has less sensitivity to roll-over due to
cross winds.
There have been a number of recent
deviations for sanding where units comply
with the objectives of GMRT2461, but do not
comply with the precise requirements of the
standard. In particular, deviation 15-061DEV permits each unit within a multiple unit
consist to sand if that unit detects wheel
slide. The new draft version of GMRT2461
recognises that current requirements are too
restrictive, and requirements for sanding
position and rate have been removed in
favour of a more general requirement to not
affect track circuits. The sanding system for
Class 345 is being developed to achieve the
required impact on adhesion while
minimising the amount of sand deposited
(lower sand usage reduces maintenance
costs as well as minimising the risks of
affecting track circuits). The current sanding
strategy (at the end of the design phase) is a
maximum sanding rate of 1. 5 kg/min at
each sander, which is equal to the 3 kg/min
rate applied by Electrostar units. The unit
will be capable of sanding at double this
rate, but it is not anticipated that this will be
required. The sanding rate will be managed
to ensure compliance with 7. 5 g/m laying
rate in GMRT2461 Clause 9. 3. 1 is
maintained. If it is found that this is not
Bombardier Transportation on
behalf of, MTR Corporation
(Crossrail) Ltd
04/05/2016
N/A
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
Bombardier Transportation on
behalf of, MTR Corporation
(Crossrail) Ltd
04/05/2016
N/A
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
Bombardier Transportation on
behalf of, MTR Corporation
(Crossrail) Ltd
04/05/2016
N/A
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
Bombardier Transportation, on 01/04/2016
behalf of, MTR Corporation
(Crossrail) Ltd
N/A
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
Bombardier Transportation on
behalf of, MTR Corporation
(Crossrail) Ltd
N/A
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
11/04/2016
Page 2
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2472
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Requirements for Data Recorders on Trains 16-016-DEV
Title
West Coast Railway Class 37 European
Train Control System (ETCS) Fitment Data
Recorders.
RGS Clause
3.1.1.5, 3.1.3.1
Scope
The deviation applies to two Class 37
locomotives (37668 and 37669) that are
being fitted with the Hitachi on-board
subsystem to provide ETCS functionality
(baseline 2. 3. 0d).
GMRT2472
Two
Requirements for Data Recorders on Trains 16-015-DEV
Class 387
Issue 2.
Compliance to GMRT2472
All clauses.
The scope of this deviation is for all Class
387 vehicles whose application for
authorisation is based on conformity to Type
UKTYPE/51/2015/0012 (Class 387 proxy
Type reference). The deviation is applicable
for all routes over which the Class 387
vehicles will operate.
GMRT2131
One
Audibility and Visibility of Trains.
16-014-DEV
Class 387
Issue 1.
Compliance to GMRT2131
All clauses
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
16-012-DEV
Waterloo Station Platforms 1 - 6 Platform
cross fall.
11.1.3
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
16-010-DEV
Waterloo Station, Platforms 3 to 6 Reduced Platform Widths at Country Ends.
7.3.1 (c) and 7.4.1
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The application design for the project was
completed in early 2015, and an Engineering
Acceptance Certificate for 37668 was issued
in August 2015 to allow dynamic testing.
This was against Issue 1 of GMRT2472.
The design for 37669 is identical, but fitment
has been delayed. This means that the
compliance date for issue 2 of GMRT2472
has now passed. The proposed On Train
Monitoring Recorder (OTMR) and Juridical
Recording Unit (JRU) are fully compliant
with Issue 1, but do not meet certain specific
requirements of Issue 2. Full compliance
would require modifications to the existing
design and installation, which would
introduce further delay and cost with minimal
benefit.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The proposed protection parameters are
West Coast Railway
slightly less extreme than those specified in
Issue 2. However, they still provide a very
high level of protection in the event of an
emergency, and are in line with the existing
installations on a large number of vehicles,
which can be considered to be reference
systems in Common Safety Method (CSM)
terms. The possible impact on data
survivability in the event of an accident is
small, and has no direct safety
consequences. The proposed orange colour
is easily recognisable and identical to a
large number of existing data recorders.
There is no impact on the ability to identify
and locate this item.
Certificate Issue Date
01/04/2016
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Rolling Stock
Lead SC Approval Date
11/03/2016
Deviation Status
Current
Compared to GMRT2472 Issue 1, the
requirements of GMRT2472 Issue 2 specify
new and more demanding survivability
requirements for the Crash-Proof Memory,
additional data to be recorded, more
onerous recording performance
requirements (I. e. faster speed to record
data), new reliability figures, and new
requirements related to both maintainability
and data retrieval. These new requirements
cannot be met by the current Class 387 OnTrain Data Recorder (OTDR). Therefore, to
achieve full compliance with GMRT2472
Issue 2, a new OTDR will need to be fitted to
the Class 387 vehicles. Bombardier has
been working with the supplier HaslerRail to
develop a GMRT2472 Issue 2 compliant
solution for the fully TSI-compliant Class 345
Crossrail design. This solution is not
electrically compatible with the Class 387
design because of the introduction of a new
electronic interface with the Trains Control
and Management System (TCMS). In
addition, the OTDR unit has larger physical
dimensions and higher mass because of the
significant difference in the level of
protection of the data required, so that the
new OTDR unit does not physically fit in the
existing space envelope. To implement the
The scope of this deviation is for all Class
Visibility The differences between
387 vehicles whose application for
GMRT2483 Issue 1 and GMRT2131 Issue 1
authorisation is based on conformity to Type are significant; GMRT2131 Issue 1 specifies
UKTYPE/51/2015/0012 (Class 387 proxy
different requirements for the dimensions of
Type reference). The deviation is applicable the lights, beam intensity and beam pattern,
for all routes over which the Class 387
introduces new dimming control functionality
vehicles will operate.
and different measurement criteria etc.
Therefore, a design solution that could meet
both standards is not achievable.
Bombardier has been working with the
supplier Translec to develop a GMRT2131
compliant solution for the fully TSI-compliant
Class 345 Crossrail design; it is expected to
reach design finalisation by March 2016.
This new Translec design solution does not
fit within the Class 387 head/tail/marker light
space envelope and has a different control
unit to achieve the newly specified dimming
functionality. To implement the solution in
the Class 387 vehicles will require a new
bracket mounting arrangement, modification
to the wiring schematics and redesign of the
GRP front end. The Class 387 design has
been in production continuously since May
2014; the production of the next 'batch' of
Class 387 vehicles which require
authorisation (as conforming to Type) will
commence in March 2016. However,
modifying the Class 387 design to
Waterloo Station Platforms 1 - 6
Waterloo Station Platforms 1 - 4 are being
extended and Platforms 5 - 6 are being
altered in order to facilitate a new track
layout. Whilst platform extensions will have
compliant falls those areas of associated
platform which will require re surfacing will
not have compliant falls Provision of
compliant falls is not practicable due to cost
and programme considerations. The design
proposes to retain the existing platform
construction, where the track alignment
allows this and the platform edge positions
to be adjusted to compliant offsets to the
new track alignment. The crossfalls shall be
improved as far as reasonably practicable in
doing so. Note that Platform 7-8 is not
considered within the scope of this
derogation as the modifications to this
platform only comprise re-positioning of
platform edge copers as opposed to
complete platform reconstruction works.
It is considered that there is no negative
impact from complying with GMRT2472
Issue 1 instead of GMRT2472 Issue 2. The
revised GMRT2472 Issue 2 requires the
recording of additional data and a greater
level of protection capability for data
survivability. The OTDR only records and
stores data that can be analysed in the event
of an incident; the recording of additional
information does not by itself improve the
safety of the vehicles. This is reflected in
GMRT2472 Issue 2 itself, since it does not
mandate to bring existing rail vehicles into
compliance. The revised requirements in
GMRT2472 Issue 2 do not have an effect on
the ability of the unit to meet the essential
requirement that trains must be fitted with a
recording device. The Class 387 design is
now almost life-expired because of the June
2017 transition phase for introducing nonTechnical Specification for Interoperability
(TSI) compliant rolling stock. Therefore, this
application is for a limited number of units
only. In order to comply with the
requirements of GMRT2472 Issue 2 would
require fitting a proportionally small number
of trains with a different Data Recorder to
that used across a fleet of several hundred
trains. This would necessitate a separate
It is considered that there is no negative
impact from complying with GMRT2483
Issue 1 and GMRT2484 Issue 2 instead of
GMRT2131 Issue 1. With respect to
audibility, the requirements in GMRT2484
Issue 2 and GMRT2131 Issue 1 are
equivalent - as stated in the relative impact
assessment - and therefore there is no
difference in complying with GMRT2484
Issue 2 instead of GMRT2131 Issue 1. With
respect to visibility, the additional Class 387
units (which conform to the authorised Class
387 Type design) are fully compliant with
GMRT2483 Issue 1. As stated by impact
assessment 15 IA22, GMRT2483 Issue 1
reflects the existing UK operating conditions.
Therefore, modifying existing designs to
achieve compliance with GMRT2131 Issue 1
instead of GMRT2483 Issue 1 will not
improve the safety of the railway system.
This is reflected in GMRT2131 Issue 1 itself,
since it does not mandate to bring existing
rail vehicles into compliance. Continued
compliance with GMRT2483 Issue 1 and
GMRT2484 Issue 2 will avoid any design
incompatibility among the Class 387 fleet,
with significant benefits to the Operators in
terms of operational and maintenance costs.
In addition, the Class 387 design is now
There is no worsening of the current
situation.
27/04/2016
N/A
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
Bombardier Transportation, on 27/04/2016
behalf of, Great Western
Railway, Porterbrook Leasing
N/A
Rolling Stock
11/03/2016
Current
Network Rail
15/04/2016
N/A
Infrastructure
02/03/2016
Current
Waterloo Station, Platforms 3 to 6 Reduced Platform Widths at Country Ends.
This programme of work increases capacity Network Rail
at Waterloo Station and other outlying
stations helping to relieve passenger
congestion and improving passenger
comfort. Whilst the proposed platform
lengthening will introduce non-compliant
widths, the proposal has been assessed to
bring significant benefits to passenger
capacity and congestion relief for the current
and future operation of the station. We
strongly believe this to be a reasonable
approach and the scheme is supported by
our stakeholders.
15/04/2016
N/A
Infrastructure
02/03/2016
Current
Wessex Capacity Programme is extending
and altering platforms at Waterloo Station in
order to improve overall capacity into
Waterloo Station. It is not practicable to
provide compliant platform widths,
particularly as some platforms are already
non-compliant to the requirements of the
standard. Platforms 3 - 6 will have noncompliant widths at their country ends.
Platforms 3 and 4 are to be extended to
accommodate ten-car class 458 trains. To
accommodate the required changes in track
layout platforms 5 and 6 will be shortened
and a large portion will be rebuilt. A number
of pinch points exist on the approach route
to Waterloo Station which limit the geometry
of the track the main pinch point being
the bridge structure to Westminster Road
Bridge. The track layout is also limited by
operational requirements such as
achieving 18 trains per hour during peak
operations.
Bombardier Transportation,
Great Western Railway,
Porterbrook Leasing
Page 3
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
16-009-DEV
Title
Maryland Station, Platform 1, 2 and 3,
Restricted Platform Width.
RGS Clause
6.2.2 b)
Scope
For the 3. 90 m length of the platform 2/3 lift,
on both the platform 2 and 3 sides of the
lifts. For a 3. 88 m length of platform 1
eastwards from the corner of the new lift
shaft.
GKRT0045
Four
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
16-003-DEV
Bristol signal B25, situated to the East of
Bedminster Station on the MLN1 at 119M
2Ch.
5.1.2.4
Bristol signal B25, situated to the East of
Bedminster Station on the MLN1 at 119M
2Ch.
GKRT0044
Three
Permissive Working
16-002-DEV
Doncaster Station Area Capacity
Enhancements - Provision of Signalling
Controls for Permissive Working.
3.2.1c, 3.2.2
GERT8000-TW5
Six
Preparation and movement of trains.
Defective or isolated vehicles and on-train
equipment
16-001-DEV
Emergency bypass switch (EBS)
requirement for competent person.
11.2
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The minimum practical width of a new lift
shaft structure, together with the existing
constraints arising from the platform layout
and adjacent structures (the platform 1
retaining wall) are such that platform widths
of 2. 5 m or greater cannot be achieved
alongside the new lifts. The new lifts are
proposed so as to provide improved access
to the platforms for passengers of reduced
mobility, including the disabled, who would
be unable to use the stairs, or who could
only use the stairs with difficulty. The
internal width of the lift cars is set to achieve
compliance with the requirements of the
Department for Transport (DfT) "Design
Standards for Accessible Railway Stations".
Bristol signal B25 (BL2166 by new WMSR
numbering system) is currently mounted on
a two track cantilever with B27 (BL2168):
both are 4 aspect signals. B25 is applicable
to the Up Relief, for an Up direction move
and B27 is applicable to the Up Main, also in
the Up direction. B27 has Junction
Indicators at positions 4 and 5, but B25 is
now mounted on the upright column of the
structure and is provided with Alphanumeric
Route Indicators in place of the former
Junction Indicators at positions 4, 5 and 6.
The linespeed on the approach to B25 is 40
mph, but there is a 25 mph Permanent
Speed Restriction at the toes of 769B points
which applies to all routes available from
B25. B25 has four recorded Category A
Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) in
recent years (22/12/1993, 04/07/2003,
02/07/2006 and 27/12/2011). Three of the
SPADs have been recorded as being due to
'reading wrong signal' [B27]. The SPAD
investigation recommended the relocation of
the signal onto a straight post in order to
reduce the possibility of any crossreading
with B27. It is not possible to site B25
provided with Junction Indicators on a
straight post due to the limited space
available between the Up Relief and the
This deviation is specifically associated to
Not all the controls specified within
signals reading into Doncaster Station
GKRT0044 (3. 2. 1c and 3. 2. 2) are
platform 1 (D279) from the South. It is
currently provided for Doncaster area.
specific to permissive routes from signals
Drivers within the area are aware of the
D269, D1465, D1467 and D1471.
current arrangements, and application of
these controls would create unnecessary
interlocking works and limited safety benefit
for the Doncaster Station area
enhancements scheme. Whilst the controls
stipulated within Sections 3. 2. 1 and 3. 2. 2
are achievable in the detailed wiring design,
provision of these controls would result in
the following: The introduction of conflicting
controls in the Doncaster interlocking, which
could result in an unsafe arrangement. The
signaller at Doncaster will retain the ability to
signal trains from other signals for the
purposes of attaching and detaching,
utilising the existing controls provided by the
Westpac circuitry without the inclusion of the
requirements listed above. The introduction
of a potentially confusing operational
arrangement to the signaller and driver
where the controls would differ for similar
signalled moves. The introduction of novel
and complex free-wired circuitry in the
Doncaster interlocking including the
requirement for additional new free wired
relays. The introduction of additional
All Great Western Routes, provided the
If it is necessary to operate the EBS on a
distance is specified within the Defective On- train in service and it is formed of more than
Train Equipment (DOTE) plan.
one unit, unless it is possible to move all the
passengers into the front unit, it is necessary
to detrain the passengers at the first suitable
station. This then means that the train would
be required to enter service as Empty
Coaching Stock (ECS) from that station.
Clause 11. 2 requires that, if a train on which
the EBS has been operated is to enter
service as ECS to travel to a maintenance
depot, and it is formed of more than one
unit, a guard or competent person has to
travel in the rear unit. If the train was being
worked driver only, it is unlikely that there
will be anyone immediately available to act
as a competent person. In such situations, it
takes about an hour for a competent person
to reach the train. At most locations, this
means that the line in one direction is
blocked for that entire time as the train is not
permitted to make any movement until a
competent person is provided. This delay is
in addition to that already incurred by the
defect that resulted in the requirement to
operate the EBS. An incident of this type on
the Great Western network on 09/11/2015
caused c1400 minutes of delay, 21
cancellations and caused significant crowd
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The original scope of the Crossrail project
would have left seven stations that are to be
served by Crossrail trains without step free
access to the platforms, one of which is
Maryland station. This station was
reconstructed in the 1940s with a new four
track layout, and with a new station building
and new access steps to the four platforms.
That reconstruction resulted in platform
widths of less than 2. 5 m on platforms 1, 2
and 3 at locations adjacent to the stairs that
provide access from the station structure
above. The platforms are located in a
cutting bounded by retaining walls, with the
wall to the rear of platform 1 being a
reinforced concrete structure. The attached
drawing MMD-336583-C-SK-MYL-0005
provides key dimensions for the current
layout. Following feasibility and option
selection studies, a preferred scheme for the
provision of lifts to provide step free access
to all platforms was selected. The layout of
the proposed lifts for platforms 1, 2 and 3 is
shown on the attached drawing MMD336583-C-SK-MYL-0005 and 0006 The lift to
serve platform 4 will be located in existing
platform buildings, and does not affect the
clear width of platform 4. The proposed lift
structure on platform 1 will replace an
N/A
Applicant Organisation
Mott MacDonald on behalf of,
Rail for London
Certificate Issue Date
23/03/2016
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Infrastructure
Lead SC Approval Date
02/03/2016
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
07/03/2016
31/12/2017
Control Command and Signalling
18/02/2016
Current
07/03/2016
N/A
Control Command and Signalling
18/02/2016
Current
01/03/2016
31/12/2018
Traffic Operation and Management
02/02/2016
Current
The implementation of the projects proposal Network Rail
will affect the below by: The safety of the
railway system We are proposing to
implement a proven, tried and tested
method of permissive working that is
consistent with the existing approach within
that specific area. The compatibility of the
railway system now and in the future The
project approach is to provide a consistent
compatible method of permissive working
for the existing railway system/operation. It
is envisaged that this would simplify future
alterations/upgrades. Costs and service
performance, including reliability and
availability by delivering the same
functionality as existing is the most costeffective method for the project to deliver the
works. If it became a requirement to
achieve full compliance to the standard, the
increased complexity of the physical works
and the conflicting approach with providing
the additional controls could have a negative
impact on the service provided. Reference
should be made to Risk Assessment Ref.
139058/SIG/RA/001 that was carried out to
form the projects opinion. The risk
assessment method to be adopted is
qualitative, with expert judgement being the
primary method for assessing the risks
The risk of operating a train formed of more Great Western Railway
than one unit with the EBS raised is that, if
the train becomes divided, no brake
application is automatically made on the
front portion and the driver is likely to be
unaware that a division has taken place.
The brakes will automatically apply on the
rear portion. No changes are intended to be
made to the existing arrangements for
detraining passengers, if it is necessary to
operate the EBS on a train in passenger
service. Consequently, the risk of
passengers travelling in the rear portion of a
divided train are unchanged. The revised
arrangements are only intended to be
applied on lines signalled by TCB so, in the
event of a train division, the rear portion will
be protected by the signalling system.
Clause 11. 2 already requires the signaller to
be told that the train is travelling with the
EBS operated. The revised arrangements
should avoid some of the present significant
delays that result when it becomes
necessary to operate the EBS on a driveronly passenger train formed of more than
one unit.
Page 4
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GCRT5021
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Track System Requirements
Certificate Number
15-136-DEV
Title
Windsor branch siding track gradient.
RGS Clause
2.8.2.1
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-135-DEV
City Thameslink Station, Platforms 1 and
Platform 2Reduced headroom to CIS
screens.
8.1.1
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-134-DEV.
Ealing Broadway Station - Island Platform 2
and 3 mid-platform fencing.
6.2.2 (a)
GERT8000-S5
Six
Passing a signal at danger or an end of
authority (EoA) without a movement
authority (MA)
15-133-DEV
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS) 1.1
Protection Zone Trials
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
The Slough Side of Bath Road Overbridge
at 18m 1705yds (CH1040550). ELR - WIN
Mileage - 18m 1460yds to 18m 1705yds
Nature and Degree
As part of the route funded relock/recontrol,
Crossrail West Outer are amending the
existing track layout on the Windsor Branch
near Slough station. A key component of
these works is removing the existing
connection between the East Loop and the
Windsor Branch (328a/b pts) and converting
the East Loop into a cripple siding which will
terminate on the Slough Side of Bath Road
Overbridge at 18m 1705yds (CH1040550).
The existing East Loop falls at an average of
1 in 158 towards Windsor (away from the
main line) over the 215 m in front of the
proposed buffer position. Following the
proposed track renewal works the Cripple
siding will fall at an average of 1 in 161. 527
from the newly installed 8313 pts to the new
buffer. The specification for the proposed
works requires the Windsor Branch to be
lowered under Bath Road Overbridge
sufficiently that the resultant clearances
provide for future electrification. This fixed
point at 18m 1740yds along with the existing
Switches and Crossings (SandC) at 18m
1340yds severely restrict the ability to make
any meaningful difference to the vertical
alignment of the East Loop meaning
compliance cannot be achieved. Standard
states that sidings should not be steeper
City Thameslink, Platforms 1 and Platform 2 At City Thameslink Station, the Thameslink
Design Type: Infotec TR Series TFT
Programme shall be installing six number
displays TR32P. lRefer to attached schedule banks of Customer Information System (CIS)
which shows the proposed CIS Display
displays on both platforms (platforms 1 and
offsets.
2), each bank consisting of four number 32"
Thin Film Transistor (TFT) displays. The
N423 CIS enhancements project has a
requirement to show enhanced train service
information appropriate for a 24 trains per
hour (tph) timetable; to meet this
requirement the project need to replace the
existing Infotec P2014 displays as these can
only display details of the next four trains at
each platform which is appropriate for the
current lower frequency train service but not
for 24 tph. The project is proposing to install
32" TFT displays which will be able to show
details of the next eight trains at each
platform to meet the requirements to show
enhanced train service information for a 24
tph train service. The CIS displays will also
show a train pictogram to show where to
wait and train facilities so that, for example,
PRMs can board the train in the correct
location reducing dwell time. A signal
sighting review has confirmed that the
placement of the six number banks of TFT
displays on Platforms 1 and 2 has no impact
to the current operational railway. The
Ealing Broadway Station - Island Platform 2 This deviation will allow a retractable barrier
and 3.
to be fitted on the island platform between
the up main line and the down relief line at
Ealing Broadway. A current station building
is situated in middle of the island platform
which prevents the fence being placed 3000
mm from the line. The fence will be noncompliant for a short length adjacent to the
waiting room, with a minimum clearance of
2800 mm. The line Speeds are: Up Main
Platform 2 - 125 mph Down Relief Platform
3 - 90 mph. A retractable fence will be
between the bottom of the staircase and the
current waiting room in the middle of the
platform but this retracts into a nonoperational area and the 'do not pass this
point' sign will be moved to ensure this. Not
installing the fence is severely negating the
potential benefit of the current fencing
already installed at the London end of Ealing
Broadway as it still allows free access to the
main lines at the point at which members of
the public access the platform. Given the
location of Ealing Broadway within the rail
network and the volume of services in the
area which are affected by fatalities at the
station, the consequences of not fencing the
whole length of the island platform will see
the problem continue to cause severe issues
The temporary deviation will be used to
1) Rule Book Module S5 - Section 1. 1 This
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
clause lists the occasions when a Signal can
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
be passed at danger or an end of authority
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with (EOA) to be passed without a movement
single and double track lines in track circuit authority (MA). A temporary deviation is
block areas that do not have axle counters, required to add an TRS Protection Zone to
level crossings or ground frames.
the list in sub clause 9 to allow an On-Track
Machine (OTM) to pass a signal at danger
towards a High Output TRS Protection
Zone. The trials will be controlled and
managed to a strict and risk assessed
methodology by the TRS Services project.
Each location will have their own trial team
that will run the day to day trialling whilst
reporting into the main project team. With
supplementary protection in place, the OTM
is fully protected from coming into contact
with other traffic on that line.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The risk assessment supporting this
Network Rail
application has identified the following
controls and mitigation: The facility will only
be used for turnback moves, when the trains
will be occupied by drivers, or for temporary
stabling of failed units so will be used
infrequently. The installed buffer stop has
been risk assessed in line with GCRT5033
and has been specified according to the
rolling stock that will be located in the siding
and will have countdown markers and a red
'stop' light. Stabled, crippled trains will be
located close to the buffer stop so
momentum towards the buffer stop will be
reduced. The fall within the siding is away
from the connection with the branch through
line and is therefore away from operational
traffic. Alignment of the siding is parallel to
the branch line I. e. not towards the running
lines Bridge structure sits beyond extended
wing walls which retain a heavily vegetated
embankment; any train run through would
impact this feature and not the bridge
structure itself - as indicated in the buffer
stop risk assessment.
Certificate Issue Date
15/02/2016
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Infrastructure
Lead SC Approval Date
05/01/2016
Deviation Status
Current
The proposed headroom clearances of 2300 Network Rail
mm would not cause any safety issues
related to train movements, alighting
between train and platform or public safety
at this station. A signal sighting review has
confirmed that the placement of the six
number banks of TFT displays on Platforms
1 and 2 has no impact to the current
operational railway.
27/01/2016
N/A
Infrastructure
05/01/2016
Current
The Island platform is between the down
Network Rail
relief line and the up main line. The up main
platform is 125 mph through the station and
is only used during perturbation or planned
engineering works. There have been 13
fatal incidents in the last 5 years, a majority
involving the person stepping onto the line
from a mainline platform. The flow of
pedestrians in peak hours prevents the
usual style of mid-platform fence being used
as it needs to be retractable to allow
passengers to flow around the building
when passengers numbers are high. The
fence will be retracted and gate opened on
any occasion when the main line platform is
in use and the platform is monitored by a
security guard as well as the station staff.
27/01/2016
31/08/2018
Infrastructure
05/01/2016
Current
Once the trials have been successfully
Network Rail
completed, the project will be looking to
increase the scope of the trials to include
multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames, with final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas. Whilst
the TRS Protection Zone is in place and
there is a requirement to have a ZKL Track
Circuit Operating Device (TCOD) in place
when the TRS Protection Zone is granted
and therefore the signal protecting will be
held at danger, this request is to allow
additional OTM's to be allowed into the TRS
Protection Zone and authority for the
Signaller to grant the movement in
accordance with the conditions in S5. The
application will support the trial of the TRS
Protection Zone procedure. Network Rail
would like to trial a new form of Protection
Zone of the line that allows the operation of
multiple on-track machines working on a line
not under possession, the method of
operation can be found in the Safe and
Efficient Access - a proposal (presentation).
The Safe and Efficient Access Safety Case
The SEA risk assessment The SEA detailed
procedure The HO protection form The SEA
trial record sheet The various SEA briefing
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
Page 5
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8000-OTM
RGS Issue Number
Seven
RGS Title
Working of on-track machines (OTM)
GERT8000-HB12
Five
Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) or 15-131-DEV
safe work leader (SWL) in a possession
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS) 3, 10
Protection Zone Trials.
GERT8000-HB7
Five
General duties of a controller of site safety
(COSS)
15-130-DEV
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS) 4.4
Protection Zone Trials.
GERT8000-TW7
Six
Wrong-direction movements
15-129-DEV
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS) 1.1, 1.2
Protection Zone Trials.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Certificate Number
15-132-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS) 4.1, 4.2
Protection Zone Trials.
Scope
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
single and double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
level crossings or ground frames.
Nature and Degree
Clause 4. 1 stipulates that the work will not
require wrong direction movements (except
as described for the rail grinding train), the
on-track machine (High Output TRS and OnTrack Machine (OTM)) that will be trialled as
part of the TRS Protection Zone procedure
(Tampers) need to make at least 2-3 wrong
direction movements as part of their normal
method of operation. The clause also
stipulates that a machine may so work if
signalled as an Engineering train requiring
to stop in section, but not on a Track Circuit
Block (TCB) lines or where intermediate
block signals are provided. Clause 4. 2
stipulates that the driver must tell the
signaller that the OTM will be working
outside of a possession as part of the trials
of the TRS Protection Zone procedure there
is not requirement for the driver to do this as
the signaller will be made aware by the
published Weekly Operating Notice (WON)
notice and the On Train Manager. So a
temporary deviation is sought to allow trials
of the TRS Protection Zone procedure on
track circuit block lines and to allow the OTM
to make wrong direction movements as
required. The trials will be controlled and
managed to a strict and risk assessed
methodology by the TRS Services project.
The temporary deviation will be used to
The project requires the addition of the TRS
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Protection Zone as trials to take reason why
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
a line should be considered to be blocked to
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with allow place to evaluate the procedure.
single and double track lines in track circuit These trials will be controlled and managed
block areas that do not have axle counters, to a strict and risk assessed methodology by
level crossings or ground frames.
the TRS Services project. Each location will
have their own trial team that will run the day
to day trialling whilst reporting into the main
project team. . With supplementary
protection in place the On-Track Machine
(OTM) is fully protected from coming into
contact with other traffic on that line.
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
single and double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
level crossings or ground frames.
This clause documents the ten occasions
when a signaller may authorise the driver to
make wrong direction movement for which a
signal is not provided. A temporary
deviation is required to allow wrong direction
movements to be authorised as part of this
proposed method of work as none of the ten
existing circumstances apply. The trials will
be controlled and managed to a strict and
risk assessed methodology by the TRS
Services project. Each location will have
their own trial team that will run the day to
day trialling whilst reporting into the main
project team. With supplementary
protection in place, the OTM is fully
protected from coming into contact with
other traffic on that line.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Once the trials have been successfully
Network Rail
completed, the project will be looking to
increase the scope of the trials to include
multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames, with final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas. The
application will support the trial of the TRS
Protection Zone procedure. Network Rail
would like to trial a new form of Protection
Zone of the line that allows the operation of
multiple on-track machines working on a line
not under possession, the method of
operation can be found in the Safe and
Efficient Access - a proposal (presentation).
The Safe and Efficient Access Safety Case
The SEA risk assessment The SEA detailed
procedure The HO protection form The SEA
trial record sheet The various SEA briefing
documents.
Certificate Issue Date
12/02/2016
Certificate End Date
31/12/2017
Lead SC
Traffic Operation and Management
Lead SC Approval Date
15/12/2015
Deviation Status
Current
To allow trials of the TRS Protection Zone
Network Rail
procedure to go ahead a deviation is
required against clauses 3 and 10 to allow a
ES/SWL to be identified within TRS
Protection Zone and for them to be used to
setup a safe system of work. Once the trials
have been successfully completed, the
project will be looking to increase the scope
of the trials to include multiple line
complexities and level crossings and ground
frames. With final trials being looked at for
axle counter areas and including DC
electrified areas. The deviation will support
the trial of the TRS Protection Zone
procedure. Network Rail would like to trial a
new form of Protection Zone of the line that
allows the operation of multiple on-track
machines working on a line not under
possession, the method of operation can be
found in the Safe and Efficient Access - a
proposal (presentation) . The Safe and
Efficient Access Safety Case The SEA risk
assessment The SEA detailed procedure
The HO protection form The SEA trial record
sheet The various SEA briefing documents.
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
Once the trials have been successfully
Network Rail
completed, the project will be looking to
increase the scope of the trials to include
multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames. With final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas The
application will support the continuing trial of
the TRS Protection Zone procedure.
Network Rail would like to trial a new form of
Protection Zone of the line that allows the
operation of multiple on-track machines
working on a line not under possession, the
method of operation can be found in the
Safe and Efficient Access - a proposal
(presentation). The Safe and Efficient
Access Safety Case The SEA risk
assessment The SEA detailed procedure
The HO protection form The SEA trial record
sheet The various SEA briefing documents.
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
So the temporary deviation is to allow trials Network Rail
of the TRS Protection Zone procedure by
allowing the On-Track Machine (OTM)
authorised to make wrong direction
movements for which no signal is provided
as required, as well as asking for the OnTrain Manager to be added to the list of
people who can authorise the OTM driver to
make a wrong direction movement. Once
the trials have been successfully completed,
the project will be looking to increase the
scope of the trials to include multiple line
complexities and level crossings and ground
frames, with final trials being looked at for
axle counter areas and including DC
electrified areas. The application will support
the operation of Multiple on-track machines
working on a line not under possession, the
method of operation can be found in the
application and will support the trial of the
TRS Protection Zone procedure. Network
Rail would like to trial a new form of
Protection Zone of the line that allows the
operation of multiple on-track machines
working on a line not under possession, the
method of operation can be found in the
Safe and Efficient Access - a proposal
(presentation). The Safe and Efficient
Access Safety Case The SEA risk
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Managementy
15/12/2015
Current
Page 6
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8000-TW5
RGS Issue Number
Six
RGS Title
Preparation and movement of trains.
Defective or isolated vehicles and on-train
equipment
Certificate Number
15-128-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS) 4.4, 4.5, 22.2, 22.3
Protection Zone Trials.
Scope
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
single and double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
level crossings or ground frames.
Nature and Degree
A temporary deviation is required to allow
Automatic Warning System (AWS) to be
isolated on an OTM when the OTM is in
working mode on a line not under a T3
possession. These clauses relate to train
borne defective/isolated Automatic Warning
System and Track Circuit Actuators. These
clauses instruct the driver that the signaller
must be informed immediately of
defective/isolated equipment and that further
movement must not be made until
authorised. The clauses go on to document
what action must be taken before the train
can proceed. The project requests that the
On-Track Machine (OTM) driver does not
need to comply with these clauses as part of
the High Output TRS Protection Zone trials.
The trials will be controlled and managed to
a strict and risk assessed methodology by
the TRS Services project. Each location will
have their own trial team that will run the day
to day trialling whilst reporting into the main
project team. With supplementary
protection in place, the OTM is fully
protected from coming into contact with
other traffic on that line.
GERT8000-TW1
Ten
Preparation and movement of trains
15-127-DEV
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS) 46
Protection Zone Trials.
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will be
restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
single and double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
level crossings or ground frames.
This clause documents that the driver of a
train can ask the signaller to stop trains on
any adjacent line which would otherwise put
the driver's personal safety in danger. The
occasions that are listed for doing this
include when an On-Track Machine (OTM)
driver requires to check working equipment
is correctly positioned before or after an
OTM carries out work. The 'Safe and
Efficient Access' project believes that the
person setting up the safe systems of work
at the site should be the Safe Works Leader
(SWL) / Engineering Supervisor (ES).
These trials will be controlled and managed
to a strict and risk assessed methodology by
the TRS Services project. Each location will
have their own trial team that will run the day
to day trialling whilst reporting into the main
project team. The project believes that only
having one person setting up safe systems
of work for the TRS Protection Zone
procedure will remove the possibility of
confusion and incident by restricting the
communications to the signaller and the On
Train Manager only.
GERT8000-TS1
Ten
General signalling regulations
15-126-DEV
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS) 13.2.1
Protection Zone Trials.
GERT8000-TS11
Two
Failure of, or work on, signalling equipment - 15-125-DEV
signallers' regulations
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
High Output Track Renewals System (TRS) 1.5
Protection Zone Trials.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Once the trials have been successfully
Network Rail
completed, the project will be looking to
increase the scope of the trials to include
multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames, with final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas. Going
trials on London North Eastern (LNE) and
Anglia which will continue but will include all
routes within Network Rail. The application
will support the trial of the TRS Protection
Zone procedure. Network Rail would like to
trial a new form of Protection Zone of the line
that allows the operation of multiple on-track
machines working on a line not under
possession, the method of operation can be
found in the Safe and Efficient Access - a
proposal (presentation). The Safe and
Efficient Access Safety Case The SEA risk
assessment The SEA detailed procedure
The HO protection form The SEA trial record
sheet The various SEA briefing documents.
The temporary deviation is required to allow Network Rail
the SWL/ ES to take the block on behalf of
the OTM driver as part of the trials of the
Track Renewals System (TRS) Protection
Zone procedure. Once the trials have been
successfully completed, the project will be
looking to increase the scope of the trials to
include multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames, with final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas. The
application will support the operation of
multiple on-track machines working on a line
not under possession, the method of
operation can be found in the Safe Efficient
Access detailed procedure. The procedure
has been designed around one person
being in charge of setting up all safe
systems of work (SSoW) for all staff working
within the TRS Protection Zone. The
present clause allows only the driver to get
the block of an adjacent line. The alteration
of the clause would remove the requirement
for the driver to take a line blockage of the
adjacent line and increase the likelihood of
the block being granted in an efficient
manner - co-ordinated with other work. The
project aim is to improve track worker safety
by removing the need for possession
Rule Book Module TS1 - Clause 13. 2. 1:
This temporary deviation is required to allow Network Rail
This clause allows a SWL/COSS /PC to
the SWL / ES to block line with a Protection
block the line for staff to work on a line
Zone without using any other formal
blocked to all movements expect those
blockages as laid down in 13. 2 of TS1. The
recognised to work within the Line Blockage, deviation is required to allow an SWL or ES
A temporary deviation is sought to enable
to request a line to be blocked to create a
the SWL / Engineering Supervisor (ES) to
protection zone for an TRS to work, with the
formally protect both the TRS train and staff TRS standing at an agreed location, and for
on a line. This would allow just the ES/SWL a tamper to enter the blocked line
to set up safe systems of work in the most
subsequently. The arrangements to be
efficient manner at the site, therefore
applied, including documentation would be
removing possible confusion.
as set out in the documentation issued for
the trials of the arrangements. The
Protection Zone would, during the trial,
become a recognised way of blocking the
line in conjunction with all other deviations
associated with this application. Once the
trials have been successfully completed, the
project will be looking to increase the scope
of the trials to include multiple line
complexities and level crossings and ground
frames. With final trials being looked at for
axle counter areas and including DC
electrified areas. The deviation will support
the operation of multiple on-track machines
working on a line not under possession, the
method of operation can be found in the
Safe Efficient Access detailed procedure.
The procedure has been designed around
The temporary deviation will be used to
This clause relates to signalling equipment Normally, an RT3187 form is completed
Network Rail
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
being disconnected and, when a form
when any signalling equipment is
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
RT3187 should be used, the project
disconnected outside of a Line Blockage or
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with requests that the RT3187 form is not used
T3 Possession, or if it affects the normal
single and double track lines in track circuit during the TRS Protection Zone for the
passage of trains or needs the signaller's
block areas that do not have axle counters, disconnection of any equipment wholly
cooperation, or will affect the normal
level crossings or ground frames.
within the Protection Zone which is outside
operation of the equipment. Whilst the TRS
of a Line Blockage or T3 Possession. If the Protection Zone is in place, some equipment
disconnection continues past the TRS
may be disconnected on the line affected
Protection Zone, then TS11 would need to
and will be reconnected prior to the TRS
be complied with.
Protection Zone being given up. The
deviation will support the trial of the TRS
Protection Zone procedure. Network Rail
would like to trial a new form of Protection
Zone of the line that allows the operation of
multiple on-track machines working on a line
not under possession, the method of
operation can be found in the Safe and
Efficient Access - a proposal (presentation).
The Safe and Efficient Access Safety Case
The SEA risk assessment The SEA detailed
procedure The HO protection form The SEA
trial record sheet The various SEA briefing
documents.
Certificate Issue Date
12/02/2016
Certificate End Date
31/12/2017
Lead SC
Traffic Operation and Management
Lead SC Approval Date
15/12/2015
Deviation Status
Current
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
11/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
Page 7
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8000-S5
RGS Issue Number
Six
RGS Title
Passing a signal at danger or an end of
authority (EoA) without a movement
authority (MA)
Certificate Number
15-124-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
High Output Ballast Cleaner Protection Zone 1.1
Trials.
Scope
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
single and double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
level crossings or ground frames.
GERT8000-OTM
Seven
Working of on-track machines (OTM)
15-123-DEV
High Output Ballast Cleaner Protection Zone 4.1, 4.2
Trials.
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
single and double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
level crossings or ground frames.
GERT8000-HB12
Five
Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES) or 15-122-DEV
safe work leader (SWL) in a possession
High Output Ballast Cleaner Protection Zone 3, 10
Trials.
GERT8000-HB7
Five
General duties of a controller of site safety
(COSS)
High Output Ballast Cleaner Protection Zone 4.4
Trials.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
15-121-DEV
Nature and Degree
Requirement 1. 1 relates to the occasions
when signals can be passed at danger or an
end of authority (EOA) to be passed without
a movement authority (MA). A temporary
deviation is required to add an High Output
Ballast Cleaner (HOBC) Protection Zone to
the list in sub clause 9 to allow a On-Track
Machine (OTM) to pass a signal at danger
towards a HOBC Protection Zone. These
trials will be controlled and managed to a
strict and risk assessed methodology by the
HOBC Services project. Each location will
have there own trial team that will run the
day to day trialling whilst reporting into the
main project team. With supplementary
protection in place the OTM is fully protected
from coming into contact with other traffic on
that line.
Clause 4. 1 stipulates that the work will not
require wrong direction movements (except
as described for the rail grinding train), the
on-track machine (High Output Ballast
Cleaner (HOBC) and On-Track Machine
(OTM)) that will be trialled as part of the
HOBC Protection Zone procedure
(Tampers) need to make at least 2-3 wrong
direction movements as part of their normal
method of operation. The clause also
stipulates that a machine may so work if
signalled as an Engineering train requiring
to stop in section, but not on a Track Circuit
Block (TCB) lines or where intermediate
block signals are provided. Clause 4. 2
stipulates that the driver must tell the
signaller that the OTM will be working
outside of a possession as part of the trials
of the HOBC Protection Zone procedure
there is not requirement for the driver to do
this as the signaller will be made aware by
the published Weekly Operating Notice
(WON) and the On-Train Manager. The
trials will be controlled and managed to a
strict and risk assessed methodology by the
HOBC Services project. Each location will
have their own trial team that will run the day
to day trialling whilst reporting into the main
project team. With supplementary
The temporary deviation will be used to
The project requires the addition of the
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
HOBC Protection Zone as reason why a line
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
should be considered to be blocked to allow
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with trials to take place to evaluate the
single and double track lines in track circuit procedure. The trials will be controlled and
block areas that do not have axle counters, managed to a strict and risk assessed
level crossings or ground frames.
methodology by the HOBC Services project.
Each location will have their own trial team
that will run the day to day trialling whilst
reporting into the main project team. With
supplementary protection in place, the OTM
is fully protected from coming into contact
with other traffic on that line.
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will be
restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
single and double track lines circuit block
areas that do not have axle counters, level
crossings or ground frames.
Rule Book Handbook 7 - Clause 4. 4: This
clause lists the occasions when a COSS
may use a blocked line to set up a safe
system of work. A temporary deviation is
required to introduce the HOBC Protection
Zone procedure into the list as none of the
existing circumstances apply. This clause
details that the COSS may use a blocked
line as part of the safe system of work but
then lays down guidelines on when a line
may be considered to be blocked. The
COSS must only consider a line to be
blocked if at least one of the following
applies: The COSS has blocked the line or
lines concerned as shown in Handbook 8.
The line or lines concerned have been
blocked by a PC and the COSS has agreed
a safe system of work with that PC as shown
in Handbook 8. The COSS's site of work is
within an Engineering Supervisor (ES)'s or
Safe Work Leader (SWL)'s work site and the
COSS has agreed a safe system of work
with that ES, as shown in Handbook 9. The
COSS's site of work is within a siding and
the COSS has agreed a safe system of work
with that Person in Charge of Sidings
(PICOS), as shown in Handbook 9. The
project requires the addition of the High
Output Ballast Cleaner (HOBC) Protection
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The application is sought to carry out initial
Network Rail
trials that will be limited to single and double
track lines in track circuit block areas that do
not have axle counters, level crossings or
ground frames in non-DC electrified areas.
Once these trials have been successfully
completed the project will be looking to
increase the scope of the trials to include
multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames. With final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas. Whilst
the HOBC Protection Zone is in place and
there is a requirement to have a ZKL Track
Circuit Operating Device (TCOD) in place
when the HOBC Protection Zone is granted
and therefore the signal protecting will be
held at danger, this request is to allow
additional OTMs into the HOBC Protection
Zone and authority for the Signaller to grant
the movement in accordance with the
conditions in S5. The application will
support the trial of the HOBC Protection
Zone procedure. Network Rail would like to
trial a new form of Protection Zone of the line
that allows the operation of multiple on-track
machines working on a line not under
possession, the method of operation can be
found in the Safe and Efficient Access - a
Once the trials have been successfully
Network Rail
completed, the project will be looking to
increase the scope of the trials to include
multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames. With final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas. The
application will support the trial of the HOBC
Protection Zone procedure. Network Rail
would like to trial a new form of Protection
Zone of the line that allows the operation of
multiple on-track machines working on a line
not under possession, the method of
operation can be found in the Safe and
Efficient Access - a proposal (presentation):
The Safe and Efficient Access Safety Case.
The SEA risk assessment. The SEA
detailed procedure. The HO protection
form. The SEA trial record sheet. The
various SEA briefing documents.
Certificate Issue Date
09/02/2016
Certificate End Date
31/12/2017
Lead SC
Traffic Operation and Management
Lead SC Approval Date
15/12/2015
Deviation Status
Current
12/02/2016
12/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
To allow trials of the HOBC Protection Zone Network Rail
procedure to go ahead a non compliance is
required against clauses 3 and 10 to allow a
ES / SWL to be identified within HOBC
Protection Zone and for them to be used to
setup a safe system of work. Once these
trials have been successfully completed, the
project will be looking to increase the scope
of the trials to include multiple line
complexities and level crossings and ground
frames, with final trials being looked at for
axle counter areas and including DC
electrified areas. The application will support
the trial of the HOBC Protection Zone
procedure. Network Rail would like to trial a
new form of Protection Zone of the line that
allows the operation of multiple on-track
machines working on a line not under
possession, the method of operation can be
found in the Safe and Efficient Access - a
proposal (presentation): The Safe and
Efficient Access Safety Case. The SEA risk
assessment. The SEA detailed procedure.
The HO protection form. The SEA trial
record sheet. The various SEA briefing
documents.
09/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
Once these trials have been successfully
Network Rail
completed, the project will be looking to
increase the scope of the trials to include
multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames, with final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas. The
application will support the continuing trial of
the HOBC Protection Zone procedure.
Network Rail would like to trial a new form of
Protection Zone of the line that allows the
operation of multiple on-track machines
working on a line not under possession, the
method of operation can be found in the
Safe and Efficient Access - a proposal
(presentation): The Safe and Efficient
Access Safety Case. The SEA risk
assessment. The SEA detailed procedure.
The HO protection form. The SEA trial
record sheet. The various SEA briefing
documents.
09/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
Page 8
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8000-TW7
RGS Issue Number
Six
RGS Title
Wrong-direction movements
Certificate Number
15-120-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
High Output Ballast Cleaner Protection Zone 1.1, 1.2
Trials.
GERT8000-TW5
Six
Preparation and movement of trains.
Defective or isolated vehicles and on-train
equipment
15-119-DEV
High Output Ballast Cleaner Protection Zone 4.4, 4.5, 22.2, 22.3
Trials.
GERT8000-TW1
Ten
Preparation and movement of trains
15-118-DEV
High Output Ballast Cleaner (HOBC)
Protection Zone Trials.
GERT8000-TS1
Ten
General signalling regulations
15-117-DEV
High Output Ballast Cleaner Protection Zone 13.2.1
Trials.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
46
Scope
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
single and double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
level crossings or ground frames.
Nature and Degree
This clause documents the ten occasions
when a Signaller may authorise the driver to
make wrong direction movement for which a
signal is not provided. A temporary
deviation is required to allow wrong direction
movements to be authorised as part of this
proposed method of work as none of the ten
existing circumstances apply. The trials will
be controlled and managed to a strict and
risk assessed methodology by the High
Output Ballast Cleaner (HOBC) Services
project. Each location will have their own
trial team that will run the day to day trialling
whilst reporting into the main project team.
With supplementary protection in place the
On-Track Machine (OTM) is fully protected
from coming into contact with other traffic on
that line.
A temporary deviation is required to allow
Automatic Warning System (AWS) to be
isolated on an On-Track Machine (OTM)
when the OTM is in working mode on a line
not under a T3 possession. These clauses
relate to train borne defective / isolated
Automatic Warning System and Track
Circuit Actuators. These clauses instruct the
Driver that the Signaller must be informed
immediately of defective/isolated equipment
and that further movement must not be
made until authorised. The clauses go on to
document what action must be taken before
the train can proceed. The project requests
that the On-Track Machine (OTM) driver
does not need to comply with these clauses
as part of the High Output Ballast Cleaner
(HOBC) Protection Zone trials The trials will
be controlled and managed to a strict and
risk assessed methodology by the HOBC
Services project. Each location will have
there own trial team that will run the day to
day trialling whilst reporting into the main
project team. With supplementary
protection in place, the OTM is fully
protected from coming into contact with
other traffic on that line.
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. The trials will
be restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
single and double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
level crossings or ground frames.
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure.
Clause 46 specifies that the driver of a train
can ask the signaller to stop trains on any
adjacent line which would otherwise put the
driver's personal safety in danger. The
occasions that are listed for doing this
include when an On-Track Machine (OTM)
driver requires to check working equipment
is correctly positioned before or after an
OTM carries out work. The 'Safe and
Efficient Access' project believes that the
person setting up the safe systems of work
at the site should be the Safe Works Leader
/ Engineering Supervisor. The trials will be
controlled and managed to a strict and risk
assessed methodology by the HOBC
Services project. Each location will have
their own trial team that will run the day-today trialling whilst reporting into the main
project team. The project believes that only
having one person setting up safe systems
of work for the HOBC Protection Zone
procedure will remove the possibility of
confusion and incident by restricting the
communications to the signaller and the On
Train Manager only.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
A temporary deviation is to allow trials of the Network Rail
HOBC Protection Zone procedure by
allowing the OTM authorised to make wrong
direction movements for which no signal is
provided as required, as well as allowing for
the On-Train Manager to be added to the list
of people who can authorise the OTM driver
to make a wrong direction movement. Once
the trials have been successfully completed,
the project will be looking to increase the
scope of the trials to include multiple line
complexities and level crossings and ground
frames, with final trials being looked at for
axle counter areas and including DC
electrified areas. The application will support
the operation of Multiple on-track machines
working on a line not under possession, the
method of operation can be found in the
application and will support the trial of the
HOBC Protection Zone procedure. Network
Rail would like to trial a new form of
Protection Zone of the line that allows the
operation of multiple on-track machines
working on a line not under possession, the
method of operation can be found in the
Safe and Efficient Access - a proposal
(presentation): The Safe and Efficient
Access Safety Case. The SEA risk
assessment. The SEA detailed procedure.
Once the trials have been successfully
Network Rail
completed the project will be looking to
increase the scope of the trials to include
multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames. With final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas. The
application will support the trial of the HOBC
Protection Zone procedure. Network Rail
would like to trial a new form of Protection
Zone of the line that allows the operation of
multiple on-track machines working on a line
not under possession, the method of
operation can be found in the Safe and
Efficient Access - a proposal (presentation).
The Safe and Efficient Access Safety Case
The SEA risk assessment. The SEA
detailed procedure. The HO protection
form. The SEA trial record sheet. The
various SEA briefing documents.
The temporary deviation is required to allow Network Rail
the SWL / ES to take the block on behalf of
the OTM driver as part of the trials of the
HOBC Protection Zone procedure. Once
these trials have been successfully
completed, the project will be looking to
increase the scope of the trials to include
multiple line complexities and level
crossings and ground frames. With final
trials being looked at for axle counter areas
and including DC electrified areas. The
application will support the operation of
multiple on-track machines working on a line
not under possession, the method of
operation can be found in the Safe Efficient
Access detailed procedure. The procedure
has been designed around one person
being in charge of setting up all Safe
Systems of Work (SSoW) for all staff
working within the HOBC Protection Zone.
The present clause allows only the driver to
get the block of an adjacent line. The
alteration of the clause would remove the
requirement for the driver to take a line
blockage of the adjacent line and increase
the likelihood of the block being granted in
an efficient manner - co-ordinated with other
work. The project aim is to improve track
worker safety by removing the need for
This clause allows a Safe Work Leader
The temporary deviation is required to allow Network Rail
(SWL) / Controller of Site Safety (COSS) /
an SWL or ES to request a line to be
Protection Controller (PC) to block the line
blocked to create a protection zone for a
for staff to work on a line blocked to all
high output ballast cleaner (HOBC) to work,
movements expect those recognised to work with the HOBC standing at an agreed
within the Line Blockage. A temporary
location, and for a tamper to enter the
deviation is sought to enable the SWL /
blocked line subsequently without using any
Controller of Site Safety (ES) to formally
other formal blockages as laid down in 13. 2
protect both the Controller of Site Safety
of TS1. The arrangements to be applied,
(HOBC) train and staff on a line. This would including documentation would be as set out
allow just the ES / SWL to set up safe
in the documentation issued for the trials of
systems of work in the most efficient manner the arrangements. The Protection Zone
at the site, therefore removing possible
would during the trial become a recognised
confusion.
way of blocking the line in conjunction with
all other temporary deviations associated
with this application. Once these trials have
been successfully completed, the project will
be looking to increase the scope of the trials
to include multiple line complexities and
level crossings and ground frames. With
final trials being looked at for axle counter
areas and including DC electrified areas.
The application will support the operation of
multiple on-track machines working on a line
not under possession, the method of
operation can be found in the Safe Efficient
Access detailed procedure. The procedure
has been designed around the SWL or ES
being in charge of setting up all Safe
Certificate Issue Date
15/02/2016
Certificate End Date
31/12/2017
Lead SC
Traffic Operation and Management
Lead SC Approval Date
15/12/2015
Deviation Status
Current
12/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
09/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
15/12/2015
Current
09/02/2016
31/12/2017
Traffic Operations and Management
15/12/2015
Current
Page 9
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8000-TS11
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Failure of, or work on, signalling equipment - 15-116-DEV
signallers' regulations
Title
RGS Clause
High Output Ballast Cleaner Protection Zone 1.5
Trials.
Scope
The temporary deviation will be used to
carry out trials nationally on all routes on
Network Rail infrastructure. Trials will be
restricted to non-DC electrified areas with
single and double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
level crossings or ground frames.
Nature and Degree
This clause relates to signalling equipment
being disconnected and when a form
RT3187 should be used. The project
requests that the RT3187 form is not used
during the High Output Ballast Cleaner
(HOBC) Protection Zone for the
disconnection of any equipment wholly
within the HOBC Protection Zone which is
outside of a Line Blockage or T3
Possession. If the disconnection continues
past the HOBC Protection Zone, then TS11
would need to be complied with.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Normally, an RT3187 form is completed
Network Rail
when any signalling equipment is
disconnected outside of a Line Blockage or
T3 Possession or if affects the normal
passage of trains or needs the signallers
cooperation or will affect the normal
operation of the equipment. Whilst the
HOBC Protection Zone is in place, some
equipment may be disconnected on the line
affected and will be reconnected prior to the
HOBC Protection Zone being given up. The
application will support the trial of the HOBC
Protection Zone procedure. Network Rail
would like to trial a new form of Protection
Zone of the line that allows the operation of
multiple on-track machines working on a line
not under possession. The method of
operation can be found in the Safe and
Efficient Access - a proposal (presentation).
The Safe and Efficient Access Safety Case
The SEA risk assessment The SEA detailed
procedure The HO protection form The SEA
trial record sheet The various SEA briefing
documents.
Certificate Issue Date
12/02/2016
Certificate End Date
31/12/2017
Lead SC
Traffic Operation and Management
Lead SC Approval Date
15/12/2015
Deviation Status
Current
GIRT7033
Three
Lineside Operational Safety Signs
15-115-DEV
Flexible Train Arrival Point (FTAP) Trial
Extension.
2.1.1
National - All routes.
Current Group Standard requirements mean
that all trains about to enter a possession
have to be authorised to pass a signal at
danger. Further authorisation and control is
required to bring trains to a stand within the
possession to the exact work site. This
process requires unproductive time
(typically 20 minutes or more) during the
possession, which is at odds with the
requirement for Network Rail to become
more efficient at delivering work generally.
The current requirements therefore mean
the High Output trains are not being used to
best advantage.
It is estimated that this process would allow Network Rail
10-20 minutes additional production time on
every High Output shift. This could equate
to an estimated 50,000 Pounds Sterling
increase in production in every shift. The
following risks have been identified: As the
possession would not be granted until the
train is at the FTAP, other train may
approach the signage. The risk is if the train
overshoots the FTAP. Threats relating to
this have been assessed and mitigated.
(see FTAP Proposal documentation). From
the bow-tie risk assessment, FTAP will not
be applied 'near' a level crossing that has
not been closed or brought under local
control. 'Near' means: from at least 200 m
before the striking in point on the approach
to a level crossing. to at least 200 m plus the
length of train beyond the striking out point
after a level crossing.
14/04/2016
31/12/2017
Control Command and Signalling
24/11/2015
Current
GERT8075
Two
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
15-114-DEV
Transition between European Train Control
System (ETCS) mode SN (class B system
Automatic Warning System / Train
Protection and Warning System
(AWS/TPWS)) and other ETCS modes .
2.2.4.11, 3.2.3.7, 3.2.4.4, 4.2.5.1, 4.2.5.2,
4.2.5.3, 4.2.5.4, 4.2.5.5, 4.2.5.6, 4.2.5.7,
4.2.5.8
Thameslink Class 700 units.
N/A
Control Command and Signalling
26/11/2015
Current
Three
Railway Wheelsets
15-113-DEV
Trial of Economic Tyre Turning (ETT) on
Class 390 Wheelsets with P12 Profiles
4.4.1
Up to five-off Class 390/0 and 390/1
trainsets in the number range 01 to 57.
Brake demand less than 59 seconds the
behaviour of the train meets the stated intent
of the 59 second requirement. It is therefore
considered that there is no safety impact of
this non-compliance. Putting the train into
shunt (SH) mode via the DMI and then
deactivating shunt mode - This scenario will
not be possible when the Class 700 enters
service in the UK. Siemens have inhibited
the selection of shunt mode on the ETCS
DMI when ETCS operates in Level NTC.
Consequently, the driver will not be able to
select level SH under any circumstances.
Setting the national value of the maximum
speed attainable in SH mode to zero from
Thameslink provides additional protection to
prevent a train moving in this state. It is
considered that there is no safety implication
from this. Putting the train into another
Level, I. e. Level 2 and then back into Level
NTC Drivers have not been told during
their training of this phenomenon. The risk
of a driver identifying this by chance as a
means of circumnavigating the 59 second
timeout following a TPWS brake demand is
very low. If a driver had an intricate
understanding of the system and used this
as a method of bypassing the timeout, it
would be considered a deliberate violation of
Findings from the RSSB T641 Research
Project and recent work by the University of
Huddersfield show that the use of a ETT thin
flange wheel profile: Does not compromise
safety against derailment (T641 report); Has
no significant detrimental effect on vehicle
dynamic performance (T641 report); Has no
significant impact on rail damage and wear
(T641 report and IRR report 110/81);An
economic benefit exists (IRR report 110/81).
On the basis of the above findings, it is
considered that the trial will have no impact
on the safety of the railway system or
compatibility of the trial trainsets with the
West Coast Main Line infrastructure.
Undertaking of the trial will require an
additional cost, related to monitoring the inservice performance of the ETT P12 wheel
profiles and the undertaking of a Ride
Quality assessment. However, provided
that the trial is successful, then it will further
support the introduction of ETT wheel
profiles, which will produce the industry
benefits identified in Section 10.
21/01/2016
GMRT2466
Testing of the class 700 fleet has revealed a
number of scenarios in which it is possible
to: have a TPWS or AWS triggered brake
application which lasts for less than 59
seconds reset a TPWS or AWS triggered
brake application by means other than those
specified in the standard. These
circumstances arise due to the interface
requirements between the ETCS and Class
B systems specified in the Command
Control and Signalling Technical
Specifications for Interoperability (CCS TSI).
The train implements baseline 3. 3. 0.
When the train transitions from ETCS mode
SN to another ETCS mode, the TSI requires
that the Class B system is reset. Three
scenarios have been identified where this is
possible. Putting the train into shunt mode
(SH) in level NTC;Selecting another ETCS
level, then reselecting level
NTC;Deactivating the cab and reactivating
the cab using the master switch. To comply
with the RGS requirement, the CCS TSI
(2012/88/EU and 2012/696/EU), Annex A,
Table A2, line 4 would need to be modified,
see Union of Signalling Industry (UNISIG)
Subset-026, chapter 4. 6. 2. The hazard
analyses for ETCS modes performed by
UNISIG and European Railway Agency
The impact of complying with the current
RGS requirement is that it limits the useful
life of wheel pans. This is because, at each
turn the full wheel profile, including a 'full
thickness' flange must be recreated. As the
wheel pan approaches its scrapping
diameter, it is not always possible to
recreate the full flange thickness of the
wheel profile without reducing the wheel
below its last turning diameter. Therefore, at
this point, whilst the wheel pans still have
usable life remaining, it is necessary for
them to be removed and scrapped. This
imposes avoidable costs on the industry: In
replacing wheels which have some useable
life remaining (unavailability of vehicles,
unplanned wheelset replacement when
wheel pick up damage near the end of their
life etc. ). A study by the University of
Huddersfield Institute of Railway Research
(IRR report 110/81 issue 1) has suggested
that saving of between £880K and £5. 1M
may be realisable across the GB passenger
fleet if RGS permitted Economic Tyre
Turning (ETT) at the end of a wheels life; In
early replacement of wheelsets at heavy
overhaul when they have significant
remaining life. ETT could be one of a range
of measures that allow maintainers to extend
01/01/2017
Rolling Stock
04/12/2015
Current
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Govia Thameslink Railway
Limited
West Coast Trains Ltd (trading 07/01/2016
as Virgin Trains)
Page 10
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0045
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
GMRT2400
Five
Engineering Design of On-track Machines in 15-109-DEV
Running Mode
Addition of drain at the base of the fuel tank. 2.4.1.1
GCRT5212
One
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
Clearances
15-108-DEV
Lower Sector Structure Gauge - Raised
Check Rails for Tram-Train.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-105-DEV
Charing Cross Station - Platforms 1-6
(uncovered sections only).
GERT8073
Three
Requirements for the Application of
Standard Vehicle Gauges
15-104-DEV
Clarification of the expression 'is included in 3.1.2.3
the Rolling Stock Library' in clause 3.1.2.3 of
GERT8073 Issue 3
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Certificate Number
15-111-DEV
Title
Location: Abbotswood Junction - signal BA
3658.
RGS Clause
5.2.3.1
Scope
Junction signal BA 3658, ELR: BAG2,
Abbotswood Junction. Mileage: 69 miles.
Nature and Degree
The only practicable and compliant solution
is to provide an approach release from red
control on BA3658 (the replacement for
G59), but this is considered operationally
restrictive and a worsening of the current
arrangement that train drivers are
accustomed to. It may also create a Signal
Passed at Danger (SPAD) risk due to driver
anticipation.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
As part of the Bromsgrove Corridor
Network Rail
Resignalling project, there is a requirement
to renew the signalling between Barnt Green
and Ashchurch. Abbotswood junction is
currently a 30 mph turnout on a 90 mph
section of line. The existing three-aspect
junction signal G59 has a single flashing
yellow in rear and operations have
requested that this is retained as part of the
resignalling to ensure that delays are not
introduced by a more restrictive approach
control. The non-compliance is not
considered to be particularly severe and has
precedents on the network where existing
non-compliant arrangements have been
perpetuated at Operations and Train
Operating Companies (TOCs) request. The
signalling arrangement provides adequate
clear and unambiguous routing information
for the driver at the earliest opportunity so
that he can control the speed of the train
safely. The Train Protection and Warning
System (TPWS) fitment for BA3658 is fully
effective to 6%g. Flashing yellow aspect
sequence reduced the likelihood of a SPAD
due to non-provision of approach release
from red the signal will normally be off when
the diverging route is set rather than at red.
There is only 10 mph difference between
This deviation is for the following vehicle:
The second sentence of the above clause
Plasser and Theurer have a large number of Plasser UK Ltd
TOPS Number: DR74002 EVN: 99 70 9128 mandates 'All openings in the fuel tank shall machines already certificated for operation
002-1.
be above the maximum fuel level'. Without on Network Rail Infrastructure (compliant
a drain plug fitted to the fuel tank, there
with earlier issues of GMRT2400) and fitted
would not be the facility to routinely remove with drains at the base of the fuel tank.
any condensation build-up. Due to the
There have been no problems with this
weather conditions in the United Kingdom
arrangement.
and the working routines in which On-Track
Machines are operated throughout the winter
months, fuel tanks are highly susceptible to
condensation contamination. The machine's
fuel tank will quite often be manually re-filled
from a barrel, which carries a high risk of
water contamination. There is a necessity to
drain the water from the tank to reduce the
risk of damage to the fuel system.
Certificate Issue Date
13/01/2016
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Control Command and Signalling
Lead SC Approval Date
26/11/2015
Deviation Status
Current
07/01/2016
N/A
Rolling Stock
04/12/2015
Current
G2, G4.1
2m61ch (Tinsley Chord turn out) to 5m59ch
(Parkgate turn out), approximately 3 miles.
This includes 9 point ends: Tinsley North
Junction 2m61chNew turnout 305 pts
Tinsley East: 2m79ch2 x existing turnouts
302 and 301B ptsRotherham:
4m40chExisting crossover 4301 A+BExisting
turnout 4300 ptsParkgate turnout:
5m59chNew crossover 4002 A+BNew
turnout 4000 pts. Not interoperable.
11.1.4
Charing Cross Station - Platforms 1-6
(uncovered sections only) ELR: XTD.
Mileage from 0m 4ch to the country ramp
ends. Charing Cross station has six existing
platforms, which are split approximately at
0m 4ch) between a covered and uncovered
sections.
It is not possibly to comply with the gauge
requirements and achieve a technically
compatible solution. Tram-Train vehicles
which have wheels compatible with highway
based tram-type track, have a narrower
flange, and are not compatible with standard
railway check rails. An alternative design of
check rail has been developed to interact
with the Tram Train wheels at a higher point.
This is needed to maintain their checking
function whilst maintaining the flangeway
clearance for conventional rolling stock
wheels. To achieve a check rail design
which will perform its function, it must
exceed the standard lower sector structure
gauge. See RGS deviation and associated
documents attached for risk justification
argument.
See RGS deviation and associated
Network Rail
documents attached for risk assessment.
The clearance is affected and changes from
standard clearance to special reduced
clearance. The SandC tamper would be
capable of operating over the raised check
rail, including in tamping mode.
18/12/2015
N/A
Infrastructure
11/11/2015
Current
Charing Cross station has six existing
platforms, which are split (approximately at
0m 4ch) between a covered and uncovered
area. The platform in the uncovered area is
supported by a steel trestle structure which
rests on a trapezoidal steel trough deck. It is
understood that the current bridge deck and
platforms were installed in the early 1970s.
The deck and trestle legs are exhibiting
severe corrosion in places. An interim
solution comprising a temporary lightweight
proprietary `Titan' metalwork structure
between the existing platform and steel
bridge deck, to provide additional support to
the platforms has been installed since
December 2013 and maintained since. The
original temporary deviation (reference
number 13/235/DEV) to allow this
installation to proceed was approved in
December 2013 with the current temporary
deviation (reference number 14/074/DEV)
expiring in January 2016. The deviation was
originally approved with the proviso that a
firm programme to reinstate compliant
platforms would be achieved; however,
RAM Sponsor personnel changes, access
restrictions and project development, design
and delivery costs have prohibited works to
progress. The scope of this deviation
The scope of the deviation is to clarify how
Historically, the Carkind descriptors used in
Clause 3. 1. 2. 3 can be applied, particularly the Rolling Stock Library to describe
in light of changes in the wagon TSI.
different vehicle types do not necessarily
reliably describe particular vehicle designs.
One wagon Carkind descriptor can, for
instance, include vehicles with different
bogie types or different physical attributes.
Similarly, wagons that may have very similar
characteristics from a gauging point of view
may have been allocated different Carkinds.
Furthermore, due to Technical Specification
for Interoperability (TSI) and other changing
standards requirements, new wagons are
likely to differ in detail and Carkind from their
similar predecessors when, from a gauging
perspective, their physical characteristics
may be essentially identical or substantively
similar to vehicles that have been in
successful operational service for many
years. In this situation, the expression `is
included in The Rolling Stock Library in R2'
is considered to be inadequately precise to
avoid the possibility of misinterpretation of
its intent with a likely consequential
requirement for unintended overly onerous
design and acceptance processes and
unnecessary contract risk.
A local risk assessment has been jointly
Network Rail
undertaken by Infrastructure Project and
Managed Stations to evaluate the possible
risks associated with deviation from Clause
11. 1. 4 and to consider possible additional
controls to mitigate those risks. The output
from further risk assessment will follow
following stakeholder HAZID / HAZOP
meeting scheduled 23/10/2015. The risks
are considered Tolerable. This will be
subject to records of events arising since the
original deviation was imposed and the
findings of the proposed HAZID / HAZOP
scheduled by the SE MFF delivery project
with Asset team, station management and
Train Operating Company (TOC)
stakeholder representatives initially for
23/10/2015. The station is a terminal station
with the linespeed adjacent to these
platforms being 10-15 mph controlled by
Train Protection Warning System (TPWS).
09/12/2015
01/12/2018
Infrastructure
11/11/2015
Current
It is considered that clarification of the intent Private Wagon Federation
of Clause 3. 1. 2. 3: will have no deleterious
effect on the safety of the railway system,
environmental protection or health. It
effectively carries forward the requirement of
Clause 2. 1. 2. 2 of the superseded RGS
GERT8073 Issue 2. Many thousands of
wagons have been accepted for operation
under this process with no known
detrimental safety consequences. Will not
affect the compatibility of the railway system
now or in the future. Will avoid the risk of
increased unnecessary costs arising from
unintended overly onerous design and
acceptance processes and the introduction
of a new and unnecessary contract risk.
07/01/2016
N/A
Rolling Stock
04/12/2015
Current
Page 11
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
15-103-DEV
Title
Finsbury Park Station - Platform 5/6 particularly Platform 6 side.
RGS Clause
6.2.2
Scope
Finsbury Park Station is located on the East
Coast Mainline at ECM1 @ 02mi 0902yd.
The station - orientated north to south - is
located in a triangle formed by the local
highways: Stroud Green to the north,
running northwest-southeast; Station Place
to east, running north to south; and Seven
Sisters to the south, running southwestnortheast. The station is accessed from
street level and is constructed on a series of
brick viaducts, with the Network Rail
platforms located approximately 6 m above
street level. The crown of the LUL running
tunnels are approximately 2 m below street
level are buried within the London clay
strata, with the crowns the lower band of the
made ground. Finsbury Park consists of
8no platforms, formed by 4no island
platforms (from east to west - Platforms 1/2,
3/4, 5/6, 7/8), with a redundant platform,
known as the Milkdock, to the west of the
site. This derogation relates only to Platform
5/6 - particularly Platform 6 side.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-099-DEV
Leicester station.- Headroom on Platforms.
8.1
Leicester station: Platform 1, Qty 3 x CIS
displays; LEI-NTI-001,002 and 003
(2405mm to underside);Platform 2, Qty 3 x
CIS displays; LEI-NTI-004,005 and 006
(2335mm to underside);Platform 3, Qty 3 x
CIS displays; LEI-NTI-007,008 and 009
(2310mm to underside).
GIRT7033
Three
Lineside Signs
15-098-DEV
Proposed new sign dimensions control the
risks for the line MRDs, applicable to the
Thameslink core area.
2.2.1.1
GKRT0045
Four
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
15-097-DEV
Swindon Area Signalling Renewal: Swindon 5.2.3.1
Station Flashing Aspect Sequences (Down
Direction).
The proposed variation will be applicable to
the Swindon Area Signalling Renewal
(SASR): Swindon Station Flashing Aspect
Sequences (Down Direction). At the eastern
approach to Swindon Station, flashing yellow
aspect sequences from the Down Main
SW1155 signal to Platform 1 SW1209
signal. Scheme Plan No. 11-GW-009/02
Version A. 6 "Swindon Station Area" refers.
GERT8075
Two
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
15-095-DEV
Non-compliance with Clause 4.2.2.1 b) of
GERT8075.
This deviation applies to the AWS Audible
Indicator Unit, part no. 062/016116, when
fitted to Thameslink Class 700 units and subclasses.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
4.2.2.1 b)
Nature and Degree
The platform at the proposed site of the new
passenger lift, is supported off made ground
retained by brick viaduct structures running
along the east and west boundaries of the
station. The made ground is circa 8-9 m in
depth (from platform level), where the strata
is then formed from London clay. Within the
fill, immediately below the site of the
passenger lift, are buried LUL crosspassageways constructed from either
brickwork or cast segmental lining.
Immediately to the east of the proposed lift is
a north-south running passageway known as
the Connect Equipment Room (CER),
therefore constraining the proposed lift
location from being designed further
centrally within the platform.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Based on the conservative approach as
Network Rail
discussed above, the project has identified
the following mitigations and risk-reduction
mechanisms and therefore feels that the
derogation is a sound and sensible
approach: The linespeed of the Down Slow
1 is 35/55 mph, and trains passing on this
line all stop for Platform 7. Direct through
trains are very seldom. Therefore,
passengers should not congregate towards
the edge of Platform 6. Platform 6 side is not
used by the train operator, Govia
Thameslink Railway (GTR), and therefore
after consultation with the operator, the
reduction of the platform edge clearance is
agreeable. The derogation to reduce the
platform edge clearance to proposed 2183
mm, minimum 2100 mm would only be for a
total length of proposed 3900 mm, maximum
4000 mm. . The total passenger usage of the
combined island Platform 5/6 is very low.
Platform 5 side is used, but a maximum of
3no trains arrive and depart from this
platform every hour, therefore actual usage
and footfall of the platform is very low. The
effective minimum platform edge clearance
from the proposed lift shaft to Platform 5
side shall be 6890 mm, therefore an
oversized clearance on the used-side of the
The height of the platform canopies is too
Network Rail
low to achieve the 2500 mm minimum
height.
Certificate Issue Date
09/12/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Infrastructure
Lead SC Approval Date
11/11/2015
Deviation Status
Current
09/12/2015
N/A
Infrastructure
11/11/2015
Current
The proposed new sign dimensions control Network Rail
the risks for the line Minimum Reading
Distances (MRDs) required. BS EN 16494:
2015 permits variation in size for the
European Train Control System (ETCS)
Block Marker (AB08) and other European
Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS)
signs. This standard states: "In the case of
low line speeds and/or structure gauge
constraints, it is permissible to use signs
within the scope of this standard with height
and width less than 500 mm, provided that
the dimensions are proportionally the same
as in Table 3. Where these signs are used,
readability shall be optimized. " Off-site trials
have been conducted and from these it has
been concluded that the smaller signs are fit
for purpose. The risk arising from their
smaller size is negligible. Two reports for
the off-site trials are attached with the
application. Signal Sighting assessment
has taken place, and the visibility of these
signs will be briefed and included in driver
training packs (as part of route learning).
The results of the assessment in the form a
report. Sample sign sighting forms and the
report are attached with the application.
14/04/2016
N/A
Control Command and Signalling
29/10/2015
Current
Junction method 2 Flashing Yellow Aspect
Sequence requires that, for a permissible
speed approaching the diverging junction in
the range 80 mph - 125 mph, the
permissible speed at the point of divergence
should be 40 mph or greater. Compliance
to the RGS requirement would restrict the
approach to Platform 1 to MAR at SW1175
signal, with performance impact on the
planned timetable services and the
approach would be inconsistent with the
existing arrangements to Platform 3 from
SW1155; this would result in a less drivable
layout from train operator's perspective. The
permissible speed at the point of divergence
(30 mph) is 10 mph below the limit required
by the standard. The WMSR Signalling
Compliance Approach "Principle of Re-lock
and Re-control" applies (CCMS Reference
10455124). Additionally, the signals
concerned enjoy good sighting of their
cautionary aspects and the permissible
speed profile decreases on approach to the
station. The Advance Warning Indicator
(AWI) for the divergence previously sighted
at braking distance is to be repositioned at
the first caution signal.
At Swindon Station, a flashing yellow aspect Network Rail
sequence from the Down Main into Platform
3 has existed for many years; it has the
property that the permissible speed
approaching the diverging junction is 40/85
mph and the permissible speed at the point
of divergence is 30 mph. The alternative
provision to additionally provide MAY-FA for
approach to Platform 1 allows greater
efficiency in the use of Swindon Station.
Although the MAY-FA facility to Platform 3
was provided at a time when most Down
Trains serving Swindon used Platform 3 (or
less commonly Platform 1) it is understood
that the Train Operating Companies (TOCs)
would like to see the present feature
retained, notably for train services from
London to Cheltenham. All the Swindon
area signals relocked by the SASR project
are predicted to be replaced with an ERTMS
L2 system in the future.
18/12/2015
N/A
Control Command and Signalling
29/10/2015
Current
As part of the approval process to
demonstrate compliance with GERT8075,
sound tests were performed on a
Thameslink Class 700 unit. The test
included on-train measurements of the
ambient noise and the warning- and clear
tones. The measured ambient noise
according to TSI Noise was 74. 7 dB(A). at
100 mph. During testing with the Automatic
Warning System (AWS) Audible Indicator
Unit, part no. 062/015822, it was found that
it was not possible to meet the requirement
for the AWS caution horn and the AWS clear
bell to be 10dB(A) above ambient.
Safety relevant acoustical information from
Govia Thameslink Railway
AWS can be clearly heard by the driver and
also considers the health and safety aspects
of drivers hearing abilities. This applies to
the AWS caution horn being 6 dB(A) above
ambient noise level and only to appear
occasionally, and the AWS 'clear' bell also
being 6 dB(A) above ambient noise level
and to appear very often. The sounds on the
train were also evaluated under real
conditions in the cab by the operator and
trade union representatives. Both parties
described the signals as clearly
distinguishable. The subjective impression
was that the signals were already very loud.
18/12/2015
N/A
Control Command and Signalling
N/A
Current
The height of the platform canopies is too
low to permit the required 2500 mm
clearance to underside. Smaller displays
would affect the readability of the
information. Low severity - the displays are
'like for like' replacements of existing
displays in their current locations utilising the
existing brackets. The existing displays
have been in place for 15 years with no
incidents.
The proposed variation will be applicable to It is impracticable to use the signs with the
the Thameslink core (tunnel) area only with dimensions prescribed in the Railway Group
limited clearances. The non-standard
Standard within the core Thameslink route
dimensions of the signs proposed: AB02,
due to limited clearances in the tunnel. It is
AB03, AB07, AC11. Specific detail on the
not practicable to achieve compliance as it
geographic scope is contained in the
would require extensive civil engineering
document "Supporting Information" attached works to provide the necessary additional
to the application. This deviation applies
clearance within the core (tunnel) area.
only to the Thameslink 'core' (tunnel) area
with limited clearances and when supported
by a signal sighting committee assessment.
.
Page 12
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2149
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
the Size of Railway Vehicle
Certificate Number
15-094-DEV
Title
Sheffield Tram-Train Lower Sector Gauge
Clearance.
RGS Clause
B6.2
Scope
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs) for operation between Sheffield
Meadowhall South and a new turn-back
platform at Parkgate via Rotherham Central.
Unit numbers: 399201 - 399207. Vehicle
numbers: 99001 - 99007;99101 99107;99201 - 99207.
Nature and Degree
General background information on the
Tram Train Project is given in Appendix A.
The tram-train vehicles are of a low-floor
design aimed at achieving level access at
tram stops on the tramway, and at dedicated
low platforms on the mainline railway. The
low floor height and associated compact
design of the vehicle bogies results in areas
of limited clearance in the lower sector.
Complying with the RGS requirements
would require a substantial re-design of the
existing vehicle bogie, and may not be
technically feasible. The resulting limited
clearances are the subject of this deviation
application.
GMRT2473
Two
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
15-090-DEV
Class 185 six-car over-length station
operations.
B12.1 and B12.2.2.
Liverpool South Parkway and Widnes
Stations.
GERT8000-TW5
Six
Preparation and movement of trains Defective or isolated vehicles and on train
equipment
15-089-DEV
Class 185 six-car over-length station
operations.
6.1
Class 185 six-car over-length operations at:
Liverpool South Parkway Station;
Warrington Central Station; Widnes Station;
Any other station on routes where the use of
the facility is occasional and/or limited to
stations with low numbers of passengers
boarding and alighting [I. e. meeting the
requirements of B12. 1 of 08/059/NC].
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
15-084-DEV
Hardstaffs User Work Crossings (UWC),
non-provision of level crossing position
indicators on East Midlands Control Centre
(EMCC) Mansfield Workstation.
2.9.3.1 b)
The deviation applies to Hardstaffs User
Worked Crossing (ELR RAC 133m 9ch) and
the control point Mansfield Workstation,
EMCC. It is not intended to provide an
identifying mark for the level crossing on the
control point Visual Display Unit (VDU)
screen when telephones are commissioned
there for use by the Authorised User.
GMRT2473 is also subject to a noncompliance pending standards change:
08/059/NC "Revisions to requirements
related to power-operated external doors"
authorised on 29/05/2008. This noncompliance already permits the use of a
manual Selective Door Opening (SDO)
system "on routes where the use of the
facility is occasional and/or limited to
stations with low numbers of passengers
boarding and alighting. " 08/059/NC
therefore covers most of the Transpennine
Express over-length operations, but
arguably not all. Six-car Class 185s stop
over-length at Liverpool South Parkway and
Widnes during the peak periods at times
when the passenger demand necessitates a
six-car train; this cannot then reasonably be
considered low numbers of passengers and,
depending on interpretation, is not
occasional either. Complying in the short
term could therefore involve either:
Reducing the train length from six cars to
three. Demand is such that the service
would be so heavily loaded that passengers
would be left behind at stations. This would
increase the risk of staff, contractor and
passenger assaults and the likelihood of
incidents at the platform/train interface. It
Compliance in the medium to long term will
be as detailed in Section 9 above - Method
of elimination. None of those options can be
achieved in the short term. Complying in the
short term could therefore involve either:
Reducing the train length from six cars to
three. Demand is such that the service
would be so heavily loaded that passengers
would be left behind at stations. This would
increase the risk of staff, contractor and
passenger assaults and the likelihood of
incidents at the platform/train interface.
Vulnerable passengers would be particularly
at risk. It would also prevent the train crew
from being able to readily walk through the
train, increasing the potential consequences
if, for example, a passenger was taken ill on
the train or a train evacuation was required.
Retaining the train length as six cars but
removing all over-length calls. Almost all of
these stops are a passenger service
requirement of the franchise. Running two
separate three-car trains instead of one sixcar train. Even if additional train crew
resources could be provided, it is highly
unlikely that an additional path would be
available. The TransPennine Express
franchise operates on already congested
routes through busy hubs including Leeds,
The Operations Risk Advisor and the Route
Level Crossing Manager are providing an
enhancement at Hardstaffs User Worked
Crossing through the provision of
telephones. The project scope did not
include the requirement to update the
signallers VDU control system and it is
proposed that the required update is
undertaken as part of a future project. The
cost of updating the Westcad screens to
show Hardstaffs UWC is 50,000 Pounds
Sterling, considerably more than the project
could afford and to undertake the change. In
becoming compliant, the level crossing
telephones would not be commissioned,
which continues the residual risk that users
of the crossing miscommunicate their
location to the signaller, and the signaller
therefore may authorise a crossing in an
unsafe situation leading to potential collision
between a train and a road vehicle.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The proposed alternative provisions have
the potential to result in insufficient
clearances between the tram-vehicles and
the infrastructure on the proposed operating
route. In order to establish that sufficient
clearance exists over the route to be
operated by tram-train, an absolute gauging
methodology has been adopted and
Network Rail has commissioned Balfour
Beatty to undertake a Clear Route
assessment of the tram-train vehicles and
the proposed route. The Clear Route
assessment was made using a Vampire
model created by the University of
Huddersfield dynamics team, reference:
Vampire Model 20140604-TT-NR-EL6.
tareVampire Model 20140604-TT-NR-EL6Deflated. The relevant co-ordinates from the
Vampire model have been input into the
Clear Route model and run over the
proposed route. No infrastructure
infringements have been identified for the
limited route over which the tram-train
vehicles will operate. It should be noted that
the proposed tram-train operation has no
diversionary routes, and the request for
deviation is limited to the route defined in
Signalling Scheme 12_ne_0047 Version 9.
1. Clearance tests and dynamic testing will
The current manual SDO Method of Work
has worked successfully since April 2014.
Customer information is provided, although
it is noted that most customers on the peak
hour trains in question are regular
customers. The risk is further reduced on
morning peak trains as most passengers at
both stations are boarding rather than
alighting. An analysis of the method of work
at these stations shows that trains have
called over length at Liverpool South
Parkway in excess of 1800 occasions per
year, and at Widnes approximately 260
occasions per year. This is a total of well
over 2000 occasions per year at these two
stations. In the sixteen month period
between 01/04/2014 and 01/08/2015, only
one irregularity has been reported, which
resulted in the doors being released but did
not result in any injury, and that incident was
on an unplanned strengthening move
arranged by control on the day as opposed
to a planned operation. This data supports
the view that, considering the low likelihood
of an incident and the most likely severity,
the overall risk is low in line with our internal
Risk Assessment standard. A review of the
over length working Method of Work and
Risk Assessment was undertaken involving
The proposed alternative provisions will
permit the continued operation of six-car
trains over-length at several stations across
the current First TransPennine Express
(FTPE) network, using a manual SDO
system. The manual SDO system involves
the conductor manually locking passenger
doors out of use at the rear of the train,
along with suitable customer information.
GM/RT2473 is subject to a non-compliance
pending standards change: 08/059/NC
"Revisions to requirements related to poweroperated external doors" authorised on
29/05/2008. This non-compliance already
permits the use of a manual SDO system
"on routes where the use of the facility is
occasional and/or limited to stations with low
numbers of passengers boarding and
alighting. "As the Class 185 Method of Work
involves the conductor manually locking
individual doors out of use at the rear of the
train (as opposed to, for example, manually
operating a system from a cab), the view of
the Traffic Operation and Management
Standards Committee (TOM SC) previously
is that a deviation to TW5 is also needed.
Class 185 units comply with the
requirements of GM/RT2473 relating to the
external Emergency Access Device (EEAD)
Safety of the rail user and information
provided to the user by the signaller when
they communicate by the phone is increased
due to the positive identity of the level
crossing on the workstation telephone
concentrator, provision of a laminated
diagram of the crossing positioned next to
the workstation position, a Special Box
Instruction detailing the procedure and
signals leading up to the level crossing, plus
local training and briefing. There will be a
residual risk that signallers will incorrectly
identify the positions of the trains despite the
information provided off of the workstation
screens, but this risk is considered tolerable.
Applicant Organisation
Stagecoach Supertram
Certificate Issue Date
14/12/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Rolling Stock
Lead SC Approval Date
30/10/2015
Deviation Status
Current
First/Keolis Transpennine Ltd 07/01/2016
(trading as First Transpennine
Express)
19/05/2018
Rolling Stock
04/12/2015
Current
First/Keolis Transpennine Ltd 20/11/2015
(trading as First Transpennine
Express)
19/05/2018
Traffic Operations and Management
20/10/2015
Current
Network Rail
27/10/2016
Control Command and Signalling
01/10/2015
Current
02/11/2015
Page 13
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0192
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
Certificate Number
15-082-DEV
Title
Non-compliance of Signals DM3, DM11
position relative to Downham Market Level
Crossing.
RGS Clause
2.1.1.3
Scope
DM3 and DM11 protecting Downham Market
Station Level Crossing. ELR BGK 86 miles
4 ch.
GMRT2044
Four
Braking System Requirements and
Performance for Multiple Units
15-079-DEV
Deterrent feature of the emergency brake.
5.4.2
GMRT2044
Four
Braking System Requirements and
Performance for Multiple Units
15-076-DEV
Class 700 Enhanced Emergency Brake
Rate.
Hitachi Class 800/801/ 802 vehicles, to be
used on Great Western and East Coast
services. This deviation is for a project
requiring authorisation for placing in service
under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
Class 700 'Thameslink EMU' and all its
subclasses. This deviation is for a project
requiring authorisation for placing in service
under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
GKRT0045
Four
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
15-074-DEV
Non-provision of approach controls on ER6
signal at Rochester.
GCRT5212
One
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
Clearances
15-071-DEV
Amendment to deviation 14/174/DEV
against GC/RT5212 Issue 1 for trialling of
platform gap fillers on Heathrow Central
Terminal Area (CTA) Platforms 1 and 2,
Terminal 4 (T4) Platforms 1 and 2 and
Terminal 5 (T5) Platforms 3 and 4.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
Signal DM3: Signal DM3 cannot be moved
due to the limited length of the Up Platform
with the crossover at the far end which
cannot be moved. A timer delaying the
aspect on signal DM3 already exists. The
estimated £550k cost of relocating the
Signal is disproportionate to the limited
safety benefits realised. Signal DM11: The
estimated £550k cost of relocating the
Signal is disproportionate to the limited
safety benefits realised.
Trains may be delayed and drivers may be
less willing to commence an emergency
brake application until they are sure that
such an application is required. Currently,
no deterrent is fitted to the High Speed Train
(HST) 125 fleets.
5.4.1
Class 700 is equipped with an emergency
braking system of high integrity. The
importance of the emergency brake system
is to being failsafe and stopping the train
safely within the shortest possible distance.
To achieve this aim, the Class 700
emergency braking system uses the
adhesion coefficient in the best possible way
as set out within Technical Specification for
Interoperability Locomotives and Passenger
Rolling Stock (TSI Loc and Pas)
2011/291/EU. TSI Loc and Pas therefore
defines adhesion coefficient limits, which are
considered best practice. That Class 700
has a high integrity emergency brake system
is also confirmed by the measured stopping
distance curves (Figures 8. 7-28 - EB at tare
load, 8. 7-38 - EB at full load and 8. 7-48 EB at crush load of Extract of Test report
EN2 A6Z00037908793 000 -) complying to
curve B3 of Figure 3 in GM/RT 2044 Issue 4.
Regards Appendix A of this standard curve
B3 is considered as the maximum desirable
retardation in order to reduce the possibility
of wheelslide. Regards full service braking
the aim is considered to best possibly meet
curve A3 of Figure 3 of the standard in order
to meet the stopping distances required by
signal spacing margins. A3 defines the
5.2.2.1
Deviation applies to ER6 signal at Rochester As part of the East Kent Resignalling Phase
only.
2 (EKR2) Project, the Rochester area is to
be extensively remodelled to facilitate the
replacement of the existing station with a
new one approximately 500 m nearer to
London. The remodelling is to be delivered
in stages and, as part of one of these, it was
necessary to relocate ER6 signal 170 m in
rear of its previous position in order to allow
for future relocation of one of the sets of
points which it reads over (60 points for
access to the Down Siding). ER6 signal at
Rochester is a three-aspect junction signal
on the Down Main with the following routes:
A(S) - into Down Siding,B(M) - into Down
Platform Loop - via a 15mph
divergence,C(M) - along Down Main 30mph line speed. As the existing
difference in line speeds between the B(M)
and C(M) routes is 15 mph, achieving
compliance with the requirements of
GK/RT0045 would require one of the
following options to be implemented:
Increase permissible speed of divergence
over 67 points into the Down Platform Loop
to 20 mph or greater (to achieve compliant
Junction Method 1: Unrestricted Aspect
Sequence). Reduce permissible line speed
on the Down Main to 25 mph (to achieve
C2.1, Table 2 - Categorisation of clearances Deviation 14/174/DEV was granted to allow Clause C2 Table 2 provides definition of
for absolute gauging. G4.1 - Alterations
the trialling of platform gap fillers on CTA
normal/reduced/special reduced clearances
other than to permit the passage of larger
Platforms 1 and 2 until the 15/01/2017. The in the lower sector. Clause G4. 1 states that
rail vehicles.
amendment that is being sought under the
alterations to infrastructure should not cause
current submission is to Deviation
reduction of clearances from one category to
14/174/DEV. It seeks to bring all HEx
a more severe (smaller clearance) category.
platform gap filler trials, the ones ongoing on The current platforms clearances comply
T5 Platform 4 and those proposed at CTA,
with the RGS requirements. In every
as well as the newly proposed trials for T4
platform (including T5 Platform 4 before
Platforms 1 and 2 and T3 Platform 5, under June 2014), there have been instances of
14/174/DEV with a synchronised finish date passengers, especially those with a small
of all trials in January 2017. "Supporting
foot size, stepping between the platform and
Document 1" attached to this deviation
the Class 332 and Class 360/2 step plate
amendment gives further details. The
and getting their foot/leg trapped.
impact of the gap filler installation is to
reduce nominal clearance between vehicles
and the infrastructure from normal clearance
to 25 mm-50 mm (I. e. reduced clearance).
The gap filler is, however, flexible and
effective clearance remains greater than this
nominal value. The clearance rules of
GC/RT5212 Issue 1, however, do not
recognise the possibility of such flexible
components, and deviation is therefore
necessary. The trial will be conducted up till
31/01/2017 to allow for sufficient trial time
and data gathering to demonstrate that the
gap filler achieves a safety benefit and the
installation is robust under the operating
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Signal DM3: The SPAD risk at DM3 was
assessed to be relatively high, the main
causes being: o The short safe overrun
distance (14. 5m). o The short standback
distance (less than 10m for passenger
trains). o Trains normally approaching the
crossing before the sequence has initiated
and the crossing receiving high use by the
public. Therefore, in the event of a SPAD, it
is likely that the road and footway over the
crossing would be occupied. The high risk
was despite the existing SPAD controls,
which include: o Signal DM3 is approach
controlled from the previous signal DM2
(when DM3 is at danger). o The previous
signal (DM2) is protected with both TSS and
Overspeed Sensor System (OSS). o Signal
DM3 is protected by TPWS TSS. Providing
SPAD prediction was found to be the most
cost-effective solution of those examined
and therefore most effective at mitigating the
risk. The cost of the option is approximately
£100k. Signal DM11: The SPAD risk at
DM11 was assessed to be low, the reasons
for this are: o The signal is only normally
approached once per day during normal
operation and very rarely during degraded
operations, where the signal could be
approached with a shunt move at low speed.
No foreseen impact on this point. TSI
requirement has been defined in order to
meet the essential requirement 2. 4. 1
(Rolling Stock/Safety) and 2. 4. 3 (Technical
compatibility) of the Interoperability Directive
(2008/57/EC).
There are no impacts on the risks that are
addressed by Clause 5. 4. 1. The risks are
identified as: Wheel slide by provision of too
much brake force leading to exceeding the
adhesion limits. Wheel slide then would be
resulting in longer stopping distances and
damage to wheel and also damage to rail
which is less likely. => Risk is controlled by
complying with TSI Loc and Pas
2011/291/EU and the adhesion limits
defined within this standard and meeting
braking curve B3 of GM/RT2044 Issue 4
Figure 3. => Risk is further mitigated by the
provision of a highly reliable Wheel slide
protection system. Providing to less
additional brake force, not enabling the
driver to react on misjudgement or in case of
emergency appropriately. => Risk is
controlled by providing at least 15%
enhancement on the brake performance.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
02/11/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Control Command and Signalling
Lead SC Approval Date
01/10/2015
Deviation Status
Current
Hitachi Rail Europe Ltd
16/10/2015
N/A
Rolling Stock
01/10/2015
Current
Govia Thameslink Railway
16/10/2015
N/A
Rolling Stock
01/10/2015
Current
The permissible speed differential is 15
mph which is only 5 mph greater than
GK/RT0045 permits and the maximum line
speed is only 30 mph. The sighting of the
new position of ER6 signal is constrained by
the viaduct over the River Medway on the
approach to the signal and the signal has
been assessed as being visible for 158 m on
approach which exceeds the minimum
reading distance by 30%. The Automatic
Warning System (AWS) magnet for the
signal has been positioned at the point at
which the signal becomes visible. It is
considered that the driver shall have
sufficient time to comprehend the signal
indication to enable him to control the speed
of the train appropriately. As ER6 B(M) will
only ever clear to a yellow aspect, the driver
will always receive an AWS warning when
taking the diverging route which should also
assist in controlling the speed. Dialogue
with Southeastern has identified that, with an
unrestricted approach to ER6, it would be
expected that a train would approach the
signal at the full line speed of 30 mph. The
signal is 657 m from the divergence and the
gradient profile between these two points is
level (for 7 m), then falls at 1 in 167 for 463
m before rising at 1 in 180 to the divergence.
The impacts of the proposed gap filler have
been more fully detailed in the supporting
documents attached. In summary, the gap
filler trial is expected to: Improve passenger
safety on T4 Platforms 1 and 2 and T5
Platforms 3 (in addition to T5 Platform 4 and
CTA Platforms 1 and 2 as already covered
in other deviations). Maintain acceptable
train / platform clearances, as demonstrated
in the trials ongoing on Heathrow T5
Platform 4, whilst not affecting technical
compatibility of the railway system through
the reduction in normal clearance
arrangements. The gap fillers can be
removed if railway requirements change in
the future, or if the trial proves to be
unsuccessful. Have no effect on service
performance. Have no direct impact on
environment. Supporting documentation
attached to this report discusses the details
including the risk assessment.
Network Rail
02/11/2015
01/08/2016
Control Command and Signalling
01/10/2015
Current
Heathrow Airport Limited on
behalf of, Heathrow Express
Limited
16/10/2015
31/01/2017
Infrastructure
09/09/2015
Current
Page 14
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0075
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
Certificate Number
15-070-DEV
Title
Shenfield, Down Main line deceleration
distance to diverging points.
RGS Clause
3.2.3.3, 3.2.3.4
Scope
Position of Advance Warning Indicator
(AWI) in relation to 2255A points, Down
Main, ELR LTN at 19 miles 11 chains.
GKRT0045
Four
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
15-069-DEV
Swansea - PT3158 Differential in
permissible speed exceeds the
requirements for approach-release-free
(MAF) junction signalling.
5.2.2
The deviation applies to PT3158 signal at
Swansea Loop East Junction, controlled
from Wales Railway Operating Centre
(ROC).
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-068-DEV
New waiting shelter(s), clearance to platform 6.2.2 b)
edge(s).
This deviation from RGS relates to
horizontal clearance between the platform
edge(s) and proposed new waiting shelter at
the station listed below: Trefforest Estate,
TRE CAM 09m 53ch. Office of Rail and
Road (ORR) Passenger Figures 227,933.
Arriva Trains Wales / Network Rail is
proposing to replace the existing waiting
shelter. Site constraints do not allow for the
installation of the new proposed shelters to
achieve the RGS.
GMRT2141
Three
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over
15-067-DEV
Class 321 reduction in trailer vehicle rollover angle to 18.0 degrees.
2.4.1.1 b)
All Class 321 trailer vehicles that have
completed their mid-life refurbishment.
GMRT2130
Four
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
15-066-DEV
Class 387 - Compliance to GM/RT2130
Issue 4.
All clauses.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
Provision of the AWI at the distance
prescribed by Appendix X of GK/RT0075 or
positioning the AWI at the next available
position 180 m on approach to the flashing
double yellow signal was discounted by the
Signal Sighting Committee because it would
dissociate the warning indicator from the
flashing aspect indicated to the driver.
Appendix X of GK/RT0075 uses the worst
case braking (Appendix A) which is not
reflective of the majority of trains that will be
using this route and 86 m at 75 mph is
equivalent to only approximately 2. 5
seconds of running time, which would have
only a small impact on the overall
deceleration profile. The deficiency
represents only approximately 6% of the
calculated AWI positioning distance.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Existing signal spacing is deficient to
Network Rail
GK/RT/0075 and is mitigated by application
of controls, essentially a YY-YY-Y-R aspect
sequence. The proposed flashing aspect
sequence of FYY-FY-(Y+Pos 1) and
provision of AWI positioned at the FYY
signal does not provide deceleration
distance in accordance with Table X of
GK/RT/0075. The driver will be alerted on
the approach to the AWI as the train passes
over the shared Automatic Warning System
(AWS) magnet which is located 180 m on
the approach. As the AWI has an
Achievable Reading Distance of 161 m
(please refer to the AWI Sighting Form), this
distance more than compensates for the
deficiency of 86 m in the required distance
between the AWI and the diverging route
speed indicator as the driver would, most
likely, commence braking once the AWI
becomes visible instead of when it is
reached.
The difference between the permissible
All trains will be starting from rest at
Network Rail
speeds of the straight ahead and diverging Swansea station. The Permanent Speed
routes through and immediately beyond the Restriction (PSR) across the station throat is
junction is 10 mph or less. Compliance is
20 mph. This steps up to 40 mph 267 m on
possible. However, in discussion with Train approach to PT3158. By this time, the signal
Operating Company (TOC) / Freight
is in view. Considering the reading distance
Operating Company (FOC) driver
and the lack of time to accelerate, it was
representatives and Network Rail schemes considered unnecessary to apply Main
experts during scheme plan development, it Aspect Red (MAR) as this would condition
was considered desirable to perpetuate the drivers to anticipate the aspect stepping up
current arrangements of free aspect, given
on approach as it would be unusual for this
the specific geography of the site with all
signal to be at red. This arrangement is
trains starting from rest.
consistent with the equivalent existing signal
PT281 for which no Signals Passed at
Danger (SPADs) are recorded.
Certificate Issue Date
07/10/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
03/09/2015
Deviation Status
Current
07/10/2015
N/A
CCS
03/09/2015
Current
The existing waiting shelter at the named
station is within 2500 mm of the platform
edge(s). The existing shelter is 1. 82 m
(upside) from the platform edge and 2. 08 m
(downside) from the platform edge. The
existing shelter is 1. 62 m in width,
measured from the outside of each post and
excluding any overhang from the roof. The
proposed new shelter is 1. 60 m in width,
measured from the outside of each post and
excluding any overhang from the roof; the
overhang of the roof is 0. 20 m to both sides
measured 2. 50 m above platform level.
The overhang of the proposed roof is not
allowed for in the calculation of the setback
from the platform edge as it achieves RGS
No. GI/RT7016 Clause 8. 1. 1 b) issue five,
Platform Headroom.
The new style shelter is a product in the
Arriva Trains Wales
latest range of high quality vandal resistant
waiting shelters. The shelters offer no
visible fixings, seating, high efficiency
internal LED lighting system, concealed
drainage and modular glazing. The existing
shelter, which has reduced horizontal offsets
from the edge of platform(s) at 1. 82 m on
the Up and 2. 08 m on the down has been in
place for a number of years and no
operational issues with regards to their
proximity to the platform edge has come to
light. The existing shelter has no internal
lighting or Close Circuit Television (CCTV)
provision and a mix of solid window or
missing panels. Cross-sections illustrating
the existing and proposed arrangement for
distances from the edge of the platform are
shown below.
11/12/2015
N/A
Infrastructure
11/11/2015
Current
The reduction in roll-over angle would
ESG Ltd
permit the introduction of air conditioning
and PRM refurbishment. Provision of the full
reduction of 3 degrees (from 21 to 18
degrees) would enable the suspension to be
optimised to minimise any reduction in ride
comfort as a result of these modifications.
There is no desire to reduce the roll-over
angle below the 18 degrees which is
considered to have been proven to be safe.
12/08/2015
31/12/2016
RST
N/A
Current
It is considered that there is no negative
Bombardier Transportation
impact from complying with GM/RT2130
Issue 3 and the SRT TSI instead of
GM/RT2130 Issue 4. An assessment of the
differences between GM/RT2130 Issue 3
and Issue 4, with respect to any safety
benefits and technical compatibility of the
railway system, is documented in
Bombardier report 3EER400019-0846_B.
Within this report, the implications of
applying the revised requirements of
GM/RT2130 Issue 4 to the Class 387 design
is also discussed; the level of assessment
involved is extensive and does not introduce
any safety benefits or have any effect on the
ability of the vehicles to meet the essential
requirements. The Office of Rail and Road
(ORR) previously issued a letter accepting
the use of the superseded Issue 3 of
GM/RT2130 for the authorisation of the
original Class 387/1 vehicles (base design),
on the basis of the justifications presented
within Bombardier report 3EER4000190846_B. The base design for the vehicles
within the scope of this application has been
authorised as compliant to the requirements
of the SRT TSI (4 minutes running
capability) and the requirements of
GM/RT2130 Issue 3, as supported by
18/09/2015
N/A
RST
28/08/2015
Current
Vehicles shall be designed with mass
distribution and suspension characteristics
which ensure the capability to run round
smooth curves at constant speed, without
rolling over, at not less than 21ø cant
deficiency. Currently, the design for the
Eversholt Class 321 fleet mid-life
refurbishment is nearing completion. This
will bring the unit into line with Persons with
Reduced Mobility (PRM) requirements,
provide additional passenger standee room
by opening up the vestibules and introduce
air conditioning units above the vestibules to
improve passenger comfort (along with
several other smaller changes as
documented in the attached System
Requirements Specification, TS-140129-007
Issue L). As part of the work, the impact on
vehicle dynamics has been assessed and
documented in the attached Interfleet report
(ITLR-T35919-001). As may be seen in the
report, the air conditioning and
refurbishment add mass in the tare
condition. The placement of the air
conditioning units in the roof above the
vestibules also increases the vertical C of G.
On top of this, the additional mass of
increased numbers of standees compounds
the issue. The increase in mass and vertical
· 27 four-car Class 387/2 Electric Multiple
The vehicles within the scope of this
Units (EMUs) (units 387201 to 387227) · 8
application were identified as options for
four-car Class 387/1 EMUs (units 387130 to additional vehicles on the contract for the
387137). All these units are an option for
supply of Class 387/1 vehicles (recently
additional vehicles on the original Class
authorised to be placed into service in June
387/1 contract (units 387101 - 387129). This 2015), which have now been exercised. The
deviation is for projects requiring
contract for the authorised Class 387/1
authorisation for placing in service under the vehicles was signed in July 2013, prior to the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011. GM/RT2130 Issue 4 application date. As
additional vehicles to the Class 387/1
contract, the vehicles within the scope of this
application are of a carry-over design. The
production of these additional vehicles has
commenced. The applications for
authorisation of the vehicles will be
predicated on conformity with the authorised
Class 387/1 type, under Regulation 9 of the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
To demonstrate compliance with
GM/RT2130 Issue 4 would require a
significant assessment of the established
Electrostar design. The timescales involved
with demonstrating compliance will place
the delivery of both projects at risk, and
result in significant additional costs.
Page 15
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8000-TW1
RGS Issue Number
Nine
RGS Title
Preparation and movement of trains
Certificate Number
15-065-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
Operation of Network Rail Infrastructure
4.4
Maintenance Unit (IMU) train with Ultrasonic
Test Unit (UTU) brakes isolated.
Scope
The deviation is sought against Clause 4. 4
to permit UTU trains consisted with
ultrasonic test cars in their formation to run
with brakes isolated. Specifically, the
deviation applies to five test cars numbered
as follows: 62384, 62287, 999606, 999602
and 999605. These vehicles are operated
throughout the UK rail network. There are,
at the present time, five UTU trains in
service, each containing one of the above
numbered vehicles. Notable features of the
ultrasonic test cars are: · The test cars have
one unbraked bogie; · They are equipped
with a full set of emergency equipment; ·
They are equipped with six wheels scotches.
UTU test cars are certificated to run in any
formation, but must not be the rear vehicle at
any time. The requirement to meet the
reduced speed requirements above must
still be complied with (table as specified in
GE/RT8000/TW1 Issue 9, Clause 4. 4). The
maximum authorised speed of UTU trains is
75 mph. When testing, the UTU train will
run at maximum speed of 30 mph.
Nature and Degree
Compliance with the RGS standard leads to
problems with wheelflats on the test cars,
particularly in the potentially low adhesion
periods. The non-availability of the test cars
puts the UTU testing plan in jeopardy,
leading to potential railhead damage and the
potential for rail non-compliance issues.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The impact of the alternative provision will
Colas Rail Ltd
be to ensure that the UTU testing plan is
maintained as planned, vehicle availability is
maintained, vehicle maintenance costs are
reduced through reduced wheelset damage,
resulting in a benefit to the operational
railway nationally. Safety issues have been
addressed by ensuring that the required
brake force for the consisted train is
available at all times, introducing additional
vehicles into the consist if required and also
compliance with the reduction in train speed
above 35 mph, 10 mph reduction in speed
up to and including 75 mph. The revised
working arrangements will be subject to a
traincrew briefing. The issued train list will
reflect the fact that there is an unbraked
UTU test car in formation.
Certificate Issue Date
10/08/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
TOM
Lead SC Approval Date
N/A
Deviation Status
Current
GKRT0045
Four
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
15-064-DEV
Flashing aspects for K531 signal at Potters
Bar.
5.2.3.1 and Table 2
Signal K531, control by Kings Cross PSB.
The route is from the Down Fast to Down
Slow lines through points 2182 crossover
reverse to the south of Potters Bar station.
Compliance would either require an
increase in crossover speed to a minimum
of 40 mph, or retaining the approach release
from red of K531. The current control
causes trains proceeding from the Fast to
Slow line to decelerate with K531 at red
before releasing the aspect to proceed over
2182 crossover. It is not currently possible
to change the line speed over the junction to
40 mph (from 30 mph) which would allow
the flashing aspect from 115 mph to 40 mph
which would be compliant with the clause
because this would require relaying the
junction.
Network Rail
03/09/2015
N/A
CCS
06/08/2015
Current
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
15-062-DEV
Positioning of Signal T645 at 22.3 m from
Plumpton level crossing.
2.1.1.3
Positioning of Signal T645 at 22. 3 m from
Plumpton level crossing.
Complying with requirements of
GK/RT0192 Section 2. 1. 13(a) will require
repositioning of Signal T645 that will result in
reduction of the platform length. This will
also require signal sighting of the
repositioned signal, review of inter-signal
spacings, platform extension on London end
of Platform 2 or provision of Selective Door
Operations (SDOs). As signal T645 has no
Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) history
and repositioning of signal will involve
expenditure of approximately œ400K in the
remedial works, this option is not
economically justifiable. Complying with the
requirements of GK/RT0192 section 2. 1. 1.
3(b) will require holding Signal T643 at 'ON'
until the level crossing is closed to road
traffic. This restriction on Signal T643 will
result in increased downtime of Plumpton
level crossing barriers, causing unwanted
disruption to road traffic that is likely to
trigger misuse and trespass of the level
crossing when the barriers are down for a
long time.
Network Rail
03/09/2015
N/A
CCS
06/08/2015
Current
GMRT2461
One
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and on- track Machines
15-061-DEV
Automatic sanding on trailing units with
automatic detection of low adhesion (using
Wheel Slide Protection (WSP)).
6.2, 9.1, 9.3.1
All multiple units with automatic sanders,
where the means of detection of low
adhesion is from a wheel slide detection,
whether running alone, or in multiple. NB:
this is intended to include all units with
automatic sanders, where the means of
detection of low adhesion is from a wheel
slide detection, that are operating as trailing
units even if the leading unit is a tread
braked unit with manual sanders or a unit
with no sanders fitted.
The deviation requests enhanced
performance, which is non-compliant with
the standard as written, but consistent with
the objectives of the standard.
Signal K531 has only one diverging route on
to the Down Slow line and therefore the risk
of misreading the routing information is
reduced when receiving a flashing aspect
sequence and reduces the Signal Passed at
Danger (SPAD) risk from anticipation. The
crossing line speed is 30 mph which is
under the requirement minimum line speed
of 40 mph for flashing aspect controls from
the approaching line speed 115 mph. In
order to manage the over-speed risk at the
junction, a permissible speed warning
indicator and associated Automatic Warning
System (AWS) for the diverging speed will
be provided on approach to the signal
displaying the flashing yellow aspect, which
will remind drivers of the junction speed.
There is a perceived risk with the existing
layout that trains will accelerate towards the
crossover after the signal clears as the
crossover is 700 m from K531. The flashing
aspect sequence will reduce the current
requirement for drivers to accelerate
towards the crossover after receiving a
delayed aspect release on the junction
signal. An existing deficiency has been
found during the signal sighting assessment,
which will be resolved with the provision of a
new, right hand mounted K531.
Signal T645 has no Signal Passed at
Danger (SPAD) history, and provision of
Stowmarket control as part of the project will
further enhance the safety of level crossing
users. As such, the severity/degree of the
proposed variation has been considered as
low as per the risk assessment report. A
risk assessment has been carried out to
identify the risks and find out additional
protection required. Following actions will
be taken to comply with the
recommendations of the risk assessment
report and provide additional protection, if
required: Monitoring of post-commissioning
frequency of Signal T645 being worked in
manual mode and frequency of activation of
Stowmarket control shall be implemented as
per recommendations of risk assessment
report. Observation of post-commissioning
behaviour of crossing users with respect to
level crossing closure warnings, and
Stowmarket control warnings shall be
recorded as per recommendations of risk
assessment report. Initiation of lowering of
the level crossing barriers, along with
activation of Stowmarket controls, will be
implemented if found to be necessary as a
result of risk assessment of the observations
in items above.
Sand will be permitted to be dispensed on
trailing units during any brake application
(service or emergency) when the leading
vehicle of that unit automatically the
presence of low adhesion (Clause 6. 1
already permits sanding on the leading unit
for any brake application when the presence
of low adhesion is automatically detected).
As such, trailing units will only dispense
sand if they detect the presence of low
adhesion using their own local wheel slide
protection system and have sufficient sand
available. The likelihood of sanding on
trailing units occurring is lower, as the
sanding by the leading unit will condition the
railhead and so the trailing units are likely to
experience wheel slide to a lesser extent.
This functionality has been developed to
increase the safety of the railway in
conditions of extremely poor rail head
adhesion or where the sanding system on
the leading unit does not function correctly
(due to a fault or having run out of sand),
having a positive impact on overall system
performance. The amount of sand
deposited and the number of axles following
the deposition point will be the same as if
the units were separate trains following each
other. Therefore, it is considered that there
Association of Train Operating 05/10/2015
Companies (ATOC)
N/A
RST
28/08/2015
Current
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Page 16
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2461
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and on- track Machines
Certificate Number
15-060-DEV
Title
Sanding on trailing units with manual
sanders.
RGS Clause
9.1, 9.3.1
Scope
All multiple units with manual sanders.
Nature and Degree
The deviation requests enhanced
performance, which is non-compliant with
the standard as written, but consistent with
the objectives of the standard.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Certificate Issue Date
Sand will be permitted to be dispensed on Association of Train Operating 18/09/2015
trailing tread braked units when sanding is
Companies (ATOC)
initiated by the driver on the leading unit and
automatically during an emergency brake
application. This functionality has been
developed to increase the safety of the
railway in conditions of extremely poor rail
head adhesion or where the sanding system
on the leading unit does not function
correctly (due to a fault or having run out of
sand), having a positive impact on overall
system performance. The amount of sand
deposited and the number of axles following
the deposition point will be the same as if
the units were separate trains following each
other. Therefore, it is considered that there
is no negative impact in terms of
contamination of the railhead, the associated
monitoring regime will be used to confirm
this on the routes over which these trains will
operate. The RSSB T1046 research project
suggests that the improvements in adhesion
achieved would give safety and operational
benefits that significantly outweigh any
possible reduction in the ability of track
circuits to detect trains.
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
28/08/2015
Deviation Status
Current
GKRT0045
Five
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
15-059-DEV
Henwick signals HK22.
5.1.2.4
Henwick signal HK22.
Compliance with the standard is considered
to present a potentially more confusing
indication to train drivers on this route who
are familiar with the current semaphore
arrangements.
GMRT2149
Three
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
the Size of Railway Vehicle
15-058-DEV
Class 700 (Thameslink EMU) Pantograph
Sway.
B10.1
Class 700 'Thameslink EMU' and all its
subclasses. This deviation is for a project
requiring authorisation for placing in service
under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
Class 700 fully complies with sub-clause a).
Class 700 fully complies with sub-clause b)
for a wind speed up to 26 m/s and cant
deficiency of 150 mm or wind speeds up to
35 m/s and cant deficiency of 65 mm. Class
700 does not fulfil the area of 26 m/s to 35
m/s at cant deficiency of 150 mm and
maximum speed.
GMRT2473
Two
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
15-057-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Door Control (Issue 2).
B5.3 B6.1 B7.5.2, B 7.5.3, B 7.5.4 B7.6,
B11.4 B7.10 B10.1 B11.2, B11.3, B11.5
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs). Unit numbers: · 399201 - 399207.
Vehicle numbers: · 99001 - 99007; · 99101 99107; · 99201 - 99207.
GKRT0075
Three
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
15-056-DEV
Down Cannon Street line country side of
3.3.1.4 a)
London Bridge High Level. Non-provision of
Permissible Speed Warning Indicator
(PSWI) and associated Automatic Warning
System (AWS) for existing 60 to 40
Permanent Speed Restriction (PSR).
The proposed approach maintains
consistency with current aspects for through
trains and makes it more obvious to trains
routed into the turnback. This approach has
been adopted on the advice of professional
railway and train operators. An assessment
of the risk arising from this non-compliance
has been provided separately. This
configuration will mitigate against the risk of
the route indicator failing and a main
proceed aspect along being displayed
(suggesting the through route) with the route
actually set for the dead-end turnback road.
The proposed arrangements are envisaged
to build upon the existing driver knowledge
for this area. As part of the Henwick
turnback scheme, existing motor worked
semaphore signals HK22 and HK23 are to
be provided with a Site Instruction (SI) to
allow trains to be routed into the turnback
road. For trains passing HK23, both routes
have a linespeed of 40 mph at the point of
divergence, although the turnout route
subsequently drops to 15 mph for the
entrance into the turnback road. Trains
passing HK22 continue at a linespeed of 40
mph, which reduced to 15 mph for both
routes at the point of divergence. To avoid
confusion for drivers and make it clearer that
The deviation has no impact on the train
design as the train is designed in its safest
way. The changed approach considers the
basics of the new draft standard as laid out
in T942. The report T942 is the basis for
GM/RT2173 on panto sway; we've worked to
the same principles and the same goal but
being a bit more conservative. We've also
assessed the 35 m/s curves from the report
which are not incorporated in GM/RT2173.
Regarding Figure E. 2 of the new draft
standard, we have an additional safety
margin as we meet the pantograph sway
requirement +190 mm at cant deficiency 150
mm and 160 kph not only for maximum wind
speed of 22 m/s but also for 26 m/s.
Discussions have been held with the
Notified Body (NoBo), and they confirm that
the methodology in T942 (which they also
considered to be valid) has been correctly
applied by Siemens.
The door arrangement is provided in
accordance with EN14752: 2005, which is a
recognised standard widely accepted across
Europe to control the risks associated with
passenger doors. See Appendix for more
details.
There is currently an existing 40 PSR on the
Down Cannon Street line on approach to the
Old Spa Road station just prior to the 2M3/4
mile post. It is understood that this PSR has
been in place for over 40 years due to track
alignment reasons. The speed on approach
to the 40 PSR is 60 mph. The 60 PSR
begins approximately 900 m on approach.
Prior to the 60 PSR, the line speed is 20
mph through London Bridge station. As part
of Thameslink Stage HL05, the existing very
old and unclear 60 PSR boards outside the
station are being replaced and moved on to
the nearest gantry to aid sighting. In
addition to this L121 signal which is two
signal sections in rear of the 40 PSR on the
affected Down Cannon Street line is also
being relocated on to the next gantry. It
should be noted that, ultimately, this stage
does not change the existing speed profile.
There is no existing PSWI or AWS for this
existing 60 to 40 mph speed reduction. The
addition of a PSWI and associated AWS
within two short signal sections will provide
an unnecessary cab task and distraction
over such a well-known speed profile.
There is also no realistic position to place a
PSWI board or AWS from a sighting
perspective. The stage scheme has been
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
The tram-train vehicles are being built to an
existing design that complies with European
standards. Replacement of the door system
with an RGS-compliant system would
require significant re-engineering of the
vehicle design.
Down Cannon Street line country side of
The provision of PSWI and associated
London Bridge High Level. Non-Provision of suppressed permanent AWS inductor would
permissible speed warning indicator and
be required in a complex area of track.
associated AWS for existing 60 to 40 PSR. Train Operating Companies (TOCs) have
expressed concern at this provision and feel
this would import risk of confusion to driver
task demands. The speed profile for nonfreight trains remains unchanged from today
and has been like this for over 40 years.
The relevant TOCs (South Eastern and
Govia Thameslink Railway (GTR)) have
been contacted about the proposal and have
confirmed that they would object to a change
to the existing PSR arrangements on the
Down Cannon Street line on the basis that it
would likely lead to driver confusion. Risks
associated with PSWI non-provision are
minimal. Network Rail operations and the
TOCs have been informed of the proposal to
not provide an additional PSWI board and
fully support this on the basis that it would
likely increase the risk of driver distraction
and therefore increase the risk of a signal
misread.
Network Rail
03/09/2015
N/A
CCS
06/08/2015
Current
Govia Thameslink Railway
Limited
18/09/2015
N/A
Rolling Stock
28/08/2015
Current
Stagecoach Supertram
02/09/2015
N/A
RST
24/07/2015
Current
Network Rail
29/07/2015
23/12/2017
CCS
09/07/2015
Current
Page 17
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2400
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Engineering Design of On-track Machines in 15-055-DEV
Running Mode
Title
RGS Clause
Automatic reset of air release parking brake 2.3.2.3
actuator.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Borders Rail Project - ELR: SBO, Galashiels 2.1.2
Platform.
GMRT2472
Two
Requirements for Data Recorders on Trains 15-051-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Data Recorder, Issue
1.
2.1.1
GMRT2045
Three
Braking Principles for Rail Vehicles
15-050-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Braking Principles,
Issue 3.
7.2.3, 7.4.3
GERT8075
One
AWS andTPWS Interface Requirements
15-049-DEV
Fitment of Train Protection Warning System 6.2.1.1, 6.2.1.2, 6.2.1.3
(TWPS) to control units compliant with
GE/RT8030 Issue 2 to Virgin Trains (West
Coast) Fleets.
GMRT2141
Three
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over
15-047-DEV
Class 465/9 Trailer Open Standard Lavatory 2.4.1.1 b)
(TOSL) reduction in roll-over angle to 19.3
degrees.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
15-052-DEV
Scope
Nature and Degree
The deviation application applies to seven
This clause references BS EN 14033-1:
vehicles of six different types (as detailed
2011, Clause 9. 2. 5. 2. BS EN 14033-1:
below) that are to be used for erection of
2011 Clause 9. 2. 5. 2 states: "Any spring
Overhead Line Electrification (OLE)
apply air release parking brake actuator
equipment (other than the masts). These
shall be provided with a mechanical release,
vehicles are existing vehicles that have been accessible from the outside. It shall be
manufactured by SVI S. p. A in Citt… di
possible to operate such a release from a
Castello, Italy, a company dedicated to the
convenient position with consideration of the
manufacture of on-track plant, and are:
risk of contact with an electrified rail of the
Traction Unit RT 250: Self-propelled and
infrastructure. The parking brake actuators
hauling vehicle with cab and crane; EVN No: shall reset automatically by filling with
99 70 9231 001-7. Wagon with four
compressed air. The parking brake
tensioning drums CG002A; unpowered, and actuators shall still be capable of manual
semi-permanently connect to the: EVN No: release even when the full service brake is
99 70 9231 002-5. Wagon with four
applied. The vehicles were designed and
hydraulic drums CG002B; also unpowered; fitted with WABCO "Trainstop" parking
currently fitted with a crane that will be
brakes which do not have an automatic reset
removed. EVN No: 99 70 9231 003-3.
option after the parking brake has been
Elevated self-propelled platform PT 500; self- released. The parking brakes are of an
propelled mobile elevated working platform automatic spring-applied type. These
with wire-positioning arm. EVN No: 99 70
parking brakes are released (if required) by
9231 004-1. Elevated self-propelled
using a screw fixture on the end on the
platform RSM 9; self-propelled mobile
cylinder, and can only be reset by manually
elevated working platform; two in the
screwing the release fixture in the reverse
consist. EVN Nos: 99 70 9231 005-8 and
direction. The vehicles were designed to be
99 70 9231 006-6. APV 250; self-propelled fitted with the existing braking system, and
and hauling vehicle with mobile elevated
to fit an alternative brake would involve an
working platform and measuring
underframe re-design and modification,
pantograph. EVN No: 99 70 9231 007-4.
including structural changes to the
Borders Rail Project - ELR: SBO,
There is a requirement within the standard
Galashiels Platform.
that station platforms shall not be located on
horizontal curves with radii less than 1000 m
unless the particular geographical
characteristics of the potential sites and the
characteristics of the railway infrastructure at
the proposed location of the platform do not
provide a reasonable opportunity for
achieving this. In October 2014, Transport
Scotland requested that the project was to
construct the future passive provision for
nine-car trains as part of the current works.
This resulted in a non-compliance of 70 m at
the southern end of the 215 m long platform.
The 70 m starts at the south end of the
platform on a 632 m radius, which then
transitions to a straight platform over a 35 m
length. The introduction of a reduced
horizontal radii curve through the station will
not have an impact on the operational and
safe running of the railway. A sketch of the
proposed track alignment is enclosed.
Network Rail and ScotRail have jointly
agreed that the risks associated with the
proposed deviation from GI/RT7016 are
tolerable: they do not warrant any additional
measures to be introduced to allow safe
train dispatch as the conductor has full
visibility of all doors.
This application relates to a total of seven
Activation of the emergency egress device is
three-car tram-train Electric Multiple Units
recorded on the On Train Monitoring
(EMUs). Unit numbers: · 399201 - 399207. Recorder (OTMR). Activation of the
Vehicle numbers: · 99001 - 99007; · 99101 - passenger communication system is
99107; · 99201 - 99207.
proposed not to be recorded on the OTMR.
This application relates to a total of seven
Operation of the passenger communication
three-car tram-train Electric Multiple Units
device does not initiate a brake application.
(EMUs). Unit numbers: · 399201 - 399207. The tram-train is fitted with different brake
Vehicle numbers: · 99001 - 99007; · 99101 - operating modes compared to mainline
99107; · 99201 - 99207.
vehicles.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The impact of the alternative provision is a SGS CORREL Rail Ltd
negligible risk. The parking brake will only
be manually wound off in an emergency
recovery situation by specialised staff. In
these specialised and very rare occasions, it
will be necessary for the recovery staff to
manually remove the mechanical device
used to wind-off the parking brake when
parking the vehicles after they have been
recovered. This is documented in the
recovery procedures they will be following
and poses no greater risk in that situation
than a vehicle with a manual handbrake that
needs to wound on. The same deviation has
been given to Plasser (reference
15/002/DEV).
Certificate Issue Date
02/09/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
24/07/2015
Deviation Status
Current
The proposed station is to be located in
Network Rail
Galashiels town centre and is to be
constructed adjacent to the new transport
bus interchange being constructed by the
local authority. This is in accordance with
the requirements of the legislation on which
the project is based (I. e. the Waverley
Railway (Scotland) Act 2006). The Act
provides powers for the compulsory
purchase of land, as identified within it, for
the sole purpose of constructing of the
railway. The horizontal alignment follows
the former track solum and the associated
land available (I. e. limit of deviation) as
defined in the Waverley Act and does not
offer any credible alternatives to the
horizontal radius proposed. The alignment
is further constrained by an existing retaining
wall on the East side of the track and a
public road on the west side of the railway
line. Additionally the alignment is further
constrained by the existing overbridge
011/101A which is located just south of the
proposed station. This structure is to be
retained. The proximity of the existing
overbridge at the south end of the station,
the track being located on the solum of the
original alignment, the station being located
between an existing retaining wall and a
The recorded images from the on-board
Stagecoach Supertram
CCTV will be available for post-incident
investigation.
10/08/2015
N/A
INS
08/07/2015
Current
02/09/2015
N/A
RST
24/07/2015
Current
The driver is responsible to apply the brake Stagecoach Supertram
19/08/2015
following the activation of the passenger
communication device. Separate brake
systems are capable of providing the
equivalent of an emergency brake
application.
· 390/0 and 390/1 trainsets in the number
Fit the latest train-borne equipment
It is considered that, due to the benefits
West Coast Trains Ltd (trading 29/07/2015
range 01 to 57; · 221 trainsets in the number compliant with GE/RT8075 Issue 2, in
identified in Section 11 - Proposed
as Virgin Trains)
range 221101 to 221118 and 221142 to
accordance with GE/RT8075 Issue 1, to the alternative provisions, the alternative
221144.
fleets of trainsets operated by Virgin Trains provisions improve the safety of the railway
(Class 221 'Super Voyager' and Class 390
system whilst retaining compatibility with the
'Pendolino) would require: Additional cab
current TPWS Driver Machine Interface
wiring from the control unit to the Driver
(DMI) and bogie mounted AWS / TPWS
Machine Interface (DMI). Revisions to the
equipment. Virgin Trains consider that the
cab desk layout, to accommodate the larger safety benefits outweigh the costs of the new
'footprint' of the Mk4 DMI. Modification or
control units, without any detriment to TPWS
replacement of the existing On-Train
reliability and availability. There are no
Monitoring Recorder (OTMR), to
impacts of the alternative provisions with the
accommodate the different OTMR interface drivers, with minimal impact for the vehicle
that the Mk4 unit provides. Revisions to the maintainers, which are based upon the
OTMR data analysis software to
revision of parts numbers in vehicle
accommodate the Mk4's serial channel
maintenance documentation. The above
OTMR interface. These requirements are
comments are supported by the successful
onerous (in terms of cost and trainset
trial of TPWS Mk3 control units to five-off
downtime) in comparison to the benefits that Class 390 cab vehicles, since 2010. Virgin
the fitment of the equipment conforming to
Trains considered the safety benefits
GE/RT8075 Issue 2 provides, thus it is
realised during the remaining life of the
considered that there is not a 'reasonable
franchise, outweigh the cost of the control
opportunity' (Clause 6. 2. 1. 3 of GE/RT8075 base unit without any detriment to
Issue 1) to modify the vehicles and related
dependability and reliability.
software to accommodate the equipment
conforming to GE/RT8075 Issue 2.
N/A
RST
24/07/2015
Current
N/A
Control Command and Signalling
09/07/2015
Current
All Class 465/9 TOSL vehicles that have
Vehicles shall be designed with mass
completed their PRM interior refurbishment. distribution and suspension characteristics
which ensure the capability to run round
smooth curves at constant speed, without
rolling over, at not less than 21ø cant
deficiency. Currently, the vehicles have
started a refurbishment programme to bring
the vehicles into line with the latest Persons
of Reduced Mobility (PRM) requirements.
The effect of this interior change on the
TOSL vehicle is to create additional standing
room in the crush condition when
wheelchairs are not present. The additional
standees increase the mass and raise the
vertical centre of gravity which, in turn, has
increased the sway and roll-over angle of
the vehicle. A comparative gauging
exercise has been undertaken
demonstrating the minimum full unloading
(roll-over) angles in Table 2. 4 of the
attached Mott MacDonald report - Dynamic
evaluation of 465/9 PRM modifications. As
may be seen, the vehicle meets the standard
requirements (>21 degrees) in tare but fails
in crush. The existing "Reference" vehicle
fails with an inflated roll-over angle of 19. 63
degrees and deflated roll-over angle of 20.
69 degrees. The modified vehicle fails with
angles of 19. 27 and 20. 40 respectively (the
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
Reduction in the roll-over angle from 21 to
19. 3 degrees would enable the TOSL
vehicles to continue to operate post PRM
modification without significant re-design of
their suspension.
ESG Ltd
28/05/2015
Page 18
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0045
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
Certificate Number
15-046-DEV
Title
Bromsgrove Signals: BA3603 (FYY),
BA3609 (FY+FYY), BA3611 (MAY+FY),
BA3617 (MAY), BA7631, BA7619, BA9621
and BA7623.
RGS Clause
5.5.1 d)
Scope
ELR: BAG2;Location: BromsgroveMilage:
52½ to 56½ miles;Signals: BA3603 (FYY),
BA3609 (FY+FYY), BA3611 (MAY+FY),
BA3617 (MAY), BA7631, BA7619, BA9621
and BA7623.
Nature and Degree
Compliance to RGS would prohibit the use
of a flashing aspect approach for services
into the Down Bromsgrove loop, or the
flashing aspect sequences for diverging
routes to platforms 1, 2 or 3. Both of these
options have significant performance
impact. Due to the severe gradient of the
Lickey incline, it is felt that the application of
Main Aspect Red (MAR) controls increases
driver expectancy of signal to clear in this
gradient area.
GKRT0075
Three
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
15-045-DEV
Bromsgrove Signals: BA3609, BA3611,
BA3617 and BA3633.
Appendix A - Section A1
ELR: BAG2; Location: Bromsgrove;
Mileage: 52« to 56« miles; Signals:
BA3609, BA3611, BA3617 and BA3633.
Signalling Braking Distance Data for all
Trains' has a number of tables that provide
train braking data for various gradients. On
'Composite table for all trains' the steepest
falling gradient that data is provided for is 1
in 50. A note is provided below the graph
that states 'For gradients greater than 1 in
50 falling - seek derogation'. Situated
between Blackwell and Bromsgrove is the
steepest main line railway in the country Lickey Incline - which has a gradient of 1 in
38 and is approximately 2 miles long. The
non-compliance is due to this geographical
feature. It would cost about œ150,000,000
to change the Lickey Incline and regrade it
into an area addressed in the requirements.
Conversely, for signals to be positioned
descending down this gradient, there is no
braking data provided in GK/RT0075 for all
trains, therefore it is not possible to comply
with the requirements.
GERT8402
One
ERTMS/ETCS DMI National Requirements
15-044-DEV
WCR Class 37 ETCS DMI speed display.
2.2.1
The deviation applies to two Class 37
locomotives listed below that are being fitted
with the Hitachi on-board subsystem to
provide ETCS functionality (baseline 2. 3.
0d). · Vehicle 37668, · Vehicle 37669. The
trains are owned and operated by West
Coast Railways. They will be used for
operation on the Cambrian Line (in ETCS
Level 2) and elsewhere on Network Rail
controlled infrastructure (in ETCS Level 0).
This deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
GMRT2400
Five
Engineering Design of On-track Machines in 15-043-DEV
Running Mode
Emergency Brake Override
2.3.1.1
GMRT2130
Four
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
15-039-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Fire Safety and
Evacuation Performance.
GMRT2100
Five
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
15-038-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Structural Performance Part 2 - All clauses; Part 3 - 3.3.2 and
(Issue 3).
3.3.3.1; Part 4 - All clauses; Part 5 - 5.3.1.4,
5.3.2, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4; Clause 5.4.2 Part 6 6.1.2, 6.2.4, 6.9.1.2, 6.5 and 6.6; Part 7 - All
clauses, plus Clauses 5.2.3 and 9.2 for
aerodynamics.
Part 2 - All clauses. Part 4 - All clauses. Part This application relates to a total of seven
5 - 5.1.1 d). Part - 6.3.3.Part 7 - 7.1.6, 7.1.8 three-car tram-train EMUs: Unit numbers:
and 7.1.9.
399201 - 399207; Vehicle numbers: 99001 99007,99101 - 99107, 99201 - 99207.
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs) for operation between Meadowhall
South (on the Sheffield tramway),
Rotherham Central and a new turn-back
platform at Parkgate. Unit numbers:
399201 - 399207. Vehicle numbers: 99001 99007;99101 - 99107;99201 - 99207.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The main risk with this proposal is that a
train driver gets confused as to which
flashing yellow aspect sequence applies to
which junction. The worst case scenario is
that a driver thinks he is set for the loop
when he is in fact set for a route into one of
the platforms. The risk is that the driver
misjudges his speed and takes the closer
junction too fast. Another risk is that the
driver loses his bearings in fog or at night
time and get confused as to which junction
the flashing yellows are set for. Mitigations
for the risk are: The provision of Preliminary
Routing Indicators (PRIs) for the first
flashing sequence only. The PRIs provide
early route information as to which platform
the driver will be signalled into. The PRIs
will indicate forward arrows for a route set
onto the Loop Permanent Speed Warning
Indicators (PSWIs) are provided for each
turnout. The Automatic Warning System
(AWS) will be suppressed for routes which
do not apply for that sign. The turnout
speed onto the loop is 50 mph and the
turnout speed into the station is 40 mph only a 10 mph difference. A train taking the
40 mph turnout at 50 mph will not derail.
PSWI with AWS are provided to enforce the
turnout speeds. There are geographic
The overrun risk, layout design and Train
Protection and Warning System (TPWS)
provision at the bottom of the incline has
taken into account the severe falling
gradient. Options that have been developed
for the new Bromsgrove Station track layout
have taken into account the need to avoid
conflicting train moves at the bottom of the
incline. Another factor is that, as a result of
the electrification and new station increased
passenger traffic will use the incline,
including three additional trains per hour
which will be turning back at Bromsgrove
once the electrification is commissioned. It
is considered that, even with the provision of
Overhead Line Electrification (OLE) masts,
the signal sighting will be very good down
the incline. As a result of an incident several
years ago, special controls are in place on
the incline. Today, G10 signal provides the
first caution when G16 is at red. In the
proposed re-signalling, the provision of fouraspect signalling achieves the same result in
that the first caution will be at the summit of
the incline. Also, the use of four-aspect
signalling gives the driver a clearer
message about the status of the line ahead
than the previous Main Aspect Red (MAR)
control. Existing signal G16 has been
The chosen solution must provide technical
compatibility with the existing Cambrian
infrastructure, as well as achieving the
necessary level of safety. The proposed
implementation will mean that the two fitted
vehicles behave in an identical manner to
the 24 Class 158s and three Class 97/3s
fitted by Ansaldo that are currently operating
on the Cambrian. From a CSM RA
perspective, the Ansaldo implementation is
considered to be a reference system since it
is already successfully implemented in
equivalent vehicles operating over the
relevant infrastructure. The proposed
implementation is compatible with the
existing Cambrian and off-Cambrian
trackside, as already demonstrated by trials
of a test locomotive (97301) fitted with the
proposed software. The proposed
implementation is compatible with the
National Onboard Subsystem Requirements
Specification which forms the requirements
specification for future ETCS fitment. There
is no impact on costs, service performance,
reliability or availability. The only identified
issue is the behaviour of the vehicles if they
enter an ETCS-fitted trackside area other
than the Cambrian, and this trackside uses
mph in Level 2. This is already an issue for
It is considered that there is no increased
risk by adopting the proposed alternate
provisions.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
02/11/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Control Command and Signalling
Lead SC Approval Date
01/10/2015
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
25/06/2015
N/A
CCS
11/06/2015
Current
Hitachi Rail Europe
10/07/2015
N/A
CCS
11/06/2015
Current
Plasser UK
23/07/2015
N/A
RST
19/06/2015
Current
See appendix A Issue 2.
Stagecoach Supertram
18/12/2015
N/A
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
The tram-trains are being built to an existing The tram-train is similar to designs of tram- Stagecoach Supertram
design that is based on compliance with
trains vehicles in Germany. More details are
European standards, in particular EN 12663- provided in Appendix A.
1, EN 15227, EN 13749, EN 15152 and EN
14752.
16/10/2015
N/A
Rolling Stock
22/05/2015
Current
The Cambrian ETCS trackside was
implemented before the production of
GE/RT8402, and the trackside is not
compatible with the requirements of
GE/RT8402. Development work would be
required on the trackside to allow a train that
is compliant with GE/RT8402 to operate as
expected. At present, a train leaving the
Cambrian will retain its NID_C value, and
hence will continue to display speed in km/h
in Level 0. This is not the required outcome
since the train is now displaying km/h on the
DMI but all lineside signage is in mph.
Modifications to the trackside would be
required to send a new NID_C value to the
train (by RBC and balise) as it left the
Cambrian. Modifications to the existing
support and maintenance procedures would
also be required so that existing Cambrian
national values balises used for
maintenance purposes are removed from
use and replaced with balises with a suitable
alternative NID_C set of national values for
use off of the Cambrian. The Hitachi
onboard software was developed and
tested, based on the specification used for
existing ETCS-fitted Class 97/3 locomotives
operating on the Cambrian Line. This
development work pre-dated the issue of
Plasser and Theurer on track machines
The final paragraph of BS EN 14033-1: 2011
authorised to self-propel outside
Clause 9. 2. 7 mandates "An override device
possessions. The following machines will
for the emergency brake for use by the
not have a driver's override for the
driver shall be provided where there is the
emergency brake fitted: DR Number EVN
possibility of the emergency brake being
DR74002 99 70 9128002-1 DR77909 99 70 applied remotely from the driving cab. " To
9125909-0 DR77010 99 70 9125010-7
comply with this paragraph would require
DR73120 99 70 9123120-6 DR73121 99 70 the development of an override system
9123121-4 DR73122 99 70 9123122-2 This capable of achieving the required
deviation is for a project requiring
functionality without any reduction in safety
authorisation for placing in service under the or reliability. Apart from the driving cab, the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011. only other location on an on-track machine
where personnel are authorised to be
present during running is the rear cab.
There is direct communication between the
rear cab and the operable driving cab. In
the exceptionally unlikely event of the need
to apply the emergency brake from the rear
cab, any personnel present in the rear cab
will be trained On-track Machine (OTM) staff
who will be able to explain to the driver why
they have done so and reset the emergency
brake button if requested by the driver.
See appendix A Issue 2.
Page 19
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2132
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
On-board Energy Metering for Billing
Purposes
Certificate Number
15-036-DEV
Title
Sheffield Tram-Train Energy Metering.
RGS Clause
All clauses.
GMRT2044
Four
Braking System Requirements and
Performance for Multiple Units
15-035-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Braking Performance.
5.4.1 and 5.4.2, 7.1.2 and 7.1.3.
GCRT5021
Five
Track System Requirements
15-034-DEV
Wembley Turnback Siding - gradient.
2.8.2.1
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-033-DEV
Wembley Stadium Station - position of
Driver Operation Only (DOO) Mirrors.
6.5.3 and 8.1.1
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-031-DEV
South Ruislip station, Platform 3 - position of 6.5.3 and 8.1.1
Driver Operation Only (DOO) Mirror.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train EMUs to be operated on
the line from the junction between the
Sheffield Tramway system and Network
Rail, and on the line to Rotherham and
Parkgate. Unit numbers: · 399201 399207. Vehicle numbers: · 99001 - 99007;
· 99101 - 99107; · 99201 - 99207.
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car Tram Train EMUs. Unit numbers:
· 399201 - 399207. Vehicle numbers: ·
99001 - 99007, · 99101 - 99107, · 99201 99207.
· Name: Wembley Turnback Siding; · ELR:
NAJ1; · Mileage: 4m70ch; · OS Ref: TQ189
853.
Wembley Stadium Station - position of
Driver Operation Only (DOO) Mirrors.
South Ruislip station, Platform 3 - DOO
Mirror.
Nature and Degree
GM/RT2132 was published to close an open
point in the Conventional Rail Conventional
Rail Locomotives and Passenger Technical
Specification for Interoperability (CR Loc
and Pas TSI) 2011. Subsequently, the TSI
has been reissued and this references EN
50463: 2012.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The limited number of units operating from a Stagecoach Supertram
single maintenance location enables a
manual download as an alternative to the
provision of a wireless network.
Certificate Issue Date
03/07/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
22/05/2015
Deviation Status
Current
See appendix.
See appendix.
15/06/2015
N/A
RST
22/05/2015
Current
In September 2015, Chiltern Railways will
begin to operate nine-car trainsets as a part
of the High Level Output Specification
(HLOS) remit to provide access for 1000
extra passengers during the peak commuter
hours into / out of London Marylebone
Station. Chiltern Railways have identified
that Wembley turnback will require
lengthening to enable nine-car trainsets to
leave Wembley depot and return to London
in the contra-peak to enable operational
readiness for the PM peak. Wembley
turnback, which is currently only long
enough for eight-car trainsets, is located
between the up and down main lines and
has a gradient of 1 in 90 which does not
comply to 1 in 500 as specified in
GC/RT5021. The length of extension
required is 40 m. Please refer to Appendix
A of the Wembley GRIP 3 report (70008452WSP-REP-MD-002) for further details of the
proposed track layout. To comply with the
requirement, the existing turnback track
would have to be completely removed. The
level of the turnback would have to drop
lower than that of both the Up and Down
main (approximately 2. 5 m lower). A
contiguous bored pile wall would need to be
installed along both sides with a reinforced
It is not deemed appropriate to achieve
compliance by moving the mirror because
this would result in: Compromising the
position of the mirrors, increasing the risk of
the driver being unable to identify
passengers fouling the Platform Train
Interface when departing from the station;
Increasing the likelihood of the driver
adjusting their operating position to optimise
the view of the Platform Train Interface. This
introduces a hazard to the Driver, resulting
in possible occupational health issues;
Disproportionate costs associated with the
construction of compliant supporting
structures. Medium - No health and safety
issues have been reported relating to the
position of the existing mirror.
The design solution proposes extension of Network Rail
the existing siding by 40 m at the current 1 in
90 gradient; please refer to Appendix A of
the Wembley GRIP 3 report (70008452WSP-REP-MD-002) for further details of the
proposed track layout. This proposal has
the following benefits over a compliant
solution: · Simpler design solution; · Greatly
reduced number of possessions, meaning
less disruption to passengers and
significantly reduced schedule 4 costs; · No
impact on Up / Down main track support
zone; · Minimal performance issues as
existing turnback siding could remain
operational during the majority of
construction works. The cost estimate for
this solution is œ200k (GRIP 3).
20/07/2015
N/A
INS
13/05/2015
Current
Project Ref. 143467 - Chiltern Railways
Network Rail
and London Midland/London Overground
DOO Mirrors Renewal/Recovery. This
deviation is requested for a like for like
renewal on a Driver Only Operation Mirror
(DOO) which forms part of a larger scheme
for the renewal of 30 mirrors on the Chiltern
line. These mirrors are now nearing the end
of life as most of them were installed before
1994. The existing mirrors, and proposed
new mirrors in the same position, are less
than the required 2000 mm from the
platform edge required by the standard.
The existing mirrors are located as follows:
· P1 5 Car - 2120 mm from the platform
edge and the bottom of the mirror is 2280
mm from the surface of the platform; · P2 4
Car - 1750 mm from the platform edge and
the bottom of the mirror is 2030 mm from the
surface of the platform; · P2 8 Car - 720 mm
from the platform edge and the bottom of the
mirror is 1720 mm from the surface of the
platform. The project has conducted a
review of the existing DOO mirrors. For
those found non-compliant, representatives
from the Train Operating Company (TOC),
Network Rail and design contractor
conducted a site visit. This visit concluded
that the mirror could not be moved to a
Project Ref. 143467 - Chiltern Railways
Network Rail
and London Midland/London Overground
DOO Mirrors Renewal/Recovery. This
deviation is requested for a like for like
renewal on a Driver Only Operation Mirror
(DOO) which forms part of a larger scheme
for the renewal of 30 mirrors on the Chiltern
line. These mirrors are now nearing the end
of life as most of them were installed before
1994. The existing mirror, and proposed
new mirror in the same position, is less than
the required 2000 mm from the platform
edge required by the standard. The existing
mirror is located as follows: · P3 three-car:
2165 mm from the platform edge and the
bottom of the mirror is 2040 mm from the
surface of the platform. The project has
conducted a review of the existing DOO
mirrors. For those found non-compliant,
representatives from the Train Operating
Company (TOC), Network Rail and design
contractor conducted a site visit. This visit
concluded that the mirror could not be
moved to a compliant position without
impacting on the driver's image of the train
and associated safety aspects of operation.
As a result, it is proposed that the mirror is
renewed in the current position. The
proposal is to: Renew the mirror on a 'like
10/07/2015
N/A
INS
13/05/2015
Current
15/06/2015
N/A
INS
13/05/2015
Current
It is not deemed appropriate to achieve
compliance by moving the mirror because
this would result in: Compromising the
position of the mirrors, increasing the risk of
the driver being unable to identify
passengers fouling the Platform Train
Interface when departing from the station;
Increasing the likelihood of the driver
adjusting their operating position to optimise
the view of the Platform Train Interface. This
introduces a hazard to the driver, resulting in
possible occupational health issues;
Disproportionate costs associated with the
construction of compliant supporting
structures. Platform 3, three-car mirror View of the rear of the three-car train is
limited due to the waiting room building
protruding into the platform. Option of
moving three-car stop further up the
platform was considered however the car
stop would extend just short of the EOP
mirror and would also mean passengers
have an extended walk down the platform
which would result in the TOC receiving
customer complaints. Medium - No health
and safety issues have been reported
relating to the position of the existing mirror.
Moving the mirrors could compromise the
position of the mirror, increasing the risk of
Stagecoach Supertram
Page 20
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
15-030-DEV
Title
Great Missenden Platform 1 - position of
Driver Operation Only (DOO) Mirror.
RGS Clause
8.1.1
Scope
Great Missenden Platform 1 - position of
Driver Operation Only (DOO) Mirror.
Nature and Degree
It is not deemed appropriate to achieve
compliance by moving the mirror because
this would result in: Compromising the
position of the mirrors, increasing the risk of
the Driver being unable to identify
passengers fouling the Platform Train
Interface when departing from the station.
Increasing the likelihood of the driver
adjusting their operating position to optimise
the view of the Platform Train Interface. This
introduces a hazard to the driver, resulting in
possible occupational health issues.
Disproportionate costs associated with the
construction of compliant supporting
structures. Medium - No health and safety
issues have been reported relating to the
position of the existing mirror.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-029-DEV
Gerrards Cross Platform 1 - position of
Driver Operation Only (DOO) Mirrors.
6.5.3 and 8.1.1
Gerrards Cross Platform 1 - position of
Driver Operation Only (DOO) Mirrors.
It is not deemed appropriate to achieve
compliance by moving the mirror because
this would result in: Compromising the
position of the mirrors, increasing the risk of
the driver being unable to identify
passengers fouling the Platform Train
Interface when departing from the station.
Increasing the likelihood of the driver
adjusting their operating position to optimise
the view of the Platform Train Interface. This
introduces a hazard to the driver, resulting in
possible occupational health issues.
Disproportionate costs associated with the
construction of compliant supporting
structures.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-028-DEV
Denham station platform 2 four-car stop
position of Driver Only Operation (DOO)
mirror.
8.1.1
Denham station platform 2 four-car stop
position of DOO mirror.
It is not deemed appropriate to achieve
compliance by moving the mirror because
this would result in: Compromising the
position of the mirrors, increasing the risk of
the driver being unable to identify
passengers fouling the Platform Train
Interface when departing from the station.
Increasing the likelihood of the driver
adjusting their operating position to optimise
the view of the Platform Train Interface. This
introduces a hazard to the driver, resulting in
possible occupational health issues.
Disproportionate costs associated with the
construction of compliant supporting
structures.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-027-DEV
Aylesbury Station Platform 2 and Platform 3 - 6.5.3 and 8.1.1
Driver Operation Only (DOO) Mirrors.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Aylesbury Station Platform 2 and Platform 3 - It is not deemed appropriate to achieve
Driver Operation Only (DOO) Mirrors.
compliance by moving the mirror because
this would result in: Compromising the
position of the mirrors, increasing the risk of
the Driver being unable to identify
passengers fouling the platform / train
interface when departing from the station.
Increasing the likelihood of the driver
adjusting their operating position to optimise
the view of the platform / train interface.
This introduces a hazard to the driver,
resulting in possible occupational health
issues. Disproportionate costs associated
with the construction of compliant supporting
structures.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
This deviation is requested for a like for like
renewal on a Driver Only Operation Mirror
(DOO) which forms part of a larger scheme
for the renewal of 30 mirrors on the Chiltern
line. These mirrors are now nearing the end
of life as most of them were installed before
1994. The existing mirrors, and proposed
new mirrors in the same position, are less
than the required 2500 mm from the
platform surface required by the standard.
The existing mirror is located as follows: P1
4 Car - 2250 mm from the platform edge
and the bottom of the mirror is 2110 mm
from the surface of the platform. The project
has conducted a review of the existing DOO
mirrors. For those found non-compliant,
representatives from the Train Operating
Company (TOC), Network Rail and design
contractor conducted a site visit. This visit
concluded that the mirror could not be
moved to a compliant position without
impacting on the driver's image of the train
and associated safety aspects of operation.
As a result, it is proposed that the mirrors
are renewed in their current positions. The
proposal is to: Renew the mirror on a 'like
for like' basis; Re-use existing supporting
structure. This would result in: No changes
to the drivers' current working practice;
Medium - No health and safety issues have
been reported relating to the position of the
existing mirrors. Moving the mirrors could
compromise the position of the mirror,
increasing the risk of the driver being unable
to identify passengers fouling the Platform
Train Interface when departing from the
station. Project Ref. 143467 - Chiltern
Railways and London Midland/London
Overground Driver Only Operation Mirror
(DOO) Mirrors Renewal/Recovery. This
deviation is requested for a like for like
renewal on a DOO which forms part of a
larger scheme for the renewal of 30 mirrors
on the Chiltern line. These mirrors are now
nearing the end of life as most of them were
installed before 1994. The existing mirrors,
and proposed new mirrors in the same
position, are less than the required 2000 mm
from the platform edge and the required
2500 mm above the platform surface
required by the standard. The existing
mirrors are located as follows: · P1 4 Car
North - 1620 mm from the platform edge
and the bottom of the mirror is 1930 mm
from the surface of the platform; · P1 4 Car
South - 2373 mm from the platform edge
and the bottom of the mirror is 1480 mm
from the surface of the platform. The project
Medium - No health and safety issues have
been reported relating to the position of the
existing mirror. Moving the mirrors could
compromise the position of the mirror,
increasing the risk of the driver being unable
to identify passengers fouling the Platform
Train Interface when departing from the
station. Project Ref. 143467 - Chiltern
Railways and London Midland/London
Overground DOO mirrors renewal/recovery.
This deviation is requested for a like for like
renewal on a DOO Mirror which forms part
of a larger scheme for the renewal of 30
mirrors on the Chiltern line. These mirrors
are now nearing the end of life as most of
them were installed before 1994. The
existing mirrors, and proposed new mirrors
in the same position, are less than the
required 2500 mm above the platform
surface required by the standard. The
existing mirror is located as follows: 2150
mm from the platform edge and the bottom
of the mirror is 2180 mm from the surface of
the platform. The project has conducted a
review of the existing DOO mirrors. For
those found non-compliant, representatives
from the Train Operating Company (TOC),
Network Rail and design contractor
conducted a site visit. This visit concluded
Medium - no health and safety issues have
been reported relating to the position of the
existing mirror. Moving the mirrors could
compromise the position of the mirror,
increasing the risk of the driver being unable
to identified passengers fouling the platform
/ train interface when departing from the
station. Project Ref. 143467 - Chiltern
Railways and London Midland/London
Overground Driver Only Operation (DOO)
mirrors renewal / recovery. This deviation is
requested for a like for like renewal on a
DOO which forms part of a larger scheme
for the renewal of 30 mirrors on the Chiltern
line. These mirrors are now nearing the end
of life as most of them were installed before
1994. The existing mirrors, and proposed
new mirrors in the same position, are less
than the 2000 mm required by the standard.
The existing mirrors are located as follows:
· P2 4/2 Car - 1715 mm from the platform
edge and the bottom of the mirror is 1655
mm from the surface of the platform; · P2
5/6 Car - 1810 mm from the platform edge
and the bottom of the mirror is 1660 mm
from the surface of the platform; · P3 S Car 1900 mm from the platform edge and the
bottom of the mirror is 1345 mm from the
surface of the platform. The project has
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
10/07/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
13/05/2015
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
10/07/2015
N/A
INS
13/05/2015
Current
Network Rail
05/06/2015
N/A
INS
13/05/2015
Current
Network Rail
10/07/2015
N/A
INS
13/05/2015
Current
Page 21
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
15-026-DEV
Title
Borders Rail Project - ELR: SBO, Stow
Platform Curvature.
RGS Clause
2.1.2
Scope
Borders Rail Project - ELR: SBO, Stow
Platform Curvature.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-025-DEV
Borders Project - ELR : SBO, Stow Up
Platform (Southbound) - reduced platform
width at existing building.
7.2
Borders Project - ELR : SBO, Stow Up
Platform (Southbound) reduced platform
width at existing building.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
15-024-DEV
Borders Rail Project - ELR : SBO,
Gorebridge Platform Curvature.
2.1
Borders Rail Project - ELR: SBO,
Gorebridge Platform Curvature.
GKRT0045
Four
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
15-022-DEV
PN177 signal non-provision of flashing
double yellow.
5.2.3.4
PN177 signal only. Between Preston from
Lancaster. Approaching Oxheys Up
Passenger Loop.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The proposed station is to be located on the
site of the original Stow station. The
deviation relates to the full length of both the
up and down platforms. The up platform
(southbound) is to be constructed on a 780
m radius and the down platform
(northbound) on a 777 m radius. This is in
accordance with the requirements of the
legislation on which the project is based (I.
e. The Waverley Railway (Scotland) Act
2006). The Act provides powers for the
compulsory purchase of land, as identified
within it, for the sole purpose of constructing
the railway. The horizontal alignment
follows the former track solum and the
associated land available (I. e. limit of
deviation) as defined in the Waverley Act
and does not offer any credible alternatives
to the horizontal radius proposed. The
alignment is further constrained by the
existing public road overbridge 011/068
which is located at the north end of the
station. The structure is to be retained. The
station location is also constrained as it is to
be located between a new housing
development on the West side of the station
and Stow primary school which is located on
the east side of the station. Additionally, it
has been requested that the existing station
The proposed station is to be located on the
site of the original Stow station. This is in
accordance with the requirements of the
legislation on which the project is based (I.
e. The Waverley Railway (Scotland) Act
2006). The Act provides powers for the
compulsory purchase of land, as identified
within it, for the sole purpose of constructing
the railway. The horizontal alignment
follows the former track solum and the
associated land available (I. e. limit of
deviation) as defined in the Waverley Act
and does not offer any credible alternatives
to the horizontal radius proposed. The
existing station building is to be retained at
the request of Scottish Borders Council for
use by the local community. The alignment
is further constrained by a new housing
development on the West side of the station
and Stow primary school which is located on
the east side of the station as well as the
existing public road overbridge 011/068
which is located at the north end of the
station. This structure is to be retained. The
proposed track alignment is required to
allow those trains which do not stop at Stow
to achieve a speed of 70 mph and thus meet
the desired timetable requirements.
The proposed station is to be located on the
site of the original Gorebridge station. The
non-compliance relates to 48 m of the 164 m
long platform. The 48 m starts at the north
end of the platform on a 298 m radius which
then transitions to a 1198 m radius over its
length. This is in accordance with the
requirements of the legislation on which the
project is based (I. e. The Waverley Railway
(Scotland) Act 2006). The Act provides
powers for the compulsory purchase of land,
as identified within it, for the sole purpose of
constructing of the railway. The horizontal
alignment follows the former track solum
and the associated land available (I. e. limit
of deviation) as defined in the Waverley Act
and does not offer any credible alternatives
to the horizontal radius proposed. The
alignment is further constrained by the
existing public road overbridges 011/025
and 011/026 which are located at each end
of the station. These structures are to be
retained. The station is also to be located
within an earthworks cutting which further
constrains the alignment.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Severity is low, as proposed platform
Network Rail
gauging, clearances and stepping distances
will continue to meet the necessary
Technical Specifications for Interoperability
(TSI) and national requirements. Compliant
stepping distances and track cant are being
provided within the design (I. e. cant is 85
mm). Signal sighting is not affected by the
track curvature in this location. The
introduction of a reduced horizontal radii
curve through the station will have an impact
on train dispatch operations as the
conductor / guard will be unable to see all
the train doors on the up (southbound)
platform without further support. The
conductor / guard, who has responsibility for
dispatching the train, can see all the train
doors when dispatching a six-car train from
the down (northbound) platform, however, is
unable to see all the doors when dispatching
a five or six-car train from the up
(southbound) platform. Drawing nos.
129713-URS-DRG-ST-CV-805-00004, 005
and 047 are enclosed which highlight the
train conductor / guard's position during train
dispatch. To aid the conductor / guard's
visibility during train dispatch from the up
platform, viewing aids (consisting of Close
Circuit Television (CCTV) and monitor bank)
A derogation workshop between Network
Network Rail
Rail and the Train Operating Company (First
Scotrail) has been held and a subsequent
site visit has taken place. Based on output/
findings of these, it has been identified that
the bay window on the west gable wall
would need to be modified or removed,
platform surface hatching and signage
would be introduced, the blue badge bays
would be relocated to the south side of the
existing station building and the train car
stops would be positioned to check for any
conflicts between train door location and the
narrow section of platform.
The introduction of a reduced horizontal
Network Rail
radii curve through the station will not have
an impact on the operational and safe
running of the railway. Proposed platform
gauging, clearances and stepping distances
will continue to meet the necessary
Technical Specification for Interoperability
(TSI) and national requirements. A sketch of
the proposed track alignment is enclosed.
Network Rail and Scotrail have jointly
agreed that the risks associated with the
proposed deviation from GI/RT7016 are
tolerable and do not warrant any additional
measures to be introduced to allow safe
train dispatch as the conductor has full
visibility of all doors. Compliant stepping
distances and track cant are being provided
within the design (I. e. cant is 110 mm at the
north end of the platform transitioning to 40
mm at the south end of the platform). Signal
sighting is affected by the track curvature in
this location and, to overcome sighting
issues, an OFF indicator shall be provided
for signal EMB 276, and a banner repeater
shall be provided for signal EMB 277. The
conductor/ guard, who has responsibility for
dispatching the train, can see all the train
doors and the OFF indicator from the centre
of the platform. Drawing nos. 129713-URSCompliance would require either nonAlternative proposal has potential for
Network Rail
provision of flashing sequence into Oxheys drivers to not respond to PN177 at steady
Up Passenger Loop, that has been identified YY. This has been considered and is
as providing significant operational benefit
mitigated by excellent sighting on PN175
with the new turnout speed or provision of a signal and braking distance at linespeed
flashing aspect to PN177 signal that has
from the sighting point of the PN175 signal
signal sighing risks. Due to a curved
to junction signal PN173. These allows
approach to PN177 it has been determined driver to response to sequence and does not
by signal sighting as not being suitable for
significantly impact on SPAD risk. Risk
provision of a flashing aspect. PN177 has
severity is considered to be less than the
multiple Overhead Line Electrification (OLE) existing arrangement due to the removal of
stanchions on the approach that causes the Main Aspect Red (MAR) and anticipation
aspect to appear and disappear several
risk that PN173 signal will clear on
times in quick succession, potentially
approach. Because PN177 cannot flash,
imitating a flashing aspects.
and deceleration distance to 40 mph is not
available from PN175 signal, the advanced
permissible warning indicator for the turnout
is positioned between PN177 and PN175
signals. Appropriate Automatic Warning
System (AWS) suppression controls are
provided for this Level Crossing Advance
Warning Signs (AWI). The warning
indicator is 670 m on the approach to PN175
and has been positioned to ensure PN175 is
visible from the warning indicator. See
attached Oxheys Signalling Design Review.
Certificate Issue Date
05/06/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
13/05/2015
Deviation Status
Current
05/06/2015
N/A
INS
13/05/2015
Current
05/06/2015
N/A
INS
13/05/2015
Current
29/04/2015
N/A
CCS
19/03/2015
Current
Page 22
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2466
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Railway Wheelsets
Certificate Number
15-021-DEV
Title
Deviation for the use steel grade - ER9T
wheel material.
RGS Clause
2.9.1
Scope
South West Trains (SWT) operate seven
Multi-Purpose Vehicles (MPV) manufactured
by Windhoff. These vehicles are suffering
high tread wear and SWT wish to trial a
harder wheel material to increase the tread
life. The proposal is to replace the current
R8 wheels with ER9T, this is not currently
permitted by the standard. The trial will be
undertaken on vehicles 98922 and 98972.
Nature and Degree
The SWT MPV vehicles are currently
operating with R8 wheels and these typically
require turning to restore the tread condition
twice in the autumn leaf fall season. At this
time, the vehicles are mainly being used for
the laying of Sandite. The time out of
service whilst the turning is being
undertaken is costly to the railway system.
SWT wishes to determine if using a harder
wheel steel (ER9T) will reduce the wheel
wear and allow the vehicles to operate more
effectively. SWT would expect to see an
increase in vehicle availability, reduction in
wheel turning costs and a commercial
benefit from having a longer wheel life.
None of this will be achieved if the R8 steel
is retained. The 3 standards permitted by
GM/RT2466 either list ER9T or have an
equivalent to this: BS 5892, Part 3: R9; BS
EN 13262: ER9/ ER9T; AAR: M-107/M208. Therefore, ER9 is not an unknown
material grade for use in wheel applications.
GMRT2181
Three
Overhead Line Equipment (OLE) Warning
Line on Traction and Rolling Stock
15-019-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train OLE Warning Line
Height
5.1.2
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs) - unit numbers: · 99001 - 99007, ·
99101 - 99107, and · 99201 - 99207.
Clause 5. 1. 1 requires the OLE warning
line to be positioned no closer than 600 mm
to the nearest train-mounted live equipment,
and in a position where it is clearly visible
when standing at rail level. Clause 5. 1. 2
requires the OLE warning line to be
positioned at a minimum height of 3100 mm
above rail level. The low-floor design of the
tram-train vehicles requires more equipment
to be mounted on the roof when compared
to a typical mainline rail vehicle, and it is not
possible to achieve both the 600 mm
electrical clearance required by Clause 5. 1.
1 and the minimum height required by
Clause 5. 1. 2.
GIRT7033
Two
Lineside Operational Safety Signs
15-018-DEV
Provision of specific platform stop markers
for Class 700 trains.
Section AK, sub-section 1, sign AK104z
Class 700 'Thameslink Unit' and all its sub- The design specification of the class 700
classes. All routes where Govia Thameslink unit is of fixed formations of eight and twelve
Railway operates.
cars with a central driving position. There is
no provision of a side-window in the cab to
facilitate the use of existing platform stop
markers and this, in conjunction with the
length of the unit, would lead to an
unacceptable degree of inaccuracy in the
positioning of the train at a platform when
using the existing marks (please refer to
Stopping Strategy document). Section 13 of
this document (`What other options have
been considered?') provides further
evidence of the potential impacts of
complying with GI/RT7033.
GERT8000-T3
Five
Possession of a running line for engineering 15-017-DEV
work
Giving Up Possessions Around a Train.
7.1
National change.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Reduced platform width at West Drayton
Station for construction hoardings on
Platform 2 and Platform 3.
6.2.2
West Drayton Station Platform 2 and
Platform 3.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
15-015-DEV
Currently, if a train is in a possession that
has axle counters within it as a means of
train detection, and a train is outside of the
section detected by axle counters, the Rule
Book is not clear if the possession can be
given up around a train as the Rule Book
states that the line must be signalled by the
track circuit block (other than by axle
counters). Currently, Rule Book Module T3
Section 7. 1 (bullet point 1) is not clear when
giving up a possession around a train when
a section detected by axle counters is within
the possession and the train is not within
that section of line but stands within a
section detected by track circuits. A
possession could be 20 miles in length with
5 miles of this containing axle counter as the
means of detection the other 15 miles could
be detected by track circuits but the whole
section has to be clear of trains before
possession can be given up as the current
rule is written.
Temporary hoarding will be erected on the
platforms 2/3 at West Drayton during
construction of lift shaft and stair
foundations, which will reduce platform
width during construction period. Network
Rail wishes to temporarily deviate from this
standard whilst construction of a new
footbridge is carried out in the centre of
platform 2/3 at West Drayton. Please read
the below statement alongside attached
sketches. The new footbridge design
complies with the railway standard as
demonstrated by attached Sketch 1.
Compliance cannot be achieved for the
construction of the structure. Sketch 2
demonstrates this by showing a section of
the completed structure and the limited
space which remains for formwork and
hoarding. Sketch 3 shows a proposal for
temporary non-compliance which reduces
the platforms to a width of 2. 0 m on
Platform 3 and 2. 563 m on Platform 2. This
will allow the structure to be constructed
and, following completion of the works, the
platform widths will be returned to compliant
widths.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Retaining the current R8 material will result
in high maintenance costs and it is
anticipated that employing the harder ER9T
steel will allow these to be reduced. There
might be a concern that introducing harder
wheels on to the system will result in
increased rail wear; however, recent
research work has identified that this is not
the case. V/T SIC report Wheel/rail
hardness and total "system" wear report, by
Mark Burstow 18/10/2012 (copy attached)
summarised that: "It has been found that
increasing the hardness of one material has
little or no effect on the wear rate of the other
material, and many researchers have
actually observed a reduction in the wear
rate in both materials when the hardness of
one of them is increased. " This was backed
up by: "In 1993 an internal British Rail
Research report, "Effect of differential
hardness on wheel/rail wear - literature
survey, reviewed available sets of test data
and published papers on wheel and rail
wear. " One of the main conclusions was
that "the belief that an increase in the
hardness of the rail, while giving a decrease
in the rail wear rate, will give an increase in
wheel wear is not generally felt to be
justified. " This conclusion was based on a
Clause 5. 1. 1 is considered to be the
primary means of reducing the likelihood of
a person or their equipment coming into
contact with live equipment. It is therefore
proposed to position the OLE warning line at
2900 mm above rail level (the maximum that
can be achieved when complying with the
600 mm electrical clearance). Note that
Clause 5. 1. 4 already permits the OLE
warning line to be lower than 3100 mm
where there are parts of the vehicle that
cannot be liveried. However, there is no
physical reason why the OLE warning line
cannot be applied to the roof panels at 3100
mm; the reason for the deviation is solely
because it is not possible to meet the
required 600mm electrical clearance at this
height. Clause 5. 1. 4 permits the lower
height only when the warning line is
sufficiently high for it still to be recognised as
a warning line. At 2900 mm, the risk of a
warning line not being recognised on the
tram-train vehicles is very low, because the
relative position of the proposed line in
relation to the top of the unit's doors and
windows, and the roof-line, is very similar to
a typical mainline rail vehicle. Apart from in
exceptional circumstances, the tram train
will stop at low-level platforms that are
The alternative provisions will provide for a
robust procedure of bringing class 700 units
to a stand at the correct position at the
platform for their formation. The design and
orientation of the platform stop markers are
such that the chance of confusion and
misreading are reduced to as low as
reasonably practicable.
Applicant Organisation
Interfleet Technology Ltd
Certificate Issue Date
08/05/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
17/04/2015
Deviation Status
Current
Stagecoach Supertram
31/03/2015
N/A
RST
12/03/2015
Current
Govia Thameslink Railway
29/04/2015
07/10/2016
CCS
19/03/2015
Current
No safety or performance risks identified.
No safety risks identified as Rule Book
module already allows for a possession to
be given up when a train is in a track
circuited area.
Network Rail
24/04/2015
N/A
TOM
03/03/2015
Current
Signal sighting has been carried out for the Network Rail
various sketches. During the excavation
works and construction of pile caps, platform
widths will be maintained. Works will be
carried out during night shifts and
possessions so as not to disrupt the train
services or impact upon passenger safety.
At the end of each shift, a polystyrene block,
with recessed, anti-slip road plate, will be
inserted into the excavation. Alternatively, a
scaffold deck will be fixed into the
excavation with anti-slip surfacing. This will
allow the full platform to be in use during the
day and platform widths can be maintained.
The temporary deviation is only required
when the superstructure is being
constructed. The hoardings for Stage 1 and
for Stage 2 will not be in place at the same
time.
10/04/2015
30/06/2016
INS
04/03/2015
Current
Page 23
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GCRT5212
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
Clearances
Certificate Number
15-014-DEV
Title
Reduced clearances at signal EK4042 at
Rochester Bridge Junction
RGS Clause
G1.2
Scope
This non-compliance application relates to
signal EK4042 only located alongside the Up
Chatham line on ELR VIR at approximately
33m 02ch in Network Rail's Southeast
Route.
Nature and Degree
The non-compliant arrangement proposed
is the only reasonably practicable way to
achieve the specified performance
requirements of the network. The safety
implications of the proposed deviation are
examined in detail in the accompanying risk
assessment which concludes that the risks
can be managed to an acceptable level
using the mitigation measures discussed
later. In summary, the primary risk is of
persons becoming injured as a result of
coming into contact with the signal whilst
leaning from a moving train. It is not
possible for passengers to do this from the
trains which operate scheduled services
over this route, limiting the risk to staff on
any train or passengers on infrequent
charter operations. It is assumed that
drivers, with a clear view of the signal they
are approaching, will recognise the
existence of the limited clearance and not
lean from their cabs (in the case of the
Southeastern passenger fleet it is difficult to
do this whilst driving the train in any case)
and thus the staff risk is primarily to the
guards who are present on just less than
half of the total train services passing the
signal.
GKRT0075
Three
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
15-005-DEV
Non-provision of Permissible Speed
Warning Indicators at Old Oak Common
3.3.1.4 b)
The deviation applies to the successive
speed reductions for passenger trains at
Ladbroke Grove from 60 mph on Lines 1
and 2 to 50 mph over diverging junctions
(MLN1: 1¬ MP to 2¬ MP) with further
reductions ahead on: Engine and Carriage
LineNorth Pole Line B Crossrail Depot Line
1
Compliance would entail the placement of a
PSWI for the associated 15 mph PSI on the
E & C Line (at Appendix B braking distance
from 60 mph of 562 m) at a position on the
approach to signal SN125, which has been
deemed by the SSC as potentially confusing
- as to whether the warning is for the
divergence or the speed restriction beyond.
Compliance would entail the placement of a
PSWI for the associated 15/35 mph PSI on
the North Pole Line B (at Appendix B
braking distance from 60 mph of 614 m) at a
position 117 m on the approach to the 25/50
divergence, which has been deemed by the
SSC as potentially confusing - as to whether
the warning is for the divergence or the
speed restriction beyond. Compliance would
entail additional AWS equipment being
required (positioned on Line 4) due to the
placement of a PSWI for the associated 25
mph PSI on the Crossrail Depot Line 1,
which has been deemed by the SCC as a
potential distraction for the vast majority of
trains using Crossrail Depot Line 1, which
will be approaching from 50 mph Lines 3 to
6. Complex AWS suppression controls
would also be required.
GKRT0075
Three
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
15-004-DEV
Plassers Crossing, St. George's Cross Sign Appendix X Deceleration Distances: Table X- Plassers AOCL+B Level Crossing, Western
Position.
1 - Deceleration distance to speed restriction Route, ELR WEL1 6 _ miles.
of 10 mph Table X-2 - Deceleration distance
to speed restriction of 20 mph
Standard deceleration for both 15 to 10 mph
and 25 to 20 mph is 402 metres (tables X. 1
and X. 2 respectively). This large distance
would severely impact on train speed for
movements onto the Greenford branch,
more confusing signage and less
advantageous train positioning. The braking
shown in the standards is extremely
pessimistic, as has been proved having
calculated the braking required, in
consultation with the TOCs/ FOCs on their
current worse case stock. This is
inappropriate for the braking of the train, to
the X10/20 sign from the Level Crossing
Warning Sign on the line to Greenford.
GMRT2400
Five
Engineering Design of On-track Machines in 15-002-DEV
Running Mode
Automatic reinstatement of the spring
actuated parking brakes that have been
manually released
BS EN 14033-1: 2011 clause 9. 2. 5. 2
states "Any spring apply air release parking
brake actuator shall be provided with a
mechanical release, accessible from the
outside. It shall be possible to operate such
a release from a convenient position with
consideration of the risk of contact with an
electrified rail of the infrastructure. The
parking brake actuators shall reset
automatically by filling with compressed air.
The parking brake actuators shall still be
capable of manual release even when the
full service brake is applied. " The MMS
machines use a standard Plasser bogie in
service throughout the UK, which
incorporates a spring applied, air release
parking brake. This bogie and brake has
always been in compliance with GM/RT2400
under Issue 4 and previous. Issue 5 (which
came into effect after contract signing) has
changed to refer to the EN which introduced
this new requirement. It is not physically
possible to modify this bogie to incorporate
automatic reset of the handbrake when it
has been manually released. `Complete
redesign to incorporate a feature not
previously mandated is totally unrealistic.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
2.3.2.3
This deviation applies to eight sets of three
permanently coupled vehicles known as
MMS (mobile maintenance systems) TOPS
Vehicle numbers (for the traction vehicles)
DR97501 to DR97508. This deviation is for
a project requiring authorisation for placing
in service under the Railways
(Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The East Kent Resignalling Phase 2 (EKR2)
Project has been tasked with meeting the
following requirements to accommodate
growth in passenger numbers in Kent: A
reduction in signalling headway through the
Medway Towns to allow an increase in train
frequency (with a two minute interval
between trains specified) The relocation of
Rochester station nearer to London whilst
maintaining the flexibility of operation of the
current layout. Performance modelling has
identified that to achieve both of these
requirements it is necessary to locate the
signal controlling the divergence of the
Chatham main line (ELR VIR) to London via
Sole Street and the North Kent lines to
London via Gravesend (ELR HDR) as close
as possible to Rochester Bridge Junction
where these lines diverge. This signal is a 4aspect searchlight type LED colour light
signal with a 'position 4' (upper right hand)
junction indicator. The point of divergence
at the junction is immediately beyond the
end of the Medway Viaduct (bridge 1046)
which is approximately 180m long, has full
height lattice girder sides with brick piers
and overhead girders linking the two sides
of the bridge. It is proposed to locate the
signal alongside the brick pier at the London
The initial divergences are only 1. 8-2. 4 km
from the platform starting signals at
Paddington. This proximity negates the
"within a distance of 3. 2 km" aspect of the
requirement because all trains will start from
rest within 3. 2 km of the first reduction. This
proximity also reduces the risks posed by
driver fatigue and confusion over location.
The majority of trains will be fitted with GWATP or ETCS. GW-ATP will govern speeds
down to 50 mph before the train leaves the
ATP area. Conversely; TPWS will be
provided for the speed restrictions which will
provide mitigation of risk of over-speeding
for those remaining trains not so fitted with
GW-ATP or ETCS. Reductions 1) and 2);
proposes to augment the PLJIs for signals
SN125 and SN105 (due to limited sighting)
with Preliminary Route Indicators (PRIs).
The junction signalling approaching the 50
mph divergences has been carefully
designed to ensure that the drivers can
sufficiently control the train speed to 50 mph,
to traverse through the points towards the
depot lines. Once train speed is at 50 mph,
no warning signs are required - drivers upon
seeing the PRI's and PLJI's for those
diverging routes will decelerate sufficiently,
therefore it is suggested that this is an
On the 1: 400R gradient GK/RT0075
Appendix A shows the distance to stop from
15mph as 136m and Appendix B shows
109m to stop from 25 mph. Proposal allows
the driver to get an AWS indication for the
Level Crossing Warning Sign to warn that
there is a level crossing as required by the
standard GK/RT0192 (Level Crossing
Interface Requirements- 2. 11. 1. 1), for
freight and passenger trains after
completing Station Duties at West Ealing
and passing the starting signal. TOCs and
FOCs have confirmed that the proposed
distances match what they experience
operating trains on the Greenford Line. The
braking is adequate to reduce to the
required speed at the Automatic Level
Crossing Speed Restriction Sign (X10/20)
and come to a complete stop at the crossing
when required. See supporting calculations.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
01/04/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
04/03/2015
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
10/03/2015
N/A
CCS
19/02/2015
Current
Network Rail
10/03/2015
N/A
CCS
19/02/2015
Current
20/04/2015
N/A
RST
13/02/2015
Current
The impact of the alternative provision is a
Plasser UK Ltd
negligible risk. The parking brake will only
be manually wound off in an emergency
recovery situation by specialised staff. In
these specialised and very rare occasions, it
will be necessary for the recovery staff to
manually remove the mechanical device
used to wind-off the parking brake when
parking the vehicles after they have been
recovered. This is documented in the
recovery procedures they will be following
and poses no greater risk in that situation
than a vehicle with a manual handbrake that
needs to wound on.
Page 24
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2400
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Engineering Design of On-track Machines in 14-175-DEV
Running Mode
GCRT5212
One
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
Clearances
14-174-DEV
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-170-DEV
GMRT2130
Four
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Title
Provision of emergency brake override.
RGS Clause
2.3.1.1
Scope
This deviation applies to eight sets of three
permanently coupled vehicles known as
MMS (mobile maintenance systems) TOPS
Vehicle numbers (for the traction vehicles)
DR97501 to DR97508. This deviation is for
a project requiring authorisation for placing
in service under the Railways
(Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
Nature and Degree
The brakes on on-track machines, in
running mode and when working outside of
a possession if designed for working at
speeds greater than 30 km/h, shall comply
with BS EN 14033-1: 2011 Clause 9. The
performance parameters shall be as set out
in GM/RT2042 or GM/RT2043 as applicable.
Clause 9 of BS EN14033-1 states among
many requirements that "An override device
for the emergency brake for use by the
driver shall be provided where there is the
possibility of the emergency brake being
applied remotely from the driving cab. " It is
not reasonable to comply with this
requirement because it would involve reengineering of an existing proven system of
control used in other machines of this type.
Moreover, it will not provide any safety risk
and is not a feature that will be required in
the future.
Heathrow CTA, platforms 1 and 2 C2.1, Table 2 - Categorisation of clearances This deviation against GC/RT5212 Issue 1
Clause C2 Table 2 provides definition of
reduction in clearance during trial of platform for absolute gauging. G4.1 - Alterations
is for the installation of rubber platform gap normal/reduced/special reduced clearances
gap fillers
other than to permit the passage of larger
fillers along the full length of the Heathrow
in the lower sector. Clause G4. 1 states that
rail vehicles.
Express CTA station Platforms 1 and 2 for a alterations to infrastructure should not cause
second phase of trialling. The impact of the reduction of clearances from one category to
installation is to reduce nominal clearance
a more severe (smaller clearance) category.
between vehicles and the infrastructure from The current platform clearances comply with
80 mm-105 mm (I. e. normal clearance) to the RGS requirements. In this scenario
25 mm-50 mm (I. e. reduced clearance).
there have been instances of passengers,
The gap filler is, however, flexible and
especially those with a small foot size,
effective clearance remains greater than this stepping between the platform and the
nominal value. The clearance rules of
Class 332 and Class 360/2 stepping plate
GC/RT5212 Issue 1, however, do not
and getting their foot/leg trapped. HEx
recognise the possibility of such flexible
propose to trial the gap fillers to assess their
components and deviation is therefore
benefits in reducing the number of such
necessary. The trial will be conducted for a accidents on Heathrow CTA Platforms 1 and
period of up to 24 months to allow for
2.
sufficient trial time and data gathering to
demonstrate that the gap filler achieves a
safety benefit and the installation is robust
under the operating conditions and
application of the gap fillers on CTA.
Conclusions of the trial and evidence of the
benefits will be presented to RSSB once
they are available within the 24 month
period. If, at any time during the trial period,
the findings of the trial indicate that the fillers
have an overall negative impact, they will be
removed. Please find the details of the
Chippenham Station, Platforms 1 & 2 - 6.2
Chippenham Station - Final installation of
As an Outside Party funded structure, it
reduced platform width at lift shaft and
new lift, shaft and stairs.
would not be possible to fund the provision
stairs.
of a compliant solution. The advantages for
both the passenger public and the station
itself by making Chippenham an Access for
All station mean that a viable solution must
be found. The extent of the non-compliant
section of platform has been kept to its
absolute minimum to mitigate as much risk
to the public as possible. To minimise the
disruption to the public by decreasing the
clearance, the lift shaft has been designed to
be narrower than a standard lift shaft.
Whilst still maintaining the sixteen person
capacity, the narrower shaft allows for an
increased clearance to the platform edge.
Despite the narrow clearances, which
cannot be avoided, the risk to passengers is
deemed to be acceptable. It is believed that
any potential safety risk associated with the
reduced clearances will be reduced to an
acceptable level.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
It is not thought that this non-provision of a
Plasser UK Ltd
driver override device will have any safety
effect at all. In the event of an emergency,
the machine consist could be brought to a
halt by the actions of the crew in the mess
room without any action on the part of the
driver. The vehicle could not be set in
motion without resetting of that emergency
control. The driver would at all times be
aware of what had happened and would be
in radio contact with the mess room. This is
not thought to be an unsafe situation and
differs greatly from a situation where
passengers are involved and who might
start to exit a train in an inappropriate place.
Certificate Issue Date
02/02/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
16/01/2015
Deviation Status
Current
The impacts of the proposed gap filler have Heathrow Express Operating
been more fully detailed in the supporting
Company Ltd
documents attached. In summary, the gap
filler trial is expected to: Improve passenger
safety on CTA Platforms 1 and 2. Maintain
acceptable train / platform clearances, as
demonstrated in the trials ongoing on
Heathrow Terminal 5, whilst not affecting
technical compatibility of the railway system
through the reduction in normal clearance
arrangements. The gap fillers can be
removed if railway requirements change in
the future, or if the trial proves to be
unsuccessful. Have no effect on service
performance. Have no direct impact on
environment. Supporting documentation
attached to this report discusses the details,
including the risk assessment.
27/01/2015
15/01/2017
INS
06/01/2015
Current
This non-compliance relates to horizontal
clearance between the platform edge and
the edge of the new lift shaft on Platforms 1
and 2 at Chippenham Station. The
permanent deviation has been amended to
reflect the dimensions in the attached
"proposed general arrangement plan". The
lift shaft on the central platform provides
clearance of 2531 mm on the Up Main and
2548 mm on the Down Main. The stairs on
the central platform also require a deviation
from the original standard. The stairs
provide clearance of 2780 mm on the Up
Main and 2835 mm on the Down Main.
Network Rail
19/03/2015
N/A
INS
06/01/2015
Current
14-166-DEV
Advance stage deviation for installation of
Global System for Mobile communications
for Railways (GSM-R) to a Class 47
Locomotive.
All clauses.
Applies to the installation of GSM-R system
to 1 x Class 47 locomotive 47830. This
deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
The locomotive will operate with the same
level of compliance as all other Class 47
locomotives in the UK that have already
been fitted with GSM-R.
Freightliner Ltd
05/12/2014
N/A
RST
16/01/2015
Current
14-160-DEV
SN105 and SN125 non-provision of
approach release from red for reduced
junction indication visibility.
5.1.3.4
Signals SN105 and SN125 are on Line 1
(Down Direction) leaving Paddington
Station, MLN 1¬MP to 2MP.
12/01/2015
N/A
CCS
11/12/2014
Current
Due to GM/RT2130 Issue 4 being notified as
a National Technical Rule (NTR) by the
competent authority in the UK, this standard
has become applicable to the project
following the completion of GSM-R system
development, but prior to it being fitted to
Class 47 locomotive 47830 (expected to be
fitted in early 2015). The design of the GSMR system is compliant with Issue 3 of
GM/RT2130. Issue 4 of GM/RT2130 is a
fundamental revision of the standard to align
it with EN 45545, and demonstrating
compliance with Issue 4 would require a
complete new assessment. Therefore,
complying with the new standard at this
advanced stage of the GSM-R project would
require significant re-work that would incur
additional cost and delays to the project. In
addition, fixed system parameters cannot be
modified, resulting in the risk that the GSMR system may not comply with the new
Euronorm.
Complying with the standard would require
the signals to have either some form of
approach control for the diverging routes, or
significant infrastructure alterations to
achieve sighting of the junction indicator.
Each approach control method would
increase the level of complexity of the
signalling controls, have negative impact on
capacity, increase Signal Passed at Danger
(SPAD) risk for the area or increase
potential for confusion with other signals in
the area. Achieving sighting of the junction
indicators is not practical to achieve due to
curved approach, amount of OverHead Line
Equipment (OHLE) masts on approach and
boundary constraints. Further detailed
consideration on each option considered is
in Section 7 of supporting document NRSDG-NC-123242. 11-000002.
No approach release controls are proposed Network Rail
as approach speed to the signals will be 60
mph, with diverging routes 50 mph. As
such, derailment presents a low safety risk
should a train not read the route information.
Diverging routes are to depot approach lines
(goods lines) and as it is desirable for
passenger train drivers to be able to avoid
taking these routes should they be
misrouted. PRI provision assists in reducing
the likely hood of misrouted train entering
the depot approach lines. PRIs will provide
positive information to train drivers about all
the routes from the signals' similar to
flashing and splitting distant signals, that
would permit non-provision of approach
control. See GK/GN0645 GN 550 and
GN551. PRIs provide more information than
a splitting banner that traditionally would be
used to provide increased reading distance
of a junction signal. Although no aspect
information is provided by the PRI, the
junction signals aspects are readable for
sufficient distance, and it was consider this
information does not require repeating.
Page 25
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0045
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
Certificate Number
14-159-DEV
Title
Signals TL4000 and TL4118 alternative
route indications.
RGS Clause
5.1.2.7 a)
Scope
Signals TL4000 and TL4118 approaching
London Bridge Low Level Station.
Nature and Degree
TL4000 and TL4118 signals are in a 50 mph
permissible speed area with a permissible
speed change to 20 mph is approximately
100 m beyond the signals. Alternative
routes are available to the platforms 11, 12
and 13 via the 25 mph crossovers (7222 or
7224). Signals are fitted with Standard
Alphanumeric Route Indicators displaying
only the platform numbers. Compliance
would require an additional indication for
each alternative route. This would
potentially be difficult to provide, and
increase the complexity and number of
elements on signals that are already
complex, I. e. additional Standard
Alphanumeric Route Indicator on each
signal.
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-158-DEV
Far North Radio Electronic Token Block
(RETB) Automatic Warning System (AWS)
cancelling indicators at Halkirk Level
Crossing (LC).
2.1.12.1
Halkirk LC is located on the WCK line at
145M 59ch.
It is not appropriate to attempt to achieve
compliance due to the high number of level
crossings involved that currently do not have
AWS cancelling boards, and the substantial
costs associated with installation and future
maintenance of AWS cancelling indicators
throughout the Far North RETB line.
Installation of AWS cancelling boards just at
this crossing would create an inconsistency,
and therefore the only two options are to
maintain the current status quo, with no
fitments, or to embark on complete line of
route fitment. To achieve full compliance,
AWS cancelling indicators would need to be
retrospectively installed at all distant boards
and level crossing Advance Warning Boards
(AWBs) at a substantial cost, both in terms
of installation and subsequent ongoing
inspection / maintenance. It is therefore not
considered reasonably practicable to bring
the entire Far North RETB line into
compliance with this requirement as the
costs far outweigh any safety benefit.
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-157-DEV
Non-provision of commencement and
termination of Automatic Warning System
(AWS) gap signage at Cannon Street
Station.
2.1.9.3
The extent of deviation apples to all lines out
of Cannon Street Station terminating
platforms to those down direction signals on
the first gantry (CBM 0 miles 20 chains) viz
TL2519, TL2707, TL2411, TL2717 &
TL2715.
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-156-DEV
Non-provision of commencement and
termination of Automatic Warning System
(AWS) gap signage at London Bridge Low
Level Station.
2.1.9.3
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Proposal was initially raised in March 2013
against the GE/RT8035, which has since
been superseded by GE/RT8075, where the
requirement is still pertinent. Compliance
with RGS would therefore require either:
Fitting of AWS to signals TL2519, TL2707,
TL2411, TL2717 and TL2715 Because it is
difficult to achieve, it is proposed not to
provide AWS at these signals, and a risk
assessment has shown that this is
acceptable. or Provision of AWS gap
signage. This is considered an unnecessary
visual distraction for drivers departing (down
direction) Cannon Street Station. For trains
approaching Cannon Street Station on lines
A to E in the up direction, no signage is
proposed to be provided to indicate the
commencement of an AWS gap at structure
423 (TL2296, TL2412, TL2510, TL2718
& TL2816), as the next stop indication
the driver will observe is the relevant buffer
stop or the tail lights of a train already in the
platform and was considered during the risk
assessment that `commencement of AWS
gap' signs on the approach into the station
will not serve any useful purpose. These
conclusions are supported by the risk
assessment (N421-JAC-RET-SG-010072,
version 3. 0).
The extent of deviation apples to all lines out Proposal was initially raised in March 2013
of London Bridge Low Level Station
against the GE/RT8035, which has since
terminating platforms to those down
been superseded by GE/RT8075, where the
direction signals on the first gantry (XTD 2
requirement is still pertinent. Compliance
miles 9 chains) viz TL4005, TL4119 and
with RGS would therefore require either:
TL4207.
Fitting of AWS to signals TL4005, TL4119
and TL4207. Because it is difficult to
achieve, it is proposed not to provide AWS
at these signals, and a risk assessment has
shown that this is acceptable. or Provision
of AWS gap signage . This is considered an
unnecessary visual distraction for drivers
departing (down direction) London Bridge
Low Level Station. For trains approaching
London Bridge Low Level Station in the up
direction, no signage is proposed to be
provided to indicate the commencement of
an AWS gap at structure 3501 (TL4118,
TL4000 & TL4204): the next stop
indication the driver will observe is the
relevant buffer stop or the tail lights of a train
already in the platform and was considered
during the risk assessment that
`commencement of AWS gap' signs on the
approach into the station will not serve any
useful purpose. These conclusions are
supported by the Risk Assessment (N421JAC-RET-SG-010071, version 1. 0).
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Using a generic deceleration figure of 0.
74m/s2, this gives a calculated speed at the
signals of 34 mph. However, the signal
sighting committee have assessed the
speed on the approach and believe the likely
maximum approach speed to be circa 30
mph. The Signal Sighting Committee (SSC)
has endorsed the signal sighting form as
such. At either of these approach speeds,
the derailment risk is very low but drivers
would not be aware which route is set. As
such, drivers would need to assume the
more restrictive alternative route is set and
drive to the 25 mph limit. Approach release
controls are proposed as will these provides
significant difference in approach to the
signals for the alternative routes, allowing
drivers to control speed over the crossovers,
but also drive to the 20 mph limit for the
preferred route. Using NR/L2/SIG/11201Mod B7 approach release will be based on
release speed of 25 mph; this equates to a
release point of 75 m on approach to the
signals.
On the RETB line North of Inverness,
Network Rail has developed an upgrade of
Halkirk LC to ABCL. When passing over a
permanent magnet, the driver of the train
has to cancel the warning. Where the
magnet does not apply to the direction the
train travels in, the driver will use route
knowledge to establish that it does not
apply. This project is similar to previous
upgrades at Marrel, Blackwood and
Acheilidh LCs carried out by Railtrack in
2002. These previous schemes were
approved by Her Majesty's Railway
Inspectorate (HMRI) and that approval was
given on the basis of the principle
established during the formal Department of
Transport (DoT) inspection of the original
RETB installation between Dingwall and
Kyle in November 1984. During that
inspection, and duly recorded in the
minutes, it was directed that AWS cancelling
indicators were of no value and were not
required on RETB infrastructure. This
principle, having been established as part of
the very first RETB DoT inspection was then
applied by British Rail to all the subsequent
RETB deployments in Scotland. This
submission, therefore, seeks a deviation
against the current RGS requirement to
Trains departing the terminal platforms of
Cannon Street Station will be travelling at
low speed (15 mph). The relevant signals
are all fitted with Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS) Train Stop System
(TSS) loops which have been shown to be
effective for all trains (passenger at 12%g
and 9%g braking, freight at 7. 5%g and 6%g
braking) passing the signal at red by
stopping them short of the safe overrun
distance. This is a perpetuation of what is
already an existing arrangement and is
envisaged will be for the lifetime of this
installation, I. e. circa 30 years +. Risk
assessment (N421-JAC-RET-SG-010072,
version 3. 0) was conducted and accepted
that there is no impact by the non-provision
of AWS or AWS gap signage.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
12/01/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
11/12/2014
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
12/01/2015
N/A
CCS
11/12/2014
Current
Network Rail
12/01/2015
N/A
CCS
11/12/2014
Current
Trains departing the terminal platforms of
Network Rail
London Bridge Low Level station will be
travelling at low speed (20 mph). The
relevant signals are all fitted with Train
Protection and Warning System (TPWS)
Train Stop System (TSS) loops which have
been shown to be effective for all trains
(passenger at 12%g and 9%g braking,
freight at 7. 5%g and 6%g braking) passing
the signal at red by stopping them short of
the safe overrun distance. This is a
perpetuation of what is already an existing
arrangement and is envisaged will be for the
lifetime of this installation, I. e. circa 30
years +. Risk Assessment (N421-JAC-RETSG-010071, version 1. 0) was conducted
and accepted that there is no impact by the
non-provision of AWS or AWS gap signage.
12/01/2015
N/A
CCS
11/12/2014
Current
Page 26
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2461
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and on- track Machines
Certificate Number
14-155-DEV
Title
Class 377 Sanding on Trailing Units.
GCRT5112
Two
Rail Traffic Loading Requirements for the
Design of Railway Structures
14-153-DEV
Bottesford Station - Installation of footbridge 7.1.3
to enable removal of a foot crossing, bridge
support on Platform 1.
Bottesford Station, Station Road,
Bottesford, Leicestershire, NG13 0GT.
Installation of footbridge to enable removal
of a foot crossing between Platforms 1 and
2.
The severity/impact at Bottesford Station in
connection with the proposed footbridge
install works is considered generally very
low for the use/operational aspect of the
finished project; furthermore, an inherent
risk identified by the Office of Rail
Regulation (ORR) will have been removed,
with extensive platform and lighting
upgrades already being carried out as part
of the overall scheme to generally improve
functionality of the station also. A recent
footfall survey carried out as part of the
Scheme Feasibility clearly suggests a
negligible effect to the general and more so
"less able" user; this has been demonstrated
to and accepted by the Department for
Transport (DfT). The safety justification is
primarily the removal of an inherent risk
identified by the ORR in connection with the
foot crossing that the proposed footbridge
will permanently replace.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-149-DEV
London Bridge station, low level terminating
platforms 10-15 - position of canopy
columns in overrun risk zone.
6.3.1
London Bridge station, low level terminating
platforms 10-15, London end, are included
in this application.
A fully compliant design is not considered
appropriate for the envisaged scenario at
the London end of these platforms. One
column on each of Platforms 10-15 is within
the overrun risk zone. The canopies are
designed to remain standing due to the
redundancy of design to prevent
disproportionate collapse in the event of a
train overrun which removes the column in
the risk zone associated with any one
platform. The canopy column alignment has
been set back as far as possible from the
platform edge consistent with providing a
compliant edge distance and maintaining a
straight alignment with those columns
across the bridge decks. A straight
alignment of canopy columns eases
pedestrian flows along the platforms and
simplifies structural framing of the canopies.
The width between pairs of columns on each
island platform is governed by the width of
escalator and stair access to platforms.
Train Protection and Warning System
(TPWS) and a compliant buffer design
mitigates any significant risk.
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-148-DEV
Far North Radio Electronic Token Block
(RETB) Automatic Warning System (AWS)
Cancelling Indicators at Duirinish Level
Crossing (LC).
2.1.12.1
Duirinish LC is located on the KYL Line at
56M 58ch.
It is not appropriate to attempt to achieve
compliance due to the high number of level
crossings involved that currently do not have
AWS cancelling boards, and the substantial
costs associated with installation and future
maintenance of AWS cancelling indicators
throughout the Far North RETB Line.
Installation of AWS Cancelling Boards just at
this crossing would create an inconsistency
and, therefore, the only two options are to
maintain the current status quo with no
fitments, or to embark on complete Line of
Route fitment. To achieve full compliance,
AWS cancelling indicators would need to be
retrospectively installed at all Distant Boards
and Level Crossing Advance Warning
Boards (AWBs) at a substantial cost, both in
terms of installation and subsequent
ongoing inspection / maintenance. It is
therefore not considered reasonably
practicable to bring the entire Far North
RETB Line into compliance with this
requirement as the costs far outweigh any
safety benefit.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
6.2, 9.1, 9.3.1
Scope
Nature and Degree
All Class 377 Electric Multiple Units (EMUs). The deviation requests enhanced
performance, which is non-compliant with
the standard as written, but consistent with
the objectives of the standard.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Sand will only be dispensed during a brake
application (step 2, full service or
emergency) by units on which the leading
vehicle detects wheel slide. As such, trailing
units will only dispense sand if they detect
wheel slide and have sufficient sand
available. The likelihood of sanding on
trailing units occurring is lower, as the
leading unit will condition the railhead and
so the trailing units are likely to experience
wheel slide or slip to a lesser extent. This
functionality has been developed to increase
the safety of the railway in conditions of
extremely poor rail head adhesion or where
the sanding system on the leading unit does
not function correctly (due to a fault or
having run out of sand), having a positive
impact on overall system performance.
Whenever sand is applied on a trailing unit,
there will always be at least twelve axles
after the initial sand deposition point. The
amount of sand deposited and the number
axles following the deposition point will be
the same as if the units were separate trains
following each other. Therefore, it is
considered that there is no negative impact
in terms of contamination of the railhead,
noting that sand will only be deployed on the
trailing unit if the railhead has not been
Following a territory wide review of all level
crossings undertaken by the ORR,
Bottesford Station, which has operational
vehicular, bridleway and foot crossing
points, was identified as a site requiring
swift improvements to minimise/eliminate
risk at the site by carrying out a scheme of
enhancements at the station generally and to
all of the crossings on site in particular also.
The vehicular and bridleway crossing
enhancement works have already been
carried out with great success, with only the
footbridge install works, which removes use
of the foot crossing point, now remaining.
Note: the drawings and details provided
forming part of this Submission, are as
follows: 3D Model Photos; Drawing Nos
NG8143-101 & 102; C114050-TG-00XX-DR-C-1001, 1002 & 1003. Details
to satisfy the apt standards for the deviation
being sought are captured on Drawing Nos
NG8143-101 and 102, with 3D Model Photos
supplied to add perspective at the location in
question also.
One column on each of Platforms 10-15 is
within the over-run risk zone. The noncompliance was identified in the form 001
(N420-COT-FO1-CV-000004 Section A1. 3)
which was signed by Network Rail on
26/02/2013. Some of the columns
supporting the shard interface canopy are
within the overrun risk zone at the end of the
terminating tracks. The canopy is designed
to remain standing in the event of a train
overrunning; the column in a single overrun
zone can be considered as removed and the
canopy will remain standing, but
simultaneous overrun events are not
contemplated as it is very unlikely that two
events will occur at the same time. Note that
the buffer stop locations have been
amended since the Form 001 was written
and the attached sketch has been amended
to show the revised arrangement. The face
of the column on Platforms 10 and 11 is
more than 2500 mm from the platform edge,
and therefore it complies with Section 6. 2. 2
of GI/RT7016. The other columns are not
adjacent to platform faces. The canopy
columns have been set as far back as
possible from the platform edge consistent
with maintaining a straight alignment across
the bridge decks. A straight alignment
On the RETB Line North of Inverness,
Network Rail has developed an upgrade of
Duirinish LC to ABCL. When passing over a
permanent magnet, the driver of the train
has to cancel the warning. Where the
magnet does not apply to the direction the
train travels in, the driver will use route
knowledge to establish that it does not
apply. This project is similar to previous
upgrades at Marrel, Blackwood and
Acheilidh LCs carried out by Railtrack in
2002. These previous schemes were
approved by Her Majesty's Railway
Inspectorate (HMRI) and that approval was
given on the basis of the principle
established during the formal Department of
Transport (DoT) Inspection of the original
RETB installation between Dingwall and
Kyle in November 1984. During that
Inspection, and duly recorded in the
minutes, the DoT directed that AWS
Cancelling Indicators were of no value and
were not required on RETB Infrastructure.
This principle, having been established as
part of the very first RETB DoT Inspection,
was then applied by British Rail to all the
subsequent RETB deployments in Scotland.
This submission therefore seeks a deviation
against the current RGS requirement to
Applicant Organisation
Southern Railway Limited
Certificate Issue Date
02/01/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
05/12/2014
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
07/10/2015
N/A
INS
06/01/2015
Current
Network Rail
11/12/2014
N/A
INS
12/11/2014
Current
Network Rail
05/12/2014
N/A
CCS
13/11/2014
Current
Page 27
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0192
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
Certificate Number
14-147-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
Woodbridge area - non-provision of
2.11.1.1
Automatic Level Crossing Advance Warning
Signs (LCAWIs) Automatic Warning System
(AWS).
Scope
Route: Anglia. Equipment: Ferry Lane,
ESK, 79m04ch; Haywards, ESK, 79m07ch.
Lime Kiln, ESK, 79m29ch. Sun Wharf, ESK,
79m31ch.
Nature and Degree
Complying with the requirements will
require four additional AWS. If Solid State
Interlocking (SSI) data interlocking changes
are needed for suppression of the magnets
(as this is on a single line), this will increase
both costs and timescales for delivering the
Automatic Open Crossing, locally monitored,
with barrier (AOCL+B) upgrade. The
additional costs and programme impact
would mean that the level crossing safety
benefit of adding the barriers would not be
realised as quickly as desired, the costs for
meeting the requirement are estimated to be
œ25 000. Provision of AWS could cause
significant distraction to drivers when
approaching level crossings and would
increase driver's workload.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The existing arrangement has no AWS
Network Rail
currently fitted to the LCAWIs between
Haywards and Lime Kiln Crossings. The
proposal perpetuates this arrangement as
the risk reduction/safety benefit achieved at
the level crossing itself is the priority. The
non-provision of the AWS will mean that
train drivers will not receive the warning of
approach to the third or fourth level crossing,
the warning is provided to draw the driver's
attention to the LCAWI and subsequent
Special Speed Restriction Board (SSRB)
and Driver's Crossing Indicator (DCI). Upon
approach to the first crossing, the driver
would have received the required AWS
warning and as these crossings are so close
to one another; they will see the signage for
the next crossing when clearing the previous
one, therefore will not benefit from another
warning. The residual risk will remain the
same as it is now, and it is believed that
providing additional AWS warnings inbetween the crossings will act as an
additional distraction to the driver, who will
be concentrating on each crossing in turn
and therefore would not benefit from having
to react to an additional AWS.
Certificate Issue Date
05/12/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
13/11/2014
Deviation Status
Current
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-146-DEV
Woodbridge area - non-provision of
2.1.7.4 Table 7, Section H.
Automatic Level Crossing Advance Warning
Signs (LCAWIs) Automatic Warning System
(AWS).
Route: Anglia. Equipment: · Ferry Lane;
ESK: 79m04ch; · Haywards, ESK:
79m07ch; · Lime Kiln, ESK: 79m29ch; · Sun
Wharf, ESK: 79m31ch.
Complying with the requirements will
require four additional AWS. If Solid State
Interlocking (SSI) data interlocking changes
are needed for suppression of the magnets
(as this is on a single line), this will increase
both costs and timescales for delivering the
Automatic Open Crossing, locally monitored,
with barrier (AOCL+B) upgrade. The
additional costs and programme impact
would mean that the level crossing safety
benefit of adding the barriers would not be
realised as quickly as desired, the costs for
meeting the requirement are estimated to be
œ25 000. Provision of AWS could cause
significant distraction to drivers when
approaching level crossings and would
increase driver's workload.
The existing arrangement has no AWS
Network Rail
currently fitted to the LCAWIs between
Haywards and Lime Kiln Crossings. The
proposal perpetuates this arrangement as
the risk reduction/safety benefit achieved at
the level crossing itself is the priority. The
non-provision of the AWS will mean that
train drivers will not receive the warning of
approach to the third or fourth level crossing,
the warning is provided to draw the driver's
attention to the LCAWI and subsequent
Special Speed Restriction Board (SSRB)
and Driver's Crossing Indicator (DCI). Upon
approach to the first crossing, the driver
would have received the required AWS
warning and, as these crossings are so
close to one another, they will see the
signage for the next crossing when clearing
the previous one, therefore will not benefit
from another warning. The residual risk will
remain the same as it is now, and it is
believed that providing additional AWS
warnings in-between the crossings will act
as an additional distraction to the driver, who
will be concentrating on each crossing in
turn and therefore would not benefit from
having to react to an additional AWS.
05/12/2014
N/A
CCS
13/11/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-145-DEV
London Bridge station, platforms 1, 2/3, 4/5,
6/7 & 8/9 eastern (Country) end reduced platform widths a canopy columns.
N/A
INS
12/11/2014
Current
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-144-DEV
London Bridge Station, Platform 9, Platforms 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4 (a) and; (b)
8 & 7, Platforms 6 & 5, Platforms 4
& 3, and Platforms 2 & 1 Horizontal track alignment through station
platforms.
Six columns at the country end of Platforms Network Rail
1, 2/3, 4/5, 6/7, 8/9 are less than 2500 mm
from the platform edge. This is because the
width of the land owned by Network Rail, the
number of platforms required to run the train
service specified and agreed with the
Department for Transport (DfT), and the
spacing of the rail tracks at this point drives
the platform widths. Edge distances are as
follows: Platform 1: 1980 mm; Platform 2/3:
2178 mm from Platform 2; 2283 mm from
Platform 3;Platform 4/5: 2179/1957 mm
from Platform 4; 2376/2139 mm from
Platform 5; Platform 6/7: 2492 mm from
Platform 6; Platform 8/9: 2493 mm from
Platform 8; 2462 mm from Platform 9.
Please see diagram attached. The width of
the platforms is driven by the track
alignments, and these are governed by the
width of the viaduct. It is not possible, using
the powers available to Network Rail, to
widen the viaduct. The design chosen is a
balance between widths of platforms across
the whole station, and a degree of noncompliance is inevitable. The six
terminating platforms (10-15) are slightly
wider, as trains terminating discharge all
their passengers at once. Not all
passengers will alight from 'through' trains
The physical constraints of the London
Network Rail
Bridge Station area and the requirement to
install new High Level platforms, new Low
Level platforms and a new station building to
accommodate twelve-car length trains
drives some platform lines to be designed
on radii that are tighter than the standard
requires. This is a historically constrained
site where the existing layout radius is below
the current standard requirement. There is
no possibility of achieving the 1000 m radius
specified due to existing railway curvature
with viaduct and structure constraints;
however, attempts have been made to
maximise the radius as part of the Guide to
Railway Investment Project (GRIP) 4 design,
while incorporating the mandatory
requirement for emergency evacuation of the
platforms. Platform widths have been
designed to maximise pedestrian access
and egress for current and anticipated
passenger forecasts. Clear route analysis
has been carried out and platform stepping
distances have been confirmed as within the
Group Standard limits. A permanent
deviation has been certificated for the Low
level Platforms 10 and 15 (number
13/175/DEV - Tracker No. 15192).
11/12/2014
GIRT7016
London Bridge station, Platforms 1, 2/3, 4/5, One column on Platform 1 is slightly less
6/7 and 8/9 eastern (Country) end, canopy
than 2000 mm from the platform edge. It is
columns.
very close to the end of the platform and
east of the emergency escape stair, and so it
is in an area of very low pedestrian flow.
One other column is less than 2000 mm
from the edge of platforms 4/5, but this is
close to the end of the operational platform
length. All columns that are less than 2500
mm from the platform edge are at the
country ends of the platforms where, in
normal operation of the station, passenger
flows are low. No flow analysis is offered
with this submission. If there is a need to
evacuate Platforms 2/3, 4/5, 6/7 and 8/9
using the country end escape stairs,
pedestrian flows past the non-compliant
columns could be high, but the pinch point
on the escape routes is always the stairs
themselves, and past these columns the
flow capability is more than twice the
capacity of the escape stairs. Evacuation of
Platform 1 would not result in a high
pedestrian flow past the non-compliant
column because the stair is on the London
side of the column. The proposed new track
and platform alignment is not significantly
different from the layout that exists today,
meaning that station personnel and
This issue applies throughout London
Within the High Level platforms, the
Bridge Station (both High and Low Level).
designed radii will be: Platform 9: between
The lengths of sub-1,000 m radius platform 300 m and 320 m; Platform 8: between 487
faces are as follows by platform: Platform 9: m and 500 7: between 483 m and 497 6:
196 m; Platforms 8 and 7: 168 m; Platforms 338 m; Platform 5 335 m; Platform 4:
6 and 5: approximately 65 m and 85 m;
between 268 m and 400 m; Platform 3: 265
Platforms 4 and 3: approximately 206 m
m and 403 2: between 250 m and 253 m;
and 181 m; Platforms 2 and 1:
Platform 1: 247 m and 354 m. There is a
approximately 209 m and 250 m.
length of straight approximately central to
each platform and a length of curve at
London end and country end. The extent of
straight for each platform is approximately:
Platform 9: 51m;Platforms 8 and 7: 82 m;
Platforms 6 and 5: 184 m and 178 m;
Platforms 4 and 3: 70 m; Platforms 2 and 1:
31 m. The length of straight is longest for
Platforms 5 and 6 and decreases toward the
platforms at the extreme of the High level
tracks (Platforms 1 and 9). The extent and
degree of curvature is least for Platforms 5
and 6 and maximum for Platforms 1 and 2.
"Clear route" analysis has been run on
tracks 1-9 and platform stepping distances
confirmed as within prescribed limits for the
High level platforms. The new platforms at
London Bridge feature an uncluttered design
with good visibility end-to-end, except for the
presence of the trains themselves. Train
dispatch staff will be positioned alongside
11/12/2014
N/A
INS
12/11/2014
Current
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
6.2.1, 6.2.2 (a) and; (b)
Page 28
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GCRT5212
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
Clearances
Certificate Number
14-143-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
Heathrow Airport Terminal 5, Platform 4 C2.1, Table 2 - Categorisation of clearances
reduction of clearance at platform gap fillers. for absolute gauging. G4.1 - Alterations
other than to permit the passage of larger
rail vehicles.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-142-DEV
Lea Bridge Station - Platform offset.
Appendix 1, Clause 1.2
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-139-DEV
TPWS application on steam locomotive
34016.
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-138-DEV
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-136-DEV
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
This deviation against GC/RT5212 Issue 1
is for the installation of rubber platform gap
fillers at all door positions (for the Class 332
rolling stock that operates the services into
the platform in question) along the length of
Heathrow Terminal 5 (T5), Platform 4, for a
second phase of trialling. Initial trials,
installing the gap fillers at a limited number
of doors positions, was undertaken following
agreement of deviation 13/227/DEV in
January 2014. The impact of the installation
is to reduce nominal clearance between
vehicles and the infrastructure from 70 mm
(I. e. normal clearance) to 25 mm (I. e.
reduced clearance). The gap filler is,
however, flexible and effective clearance
remains greater than this nominal value.
The clearance rules of GC/RT5212 Issue 1,
however, do not recognise the possibility of
such flexible components and deviation is
therefore necessary. The trial will be
conducted for a period of up to 24 months to
allow for sufficient trial time and data
gathering to demonstrate that the gap filler
achieves a safety benefit. Conclusions of
the trial and evidence of the benefits will be
presented to the RSSB once they are
available within the 24 month period. If, at
any time during the trial period, the findings
Lea Bridge Station. Engineers' Line
Reference (ELR): SDC. Mileage: 6m 25ch.
Nature and Degree
Clause C2 Table 2 provides definition of
normal/reduced/special reduced clearances
in the lower sector. Clause G4. 1 states that
alterations to infrastructure should not cause
reduction of clearances from one category to
a more severe (smaller clearance) category.
The current platform clearances comply with
the RGS requirements. In this scenario,
there have been incidents of passengers,
especially those with a small foot size,
stepping between the platform and the
Class 332 stepping plate and getting their
foot/leg trapped. HEx is trialling the gap
fillers to assess their benefits in reducing the
number of such accidents on Heathrow
Terminal 5 Platform 4.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The impacts of the proposed gap filler have Heathrow Express Operating
been more fully detailed in the supporting
Company Ltd.
documents attached. In summary, the gap
filler trial is expected to: Improve passenger
safety on the Terminal 5 platform 4.
Maintain acceptable train - platform
clearances, as demonstrated through Phase
1 trials, whilst affecting technical
compatibility of the railway system through
the reduction in normal clearance
arrangements. The gap fillers can be
removed if railway requirements change in
the future, or if the trial proves to be
unsuccessful. Have no effect on service
performance. Have no direct impact on
environment. Please see the supporting
documentation for details.
Compliance with the standard would mean
non-compliance with another.
4.1.3.3, 4.2.1.7 and 4.2.3.
Operation of the following preserved Steam
Locomotive on all lines as agreed by
Network Rail Acceptance Panel (NRAP)
and, subsequently, by the Transport
Undertaking. S. R. West Country steam
locomotive `Bodmin'. TOPS No. 98716
Painted No. 34016 Class / Power
Classification 7P Wheel Arrangement 4-6-2
Maximum Speed 75 mph.
Enhancements to the TPWS DMI and
speech warning announcements. Noncompatibility for spares with other steam
locomotives currently operating on Network
Rail controlled infrastructure under
deviations from RGS and non-comparative
driver interface for steam locomotives.
TPWS application on steam locomotive
76084.
4.1.3.3, 4.2.1.7 and 4.2.3.
Operation of the following preserved Steam
Locomotive on all lines as agreed by
Network Rail Acceptance Panel (NRAP) and
subsequently, by the Transport Undertaking.
British Railways Standard Class 4 TOPS
No. 98484 Painted No. 76084 Class /
Power Classification 4MT Wheel
Arrangement 2-6-0 Maximum Speed 60
mph.
Enhancements to the TPWS DMI and
speech warning announcements. Noncompatibility for spares with other steam
locomotives currently operating on Network
Rail controlled infrastructure under
deviations from RGS and non-comparative
driver interface for steam locomotives.
Strood Station, Platforms 2 and 3 - reduced
platform width.
7.3
This deviation relates to Platforms 2 and 3 at As part of the East Kent Resignalling Phase
Strood station in Kent.
2 (EKR2) Project, the platforms at Strood
station are to be lengthened at the London
end to accommodate twelve-car trains in
place of the current ten-car maximum. This
is required to facilitate service lengthening of
Southeastern metro services to twelve-car
operation on this route as the networker train
fleet used does not have selective door
operation capability. The platforms can only
be extended at the London end because of
the existence of a major junction layout at the
country end of the platforms, and hence the
extensions are being undertaken at the
London end which is on a curve constrained
by the position of the entrance to Strood
tunnel. This deviation relates only to the Up
island platform (Platforms 2 and 3). As the
permanent speed restriction applicable to all
lines through Strood station is 15 mph, this
should have a minimum width of 4000 m for
compliance. However, in this instance, it is
proposed that the island platform will taper
to a minimum width of 2905 mm. The total
length of platform less than 4000 mm wide
will be 25 m (of a total platform length of
circa 270 m). To maximise the space
available for the platform extension, Network
Rail has purchased adjacent land (the verge
Certificate Issue Date
11/12/2014
Certificate End Date
12/11/2016
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
12/11/2014
Deviation Status
Current
Minor impact in regards to safety, no affect Network Rail
11/12/2014
to performance: · The increased offset
reduced the platform overhang which is the
subject of another deviation application Ref.
14/108/DEV (Tracker No. 17890).
The preserved steam locomotive is of a
West Coast Railway Company 04/12/2014
type that ran safely over the British railway
Limited
infrastructure since its introduction and
continued until its withdrawal from revenue
service. The locomotive had a history of
reliable service. The locomotive is intended
for Heritage Operation only. In order to
achieve compliance with all RGSs, the cost
would be prohibitive and such engineering
change would also destroy the locomotive's
fundamental nature and authenticity as a
"heritage" vehicle. Making the locomotive
compliant would, in many instances, be
impractical because of the bulk and location
of the locomotive boiler. · Footplate crew
are subject to specific training in the
handling of a steam locomotive. Steam
locomotive operation requires at least two
persons to present in the cab at all times
and regularly includes a third person whose
role is to independently monitor the
performance. · Use of locomotive restricted
to <15 k Miles p. a. as a `heritage' vehicle
which limits exposure to risk.
N/A
INS
12/11/2014
Current
N/A
CCS
13/11/2014
Current
The preserved steam locomotive is of a
West Coast Railway Company 04/12/2014
type that ran safely over the British railway
Limited
infrastructure since its introduction and
continued until its withdrawal from revenue
service. The locomotive had a history of
reliable service. The locomotive is intended
for Heritage Operation only. In order to
achieve compliance with all RGS, the cost
would be prohibitive and such engineering
change would also destroy the locomotive's
fundamental nature and authenticity as a
"heritage" vehicle. Making the locomotive
compliant would, in many instances, be
impractical because of the bulk and location
of the locomotive boiler. Footplate crew are
subject to specific training in the handling of
a steam locomotive. Steam locomotive
operation requires at least two persons to
present in the cab at all times and regularly
includes a third person whose role is to
independently monitor the performance.
Use of locomotive restricted to <15 k Miles
p. a. as a `heritage' vehicle which limits
exposure to risk.
N/A
CCS
13/11/2014
Current
Network Rail have worked with the relevant Network Rail
train operating company, Southeastern, to
assess the risks arising from the final twelvecar platform arrangements. The resulting
risk assessment document is attached and
is supportive of this deviation. Control
measures proposed over and above those
needed to achieve compliance with Railway
Group and Network Rail company standards
have been identified as follows and will be
implemented: Signage to encourage
passengers to wait in the appropriate
section of the platform; Signage to prohibit
passengers from waiting in the narrowest
area beyond the 8/10/12-car DOO monitor
bank where trains will not routinely stop. It
will be ensured that signage and platform
finishes (lining and tactiles) remain present,
legible and effective for the life of the asset
through appropriate maintenance regimes.
Note that (unlike the temporary arrangement
covered under Tracker No. 18100 14/115/DEV), there is no requirement to
restrict where passengers, who need to use
the access ramp to board or alight the train,
can be accommodated as the platform width
- although reduced - is sufficient to allow the
ramp to be used safely on the 16 m section
that will be in daily use. In the event that
N/A
INS
12/11/2014
Current
11/12/2014
Page 29
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
14-135-DEV
Title
Curvature of Platform Extensions at Strood
Station.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
14-134-DEV
Use of NYMR Teak Bodied Carriages on
Network Rail Infrastructure
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
14-133-DEV
Richmond Station Platforms 4, 5, 6 and 7.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
14-132-DEV
Steam Locomotive Bodmin TOPS number
98716.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
14-131-DEV
Steam Locomotive TOPS number 98484.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
2.1.3
Scope
This deviation relates to Strood station in
Kent (all platforms).
Nature and Degree
The extension of Platform 1 will be used
only by twelve-car trains as all trains stop at
the same stopping position at the extreme
country end of the platform. The extension
of Platform 2 will be used by all trains of
eight-cars or more (these currently form
about 35% of the weekday train service).
The extension of Platform 3 will be rarely
used as this platform is predominantly used
by short (3 or 4 car) trains for the Medway
Valley line shuttle service which stop
towards the country end of the platform, near
the entrance, where the platform is
essentially straight. Usage of the extensions
will therefore be focussed primarily on peak
times when the longer formations are used.
Signal sighting constraints apply only to the
extensions of Platforms 2 and 3 with new
banner repeating signals being provided to
achieve a satisfactory reading distance. The
design of the platform extensions (and
widening of Platform 3) achieves standard
offsets in compliance with GC/RT5212.
However, recognising that the platforms are
on a tight curve, it has been agreed to
provide "Mind the Gap" warning messages
on the platform surfaces. With the exception
of the short Medway Valley services (which
use the straight section of the platform), all
6.6.3 and Appendix H.2
Deviation is requested for seven Ex LNE
In the case of GM/RT2000, deviation is
Railway teak bodied carriages currently
sought from the policy statement laid out in
used by the North Yorkshire Moors Railway clause H2 (a) which states: "No additional
(NYMR) on its internal services viz: · Brake wooden bodied rail vehicles designed or
Third Open: 43567; · Buffet Unclassified:
modified to carry persons shall be
641; · Restaurant: 43654; · Tourist Third
certificated for registration to operate on
Open: 23956, 56856; · Saloon: 3087; ·
Railtrack Controlled Infrastructure. " The
Brake Third Corridor: 3669.
NYMR, in association with Network Rail, has
been awarded funding from the Coastal
Communities initiative for works at Whitby
Station to enable the NYMR to improve train
services from Whitby to Pickering. The
improvement to services will be enhanced
and sustained by the use of attractive
historic vehicles as an alternative to the
Mark 1 sets which would have to be used
instead. Deviations from the other quoted
RGS requirements are matters of technical
content, for which deviations are sought on
the basis that the vehicles generally
complied with the standards extant at the
time of their service use on the London and
North Eastern Railway (LNER) and British
Rail (BR), but which standards have now
been revised in line with current available
technology. Generally, compliance with this
group of standards would be unreasonably
expensive and would detract from the
experience of offering a passenger service
2.5.3.4 b) and d)
Richmond Station Buffer Stops - Platforms
Railway Group Standard GK/RT0045
4, 5, 6 and 7.
conflicts with London Underground (LU)
Category 1 Standard S1195. RGS
GK/RT0045 - Clause 2. 5. 3. 4 b) and d)
requires stop lights to be vertically aligned
above the centre line of the track and be
positioned at the buffer stop, in the same
vertical plan as the buffer stop. LU Category
1 Standard S1195, Clause 3. 4. 2. 7. 3 Fixed red lights shall be provided for each
track, 2 side-by-side, approximately 3
metres beyond the normal stopping point
and, if there is greater than 10 metres
between the 2 fixed red lights and the end of
the track, a third shall be placed at the
extreme end of the track, at sidings and
terminal platforms. If site geography does
not allow 3 metres between the normal
stopping mark and the two red lights, then
that distance may be decreased, but it shall
not be less than 1. 5 metres. Project felt that
the current requirements in GK/RT0045
were overly prescriptive; it should be left
with the Signal Sighting Committee to
decide the position.
The clauses against which non-compliances Operation of the following preserved Steam Steam Locomotive construction and
are sought can be found in Appendix 2 page Locomotive on all lines as agreed by
operating systems are incompatible with the
1 of the accompanying supporting
Network Rail Acceptance Panel (NRAP)
areas of RGS specified in the supporting
document.
and, subsequently, by the Transport
document.
Undertaking. S. R. West Country steam
locomotive `Bodmin': TOPS No. . 98716
Painted No. 34016 Class / Power
Classification 7P Wheel Arrangement 4-6-2
Maximum Speed 75 mph.
The clauses against which non-compliances Operation of the following preserved Steam
are sought can be found in Appendix 2 page Locomotive on all lines as agreed by
1 of the accompanying supporting
Network Rail Acceptance Panel (NRAP) and
document.
subsequently, by the Transport Undertaking.
British Railways Standard Class 4 TOPS
No. 98484 Painted No. 76084 Class /
Power Classification: 4MT Wheel
Arrangement: 2-6-0 Maximum Speed: 50
mph.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
As part of the East Kent Resignalling Phase Network Rail
2 (EKR2) Project, the platforms at Strood
station are to be lengthened at the London
end to accommodate twelve-car trains in
place of the current ten-car maximum. This
is required to facilitate service lengthening of
Southeastern metro services to twelve-car
operation on this route as the networker train
fleet used does not have selective door
operation capability. The platforms can only
be extended at the London end because of
the existence of a major junction layout at the
country end of the platforms. At the London
end of Strood station, the line curves sharply
through approximately 90 degrees in order
to enter Strood Tunnel (2127 m long). This
curve starts within the length of the existing
platforms, and therefore the platform
extensions will also be on a curve as there is
no practical opportunity to straighten out the
layout sufficiently to achieve a 500 m radius
curve. The actual track radius, through each
of the proposed platform extensions, is as
follows: Platform 1 (Down North Kent) - 240
2 (Up North Kent) - 225 3 (Up Strood Loop) 270 m (210 m where existing length of
platform is being widened). The permanent
speed restriction applicable to all lines
through Strood station is 15 mph. The
There is unlikely to be any significant impact North Yorkshire Moors Railway
with the use of these vehicles on NYMR
Enterprises plc
services; they have very similar traffic
characteristics to the existing fleet of NYMR
Mark 1 carriages, with which they are
completely interchangeable, although the
intention would be to run them as a uniform
formation. The benefits to the NYMR of
running these vehicles to Whitby in
particular are: it increases the pool of
available vehicles; it provides a particularly
attractive historical train of vehicles of a type
which will have worked to Whitby during
their LNER and BR service lives. The use of
these vehicles would have no effect on the
safety of the railway system as they would
be used on the same basis as the NYMR
Mark 1 fleet. The use of these vehicles will
have no effect on the technical compatibility
of the railway system now and in the future
as they use conventional drop head buck
eye couplers, conventional buffers and
automatic vacuum brakes. The use of these
vehicles does not affect costs or service
performance. The NYMR experience of
using these vehicles between Pickering and
Grosmont shows them to be as reliable in
service as our mark one fleet. The affected
parties would be Northern Rail as the other
The arrangements are complaint to LUL
Network Rail
standard and meet the operators (LU and
LOROL) requirements. The proposed Fixed
Red Lights (FRL) arrangements have been
supported by the Signal Sighting Chairman
and Committee members and mitigates
against multiple stop light positions and
considers failure of NR or LU lights. A retroreflective buffer beam surface will be
provided. No risk introduced, the solution
proposed by the Signal Sighting Chairman
and committee members and supported by
the endorsed SSFs.
Certificate Issue Date
19/12/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Infrastructure
Lead SC Approval Date
12/11/2014
Deviation Status
Current
27/11/2014
31/03/2023
RST
31/10/2014
Current
12/11/2014
N/A
CCS
16/10/2014
Current
As indicated in Appendix 7 of this
West Coast Railway Company 03/12/2014
document. The preserved steam locomotive Limited
is of a type that ran safely over the British
railway infrastructure since its introduction
and continued until its withdrawal from
revenue service. The locomotive had a
history of reliable service. The locomotive is
intended for Heritage Operation only. In
order to achieve compliance with RGS, the
cost would be prohibitive and such
engineering change would also destroy the
locomotive's fundamental nature and
authenticity as a "heritage" vehicle. Making
the locomotive compliant would, in many
instances, be impractical because of the
bulk and location of the locomotive boiler.
N/A
RST
31/10/2014
Current
Steam Locomotive construction and
As indicated in Appendix 7 of this
West Coast Railway Company 03/12/2014
operating systems are incompatible with the document. The preserved steam locomotive Limited
areas of RGS specified in the supporting
is of a type that ran safely over the British
document.
railway infrastructure since its introduction
and continued until its withdrawal from
revenue service. The locomotive had a
history of reliable service. The locomotive is
intended for Heritage Operation only. In
order to achieve compliance with RGS, the
cost would be prohibitive and such
engineering change would also destroy the
locomotive's fundamental nature and
authenticity as a "heritage" vehicle. Making
the locomotive compliant would, in many
instances, be impractical because of the
bulk and location of the locomotive boiler.
N/A
RST
31/10/2014
Current
Page 30
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2000
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
Certificate Number
14-130-DEV
Title
Generic deviation against NNTRs for UK
Dual Locomotives.
RGS Clause
See details of RGS clauses in Annex 1.
Scope
This deviation is for a new fleet of dual
electric/diesel powered locomotives, known
as UK Dual (Class 88), supplied by Vossloh
España S. A. for operation by Direct Rail
Services Ltd. This deviation is sought for
the present order of 10 locomotives (8800188010) and all subsequent builds of Class
88 as allowed by the type authorisation rules
(subject to major standards changes). The
UK Dual locomotive is based on the existing
EUROLIGHT and UK Light design. This
deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
GKRT0094
One
Train Voice Radio Systems
14-129-DEV
Global System for Mobile communications
for Railways (GSM-R) Calling Line Identity
and Contacting Emergency Services.
5.11.3.1 and 5.14.2
The derogation applies to the UK National
GSM-R network.
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-127-DEV
Class 170 &amp; 334 Light Emitting Diode
(LED) Automatic Warning System (AWS)
Indicator Sounder Levels.
4.2.2.1 b)
This deviation applies to the LED AWS
indicator unit, part no. 062/015808 when
fitted to ScotRail Class 170 and 334 trains.
GMRT2141
Three
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over
14-126-DEV
Chiltern Railways Mk3 Galley First
Wheelchair (GFW) Auxiliary Power Unit
Modification Resistance to Overturning.
2.4.1.1 b)
Chiltern Railways Mk3 GFW; extension of
derogation 10/046/DGN.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The UK Dual locomotive will be compliant
with the Technical Specifications for
Interoperability (TSI) requirements, including
the Locomotive and Passenger TSI. In
addition, it will be compliant with all
applicable Notified National Technical Rules
(NNTRs) to cover open points and specific
cases, and ensure compatibility with the GB
mainline system. It will also operate over off
Trans-European Network (TEN) routes and
therefore the complete suite of RGSs is
applicable. Within these RGSs, there are a
significant number of requirements that are
not directly related to TSI open points,
specific cases or compatibility. These
requirements have equivalent or
comparable requirements within the suite of
TSIs, therefore compliance with these RGS
requirements duplicates the TSI
assessment. Consequently, additional effort
and cost will be expended both in respect of
production of the evidence of compliance
and in its subsequent assessment by the
Designated Body. It is also possible that,
due to the differences in the detail of the
requirements, conflicts might exist that either
prevent full compliance with both the TSI
and RGS clauses or necessitate a more
complex design. Due to both the additional
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card
issue: There is no field on the SIM card (the
fields and contents of which are defined by
international standards) that can provide this
functionality. Public Emergency Call issue:
Any GSM-R subscriber making a 999 or 112
call is connected by a point to point call to
the Rail Emergency Operator (Level 3) who
is able to direct the call to the appropriate
person (public emergency services, Network
Rail Signaller, Network Rail Route Control).
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Certificate Issue Date
Use of the alternative actions are considered Vossloh España S.A on behalf 02/12/2014
to deliver an equivalent level of control and of, Direct Rail Services Limited
safety as demonstrated in BB14807700005 (-) and will also not require any further
ongoing actions or operational constraints.
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
31/10/2014
Deviation Status
Current
N/A
Network Rail
12/11/2014
N/A
CCS
16/10/2014
Current
Have a sound level at least 10 dBA above
the expected ambient noise level, subject to
a minimum of 65 dBA and a maximum of 95
dBA, at a distance of 1 m from the front of
the equipment, measured as installed in the
driving cab. As part of the approval process
to demonstrate compliance with GE/RT8035
(since superseded), sound tests were
performed on all First ScotRail (FSR) fleets
which were proposed to be fitted with the
new indicators. See Atkins reports
Let0045022(1 and 2a) for further details.
The test included on train measurements of
the ambient noise and the warning and clear
tones. During testing, it was found that the
clear 'ping' tone sounder volume was
measured to be slightly lower than the
warning 'horn' tone sounder. As a result of
this, the class 170 and 334 tests do not meet
the requirement for 10dBA above ambient.
It is suggested, in the report, that this is
likely due to the initial transient nature of the
'ping' signal and meter readings every 0.
125 seconds not providing enough
resolution to capture the peak sound level.
The supplier Unipart confirmed that the
volume levels for both clear and warning are
set to the same level. The cost of using
meter equipment with a higher sample rate
Chiltern Railways intends to modify its
locomotive-hauled Mk3 Galley First
Wheelchair (GFW) vehicles by removing the
motor alternator sets and associated control
equipment and installing one modern, solidstate Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). With the
proposed new underframe layout of the
GFW vehicle in crush laden conditions,
using the DeltaRail VAMPIRE modelling
software, the vehicle is predicted to overturn
at 20. 3ø (non-compliant by 0. 7ø). The
singular cause of this deviation, in
comparison to the existing GFW vehicle, is
due to the mass reduction and higher centre
of gravity of the vehicle with the net
reduction in vehicle mass. The DeltaRail
VAMPIRE software has been previously
validated for accuracy against Mk3 vehicle
sway test results produced by the British
Railways Board (BRB). On the GFW
vehicle, a universal accessible toilet and two
wheelchair positions are provided at one
end and a galley with vestibule-facing
serving counter at the other end, which,
when calculated in accordance with BRB
document TPE24 `Calculation of Passenger
Carrying Capacity in Multiple Unit Trains',
equates in crush laden conditions to 134
standing passengers. The mass and centre
Using a compliant indicator would require a First ScotRail
louder sounder. However, drivers have
indicated that this louder sound is of
discomfort and acts as a potential distraction
whilst driving. Using the 90 dBA indicator is
felt to be a safer solution (see associated
risk assessment FSRM786). Previous
conversations with RSSB have stated that
there is a view that 6 dBA is the appropriate
minimum value as this is specified for
controls and indications in the cab in the
Rolling Stock Locomotive and Passengers
Technical Specifications for Interoperability
(RST LOC & PAS TSI), Clause 4. 2. 9. 3. 4
(see email "RE: LED AWS indicators" dated
10/10/2013 22: 04). A further benefit of the
new LED style (as opposed to the traditional
mechanical style) indicator is increased
reliability. This benefit has been witnessed
across the 156 fleet which have been fitted
with the indicator as a fleet change and have
seen an increase in indicator reliability. The
increased reliability means that this
component is no longer replaced as
frequently with associated price savings.
Using a uniform style of indicator across the
fleet also simplifies stock management,
reducing the opportunity for error.
10/11/2014
N/A
CCS
16/10/2014
Current
None
20/10/2014
N/A
RST
03/10/2014
Current
Chiltern Railways
Page 31
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8026
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
,Safety Requirements for, ,Cab Signalling
Systems,
Certificate Number
14-125-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
Automatic control of train speed
10.3.6
approaching and proceeding over
Llanbadarn Automatic Barrier level Crossing
Locally monitored by train crew (ABCL)
using European Train Control System
(ETCS) Level 1 controls on Level 2 ETCS
fitted lines when the conditions for the
Driver's Crossing Indicator (DCI) to display a
white indication are not met.
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-124-DEV
Variation to AWS Indicator Image layout
Appendix A
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-123-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS) receiver position.
3.2.1.3
GMRT2161
One
Requirements of Driving Cabs for Railway
Vehicles
14-122-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Windscreen Optical
Properties.
6.2.1, 6.2.5
GMRT2176
One
Air Quality and Lighting Environment for
Traincrew Inside Railway Vehicles
14-121-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Cab Air Quality.
5.1, 5.2
GMRT2461
One
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and on- track Machines
14-120-DEV
Sheffield Tram Train Sanding, Issue 2.
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
14-118-DEV
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
14-117-DEV
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
Llanbadarn ABCL located between Dovey
Jcn and Aberystwyth on the SBA2.
Nature and Degree
Fully interlocking the crossing with the
ETCS would require the crossing to be
converted to a Manned Crossing with
Barriers (MCB) type which would
significantly increase costs, time to
implement and extending crossing closure
times for users. Deviation 09/169/DGN was
granted to permit Automatic Open Crossing locally monitored by train crew (AOCL) and
ABCL crossings not be interlocked to the
Movement Authority (MA). Part compliance
with current RGS is possible by applying a 0
km/h Temporary Speed Restriction (TSR).
However, if a zero speed were applied
locally to the crossing in place of the
proposed 10 km/h, it would prevent a train
from proceeding over the crossing as
directed in GE/RT8000/TW8 ERTMS Rule
Book Level Crossings on ERTMS Lines drivers' instructions Clause 4. 4, without the
driver first overriding the on board systems
cancelling the MA. Therefore, the train
would have to proceed in degraded "Staff
Responsible" mode to the next awakening
area before returning to a supervised mode,
which is considered to increase risk.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The fitment of additional automatic
Network Rail
protection has been recommended in a
report produced by the Rail Accident
Investigation Branch (RAIB) and supported
by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) at
Llanbadarn ABCL. Proposal will
automatically control the speed of an
approaching train to 10 km/h at a predetermined position on the approach to the
crossing. The pre-determined position for
the 10 km/h commencement shall be
calculated such that any train shall be able
to stop from 10 km/h before entering the
crossing. The 10 km/h restriction shall be
enforced on the train continuously from the
commencement of the 10 km/h until the front
of the train passes clear of the crossing
deck. If the vehicle overspeeds, a Class 158
unit will be subject to a service brake
application that is released once the vehicle
speed has decreased to 10 km/h. Class 97
locomotives will be subject to an emergency
brake application, which has the effect of
bringing the vehicle to a stand. The brakes
may be released by the driver once the
vehicle is stationary. The 10 km/h has been
selected as the lowest speed it is practicable
to reliably drive all types of traction in use on
the route. The 10 km/h also reduces the
Minimum dimension of AWS Visual
Compliance will require the redesign of the
No impact on other affected parties. The
Mors Smitt UK Ltd.
Indicator. This deviation is for a project
LED arrangement to use an alternative LED TY341 AWS LED Indicator is a redesign of
requiring authorisation for placing in service and filter arrangement. Should the
the earlier TY228 AWS LED Indicator
under the Railways (Interoperability)
application be rejected we will be faced with developed for the Channel Tunnel fleets in
Regulations 2011.
redesigning the unit.
1991. The indicator uses the same LED
display elements and size as the earlier
design which has proved satisfactory in use
since the Channel Tunnel opened in 1993. It
is also the image used to illustrate Appendix
A of GE/RT8075. Given that the requested
display size has been in use on Class 92
and Class 373 vehicles, and on the Class
395 since June 2009, it is believed that the
display diameter of 38 mm has been shown
to be adequate for the application. It is not
believed that the deviation will have any
impact on the following: The safety of the
railway system; The technical compatibility
of the railway system now and in the future;
Costs and service performance, including
reliability and availability; If relevant, other
essential requirements such as
environmental protection and health.
Certificate Issue Date
29/04/2015
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
19/03/2015
Deviation Status
Current
22/09/2014
N/A
CCS
18/09/2014
Current
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train EMUs for operation only
on routes fitted with axle counters. Unit
numbers: 399201 - 399207. Vehicle
numbers: 99001 - 99007 99101 9910799201 - 99207.
This deviation relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train EMUs. Unit numbers:
399201 - 399207. Vehicle numbers: 99001 99007;99101 - 99107;99201 - 99207.
There is no impact of the alternative TPWS Stagecoach Supertram
receiver position on the hazard controlled by
the standard (that of interference with TI21
track circuits).
12/10/2015
N/A
CCS
03/09/2015
Current
See Appendix.
Stagecoach Supertram
12/11/2014
N/A
RST
03/10/2014
Current
This application relates to a total of seven
See Appendix.
three-car tram-train EMUs. Unit numbers:
399201 - 399207. Vehicle numbers: 99001 99007;99101 - 99107;99201 - 99207.
See Appendix.
Stagecoach Supertram
12/11/2014
N/A
RST
03/10/2014
Current
7.1, 9.1, 10
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs). Unit numbers: 399201 - 399207.
Vehicle numbers: 99001 - 99007; 99101 99107; 99201 - 99207.
Sanding is ahead of the leading wheelset
Stagecoach Supertram
and risk to train detection is discussed in
Appendix A. The mainline route is fitted with
axle counters that are immune to sanders.
02/09/2015
31/12/2016
RST
24/07/2015
Current
Contradiction of Running Time
Requirements - Class 387.
2.3.3
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 EMUs and
up to thirty-five four-car Class 387/x EMUs
(an option on the current contract). This
deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
It is considered that there is no negative
impact from complying with the relevant
clause of the SRT TSI instead of
GM/RT2130. The requirement of the SRT
TSI is considered to be an appropriate
requirement for the Class 387 units.
Bombardier Transportation
02/09/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
Class 387 Cab-Saloon Door not Self
Closing.
2.5.5
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 EMUs and
up to thirty-five four-car Class 387/x EMUs
(an option on the current contract. This
deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
It is considered that there is no negative
Bombardier Transportation
impact of this deviation since train crew are
already used to closing the cab-saloon door.
Therefore, a fire barrier is always
maintained.
02/09/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
Full compliance with the GE/RT8075 Issue
1, Clause 3. 2. 1. 3 would necessitate a
significant redesign of the vehicle, and
would add considerable time and cost to the
project even if it were found to be technically
feasible.
See Appendix.
The tram-trains are not permitted to continue
in service with isolated sanders. The tramtrain is fitted with a distributed sanding
system, when operating on the mainline:
only the leading sander will be used. The
sand used will be the same as for the
Sheffield Supertram.
To comply with Clause 2. 3. 3, it would be
necessary to provide significant protection of
systems and/or redundancy to enable the
units to operate for 15 minutes after the
outbreak of a fire. Control cabling in any
area judged to be vulnerable would need to
be protected by some form of shielding.
Some systems may need redundancy with
cabling routed in separate locations. To
achieve this, there would be significant
design changes and additional equipment.
This would add significant cost to the
project. In addition, maintenance of the
vehicles would be changed and in some
cases hindered by the extra protection.
At the outer ends of a train the cab/saloon
door forms part of the fire barrier between
the cab and the passenger saloon, and it is
locked shut to prevent passenger access to
the cab. This door is not self-closing. To
comply with the clause, a closing device
would have to be added to the door. It is
considered that, if such a device was fitted,
train crew could rely on the device and may
not check that the door is securely closed.
There is a risk that the closing device would
shut the door, but not fully, which presents a
risk to the train security. It should be noted
that, when the cab is in the middle of a
multiple formation, the cab/saloon door is
locked in the converted position, preventing
passenger access to the cab controls, and a
compliant gangway door operates as part of
the fire barrier.
Page 32
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2130
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
Certificate Number
14-116-DEV
Title
Class 387 Emergency Lighting
Performance.
RGS Clause
4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.6
GCRT5033
Two
Terminal Tracks - Requirements for Buffer
Stops, Arresting Devices and End Impact
Walls
14-112-DEV
Waterloo International, Platforms 20-23 track curvature at buffer stop
2.3.1
GERT8000-SP
Four
Speeds
14-111-DEV
Class 68 Locomotives Running Light Engine 2.2
at Permissible Speeds.
GMRT2149
Three
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
the Size of Railway Vehicle
14-110-DEV
Class 375/6 Automatic Power Control (APC) B10.3
Receiver Gauging.
GMRT2130
Four
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
14-109-DEV
Advance stage deviation for installation of
Global System for Mobile communications
for Railways (GSM-R) to Class 37
Locomotives.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
All clauses.
Scope
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 Electric
Multiple Units (EMUs) and up to thirty-five
four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an option on the
current contract). This deviation is for a
project requiring authorisation for placing in
service under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
Nature and Degree
· Light above doorway: There is limited
space above each doorway due to the UK
loading gauge and the space requirements
of the door header gear. To fit emergency
lighting directly above each bodyside door,
the lighting unit would have to be fitted
between the door gear and the header gear
trim panel, moving the trim panel lower.
This would reduce the door throughway
height, which is already lower than that
required by GM/RT2473 Clause B5. 1. 2; a
separate deviation application applies to this
clause. The lower doorway would increase
the risk of passengers striking their head,
and would impede evacuation. Controls and
signage in field of illumination: The door
controls and signage are located on stand
backs to the side of the doorways, and back
from the door itself. It is not possible to have
a single light pointing at the door threshold
and at the controls. Therefore, multiple
lights would be required. This would
contradict the objective of not attracting
passengers to the vestibule (as described in
guidance note GM/RC2531 Clause RC024).
Provide lighting for charging photoluminescent signage: As above, this would
require a bright light directed at the signage,
which would emphasise the emergency
· P20 radius 220m at proposed location; ·
P21 radius 223m at proposed location; · P22
radius 227m at proposed location; · P23
radius 241m at proposed location. Please
refer to the attached document 'Waterloo
International Terminal - Buffer Stop
Derogation - Issue 3'.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
It is considered that there are no negative
impacts from the Class 387 emergency
lighting design. Position of lights and
illumination of controls: GM/RT2130
(together with guidance note GM/RC2531)
gives two reasons for requiring emergency
lights above the door and not in the centre of
the vestibule. o Firstly, it should avoid
encouraging passengers towards the
vestibule. This is not applicable to vehicles
such as Class 387 where the vestibules are
at 1/3 and 2/3 positions in the vehicle, and
there is no full partition between the
passenger seats. Any lighting in the
vestibule, at the centre or at the doorway,
will be visible to passengers. The proposed
location of lighting will create even lighting
along the vehicle, without attracting
passengers to any area. o Secondly,
lighting from the centre would mean that
passengers created shadows over any
equipment they tried to use since the light
would be behind the passengers. The
position of the lighting on Class 387
minimises this issue within the space
constraints of the doorway. The problems
with shadows are minimised due to the
position of the normal and emergency door
controls (and passenger emergency alarm)
Waterloo International, Platforms 20-23.
The Waterloo International Station platforms
were originally designed to operate using
the areas under the platforms (arrivals and
departures with passport controls) for the
low frequency Eurostar services. Changing
to a high intensity service requires additional
space behind the buffer stops to allow
passenger congregation and access to and
from the platforms to occur safely, where
opposing passenger flows will occur. The
station structure and platforms have a small
existing straight section (approximately 35
m) at the buffer stop end, and then curve at
radii between 220-241 m. The proposed
location for the buffer stop is approximately
57 m from its current position, which is
compatible with track remodelling options
from GRIP 2 and existing structural bracing
of the elevated track slabs. The
modifications being proposed to the existing
structure are so significant, Section 2. 3
General Requirements for New Construction
have been applied. A risk assessment
using GC/RC5633 has been undertaken to
satisfy Section 2. 4 - Requirements for
Existing Locations. The need for a straight
approach to the buffer stops, to satisfy
Clause 2. 3. 1. 1, is to ensure a collision with
the buffer stop beam is not at an angle. This
This deviation applies to all light engine
The current RGS was written for the historic This alternative action will allow better use of
movements of Class 68 Locomotives by
situation where locomotives had a braking
available line capacity since a class 68
Direct Rail Services on Network Rail
capability worse than the vehicles that they locomotive running light engine will be able
Infrastructure. Direct Rail Services seeks to were hauling. The Class 68 is a modern
to run at the permissible speeds. This
permit Class 68 locomotives running as light locomotive with braking capability better
approach is reasonable since the braking
engine to run at permissible line speed.
than that shown in figure 3 of GM/RT2042
capability of a class 68 is sufficient for all
`Stopping Distance Curve - Maximum
signalled routes on Network Rail
Speed 125 mile/h Performance for Traction infrastructure. The class 68 is fitted with
Units required to operate over routes
automatic sanders and modern Wheel Slide
signalled in accordance with Appendix 3 of Protection (WSP) systems to minimise the
GK/RT0034'. The locomotive meets the
risk of poor rail adhesion. Direct Rail
required stopping distances for all signalled Services drivers' will be briefed on this
routes on Network Rail infrastructure,
deviation pending planned revision of Rule
therefore the RGS assumption is not
Book module SP to permit this. It is notable
appropriate to the class 68 locomotive.
that Rule Book module SP already
Complying with the current RGS will result in recognises that these restrictions do not
under-utilisation of track capacity due to
need to apply for locomotives with enhanced
reduced running speeds of Class 68
braking (such as Class 67) and this
locomotives running light or hauling short
deviation seeks to apply this principle to a
trains.
new locomotive with similar braking
capability.
Class 375/6 rolling stock.
If the replacement APC receiver were to be The attached reference document
set up within the gauge specified in
(3EER400018-6880) compares the Class
GM/RT2149, it will be outside the
375 fleet with other Electrostar fleets which
specifications that the manufacturer will
have had the same deviation accepted, as
guarantee operation, and therefore subject
well as other typical British Rail vehicles
to failing to operate correctly.
(Classes 313 and 365). This comparison
demonstrates that the gauging risk for the
new APC receiver is no greater than those
fleets for which derogations have been
made or the existing British Rail fleets. It is
considered that the risk of the APC not
operating when required, due to being
outside the manufacturer design limits is
greater than the gauging risk considered
above. It is therefore considered
appropriate to progress with this deviation.
Applies to the installation of GSM-R system Due to GM/RT2130 Issue 4 being notified as The machine will operate with the same
to 4x Class 37 locomotives;
a National Technical Rule (NTR) by the
level of compliance as all other Class 37
37116/175/219/421. This deviation is for a
competent authority in the UK, this standard locomotives in the UK that have already
project requiring authorisation for placing in has become applicable to the project
been fitted with GSM-R.
service under the Railways (Interoperability) following the completion of GSM-R system
Regulations 2011.
development, but prior to it being fitted to
Class 37 locomotives 37116/175/219/421
(expected to be fitted in Summer/Autumn
2014). The design of the GSM-R system is
compliant with Issue 3 of GM/RT2130. Issue
4 of GM/RT2130 is a fundamental revision of
the standard to align it with EN 45545 and
demonstrating compliance with Issue 4
would require a complete new assessment.
Therefore, complying with the new standard
at this advanced stage of the GSM-R project
would require significant re-work that would
incur additional cost and delays to the
project. In addition, fixed system
parameters cannot be modified, resulting in
the risk that the GSM-R system may not
comply with the new Euronorm.
Applicant Organisation
Bombardier Transportation
Certificate Issue Date
02/09/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
N/A
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
12/12/2014
N/A
INS
12/11/2014
Current
Direct Rail Services
27/08/2014
N/A
TOM
N/A
Current
London and South Eastern
Railway
19/08/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
Colas Rail Ltd
04/08/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
Page 33
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
14-108-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
Re-opening of Lea Bridge Station - provision 11.1.4.1 Provision of recess beneath
of recess
platform edge
Scope
Lea Bridge Station. ELR: SDC. Mileage:
6m 25ch.
Nature and Degree
Minor impact in regards to safety, no effect
to performance: The overhang will still be
present but not to the extent required in
GI/RT7016. Please note that the route has
requested that a 760 mm offset is used
rather than the normal 730 mm, to provide
clearances for W10 and W12, this affects
the remaining overhang. Compliant
stepping distances will be provided, an
overhang will be present with a minimum
proposed dimension of 160 mm. The
platform extensions will be compliant.
GKRT0075
Two
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
14-106-DEV
Up Slow Permissible Speed Warning
Indicator (PSWI) position approaching
Thornton Heath Station.
40 PSWI (UVS9M13CHU) on Up Victoria
Slow at on approach to Thornton Heath
Station.
Currently, a permanent PSWI is installed at
a compliant position on signal T64 at the
start of the 60 mph line speed. As per
GK/RT0075. An Automatic Warning System
(AWS) is provided 171 metres from signal
T64, acting as the AWS for both the signal
and the PSWI. This was resulting in a horn
vice bell warning to drivers when T64 was
displaying a green aspect, thus causing
confusion. As a result, T64 Signal is
currently restricted to double yellow.
GKRT0075
Two
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
14-105-DEV
Non-provision of Permissible speed warning 3.3.1.4
indicators (PSWI) boards in the vicinity of
Bricklayers Arms Junction.
GKRT0075
Two
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
14-104-DEV
Non-provision of Permissible Speed
Warning Indicators (PSWI) boards in the
vicinity of Spa Road.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
3.3.5.5 d)
3.3.1.4 b)
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The project is planning to re-open Lea
Network Rail
Bridge Station, which was closed in 1985.
The new station will have a footbridge (reusing the old station deck spanning the
tracks), two lifts and be extended to
accommodate eight-car trains. The old
platforms are still present and in reasonable
condition (with the copers removed). They
have the existing OLE support structures
and other services in the platform which
make it not reasonably practicable to
demolish them. As such, the old platforms
from the closed station are to be reused and
extended. When the new copers and
surface are installed, there will not be a 300
mm recess beneath the platform edge; the
existing construction of the platform is a
brick front wall which it is not reasonably
practicable to demolish to construct platform
compliant to this clause. Accompanying this
application are details of the proposed
overhang dimensions. This was identified
as part of the design process and identified
that it would be un-economical to demolish
due to its good condition and the presence
of numerous OLE mast foundations in the
platform structure.
Deceleration distances shown in the
Network Rail
standards is extremely pessimistic.
Calculating the deceleration distance
required, to reduce to the required speed
shows sufficient distance. See supporting
information for calculations. At assumed
braking rate of 8%g (passenger trains),
approximately 295 m deceleration distance
required to reduce speed from 60 mph to
40mph. At assumed braking rate of 6%g,
approximately 400 m deceleration distance
required to reduce speed from 60 mph to 40
mph. Line speed on approach to the 60
mph PSR at T64 is maximum of 30 mph/40
mph. Freight trains are not expected to
attain a speed greater than 40 mph due to
30 mph approach. Based on a four-car unit
and acceleration rate of 6. 5%g, maximum
attainable speed would be approximately 55
mph, only 5 mph greater than speed that a
train could be expected to brake to a stand
in accordance with GK/RT0075 Appendix B
and permitted to be used for deceleration
distance in Section 3. 2. 3. 3 b). Analysis of
track circuit data conducted by the Route
over two separate weeks before and after
the T64 YY restriction was introduced has
shown the average speed of trains through
the affected section of line to be 28. 12 mph
Non-provision of PSWI boards in the vicinity Permissible speed warning indicators
All approaches to the 40mph speed
Network Rail
of Bricklayers Arms Junction.
(PSWI) would need to be provided in the Up restriction are via a high speed turnout at
direction for the following speed reductions: Bricklayers Arms Junction, which is
60 mph from the Up Sussex Fast to 40 mph immediately followed by a section of line at
PSR on the Sussex Reversible at LBC 2816 50 mph requiring the driver to slow down
m; 60 mph from the Up Sussex Slow to 40
from 60 mph. The 50 mph section is 400m+
mph PSR on the Sussex Reversible at
long on approach to the 40 mph restriction.
LBC;60 mph - 40 mph speed reduction
This will allow sufficient time/sighting for the
would require a PSWI at minimum of 630 m driver to reduce speed accordingly. Taking
(at approximately LBC 3446 m) from the
into account all potential warning board
speed restriction. This would place it within positions detailed in section 10, it is
the switches and crossings (S &amp; C) at considered that the benefits of providing a
Bricklayers Arms Junction so the PSWI
warning of the reduction in speed is
board would have to be moved back clear of outweighed by the risk of overloading
crossover 8005/8006. There are 35/40
drivers with information and liable to cause
diverging Permanent Speed Restriction
confusion. (Note this is described in
(PSR) boards at this position for routes
GK/RT0075 Section 3. 2. 2).
towards the Bermondsey Reversible and the
Up Bermondsey Spur. The PSWI board for
the 'straight ahead' route from the Down
Sussex Slow to the Sussex Reversible Line
could be placed alongside the existing
Diverging PSR board. The PSWI board for
the 'straight ahead' route from the Down
Sussex Fast to the Sussex Reversible Line
cannot be similarly positioned because there
is no space. However, it could be placed on
the right hand side opposite the Diverging
PSR board. This issue was discussed at
Non-provision of PSWI boards in the vicinity Permissible Speed Warning Indicators
All approaches to the 30 and 40 mph speed Network Rail
of Spa Road.
(PSWI) would need to be provided in the
restrictions are via 50 mph crossovers or are
Down direction for the following speed
on a line with a maximum linespeed of 50
reductions: 60 mph from the Down Sussex mph for a distance of 500 m+ on approach,
Slow to 40 mph PSR on the Sussex
which should allow sufficient time/sighting
Reversible at LBC 2624 m; 60 mph from the for the driver to reduce speed accordingly.
Sussex Reversible to 40 mph PSR on the
Taking into account all potential warning
Sussex Reversible at LBC 2624 m; 60 mph board positions detailed in Section 10, it is
from the South London Reversible to 40
considered that the benefits of providing
mph PSR on the South London Reversible
PSWI for the reduction in speed is
at LBC 2624 m;60 mph from the South
outweighed by the risk of overloading
London Reversible to 30 mph PSR on the
drivers with information and liable to cause
South London Reversible at LBC 2624 m;60 confusion. (Note this risk is described in
mph - 40 mph speed reduction would
GK/RT0075 Section 3. 2. 2).
require a PSWI at minimum of 706 m (at
approximately 4865 m) from the speed
restriction;60 mph - 30 mph speed reduction
would require a PSWI at minimum of 805 m
(at approximately 4766 m) from the speed
restriction. The first logical position for the
PSWIs would be combined with the 30/50
mph turnout board at 3m00ch on the Down
Sussex Slow, combined with the 30/50 mph
turnout at 2m78ch on the Sussex Reversible
and approximately 2m78ch on the South
London Reversible. However, in order to
physically fit the boards in the 6ft, they would
require to be positioned in a stack formation,
which would mean the combined height
Certificate Issue Date
08/12/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
12/11/2014
Deviation Status
Current
01/10/2014
N/A
CCS
18/09/2014
Current
24/09/2014
N/A
CCS
21/08/2014
Current
24/09/2014
N/A
CCS
21/08/2014
Current
Page 34
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2461
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and on- track Machines
Certificate Number
14-097-DEV
Title
Class 142, 143, 144, 150, 153, 155 and 156
manual sander systems; sand application
prior to commencement of braking.
RGS Clause
6.4
Scope
The scope of the deviation shall include all
Class 142, 143, 144, 150, 153, 155 and 156
Diesel Mechanical Multiple Unit (DMMU)
pacer and sprinter units operated by
Northern Rail, First Great Western and
Arriva Trains Wales over all routes operated
over by the named companies with the
detailed traction types.
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
14-095-DEV
London Bridge station low level terminal
platforms buffer stop lights.
2.5.3.4 b)
London Bridge station low level platforms.
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
14-094-DEV
Telephone requirements for Automatic
2.10.2.1
Barrier Level Crossing Locally Monitored by
train crew (ABCL) converted from Automatic
Open Crossing Locally Monitored (AOCL).
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-093-DEV
Class 387 Train Protection and Warning
System (TPWS) Labelling.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
4.1.3.1 and Appendix F, clauses F3.6 and;
F3.7
Nature and Degree
This is already dealt with in Deviation
14/083/DEV for the fitment and use of brake
step one sanding (will cover all 14X and 15X
units so fitted with the manual sanding
device). This is an extension of this and
looks to allow sand to be applied prior to
brake step one taking place to ensure the
train wheels are on a sand treated rail prior
to braking commencing. Note: this does not
cover units fitted with auto-devices that links
into the Wheel Slide Protection (WSP)
systems (I. e. 158, 321, 322, 333 etc. ).
Previously, deviations were raised against
the requirements of GM/RT2461 regarding
the manual application of sand on 14X and
153 units which do not comply to the
standard requirements due to their
wheel/axle formation. The deviation was in
way of asking for permission to have
sanding devices fitted to these units despite
the wording of the procedure. Initial fitment
saw a step three system placed on the units
which was immediately recognised as being
not fit for purpose, and a deviation was
raised to have this changed to step two
application. The step two sanding was an
improvement; however, it was recognised
that, to achieve better results, a deviation
should be requested for step one sanding to
Track on approach to the buffers is curved.
If the rolling stock approaches the buffer
stop lights positioned in the centre of the
track, then at approximately 10 m, the driver
would lose sight of the buffer stop lights.
This is due to the driver's position being
within the left hand half of the driving cab,
and much of the rolling stock having centre
gangways.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
It should be acknowledged that the main
Northern Rail Ltd
impacts of the deviation regarding the use of
sanders has been covered in the deviation
for brake step one sanding. The main
issues raised are the train coming to a stand
"beached" on sand. The application of
additional sand prior to the initial application
of the brake will have no effect on what
occurs at the end of the braking when the
train comes to a stand. It is hoped that one
impact will be the increased ability of the
train, especially the 14x units to be able to
sustain a step one brake application more
readily if the application commences on a
pre-treated rail. 14X units are susceptible to
sliding when the brake is initially applied and
have a low tolerance to rail head conditions.
The application of sand post the brake
application may not allow the sand to
propagate along the train prior to the slide
commencing and, once the leading axle is
sliding, this tends to act like a plough
pushing the applied sand from the rail head
and preventing the trailing axles from
gaining any benefit. Northern have also
noted that, during 2013, there was a marked
increase in 14x wheel set wear. Whilst the
reasons for this are as yet unclear, there are
possible links to the fitment and use of sand
Line speed on approach to the Buffer Stops Network Rail
is 20 mph. The existing London Bridge
Station terminating Platform 8 - 16 inclusive
operate with left hand mounted buffer stops
lights. This reflects application of old
standard CP-PM-040, Section 4. 2. 2. This
permitted this option if curvature of
approach track and rolling stock limits / loss
of viewing of the buffer stops on the
approach to the buffer stops. It has been
proposed in recent updates planned to RGS
to allow buffer stop lights to be positioned to
improve visibility and not fixed to the centre
line. Second stage of the remodelling the
eastern approach to London Bridge Low
Level station (designated LL04) took place in
March 2014, when new Platforms 14 and 15
were brought in to use. The third stage
(LL07 August 2014) and fourth stage (LL09
January 2015) bring remaining new
Platforms 10 to 13 into use. The application
is to cover all terminating platforms.
Certificate Issue Date
14/08/2014
Certificate End Date
31/12/2017
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
25/07/2014
Deviation Status
Current
21/08/2014
N/A
CCS
24/07/2014
Current
National application for conversions of
Automatic Open Crossing Locally Monitored
(AOCL) to Automatic Barrier Crossing
Locally Monitored (ABCL).
Many AOCL crossings do not have public
telephones. The impact of adding phones at
the time of conversion to ABCL would
require signaller ergonomic aspects to be
considered. Addition of telephones at level
crossings with barriers can affect the
signaller's workload, particularly due to
nuisance usage of telephones. This can
distract signallers from safe operation of
railway and other crossings. Workload
would need to be assessed to ensure that it
will not adversely affect the performance of
the signaller. In some cases, an increase of
the number of telephones within a control
area may lead to the assessment requiring
more resources to adequately manage the
control area.
A fundamental part of conversion to ABCL Network Rail
is that the crossing remains locally
monitored by the train driver. The
telephones associated with locally monitored
crossing types are not required to be utilised
for making emergency calls, and they are of
a type that is not self-proving. Their use is
primarily to report equipment failure, and to
request permission to cross in vehicles that
are likely to need additional crossing time
(typically slow freight vehicles, wide loads,
and low loaders at risk of grounding). The
addition of telephones at locally monitored
crossings does very little to improve risk
management, since the primary safety
operation of the crossing includes
monitoring of the crossing area by train
drivers and trains operated at speed such
they can stop short of the crossing if it does
not operate correctly.
21/08/2014
N/A
CCS
N/A
Current
Four-car Class 387/1 Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs) and four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an
option on the current contract). This
deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
Fully complying with Clauses F3. 6 and F3.
7 of GE/RT8075 would make the TPWS
labels inconsistent with the labelling in the
remainder of the cab. The control
pushbuttons are different sizes. Complying
with GE/RT8075 Clause F3. 6, vertically
aligning the rows for each label, causes the
space between the control and the label to
be different and larger than necessary. This
is not consistent with good practice whereby
space between the label and control is
consistent. Text would be considerably
larger than the existing labels and would
appear more prominent than on other
controls and indicators. This could be
interpreted as the TPWS interface being
more important than other displays in the
cab. Although it is a primary instrument, it
should not be prioritised over other primary
instrumentation. There is insufficient space
to make all other labelling consistent with the
specified text size. This good practice of
consistency is identified within the "Ten
principles for good interface design", shown
on page 36 of the RSSB's "Understanding
Human Factors - A Guide for Railway
Industry" 2008, and is contained within the
guidance notes of the RSSB's "Alarms and
Alerts Guidance and Evaluation Tool".
All current existing Electrostar units feature Bombardier Transportation
TPWS Driver Machine Interface (DMI) labels
with a character height of 3 mm and a
similar arrangement to that proposed for the
Class 387. The worst case angle subtended
at the eye is 11. 3 minutes of arc, which is
comparable to and better than other labels
on the driver's desk that comply with good
practice. There is no evidence that the
existing controls are difficult to read, and so
it is not considered that there is a negative
impact from this non-compliance.
21/08/2014
N/A
CCS
24/07/2014
Current
Page 35
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2461
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and on- track Machines
Certificate Number
14-092-DEV
Title
Class 387 Sanding on Trailing Units.
RGS Clause
6.2, 9.1 and 9.3.1
Scope
Four-car Class 387/1 Electric Multiple Units
(EMUs) and four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an
option on the current contract). This
deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
GMRT2473
Two
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
14-091-DEV
Class 387 - Emergency brake override
indication.
B11.4
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 Electric
Multiple Units (EMUs) and up to thirty-five
four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an option on the
current contract). This deviation is for a
project requiring authorisation for placing in
service under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
GMRT2161
One
Requirements for Driving Cabs of Railway
Vehicles
14-090-DEV
Class 387 Windscreen Wipers Obscuring
Sightline.
6.2.6
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 Electric
Multiple Units (EMUs) and up to thirty-five
four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an option on the
current contract). This deviation is for a
project requiring authorisation for placing in
service under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
GMRT2473
Two
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
14-089-DEV
Class 387 - Locking Doors Out of Use.
B9.1, B10.1, B10.2 and B11.1
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 EMUs and
up to thirty-five four-car Class 387/x EMUs
(an option on the current contract). This
deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The deviation requests enhanced
performance which is non-compliant with the
standard as written, but consistent with the
objectives of the standard.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Sand will only be dispensed during a brake Bombardier Transportation
application (step 2, full service or
emergency) by units on which the leading
vehicle detects wheel slide. As such, trailing
units will only dispense sand if they detect
wheel slide and have sufficient sand
available. The likelihood of sanding on
trailing units occurring is lower, as the
leading unit will condition the railhead and
so the trailing units are likely to experience
wheel slide or slip to a lesser extent. This
functionality has been developed to increase
the safety of the railway in conditions of
extremely poor rail head adhesion or where
the sanding system on the leading unit does
not function correctly (due to a fault or
having run out of sand), having a positive
impact on overall system performance.
When sand is deployed on the leading unit
of a train, sixteen axles will have passed
over the sand, dispersing it on the rail head,
prior to the trailing unit deploying further
sand (assuming that the training unit is
experiencing slide). Any sand deployed by
the final unit in a train will be dispersed on
the rail head by fourteen axles. Therefore,
the amount of sand deposited and the
number axles following the deposition points
will be the same as if the units were
To comply with this requirement extra
There are considered to be no negative
Bombardier Transportation
functionality would have to be added to an
impacts of the proposed design as it is a
existing indicator, or an additional indicator continuation of the existing Class 377
would have to be added to the driver's desk. design, to which drivers are already
In either case, changes to the units'
accustomed. The design adequately warns
schematics and wiring would be needed to the driver that an emergency brake override
illuminate the indicator when an emergency has been made.
brake application had been overridden. The
change would make the cab desk different
from the existing Class 377 fleet and would
require additional training for the driver; the
additional desk indicator could be confusing
to drivers used to the existing Class 377
desk.
To comply with the standard would require a When the proposed wipers are in the
Bombardier Transportation,
change to the wiper arm, to incorporate a
parked position (I. e. when not in use) part Southern
`dog-leg' design. This would necessitate
of the support arms for the wiper blade
that Class 387 units have a different spare
obscures part of the primary vision area, low
part from other existing Electrostars.
down and to the right of the driver's vision.
This obscured part of the driver's sight lines
(taken from the driver's seat position)
measures 94 mm upwards and 48. 5 mm to
the left of the bottom right corner of the
primary vision area. The attached drawing
No. 3EER400014-6151 indicates the
obscured portion of the windscreen from the
exterior perspective of the cab, although the
dimensions are as observed from the
driver's seat position. The area obscured is
required by case (a) of the sightlines
required for seated drivers, I. e. : A view of
the track (at rail height) at 5 m beyond the
vehicle buffers (or vehicle end) for vehicles
subject to frequent coupling and uncoupling
activities. The wiper arm will slightly
obscure the right-hand rail (from the driver's
perspective). A small movement of the
driver's head to the left will allow the
obscured area to be viewed. Case (b) - line
side signals - and case (d) - a view of the
track in the distance - are not obscured.
There are no known negative impacts from
the current design. The infringement is
All previous Electrostar builds have the
The Electrostar functionality was previously Bombardier Transportation
following functionality when a door is locked permitted for "all passenger vehicles fitted
out of service (which complies with
with power operated doors with. . .
GO/OTS300, the standard in force at the
emergency access and egress devices"
time the original design was created): Door under non-compliance 08/059/NC.
interlock is bypassed and so the door status However, this non-compliance applies to
is no longer monitored. Door emergency
GM/RT2473 Issue 1. GM/RT2473 has
egress devices have no effect on a door
subsequently been up-issued to Issue 2 and
which has been locked out of service. Door so the non-compliance cannot be applied to
emergency access devices have no effect
the Class 387 units. 08/059/NC states: "A
on a door which has been locked out of
number of deviations are listed against
service. Changing the design to fully comply GM/RT2473 Clauses B9. 1 and B10. 1. The
with Clauses B9. 1, B10. 1, B10. 2 and B11. deviations relate to the ability of the access
1 of GM/RT2473 would: Require the door
and egress device to open a door that has
system to be redesigned. Increase the
been manually locked out of use by the train
security and vandalism risks associated with crew. The deviations are: 04/265/DGN
unauthorised access to the train. Conflict
relating to Clauses B9 and B10 which
with the requirements in the High Speed
applies to the unlocking of passenger doors
Rolling Stock Technical Specification of
via the emergency egress and access
Interoperability (HS RST TSI) (referred to
devices. 05/031/DGN relating to Clauses B9.
from the SRT TSI). Part of Clause 4. 2. 2. 4. 1, B10 and B11. 2 which applies to the
2. 1 of the TSI states ". . . Each door shall
position of the passenger egress device, the
be provided with an individual opening
direction to operate the emergency access
device, accessible to passengers, to allow
device and the unlocking of passenger
that door to be opened for emergency
doors via the emergency egress and access
reasons, at speeds below 10 km/h. This
devices. 07/205/DGN relating to Clauses
device shall have no effect on 'a door locked B9. 1 and B10. 1 which applies to the
out of service'. . . "Be inconsistent with the
unlocking of passenger doors, via the
remainder of Southern's Electrostar fleet.
emergency egress and access devices that
Certificate Issue Date
14/08/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
25/07/2014
Deviation Status
Current
09/07/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
09/07/2014
N/A
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
09/07/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
Page 36
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2473
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
Certificate Number
14-088-DEV
Title
Class 387 Door Auto-Close Timing.
RGS Clause
B7.10
Scope
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 Electric
Multiple Units (EMUs) and up to thirty-five
four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an option on the
current contract). This deviation is for a
project requiring authorisation for placing in
service under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
Nature and Degree
All previous Electrostar builds (as well as
some other non-Bombardier products such
as the Hitachi Class 395) have used a door
auto-close time of around 15 seconds, rather
than the 45 second minimum specified in
GM/RT2473. The energy consumption of
the Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning
(HVAC) system would be increased and
passenger comfort reduced if the auto-close
time was increased from around 15 to 45
seconds.
GMRT2473
Two
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
14-087-DEV
Class 387 Ready-to-start Pushbutton
Texture and Functionality.
B8.4.2
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 EMUs and
up to thirty-five four-car Class 387/x EMUs
(an option on the current contract). This
deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
All the Southern Electrostar fleets are
designed as follows: The 'ready to start'
pushbutton is not textured (and neither is the
surround), because the control is located
close to the textured 'door close' pushbutton
at most locations. The 'ready to start'
pushbutton on the saloon guard's control
panels is only active when all the passenger
doors are locked closed. The 'ready to start'
pushbutton in a cab will operate irrespective
of the status of the passenger doors.
Changing the design to comply with the
RGS requirements would introduce
inconsistency across Govia Thameslink
Railway's Class 377 fleet, and would prevent
the `ready to start' pushbutton in the nonactive cab from functioning. Complying with
this RGS requirement would also make the
design inconsistent with the Rule Book,
GE/RT8000/SS1, Station Duties and Train
Dispatch, Issue 3.
GMRT2473
Two
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
14-086-DEV
Class 387 Door Throughway.
B5.1.2
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 EMUs and
up to thirty-five four-car Class 387/x EMUs
(an option on the current contract). This
deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
To comply with this clause would require the
doorway to be enlarged by approximately 10
mm. This would require the car body design
to be changed, and new structural validation
of the car body design would be needed.
Door header gear would have to be moved
upwards and the door design altered. New
interior trim would be needed for the new
installation. This would add significant cost
to the units.
GMRT2149
Three
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
the Size of Railway Vehicle
14-085-DEV
Class 387 Shoegear Gauge.
B10.2
GMRT2149
Three
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
the Size of Railway Vehicle
14-084-DEV
Class 387 Automatic Power Control (APC)
Gauge.
B10.3
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Applicant Organisation
Bombardier Transportation
Certificate Issue Date
09/07/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
N/A
Deviation Status
Current
Bombardier Transportation,
Southern
09/07/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
A door throughway height of 1900 mm (in
Bombardier Transportation
accordance with GM/RT2473) permits a
92nd percentile male to board the train
without ducking. The proposed alternative
action would result in a minimum door
throughway height of 1880 mm, which
permits an 87th percentile male to board the
train without ducking. The nominal height of
the throughway of 1890 mm permits a 90th
percentile male to board the train without
ducking. Note that neither throughway
height permits the standard design case
95th percentile male to board the train
without ducking. A door throughway height
of 1880 mm permits a >99th percentile
female to board the train without ducking.
Note that, once the door threshold is
passed, the minimum ceiling height is 206
mm. All anthropometric data is taken from
People Size 2008 and includes a 40 mm
shoe correction.
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 Electric
It is possible to comply with the
The nominal shoegear height setting on the Bombardier Transportation
Multiple Units (EMUs) and up to thirty-five
requirements by raising the shoegear height, Class 387 is 57 mm ARL in the static tare
four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an option on the but this would cause extremely poor contact laden condition. When the two cases of
current contract). This deviation is for a
between the conductor rail and the
GM/RT2149 are applied, this leads to a
project requiring authorisation for placing in shoegear. If the Class 387 shoegear is set worst case exceedance of the swept
service under the Railways (Interoperability) to comply with GM/RT2149, then the
envelope of 13. 2 mm. All Electrostar units
Regulations 2011.
following risks arise: The shoes will lose
fitted with shoegear are subject to deviations
contact with the third rail and thus prevent
to permit shoegear height setting which
the Class 387 from being powered if static
infringes the swept envelope defined in
and present unreliable operation if running
GM/RT2149 Appendix B (see 08/145/DGN
dynamically. When running dynamically the and 10/218/DGN). The oldest DC
shoes would periodically lose contact with
Electrostar fleet (Class 375) has been
the third rail which will cause significant
running on Network Rail infrastructure for
arching and the electrical interference
over 10 years. There have been no
generated as a result of this would give rise significant issues as a result of the gauge
to signalling compatibility issues.
infringement.
09/07/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
09/07/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
Twenty-nine four-car Class 387/1 Electric
Multiple Units (EMUs) and up to thirty-five
four-car Class 387/x EMUs (an option on the
current contract). This deviation is for a
project requiring authorisation for placing in
service under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
09/07/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
If the APC receiver is fitted in a location
which complies with Clause B10. 3 of
GM/RT2149 Issue 3, the manufacturer will
not underwrite the performance of the
device. There is no alternative supplier for
the APC receiver. If the receiver is not
positioned in accordance with the
manufacturer's requirements, the receiver
may not function correctly.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
A fifteen-second door auto-close time was
previously permitted for "all passenger
vehicles fitted with power operated doors
with an autoclose facility" by non-compliance
08/059/NC. However, this non-compliance
applies to GM/RT2473 Issue 1. GM/RT2473
has subsequently been up-issued to Issue 2
(a small-scale change not affecting the autoclose timing requirement) and so the noncompliance cannot be applied to the Class
387 units. 08/059/NC states: "The
requirement in Clause B7. 10 is the
responsibility of the Railway Undertaking
and is therefore not within the scope of
Railway Group Standards. This clause is a
single duty holders responsibility and should
be removed from GM/RT2473. A number of
deviations are listed against GM/RT2473
Clause B7. 10. The deviations relate to the
reduction of the door autoclose facility from
45 seconds to a time determined by the
Railway Undertaking. Allowing Railway
Undertakings to determine the optimum
door auto-close timing for power operated
doors would potentially reduce the risk to
passengers of slip / trip hazards due to
inclement weather conditions. It would also
increase passenger comfort by reducing the
exposure of the interior of the vehicle to the
The alternative actions are not considered to
have any adverse effect on safety. The
proposed design increases the level of
safety, as guards are already familiar with
the design, and all passenger doors have to
be closed prior to the guard giving the
`ready to start' signal. When the guard is in
the rear cab and the cab door is open,
traction cannot be taken until the cab door is
shut as the door interlock circuit will not be
made.
This APC receiver has been designed to be Bombardier Transportation
dimensionally set-up in accordance with the
manufacturer's requirements. When the inservice conditions of the bogie (and
subsequently APC receiver) are analysed for
gauging purposes and compared to the
APC gauge as defined in Appendix C of
GM/RT2149, both a lateral infringement of
17. 25 mm and a vertical infringement of 24
mm to the gauge line is experienced.
Lateral Infringement: GE/GN8573 Guidance
on Gauging, Part 4, defines a lower sector
vehicle gauge that can be used by vehicle
manufacturers to ensure compliance with
the relevant Railway Group Standards. After
considering all appropriate static
displacement and dynamic movements
(including tolerances and vehicle
maintenance), if the vehicle and components
on it are within the limits defined in Part 4 of
GE/GN8573, compliance has been
demonstrated. When the lateral movements
of the Class 387 APC receiver are
superimposed against the Lower Sector
Vehicle Gauge as shown in Drawing Ref.
100173029, it can be seen that there is no
lateral infringement, and hence the lateral
infringement of 17. 25 mm against
GM/RT2149, Clause B10. 3 is considered
Page 37
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2461
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and on- track Machines
Certificate Number
14-083-DEV
Title
Class 142, 143, 144, 150, 153, 155 and 156
units Sanding in Brake Steps 1 &amp; 2.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-082-DEV
Unused Bay Platform at Pontypridd Station - 2.1
Horizontal curvature.
GERT8000-SP
Four
Speeds
14-081-DEV
Class 68 Running Light Engine &amp;
2.2
Hauling Short Trains at Permissible Speeds.
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
14-080-DEV
Non-fitment of Train Protection and Warning 4.1.3.4 a)
System (TPWS) to signals that display the
single yellow aspect as part of the nonstandard four-aspect sequence on Great
Eastern Main Line (GEML).
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
14-079-DEV
Chaffers TMOB - Stop boards Close to
Crossing.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
6.4
2.1.2.2
Scope
All Class 142, 143, 144, 150, 153, 155 and
156 units.
Nature and Degree
The multiple unit fleets within the scope of
this application have either step 2 or step 1
sanding enabled, making them noncompliant with Clause 6. 4 of RGS
GM/RT2461; either permanent or temporary
deviations are in place to permit this. When
first fitted, the sanders were initially
configured to discharge automatically in
emergency brake or manually in step 3
when the driver depresses the sanding
button. Since then, a number of temporary
deviations have been sought and approved
to allow trials of manually sanding in braking
step 2 and, more recently, braking step 1,
with some permanent deviations now
approved. Current status: 10/082/DGN step 2 - Class 150/2 (ATW) - permanent;
11/137/DGN - step 3 and emergency Classes 14X &amp; 153 (all operators) permanent;11/054/DGN - step 2 - Class 156
(AGA) - permanent;13/066/DGN - step 2 class 150 (FGW) - permanent;13/074/DEV step 1 trial - Classes 14X &amp; 153 (FGW,
NT, ATW, AGA) - expires
31/07/2014;13/075/DEV - step 1 trial Classes 150, 155 &amp; 156 (FGW, NT,
ATW, AGA) - expires 31/07/2015;
13/171/DEV - step 2 trial - Class 153 (LM,
AGA, EMT) - expires 31/07/2014.
The variation applies to the currently unused Minor - Although the radius of the platform is
Bay Platform at Pontypridd Station, Wales. much less than the minimum required, the
design will provide compliant stepping
distances and safe train dispatch
arrangements. This is shown in attached
evidence "AFC-Proposed Bay Combined.
pdf".
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
This alternative provision has been proven
to have the following advantages: It
supports driver instruction to brake light and
early in areas of poor adhesion; The ability
to lay sand earlier in the braking curve
permits drivers to react earlier to low
adhesion, applying sand whilst the wheels
are still rotating; Drivers regularly switch
between classes of train, standardisation
satisfies their desire for consistency. There
have been no Wrong Side Track Circuit
Failure (WSTCF) attributed to the trials, nor
have network Rail Route Asset Managers Signalling reported any other detriments
attributable to the change. A survey of
Drivers reported widespread positive
feedback of the trial. It is the intention of this
application to consolidate the trials
undertaken to both reduce the number of
future applications and standardise the nonWheel Slide Protection (WSP) fleets by
means of a permanent deviation which will,
in turn, allow for improved sander operation.
Neither the step 2 nor the step 1 trials have
resulted in an increase in wrong side track
circuit failures. The potential for an increase
in the risk of this failure mode is therefore
considered to be very low. Weighted
against the reduced risk of signals passed at
Existing unused bay platform at Pontypridd
Station is to be brought back into operational
use as a Turnback platform. The platform
forms one side of the island platform (and is
currently fenced off). The horizontal track
radius through the usable length of the bay
platform is 280 m which is less than 1000 m
and therefore does not comply with
GI/RT7016, Clause 2. 1. A joint risk
assessment workshop "106610-TRT
Curvature Joint Risk Assessment-signed.
pdf" was undertaken and evidence of this
has been included in the derogation
application pack.
This deviation applies to all light engine and The current RGS was written for the historic This alternative action will reduce rescue
short train movements of class 68
situation where locomotives had a braking
times for failed locomotive hauled trains on
locomotives by the Chiltern Railway
capability worse than the coaches they were Chiltern Railways routes and allow better
Company Limited ("Chiltern Railways") on
hauling. The class 68 is a modern
use of available line capacity since a class
Network Rail infrastructure. Chiltern
locomotive with braking capability better
68 running light engine or hauling a short
Railways seeks to permit class 68
than the figure 3 curve of GM/RT2042 (for
train can run at the permissible speeds.
locomotives running as light engine or
use on lines signalled to GK/RT0024
This approach is reasonable since the brake
hauling short trains of Mk3 coaches to run at appendix 3) and, therefore, this RGS
capability of a class 68 is sufficient for all
the permissible line speed.
assumption is not appropriate to the class
signalled routes on Network Rail
68 locomotive. Complying with the current
infrastructure. The class 68 is fitted with
RGS results in: Under-utilisation of track
automatic sanders and modern Wheel Slide
capacity due to reduced running speeds of Protection (WSP) systems to minimise the
class 68 running light on Empty Coaching
risk of poor rail adhesion. Chiltern Railways
Stock (ECS) movements or hauling short
drivers will be briefed on this derogation
trains. Increased rescue times for rescuing pending planned revision of rule book
failed trains with a class 68 locomotive.
module SP to permit this. It is notable that
Rule Book module SP already recognises
that these restrictions do not need to apply
for locomotives with enhanced braking (such
as class 67s) and this derogation seeks to
apply this principle to a new locomotive with
similar braking capability.
Modified signals on the Up and Down
Electric Lines of the GEML between Pudding
Mill Lane (Stratford area) and Guide a Park.
Signals without TPWS: L331, L935, L365,
L377, L381, L383, L412, L414. Details of all
the signals affected by Crossrail are given in
Table A.
Fitment of TPWS at all signals affected by
Crossrail that display a single yellow aspect
as part of the non-standard four-aspect
sequence is considered not reasonable. A
number of signals affected have a low
Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) risk
(Signal Assessment Tool (SAT) score less
than 75) and, considering this low risk, do
not justify fitment of TPWS. Complying with
the requirements of RGS will increase
assets that are required to be implemented
and maintained that have no justifiable
benefit or purpose. Crossrail works alters a
number of signals on a section of the GEML
route that makes extensive use of nonstandard four-aspect sequences (see Table
A attached). Full compliance to current
standard for all signals in this area would
require TPWS fitment on most signals on
Up and Down Electric Lines, of the GEML.
Applicant Organisation
Arriva Trains Wales, Northern
Rail Ltd, Abellio Greater
Anglia, First Great Western,
London and Birmingham
Railway Limited (trading as
London Midland), East
Midlands Trains Ltd, First
Scotrail Limited
Certificate Issue Date
30/07/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
25/07/2014
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
03/09/2014
N/A
INS
09/07/2014
Current
The Chiltern Railways
Company Ltd
04/07/2014
N/A
TOM
24/06/2014
Current
07/08/2014
N/A
CCS
26/06/2014
Current
16/07/2014
N/A
CCS
26/06/2014
Current
Proposed alternative approach means that Network Rail
some signals assessed as "low risk" signals
that display the single yellow aspect as part
of the non-standard four-aspect sequence
would not be fitted with TPWS. The intent of
TPWS fitment is to mitigate any increase
risk of an overrun (SPAD) that arises at a
signal as its preliminary caution would also
be the preliminary caution for the signal
ahead of it. The driver could, therefore,
misinterpret the true meaning of the
preliminary caution (double yellow) aspect
and, as a result, approach the previous
signal, which would be at single yellow, at a
higher than intended speed with the
potential of a SPAD at the signal in question.
A Signal Overrun Risk Assessment (SORA)
using the Signal Assessment Tool (SAT)
has been carried out on all signals on the
Electric Lines that will be used by Crossrail
services. This assessment has been used
to determine the SPAD "risk score" of all
signals. The normal "risk score" for carrying
out assessment for further mitigations on
new or altered signals (that may lead to the
fitment of additional TPWS protection), is
150 or greater. It is, however, proposed to
reduce this threshold to "risk score" of 75
and apply TPWS as SPAD mitigation. With
Chaffers level crossing is located on the
Moving the stop board to a compliant
With respect to the stop board positions,
LNW North
Gannow Jcn to Colne (GJC) single line at 25 position of 50 m from the crossing will have changing the operation of the crossing is not
miles and 62 chains. Linespeed: 50 mph.
an adverse effect on the sighting of the
expected to have significant impact on the
The crossing is classed as a Train Crew
crossing, and increase the barrier down
safety profile of the crossing. Trains have
Operated Barrier (TMOB).
times. It would adversely affect the sighting been stopping at these stop boards for many
of the St George's Cross sign in the up
years without recorded incident. As there is
direction, and the stop board in the down
no pull cord to draw up to, trains may stop
direction. The attached risk assessment has further from the stop boards, which may
fully assessed the change to the risk profile slightly reduce the risk of passing these
that would be introduced by configuring the accidentally. The wording on the stop
crossing with signs in a position that
boards will be altered to remove reference
complies with the requirement.
to the pull cord, which will be no longer part
of the operation of the crossing, and the
railway undertakings will be briefed on the
change in operation. Removal of the pull
cord is designed to mitigate for vandalism to
it; members of the public have been
smearing the cord with excrement, which is
a health hazard. The proposed method of
operation removes the need for the driver to
contact anything in normal operation, as the
crossing is initiated by treadle. Controls
monitor the train from strike-in, and these do
not allow the driver's white light indication to
flash until the train has come to a stand.
Page 38
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7033
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Lineside Operational Safety Signs
Certificate Number
14-078-DEV
Title
Reduced Sized Temporary Speed
Restriction Boards for Thameslink.
GERT8000-TW5
Five
Preparation and movement of trains.
Defective or isolated vehicles and on-train
equipment
14-077-DEV
Door defects on passenger vehicles 6.1
exemption from isolating a vehicle where the
first or last sets of passenger doors are
locked out of use.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-072-DEV
East Ham driver's access walkway
footbridge - reduced buffer stop overun risk
zone.
GMRT2483
One
Visibility Requirements for Trains
14-070-DEV
Sheffield Tram-Train Visibility (Issue 5).
GMRT2400
Five
Engineering Design of On-track Machines in 14-068-DEV
Running Mode
Addition of drain at the base of the fuel tank. 2.4.1.1
To fit a drain plug to the fuel tank, thus
having an opening in the fuel tank below the
maximum fuel level. For the following TSU
vehicles: DR 97501DR 97502 DR 97503
DR 97504DR 97505DR 97506DR 97507DR
97508. This deviation is for a project
requiring authorisation for placing in service
under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
Clause 16. 3 of BS EN 14033-1: 2011
mandates "All openings in the fuel tank shall
be above the maximum fuel level". Without
a drain plug fitted to the fuel tank, there
would not be the facility to routinely remove
any condensation build-up. Due to the
weather conditions in the United Kingdom
and the working routines in which On-Track
Machines are operated throughout the winter
months, fuel tanks are highly susceptible to
condensation contamination. The machine's
fuel tank will quite often be manually re-filled
from a barrel, which carries a high risk of
water contamination. There is a necessity to
drain the water from the tank to reduce the
risk of damage to the fuel system.
Plasser &amp; Theurer have a large number Plasser UK Ltd
of machines currently in service on Network
Rail infrastructure, compliant to Issue 4 (and
earlier versions of GM/RT2400) where fitting
a drain to the base of the fuel tank was
permitted and has not caused an issue.
There are no impacts of the alternative
action proposed.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
Derogation for a Steam Locomotive.
Operation of the following preserved steam
locomotive from Sheringham East Network
Rail / North Norfolk Railway (NNR)
boundary to Cromer bufferstops Platform 2,
with diversionary route to Cromer Platform 1
for contingency purposes. Note that: There
is no run round facility at Cromer;
Movements from the NNR must be routed to
Platform 2 at Cromer and the route set
throughout; There is limited scope for
parallel movements - only at Cromer;
Sheringham East Network Rail (NR)
boundary is protected by rail stop devices
vice Train Protection and Warning System
(TPWS);Working of single lines by Pilotman
is currently implemented for all Cromer to
NNR movements London and North Eastern
Railway (LNER). B12 class steam
locomotive No. 8572 TOPS No. 98472
Painted No. 8572 Class / Power
Classification 4 Wheel Arrangement 4-6-0
Maximum Speed 25 mph. For further
details, see Appendix 8.
It would not be practical to revise the RGS to
include steam locomotives, due to their wide
diversity of design from modern traction
units and the general scarcity of technical
information now available to prove their
compliance or otherwise. In a number of
recent re-issues of RGS, specific
exemptions for steam locomotives, shown in
the previous issues, have been withdrawn,
increasing the number of non-compliances
for which derogation has now to be sought.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
14-066-DEV
RGS Clause
B6.1, Appendix A Signs AF02m, AF03,
AF04m.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Readability of the smaller sized sign has
Network Rail
been designed to be at least as effective at
60 mph as the standard sized sign at 125
mph which complies with current standards.
As this size of font is already suitable for
speeds up to 125 mph, the reduced size
boards proposed here have better
readability than those already approved for
use. The proposed smaller signs reduces
the risk of a TSR boards being struck by a
train and reduces the cost of operational
delays by minimising the length of TSR
sites. Reduced size signs are proposed for
a scope area where the maximum line
speed does not exceed 60 mph. Trials have
been undertaken to prove that, at line speed
60 mph, the reduced size board is at least
as visible as the standard sign at 125 mph,
which is currently approved. A reduced
sized sign was tested against the
requirement for a sign to be readable for
four seconds at 60 mph, a distance of 107.
26 m. This will provide a surface area
approximately 60% of the size of a normal
sign.
Class 700 `Thameslink EMU' and all its sub- The following diagram shows the scaled
The driver's primary means of egress from
First Capital Connect
classes.
layout of the leading and trailing vehicles,
the cab would normally be via the cab doors.
including the lockable first class partition
However, there may be occasions when they
door. [See drawing]. The class 700 does
would be required to egress the train via the
not have conventional gangway or vestibule passenger doors in the saloon. In an
doors between the vehicles; rather, it is open emergency, they would be required to
plan, thus allowing quick access from one
unlock the partition door to reach the
vehicle to the next. Both sub-classes of the standard accommodation area; however,
train are fitted with two pairs of deployable
this is not considered to be any different to
gangway partitions per unit. Compliance
accessing the second coach of a train that
with the existing rule would result in the
has been locked out of use as per the
leading or rear three vehicles being locked
existing Rule Book requirements.
out of use by means of the deployable
gangway partitions due to their location
within the unit. This would result in the train
being taken out of service as continuation
would result in excessive dwell times and
confusion amongst passengers attempting
to alight at subsequent station stops which
are adjacent to the locked vehicles. The
diagram below demonstrates deployment of
the gangway partitions and the consequent
impact this would have on the leading or
trailing three vehicles if the current Rule
Book requirements are applied. [See
drawing].
Certificate Issue Date
16/07/2014
Certificate End Date
22/10/2018
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
26/06/2014
Deviation Status
Current
16/07/2014
N/A
TOM
24/06/2014
Current
6.3.1
This application is to request permission to
install the new footbridge at the location,
being the most practicable and feasible, to
provide a safe crossing for the drivers at the
end of the walkway. The East Ham driver's
access walkway scheme is being proposed
to provide a route for train drivers from the
train station at East Ham to the C2C depot
(and vice-versa). As part of providing a safe
crossing for train drivers over the 60 mph
Down Main FSS1 line, a footbridge is being
proposed over the line. Due to the footprint
constraint to implement the crossing over
the down main line, the deviation will involve
the footbridge being constructed within the
overrun risk zone as defined by Clause 6. 3.
1 of GI/RT/7016. The bottom of the stairs for
the new footbridge will be 2. 47 m from the
face of the buffer stop. This deviation is for
a project requiring authorisation for placing
in service under the Railways
(Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
29/10/2014
N/A
INS
21/05/2014
Current
C1.1, C1.2, C2.1, C2.2, C2.3.1, C2.4, C2.5,
C3.2.1, C3.3
This application relates to a total of seven
The tram train is required to provide lighting Please refer to Appendix 1 attached for the
three-car tram-train EMUs: Unit numbers:
that complies with the road vehicle lighting
justification for the alternative provisions.
399201 - 399207. Vehicle numbers: 99001 - regulations 1989 and ORR RSP2 (Guidance
99007, 99101 - 99107, 99201 - 99207.
on tramways).
14/10/2015
N/A
Rolling Stock
28/08/2015
Current
05/06/2014
N/A
RST
24/04/2014
Current
As indicated in Appendix 7 of this
West Coast Railway Company 05/06/2014
document. The preserved steam locomotive Ltd
is of a type that ran safely over the British
railway infrastructure since its introduction in
1928, and continued until its withdrawal from
revenue service. The design was an
updated version of an earlier design from
1913 (the B12/1). The improved locomotive
design had a history of reliable service. The
locomotive is intended for Heritage
Operation only. In order to achieve
compliance with RGS, the cost would be
prohibitive and such engineering change
would also destroy the locomotive's
fundamental nature and authenticity as a
`heritage' vehicle. Making the locomotive
compliant would, in many instances, be
impractical because of the bulk and location
of the locomotive boiler. In addition,
complying with some elements of RGS
would be of limited benefit, due to the
specific characteristics of the route to be
operated on.
N/A
Rolling Stock
15/05/2014
Current
6.6.3 and Appendix H
Scope
The scope of using these Temporary Speed
Restriction (TSR) boards covers the
geographical area of London Bridge on the
Thameslink Programme. The extents of
which are: All lines on ELR XTD from
Charing Cross to Hither Green; All lines on
ELR LBW from London Bridge to Brockley;
All lines on ELR LBC from London Bridge to
Bricklayers Arms Junction; All lines on ELR
CBM from Canon Street to London Bridge;
All lines on ELR CSW from Canon street to
Metropolitan Junction; All lines on ELR HHH
and BMJ from Blackfriars to Metropolitan
Junction. The equipment involved is a
temporary speed restriction sign of identical
construction to those already in use with a
reduced surface area. Note that the same
design of sign is used for emergency speed
restrictions, and this usage is in scope of
this deviation.
Nature and Degree
Due to the complex layout and works around
London Bridge, temporary speed restrictions
for multiple lines often require a large
number of signs to be placed in the same
location, which becomes foul of gauge once
three or more standard sized signs are
placed on top of each other if the currently
authorised signs are continued to be used.
In order to avoid them being struck by trains,
it may be necessary to greatly extend
temporary speed restrictions, which is
undesirable.
Compliance cannot be achieved due to site
specific constraints. The risk level of
overrun is extremely low since the sand trap
is designed to prevent trains from entering
the Down Mainline. The Solid State
Signalling Interlocking (SSSI) signalling
system is designed to prevent wrong routed
movements towards the trap point. The
severity of non-compliance will be minor.
The primary function of the current sand
drag and buffer stop is to prevent runaway
train units from the depot from entering the
Fenchurch Street to Southend (FSS) down
main line. With the gradient for this site 1 in
200 away from the buffer stops, it implies a
non-braked unit would travel away from the
sand drag and buffer stop rather than
towards it. There have been no reported
emergency uses in the last 40 years, so the
likelihood of this happening would be rated
as extremely low. In addition, the line speed
is listed as 15 mph; however, from the depot
yard the starting point is 5 mph with facing
spring points, and trap points set in the
wrong position would require a major
signalling failure allowing for the trains to
move in the wrong direction.
To achieve this within the footprint available, Network Rail
the major component of the new structure (I.
e. the substructure of the footbridge) will be
located within the zone extending 20 m
behind the face of the buffer stop, although
the footbridge superstructure is adjacent to
the buffer stop. In addition, the access to the
footbridge is located within 5 m of the left
hand side of the projected centre line of the
track approaching the buffer stop, but does
not lay parallel to the tracks or buffer stop.
Stagecoach Supertram
Page 39
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8014
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Hot Axle Bearing Detection
Certificate Number
14-065-DEV
Title
Sheffield Tram Train Bearing Condition
Detection.
RGS Clause
2.1.1
Scope
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car Tram Train EMUs: Unit numbers:
399201 - 399207. Vehicle numbers: 99001 99007 99101 - 99107 99201 - 99207.
Nature and Degree
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
BS EN 15437-1: 2009 is not applicable
See Appendix (GE/RT8014, Sheffield Tram- Stagecoach Supertram
because the tram-train vehicles are fitted
Train Bearing Condition Detection, Issue 2).
with inboard axle bearings. Clause 2. 1. 1 of
GE/RT8014 therefore requires an onboard
axle bearing monitoring system to be fitted.
The tram-train vehicles are being built to an
existing design which, in common with other
tram vehicles, does not have any bearing
monitoring equipment fitted. Fitting a
bearing monitoring system would require redesign of the vehicle and development and
validation of onboard systems to incorporate
the associated alarm functions.
Certificate Issue Date
20/10/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
03/10/2014
Deviation Status
Current
GMRT2491
Two
Design Requirements for a Driver's
Reminder Appliance (DRA)
14-064-DEV
Sheffield Tram Train DRA Fitment.
3.1.1
This application relates to a total of seven
three-car tram-train EMUs. Unit numbers:
399201 - 399207. Vehicle numbers: 99001 99007, 99101 - 99107,99201 - 99207.
The tram-train vehicles are being built to an See Appendix.
existing design which, in common with other
tram vehicles, does not have a Driver's
Reminder Appliance (DRA) system fitted.
Integration of the DRA system would require
a series of design changes, including further
modification to the driving cab environment.
Stagecoach Supertram
12/11/2014
N/A
RST
03/10/2014
Current
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
14-062-DEV
Telephones requirements for Automatic
Open Crossing, locally monitored, with
barrier (AOCL+B) crossing type.
2.10.2.1
All Automatic Open Crossings Locally
Monitored (AOCL) that are being provided
with addition of half barriers. Network Rail
have designated this crossing type as
AOCL+B.
Network Rail
28/05/2014
N/A
CCS
01/05/2014
Current
GERT8000-TW5
Four
Preparation and movement of trains Defective or isolated vehicles and on-train
equipment
14-060-DEV
AWS required to be sealed to enter service
deviation.
4.2
06/08/2014
N/A
TOM
20/05/2014
Current
GMRT2130
Four
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
14-059-DEV
Deviation against GM/RT2130 Issue 4 for
GSM-R Equipment Installation.
All clauses.
11/04/2014
N/A
Rolling Stock
N/A
Current
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
14-057-DEV
Deviation against the TPWS and AWS
requirements of GE/RT8075 Issue One.
All clauses.
The main impact potentially would be a train Northern Rail Limited
entering service with AWS isolated due to
the driver either forgetting or choosing to not
re-instate the system. Once the AWS is reinstated, there is no impact on safety or any
other concerned party. The rule book now
permits a unit to run Empty Coaching Stock
(ECS) with AWS isolated to a depot. What
the rule book does not do is stipulate what
sort of distance this journey may be so,
potentially, a unit could run a great distance
to get to a depot for repair with the AWS
isolated in line with GE/RT8000/TW5,
Clause 4. 4. What Northern are proposing
is a safer system which allows for the fact
that the AWS has been made operative prior
to the journey commencing. Drivers will
receive a full briefing on the deviation and
the method of working and details will be
recorded on the Northern contingency plan
(DOTE). Northern controllers will also be
briefed on the specific requirements. The
frequency of these events is low, which
reduces the amount of times a unit will be
required to run with the AWS unsealed. The
measures to ensure that the AWS systems
are not being misused are: · other drivers
who safety check and operate the units in
should be reporting any seals that are
It is proposed that due to the advanced state Southeastern
of the project, this is sufficient to progress to
submission and approval. As the GSM-R
installation is fully compliant with
GM/RT2130 Issue 3, there is no safety
implication of this proposed deviation.
The 10 new Class 70 locomotives (70801 to The deviation 13/044/DGN against
Mk3 TPWS equipment from Thales, which
GE Transportation
70810 inclusive) manufactured by General
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 to allow the installation GE Transportation plan to install to the newly
Electric (GE) in 2013 and 2014 onwards for and usage of the Thales MK3 TPWS
built locomotives, is compliant with
Colas Rail. This deviation is for a project
equipment (which complies with GE/RT8030 GE/RT8030 Issue 2 but not GE/RT8075
requiring authorisation for placing in service Issue 2) was granted to the project. With the Issue 1. Derogation was granted in midunder the Railways (Interoperability)
publication of GE/RT8075 Issue 1 to
2013 for this, prior to the publication of
Regulations 2011.
supersede GE/RT8030 Issue 4, the project GE/RT8075.
is seeking to extend the deviation to apply to
GE/RT8075 Issue 1. The need for this
deviation follows the update by the
Department for Transport (DfT) of the
Notified National Technical Rule (NNTR)
list, whilst the locos development /
manufacture is at a very advance stage (the
first three locomotives are currently in the
UK). As presented in the previous deviation
application, production Thales Mk4 TPWS
equipment that is validated as being
compliant with GE/RT8075 Issue 1 was only
recently made available for procurement on
the market by Thales. The production of the
locomotives had been started by then and
had reached final stages, with one
locomotive already completed. The
integration of the MK4 TPWS equipment
would have caused a delay of 4 to 6 months
and large integration costs of design and
installation. In addition, this delay would
have had major ramifications due to other
19/05/2014
N/A
CCS
01/05/2014
Current
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Installation of telephones at all sites being
converted to AOCL+B crossings will require
additional design and installation exercise,
which would delay provision of the barriers
at currently open crossings, type AOCL.
The impact of adding phones would require
signaller ergonomic aspects to be
considered. Addition of telephones at level
crossings with barriers can affect the
signaller's workload, particularly due to
nuisance usage of telephones. This can
distract signallers from safe operation of
railway and other crossings. Workload
would need to be assessed to ensure that it
will not adversely affect the performance of
the signaller. In some cases, an increase of
the number of telephones within a control
area may lead to the assessment requiring
more resources to adequately manage the
control area. This additional work would
make provision of barriers, which provide
the intended safety improvement, less cost
effective and may lead to fewer crossings
being enhanced.
Class 142, 144 and 150/1 Diesel
Any unit has the potential for coming to a
Mechanical Multiple Unit (DMMU) which
stand with the on board AWS equipment
employ a traditional isolating handle with
directly above the track AWS equipment
seal for the Automatic Warning System
which results in the AWS having to be
(AWS). The deviation is with regards to the isolated to be able to move the vehicle off
AWS seal being broken and does not in any the magnet. This more often occurs with the
way seek to deviate against the rules for
rear vehicle when arriving in stations such
AWS isolation. It is assumed that the AWS as Leeds where AWS is used in the
will still be operative but for operational
platforms for bi-directional working; a driver
reasons the AWS seal has had to be broken changes ends and discovers that the vehicle
to affect a temporary isolation following the is stood over the magnet. With most
train coming to a stand on the AWS track
modern units, this results in the AWS being
equipment.
isolated and a fitter or engineer being
required to reinstate the AWS. However,
with 142, 144 and 150/1 units, a traditional
AWS isolating handle with seal is used.
This means that the driver can isolate the
AWS, move the unit and then reinstate the
AWS, but cannot reseal the AWS handle.
We are then left with a unit which has a fully
functioning AWS system but which is not
permitted to enter passenger service due to
the seal being missing and, if we do not
have a fitter to hand, we have to then cancel
the service or severely delay it. However,
this is not a frequent occurrence. Note that
we are not looking to change any rules or
obtain any deviations to any rules
appertaining to the AWS remaining isolated
Applicable for Southeastern operated Class The GSM-R Project is at an advanced stage
465, 466, 375, 376 and 395 rolling stock.
and demonstrating compliance with the
updated standard would delay the project
implementation.
As a fundamental part of AOCL+B is the
existing AOCL, the crossing remains locally
monitored by the train driver. Telephones
associated with locally monitored crossing
types including AOCL+B are not required to
be utilised for making emergency calls, and
they are of a type that is not self-proving.
Their primarily use is to report equipment
failure, and request permission to cross in
vehicles that need additional crossing time
(typically slow freight vehicles, wide loads,
and low loaders at risk of grounding).
Addition of telephones at locally monitored
crossings does very little to improve overall
risk management when compared to the
addition of the barrier. Since the primary
safety operation of the crossing includes
monitoring of the crossing area by train
driver and trains operated at speed such
they can stop short of the crossing if it does
not operate correctly, non-provision of
phones is not considered to have an impact
of crossing safety.
Page 40
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2130
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
GMRT2400
Five
GMRT2466
Title
Advance stage deviation for installation of
GSM-R to Plasser &amp; Theurer 09-16
CSM Tampers.
RGS Clause
All clauses.
Scope
Applies to the installation of GSM-R system
to DR 73105. This deviation is for a project
requiring authorisation for placing in service
under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
Engineering Design of On-track Machines in 14-050-DEV
Running Mode
Advance stage deviation for installation of
GSM-R to Plasser &amp; Theurer 09-16
CSM Tampers.
All clauses
Applies to the installation of GSM-R system
to DR 73105. This deviation is for a project
requiring authorisation for placing in service
under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
Three
Railway Wheelsets
14-049-DEV Revised
15-06-2015
Sheffield Tram Train Wheelsets (Mainline
Testing).
Clauses relating to the use of monobloc
wheels: 2.3.1, 2.9.1. Clauses relating to
wheel profile: 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.6.1, 4.4.1.
GMRT2141
Three
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over
14-048-DEV
Class 700 (Thameslink EMU) - Resistance
to Roll-over.
2.4.1.1 b)
Class 700/0 (Thameslink EMU eight-car
unit) and Class 700/1 (Thameslink EMU
twelve-car unit) trailer cars (TOSW_12,
TOSW_8, TOS2_12, TOS3_12, TOSLW_12,
TOSLW_8). This deviation is for a project
requiring authorisation for placing in service
under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
14-047-DEV
No Route Indication for Straight Route on
EK4157 signal at Rainham, Kent.
5.1.2.4
EK4157 signal on Down Chatham Line
approaching Rainham Station.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Certificate Number
14-051-DEV
Nature and Degree
Due to GM/RT2130 Issue 4 being notified
as a National Technical Rule (NTR) by the
competent authority in the UK, this standard
has become applicable to the project
following the completion of Global System
for Mobile communications for Railways
(GSM-R) system development, but prior to it
being fitted to DR 73105 (expected to be
fitted in March/April 2014). The design of
the GSM-R system is compliant with Issue 3
of GM/RT2130. Issue 4 of GM/RT2130 is a
fundamental revision of the standard to align
it with EN 45545, and demonstrating
compliance with Issue 4 would require a
complete new assessment. Therefore,
checking compliance with the new standard
at this advanced stage of the GSM-R project
would require significant new assessment
which would incur additional cost and delays
to the project. In addition, fixed system
parameters cannot be modified, resulting in
the risk that the GSM-R system may not
comply with the new Euronorm.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The machine will operate with the same
level of compliance as all other on-track
machines in the UK that have already been
fitted with GSM-R.
Applicant Organisation
dg8 Design and Engineering
Ltd
Certificate Issue Date
02/05/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
11/04/2014
Deviation Status
Current
Due to GM/RT2400 Issue 5 being notified
as a National Technical Rule (NTR) by the
competent authority in the UK, this standard
has become applicable to the project
following the completion of GSM-R system
development, but prior to it being fitted to
DR 73105 (expected to be fitted in
March/April 2014). The design of the GSMR system is compliant with Issue 4 of
GM/RT2400 and the other relevant RGS that
have been excluded by Issue 5 of
GM/RT2400. Issue 5 of GM/RT2400 is a
fundamental revision of the standard to align
it with the prevailing Euronorm EN 14 033
and demonstrating compliance with Issue 5
would require a complete new assessment.
Therefore, checking compliance with the
new standard at this advanced stage of the
GSM-R project would require significant
new assessment which would incur
additional unjustified cost and delays to the
project.
This application relates to a total of seven
Changing the wheelset to a monobloc
tram trains for test operation on mainline
design would compromise the project
infrastructure between Meadowhall South
objective of using a `standard' tram train
and Parkgate. Operation is subject to the
vehicle, and add significant cost for no
completion of infrastructure changes that are practical benefit. The use of a wheel profile
essential for compatibility, such as the
permitted by GM/RT2466 Issue 3 Appendix
raising of check rails by at least 45 mm. The A would result in a fundamental
Tram Train units will use wheelsets that do incompatibility with the Sheffield tramway,
not meet RGS requirements in two areas:
as flange-tip running is necessary to
Monobloc wheels will not be used; The
negotiate switches and crossings on the
wheel profile is not currently permitted, and tramway.
will not meet the requirements for flange
tip/back blend and flange toe radii. This
application does not relate to a project
requiring authorisation under the Railways
(Interoperability) Regulations 2011. Tram
train vehicles are included on the Approved
List of Exclusions published by the
Department for Transport.
The machine will operate with the same
level of compliance as all other on-track
machines in the UK that have already been
fitted with GSM-R.
dg8 Design and Engineering
Ltd
02/05/2014
N/A
RST
11/04/2014
Current
15/06/2015
31/12/2016
RST
13/03/2014
Current
11/04/2014
N/A
RST
13/03/2014
Current
01/04/2014
N/A
CCS
06/03/2014
Current
Class 700 (Thameslink EMU) vehicles are
designed as lightweight vehicles with high
payload, in terms of a whole life, whole
system optimisation. In combination with the
conventional high floor level, and
consequently high centres of gravity, this
design leads generally to disagreement with
the 21° criterion of GM/RT2141. Resistance
to roll-over induced by overspeeding was
calculated according to GM/RT2141 with
multi body simulation software. Here, the
trailer cars are predicted to infringe the 21°
rollover limit of GM/RT2141 Issue 3. In
crush-laden condition, the most critical
vehicles are predicted not to overturn up to
19. 5° cant deficiency (non-compliant by less
than 1. 5°). All pantograph and motor cars
comply with 21° limit. The design has been
optimised with respect to weight reduction in
the new bogie and carbody design.
Moreover, the interior layout has been
designed to carry more passengers during
rush hours. Notwithstanding, measures to
lower down the centres of gravity as much
as possible were introduced during the
vehicle design process: Classes 700/0 and
700/1 have a lower floor height (1100 mm) in
comparison with existing suburban rolling
stock (1140 mm). This lowers the centre of
Rainham Station area is to be resignalled
and the track layout remodelled with the
provision an additional bay platform. Trains
approaching on the Down Chatham line may
be routed three ways from the junction
signal (EK4157) via main class routes into
Rainham Station: Route A(M) - Down
Chatham line (straight ahead) into Platform
2 and subsequently onwards towards the
coast. Route B(M) - Across to Up Chatham
line and into Platform 1 to terminate at a
fixed red light. Route C(M) - Across to Bay
Platform 0 to terminate. Application of a
route indication for the straight ahead route
without approach control would not be
compatible with the readability performance
of the standard alpha-numeric route
indicator due to the line speed for the
straight-ahead route. Approach control of
the signal for the straight-ahead route which
is likely to result in a Signal Passed at
Danger (SPAD) trap as drivers as would
routinely clearing as the train approaches.
This is consequently not considered to be a
satisfactory arrangement by the signal
sighting committee. Therefore, it is
considered that the arrangement of
providing a standard route indicator with an
indication only for the divergent routes
The use of resilient wheels fitted with tyres Stagecoach Supertram
is consistent with Stagecoach Supertram's
existing fleet and normal practice for tram
vehicles, and is not considered to have a
significant impact on any other party. The
use of the revised wheel profile requires
existing mainline check rails to be raised by
at least 45 mm to ensure compatibility.
Network Rail is managing this change to the
infrastructure alongside other changes
required for tram train operation, and will
consider the effect on other rolling stock as
part of their engineering change process.
IRR Report 81/95 Issue 2, Tram-Train
Wheel Profile Design, dated 27/09/2013,
documents the design process followed in
developing the proposed wheel profile.
Safety against derailment and compatibility
are considered in this report as part of
determining the optimum tram train wheel
profile.
The impact of a deviation from the 21°
First Capital Connect
criterion of GM/RT2141 was investigated in
detail, and a summary of the findings is
described in the document `Deviation
Against 21° Limit of GM/RT2141 (Class 700,
Thameslink EMU)', [Doc-ID: EN1
A6Z00035402944 000 B]. The investigation
shows that, based on the design limits and
provision instructions from the RGS
(GC/RT5021, GE/RT8075, GK/RT0075), the
lower roll-over resistance does not introduce
an additional risk of such extent as to be
unacceptable. It is shown that the
differences in terms of overspeed remain
negligible for the worst case. A substantial
margin of overspeeding remains between
intervention of AWS or TPWS, respectively,
and the predicted overturn. Therefore, the
possibility of train overspeed (and hence
rolling over in a curve) is reduced to a level
that is as low as reasonably practicable.
Furthermore, the vehicles in question which
do not comply with GM/RT2141 are
intermediate cars which show a lower
sensitivity for wind effects than leading cars
complying with the 21° requirement, whether
both leading and intermediate cars comply
with the GM/RT2142 requirement regarding
resistance against overturning in gales. The
EK4157 signal has been assessed during
Network Rail
the signal sighting process as being visible
from 800 m away with an essentially straight
approach and the line speed on the
approach is 80 mph. The divergent routes
into platforms 1 and 0 are to be approachcontrolled from red due to the step down in
speed required to traverse the divergent
routes through the crossovers into the
platforms (these shall be restricted to 25
mph). Impact is considered to be minor as
both diverging routes from the signal are
approach-released from red. Therefore, if
the signal is sighted displaying a proceed
aspect from a significant distance, the driver
will be aware that this corresponds to the
straight-ahead route for which a route
indication is not provided. The proposed
route indication arrangement shall be clearly
shown in the signalling notice and other
briefing material prepared for operational
staff associated with the commissioning of
the new signalling system including for
Southeastern's train crew. In the longer
term, following the commissioning of the
new signalling, an appreciation of the route
indication arrangements at this signal by
drivers shall be maintained through the route
knowledge management process. As the
Page 41
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0075
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
Certificate Number
14-045-DEV
Title
Automatic Warning System (AWS) position
for LTN00538 permissible speed warning
indicator located approaching Forest Gate
Station.
RGS Clause
3.3.8.2 a)
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
14-044-DEV
OFF indicator legend at Maidstone West
Station Platform 2.
2.4.5.2 Table 16
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
14-043-DEV
OFF indicator legends at Clapham Junction
Station Platform 17.
2.4.5.2 Table 16
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
14-041-DEV
Signal T869 in close proximity to
Billingshurst Level Crossing.
2.1.1.3 a)
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
AWS position for LTN00538 permissible
speed warning indicator located on the Up
Electric line of the GE route from Liverpool
Street to Shenfield, approaching Forest Gate
station, at 5M 38CH.
Nature and Degree
Requirement for AWS at permissible speed
warning indicators is specified as exactly
180 m in GK/RT0075. Given existing signal
spacing in the area is circa 300 m,
compliance is not possible without moving
signals or putting signal AWS at less than
normal 180 m or move the permissible
speed warning indicator without
compromising one or more of the other
clauses in GK/RT0075: 3. 3. 8. 1. - The
AWS magnet shall: b) be positioned not
less than 4 seconds running time from any
other AWS equipment. c) not be positioned
between any other AWS equipment and its
associated signal, board or indicator. 3. 3.
5. 1 a): The board must be positioned as
close as practicable to the longest
deceleration distance from the PSR. 3. 3. 8.
1: An AWS magnet shall be provided on the
approach to all permissible speed warning
indicators provided to satisfy the criteria set
out in 3. 3. 1. 4. 3. 3. 5. 1 b): The board
must not be positioned between a signal and
its AWS. To position the AWS at less than
180 m is considered the least onerous to
break. Train Operating Companies (TOCs),
Freight Operating Companies (FOCs) and
Network Rail agree that positioning the
permissible speed warning indicator's AWS
OFF indicator at Maidstone West Platform 2 As a consequence of bi-directional
for Signal EK4753. ELR PWS1, 42 miles 36 signalling being installed at Maidstone West
chains.
Platform 2, an OFF indicator with a legend
needs to provide an indication of the
direction in which it applies. Maidstone
West station, although a through station, is
located at a transition point in line
designations and Engineers' Line
References (ELRs) such that all trains
leaving the station are effectively "Up" trains,
regardless of their direction of travel (the line
designations change at the platform starting
signal to which the OFF indicator refers).
Only directional information permitted is the
text "UP" or "DN". Compliant OFF indicator
means that the "UP" or "DN" text would
cause confusion to the platform staff giving
with consequent risk of unauthorised
movements taking place. Confusion to the
dispatch staff increases likelihood of start
away Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD), thus
increasing SPAD risk on EK4753 and
EK4750.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Impacts are considered minor. The AWS
Network Rail
will still be in position in line with
requirements of GE/RT8075: 2. 1. 8. 1.
allows a signal AWS to be positioned a
minimum of 3 seconds from the signal,
and2. 1. 8. 2. h) permits a signal sighting
committee (SSC) to recommend an
alternative position and this achieves a
reduction in risk. Drivers use signal AWS to
assist with stopping at signals so a standard
180 m distance is import; no equivalent use
is made of AWS at permissible speed
warning indicator. GN158 in GK/GN0675
implies variation is permitted, but wording in
GK/RT0075 means a deviation is still
required. GN158 states: "GE/RT8035:
Automatic Warning System (AWS) permits
the distance from the AWS magnet to the
permissible speed warning indicator to be
reduced to a minimum of 3 seconds running
time. This accounts for the 1 second delay
after passing over the permanent magnet
before the AWS equipment gives a warning
indication and provides the driver with a
minimum of 2 seconds to respond to the
AWS indication, observe the speed sign and
acknowledge the warning. "
Certificate Issue Date
01/04/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Control Command and Signalling
Lead SC Approval Date
06/03/2014
Deviation Status
Current
The directional identifier proposed has been Network Rail
selected so as to use a distinctive and
recognisable abbreviation of the next
principal station name in the direction of
travel, which all operating staff in the area
would be aware of as part of the route/local
knowledge necessary for the safe and
effective execution of their duties. Proposed
directional legend of the OFF indicator will
provide a clear identification of the direction
of the movement which has been authorised.
Proposed legends present a lower risk than
a standard legend, as they will not cause
confusion as to the direction of an authorised
train movement. The proposed legend shall
be clearly shown in the signalling notice and
other briefing material prepared for
operational staff for the Railway
Undertakings associated with the
commissioning of the new signalling system,
including for Southeastern's train crew and
platform staff. In the longer term, following
the commissioning of the new signalling, an
appreciation of the meaning of the nonstandard legend by operational staff shall be
maintained through the route/local
knowledge applicable to their role.
01/04/2014
N/A
CCS
06/03/2014
Current
Proposed alternative identifiers have been Network Rail
selected to use distinctive characters that
minimise the risk of confusion between
legend. They are also both recognisable
abbreviations to local station names that all
operating staff in the area are aware of as
part of their current route/local knowledge
necessary for the safe and effective
execution of their duties. Proposed
directional legend of the OFF indicator will
provide a clear identification of the direction
of the movement which has been authorised.
Proposed legends present a lower risk than
standard legends as they will not cause
confusion as to the direction of an authorised
train movement. Legends will be shown in
the signalling notice and other briefing
material prepared for operational staff
associated with the commissioning of the
new signalling equipment. All will be briefed
to the Train operating Company (TOC) and
Freight Operating Company (FOC) drivers
and platform dispatch staff. In the longer
term, following commissioning of the new
signalling equipment, an appreciation of the
meaning of the non-standard legend by
operational staff shall be maintained through
the route/local knowledge applicable to their
role.
Signal T869 at Billingshurst Station is
In order to comply with the RGS
The principal risk that is mitigated by the
Network Rail
positioned 15m from the Level Crossing, but requirement, the signal would have to be
level crossing controls is that arising from
is only utilised as a Turn Back Signal and
positioned at least 25 m from the crossing.
Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD). The
thus non-approached. The signal has been Standage for trains in the normal direction is signal is not normally approachable by trains
positioned in parallel to the main running
sufficient for trains to occupy the whole
as there is no wrong direction signalling.
signal T867 which has been configured so
platform. This in turn would mean that trains The signal has good sighting due to the
that movement authorities towards the stop reversing at Billingshurst would have to pull position of the train at its allocated stopping
signal are only displayed when the level
forward in normal direction of travel to a
position and architecture of the station, and
crossing is closed to road traffic.
point that allows the other end of the train to also for trains approaching under perturbed
be positioned to view signal T869. The
working without being signalled. TPWS
signal and its base would have to be reTSS is fitted, principally to mitigate the
installed in the compliant position.
SPAD risk associated with the conflict on the
cross-over, but has a secondary mitigation
role to arrest a SPAD and therefore
minimise the potential risk of collision on the
level crossing.
01/04/2014
N/A
CCS
06/03/2014
Current
25/03/2014
N/A
CCS
06/03/2014
Current
OFF indicators at Clapham Junction Station As a consequence of platform extension
Platform 17 for Signals VC600 and VC607
works, OFF indicators are needed on
signals. Route Kent/Sussex, ELR TTB1, 2
Platform 17 at Clapham Station. Due to a
miles 57 chains.
curve through the platform, which continues
once the platform is extended; the signal
VC600 mounted on the left hand side cannot
be seen from the platform by the dispatch
staff. Signal VC607 cannot be seen due to
the passenger over-bridge restricting
dispatch staff visibility of the signal. Existing
Platform 17 Up and Down directions are the
opposite to the rest of the platforms at the
Clapham Junction (Up to Wandsworth,
Down to Kensington). Trains depart from
Platform 17 via the Up West London, either
towards the Down West London line or the
Down Brighton Slow line. This means all
trains depart in a down direction. Only
directional information permitted is the suffix
(or prefix) "UP" or "DN". A compliant OFF
indicator means that the "UP" or "DN" text
would cause confusion to the platform staff
with consequent risk of unauthorised
movements taking place. Confusion to the
dispatch staff increases likelihood of start
away Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD), thus
increasing SPAD risk on VC600 and VC607.
Page 42
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8075
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
Certificate Number
14-038-DEV
Title
TPWS receiver position on Class 68 UK
Light locomotive.
RGS Clause
3.2.1.3
Scope
UK Light locomotives manufactured by
Vossloh España S. A. (Class 68) (limited to
a maximum of 41 units due to stage IIIA
engine). This application is for a project
requiring authorisation for placing in service
under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
GERT8000-T3
Three
Possession of a running line for engineering 14-037-DEV Revised
work
02-09-2015
LNE Route - 'Flexible Train Arrival Point'
2.2, 9.7
National.
GERT8000-HB12
Two
Duties of the engineering supervisor (ES)
14-036-DEV
LNE Route - 'Flexible Train Arrival Point'
3.2
National.
The current RGS requires that, when
possession is taken around a train, it is done
so whilst the engineering train is standing at
a signal which is being held at danger. This
means the High Output (HO) trains are
positioned away from their planned start-ofwork site, and between 10 and 20 minutes of
lost production occur at the start of work
whilst the train is positioned in the correct
place to start work. This can equate to an
estimated 50,000 Pounds Sterling in lost
production.
GERT8000-HB11
Two
Duties of the person in charge of a
possession (PICOP)
14-035-DEV
LNE Route - 'Flexible Train Arrival Point'.
4.2
National.
The current RGS requires that, when
possession is taken around a train, it is done
so whilst the engineering train is standing at
a signal which is being held at danger. This
means the High Output (HO) trains are
positioned away from their planned start-ofwork site, and between 10 and 20 minutes of
lost production occur at the start of work
whilst the train is positioned in the correct
place to start work. This can equate to an
estimated 50,000 Pounds Sterling in lost
production.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-032-DEV
Finsbury Park Station Platform 3 (old
Platform 1) - platform height.
3.1.1 Platform Height
Finsbury Park to Alexandra Palace Capacity The platform height within the existing,
Improvements Project. Finsbury Park
interim and final stages exceed the
Station Platform 3 (old Platform 1).
maximum allowable of 915 mm, the worst
case being 952, 952 and 944 mm in the
existing, interim and final stages
respectively. These are 37, 37 and 29 mm
greater than the 915 mm target height. The
platform within this area of non-compliance
cannot be lowered due to the construction of
the platform (steel deck with GRP surface
between Ch 4120 and 4150). There is no
action plan being put in place due to the
disproportionate costs associated with the
magnitude of work to bring the steel deck
platform area into conformity with the
standard.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The Vossloh Class 68 (UK Light) project is
already at an advanced stage, with the first
units already built and the lead unit in the UK
for commissioning. The project was
previously being assessed against
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 as amended by
deviation 12/116/DGN which has already
been granted. To future proof further
locomotive builds and to comply with the
latest list of NNTRs published by the UK
Department for Transport (DfT) in midOctober, Vossloh have decided to
demonstrate compliance against
GE/RT8075 Issue 1 rather than GE/RT8030
Issue 4. As such, a new/updated deviation
against Clause 3. 2. 1. 3 of GE/RT8075
Issue 1 is required, covering the same
technical requirements as derogation
12/116/DGN against GE/RT8030 Issue 4.
The UK Light design is based on the existing
EuroLight locomotive. The arrangement of
the UK Light locomotive components is such
that it is impossible to fit the Train Protection
and Warning System (TPWS) antenna no
further than 2. 3 m behind the leading
wheelset. This is due to: The lack of
available space behind the leading
wheelset. Any installation of the TPWS
receiver 2. 3 m behind the leading axle will
The current RGS requires that, when
possession is taken around a train, it is done
so whilst the engineering train is standing at
a signal which is being held at danger. This
means the High Output (HO) trains are
positioned away from their planned start-ofwork site, and between 10 and 20 minutes of
lost production occur at the start of work
whilst the train is positioned in the correct
place to start work. This can equate to an
estimated œ50,000 in lost production.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Certificate Issue Date
The requirement to position the TPWS
Vossloh España S.A. on behalf 25/03/2014
receiver behind the leading axle was
of, Direct Rail Services Limited
introduced to avoid spurious operation of
TPWS caused by interference from TI21
track circuits. A number of derogations have
previously been granted against the same
technical requirement in GE/RT8030 Issue
4, which permit the TPWS antenna to be
located ahead of the leading axle (for
instance derogations 10/045/DGN,
06/105/DGN and 05/032/DGN). On this
basis, it is considered that the risk
associated with the TPWS antenna being
located ahead of the leading axle is
controlled. The new location avoids the
technical and geometrical problems of the
original position (available space and EMC
emissions).
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
06/03/2014
Deviation Status
Current
The HO train would be stopped at the FTAP
at the exact location of work (which would
ordinarily be distant from a signal) and
possession would be taken around the train
at that point. It is estimated that this would
allow 10 to 20 minutes of additional
production time on every HO shift. This
could equate to an estimated œ50,000
increase in production each shift. As part of
the initial study, a risk assessment has been
performed, involving stakeholders from
route operations, National Delivery Service
(NDS), Freightliner, RSSB and HO
Operations. As possession will not be
granted until the HO train is at the FTAP,
then no personnel will be on or near the line
whilst the train is in motion. There is a risk
that the HO train overshoots the FTAP.
Threats relating to this have been assessed
and mitigated, principally by driver briefing
and the use of countdown markers on the
approach to the FTAP (see FTAP proposal
document).
The HO train would be stopped at the FTAP
at the exact location of work (which would
ordinarily be distant from a signal) and
possession would be taken around the train
at that point. It is estimated that this would
allow 10 to 20 minutes of additional
production time on every HO shift. This
could equate to an estimated œ50,000
Pounds Sterling increase in production each
shift. As part of the initial study, a risk
assessment has been performed, involving
stakeholders from route operations, National
Delivery Service (NDS), Freightliner, RSSB
and HO Operations. As possession will not
be granted until the HO train is at the FTAP,
then no personnel will be on or near the line
whilst the train is in motion. There is a risk
that the HO train overshoots the FTAP.
Threats relating to this have been assessed
and mitigated, principally by driver briefing
and the use of countdown markers on the
approach to the FTAP (see FTAP proposal
document).
The HO train would be stopped at the FTAP
at the exact location of work (which would
ordinarily be distant from a signal) and
possession would be taken around the train
at that point. It is estimated that this would
allow 10 to 20 minutes of additional
production time on every HO shift. This
could equate to an estimated 50,000 Pounds
Sterling increase in production each shift.
As part of the initial study, a risk assessment
has been performed, involving stakeholders
from route operations, National Delivery
Service (NDS), Freightliner, RSSB and HO
Operations. As possession will not be
granted until the HO train is at the FTAP,
then no personnel will be on or near the line
whilst the train is in motion. There is a risk
that the HO train overshoots the FTAP.
Threats relating to this have been assessed
and mitigated, principally by driver briefing
and the use of countdown markers on the
approach to the FTAP (see FTAP proposal
document).
A snapshot has been taken from Track
Design Handbook NR/L2/TRK/2049 Issue
12 to be used as a visual aid and illustration
purposes showing the dimensions relating to
the recess value. (See attached documents
for application with diagram on). A full
stepping analysis has been carried out to all
passenger stock and is compliant to group
standard. There is no worsening of the
platform heights to its current position today.
Network Rail
02/09/2015
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
28/07/2015
Current
Network Rail
02/09/2015
31/12/2017
TOM
28/07/2015
Current
Network Rail
02/09/2015
31/12/2017
Traffic Operation and Management
28/07/2015
Current
Network Rail
07/04/2014
N/A
INS
05/03/2014
Current
Page 43
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
14-031-DEV
Title
Winchmore Hill Platform 2 - reduced width
of recess.
RGS Clause
11.1.4.1
Scope
Winchmore Hill Platform 2, Hertfordshire,
UK
Nature and Degree
Winchmore Hill Platform 2 (140 m in length
/ reduced recess will be over a 10 m
section): If measured from the coping stone
face, the recess will be reduced to a
minimum of 258 mm, 42 mm less than the
minimum standard requirement. There are
no physical track works currently planned at
Winchmore Hill. Thus, technically, the
recess is not reduced by adjustment of the
coping stone. When measuring the
dimension from the running edge of the
nearest rail, the X dimension of 730 mm
dimension increases due to the setback of
the coping stone. A full stepping analysis
has been carried out against existing track /
existing platform and against final platform/
theoretical track. As a result of the coper
lifts at the London end of the platform, the
stepping will be improved and, thus, create
a fully compliant platform for stepping
dimensions.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Winchmore Hill - Platform 2, Down
Network Rail
Hertford: Throughout the length of the 140
m platform, there is an existing compliant
(Z1) recess value in excess of the 300 mm
requirement. The existing dimensions are
minimum 304 mm and maximum 331 mm.
Due to the required adjustments of the
copers by means of setting back or trimming
the coper face, there is a small 10 m section
between Ch260m and Ch270m, whereby the
recess value is reduced by 47 mm. The
adjusted dimensions are minimum 258 mm
and maximum 288 mm. (Please refer to
general arrangement drawing). There is a
theoretical smoothing track alignment
submitted in support of the Civil Engineering
design to provide assurance that the new
profile of the platform face will be compliant
to the future track realignment scheme.
Below is a snapshot taken from Track
Design Handbook NR/L2/TRK/2049 Issue
12, for illustration purposes, showing the
minimum dimension of the recess value
(*a=300 mm). (See attached document for
application with diagram on).
Certificate Issue Date
07/04/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
05/03/2014
Deviation Status
Current
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-030-DEV
Oakleigh Park Station Platform 1 and 2 reduced platform width at mid-platform
fencing.
6.2.2
Oakleigh Park Station Platform 1 and 2.
Station Capacity Planner, Fire Safety
Engineer, Route Asset Manager Buildings
and Route Safety Improvement Manager
have all approved the proposed fencing
design and support this deviation. Support
is also present from the Customer Service
Safety Business Partner for First Capital
Connect (FCC) who runs the station.
Extensive design review has taken place
from the Station Capacity Planner, Fire
Safety Engineer, Route Asset Manager
Buildings and Route Safety Improvement
Manager who all support the design and this
derogation application. The station facility
owner FCC also supports this derogation via
the Customer Service Safety Business
Partner. Finally, it is very similar to
previously granted derogations for suicide
mitigation fencing at Southall (Certificate No
12/198/DGN), Hayes and Harlington
(Certificate No 12/231/DGN) and Goring and
Streatley (Certificate No 13/089/DEV). For
reasons of fire safety and pedestrian flow,
this is the best option for the fenceline to
take.
Network Rail
02/05/2014
N/A
INS
05/03/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-029-DEV
New Southgate Station Platforms 3 &amp; 4 - 6.2.2
reduced platform width at mid platform
fencing.
New Southgate Station Platforms 3 &amp; 4. New fencing would be introduced to prevent
suicide. The fenceline would follow an
existing non-compliance and cannot comply
for pedestrian flow and fire safety reasons.
The existing outer edge of the stairs has
2720 mm clearance, a non-compliance;
therefore, the fenceline cannot be placed
further from the platform edge and is not
making the situation worse.
Network Rail
09/04/2014
N/A
INS
05/03/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-028-DEV
Brookmans Park Station - mid platform
fencing.
6.2.2
Brookmans Park Station.
The Fire Safety Engineer, Station Capacity
Planner, Route Asset Manager Buildings
and Route Safety Improvement Manager
have all extensively checked and approve
the designs and derogation. The derogation
is also supported by the Customer Service
Safety Business Partner for First Capital
Connect (FCC) who manages the station.
They are confident that it does not import
unacceptable risk to any station users. Fire
Safety Engineer, Station Capacity Planner,
Route Asset Manager for Buildings and
Route Safety Improvement Manager have
been involved in the development and
checking of designs, which they approve,
and support this derogation application. The
FCC Customer Service Safety Business
Partner supports this application for
derogation. For reasons of fire safety and
pedestrian flow, this is the best possible
option for our fenceline to take.
Network Rail
08/04/2014
N/A
INS
05/03/2014
Current
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
14-024-DEV
Paddock Wood Station, Platform 2 Reduced platform width and column in
overrun risk zone.
6.2.2 and 6.3.1
Paddock Wood Station Platform 2. ELR
XTD/PWS1.
A major rebuild of the station canopy would
be required.
Oakleigh Park Station - approximately 8 m
of the proposed fenceline, at the bottom of
the stairs to platform 1/2, has a platform
clearance of 2600 mm to the Up Fast Side.
The minimum clearance in accordance with
GI/RT7016 is 3000 mm. The proposed
fenceline directly replaces an existing fence
at the base of the stairs therefore is not
making the arrangement worse. The final 4
m of the proposed fenceline to the south end
of Platform 2 is also non-compliant. This
section of fence is proposed at 2500 mm
clearance from the Up Fast platform edge
(GI/RT7016 requires 3000 mm). This would
be the installation of new fencing which,
where the derogation is needed, would not
be installed until this derogation were
approved. This new fencing is to save lives
Oakleigh Park which has seen three
instances of suicide from the platform edge
over the last five years. The Peterborough
to London Kings Cross stretch of the East
Coast Main Line has had 30 mid-platform
suicides and many others from people
walking off platform ends (which has been
mitigated through platform end gating here).
It is the worst area for suicide on our route
and plans are in place to improve defences
at every station in this area.
The introduction of 247 metres of 1. 4 m
high grey galvanised mid-platform fencing at
the location is intended to restrict the access
by passengers to the fast line edge of the
track so as to discourage suicide, access
where it is necessary (e. g. in an emergency
stopping service) is maintained through the
introduction of 3 m wide gates which will not
be locked and clearly identified by signage.
The deviation for New Southgate is for 5 m
of the proposed fenceline, at the bottom of
the stairs to Platforms 3 &amp; 4, which has
a platform clearance of 2720 mm to the
Down Fast Side. The minimum clearance in
accordance with GI/RT7016 is 3000 mm.
The introduction of this fencing is intended to
save life at a station where four people have
intentionally taken their lives in the last five
years. There is an existing non-compliance
which we intend to extend - this is very
similar to approved derogations for Southall
(Certificate No 12/198/DGN), Hayes and
Harlington (Certificate No 12/231/DGN) and
Goring and Streatley (Certificate No
13/089/DEV). Pedestrian flow and fire
safety analysis have been performed at the
station and on these designs. They have
been approved as not making the situation
worse and not representing any
Brookmans Park Station: As part of fatality
mitigation works to combat railway suicide
which, over the last 5 years and year to date,
has resulted in 281 deaths on the London
North Eastern (LNE) and East Midlands
Routes, Network Rail has decided to utilise
the guidance of the Network Rail National
Suicide Prevention Steering Group to
implement mid-platform fencing at a number
of stations. The national guidance was
issued following the implementation of midplatform fencing at 10 stations, including
Southall (Certificate No. 12/198/DGN),
Hayes and Harlington (Certificate No.
12/231/DGN) and Goring and Streatley
(Certificate No. 13/089/DEV), which were
granted deviations. The introduction of 247
metres of 1. 4 m high grey galvanised mid
platform fencing at the location is intended to
restrict the access by passengers to the fast
line edge of the track so as to discourage
suicide, access where it is necessary (e. g.
in an emergency stopping service) is
maintained through the introduction of 2. 5 m
wide gates which will not be locked and
clearly identified by signage. Where the
fenceline stops before the platform end,
hatching and signage will be provided to
direct passengers to the correct side of the
The canopy cannot be supported without the
positioning of a column within a buffer
overrun zone and at a sub-standard
clearance from the platform edge.
Network Rail
11/04/2014
N/A
INS
05/03/2014
Current
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Page 44
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
14-023-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
Paddock Wood Station, Platform 1 6.2.2
reduced platform width at replaced columns.
GMRT2100
Five
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
14-020-DEV
Advanced stage deviation to GM/RT2100
Issue 5 for Class 68 UK Light locomotive
based on the already granted deviation
12/115/DGN that includes GM/RT2100 Issue
4.
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
14-019-DEV
Fire compliance of Rollers on Balfour Beatty 2.9.1.1 a)
Overhead Line Electrification (OLE)
Modules.
This deviation applies to Balfour Beatty OLE
Installation Modules fitted to wagons VTG
95382 and VTG95385.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
14-017-DEV
Derogation for a Steam Locomotive.
6.6.3 and Appendix H
Operation of the following preserved steam
locomotive on all lines, as agreed by the
Network Rail Acceptance Body (NRAB) and
subsequently by the Licensed Operator. SR
Merchant Navy class steam locomotive No.
35018 `British India Line'. TOPS No. 98818
Painted No. 35018 Class / Power
Classification 8P Wheel Arrangement 4-6-2
Maximum Speed 75 mph.
GMRT2161
One
Requirements for Driving Cabs of Railway
Vehicles
14-016-DEV Revised
02-07-2014
Use of transportable GSM-R equipment on
steam locomotives registered to operate on
Network Rail.
7.2.1 (j)
GWR steam Rail Motor Class: Steam Rail
Motor Original number: 93 TOPS number:
99093 Max speed (mph) Forward/reverse:
25/25 King Edward II Class: King class
Original number: 6023 TOPS number:
98823 Max speed (mph) Forward/reverse:
75/45 Pendennis Castle Class: Castle class
Original number: 4079 TOPS number:
98779 Max speed (mph) Forward/reverse:
75/45 Lady of Legend Class: Based on
Saint class Original number: 2999 TOPS
number: 98499 Max speed (mph)
Forward/reverse: 75/45 County of
Glamorgan Class: Based on 1000 class
Original number: 1014 TOPS number:
98614 Max speed (mph) Forward/reverse:
75/45.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
Paddock Wood Station Platform 1. ELR
XTD/PWS1.
Part 2 Part 3 (except 3.3.3) Part 4 Part 5
Class 68 UK Light locomotives
(except 5.4 and; 5.5) Part 7 Part 8 (except
manufactured by Vossloh España S. A.
8.1.6, 8.1.7, 8.1.8, 8.3.1.2, 8.3.1.3 and
8.3.2.3) Clauses 9.1.1.1 to 9.1.1.3 and 9.2.1,
9.2.3 and 9.2.4.
Nature and Degree
It is proposed that two new columns are
installed to support the existing canopy upon
removal of the existing footbridge, which
currently provides support. The columns
are to match the existing double column
arrangement. The column nearest the
platform will be 1. 733 m from the platform
edge.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The canopy modification support design for
Platform 1 does not comply with the
requirements of Railway Group Standard
GI/RT7016 Clause 6. 2. 2. The clearance
from the proposed outer canopy support
column is 1. 733 m, less than 2. 5 m
required. The design has been developed
to match the existing arrangement of the
canopy support structure, which do not
comply with this standard. Compliance with
the standard would require a column
positioned 2. 5 m from the platform edge
which would not align with the existing
canopy support columns and by doing so
would impede sighting along the platform.
This deviation is for a project requiring
There is no predicted adverse impact
authorisation for placing in service under the arising from continued use of the current
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011. standard.
The Class 68 UK Light project is already in
an advanced stage, with the firsts units
already built and expected to arrive for
commissioning in the UK in late January.
The project is being assessed against
GM/RT2100 Issue 4 as amended by
deviation 12/115/DGN which has already
been granted. As GM/RT2100 has been upissued to Issue 5 since derogation
12/115/DGN was granted, Vossloh need to
apply for this deviation to meet the Office of
Rail Regulation (ORR) requirement for
authorisation to place in to service against
the latest NNTR list. The UK Department for
Transport (DfT) published an updated list of
NNTRs in mid-October 2013, which
replaces GM/RT2100 Issue 4 with
GM/RT2100 Issue 5. Reassessment work
would be necessary to demonstrate
compliance with GM/RT2100 Issue 5 at this
late stage in the project. This previous
deviation 12/115/DGN remains in place and
is not withdrawn as a result of this further
deviation. There are no changes to the
standards requirements that are the subject
of this application between Issues 4 and 5
Surfaces and materials shall have fire
The alternative provisions detailed in
properties as set out in Appendix A. The
Section 11 (Proposed alternative provisions)
materials used for the rollers and tensioning will ensure that, when possible sources of
drums on the tensioning and access
ignition are present on the machines from
modules have been selected specifically for electrical systems and combustion engines,
their frictional and wear characteristics
trained operators are present, equipped with
which are integral to the performance of
fire extinguishers and able to address any
each module's intended function. The
issues with the non-compliant materials.
design of the modules and their
They will also ensure that this condition will
performance has been developed and
only occur when the machine is removed
evolved over a number of years. Altering
from the operational railway by being within
the materials would negate the experience
a possession.
that has been gained and jeopardise the
performance of the modules. Materials used
on the contact surfaces of rollers and tension
drums on the modules (listed below) do not
meet the materials requirements of the
standard (minimum limiting oxygen index of
28%). The drums and rollers have steel
centres/axles and are mounted in steel
frames. Grooved plastic pads on the
tensioner drums, rollers on the tensioner' Performance: Oxygen index (ISO 4589-1/-2)
25%; HB/HB according to UL 94 (3/6mm
thickness). Rollers on the drum stands and
main masts (Ertalon 66 SA black) Performance: Oxygen index (ISO 4589)
26%; HB/HB according to UL 94 (3/6mm
thickness). Rollers at either end of the
It would not be practical to revise the RGS to As indicated in Appendix 7. The preserved
include steam locomotives, due to their wide steam locomotive is of a type that ran safely
diversity of design from modern traction
over the British railway infrastructure since
units and the general scarcity of technical
its introduction in May 1945 and continued
information now available to prove their
until its withdrawal from revenue service.
compliance or otherwise. In a number of
The locomotive had a history of reliable
recent re-issues of RGSs, specific
service. The locomotive is intended for
exemptions for steam locomotives shown in Heritage Operation only. In order to achieve
the previous issues have been withdrawn,
compliance with RGS, the cost would be
increasing the number of non-compliances prohibitive and such engineering change
for which derogation has now to be sought. would also destroy the locomotive's
fundamental nature and authenticity as a
"heritage" vehicle. Making the locomotive
compliant would, in many instances, be
impractical because of the bulk and location
of the locomotive boiler.
Due to its limited application solely to British Impacts on company: Improved flexibility
steam locomotives operating on Network rail and reduced costs. Improved security as
controlled infrastructure, the deviation does equipment can be securely locked away
not require authorisation under the Railways when not in use. Impacts on affected
(Interoperability) Regulations 2011. The
parties: Impacts already covered in
deviation would apply to steam locomotives deviation 12/032/DGN. Impact on the crew:
registered to operate on Network Rail and
Footplate crew have improved visibility of
will permit the use of a restrained
the equipment over the normal fixed
transportable Global System for Mobile
installation. Impact on the safety of the
communications for Railways (GSM-R) as
railway system: No increased risk over that
an alternative to a permanently installed
accepted in deviation 12/032/GDN.
system. The deviation is to be implemented Technical compatibility: Fully compatible
by the Railway Undertaking where a limited with the GSM-R system. Cost and service
number of operations and geographical
performance: Reduced cost of installation.
scope might impose disproportionate effort Improved availability as equipment can be
in order to gain the benefits of fitting a
easily swapped. Procedures will be
permanently fixed system. As stated in
produced covering the installation,
derogation 12/032/DGN, it is not practicable operation, maintenance and repair of the
to fit the GSM-R equipment within reach of
equipment, as is the case for fixed
the driver's position on a steam locomotive installations. Attachments: Appendix B due to the restricted space that is available User instruction for transportable GSM-R;
and the temperatures that potentially occur Appendix C - Technical specification of the
in the area immediately beside the driver,
equipment. It should be noted that steam
which are beyond the known reliability range locomotives that operate on the national rail
of the GSM-R equipment. The derogation
network are: Registered, certified and
allows the equipment to be sited behind the maintained to operate safely; Limited to a
driver due to the fact that there is more than maximum of 15,000 miles per annum; Have,
one person on the footplate and, therefore,
as a minimum, a second person in the cab
there are additional trained and competent
(fireman) that are trained and competent to
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
08/04/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
05/03/2014
Deviation Status
Current
Vossloh España S.A. on behalf 31/01/2014
of, Direct Rail Services Limited
N/A
INS
N/A
Current
Balfour Beatty Rail Ltd
03/03/2014
N/A
RST
14/02/2014
Current
West Coast Railway Company 06/03/2014
Ltd
N/A
RST
14/02/2014
Current
West Coast Railway Company 02/07/2014
Ltd
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
Page 45
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2130
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
Certificate Number
14-015-DEV
Title
Advanced stage deviation to GM/RT2130
Issue 4 for Class 68 UK Light locomotive.
RGS Clause
All clauses.
Scope
Class 68 UK Light locomotives
manufactured by Vossloh España S. A.
GMRT2484
Two
Audibility Requirements for Trains
14-014-DEV
Warning horns Vossloh España S.A - Class
68 UK Light locomotive.
All clauses
41 x Class 68 UK Light locomotives
manufactured by Vossloh España S. A.
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
14-008-DEV
TJ30/37 Signal - use of unrestricted aspect
sequence for junction signalling controls
5.2.2.1 a)
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
14-007-DEV
PT249 and PT449 signals in the proximity of 2.1.1.3
Llanelli East level crossing.
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
14-006-DEV
Signal TEB1372 in close proximity to
Polegate Level Crossing.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
2.1.1.3 a)
Nature and Degree
This deviation is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
The Class 68 UK Light project is already in
an advance stage, with the firsts units
already built and expected to arrive for
commissioning in the UK in late January.
The design and assessment of the UK Light
locomotive has been based on the
requirements of GM/RT2130 Issue 3 as
amended by derogation 12/115/DGN which
has already been granted. Reassessment
work would therefore be necessary to
demonstrate compliance with GM/RT2130
Issue 4 at this late stage in the project.
GM/RT2130 Issue 4 was issued in
December 2013 but does not come into
force until 01/03/2014. This is after the date
that the Vossloh Class 68 UK Light
Locomotives Final Technical File is
expected to have been submitted to the
Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) for granting
authorisation (an interim issue of the
Technical File containing GM/RT2130 Issue
3 assessment was already submitted to the
ORR on August 2013). However, it is
unknown whether GM/RT2130 Issue 4 will
be listed as a NNTR by the UK Department
for Transport (DfT) prior to the coming into
The Technical Specification for
Interoperability (TSI) relating to the rolling
stock subsystem - `Locomotives and
passenger rolling stock' of the transEuropean conventional rail system establishes the warning horn sound
pressure levels in its clause 4. 2. 7. 2. 2:
"The C weighted sound pressure level
produced by each horn sounded separately
(or in a group if designed to sound
simultaneously as a chord) shall be between
115 dB and 123 dB, as defined in EN 151532: 2007, Clause 4. 3. 2. " The TSI includes a
permanent Specific case UK for Great
Britain in its clause 7. 3. 2. 12, that allows
access of TSI compliant rolling stock: "('P')
Rolling stock for national use only, may be
compliant with the horn sound pressure
levels as stipulated in the national technical
rules notified for this purpose in the UK.
Trains intended for international use shall be
compliant with the horn sound pressure
levels as stipulated in this TSI. " This
specific case does not prevent the access of
TSI compliant rolling stock to the national
network. " Vossloh aims to get the UK Light
locomotives assessed against the currently
published Locomotive and Passenger TSI to
simplify future mainland European
To comply with the RGS would require one
of the following options to be implemented:
Junction Method 3 - Approach Control from
red: the impact of this would be an
increased Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD)
risk by creation of consecutive approach
release sequences. Junction Method 2 Flashing yellow aspect sequence: the
impact of this would be an increased
complexity in the design and alteration to
existing equipment due to be removed in
approximately two years. Lower permissible
speed on approach for passenger trains (to
achieve junction method 1: Unrestricted
aspect sequence) - the impact of this would
be to impose a capacity constraint for all
passenger trains that was not considered
acceptable when viewed against over speed
risks at the junction. None of the methods
above were considered appropriate as the
final solution (see also attached supporting
statement).
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
There is no predicted adverse impact
arising from continued use of the current
standard.
The main safety related risks associated
with the use of non-GM/RT2484 compliant
warning horn sound pressure levels are:
Inadequate warning to persons on or about
the track when trains are approaching.
Noise Pollution. Damage to staff hearing.
The risks from item 2 will be limited due to
the limited number of locomotives in the fleet
(41 maximum). Item 3 will be controlled by
company specific instructions for operating
staff regarding the use of the warning horn in
depots and yard if necessary. Item 1 is
controlled by the fact that the sound
pressure levels mandated in the Loc & Pas
TSI are higher than those mandated in
GM/RT2484 and thus provide a better level
of warning. The effectiveness of Loc & Pas
TSI (EN15153-2: 2007) compliant warning
horns is proven by their use in mainland
Europe. The Common Safety Methods
(CSM) Directive allows the application of
codes of practice as a risk acceptance
criterion. On this basis, by complying with
requirements of TSI Loc & Pas clause 4. 2.
7. 2. 2 (EN15153-2: 2007), it is considered
that the risks associated with the warning
horn sound pressure level are controlled. In
addition, the Loc & Pas TSI (2011/291/EU)
states that vehicles equipped with TSI
TJ30/37B(M) Route, Gainsborough Trent
Line-speed on the Up Main from Thrumpton
Junction.
to the junction signal TJ30/37 is currently
30/40 mph. The turn out speed for the
junction is 25 mph. The permissible speed
differential of 15 mph is 5 mph over that
which the standard permits, and the risk of
overspeeding are considered low as
sighting of the junction indicator is in region
of 500 m, and gives sufficient time for the
driver to identify signal and control train
speed to that of the turnout. Route
knowledge learning and briefing are being
carried out for project works and new
signalling arrangements are part of this
work. Other changes are being undertaken
but, as turn out speed is not changing,
existing route knowledge will also mitigate
any overspeed risk at the junction. This
deviation will allow removal of the TSR
applied to make differential in speed 10mph,
covered under Deviation No. 13/228/DEV
(tracker No. 15381) which expires on
28/02/2014. Further details on the analysis
of proposed arrangements are contained in
the supporting information.
PT249 and PT449 signals in the proximity of It is not practicable to move PT249 or PT449 If a train approaching PT249 does not
Llanelli East level crossing situated on the
due to the close proximity of both Llanelli
trigger the SPAD Prediction equipment to
GW900 Pilining to Fishguard Harbour ELR East and West level crossings adjacent to
commence a warning sequence on Llanelli
SWM2 Western Route. Llanelli East is
both ends of the platform, and prior works
East level crossing, the user will not see any
located at 225 miles 14 chain.
have taken place to enable First Great
indication from the road traffic lights or
Western trains to stand in the platform
audible warning until the train has come to a
where train stop boards have been
stand in the station, and the forward route is
provided. Any further adjustment of these
set; the level crossing then goes through the
signals would not allow the service to use
full sequence of amber and flashing red
this station. It is not practicable to close
lights before the barriers come down. If the
either of the level crossings to create
SPAD Prediction equipment calculates that
additional standage at the platforms.
a SPAD is likely, then the red flashing road
lights are initiated to give at least five
seconds of warning to road users to get
clear, but the barriers are not lowered. The
risk of this happening is judged to be very
low, I. e. the train will not SPAD or the
forward route is set and the crossing is
already closed to the road. This SPAD
prediction initiation supplements the
initiation caused when the train passes the
red signal. The design of SPAD prediction
timers are based on deceleration of a train,
and gives an improved warning time of the
actual SPAD of the train, which will trigger
the red flashing road traffic lights at less
than five seconds. Signal PT449 controls
reversing moves, and cannot be
approached by trains in normal operation.
Polegate level crossing.
In order to comply with the RGS
The principle risk that is mitigated by the
requirement, the signal would have to be
level crossing controls is that arising from
positioned at least 25m from the crossing.
SPAD. The signal is not approachable by
Standage for trains in the normal direction is trains as there is no wrong direction
sufficient for trains to occupy the whole
signalling. The signal has good sighting due
platform. This in turn would mean that trains to the position of the train at its allocated
reversing at Polegate would have to pull
stopping position and architecture of the
forward in normal direction of travel to a
station. TPWS TSS is fitted, principally to
point that allows the other end of the train to mitigate the SPAD risk associated with the
be positioned to view signal TEB1372. The conflict on the cross-over, but has a
signal and its base would have to be resecondary mitigation role to arrest a SPAD
installed in the compliant position.
and therefore minimise the potential risk of
collision on the level crossing.
Applicant Organisation
Certificate Issue Date
Vossloh España S.A. on behalf 31/01/2014
of, Direct Rail Services Limited
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
N/A
Deviation Status
Current
Vossloh España S.A. on behalf 25/02/2014
of, Direct Rail Services Limited
N/A
RST
14/02/2014
Current
Network Rail
27/02/2014
N/A
CCS
06/02/2014
Current
Network Rail
27/02/2014
N/A
CCS
06/02/2014
Current
Network Rail
27/02/2014
N/A
CCS
06/02/2014
Current
Page 46
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2130
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
Certificate Number
14-002-DEV
Title
Deviation against the requirements of
GM/RT2130 Issue 4.
RGS Clause
All clauses.
Scope
The new Class 70 locomotives
manufactured by General Electric (GE) in
2013 and 2014 onwards.
GCRT5112
Two
Rail Traffic Loading Requirements for the
Design of Railway Structures
14-001-DEV
Bridge 110 in Tanners Hill area - Design for
collision loading.
7.1.3
Localised derogation for deck and new
trestles for Bridge 110 in the Tanners Hill
area.
GERT8000-SS2
Three
Shunting
13-242-DEV
Entering a shed or building - Non-sounding
of the warning horn before restarting.
Clause 5.7, bullet point 3.
GIRT7016
Five
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-241-DEV Revised
23-06-2015
Hendon Station, Platform 3 - reduced
platform width at mid platform fencing.
7.2.1
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
GE has developed and is in the process of None.
manufacturing 10 new Class 70 locomotives
for Colas Rail. Three of these locomotives
(70801, 70803, 70805) are currently in the
UK and undergoing final commissioning.
The September 2013 RGS catalogue has
been applied as the basis of the current
Notified National Technical Rules (NNTRs)
(as per the current Department for Transport
(DfT) published NNTR list). However, as
the December 2013 RGS catalogue includes
an update to GM/RT2130 (to Issue 4), there
is a potential for this to be listed as an NNTR
before the completed application for
authorisation is made to the Office of Rail
Regulation (ORR) under RIR2011. In
addition, a derogation has already been
granted to GM/RT2130 Issue 3
(13/041/DGN). Therefore the project wishes
to obtain a derogation to GM/RT 2130 issue
4, and instead continue to use issue 3, on
the basis of advanced stage of
development.
Applicant Organisation
GE Transportation
Certificate Issue Date
13/01/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
N/A
Deviation Status
Current
Permission is being sought to place new
supports to a structure within the hazard
zone (4. 5 m from the cess rail and
anywhere between the tracks) which have
not been designed to withstand accidental
impact. No action plan has been adopted to
achieve the compliance. Alternative design
approaches have been developed and a risk
assessment has been undertaken to
evaluate the risk. The risk assessment
showed that it is not reasonably practical to
seek compliance (please see Part 4 of the
Tracker Application Form for compliance
cost). As a result, the derogation is being
sought. The new steel support trestles are
designed to allow for a passive collapse of
just the trestle when a train collides with
them. The superstructure will be
strengthened, such that it will not fail in the
ultimate limit state, in the event that a train
derailment has caused the removal of one of
the new supporting trestles. Therefore, it is
believed that the proposed solution fulfils the
"spirit" or intention of Clause 7. 1. 3. namely that, in the case of a derailment, an
overhead structure is not brought down onto
the train, causing additional injuries to either
train passengers or people using the bridge.
However, derogation is sought as the
The deviation only applies across First Great There have been concerns raised by Health
Western (FGW) depot buildings that have
and Safety representatives relating to
depot protection systems in operation. The shunters and fleet operatives being exposed
deviation applies to the rule requiring the
to high noise levels when drivers use the
warning horn to be used as a warning before warning horn upon entering depot buildings.
restarting and entering a shed or building.
Depot Operating Instructions require the
Shunters to be at shed doors to: · operate
depot protection and · authorise a train into
the shed. Operation of the warning horn is
to warn personnel in the area that a train is
entering the shed; this safety feature is
adequately covered by the shunter on the
door, verbally warning his colleagues in the
area and operation of the depot protection
system. The depot protection system gives
an audible and visual warning that
movements are taking place. It is believed
that sounding the warning horn, in addition
to the above requirements, introduces an
unnecessary hazard to shunters and fleet
colleagues, causing a risk of ill health
injuries.
An existing footbridge (Bridge 110)
Network Rail
currently spans three tracks of the four-track
XTD (Charing Cross to Dover) mainline and
a reversible single LVT (Lewisham Vale and
Tanners Hill Line) track at Tanners Hill, with
two existing steel support trestles adjacent
to the railway without any derailment
protection. In order to double the LVT line,
one existing steel support trestle needs to be
removed as it clashes with the proposed
new alignment. Options considered
included: Replacement of footbridge with a
completely new and compliant structure,
with supports outside the hazard zone.
However, this solution has been deemed
excessively expensive and disruptive to the
travelling public (the footbridge provides
access to St John's station) and has thus
been rejected outright. Installation of two
new supports within the hazard zone, but
with the provision of derailment plinths to
ensure that these supports would not be
affected by the predicted loads acting in the
event of a train derailing and striking the
structure. These plinths would thus ensure
compliance with Clause 7. 1. 3 of standard
GC/RT5112. This solution has been
developed, and a cost of this solution
derived, which is used in the enclosed UIC
This proposed alternative will reduce the
First Greater Western Ltd
risk of ill health claims against FGW and
reduce the risk of injury to all colleagues
who operate on a depot. Safeguards have
been included in the proposed instructions
that, if any system is not in place, Shunter to
authorise the movement or depot protection
system not operating, the driver will operate
the horn as a warning before restarting a
movement into a shed or building. Risk
assessments undertaken have indicated that
the risk is categorised as low, with the
following controls in place: · Depot
Protection Procedure (SMS-1875-00 SPM
Depot Operating Instructions) · Production
support / shunter on door of shed · Depot
protection warning lights · Depot protection
bell / siren sounded during movements ·
Personal track safety of all colleagues
operating in the area · Track awareness
briefings for all colleagues operating in the
area · Regular safety briefs.
10/04/2014
N/A
INS
05/03/2014
Current
21/02/2014
N/A
TOM
04/02/2014
Current
Platform 3, Hendon Station, Station Road,
Hendon NW4 4PT.
To assist in suicide prevention, midNetwork Rail
platform fencing is being installed at 5No
Stations on the East Midlands route, namely:
Hendon, Radlett, Mill Hill Broadway,
Cricklewood, and Elstree &amp;
Borehamwood. The proposed gated midplatform fencing will prevent access to the
fast lines, which are only used in times of
engineering work or disruption. There has
been a significant increase in the average
cost per incident, this is thought to be due to
an increase in suicides in high impact
locations, and during the peak of passenger
travel. Due to obstructions both on and
within the platform construction, the platform
fencing cannot be positioned to provide the
compliant 3 m clearance from coping stone
edge to fence. This non-compliance varies
from 2941 mm at the country end, 2970 mm
at various positions and 2990 mm in one
location on Platform 3. This can be seen on
accompanying as built Drawing No C1290BCS-DRG-CV-000101 Rev Z01, and on the
attached as built photographs Ref. 17054
Hendon. doc. This replaces Tracker No.
15644.
24/06/2015
N/A
INS
13/05/2015
Current
The severity/impact at Hendon Station is
considered generally low. The reduced
platform width affects the fast lines only.
The fast line platform is only used during
slow line closures and during perturbed
working. To assist in suicide prevention,
mid-platform fencing is being installed at
5No Stations on the East Midlands route,
namely: Hendon, Radlett, Mill Hill
Broadway, Cricklewood, and Elstree &amp;
Borehamwood.
Page 47
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
13-240-DEV
Title
Mill Hill Broadway Station, Platform 3 reduced platform width at mid platform
fencing.
RGS Clause
7.2.1
Scope
Platform 3, Mill Hill Broadway Station,
Station Road, Mill Hill, NW7 2JU.
Nature and Degree
Based on the drawings / details in existence
that reflect the proposed fencing layouts at
Mill Hill Broadway Station (copy attached),
full compliance is unachievable and,
therefore, in the absence of a deviation
being granted, then the scheme in its
entirety will be undeliverable. The severity /
impact at Mill Hill Broadway Station is
considered generally low, given the reduced
platform width affects the fast lines only and
there are currently no services whatsoever
"Stopping Off" whereby the
embarkation/disembarkation of passengers
would not be an issue, however
consideration by virtue of additional gated
access points along the lengths of the
general fence line could be incorporated at
cost within the scheme, to be used /
managed / policed only by the Train
Operating Company (TOC) / station
management staff under emergency
situations or engineering works and thereby
built into the Station Management Strategy
Plan.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-239-DEV
Elstree &amp; Borehamwood station,
Platform 3 - reduced platform width at mid
platform fencing.
7.2.1
Platform 3, Elstree &amp; Borehamwood
Station, Allum Lane, Elstree, WD6 3LS.
Based on the drawings / details in existence
that reflect the proposed fencing layouts at
Elstree &amp; Borehamwood Station (copy
attached), full compliance is unachievable
and, therefore, in the absence of a deviation
being granted, then the scheme in its
entirety will be undeliverable. The severity /
impact at Elstree &amp; Borehamwood
Station is considered generally low, given
the reduced platform width affects the fast
lines only, and there are currently no
services whatsoever "Stopping Off",
whereby the embarkation/disembarkation of
passengers would not be an issue; however,
consideration by virtue of additional gated
access points along the lengths of the
general fence line could be incorporated at
cost within the scheme, to be used /
managed / policed only by the Train
Operating Company (TOC) / station
management staff under emergency
situations or engineering works and thereby
built into the Station Management Strategy
Plan.
GMRT2473
Two
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
13-236-DEV
Class 323 External Passenger Door Closing B6.1
Forces.
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
13-234-DEV
Flashing aspects for P468 signal at
Peterborough.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
5.2.3.1
This deviation applies to all Class 323s
operated by London Midland.
The deviation applies to the external
passenger door control system (specifically
the Electronic Door Control Unit, the EDCU).
Software variables within the EDCU control
a number of parameters, including opening
and closing forces. Each pair of bi-parting
passenger doors is controlled by an
individual EDCU. New software (version
F0) has been written and is required to be
installed to the EDCUs, to replace the
existing software (version E2). The purpose
of the new software is to increase the door
closing forces to overcome problems with
door failing to close in service. As built,
Class 323s were fitted with an analogue type
of door control unit, referred to here as the
Analogue EDCU. The Analogue EDCU
operated the doors with closing forces in
excess of the maximum figures specified
with GM/RT2473 Issue 2. However, the
door system on these EMUs was not
designed to comply with this standard:
Class 323s were built in 1992 / 1993, and
GM/RT2473 was introduced ten years later,
in 2003. Over time, the Analogue EDCU
became obsolete as more advanced
electronic door control systems were
developed. In 2009, the door equipment
OEM, Faiveley, introduced a new EDCU.
Signal 468 4(M) and 5(M) flashing aspects
Compliance could be maintained by
routes, reading from the Up Fast to Platform continuing to use approach release from red
2 or 3, controlled by Peterborough PSB.
on P468. This control currently causes
trains proceeding from the Up Fast to
Platform 2 or 3 to decelerate to P468 at red
before the aspect is released to proceed
over 1243 and 1242 points. The controls
currently have a risk of anticipation and that
required trains to accelerate towards the
points after the signal clears due to 1243
points being 700 m from P468 signal. Train
Operating Companies have raised these
issues from performance and safety
perspective, and requested the controls are
amended.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
To prevent suicides at 5No Stations on the
East Midlands Route, namely: Hendon,
Radlett, Mill Hill Broadway, Cricklewood,
&amp; Elstree &amp; Borehamwood. The
proposed gated mid-platform fencing will
prevent access to the fast lines, which are
only used in times of engineering work or
disruption. The installation of fencing at
Purley and Harrow &amp; Wealdstone (see
attached photos) has proved effective in
preventing suicides since their
commissioning in 2008/2010 respectively. In
order to maintain the majority width
(minimum 3 m) on the operational "Slow"
sides of the affected platforms at Mill Hill
Broadway Station (I. e. the platforms at
which the trains consistently stop to allow
passenger embarkation/disembarkation)
and in line with TOC / safety expectations
and "best linear fit" to fully consider evasion
of underground service or above ground
lighting, drainage channels, shelters, Driver
Only Operation (DOO) mirrors etc. , the
residual width of platform left adjacent the
"Fast" lines is reduced down to a noncompliant width, as can be seen on the
accompanying Drawing NopC1290-BCSDRG-CV-000301 Rev P01.
To prevent suicides at 5No Stations on the
East Midlands Route, namely: Hendon,
Radlett, Mill Hill Broadway, Cricklewood,
&amp; Elstree &amp; Borehamwood. The
proposed gated mid-platform fencing will
prevent access to the fast lines, which are
only used in times of engineering work or
disruption. The installation of fencing at
Purley and Harrow &amp; Wealdstone (see
attached photos) has proved effective in
preventing suicides since their
commissioning in 2008/2010 respectively. In
order to maintain the majority width
(minimum 3 m) on the operational "Slow"
sides of the affected Platforms at Elstree
&amp; Borehamwood Station (I. e. the
platforms at which the trains consistently
stop to allow passenger embarkation /
disembarkation) and in line with Train
Operating Company (TOC) / safety
expectations and "best linear fit" to fully
consider evasion of underground service or
above ground Lighting, drainage channels,
shelters, Driver Only Operation (DOO)
mirrors etc. , the residual width of platform
left adjacent the "Fast" lines is reduced
down to a non-compliant width, as can be
seen on the accompanying Drawing
NopC1290-BCS-DRG-CV-000501 Rev P01.
The consequences of the higher door
closing forces are discussed below, and
include a justification that the affect upon
passenger safety is acceptable. A history of
Class 323 passenger door safety: London
Midland record all accidents reported by
passengers, station staff or train crew, and
the information is held on a database.
London Midland has carried out a search
stretching back five years to establish how
many accidents have been attributed to
trapping in doors, and the events relating to
each accident. Since November 2008, there
have been 38 recorded accidents involving
people becoming trapped in the passenger
doors on London Midland's Class 323 fleet.
From the limited information given in the
`Comments' field in the accident report, it is
difficult to interpret a clear picture of exactly
what happened: what were the sequence of
events and what were the causal factors with
each accident. The information consists
mainly of allegations and statements from
passengers. There is no evidence to
support or disclaim the events as recorded.
We do not know at what door position the
accident occurred. Therefore, it is prudent
not to form firm conclusions. Nevertheless,
studying the information shows a number of
The flashing aspect sequence will reduce
the risk of trains accelerating towards the
divergence after receiving a delayed aspect
release on the junction signal, as majority of
diverging trains will be signalled with the
flashing aspects rather than Main Aspect
Red (MAR). The SPAD risk from
anticipation on P468 is reduced. Flashing
aspects exist for a range of different turnout
speeds on this route, including lower
speeds, and driver route knowledge is
acceptable as the primary means of speed
control for this junction, which has little
potential for confusion with other junctions in
this area. Provision of PSWI with AWS
arrangement is considered to adequately
manage the over-speed risk at the junction,
and assist with driver route knowledge as to
what speed the flashing sequence relates.
Provision of MAY-FA can have an impact on
SPAD risk the signal after the junction.
Controls and TPWS have been provided in
line with current RGS to manage these risks.
In addition to the reduced SPAD and
derailing risk due to accelerating to excess
speed, the performance benefit of this
arrangement has been estimated at 90 s
when compared to current MAR
arrangements. Future S & C renewal is
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
23/04/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
05/03/2014
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
23/04/2014
N/A
INS
05/03/2014
Current
Porterbrook Maintenance Ltd
30/01/2014
N/A
RST
17/01/2014
Current
Network Rail
28/02/2014
N/A
CCS
N/A
Current
Page 48
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2000
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
Certificate Number
13-230-DEV
Title
Derogation in accordance with GM/RT2000
Clauses 6.6.3 for Tyne and Wear Battery
Locomotives.
RGS Clause
6.6.3 - Vehicles for heritage or special
services only 6.8.6 - Vehicles for heritage or
special services only Appendix H
Requirement for Engineering Acceptance of
non-compliant Vehicles for limited use on
heritage or special service trains.
Scope
The deviation applies to three battery
locomotives owned and operated by Tyne
and Wear Metro, currently used for the
purposes of shunting Metro units around the
depot, and for rescuing in-service stranded
Metro units, for example due to Overhead
Line Electrification (OLE) failure. This
deviation is required to allow these
locomotives to run on the part of Network
Rail Infrastructure between Pelaw Metro
Junction and Sunderland, including Boldon
loop and Burdon Road sidings at
Sunderland, between Sunderland and South
Hylton, the Boldon to Port of Tyne branch
and the refuge off the main Sunderland line.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-226-DEV
Willesden Junction High Level Station platform extension on track curvature less
than 1000 m radius.
2.1
Willesden Junction High Level Station
Platform 5.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-225-DEV
South Acton Station, Platform 1 - reduced
width of platform extension.
7.2.1
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-224-DEV
Finchley Road &amp; Frognal Station,
Platform 2 - reduced width of platform
extension.
7.2.1
GMRT2473
Two
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
13-223-DEV
Derogation for the power operated
passenger doors as fitted to new Class
377/7 Electric Multiple Units (EMU).
All clauses.
The deviation applies to a platform
extension of some 27. 5 m (final length to be
developed in detailed design), on the Down
Line at the London end of Platform 1 at
South Acton station. The minimum platform
width will be 2. 4 m. All relevant Guidance
Notes within GI/GN7616 Issue 1 have been
considered prior to the submission of the
deviation request. The platform extension is
required due to the introduction of five-car
Class 378 operations on the London
Overground network, which will commence
on the North London Line in 2015. The
extension is required as the existing platform
is only long enough for a four-car CL378
unit. As part of the approval in principle of
the design, a gauging and stepping analysis
has been conducted and Track Form A
produced for this platform. The Form A has
been reviewed and signed by the Network
Rail Gauging Engineer and Track RAM for
Anglia and shows that there is no worsening
of the existing gauging and stepping values
at this location and that all values are within
the `stepping triangle' albeit towards the
upper end of the range. A copy of this report
is included with this submission. Similarly,
copies of relevant Civils drawings of the
proposal are included with this submission.
The deviation applies to 16 m of the
proposed 20. 35 m platform extension (final
length to be developed in detailed design),
on the Up Line at the country end of Platform
2 at Finchley Road &amp; Frognal station.
Over the 16 m length there will be a reduced
platform width of 2025 mm tapering to a
compliant width. All relevant Guidance
Notes within GIGN7616 Issue 1 have been
considered prior to the submission of the
deviation request. The platform extension is
required due to the introduction of five-car
Class 378 operations on the London
Overground network which will commence
on the North London Line in 2015. The
extension is required as the existing platform
is only long enough for a four-car CL378
unit. As part of the approval in principle of
the design, a gauging and stepping analysis
has been conducted and Track Form A
produced for this platform. The Form A has
been reviewed and signed by the Network
Rail Gauging Engineer and Track RAM for
Anglia and shows that there is no worsening
of the existing gauging and stepping values
at this location and that all values are within
the `stepping triangle' albeit towards the
upper end of the range. A copy of this report
is included with this submission. Similarly,
Class 377/7 units (8 x 5 car units), power
operated doors. This application is for a
project requiring authorisation for placing in
service under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
Clause 6. 6. 3 allows applications for
derogations for non-compliant vehicles with
an annual mileage not exceeding 15,000
miles to be submitted as a single request.
The battery locomotives were manufactured
in 1989. The requirement is for the
operating lines of these locomotives to be
extended to include the section of Network
Rail infrastructure used by Metro trains
between Pelaw Metro Junction and
Sunderland, and from Sunderland to South
Hylton in the event of an OLE failure, rather
than hiring locomotives. In addition, various
loops and sidings (see Section 7 - Scope of
deviation) may be required as refuge for the
failed train or as a potential alternative route
for dispatch of trains for refurbishment. The
cost of either procuring a compliant shunter
(which would be a unique design as
batteries are required for running with no
OLE in tunnels) or making the existing
shunters compliant would be
disproportionate to the occasional use for
which they would be required. Clause 6. 8.
6 and associated appendix give special
arrangements due to the special
circumstances of operating a heritage or
special service. It allows, under certain
circumstances, that a maintenance and an
The only method of complying with the
current RGS requirement would be to
introduce Automatic Selective Door Opening
at this location. Early consultation with
LOROL determined this was not a preferred
option as: Dwell times would increase to an
intolerable level and impact on the service
frequency and punctuality. Platform
passenger flows would be markedly
affected, at the London end of the platform
Train evacuation times would not be
acceptable in the event of a fire . As the use
of ASDO did not have the support of
LOROL, the option was not pursued.
The only method of complying with the
current RGS requirement would be to
introduce Automatic Selective Door Opening
at this location. Early consultation with
LOROL determined this was not a preferred
option as: Dwell times would increase to an
intolerable level and impact on the service
frequency and punctuality Platform
passenger flows would be markedly
affected, at the London end of the platform
Train evacuation times would not be
acceptable in the event of a fire. As the use
of ASDO did not have the support of
LOROL, the option was not pursued.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The normal operating procedures for
dealing with a failed Metro unit is for the
following unit to couple up and move it to the
depot. If this is not possible, for example
due to a failed OLE power supply (e. g.
lines down or power supply failure), then
they will need to be rescued by a locomotive
with an independent power source. On
most of the Tyne and Wear system, this is
conducted by these battery locomotives that
have a compatible mechanical, electrical
and pneumatic coupling system. This
deviation is being requested such that this
procedure can be extended to the Network
Rail infrastructure as detailed in Section 7
above, if similar circumstances were to
occur here. The battery locomotives are
being used and stored in the Tyne and Wear
maintenance facility at South Gosforth. They
are being maintained by the same trained
staff and under the same maintenance
controls and structure as the Metro stock.
Certification shall remain valid as long as the
maintenance procedures remain unchanged
within the scope of the certification (I. e.
maintenance to ensure the continued
compliance with Railway Group Standards),
at the same facility as the Metro stock, and
under the same maintenance controls, I. e.
LOROL have confirmed that the current
Driver Only Operation (DOO) train dispatch
with in-cab Close Circuit Television (CCTV)
is satisfactory for the increased length of the
platform for five-car trains. Stepping
distances are no worse than at the existing
platform and are within the stepping triangle.
Willesden Junction High Level Station
operates with extended dwell times currently
and these will be maintained in the future at
90 seconds; extended dwell times at this
location are required due to the numbers of
boarders and alighters.
Applicant Organisation
SGS CORREL Rail Ltd
Certificate Issue Date
02/04/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
17/01/2014
Deviation Status
Current
London Overground Capacity
Improvement Project
11/04/2014
N/A
INS
05/03/2014
Current
The provision of additional platform
London Overground Capacity
dispatch staff maintains the current safe
Improvement Project
method of train dispatch and does not
materially affect the future operation of the
station. Extending the current train dispatch
arrangements to cater for five-car operation
will necessarily increase the OPEX costs for
the Station Operator, LOROL; these
additional costs are being accounted for in
the renegotiation of the current franchise
arrangements which will come into force
when five-car operations commence.
21/02/2014
N/A
INS
07/01/2014
Current
The only method of complying with the
current RGS requirement would be to
introduce Automatic Selective Door Opening
at this location. Early consultation with
LOROL determined this was not a preferred
option as: Dwell times would increase to an
intolerable level and impact on the service
frequency and punctuality Platform
passenger flows would be markedly
affected, at the London end of the platform
Train evacuation times would not be
acceptable in the event of a fire. As the use
of ASDO did not have the support of
LOROL, the option was not pursued.
The provision of additional platform
London Overground Capacity
dispatch staff maintains the current safe
Improvement Project
method of train dispatch and does not
materially affect the future operation of the
station. Extending the current train dispatch
arrangements to cater for five-car operation
will necessarily increase the OPEX costs for
the Station Operator, LOROL; these
additional costs are being accounted for in
the renegotiation of the current franchise
arrangements which will come into force
when five-car operations commence.
13/02/2014
N/A
INS
07/01/2014
Current
The Department for Transport (DfT) have
published an updated list of Notified
National Technical Rules (NNTRs), which
now includes GM/RT2473 Issue 2, replacing
Issue 1 as referenced in the previously
published list of NNTRs. The Class 377/7
project is already at an advanced stage of
production and, with the exception of
elements dedicated to running under
Overhead Line Electrification (OLE), the
design is as close to identical to the Class
377/6 units as is feasible, in order to aid
maintenance and spares holding.
Therefore, the design and assessment of the
passenger doors has been based on the
requirements of the superseded standard.
An assessment of the changes of
GM/RT2473 from Issue 1 to Issue 2
indicates that, whilst the changes are minor,
there has been no consideration of the
derogations that have been granted against
Issue 1.
As compliance is being demonstrated in line Southern Railway Limited
with the standards applied on recent builds,
there are not expected to be any adverse
impacts.
22/01/2014
N/A
RST
N/A
Current
Page 49
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8075
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
Certificate Number
13-222-DEV
Title
Derogation for the supply of AWS and
TPWS equipment fitted to new Class 377/7
Electric Multiple Units in accordance with
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035 Issue
2.
RGS Clause
All clauses.
Scope
Equipment fitted in each cab of 8 off five-car
Class 377/7 units, I. e. 16 AWS/TPWS
systems. This application is for a project
requiring authorisation for placing in service
under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
Nature and Degree
The Department for Transport (DfT) have
published an updated list of Notified
National Technical Rules (NNTRs), which
now includes GE/RT8075 Issue 1, replacing
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 requirements for the
Train Protection and Warnings System
(TPWS) and GE/RT8035 Issue 2 Automatic
Warning System (AWS), as referenced in
the previously published list of NNTRs. The
Class 377/7 project is already at an
advanced stage of production, and with the
exception of elements dedicated to running
under OLE, the design is as close to
identical to the Class 377/6 units as is
feasible, in order to aid maintenance and
spares holding. Therefore, the design and
assessment of the AWS/TPWS equipment
has been based on the requirements of the
superseded standards. Consequentially, reassessment work would be required to
demonstrate compliance with GE/RT8075
Issue 1, and individual derogations sought if
non-compliances are to be found.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
As compliance is being demonstrated in line Southern Railway Limited
with the standards applied on recent builds,
there are not expected to be any adverse
impacts.
Certificate Issue Date
28/01/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
09/01/2013
Deviation Status
Current
GMRT2132
One
On-board Energy Metering for Billing
Purposes
13-217-DEV
Class 357 Energy Metering
2.2.6, 2.2.8 a) and; b), 2.3.2, 2.3.5, 2.6.3,
A1.1, A1.2 and A1.3.
74 x Class 357 EMU Units (357001 - 046
and 357201 - 228).
None - Data for billing purposes is still
available at the required accuracy and
frequency.
22/05/2014
N/A
RST
13/03/2014
Current
GMRT2307
One
Self contained electrical power supply
systems fitted to infrastructure support
vehicles
13-215-DEV Revised
23-01-2014
Derogation to GM/RT2307 Issue 1 for the
Clause 4.1.1 (99 70 9131 010 - 9, 99 70
MPVs and Wagons of the Network Rail High 9131 008-3, 99 70 9131 009-1) Clause 4.4
Output OLE Construction System (HOPS).
(99 70 9131 010 - 9, 99 70 9131 008-3, 99
70 9131 009-1) Clause 6.4 (all vehicles
quoted in Section 7) Clause 6.5 (all vehicles
quoted in Section 7) Clause 6.6 (all vehicles
quoted in Section 7)
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard clauses
of GM/RT2307 Issue 1 as identified in 6b
above (RGS Clause), for the following: MPV
vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB): · 99 70 9131 010 9. Type 3 (SNPB): · 99 70 9131 015 - 8 · 99
70 9131 020 - 8. Type 5 (SORB): · 99 70
9131 014 - 1. Wagons: Type KFA recertified as On-Track machines: · 99 70
9131 008 - 3 · 99 70 9131 009 - 1 · 99 70
9131 019 - 0.
`Bonding methods': Vehicles 99 70 9131
Windhoff Bahn- und
010-9, 99709131008-3 and 99709131009-1 Anlagentechnik GmbH
are connected to each other electrically
using a protective conductor system (IT
system) in accordance with German industry
standard DIN VDE 0100-410: 2007-06; thus,
RCDs are not required because personnel
protection is guaranteed by the protective
conductor system. In consequence, it is
considered that the risk is controlled to As
Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP) level
and is equivalent or better than would be the
case if an RCD based protection system had
been fitted. Pilot Protection (Inter-vehicle
connection): Due to the screwed
connection, the unintentional disconnection
of the specific inter-vehicle connectors is
prevented and is only undertaken by
competent staff using tools for the purpose.
It is therefore considered that the risks are
controlled to ALARP and are no greater than
they would have been had a pilot protection
system been fitted. The system and
procedure used is similar to previous
derogations 01/265/DGN, rail grinders and
03/038/DGN, track measuring machines.
16/01/2014
N/A
PLT
12/12/2014
Current
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
13-214-DEV
Derogation to GM/RT2130 Issue 03 for the
2.5.4b).
MPVs and Wagons of the Network Rail High
Output OLE Construction System (HOPS).
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard clauses
of GM/RT2130 Issue 3 as identified in 6b
above (RGS clauses), for the following.
MPV vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB): · 99 70
9131 010 - 9 · 99 70 9131 013 - 3 · 99 70
9131 021 - 6 · 99 70 9131 022 - 4, · 99 70
9131 023 - 2. Type 2 (HOPB): · 99 70 9131
001 - 8 · 99 70 9131 005 - 9 · 99 70 9131
006 - 7 · 99 70 9131 011 - 7. Type 3
(SNPB): · 99 70 9131 015 - 8 · 99 70 9131
018 - 2 · 99 70 9131 020 - 8. Type 4
(HNPB): · 99 70 9131 003 - 4. Type 5
(SORB): · 99 70 9131 014 - 1. Wagons: ·
KFA 99709131019-0. This deviation is for a
project requiring authorisation for placing in
service under the Railways (Interoperability)
Regulations 2011.
The proposed energy metering system for
the class 357 Electrostar units utilises the
existing traction control electronics to
provide the measurements, with new
software to assimilate and record the data.
The RGS was written principally with
discrete meters in mind, and so some
features of the traction electronics cannot
exactly replicate the functions of a standalone meter. Some data assimilation
functions are stated as being completed onboard but must be completed off-board.
Removal and retesting of the Voltage
Measurement Transformer (VMT), Current
Measurement Transformer (CMT) and
electronics for the Energy Calculation
Function (ECF) would not be practical and
would be prohibitively expensive. The
deviation presents the technical argument,
test data and component accuracy for the
existing train components as an alternative.
All efforts have been made to ensure that the
solution complies with the standard but this
has not been possible for certain clauses.
The changes required to be fully compliant
would require hardware upgrade and
software change meaning the solution would
be prohibitively expensive, add hardware
and complexity to the train and would
The MPVs and work modules being
delivered to the Project are based on current
in-service vehicles that provide the
functionality required. However, it is
acknowledged that the bonding criteria for
the three vehicles of the concrete
mixing/batching plant as well as specific
vehicle inter-connectors differ from those
defined in GM/RT2307 Issue 1. `Bonding
methods': Within HOPS, three vehicles are
equipped with concrete mixing/batching
plant modules. These modules are boughtin proprietary equipment which comply with
the EU Machinery Directive. The
comprehensive protection system provided
on each of these modules does not use an
RCD as required by the Standard. In
consequence and in contrast to the
generator applications of all other vehicles
within HOPS, the bonding method used on
these three vehicles does not feature a threephase a. c. with the star point connected to
the vehicle frame. Pilot Protection (Intervehicle connection): Within HOPS, two
vehicle pairs and one three-vehicle
formation feature inter-vehicle connections
at a voltage of 110/230/400V for work
equipment fitted to the modules on these
permanently coupled vehicles. The interThe Multi-Purpose Vehicles (MPVs) have
been designed to be compliant with
Technical Specifications for Interoperability
(TSI) requirements, including the
Locomotive and Passenger TSI, and are
closely based on the existing MPV design
which is EN 14033 compliant. This design
is based on fire performance in accordance
with DIN 5510-2. Changes to the cab
design to meet full GM/RT2130 compliance
would invalidate the previously assessed
design, not only with respect to fire safety
but also other requirements. It is considered
that using the current design, as detailed
below, is adequate to control the risks and
that the significant additional work to achieve
full GM/RT2130 compliance is not beneficial.
This principle is consistent with the
previously granted deviation, 13/013/DGN,
which permits use of DIN 5510-2 for fire
properties of materials.
Although the cab floor fire barriers have not Windhoff Bahn- und
been demonstrated as compliant to
Anlagentechnik GmbH
GM/RT2130 requirements, the risks to onboard staff are considered to be adequately
controlled because: · DIN 5510 fire barriers
are fitted (note it is not possible to directly
equate these to UK fire resistance durations
due to different nature of the standards). ·
The fire sources directly under the cabs are
small - diesel cab heaters only. · Selfmonitoring fire detection and suppression
systems are fitted. · Limited numbers of
people on board, and they are all trained
staff. · Train speed is limited to 60 mph,
hence train can be stopped in around 30
seconds. · Direct communication is
available between all staff locations and the
driver. · Manual fire extinguishers are fitted
to the vehicles, which can be used if
necessary. Therefore, even in the unlikely
event of a failure of the fire
detection/suppression system, there will be
sufficient time to stop and evacuate the train
before the floor barrier is compromised.
07/02/2014
N/A
RST
06/12/2013
Current
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
c2c Rail Ltd
Page 50
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2461
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and on- track Machines
Certificate Number
13-180-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
Additional sanding devices on 11th axle as 9.1
permissible by TSI CCS (2012/88/EC) while
complying to the overall sanding rates as
defined by GM/RT2461.
GMRT2149
Three
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
the Size of Railway Vehicle
13-179-DEV
Class 700 (Thameslink EMU) shoegear
height.
B10.2
GMRT2141
Three
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over
13-178-DEV
Resistance to Derailment - Use of Multiple
Regression for Technical Conformity in lieu
of UK On-track Tests.
E.2.1 Test conditions E.5 Performance
requirements
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-177-DEV
Installation of additional platform and track at 2.1
Whitby Station - platform curvature.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
Class 700 trains.
Nature and Degree
Class 700 trains are eight-car and twelvecar units in fixed formation, consisting 20 m
cars. On Class 700, a first active sanding
device is placed in front of the third axle and
a second active sanding device is placed in
front of the eleventh axle in direction of
driving, whereas the above clause does not
allow a second active sanding on the train.
The recommended sanding rate
approaching, but not exceeding, 2kg/minute
per rail will be distributed and the maximum
quantity of sand dispensed will be compliant
to GM/RT2461. For operation in braking
mode, sand shall be delivered to the
railhead by the leading vehicle only for all
train formations (including multiple
formations), at a location forward of the third
axle and after the second axle, in the
direction of travel. There are different
concepts described in GM/RT2461 and the
Technical Specification for Interoperability
(TSI) Control Command and Signalling
(CCS) concerning the sanding rate and
amount of active sanding devices. The
Group Standard GM/RT2461 limits the
number of active sanding devices to one
device per unit and rail. It also recommends
a sanding rate approaching, but not
exceeding, 2kg/minute per rail. The TSI
Class 700 'Thameslink EMU' and all its
This deviation relates to the Class 700
subclasses.
'Thameslink EMU' non-compliance with the
swept envelope for shoegear as defined in
Clause B10. 2 and Appendix B of
GM/RT2149. Complying with the
requirements by raising the shoegear height
would cause extremely poor contact
between the conductor rail and the
shoegear. It is important to note that, if the
shoegear is set higher in order to comply
with GM/RT2149, then the following risks
arise: The shoes will lose contact with the
third rail and thus prevent the Class 700
'Thameslink EMU' from being powered if
static, and cause unreliable operation if
moving. When moving the shoes would
periodically lose contact with the third rail,
which will cause significant arcing and the
electrical interference generated as a result
of this may give rise to signalling
compatibility issues. Drawing number
M59134-02-LT provides the assessment of
the shoegear against the swept envelope
defined in Appendix B of GM/RT2149. This
assessment includes: · the maximum lateral
movement derived for Cases A and B
(defined in Clause B10. 2) for any vehicle
condition, · vertical movements for any
relevant vehicle condition (I. e. load or wear
Class 700 `Thameslink EMU' and all its sub- As the Class 700 needs to comply with the
classes.
Locomotives and Passenger Rolling Stock
Conventional Rail Technical Specification for
Interoperability (CR TSI LOC PAS) (
2011/291/EU, Commission Decision
26/04/2011 concerning a technical
specification for interoperability relating to
the rolling stock subsystem - `Locomotives
and passenger rolling stock' of the transEuropean conventional rail system'), a full
vehicle testing in accordance with EN14363:
2005 ( Railway applications - Testing and
Simulation for the acceptance of running
characteristics of railway vehicles - Running
Behaviour and stationary tests ) is required,
which will not be possible in UK due to the
absence of required test zones on routes
accessible with the Thameslink gauge.
Therefore, on-track tests according
EN14363: 2005 are scheduled to be
performed outside UK. Complying with
GM/RT2141 Appendix D or Appendix E
would call for additional dynamic on-track
ride tests in UK. Limited accessibility of
Thameslink routes for vehicle testing
introduces a project risk in terms of delay in
the approval and homologation process due
to the resulting late availability of the
generated test report.
The Deviation relates to the re-instatement
At present, Whitby Station is a single track,
of a station platform and associated track at single platform terminus of the Network Rail
Whitby Station where the radius of the curve single line branch from Middlesbrough. The
will be less than 1000 m.
NYMR service cannot meet demand nor
offer a full range of journey opportunities to
potential travellers unless the number of
services is increased. Funding for this work
has been obtained from national funding
agencies keen to stimulate the economy of
Whitby through the enhancement of tourist
related rail services into the North York
Moors National Park and from Network Rail
itself. To do this requires the commissioning
of a second platform and options appraisals
show that the only meaningful option is the
reinstatement of the demolished part of the
former Platform 2 in its original location.
The rebuilt platform will have a fractionally
greater radius compared with the existing
Platform 1 currently used by all services.
The reinstated platform would normally be
used by NYMR trains but would be
accessible to other users. Northern Rail are
the franchise operator and will continue
normally to use Platform 1. Occasional
charters (currently around 2 - 3 per year)
visit Whitby and may use either platform
depending on circumstances. Northern Rail
normally uses Classes 153 and 156 Diesel
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Safety of the railway system: The lower
First Capital Connect
sanding rate recommended by the TSI CCS
insures that no signal devices are isolated
by a too high amount of sand. The second
active sanding device allows a more even
distribution of sand on the track will
therefore improve the performance during
low adhesion condition. Technical
compatibility: This solution is compliant to
TSI CCS.
Certificate Issue Date
28/01/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
05/12/2013
Deviation Status
Current
None, providing that structure clearance is
provided in accordance with
NR/GN/ELP/27010 5. 9 for a minimum
dynamic shoegear height of 25 mm ARL.
27/01/2014
N/A
RST
06/12/2013
Current
The method of multi linear regression was First Capital Connect
27/01/2014
recently investigated within the European
railway dynamics research project
DynoTRAIN. It will be introduced in the
revised EN 14363 (prEN 14363: 2013,
`Railway applications - Testing and
Simulation for the acceptance of running
characteristics of railway vehicles - Running
Behaviour and stationary tests') to the
assessment of rolling stock dynamic
behaviour at different track geometry levels.
Moreover, the method was already
introduced in the clarification document
ERA/TD/2012-17/INT (European Railway
Agency, Interoperability Unit, Running
Dynamics Applications of EN 14363: 2005 Modifications and Clarifications) for the
same purpose (see Clause 4. 4. 8 and
Annex A of the corresponding document).
According to the documents mentioned
above, the multi linear regression is a
suitable method to estimate the result of a
vehicle assessment even if the test
conditions do not meet the requirements to
reflect the vehicle's dynamic behaviour in the
operating conditions completely. Therefore,
the safety, the technical compatibility, the
performance and other properties of the
railway system will not be affected. The
The speed restriction over the reinstated
North Yorkshire Moors Railway 12/11/2013
terminal platform line will be 10 mph. Trains Enterprises Plc
entering the platform will have been stopped
at the end of the single line section, to allow
operation of the Ground Frame controlled
points. Trains leaving the station will stop
once clear of the loop again to allow
operation of the Ground Frame. The end
throw of the Mark 1 vehicles on the inside of
the curved platform will result in the end
doors being closer to the platform edge.
The centre doors of these vehicles are
permanently secured out of use. Train
despatch will be from the guard to driver
with assistance from other competent
persons with monitoring, sighting, and
relaying of hand signals as necessary. The
guard's location towards the rear of the train,
adjacent to the brake van, where the
platform curvature is greatest will ease
sighting distance. Northern Rail trains will
normally continue to use Platform 1, where
their vehicles are on the outside of the curve,
although occasional use of the new platform
is possible. The end doors on Classes 153,
155, 156 and 158 units and 14x vehicles
currently used by Northern Rail will also be
closer to the platform edge through the
curvature, while these vehicles also benefit
N/A
RST
06/12/2013
Current
N/A
INS
11/09/2013
Current
First Capital Connect
Page 51
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
13-176-DEV
Title
Richmond Platforms 4 to 7 - platform edge
position.
RGS Clause
3.1
Scope
Richmond Platforms 4 - 7.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-175-DEV
London Bridge Station - Platforms 10 and
11, 12 and 13, 14 and 15 - platform
curvature.
Part 2; Clause 2.1.2
This issue applies throughout London
Bridge Station (both High and Low Level).
For Platforms 14 and 15, the length of sub1000 m radius is approximately 165 m. For
Platforms 12 and 13, the length of sub-1000
m radius is approximately 160 m. For
Platforms 10 and 11, the length of sub-1000
m radius is approximately 25 m.
GMRT2044
Four
Braking System Requirements and
Performance for Multiple Units
13-167-DEV
Unit 317 722, Difference between Service
and Emergency Brake Pressures.
5.4.1 a)
Unit 317 722.
GKRT0075
Two
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
13-162-DEV
Carmuirs East Jnc to Grangemouth Jnc,
CEJ10 to GH6 braking distance for trains at
40 mph Appendix A.
2.3.3
Signal section CEJ10 to GH6, Carmuirs
East Junction to Grangemouth Junction,
Scotland Route. LOR : SSC109, ELR :
PMT.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
With input from DfT and Disabled Persons
Transport Advisory Committee (DPTAC), LU
has assessed all of the 248 platforms served
by S Stock to see where through the
application of reasonable effort, compliance
with the RVAR (2010) at the two nominated
S Stock doorways can be achieved. This is
the equivalent platform length of
approximately 29 metres. Compliance with
Clause 4. 2. 3 of GI/RT7016 results in a
stepping distance both horizontally and
vertically greater than maximum permitted
offset set by the RVAR (2010). The platform
listed in Section 6 has heights and/or offsets
that largely do not comply with the
requirements of GI/RT7016 with respect to
height (915 mm) and offset (730 mm). All
platforms have datum plates fitted. Platform
copers elsewhere on the platform have been
moved back to accommodate S Stock.
Under the platform copers, cable brackets
have been found to infringe the lower sector
structure gauge (Figure 1 GC/RT5212) by
up to 50 mm and have been recessed into
the platform wall where necessary to
accommodate S Stock. S Stock has been
designed to meet LU Standard S1156
platform offset of 711 mm and height of 950
mm. The scope of introduction of S Stock
Within the Low Level platforms 14 and 15,
the designed radii will be between 700 and
704 m. There is a length of straight in front
of the new buffer stops at the London end
and a length of 1000 m/1004 m radius curve
at the country end. For Platforms 12 and 13,
the radii are 750 and 753 m and, again,
there is a length of straight (approximately
60 m) in front of the buffers stops. Platforms
10 and 11 contain a short length (circa 25 m)
of 520 m radius at their eastern end. Clear
route analysis has been run on Low Level
tracks and platform stepping distances have
been confirmed as acceptable for Low Level
platforms. This layout will be installed with
new components throughout incorporating
track lateral resistance measures where
necessary. The new platforms will be
designed to the proposed track alignment
design throughout. The proposed new track
and platform alignment is not significantly
different from the layout that exists today,
meaning that station personnel and
maintenance staff will be alert to the risks
associated with curved platforms. It is
believed that the current deviation delivers a
solution with minimum safety risk.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The proposal is to make a portion of
Network Rail
Richmond Platforms 4-7 on the Network Rail
Richmond branch higher and closer to trains
than standard, in order to provide level
access to one particular type of rolling stock
using the Branch - the new LU S stock. A
similar amendment to Kew Gardens
Platform 1 on the branch was approved in
an earlier deviation submission. The 29 m
long level access portion is designed to
serve particular doors on the train matching
similar raised platforms on other stations the
stock calls at. However, the platforms are
used by both LU and conventional railway
rolling stock, and the design therefore
retains compatibility to all vehicles that are
authorised to use the Branch. Railway
Group Standard GI/RT7016 requires offsets
(in the plane of rail) of Y = 915 mm X = 730
mm for straight and level track. The LU
RVAR standard requires offsets (in the
plane of rail) of Y = 950 mm X = 711 mm for
straight and level track. Along a 29 m length
at Richmond Platforms 4-7 localised
platform coper adjustments will be
undertaken so that the step from an S Stock
to the platform is less than 75 mm
horizontally and 50 mm vertically. The table
below shows the resultant average stepping
The physical constraints of the London
Network Rail
Bridge Station area and the requirement to
install 9No High Level platforms, 6No Low
Level platforms and a new station building to
accommodate twelve-car length trains
drives some platform lines to be designed
on radii that are tighter than the standard
requires. Refer to Track team derogation
application against NR/L2/TRK/2049 Ref
KO2-RS-DEV-029. Platform widths have
been designed to maximise pedestrian
access and egress for current and
anticipated passenger forecasts.
Certificate Issue Date
11/12/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
13/11/2013
Deviation Status
Current
09/12/2013
N/A
INS
13/11/2013
Current
AT/VI3174, Issue 2A, `VOI, Class 317
Electrical Multiple Unit (EMU), C4 Overhaul',
Job No. V*S 0029 for the Class 317 Greater
Anglia fleet, requires a brakes test, as
summarised in Table 1 below. This shows
that the emergency brake pressure can be
39% higher than the service brake pressure
on the MS vehicle type (see 3 Max and
Emergency Max), this being the highest
differential for the fleet. [See Table - Class
317/3, 317/5. 317/7 and 317/8 Pressure
Setting Table for Brake Test - Table 1
Extract from AT/VI3174, Issue 2A, `VOI,
Class 317 EMU, C4 Overhaul', Job No. V*S
0029] For the Class 317 fleet, the unit
differential of brake force between the step 3
service brake and the emergency brake is
calculated using the following: Vehicle
weight information: · DTS - 31. 4t · DTC 31. 6t · MS - 51. 3t · TS - 30. 2t Total unit
weight = 144. 5t. Nominal brake cylinder
pressure differences between step 3 brake
pressure and emergency brake pressure: ·
DTS - 35% · DTC - 35% · MS - 35% · TS 34%. Calculation to determine overall unit
braking performance: [(31. 4 x 35) + (31. 6 x
35) + (51. 3 x 35) + (30. 2 x 34)] / 144. 5 =
34. 8% overall effect on train braking
performance. For Class 317 units, the
Current standards for gradient of 1: 200 in
Appendix A. 1 table, required braking
distance of 990 m for trains at 40 mph.
Existing Carmuirs East Jcn Signal CEJ10 to
Grangemouth Jcn Signal GH6 is a threeaspect signal section that has a braking
distance of 922 m on a gradient of 1: 210
which is 68 m short. To achieve compliance
with current standards either, signals would
require to be repositioning add signalling
controls, adding an additional signal or line
speed reduction. Moving CEJ10 towards
Falkirk Camelon Station would convert the
signal from a remote platform starter to a
platform starter, and require CEJ10 AWS
magnet to be moved and fitted with special
suppression circuitry. It would also reduce
the braking from CEJ9 which is on the limits
of minimum spacing. CEJ9 signal rear is
optimally positioned for freight train
standage issues on the Up Grahamston line
(clear of Larbert Junction S & C) so could
not be moved. Moving GH6 away from
Falkirk Camelon Station would compromise
braking to GH4 signal for the 50 mph line
speed. Other compliant technical options
considered have included the introduction of
an isolated four-aspect sequence that would
convert CEJ9 signal to be an isolated signal,
The alternative proposal will retain
Abellio Greater Anglia Ltd
compatibility and standardisation of the
`Post C4 Brakes Test', for unit 317 722 with
the rest of the Greater Anglia fleet. This
alternative proposal will: Not have any
detrimental effect on the safety of the railway
system Retain the technical compatibility of
the railway system, now and in the future Not
have any implications associated with cost
and service performance, including reliability
and availability Not have any implications
associated with other essential
requirements, such as environmental
protection and health.
27/11/2013
N/A
RST
01/11/2013
Current
Required braking distance between CEJ10 Network Rail
and GH6 signals is only deficient by 68 m
per current GK/RT0075. Signal sighting of
both signals is compliant with current
standards. CEJ10 signal has 212 m
sighting, sufficient to give additional sighting
at 40 mph to allow the driver to take action a
minimum of 68 m on approach to signal thus
mitigating short spacing to GH6 signal. It is
not considered reasonable to attempt modify
the current infrastructure to achieve
compliance with current standards. This is
on the grounds that there is little safety
justification proportionate to the expenditure
required to deliver compliance. There is no
SPAD history at GH6. Only one SPAD
recorded at CEJ10 in 2005, due to driver
error. As such, there have been no SPADs
or driver complaints related to signal
spacing issues since that time, since 1997
when the signalling system was
commissioned. Scotland Route has
considered this site and the options to
deliver signal spacing compliance. It is
considered that the risks arising from this
deviation are very low. Freight trains have
been running over this section of line at
speeds of 40 mph since 1997 without any
recorded issues. Current signals were
14/11/2013
N/A
CCS
31/10/2013
Current
Page 52
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2400
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Engineering Design of On-track Machines in 13-161-DEV
Running Mode
Title
Advance stage deviation for Plasser 94x4/4S Tamper.
RGS Clause
All clauses
Scope
Plasser &amp; Theurer 09-4x4/4S Tamping
Machine Number 99 70 9128 001-3. The
application is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
GMRT2400
Five
Engineering Design of On-track Machines in 13-160-DEV
Running Mode
Advanced stage deviation to GM/RT2400
Issue 5 for High Output OLE Construction
System (HOPS) Multi-Purpose Vehicles
(MPVs).
All clauses
This application is to permit non-compliance
with the RGS standard GM/RT2400 Issue 5
for the following MPV vehicles: Type 1
(SOPB): · 99 70 9131 010 - 9 · 99 70 9131
013 - 3 · 99 70 9131 021 - 6 · 99 70 9131
022 - 4 · 99 70 9131 023 - 2. Type 2
(HOPB): · 99 70 9131 001 - 8 · 99 70 9131
005 - 9 · 99 70 9131 006 - 7 · 99 70 9131
011 - 7. Type 3 (SNPB): · 99 70 9131 015 8 · 99 70 9131 018 - 2 · 99 70 9131 020 - 8
Type 4 (HNPB): · 99 70 9131 003 - 4. Type
5 (SORB): · 99 70 9131 014 - 1.
GKRT0094
One
Train Voice Radio Systems
13-159-DEV
Advanced stage deviation to GK/RT0094
Issue 1 for High Output OLE Construction
System (HOPS) MPVs.
All clauses in GK/RT0094 Issue 1.
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard
GK/RT0094 Issue 1, for the following MPV
vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB): · 99 70 9131 010 9 · 99 70 9131 013 - 3 · 99 70 9131 021 - 6 ·
99 70 9131 022 - 4 · 99 70 9131 023 - 2.
Type 2 (HOPB): · 99 70 9131 001 - 8 · 99
70 9131 005 - 9 · 99 70 9131 006 - 7 · 99 70
9131 011 - 7. Type 5 (SORB): · 99 70 9131
014 - 1.
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
13-158-DEV
Advanced stage deviation to GE/RT8075
Issue 1 for High Output OLE Construction
System (HOPS) MPVs.
All clauses in GE/RT8075 Issue 1.
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard
GE/RT8075 Issue 1, for the following MPV
vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB): · 99 70 9131 010 9 · 99 70 9131 013 - 3 · 99 70 9131 021 - 6 ·
99 70 9131 022 - 4, · 99 70 9131 023 - 2.
Type 2 (HOPB): · 99 70 9131 001 - 8 · 99
70 9131 005 - 9 · 99 70 9131 006 - 7 · 99 70
9131 011 - 7. Type 5 (SORB) : · 99 70 9131
014 - 1.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
Due to it being notified as an National
Technical Rule (NTR) by the competent
authority in the UK, this standard has
become applicable to the project following
completion of the machine but prior to it
being Authorised into service. The design of
the machine is compliant to Issue 4 of
GM/RT2400 and the other relevant RGS that
have been excluded by issue 5 of
GM/RT2400. Issue 5 of GM/RT2400 is a
fundamental revision of the standard to align
it with the prevailing Euronorm EN 14 033
and demonstrating compliance with the
Issue 5 would require a complete new
assessment. Therefore, complying with the
new standard at this late stage of the project
would require a huge amount of re-work and
incur an unfeasibly long delay.
The Department for Transport (DfT) plan to
publish an updated list of NTRs in midOctober 2013, which is expected to replace
GM/RT2400 Issue 4 by Issue 5. GM/RT2400
Issue 5 was issued in September 2013 but
does not come into force until 07/12/2013l;
however, once the DfT publish the updated
National Technical Rule (NTR) list,
GM/RT2400 Issue 5 will become the
mandatory NTR and compatibility and the
open points in the Technical Specifications
for Interoperability (TSIs) can no longer be
satisfied by compliance with GM/RT2400
Issue 4. The HOPS project is already at an
advanced stage, with the first units already
completed and expected to arrive for
commissioning in the UK in early November.
The design of the machine is compliant to
Issue 4 of GM/RT2400 and the other
relevant RGS that have now been excluded
by Issue 5 of GM/RT2400. Issue 5 of
GM/RT2400 is a fundamental revision of the
standard to align it with the prevailing
Euronorm EN 14033 and demonstrating
compliance with the Issue 5 would require a
complete new assessment and potentially
design changes. Therefore, complying with
the new standard at this late stage of the
project would require a significant amount of
The Department for Transport (DfT) plan to
publish an updated list of NTRs in midOctober 2013, which is expected to replace
GE/RT8080 Issue 1, GE/RT8081 Issue 1
and GE/RT8082 Issue 1, with GK/RT0094
Issue 1. GK/RT0094 Issue 1 was issued in
March 2013 and came into force in June
2013. Once DfT publish the updated
Notified Technical Rule (NTR) list,
GK/RT0094 Issue 1 will become the
mandatory NTR and the UK Global System
for Mobile communications for Railways
(GSM-R) requirements can no longer be
satisfied by compliance with GE/RT8080
Issue 1, GE/RT8081 Issue 1 and
GE/RT8082 Issue 1. The High Output (OLE)
Construction System (HOPS) project
commenced in late 2011 and the GSM-R
equipment was procured early in the project.
This equipment was procured against
GE/RT8080, GE/RT8081 and GE/RT8082
and is the same as being fitted under the
Network Rail managed National GSM-R
project. The HOPs project is at an
advanced stage, with the first units already
completed and expected to arrive for
commissioning in the UK in early November.
The design and assessment of the GSM-R
equipment for the HOPS Multi-Purpose
The Department for Transport (DfT) plan to
publish an updated list of NTRs in midOctober 2013, which is expected to replace
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035 Issue
2, with GE/RT8075 Issue 1. GE/RT8075
Issue 1 was issued in September 2013 but
does not come into force until 07/12/2013,
however, once the DfT publish the updated
NTR list, GE/RT8075 Issue 1 will become
the mandatory NTR and the open points in
the TSIs regarding AWS/TPWS can no
longer be satisfied by compliance with
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035 Issue
2. The HOPS project is already at an
advanced stage, with the first units already
completed and expected to arrive for
commissioning in the UK in early November.
The design and assessment of the
AWS/TPWS equipment for the HOPS MPVs
has been based on the requirements of
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035 Issue
2; reassessment work would therefore be
necessary to demonstrate compliance with
GE/RT8075 Issue 1 at this late stage in the
project. Additionally, design and
manufacturing changes might also be
required.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The machine will enter into service with the
same level of compliance as all other ontrack machines in the UK as GM/RT2400
Issue 5 is not yet in force as a Railway
Group Standard.
Applicant Organisation
Plasser UK Ltd
Certificate Issue Date
27/11/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
01/11/2013
Deviation Status
Current
The MPVs will be compliant with
Windhoff Bahn- und
GM/RT2400 Issue 4, subject to the
Anlagentechnik GmbH
deviations 12/160/DGN and 12/161/DGN
which have already been granted. Windhoff
Bahn does not perceive an inacceptable risk
since that what is demonstrated being in
compliance with the requirements of
GM/RT2400 Issue 4 until December 2013 is
also still valid after that date.
16/01/2014
N/A
RST
01/11/2013
Current
There is no predicted adverse impact
arising from continued use of the current
standards.
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
18/12/2013
N/A
CCS
31/10/2013
Current
There is no predicted adverse impact
arising from continued use of the current
standards.
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
18/12/2013
N/A
CCS
31/10/2013
Current
Page 53
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2473
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
Certificate Number
13-157-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
Supply of seats for 20 new Class 350
All requirements in GM/RT2473 Issue 2.
Electric Multiple Units (EMU) to a preexisting design in accordance with Siemens
Strategy for the Introduction of Additional
Vehicles to an Existing Design, 27/01/2012
Issue 1.
Scope
· 10 x Class 350/3 for First Transpennine
Express · 10 x Class 350/4 for London
Midland.
GMRT2100
Five
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
13-156-DEV
Supply of seats for 20 new Class 350
6.2.1.2 and 6.2.4.1-3
Electric Multiple Units (EMU) to a preexisting design in accordance with Siemens
Strategy for the Introduction of Additional
Vehicles to an Existing Design, 27/01/2012
Issue 1.
· 10 x Class 350/3 for First Transpennine
Express · 10 x Class 350/4 for London
Midland.
GMRT2100
Five
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
13-155-DEV
Derogation for the manufacture and supply
of new Class 350 Electric Multiple Units
(EMU) with vehicle bodyshell structures,
bogies and glazing manufactured in
accordance with GM/RT2100 Issue 3.
Supply of 20 new four-car EMUs.
GERT8075
One
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
13-153-DEV
Advance stage deviation for AWS/TPWS on All clauses.
Plasser 09-4x4/4S Tamper.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
2.1.1.4, 2.1.2.1, 2.1.5.1c); 3.1.1, 3.2.2,
3.3.1.1, 3.3.3.1a); 5.2.2, 5.3.2, 5.3.3.2,
5.3.3.3, 5.3.4; 6.5.2.1, 6.9.1.2.
Plasser &amp; Theurer 09-4x4/4S Tamping
Machine Number 99 70 9128 001-3.
Nature and Degree
This is an update to derogation 12/171/DGN
(which has already been granted against
GM/RT2100 Issue 4) to reflect that
GM/RT2100 has been up-issued to Issue 5
since the previous derogation was granted.
There have been no technical changes to
either the nature of the non-compliance or
the requirements against which the
derogation is being sought. Siemens are in
the process of supplying of twenty new fourcar EMUs that, with the exception of certain
internal layout differences and other minor
changes, will be identical to the existing
Class 350/2 (`Desiro') EMUs presently
operated by London Midland. A strategy
outlining approach to be taken in the
assessment of the new units, including the
methodology and actions required to meet
the approvals requirements for the
introduction of the new EMUs of an existing
design into passenger service, has been
approved by the Rolling Stock Standards
Committee at its meeting held on
17/02/2012. The strategy requires
consideration of new standards and
changes to existing standards made in the
period between the introduction of the
original vehicles and the present. The
strategy and some particularly high risk (to
This is an update to derogation 12/171/DGN
(which has already been granted against
GM/RT2100 Issue 4) to reflect that
GM/RT2100 has been up-issued to Issue 5
since the previous derogation was granted.
There have been no technical changes to
either the nature of the non-compliance or
the requirements against which the
derogation is being sought. Siemens are in
the process of supplying of twenty new fourcar EMUs that, with the exception of certain
internal layout differences and other minor
changes, will be identical to the existing
Class 350/2 (`Desiro') EMUs presently
operated by London Midland. A strategy
outlining approach to be taken in the
assessment of the new units, including the
methodology and actions required to meet
the approvals requirements for the
introduction of the new EMUs of an existing
design into passenger service, has been
approved by the Rolling Stock Standards
Committee at its meeting held on
17/02/2012. The strategy requires
consideration of new standards and
changes to existing standards made in the
period between the introduction of the
original vehicles and the present. The
strategy and some particularly high risk (to
This is an update to derogation 12/014/DGN
(which has already been granted against
GM/RT2100 Issue 4) to reflect that
GM/RT2100 has been up-issued to Issue 5
since the previous derogation was granted.
There have been no technical changes to
either the nature of the non-compliance or
the requirements against which the
derogation is being sought. Siemens are in
the process of supplying 20 new four-car
EMUs that, with the exception of certain
internal layout differences and other minor
changes, will be identical to the existing
Class 350/2 (`Desiro') EMUs operated by
London Midland. The new EMUs shall be
operated by London Midland (10 four-car
units) and First Transpennine Express (10
four-car units) along their respective
operational routes. Derogation 12/014/DGN
has already been granted for this project,
against the same requirements in
GM/RT2100 Issue 4. Because GM/RT2100
has been up-issued to Issue 5 since the
previous derogation was granted, Siemens
need to up-issue this derogation to meet the
ORR requirement for authorisation to place
in to service against the latest NNTR list.
There are no changes to the standards
requirements that are the subject of this
The application is for a project requiring
authorisation for placing in service under the
Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.
The Department for Transport (DfT)
Interoperability help note on 'Dispensations
from Notified National Technical Rules' sets
out how an industry process can be used by
projects to obtain deviations from a national
rule. The process for obtaining deviations
from RGSs in accordance with the RGS
Code is recognised as an established
industry process in this context. Due to it
being notified as a Notified Technical Rule
(NTR) by the competent authority in the UK,
this standard has become applicable to the
project following completion of the machine
but prior to it being authorised into service.
The design of the machine incorporates
AWS/TPWS equipment which is compliant
to GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035
Issue 2 subject to deviations 12/176/DGN
and 12/177/DGN due to equipment
compliant to the standards current at the
time of construction not being available.
Complying with the new standard at this late
stage of the project would require significant
additional work and incur a sizable delay.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
There is no predicted adverse impact
arising from the introduction of the revised
seat fixing arrangements of the alternative
seating arrangements.
Applicant Organisation
Siemens plc
Certificate Issue Date
20/11/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
01/11/2013
Deviation Status
Current
There is no predicted adverse impact
arising from the introduction of the revised
seat fixing arrangements of the alternative
seating arrangements.
Siemens plc
20/11/2013
N/A
RST
01/11/2013
Current
The proposed new EMUs are mechanically Siemens plc
similar to the existing Class 350/2 EMUs
operated by London Midland, which were
manufactured in 2008-2009 and were
proven to be demonstrably compliant with
GM/RT2100 Issue 3. Given that the Class
350/2 fleet is a relatively modern design and
the proposed additional vehicles will be very
similar to these vehicles, it can be concluded
that the introduction of the additional trains
on London Midland and First Transpennine
Express routes will not introduce any
adverse risks to third parties, and the risks
to passengers will be comparable to existing
trains. Siemens confirm that they have not
raised any concerns regarding the structural
integrity of the Class 350/2 fleet currently in
passenger service. Please refer to
`Supporting Paper for LM TPE Class 350
Issue 1' for full details.
20/11/2013
N/A
RST
01/11/2013
Current
The machine will enter into service with
Plasser UK Ltd
AWS/TPWS equipment identical to that
fitted to the majority of rolling stock in the UK
as GE/RT8075 is not yet in force as a
Railway Group Standard and equipment
fully compliant to GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and
GE/RT8035 Issue 2 has only recently
become available.
27/11/2013
N/A
CCS
31/10/2013
Current
Page 54
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8075
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
Certificate Number
13-152-DEV Revised
22-11-2013
Title
Derogation for the manufacture and supply
of new Class 350 Electric Multiple Units
(EMU) with AWS/TPWS equipment
manufactured in accordance with
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035 Issue
2.
RGS Clause
All requirements in GE/RT8075 Issue 1.
Scope
· 10 x Class 350/3 for First Transpennine
Express · 10 x Class 350/4 for London
Midland.
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
13-151-DEV
Signal TEB1429 in close proximity to
Havensmouth level crossing.
2.1.1.3 a)
This application applies only to signal
TEB1429 which is proposed to be located 4
m from the crossing edge.
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
13-150-DEV
Signals TEB1361 and TEB1363 in close
proximity to Berwick level crossing.
2.1.1.3 a)
This application applies to signals TEB1361 Placing new signal TEB1361 at 25 m from
and TEB1363 which will be positioned 8 m
the crossing is not possible due to the
and 5 m respectively from Berwick MCB
presence of the station buildings and the
level crossing.
'Out of Hours' station exit. The first location
that TEB1361 could occupy is at 29 m from
the crossing - this would necessitate moving
the stopping position plus a platform
extension of circa 28 m, the total cost being
œ420,000. The position for signal TEB1363
is designed to be in parallel with TEB1361,
and allows a three-car train to stand
between it and the stopping position in the
up direction. To enable TEB1363 to be
installed at 25 m from the level crossing, the
platform would have to be extended by a
similar amount to that described for
TEB1361 above and with a similar cost. As
an alternative to placing TEB1361 in a
compliant position, configuring the signalling
system to allow movement authorities to
pass the signal in rear (TEB1359) only when
the level crossing is closed to road traffic
was considered. It was discounted as it
would delay trains approaching the station
until the crossing was closed, and increase
the crossing closure time affecting road
users adversely.
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
13-149-DEV
Signal TEB1378 in close proximity to
Hampden Park level crossing.
2.1.1.3 a)
This application applies only to signal
TEB1378 which is proposed to be located
23 m from the crossing edge.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The Department for Transport (DfT) plan to
publish an updated list of NNTRs on
11/10/2013, which is expected to replace
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035 Issue
2, with GE/RT8075 Issue 1. GE/RT8075
Issue 1 was issued in September 2013 but
does not come into force until 07/12/2013.
This is after the date that the units are
expected to have been granted authorisation
by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR).
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035 Issue 2
will not be withdrawn until 07/12/2013.
However, once the DfT publish the updated
NNTR list, GE/RT8075 Issue 1 will become
a mandatory NNTR and the open points in
the TSIs regarding AWS/TPWS can no
longer be satisfied by compliance with
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and GE/RT8035 Issue
2. The Class 350/3 and 350/4 project is
already at an advanced stage, with the first
units already built and expected to arrive for
commissioning in the UK in early November.
A draft version of the Technical File has
already been submitted to the ORR for
review. The design and assessment of the
AWS/TPWS equipment for the Class 350/3
and 350/4 fleets has been based on the
requirements of GE/RT8030 Issue 4 and
GE/RT8035 Issue 2; reassessment work
Placing new signal TEB1429 at 25 m from
the crossing is not possible as after
considering stopping positions, a platform
extension of 20 m at a cost of œ15,000 per
linear metre would be required, and the total
cost of œ300,000 is considered too high.
Configuring the signalling system to allow
movement authorities to pass the signal in
rear (TEB1427) only when the level crossing
is closed to road traffic is considered
unacceptable due to the length of travelling
time from the signal to the station combined
with the platform dwell time.
Signal TEB1378 would require a new
substructure which would necessitate works
on the platform and shortening the available
platform length to maintain the stopping
distance from the signal. To preserve the
operational length of the platform, it would
need to be extended, which would
necessitate relocation of the reversing
crossover at the south end of the station. As
an alternative to relocation of signal
TEB1378, configuring the signalling system
to only allow trains to pass the signal in rear
when the crossing has been closed to road
traffic was considered. It was discounted as
it would increase the crossing closure time
unacceptably.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
There is no predicted adverse impact
arising from continued use of the current
standards.
Applicant Organisation
Siemens plc
Certificate Issue Date
20/11/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
31/10/2013
Deviation Status
Current
The `Stowmarket Controls' are designed
Network Rail
such that an overrunning train should only
reach the crossing after it has gone through
a full light sequence (I. e. 3s amber lights
followed by 5s red lights). In line with
Network Rail standards, it is not proposed to
lower the barriers in conjunction with the
control. Havensmouth crossing is, due to
the road width, proposed to be a two-barrier
crossing and, therefore, automatically
lowering the barriers presents a risk of
trapping users. It is considered that the
infrequent application of the control and the
nature of the crossing use will mean that
operating the lights without lowering the
barriers is unlikely to create or compound
crossing misuse. The analysis of the
proposed arrangements and consideration
of the alternatives is detailed in document
reference RAR-NWR-119966-64195265
Version 3, "Havensmouth MG Level
Crossing Renewal, Crossing and Signalling
Assessment".
27/02/2014
N/A
CCS
31/10/2013
Current
The `Stowmarket Controls' are designed
Network Rail
such that an overrunning train should only
reach the crossing after it has gone through
a full light sequence (I. e. 3s amber lights
followed by 5s red lights). In addition, the
barriers will be lowered at the end of the
light sequence, which is consistent with a
normal operating sequence; this is primarily
to ensure a consistent user experience. The
TSS loops provided at signals TEB1361 and
TEB1363 will mitigate the start-away SPAD
risk by virtue of minimising the speed and
distance of an overrunning train starting
from rest at the station. In addition, on
occupying the replacing track section, the
red road lights will operate immediately in
line with standard controls. The Up direction
car stop marks will be located so that the
driver of a train reversing on signal TEB1363
will have good sight of the signal. This
signal will only be used at times of
perturbation and not as part of normal
timetabled operation and, therefore, there
will be greater supervision of the move by
the signaller. The analysis of the proposed
arrangements and consideration of the
alternatives is detailed in document
reference RAR-NWR-119966-64195276
Version 3, "Berwick MCB Level Crossing
TPWS will achieve some mitigation against Network Rail
a potential overrun of the signal by at least
reducing the speed of an overrunning train
and, in some circumstances, will stop the
train before it reaches the crossing. It has
been selected in the absence of the other
available control measures being suitable
for the crossing, given its level of usage and
misuse. The analysis of the proposed
arrangements and consideration of the
alternatives is detailed in document
reference RAR-NWR-119966-64195267
Version 3, "Hampden Park MCB Level
Crossing Renewal, Crossing and Signalling
Assessment".
27/02/2014
N/A
CCS
06/02/2014
Current
27/02/2014
N/A
CCS
06/02/2014
Current
Page 55
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
13-143-DEV
Title
Kew Gardens Station Platform 1 - platform
edge position
RGS Clause
3.1.1 and 3.2.1
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-142-DEV
Pegswood Station (Down Line) Platform
Two - Platform Recess.
11.1.4
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-140-DEV
Thirsk Station (Down Line) Platform Two Platform Recess.
11.1.4
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-139-DEV
Thirsk Station (Up Line) Platform One Platform Recess.
11.1.4
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
Kew Gardens Station Platform 1. Kew
Gardens Station Platform 2 will not receive
raised portions due to the tight curvature at
the location of the raised portion.
Nature and Degree
With input from DfT and DPTAC, LUL, has
assessed all 248 platforms served by S
Stock to see where, through the application
of reasonable effort, compliance with the
Rail Vehicle Accessibility (RVA) Regulations
(2010) at the two nominated S Stock
doorways can be achieved. This is the
equivalent platform length of approximately
29 metres. Compliance with GI/RT7016
Clauses 3. 1. 1 and 3. 2. 1 results in a
stepping distance both horizontally and
vertically greater than maximum permitted
offset set by the RVA Regulations (2010).
Platform copers elsewhere on Platform 1 at
Kew Gardens have been moved back in
places to accommodate S Stock. The scope
of introduction of S Stock by LUL does not
provide reasonable opportunity to rebuild all
of the existing platform. The revised profile
of the platforms will prevent certain current
stock (that is currently permitted elsewhere
on the network but not on the Richmond
Branch) and possibly some future stock from
achieving compatibility to use this Branch if
this is requested by a Train Operating
Company (TOC) at some stage in the future.
There are designed special reduced
clearances following these RVAR platform
modification works at Kew Gardens.
This scheme is the result of an initiative led Within the scope of the project, it would not
by the Department of Transport (DfT) to
be reasonably practicable to provide a
bring about the specification, design,
compliant solution at the station platform. It
construction and entry into service of routes is not deemed as a reasonable opportunity
to accommodate larger intermodal traffic
to comply with the standard as the costs of
freight trains. W12 2nd Generation and
compliance would place unreasonable costs
W6a lower sector gauges are required to
on the project and industry. The cost of a
enable the movement of 9'6" high containers compliant solution (design and execution)
on standard height wagons without any
would be difficult to quantify, however the
operating or speed restrictions. The
cost of simply building a compliant solution
platform alterations are a direct result of a
would be circa œ800,000. This does not
gauge improvement portfolio across a
take into account the possessions, waste,
number of projects to clear for W12 2nd
compensation and additional service costs,
Generation and W6a lower sector gauges.
which could easily estimated to be circa
This deviation application applies to the
œ1,000,000. The cost of our alternative nonDown Platform (No. 2) Pegswood Station
compliant solution (design and execution) is
only and, specifically, non-compliance to the circa œ216,000.
safe recess ("Z"). In principle, the works will
have moderate effect on the recess. The
deviation application is required as Network
Rail does not plan to resolve the existing noncompliance. The proposed design
comprises both an element of Civils works,
to the existing coper positions, as well as
track work. The existing recess "Z" will be
affected by the proposed works, but this
effect is extremely limited. Overall, the
existing platform has a 100% non-compliant
recess over its "usable" operational length;
This scheme is the result of an initiative led Within the scope of the project, it would not
by the Department of Transport (DfT) to
be reasonably practicable to provide a
bring about the specification, design,
compliant solution at the station platform. It
construction and entry into service of routes is not deemed as a reasonable opportunity
to accommodate larger intermodal traffic
to comply with the standard as the costs of
freight trains. W12 2nd Generation and
compliance would place unreasonable costs
W6a lower sector gauges are required to
on the project and industry. However, the
enable the movement of 9'6" high containers project will reduce the severity of the existing
on standard height wagons without any
non-compliances. The cost of a compliant
operating or speed restrictions. The
solution (design and execution) would be
platform alterations are a direct result of a
difficult to quantify; however, the cost of
gauge improvement portfolio across a
simply building a compliant solution would
number of projects to clear for W12 2nd
be circa œ1,000,000. This does not take
Generation and W6a lower sector gauges.
into account the possessions, waste,
This deviation application applies to the
compensation and additional service costs,
Down Platform (No. 2) Thirsk Station only, which could easily estimated to be circa
and specifically non-compliance to the safe œ1,500,000. The cost of our alternative nonrecess ("Z"). In principle, the works will
compliant solution (design and execution) is
have moderate effect on the recess. The
circa œ210,000.
deviation application is required as Network
Rail does not plan to resolve the existing noncompliance. The proposed design
comprises both an element of Civils works,
to the existing coper positions, as well as
track work. Safe Recess (Clause 11. 1. 4,
Sub-clause 11. 1. 4. 1) The existing recess
"Z" will be affected by the proposed works,
but this effect is extremely limited. Overall,
the existing platform is mostly compliant with
This scheme is the result of an initiative led Within the scope of the project, it would not
by the Department of Transport (DfT) to
be reasonably practicable to provide a
bring about the specification, design,
compliant solution at the station platform. It
construction and entry into service of routes is not deemed as a reasonable opportunity
to accommodate larger intermodal traffic
to comply with the standard, as the costs of
freight trains. W12 2nd Generation and
compliance would place unreasonable costs
W6a lower sector gauges are required to
on the project and industry. However, the
enable the movement of 9'6" high containers project will reduce the severity of the existing
on standard height wagons without any
non-compliances. The cost of a compliant
operating or speed restrictions. The
solution (design and execution) would be
platform alterations are a direct result of a
difficult to quantify; however, the cost of
gauge improvement portfolio across a
simply building a compliant solution would
number of projects to clear for W12 2nd
be circa œ1,000,000. This does not take
Generation and W6a lower sector gauges.
into account the possessions, waste,
This deviation application applies to the Up compensation and additional service costs,
Platform (No. 1) Thirsk Station only and
which could easily be estimated to be circa
specifically to non-compliance to the safe
œ1,500,000. The cost of our alternative nonrecess ("Z"). In principle, the works will
compliant solution (design and execution) is
have moderate effect on the recess. The
circa œ210,000.
deviation application is required as we do
not plan to resolve the existing noncompliance. The proposed design
comprises both an element of Civils works,
to the existing coper positions, as well as
track work. Safe Recess (Clause 11. 1. 4,
Sub-clause 11. 1. 4. 1): The existing recess
"Z" will be affected by the proposed works,
but this effect is extremely limited. Overall
the existing platform has a 100% non-
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The proposal is to make a portion of Kew
Gardens Platform 1 on the Network Rail
Richmond Branch higher and closer to trains
than standard, in order to provide level
access to one particular type of rolling stock
using the branch - the new LU S stock.
Similar amendments to other platforms on
the branch will form a subsequent
derogation submission. The 29 m long level
access portion is designed to serve
particular doors on the train, matching
similar raised platforms on other stations the
stock calls at. However, the platform is used
by both LUL and conventional railway rolling
stock, and the design therefore retains
compatibility to all vehicles that are
authorised to use the branch. Group
Standard GI/RT7016 requires offsets (in the
plane of rail) of Y = 915 mm X = 730 mm for
straight and level track. The LUL RVAR
Standard requires offsets (in the plane of
rail) of Y = 950 mm X = 711 mm for straight
and level track. Along a 29 m length at Kew
Gardens Platform 1, localised platform
coper adjustments will be undertaken so that
the step from a S Stock to the platform is
less than 75 mm horizontally and 50 mm
vertically. The table below shows the
resultant average stepping distance for each
The impact of the proposed alternative
solution is low, as it maintains the existing
situation. The risk and impact to the various
stakeholders is assessed in more details
within the risk assessment, Appendix D.
The analysis has taken into to account the
most frequently used platform length. Most
trains stop within this length of platform;
chainage 998 m to 1090 m. Operationally,
the station has a total of 1,904 entries and
exits per annum or five people per day
(Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) estimates).
Stepping distances have been assessed for
relevant rolling stock. The stepping
distances will remain in the stepping triangle
with a maximum worsenment of 24 mm
horizontal and 11 mm vertical. In some
locations, stepping distances will be
improved by up to 42 mm horizontal and 12
mm vertical. In order to achieve the
objectives of the project as stated above, it
is deemed to be unreasonable for the
project to incur such alteration costs when
the proposed alternative works could be
classed as a platform modification. To
correct the existing non-compliances, the
project would incur significant additional
costs. Overall, the "safe space" dimension
between the running edge and the vertical
Impact: The impact of the proposed
alternative solution is low, as it maintains or
betters the existing situation. The risk and
impact to the various stakeholders is
assessed in more details within the risk
assessment, Appendix D. The analysis has
taken into account the most frequently used
platform length. Most trains stop within this
length of platform; chainage 1005 m to 1150
m. Operationally, the station has a total of
188,484 entries and exits per annum, or 516
people per day (Office of Rail Regulation
(ORR) estimates). Stepping distances have
been considered and there are minor
changes (in many cases improvements) as
a result of the platform alterations, which are
supported by the affected railway
undertakings. Rationale: Project Scope: In
order to achieve the objectives of the
project, as stated above, it is deemed to be
unreasonable for the project to incur such
alteration costs when the proposed
alternative works could be classed as a
platform modification. To correct the
existing non-compliances, the project would
incur significant additional costs. The
reduced recess of 270 mm, occurs on a part
of the platform within the section of platform
where the majority of trains stop. Overall,
Impact: The impact of the proposed
alternative solution is low, as it maintains or
betters the existing situation. The risk and
impact to the various stakeholders is
assessed in more details within the risk
assessment, Appendix D. The analysis has
taken into account the most frequently used
platform length. Most trains stop within this
length of platform; chainage 995 m to 1180
m. Operationally, the station has a total of
188,484 entries and exits per annum or 516
people per day (Office of Rail Regulation
(ORR) estimates). Stepping distances have
been considered and there are minor
changes (in many cases improvements) as
a result of the platform alterations, which are
supported by the affected railway
undertakings. Rationale: Project Scope: In
order to achieve the objectives of the
project, as stated above, it is deemed to be
unreasonable for the project to incur such
alteration costs when the proposed
alternative works could be classed as a
platform modification. To correct the
existing non-compliances, the project would
incur significant additional costs. The
reduced recess of 190 mm occurs on a part
of the platform within the section of platform
where the majority of trains stop. Overall,
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
20/01/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
11/09/2013
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
08/04/2014
N/A
INS
11/09/2013
Current
Network Rail
15/05/2014
N/A
INS
11/09/2013
Current
Network Rail
15/05/2014
N/A
INS
11/09/2013
Current
Page 56
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
13-137-DEV
Title
Moorthorpe Station (Down Line) Platform
Two - Platform Recess.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-136-DEV
Moorthorpe Station (UP Line) Platform One - 11.1.4
Platform Recess.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-133-DEV
Dinsdale Station (Down Line) Platform Two - 11.1.4
Platform Recess.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-129-DEV
Thornaby Station (Down Line) Platform Two - 11.1.4
Platform Recess.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
11.1.4
Scope
This scheme is the result of an initiative led
by the Department of Transport (DfT) to
bring about the specification, design,
construction and entry into service of routes
to accommodate larger intermodal traffic
freight trains. W12 2nd Generation and
W6a lower sector gauges are required to
enable the movement of 9'6" high containers
on standard height wagons without any
operating or speed restrictions. The
platform alterations are a direct result of a
gauge improvement portfolio across a
number of projects to clear for W12 2nd
Generation and W6a lower sector gauges.
This deviation applies to the Down platform
(No. 2) Moorthorpe Station only.
Specifically, it is a non-compliance to the
safe recess ("Z"). In principle, the works will
have negligible effect on the existing recess.
The deviation is required as Network Rail
does not plan to resolve the existing noncompliance. The proposed design
comprises both an element of civils works to
the existing coper positions, as well as track
work. The existing recess "Z" will be
affected by the proposed works, but this
effect is extremely limited. Overall, the
existing platform is 100% non-compliant
over its "usable" operational length; the
This scheme is the result of an initiative led
by the Department of Transport (DfT) to
bring about the specification, design,
construction and entry into service of routes
to accommodate larger intermodal traffic
freight trains. W12 2nd Generation and
W6a lower sector gauges are required to
enable the movement of 9'6" high containers
on standard height wagons without any
operating or speed restrictions. The
platform alterations are a direct result of a
gauge improvement portfolio across a
number of projects to clear for W12 2nd
Generation and W6a lower sector gauges.
This deviation applies to the Up Platform
(No. 1) Moorthorpe Station only.
Specifically, it is a non-compliance to the
safe recess ("Z"). In principle, the works will
have negligible effect on the existing recess.
The deviation is required as Network Rail
does not plan to resolve the existing noncompliance. The proposed design
comprises both an element of civils works,
to the existing coper positions, as well as
track work. The existing recess "Z" will be
affected by the proposed works, but this
effect is extremely limited. Overall, the
existing platform has a compliant recess of
13% over its "usable" operational length; the
Seven Sisters Station / Platform 2 temporary
hoarding only.
Nature and Degree
Within the scope of the project, it would not
be reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution at the station platform. It
is not deemed as a reasonable opportunity
to comply with the standard as the costs of
compliance would place unreasonable costs
on the project and industry. The cost of a
compliant solution (design and execution)
would be difficult to quantify; however, the
cost of simply building a compliant solution
would be circa œ1,500,000. This does not
take into account the possessions, waste,
compensation and additional service costs,
which could easily be estimated to be circa
œ2,500,000. The cost of Network Rail's
alternative non-compliant solution (design
and execution) is circa œ100,000.
This scheme is the result of an initiative led
by the Department of Transport (DfT) to
bring about the specification, design,
construction and entry into service of routes
to accommodate larger intermodal traffic
freight trains. W12 2nd Generation and
W6a lower sector gauges are required to
enable the movement of 9'6" high containers
on standard height wagons without any
operating or speed restrictions. The
platform alterations are a direct result of a
gauge improvement portfolio across a
number of projects to clear for W12 2nd
Generation and W6a lower sector gauges.
This deviation application applies to the
Down Platform (No. 2) at Thornaby Station
only, specifically non-compliance to the safe
recess ("Z"). In principle, the works will
have a negligible effect on the recess. The
deviation application is required as Network
Rail do not plan to resolve the existing noncompliance. The proposed design
comprises both an element of Civils works,
to the existing coper positions, as well as
track work. The existing recess dimensions
range from 255 mm to 339 mm and are
mostly around 300 mm. The proposed
recess dimensions range from 277 mm to
396 mm and are improved in most cases.
Within the scope of the project, it would not
be reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution at the station platform. It
is not deemed as a reasonable opportunity
to comply with the standard as the costs of
compliance would place unreasonable costs
on the project and industry. However, the
project will reduce the severity of the existing
non-compliances. The cost of a compliant
solution (design and execution) would be
difficult to quantify; however, the cost of
simply building a compliant solution would
be circa œ1,000,000. This does not take
into account the possessions, waste,
compensation and additional service costs,
which could easily be estimated to be circa
œ1,500,000. The cost of our alternative noncompliant solution (design and execution) is
circa œ120,000.
Within the scope of the project, it would not
be reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution at the station platform. It
is not deemed as a reasonable opportunity
to comply with the standard as the costs of
compliance would place unreasonable costs
on the project and industry. The cost of a
compliant solution (design and execution)
would be difficult to quantify, however the
cost of simply building a compliant solution
would be circa œ1,500,000. This does not
take into account the possessions, waste,
compensation and additional service costs,
which could easily be estimated to be circa
œ2,500,000. The cost of Network Rail's
alternative non-compliant solution (design
and execution) is circa œ100,000.
Within the scope of the project, it would not
be reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution at the station platform. It
is not deemed as a reasonable opportunity
to comply with the standard as the costs of
compliance would place unreasonable costs
on the project and industry. The cost of a
compliant solution (design and execution)
would be difficult to quantify, however the
cost of simply building a compliant solution
would be circa œ1,500,000. This does not
take into account the possessions, waste,
compensation and additional service costs,
which could easily be estimated to be circa
œ2,500,000. The cost of our alternative noncompliant solution (design and execution) is
circa œ150,000.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Impact: The impact of the proposed
alternative solution is low, as it maintains the
existing situation. The risk and impact to the
various stakeholders is assessed in more
detail within the risk assessment, Appendix
D. The analysis has taken into account the
most frequently used platform length. Most
trains stop within this length of platform;
chainage 1020 m to 1100 m. Over this
length, the recess overall is improved.
Operationally, the station has a total of
200,258 entries and exits per annum or 549
people per day (Office of Rail Regulation
estimates). Stepping distances have been
assessed for relevant rolling stock. The
stepping distances will remain in the
stepping triangle with a maximum
worsenment of 51 mm horizontal and 45 mm
vertical. Where most trains stop, there is a
betterment of 28 mm horizontal and, in most
cases, less than 10 mm effect on vertical.
Rationale: In order to achieve the objectives
of the project as stated above, it is deemed
to be unreasonable for the project to incur
such alteration costs when the proposed
alternative works could be classed as a
platform modification. To correct the
existing non-compliances, the project would
incur significant additional costs. See
Impact: The impact of the proposed
alternative solution is low, as it essentially
maintains the existing situation. The risk
and impact to the various stakeholders is
assessed in more details within the Risk
Assessment, Appendix D of the
supplementary information. The analysis
has taken into account the most frequently
used platform length. Most trains stop within
this length of platform; chainage 1020m to
1100m. Operationally, the station has a total
of 200,258 Entries and Exits per annum or
549 people per day (ORR Estimates).
Stepping distances have been assessed for
relevant rolling stock. The stepping
distances will remain in the stepping triangle
with a maximum worsenment of 41 mm
horizontal and 51 mm vertical. In some
locations, stepping distances will be
improved by up to 12 mm horizontal and 39
mm vertical. Rationale: In order to achieve
the objectives of the project, as stated
above, it is deemed to be unreasonable for
the project to incur such alteration costs
when the proposed alternative works could
be classed as a platform modification. To
correct the existing non-compliances the
project would incur significant additional
costs. The alternative solution is considered
Stepping distances: Stepping distance
analysis has been carried out for the
potentially affected trains. The worst case
stepping distance will be marginally
improved and the typical stepping distance
will be marginally worsened. The propose
platform edge position will be compliant in
terms of height and offset. Impact: The
impact of the proposed alternative solution is
low. The risk and impact to the various
stakeholders is assessed in more details
within the Risk Assessment, Appendix D.
The analysis has taken into to account the
most frequently used platform length. Most
trains stop within this length of platform;
chainage 1025 m to 1075 m. Operationally,
the station has a total of 28,378 entries and
exits per annum or 78 people per day (Office
of Rail Regulation (ORR) estimates).
Rationale: Project Scope: "This scheme is
the result of an initiative led by the
Department of Transport (DfT) to bring
about the specification, design, construction
and entry into service of routes to
accommodate larger intermodal traffic
freight trains. W12 2nd Generation and
W6a lower sector gauges are required to
enable the movement of 9'6" high containers
on standard height wagons without any
The impact of the proposed alternative
solution is low, as it maintains or improves
the existing situation. The risk and impact to
the various stakeholders is assessed in
more details within the Risk Assessment,
Appendix D. The analysis has taken into to
account the most frequently used platform
length. Most trains stop within this length of
platform; chainage 1030 m to 1105 m.
Operationally, the station has a total of
574,596 entries and exits per annum or 1575
people per day (Office of Rail Regulation
(ORR) estimates). Stepping distances have
been assessed for relevant rolling stock. In
achieving a standard platform offset (with
tolerances) for 2. 6 m wide containers,
stepping distances have increased. Class
14x units usually stop at the straight section
of platform where stepping distances are not
affected by curvature. In order to achieve
the objectives of the project, as stated
above, it is deemed to be unreasonable for
the project to incur such alteration costs
when the proposed alternative works could
be classed as a platform modification. To
correct the existing non-compliances, the
project would incur significant additional
costs. Overall, the "safe space" dimension
between the running edge and the vertical
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
12/03/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
11/09/2013
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
12/03/2014
N/A
INS
11/09/2013
Current
Network Rail
29/10/2013
N/A
INS
11/09/2013
Current
Network Rail
05/06/2014
N/A
INS
11/09/2013
Current
Page 57
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
13-126-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
Richmond Station platforms 4, 5, 6 &amp; 7. 11.1.3
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-124-DEV
Paddington Station realigned Platforms 12
and 14 - reduced platform width at column.
6.2.2
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-118-DEV
Proposed Low Moor New Station (New Up
&amp; Down Side Platforms) - platform
radius.
2.1.2
GMRT2100
Five
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
13-117-DEV
Rail vehicle interior construction - loading
requirements for glazed elements.
6.5.2.2
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
Nature and Degree
Richmond Station platforms 4, 5, 6 &amp; 7. Existing situation: The cross falls gradient
of the existing Richmond platforms within
the area of the proposed Rail Vehicle
Accessibility Regulations (RVAR) works
already contravene Railway Group
Standards (they are not within limits 1: 20 to
1: 80) and are as follows: · Platform 4 approximately 1: 85 to 1: 3000 · Platform 5 approximately 1: 45 to 1: 150 · Platform 6 approximately 1: 40 to 1: 1250 · Platform 7 approximately 1: 40 to 1: 210. Proposed
situation: To provide `step-free' access at
platform level under RAVR, it is proposed to
adjust the coper height and offset for
Platforms 4, 5, 6 &amp; 7 within the RVAR
area, and re-surface the platform area to
suit. As a result, the platforms cross fall
gradient change as follow: · Platform 4 approximately 1: 110 to 1: 700 (nosing
height adjustment range from -31mm to 2mm, horizontal adjustment range from
23mm to 63mm) · Platform 5 approximately 1: 40 to 1: 150 (nosing height
adjustment range from -10mm to 2mm,
horizontal adjustment range from 47mm to
72mm) · Platform 6 - approximately 1: 30 to
1: 110 (nosing height adjustment range from
20mm to 35mm, horizontal adjustment
range from 30mm to 72mm) · Platform 7 ELR: MLN1 Mileage: From 0m 0000y To
The clearance to the Train Shed Column is
0m 0440y Paddington Station realigned
currently non-compliant and is unchanged.
Platforms 12 and 14.
All the dimensions are to be verified at GRIP
Stage 5. The design of the platform
modifications has been based on diverting
passengers away from the 2 m restriction at
the Train Shed Column. The length of the
restriction is not more than 5 m in length.
Supported by signage, the intent is for
passengers to only walk through the 2 m
restriction when alighting from the front door
of a train, when they will be protected from
the platform edge by the stationary train. A
much wider pedestrian route is provided to
the opposite side of the column, significantly
improving the existing situation.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Note there is an existing deviation
Network Rail
(10/118/DGN) - for RVAR works the risks
and Mitigations are as follow: Platform
Gradient out of regulation at RVAR Hump too shallow. Consequences: Not all RVAR
door areas are covered by canopy. Rain /
water does not run away to drainage.
Ponding of water when wet. Potential
freezing. Slips and falls on water / ice Minor injuries. Fall towards / into PTI Gap Potential fatality (normally minor injury).
Mitigations: - Design for Kew Gardens
Platform 1 is within regulations. - Richmond
RVAR Hump design improves the Platform
Gradient closer to regulations than current.
Where not within regulation the gradient is
not expected to cause significant ponding. One third of Richmond platforms RVAR
areas are covered by a canopy. - Gradients
generally fall away from platform edge / PTI
gap. Where the gradient is towards, the
gradient is improved on existing and is not
considered significant. - NR approved nonslip surface, tactiles and nosing stones
used. Risk estimation: Better - Minor.
Platform Gradient out of regulation at RVAR
Hump - too steep. Consequences: Not all
RVAR door areas are covered by canopy.
Rain / water falls too fast into drainage
The clearances from the proposed edge of Network Rail
Platform 14 to the following existing
structures will be less than the 2500 mm
required by Railway Group Standard
GI/RT7016: · Train Shed Column - 2. 00 m
proposed (2. 00 m existing).
Certificate Issue Date
11/10/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
11/09/2013
Deviation Status
Current
04/12/2014
N/A
INS
13/11/2013
Current
The deviation applies to track curvature
through a proposed new station at Low Moor
situated on the railway between Halifax and
Bradford Interchange (ELR: MRB) at 37
miles 650 yards. The proposed new rail
station is located at OS GRID Ref. SE 164
283, immediately west of Cleckheaton Road
Bridge. Please see Appendix B. The site is
brownfield area and comprises of rough
ground lying between New Works Road to
the north and Ogden's Yard to the south.
There are two tracks (Up and Down Main).
The track alignment is shown in Appendix B
which shows (starting at the low mileage
end), the horizontal alignment following a
reverse curve into a left hand curve with an
existing radius of between 730 m and 800 m
where the proposed platforms are situated.
The curved track alignment is constrained
by a tunnel at each end. The topographical
survey shows the existing cant peaks at 100
mm at CH165 and averages 80 mm through
the area of the proposed platforms. The line
speed is currently 55 mph. The existing
track consists of flat bottom rail seated on
concrete sleepers. There is no overhead or
3rd rail electrification present and no signal
present within the vicinity of the proposed
station. The purpose of a new station at Low
Hitachi Class 800 / 801 vehicles, to be used
on Great Western and East Coast services.
It is not reasonably practical to comply with
the existing requirement in the current RGS
of not placing platforms on horizontal curves
with radii less than 1000 m. Compliant track
radii would require re alignment of both the
up and down lines. This is considered not
reasonably practical due to: · The upside
would encroach on the exclusion zone
around the High Pressure gas main. ·
Northern Gas Networks have indicated that
they would formally object to this proposal
(see Appendix C). · Relocating the high
pressure gas main would cost in the region
of œ450k; track re-alignment would be
costly (estimated to be in the region of
œ500k) and cause disruption to the busy
Caldervale line between Bradford, Halifax,
Manchester Victoria and York to Blackpool
services. The total cost of diverting the gas
main and increasing the track radius to 1000
m through the station would therefore be in
the region of œ950k which equates to an
increase of 17% of the capital cost of the
station.
The impacts of the proposal to maintain
West Yorkshire Passenger
track curvature would be: Safety of the
Transport Executive
railway system: minimal as conductor sight
lines for four-car DMUs only would be
affected. It should be noted that a mixture of
two, three and four-car DMUs will serve the
station. Technical compatibility of the
railway system: No effective impact stepping distances are compliant with the
requirements of clause 3. 3. 1 of GI/RT7016.
The new station will not prevent the planned
line speed increases (as part of the Northern
Hub works) or electrification in the future. In
the event that longer trains are required to
stop at the station in the future, selective
door opening could be deployed as a costeffective solution to eliminate the issue.
Costs and service performance: track and
platform curvature will have no effect on
service costs and performance. The
impacts will have no direct effect on Metro
as a Passenger Transport Executive. The
station, when built on the existing track
curvature, will impact on Network Rail's
infrastructure and has the support of the
Route Asset Manager Track. Please see
letter of support in Appendix A.
12/11/2013
N/A
INS
11/09/2013
Current
GM/RT2100 Section 6. 5. 2 is ambiguous
and open to interpretation, particularly the
use of the word "without failure" in the first
sentence of Section 6. 5. 2. 2. The sentence
states "Interior glazing shall withstand
without failure, the following ultimate load
cases". It is Hitachi's contention that
laminated glass may perfectly well withstand
the specified ultimate static loads with the
glass intact and in position although it may
be cracked or crazed. This would not be the
case if toughened glass were to become
cracked or crazed. In these circumstances,
a toughened glass panel would form small
glass "dices" and lose any ability to contain
load or provide "containment" of passengers
or their luggage in impact conditions.
Hitachi intend to interpret the word "failure"
in these circumstances such that laminated
glass may be allowed to crack or craze
whilst the ultimate loads are applied or
removed, providing that the glazed panel
provides integrity, "containment" and
remains securely retained by its fixings.
Hitachi believes that the proposed deviation Hitachi Rail Europe Ltd
and interpretation complies with the aims of
the Railway Group Standard and does not
affect the safety of the railway system now or
in the future.
27/11/2013
N/A
RST
01/11/2013
Current
Page 58
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8000-DC
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
DC Electrified lines
Certificate Number
13-116-DEV
Title
Controlled evacuations.
RGS Clause
6.4b)
Scope
Nature and Degree
The deviation will apply to all lines electrified The current rules require that, before a
using DC third or fourth rail systems.
controlled evacuation of a train takes place,
a temporary isolation must be taken on any
line where passengers may walk. A
temporary isolation is managed in
accordance with Network Rail company
instructions, but it does require that one or
more short-circuiting devices are placed at
the site to prevent accidental reenergisation. It is not always possible to be
compliant with the current requirement as
temporary isolations cannot be taken on all
areas of the DC railway. This is because a
short-circuiting device cannot be placed:
where the traction return rail is next to the
conductor rail, where there is a guard board
between the conductor rail and the adjacent
running rail, or a yellow plastic shroud is
fitted to the underside of the conductor rail.
Furthermore, if multiple lines have to be
crossed by passengers, each line must be
provided with a short-circuiting bar. This
might mean a considerable delay whilst
sufficient bars are conveyed to site, which
would in turn encourage self-evacuation of
passengers and result in an emergency
switch-off anyway.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The proposed benefit allows for a choice of Network Rail
response to be taken dependant on the
scenario, the location and the availability of
staff. It also allows for quicker decision
making, which should reduce the overall
time taken to evacuate passengers and thus
reduce the probability of other passengers
on other trains detraining without
authorisation. Network Rail recognises that
the use of an emergency switch-off can
create performance issues, although under
these circumstances it can be possible to
move trains from the affected and abutting
sections before implementing the
emergency switch-off, and thus reducing the
overall impact of the situation.
Certificate Issue Date
16/10/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
TOM
Lead SC Approval Date
17/09/2013
Deviation Status
Current
GMRT2132
One
On-board Energy Metering for Billing
Purposes
13-114-DEV
Deviation against clause 2.2.1 of
GM/RT2132 to allow DC metering only on
class 375/6 stock where AC equipment is
maintained and operational but not in use.
2.2.1
Deviation for class 375/6 dual voltage units
to be metered on DC collection points only.
N/A
Southeastern
01/11/2013
N/A
RST
04/10/2013
Current
GMRT2466
Three
Railway Wheelsets
13-113-DEV
Railway Wheelsets
3.5.2
N/A
Freightliner Ltd
15/08/2013
N/A
RST
02/08/2013
Current
GMRT2400
Four
Engineering design of on-track machines
13-108-DEV
Derogation to GM/RT2400 Issue 4 Clause
3.5.4 Parking Brake.
Clause 3.5.4, sub-clauses 3.5.4.1 a) and
3.5.4.1 b)
The functionality of the parking brake
Windhoff Bahn- und
remains the same and the impact of
Anlagentechnik GmbH
retaining the existing arrangement is
considered minor as the vehicles are
compliant if carrying freight containers to the
same GLW. The vehicles will be used in
train formation in the same way as a freight
wagon, this risk is therefore unchanged.
The following measures will be in place: ·
An operating instruction to state that the KFA
wagons are not to be uncoupled from an
MPV on gradients greater than 1 in 40. · A
label to that effect is to be fitted to each
wagon adjacent to the couplings.
02/12/2013
N/A
PLT
17/10/2013
Current
GERT8082
One
GSM-R Cab Mobile, Great Britain Open
Interface Requirements (Rapid Response)
13-107-DEV
Call quality requirements for GSM-R Radio 3.9.1, 3.9.2, 3.9.3, 3.9.4, 3.9.5 and 3.9.7
installations using single handset Cab Audio
Control Units on Southeastern Cl375, 376,
465 and 466 fleets.
There are no negative impacts of the
Southeastern
alternative actions. This is because
maintaining the use of a single handset
reduces the level of change effected by the
introduction of the GSM-R radio to the
Classes 375, 376, 465 and 466 cab designs
thereby maintaining current driver practice
of controlling voice communications through
a single handset.
04/09/2013
N/A
CCS
15/08/2013
Current
GERT8000-HB7
Three
General duties of a controller of site safety
(COSS)
13-101-DEV Revised
30-09-2014
The On-Track Machine (OTM)-PZ project
intends to carry out tranche 2 of trials.
To allow Tranche 2 of trials of Phase 1a of
Network Rail
the OTM protection zone procedure to
proceed a deviation is required against
Clause 4. 4. The deviation is to add the
OTM protection zone procedure as a reason
to consider the line to be blocked and for it
to be used to set up a safe system of work.
This application will support the continued
trialling of Phase 1a of the OTM protection
zone procedure. Network Rail would now
like to trial Tranche 2 of the new form of
protection of the line that allows the
operation of a single on-track machine
working on a line not under possession; the
method of operation can be found in the
Trial Operations Manual (OTMPZ/Phase
1a/TOM/050613) document.
30/09/2014
30/06/2016
TOM
N/A
Current
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
4.4
Metering the AC component of the vehicles
mentioned in part 7 would be of no benefit
as Southeastern do not use (or intend to
use) the AC equipment for energy collection
for the class 375/6 fleet.
All wheelsets used on Network Rail
The standard mandates that electrical
managed infrastructure that are of a
testing is performed on all wheelsets in
monobloc all steel construction with an
accordance with applicable standards.
interference fit between wheel and axle.
Introduction of this additional requirement
would entail the development of test
equipment and the revision of existing
maintenance instructions. The likely costs
involved are deemed to be disproportionate
to the benefits expected.
This application is for eight existing KFA
These vehicles were designed as container
wagons modified by Windhoff Bahn- und
carrying freight vehicles and are compliant
Anlagentechnik GmbH and re-classified as with the applicable RGS. The vehicles are
OTMs to form part of the Network Rail High now to be used in the HOPS OLE
Output OLE Construction System (HOPS).
construction train to carry various loads,
The application is to permit non-compliance including plant and machinery modules
with the RGS clause identified in 6b) above mounted on the vehicle twist locks.
for the following vehicles: · 99709131002-6 GM/RT2000 Issue 3 clause 6. 4 specifies
· 99709131004-2 · 99709131008-3 ·
that such a combination shall be classified
99709131012-5 · 99709131016-6 ·
as an on-track machine, hence GM/RT2400
99709131017-4 · 99709131019-0 ·
applies. The vehicles were designed to
99709131009-1.
comply with freight vehicle RGS, I. e. a 1 in
40 gradient requirement and no minimum
hand wheel diameter. The vehicles will hold
on a worst case 1 in 37 gradient (I. e. within
the limit prescribed for a freight vehicle) and
have a parking brake hand wheel of
diameter 270 mm. To achieve the
requirements specified by GM/RT2400 to
hold on a gradient of 1 in 30 would require
considerable re-design of the vehicle, and
there is not sufficient space to fit a hand
wheel of diameter 400 mm.
A standard GSM-R installation utilises a
As with derogations 09/285/DGN,
dedicated GSM-R handset for radio
10/048/DGN and 12/102/DGN, there is no
communication function. However, vehicles known route whereby compliance to the
currently fitted with a single handset will
clauses in Section 6 can be achieved. The
have their Cab Audio Communication Unit
Southeastern Classes 375 and 376 fleets
(CACU, sometimes known as Drivers
have had a single handset arrangement
Interface Unit - DIU) modified to allow the
since they were introduced into service. The
existing single handset to work in
existing handset occupies the optimum
conjunction with the GSM-R radio, thus
position in terms of driver ergonomics.
maintaining the existing arrangement
Fitment of a dedicated GSM-R handset
whereby all cab audio functions are
would require the GSM-R handset to be
managed through a single handset. This
placed in another location, away from the
deviation application applies to the use of
optimum location. The Southeastern
the existing handset (Whiteley/BTROS
Classes 465 and 466 underwent a
TD500 or DAC handset) in place of a
modification programme to replace separate
dedicated GSM-R handset on the Classes
radio and PA handsets with a single handset
375 and 376 Electrostar fleets and the
arrangement. This new arrangement only
Classes 465 and 466 Networker fleets,
allows for one handset to be fitted in the
noting that the existing handset and CACU
optimum cab location. This means the
arrangement will not pass the test
fitment of a dedicated GSM-R handset
requirements in the clauses identified in
would require drivers to change the way the
Section 6 of this application (Details of
operate the GSM-R radio in comparison to
Railway Group Standard). It should be
current practice.
noted that the scope of this deviation is
similar to that for derogations 09/285/DGN,
10/048/DGN and 12/102/DGN which also
relate to the use of a single handset and
CACU arrangement which cannot pass the
test criteria as set out in section 6 above.
The Phase 1a trials will be limited to single This handbook clause details that the COSS
and double track lines in track circuit block
may use a blocked line as part of the safe
areas that do not have axle counters, level
system of work; it then lays down guidelines
crossings or ground frames in non-DC
on when a line may be considered to be
electrified areas. Trial Areas/Routes will
blocked. The project continues to require
include: Anglia Route Delivery Units: ·
the addition of the OTM protection zone as
Tottenham · Romford · Ipswich. Western
reason why a line should be considered to
Route Delivery Units: · Bristol · Swindon ·
be blocked to allow Tranche 2 of Phase 1a
Plymouth · Reading. Wessex Route
trials to take place to evaluate the procedure
Delivery Unit: · Eastleigh. Scotland Route further.
Delivery Units: · Motherwell · Glasgow ·
Perth · Edinburgh. Wales Route Delivery
Units: · Shrewsbury · Cardiff. LNE Route
Delivery Units: · Hitchin · York · Leeds ·
Sheffield. LNW Route (WM & C) Delivery
Units: · Saltley · Sandwell &amp; Dudley.
Page 59
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8000-TW5
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Preparation and Movement of Trains:
Defective or Isolated Vehicles and On-Train
Equipment
Certificate Number
13-099-DEV Revised
30-06-2014
Title
The OTM-PZ project intends to carry out
tranche 2 of trials.
RGS Clause
4.3, 4.4 and 21.3
Scope
The Phase 1a trials will be limited to single
and double track lines in track circuit block
areas that do not have axle counters, level
crossings or ground frames in non-DC
electrified areas. Trial areas/routes will
include: Anglia Route Delivery Units: ·
Tottenham · Romford · Ipswich. Western
Route Delivery Units: · Bristol · Swindon ·
Plymouth · Reading. Wessex Route
Delivery Unit: · Eastleigh. Scotland Route
Delivery Units: · Motherwell · Glasgow ·
Perth · Edinburgh. Wales Route Delivery
Units: · Shrewsbury · Cardiff. LNE Route
Delivery Units: · Hitchin · York · Leeds ·
Sheffield. LNW Route (WM & C) Delivery
Units: · Saltley · Sandwell &amp; Dudley.
GERT8000-TW7
Four
Wrong-direction movements
13-098-DEV Revised
30-09-2014
The On-Track Machine (OTM)-PZ project
intends to carry out Tranche 2 of trials.
1.1 and 1.2
The Phase 1a trials will be limited to single
and double track lines in track circuit block
areas that do not have axle counters, level
crossings or ground frames in non-DC
electrified areas. Trial Areas/Routes will
include: Anglia Route Delivery Units: ·
Tottenham · Romford · Ipswich. Western
Route Delivery Units: · Bristol · Swindon ·
Plymouth · Reading. Wessex Route
Delivery Unit: · Eastleigh. Scotland Route
Delivery Units: · Motherwell · Glasgow ·
Perth · Edinburgh. Wales Route Delivery
Units: · Shrewsbury · Cardiff. LNE Route
Delivery Units: · Hitchin · York · Leeds ·
Sheffield. LNW Route (WM & C) Delivery
Units: · Saltley · Sandwell &amp; Dudley.
GERT8000-OTM
Five
Working of on-track machines (OTM)
13-097-DEV Revised
30-09-2014
The OTM-PZ project intends to carry out
tranche 2 of trials.
4.1 and 4.2
The Phase 1a trials will be limited to single
&amp; double track lines in track circuit
block areas that do not have axle counters,
level crossings or ground frames in non-DC
electrified areas. Trial areas/routes will
include: Anglia Route Delivery Units: ·
Tottenham · Romford · Ipswich. Western
Route Delivery Units: · Bristol · Swindon ·
Plymouth · Reading. Wessex Route
Delivery Unit: · Eastleigh. Scotland Route
Delivery Units: · Motherwell · Glasgow ·
Perth · Edinburgh. Wales Route Delivery
Units: · Shrewsbury · Cardiff. LNE Route
Delivery Units: · Hitchin · York · Leeds ·
Sheffield. LNW Route (WM & C) Delivery
Units: · Saltley · Sandwell &amp; Dudley.
GMRT2483
One
Visibility Requirements for Trains
13-093-DEV Revised
25-11-2013
Use of TSI/EN Compliant Head, Marker and C2.1, C2.3.1, Appendix 3 Tables 2, 3, 5, 7
Tail Lights on GB non-TENs Routes.
and 10, Appendix 4 Table 11.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
These clauses relate to train borne
defective/isolated Automatic Warning
System and Track Circuit Actuators. These
clauses instruct the driver that the signaller
must be informed immediately of
defective/isolated equipment and that further
movement must not be made until
authorised. The clauses go on to document
what action must be taken before the train
can proceed. The project requests that the
OTM driver does not need to comply with
these clauses as part of the OTM protection
zone trials.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
To allow the continued trialling of Phase 1a Network Rail
of the OTM protection zone procedure a
deviation against clauses B5. 2, B5. 3 and
B32. 3. The OTM-PZ project continues to
require the addition of the OTM protection
zone as reason why a line should be
considered to be blocked to allow Tranche 2
of Phase 1a trials to take place to evaluate
the procedure further. When tampers are in
"work mode", their on-board equipment is
powered by a 24 volt system. To minimise
the draw on this power supply, certain
tampers are designed so that certain on
board equipment is effectively isolated. This
means that when these tampers are in work
mode, the on-board AWS and TCA cannot
be relied upon to work. The mitigation
measure built into the OTM protection zone
procedure is the use of a supplementary
protection method that disables the
signalling equipment and stops the signaller
from routing another train into the protected
area if the OTM was to disappear from the
track circuits whilst in work mode. This
application will support the continued
trialling of Phase 1a of the OTM protection
zone procedure. Network Rail would now
like to trial Tranche 2 of the new form of
protection of the line that allows the
This clause documents the ten occasions
To allow the continued trialling of Phase 1a Network Rail
when a signaller may authorise the driver to of the OTM protection zone procedure, a
make wrong direction movement for which a temporary deviation against clause 1. 1 is
signal is not provided. To allow Tranche 2
requested to allow wrong direction
of trials of Phase 1a of the OTM protection
movements where no signal is provided as
zone to proceed, there is a requirement to
required. A further deviation is required
add the trials of this procedure to the list of
against clause 1. 2 to add the TQS to the list
reasons when a wrong direction movement of people who can authorise the OTM driver
can be made without the authority of a
to make a wrong direction movement. This
signal. Additionally, there is a need to add
application will support the continued
the Track Quality Supervisor (TQS) to the
trialling of Phase 1a of the OTM protection
list of people who can authorise the OTM
zone procedure. Network Rail would now
driver to make a wrong direction movement. like to trial Tranche 2 of the new form of
protection of the line; that allows the
operation of a single on-track machine
working on a line not under possession; the
method of operation can be found in the
Trial Operations Manual (OTMPZ/Phase
1a/TOM/050613) document.
Clause 4. 1 stipulates that the work will not
require wrong direction movements (except
as described for the rail grinding train), the
on-track machine (OTM) that will be trialled
as part of the OTM protection zone
procedure (Tampers &amp; Stoneblowers)
need to make at least 2-3 wrong direction
movements as part of their normal method
of operation. The clause also stipulates that
a machine may so work if signalled as an
Engineering train requiring to stop in
section, but not on a TCB lines or where
intermediate block signals are provided.
Clause 4. 2 stipulates that the driver must
tell the signaller that the OTM will be
working outside of a possession as part of
the trials of the OTM protection zone
procedure there is not requirement for the
driver to do this as the signaller will be made
aware by the published WON notice and the
TQS. So a deviation is sought to allow
Tranche 2 of Phase 1a trials of the OTM
protection zone procedure on track circuit
block lines and to allow the OTM to make
wrong direction movements as required.
The deviation will be used to carry out trials
in selected routes on Network Rail
infrastructure. Tranche 2 of the trials will be
managed by the Maintenance Services,
Use of Interoperable constituent head,
GM/RT2483 is not compatible with the
marker and taillights compliant with the
requirements of the CR Loc and Pas TSI,
Conventional Rail Locomotive and
which contains clauses from EN 15153-1:
Passenger Technical Specification for
2013. Head, marker and taillights designed
Interoperability (CR Loc &amp; Pas TSI) and to meet the requirements of the TSI (for
EN15153-1: 2013 on all applicable vehicles, running on GB TENs Routes) and EN 15153when replacing headlamps fitted to both
1 2013, certified as Interoperable
vehicle ends.
Constituents, do not comply with the
requirements of GM/RT2483. The previous
head lamp designs which comply with
GM/RT2483 are Tungsten Halogen Bulb and
High Intensity Discharge (HID) technology.
Continued compliance to GM/RT2483 for
head lamps would preclude the use of LED
head lamps which are being specified for
vehicles running on GB TENs Routes.
Continued compliance to GM/RT2483 would
preclude the use of standard components
already available from a number of
European Union (EU) manufacturers. Cost,
reliability improvements and power savings
from the use of LED headlamps would not
be realised (supplied by BMAC): · Tungsten
Halogen Bulb: 1000 hours life, 55w or 70w
power consumption dependant on fitment ·
HID: 6000 hours, 42w power consumption ·
LED Headlamp: 47393 hours life, 20w
power consumption. Costs for a light unit
containing a head, marker and tail lamp with
Certificate Issue Date
30/09/2014
Certificate End Date
30/06/2016
Lead SC
TOM
Lead SC Approval Date
N/A
Deviation Status
Current
30/09/2014
30/06/2016
TOM
N/A
Current
Trial sites will be assessed by the local
Network Rail
Delivery Unit (DU) team using the OTM-PZ
project team's Site Scoping Form that will
allow an informed decision by the local DU
and project teams about the suitability of the
site for a trial. All staff involved in each trial
will be briefed on the procedure to make
sure that they fully understand the procedure
and their role in it. Feedback will be
gathered after each trial and, if
improvements to the procedure are
highlighted, the project will make the
necessary amendments before returning to
TOM SC and seeking the final rule book
change.
30/09/2014
30/06/2016
TOM
N/A
Current
Head, marker and tail lamps complying with First Greater Western Ltd
the requirements CR Loc &amp; Pas TSI are
required to be installed on new rolling stock
for operation on GB TENs routes, I. e. the
majority of higher speed lines including
West Coast Main Line (WCML), East Coast
Main Line (ECML), Midland Mainline (MML),
Great Western Main Line (GWML), etc. The
requirements of the CR Loc &amp; Pas TSI,
EN 15153-1 2013 differ from GM/RT2483 in
the following respects: · C2. 1 and C2. 3. 1
(c) and (d): The TSI EN lighting
arrangement of two lower head lights with
full/dimmed headlight differs from the day
time and night time headlight arrangement
specified in GM/RT2483. · Tables 2 and 5:
The GM/RT2483 maximum day and night
time headlight luminosities in the vertical
plane above 2 degrees up are not specified
in the CR Loc &amp; Pas TSI or EN 15153-1
2013, and therefore are not required
parameters for the TSI/EN headlights. ·
Tables 3 and 7: The minimum full and
dimmed headlight luminous intensities are
only specified by EN 15153-1 2013 over
beam spread in the horizontal plane, not
above and below horizontal as required by
GM/RT2483. The GM/RT2483 headlight
colour is specified as White Class B,
14/08/2013
N/A
RST
02/08/2013
Current
Page 60
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
13-092-DEV
Title
Apsley Station Platforms 2 and 3 - Suicide
Reduction Fencing and Reduced Platform
Width.
GERT8030
Four
Requirements for Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS)
13-091-DEV
GE/RT8030 Appendix F Clause F.2.1 TPWS F2.1.1, F2.1.3 (part), F2.1.4, F 2.10.7.
DMI appearance and labelling.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-089-DEV
Langley station, platforms 2 and 3 - distance 6.2.2
of fencing from platform edge
168. 4 m of 1. 4 m high fencing grey
galvanised fencing to restrict access to the
main line side of the island platform
(platforms 2 and 3) at Langley; of this 168. 4
m, 11 m would be out of compliance and is
what the derogation relates to. There will be
four sliding gates within the fence to allow
access and egress where necessary
between the main lines and relief lines.
These gates can be left open in the rare
occasions where services need to call on the
main line platforms at the station and or
when the station is unmanned, such as
overnight.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-087-DEV
Goring &amp; Streatley platforms 2 and 3 distance of fencing from platform edge.
140 m of 1. 4 m high grey galvanised
fencing to restrict access to the main line
side of the island platform (platforms 2 and
3) at Goring &amp; Streatley. There will be
four sliding gates within the fence to allow
access and egress where necessary
between the main lines and relief lines.
These gates can be left open in the rare
occasions where services need to call on the
main line platforms at the station and or
when the station is unmanned.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
6.4.2, 7.2.1, 7.3.1
6.2.2
Scope
London Midland is implementing a joint
industry suicide prevention initiative at eight
of its stations on the West Coast Main Line
(WCML) to "fence-off" the fast line platforms
at the stations it operates on the West Coast
South route. The deviation sought relates to
platforms 2 and 3 at Apsley Station.
Platform 2/3 at Apsley is a double-face
platform. Platform 2 is on the Up Fast Line,
has an eight-car capacity, and the line speed
is 125 mph. Platform 3 is in the Down Slow
Line, has a twelve-car capacity, and the line
speed is 100 mph. A report was
commissioned to identify and make
recommendations regarding any safety
issues that might arise out of the proposals.
It was identified that, due to the existing
platform dimensions at Apsley Station, the
erection of a fence on the island platform
(Platforms 2 and 3) effectively divides the
platform into two single-faced platforms and
converts an existing non-compliance with
Clause 7. 3. 1 of GI/RT7016 into a new noncompliance with Clause 6. 4. 1 for the final
13. 5 metres platform length at the southern
end. A workshop was held on 30/04/2013 to
consider the report referred to above and,
having considered the options set out in the
report, the proposed non-compliance with
This application is for the MPV vehicles
supplied by Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH which form part of
the Network Rail High Output OLE
Construction System (HOPS) and is to
permit non-compliance with the RGS
standard clauses as identified in 6b above,
for the following vehicles: MPV Type 1
(SOPB): · 99 70 9131 010-9 · 99 70 9131
013-3 · 99 70 9131 021-6 · 99 70 9131 022-4
· 99 70 9131 023-2. MPV Type 2 (HOPB): ·
99 70 9131 001-8 · 99 70 9131 005-9 · 99 70
9131 006-7 · 99 70 9131 011-7. MPV Type
5 (SORB): · 99 70 9131 014-1.
Nature and Degree
Providing the minimum distance to the
platform edge of 3. 0 m required by
GI/RT7016 Clause 6. 4. 2 on the affected
section of platform 2 would involve
substantial re-engineering of both the track
layout and platform structures, not just of
Platforms 2/3 but also Platforms 1 and 4.
The costs of such re-engineering would be
grossly disproportionate to the benefits of
the proposed suicide reduction measures.
London Midland's proposed alternative
provisions substantially mitigate the risks
presented by the proposals, enabling the
realisation of the benefits of proposed
suicide reduction measures and therefore an
improvement in the overall level of safety.
Derogation 12/162/DGN was authorised in
November 2012 to permit a TPWS
installation in accordance with GE/RT8030
Issue 2 to be installed on these vehicles
instead of a system compliant with Issue 4 of
the Standard. This derogation was sought
due to the risk that validated TPWS
equipment compliant with Issue 4 of the
Standard would not be available within the
project delivery timescales current at that
time. This application was subsequently
supported by derogation 13/010/DGN
authorised in March 2013 to permit noncompliance with Clause 2. 6. 8. 2 of
GE/RT8035 Issue 2 which requires the
capability to isolate train borne AWS
equipment independent of the isolation of
TPWS equipment. Inclusion of this
requirement was not possible since the new
generation TPWS equipment was not
available. In seeking these derogations,
Windhoff committed to design the vehicles
to accept equipment supplied to them at that
time for which approval was being sought by
Unipart, and which was believed to be
compliant with GE/RT8030. The Project
also committed to retrofit equipment
compliant with GE/RT8030 issue 4 as and
when approved equipment became
The non-compliance lies solely on the main
line side of the platform (Platform 2) where
the clearance would be between 2300 mm
and 3000 mm for the first 11 m of the fence
line. As the staircase on the island platform
is already out of compliance with the
standard, the new fence will create an area
of 18 m in length, which will be between
2100 mm and 3000 mm from the platform
edge. The main line side of the island
platform is little used (normally used only
during diversions as a result of engineering
work on the Relief Lines) and the fence will
restrict public access to this side of the
platform when the main lines are not being
used by stopping services. Access to the
area where clearance is less than standard
will therefore be minimal. Sixty six fatalities
have occurred at the nineteen stations
between Paddington and Didcot Parkway
since 2006. The majority of these fatalities
involved a member of the public accessing
the main lines via the island platform. The
introduction of these fences has proved a
successful anti-fatality mitigation at locations
where they have been introduced across the
rail network to date and is endorsed and
supported by the National Fatality
Prevention Steering Group.
Twenty metres of fencing on Platform 3 will
be closer to the platform edge than the
standard dictates by virtue of being between
2300 mm and 2500 mm from the platform
edge where the adjacent line speed is 100
mph. For 18 m of the total 20 m, the fence is
also between 2400 mm and 3000 mm from
the main line Platform 2 where the line
speed is 125 mph. The main line platforms
are little used (normally used only during
diversions as a result of engineering work on
the Relief Lines) and the fence will restrict
public access to this side of the platform
when the main lines are not being used by
stopping services. Access to the area of
Platform 2 where clearance is less than
standard will therefore be minimal. On both
sides of the platform, there is sufficient
space for two and three car turbo units to
stop in the station without any of the doors
being in the 'derogation area', so passenger
access and egress into and out of this area
should be limited. For Class 180 and six-car
turbos, which also call at the station, only
one set of doors would open into the area.
The area of reduced width is at the far end
of the platform away from the station
footbridge and has no canopy, so is not an
area where people tend to dwell. Sixty-six
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
London Midland's proposals at Apsley
enable the implementation of a worthwhile
mitigation measure that will discourage
suicides. Although this location is not a "hotspot" for such events, the density of traffic on
the WCML is such that the impact in terms
of significant delays and disruptions is
proportionately greater than most other
routes on the GB Mainline Railway.
Suicides have an emotional impact not just
on the families affected, but also seriously
affect front line railway staff involved in them,
as well as those called to deal with the
immediate aftermath. London Midland's
proposals, for which this deviation is being
sought, allow the retention of the existing
operational capacity of the station at Apsley,
and also suitably mitigating the impact of the
proposed suicide reduction fencing in the
event that an emergency evacuation is
required of trains longer than the operational
capacity of platform 2 (eight-cars). The
erection of suicide reduction fencing at
Apsley provides an incidental but significant
safety benefit in discouraging access to the
fast line platforms during "normal" operation,
in an area of the platforms where the
combined platform width presents an
existing non-compliance. London Midland is
Retention of the earlier version DMI panels
will remove the need to substantially change
the driver's desk layout, construction and
associated components. The current layout
has also been agreed with the vehicle owner
(Network Rail) and Operator (Amey) and will
negate the requirement for further
consultation on any potential changes. The
differences between the DMI panel currently
fitted and the later supplied approved panel
are; The AWS isolation light is included in
the current panel; this is not compliant with
clauses F2. 1. 1, F2. 1. 3 and F2. 1. 4 of
GE/RT8030 Issue 4. The labelling of the
panel is smaller than specified by clause F
2. 10. 7 of GE/RT8030 Issue 4. The
inclusion of the AWS isolation light in the
DMI panel has been the subject of a
previous derogation application
12/203/DGN, and the labelling of the DMI
panel of derogation application 12/204/DGN.
In both cases, the derogations were
submitted but subsequently withdrawn by
Unipart. The Train Operator has also been
consulted in the use of this panel and does
not foresee any problems. Vehicle drivers
will be fully briefed, instructed and trained on
the individual controls and indicators
installed in the current DMI. The use of the
A fence is planned to be added along the
island platform at Langley which serves the
down relief and up main lines. The purpose
of the fence is to achieve a greater degree of
physical separation between the lightly used
main line platform face (Platform 2) and the
highly used relief line platform (Platform 3)
because Langley is a suicide `hot spot'.
Langley station has witnessed three fatalities
in the past four years. The majority of the 66
fatalities at the 19 stations in the four track
section between Paddington and Didcot
Parkway which have occurred since 2006
involved a member of the public stepping
from the island platform into the passage of
a train on the adjacent main lines. Providing
the fence will make it less easy for the public
to access the main line side of the fence
(which is generally not used) and, more
importantly, make it visibly clearer should
someone access that side, so that
preventative action can be taken. Details of
the proposed fence are as follows: · 157. 4
m of the fence line would be within
compliance · 11 m of would be new fence
would be out of compliance. The fence
would contain four sliding gates to allow
access and egress between the main and
relief sides of the island platform where
A fence is planned to be added along the
island platform at Goring &amp; Streatley
which serves the Down Relief and Up Main
Lines. The purpose of the fence is to
achieve a greater degree of physical
separation between the lightly used main
line platform face and the highly used relief
line platform face. There have been 66
fatalities at the 19 stations in the four-track
section between Paddington and Didcot
Parkway since 2006, the majority of which
involved a member of the public stepping
from the island platform into the passage of
a train on the adjacent main lines. Providing
the fence will make it less easy for the public
to access the main line side of the fence
(which is generally not used) and, more
importantly, make it visibly clearer should
someone access that side so that
preventative action can be taken. The
Country-End half of the station platform is
currently divided in a similar fashion by a 1
m high metal barrier, which is currently out
of compliance by the same amount as the
new fence will need to be, as it is being
replaced in the area of reduced width at the
country end of platform. Details of the
proposed new fence are as follows: · The
total platform length is 154 m and the mid-
Applicant Organisation
London and Birmingham
Railway Company
Certificate Issue Date
27/08/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
10/07/2013
Deviation Status
Current
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
07/08/2013
N/A
CCS
11/07/2013
Current
Network Rail
12/08/2013
N/A
INS
10/07/2013
Current
Network Rail
12/08/2013
N/A
INS
10/07/2013
Current
Page 61
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
13-086-DEV
Title
Streatham Hill Station, Platform 2 extension
(Down Slow line at Country end) - platform
width.
RGS Clause
7.2.1 and 7.4.1
Scope
Streatham Hill Station: Station platform Platform 2 (Down Slow line at Country end).
Platform 2 is to be extended at the Country
end. The proposed platform extension
works will maintain the existing track
alignment. Due to the presence of an
existing retaining wall that supports a cutting
slope, it will not be possible to comply with
the minimum width requirements of Clause
7. 2. 1b of 2. 5 m and derogation from the
Railway Group Standard will be required.
GMRT2161
One
Requirements for Driving Cabs of Railway
Vehicles
13-085-DEV
Deviation for windscreen wiper swept area
on Class 70 locomotive.
6.1.1 and; 6.2.6
All Class 70 locomotives.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-084-DEV
Didcot Station, Platform 5 - Driver Only
Operation (DOO) Mirror headroom.
8.1 b)
Project Ref. 118833 - DOO Mirrors
Scheme to renew the existing DOO Mirrors
at 34 Stations in the Thames Valley Area.
This issue is at Didcot Station, Platform 5.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-083-DEV
Hungerford Station, Platform 1 - Driver Only 8.1 b)
Operation (DOO) Mirror headroom.
Project Ref. 118833 - DOO Mirrors
Scheme to renew the existing 59 DOO
mirrors at 34 stations in the Thames Valley
Area. This issue is at Hungerford Station,
Platform 1.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-082-DEV
Midgham Station, Platform 2 - Driver Only
Operation (DOO) Mirror headroom.
8.1
Project Ref. 118833 - DOO Mirrors
Scheme to renew the existing DOO Mirrors
at 34 Stations in the Thames Valley Area.
This issue is at Midgam Station, Platform 2.
No action has been taken, as the existing
mirror has been in situ for at least ten years
at a height of 2. 15 m with no known
problems and the new mirror is an
improvement to the situation.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-081-DEV
Shiplake Station Platform 1 - Driver
Operation Only (DOO) mirrors headroom.
8.1 b)
Project Ref. 118833 - DOO Mirrors Scheme Shiplake Station Platform 1 (single line
No action has been taken as the existing
to renew the existing DOO Mirrors at 34
railway between Twyford and Henley) - (2 x mirror has been in situ for at least 10 years
Stations in the Thames Valley Area.
mirrors). The existing mirrors on Platform 1 with no known problems.
at CS 2/3 and CS 3/4/5 in the Twyford
direction were identified during the survey
that the height from the underside of the
mirror housing to platform level was less
than 2500 mm, which is below the minimum
requirement as stated in GI/RT7016 Section
8. 1. It has been confirmed that new mirrors
cannot be raised to achieve the minimum
height clearance whilst maintaining a
compliant image due to obstruction by the
canopy. · CS2/3: The new mirror height is
2. 4 compared to the original mirror height of
2. 2 m; the mirror is 1650 mm from the
platform edge, thus erecting a barrier to the
edge of the mirror would force the
passengers close to the platform edge.
There are also two additional car stops on
the platform CS 4/5/6, plus CS 7 which is
used during the Henley Regatta week;
erecting a barrier would affect access to the
train doors. · CS4/5/6: The new mirror
height is 2. 2 m compared to the original
mirror height of 1. 9 m; the mirror is 780 mm
from the platform edge. There is also a CS
7 which is used during the Henley Regatta
week, erecting a barrier would affect access
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The proposed extension of 24 m will be 2. 5
m wide, except for a section of 4 m where it
will be 2425 mm due to the wall alignment.
The platform extension is on the country end
of the Down Platform 2 and is 24 m long
affecting the front coach. The exit to/from
the platform is via a footbridge where the
stairs face London and passengers
movement from trains is generally from the
middle coaches of the train.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The Sussex Route Suburban Train
Network Rail
Lengthening project seeks to increase
passenger capacity over selected routes by
increasing train lengths from eight to ten
cars. This requires platform extensions on
the Slow Lines at a number of stations
including Streatham Hill. Streatham Hill
station comprises two platforms as follows:
· Platform 1 - Up Slow; · Platform 2 - Down
Slow. The main station entrance is located
on a footbridge structure that abuts a road
over bridge at approximately the country end
of the station with inter platform access via a
footbridge staircase starting towards the
middle of the platform.
GE Transportation has recently been
The design modification proposed by GE
GE Transportation
working to increase the reliability of the
Transportation will lead to an increase in the
windscreen wipers on the Class 70
reliability of the windscreen wipers while
locomotives. Part of the existing problem is providing the best swept areas of the
that tolerance build ups can lead to the
wipers, without undertaking major redesign
wider blades striking the edge of the
of the cab structure / windscreen. It
windscreen. During the development of the provides a reliability improvement over the
modification, it was identified that the
existing design. The new design is only
sightline requirements for cases A and C (as marginally non-compliant, and is considered
described above) do not pass through the
to present no greater risk than on other
area of the windscreen that is wiped by the vehicles where similar derogations have
windscreen wipers when viewed from the
been granted in the past. Please refer to the
same point in the reference cube. (The
attached document for further details.
sightlines do pass through the windscreen
itself, and they do pass through the wiper's
swept area if viewed from different points in
the reference cube). The attached paper
provides additional explanation. To date, in
the three years that Class 70s have been in
service, there have been no recorded
complaints or problems for drivers in
respect to the RGS sightlines not passing
through the swept area (problems have
related to the faults with the wipers
themselves). The changes proposed by GE
Transportation to increase the wiper arm
and wiper blade length, whilst reducing the
angular sweep of the arms, will provide
improvements in reliability, whilst having a
Didcot Station - The existing mirror on
No action has been taken as the existing
Network Rail
Platform 5 is canopy mounted and it was
mirror has been in situ for at least ten years
identified during the survey that the mirror
with no known problems.
height from the underside of the mirror
housing to platform level is 2. 20 m, which is
below the minimum requirement of 2500
mm as stated in GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1.
Hungerford Station - The existing mirror on No action has been taken as the existing
Network Rail
Platform 1 was mounted on a post and was mirror has been in situ for at least ten years
identified during the survey that the mirror
with no known problems.
height from the underside of the mirror
housing to platform level was 2200 mm,
which is below the minimum requirement of
2500 mm as stated in GI/RT7016 Section 8.
1. The new mirror was commissioned on
12/01/2013 with the intention of raising the
clearance height from the underside of the
mirror to platform to 2500 mm. However, a
compliant image could not be achieved at
this height, therefore the mirror was lowered
until a compliant image was achieved. The
new clearance from underside of mirror to
Platform is now 2320 mm, which is an
improvement on the old mirror. Due to the
mirrors proximity to the platform edge,
erecting a barrier to the edge of the mirror
would force the passengers to less than
1250 mm from the platform edge.
Certificate Issue Date
09/09/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
10/07/2013
Deviation Status
Current
18/07/2013
N/A
RST
28/06/2013
Current
19/08/2013
N/A
INS
10/07/2013
Current
01/08/2013
N/A
INS
10/07/2013
Current
Midgham Station, Platform 2, Car Stop S: It
was identified during the survey that the
existing Mirror height from the underside of
the Mirror housing to platform level was 2.
15 m, which is below the minimum
requirement of 2500 mm as stated in
GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1. The new mirror
was installed at a height of 2. 50 m.
However, during commissioning, Network
Rail could not get a compliant image at this
height, and the mirror was therefore lowered
until a compliant image could be viewed;
this was at a height of 2. 36 m (note this is
an improvement to the old mirror).
Network Rail
01/08/2013
N/A
INS
10/07/2013
Current
Network Rail
12/09/2013
N/A
INS
10/07/2013
Current
Page 62
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
13-080-DEV
Title
Cholsey Station, Platform 3 - Driver Only
Operation (DOO) Mirror headroom
RGS Clause
8.1 b)
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-079-DEV
Wargrave Station Platform 1 - Driver Only
Operation (DOO) Mirror headroom.
8.1 b)
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-078-DEV
Shiplake Station Platform 1 - Driver
Operation Only (DOO) mirrors headroom.
8.1 b)
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-077-DEV
Cookham Station, Platform 1 (Marlow
direction) - Driver Only Operation (DOO)
Mirror headroom.
8.1 b)
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-076-DEV
Newbury station, platform 1- Driver
Operation Only (DOO) Mirror headroom.
8.1 b)
GMRT2307
One
Self contained electrical power supply
systems fitted to infrastructure support
vehicles
13-073-DEV
Use of voltages higher than Low Voltage
(LV).
4.6
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
Project Ref. 118833 - DOO Mirrors
Scheme to renew the existing DOO mirrors
at 34 Stations in the Thames Valley Area.
This issue is a Cholsey Station, Platform 3.
Nature and Degree
Cholsey - The existing Mirror on Platform 3
(car Stop 2/3/4) was identified during the
survey that the Mirror height from the
underside of the Mirror housing to platform
level was 2060 mm, which is below the
minimum requirement of 2500 mm as stated
in GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1. It has been
confirmed that a new mirror cannot be
raised to achieve the minimum height
clearance whilst maintaining a compliant
image, although the new mirror height is
2300 mm, an improvement on the old mirror.
Due to the mirrors location on the platform,
erecting a barrier would force the
passengers to less than 1250 mm from the
platform edge.
Project Ref. 118833 - DOO Mirrors Scheme Wargrave Station - The existing mirror on
to renew the existing DOO Mirrors at 34
Platform 1 was identified during the survey
Stations in the Thames Valley Area.
that the mirror height from the underside of
the mirror housing to platform level is 1950
mm, which is below the minimum
requirement of 2500 mm as stated in
GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1. It has been
confirmed that a new mirror cannot be
raised to achieve the minimum height
clearance whilst maintaining a compliant
image. The new mirror height is 2440 mm
(which is better than the old mirror) and is
1900 mm from the platform edge. This is a
single line railway (Twyford to Henley); the
Mirror is in the Twyford direction, CS 2/3,
there is also CS 4/5/6 in the same direction
and an S CS in the Henley direction, thus
erecting a barrier to the edge of the mirror
would force the passengers quite close to
the platform edge, and also could affect the
access to train doors for trains stopping at
the other two-car stops. The mirror is 1900
mm from the platform edge thus erecting a
barrier to the edge of the mirror would force
the passengers quite close to the platform
edge, and also could affect the access to
train doors for trains stopping at the other
two-car stops.
Project Ref. 118833 - DOO Mirrors Scheme Shiplake Station Platform 1 (single line
to renew the existing DOO Mirrors at 34
railway between Twyford and Henley) - (2 x
Stations in the Thames Valley Area.
mirrors). The existing mirrors on Platform 1
at CS 2/3 and CS 3/4/5 in the Twyford
direction were identified during the survey
that the height from the underside of the
mirror housing to platform level was less
than 2500 mm, which is below the minimum
requirement as stated in GI/RT7016 Section
8. 1. It has been confirmed that new mirrors
cannot be raised to achieve the minimum
height clearance whilst maintaining a
compliant image. · CS2/3: The new mirror
height is 2. 4 m compared to the original
mirror height of 2. 2 m; the mirror is 1650
mm from the platform edge, thus erecting a
barrier to the edge of the mirror would force
the passengers close to the platform edge.
There are also two additional car stops on
the platform CS 4/5/6, plus CS 7 which is
used during the Henley Regatta week;
erecting a barrier would affect access to the
train doors. · CS4/5/6: The new mirror
height is 2. 2 m compared to the original
mirror height of 1. 9 m; the mirror is 780 mm
from the platform edge. There is also a CS
7 which is used during the Henley Regatta
week, erecting a barrier would affect access
to the train doors. Additionally, this is a
Project Ref. 118833 - Mirrors Scheme to
Cookham Station - The existing mirror on
renew the existing DOO mirrors at 34
Platform 1: it was identified during the
Stations in the Thames Valley Area. This
survey that the mirror height from the
issue is at Cookham Station, Platform 1
underside of the mirror housing to platform
(Marlow direction).
level is 2200 mm which was below the
minimum requirement of 2500 mm as stated
in GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1. The mirror is
1250 mm from the platform edge, thus
erecting a barrier to the edge of the mirror
would block the access to the waiting room
and station exit.
Project Ref. 118833 - DOO Mirrors
Newbury Station - The existing Mirror on
Scheme to renew the existing DOO Mirrors Platform 1 is canopy mounted and it was
at 34 Stations in the Thames Valley Area.
identified during the survey that the mirror
This issue is at Newbury station, Platform 1. height from the underside of the mirror
housing to platform level is 2160 mm, which
is below the minimum requirement of 2500
mm as stated in GI/RT7016 Section 8. 1.
The mirror is 1750 mm from the platform
edge thus erecting a barrier to the edge of
the mirror would force the passengers to
less than 1250 mm from the platform edge.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
No action has been taken as the existing
Network Rail
mirror has been in situ for at least ten years
with no known problems. The new mirror is
installed at a greater height (2. 30 m) than
the old (2. 06 m).
Certificate Issue Date
01/08/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
10/07/2013
Deviation Status
Current
No action has been taken as the existing
mirror has been in situ for at least ten years
with no known problems.
Network Rail
01/08/2013
N/A
INS
10/07/2013
Current
No action has been taken as the existing
mirror has been in situ for at least 10 years
with no known problems.
Network Rail
17/09/2013
N/A
INS
10/07/2013
Current
No action has been taken as the existing
Network Rail
mirror had been in situ for at least 10 years
with no known problems, and the new mirror
is an improvement in height.
01/08/2013
N/A
INS
10/07/2013
Current
No action has been taken as the existing
mirror has been in situ for at least 10 years
with no known problems.
17/10/2013
N/A
INS
10/07/2013
Current
Applies to portable electrical tools used in
The size and capacity of the electrical tools
the ROBEL MMU vehicles and the electrical means it is not practical to power them using
supply to power them. An MMU consists of a RLV or ELV supply.
three semi-permanently coupled bogied
vehicles with a driving cab at each end.
There are no safety implications of using this Plasser UK Ltd
alternative supply as it reflects modern
standard electrical practice in construction
sites. Additionally, this reflects common
practice in continental Europe on this type of
machine.
04/09/2013
N/A
PLT
15/08/2013
Current
Network Rail
Page 63
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8075
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
AWS and TPWS Interface Requirements
Certificate Number
13-070-DEV
Title
RGS Clause
AWS Caution acknowledgement period for 2.2.4.7
Class 390 and Class 221 Super Voyager
operated by Virgin Trains on the West Coast
Mainline.
Scope
The deviation applies to all 390 and 221
operated by Virgin Trains.
GMRT2461
One
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and On-Track Machines.
13-068-DGN
Railway Undertaking, RSSB Member
9.1
All Class 377/1, Class 377/2, Class 377/3,
Class 377/4 units.
GMRT2149
Three
Requirements for Defining and Maintaining
the Size of Railway Vehicle
13-067-DGN
Railway Undertaking, RSSB Member
B10.3
Class 377/2, Class 377/6 (if converted for
DV operation) and Class 377/7 fleets. (It
should be noted that the design of the APC
receiver is the same as that fitted to Class
377/5, Class 378 and Class 379 units).
GMRT2461
One
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and On-Track Machines.
13-066-DGN
FGW 150 Step 2 Sanding
9.3.1
This deviation applies Class 150 vehicles
operated by First Great Western (FGW).
Current fleet size is 78 fitted vehicles, and
this would apply to any future Class 150
vehicles FGW may operate.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
During the last three full Railway years and
three periods of the current 2013/14 year,
the total number of AWS late to cancel
events stands at 135 (see chart). It can be
seen from the year on year data that we are
getting worse. We believe some of this
might be due to a higher density of traffic
and considered normalising on mileage but
to do so would only serve to disguise the
problem. The random nature of late to
cancel AWS warnings supports the theory of
unexpected AWS warnings and high
workload being at the centre of the issue
however the low period 6 figures are
interesting and no explanation for this has
been identified as yet. [See chart]. Both the
390 and 221 are speed supervised allowing
the trains to run at EPS. Part of the TASS
system is an arrangement to warn of the
approach to speed restrictions where the
train measures an approach speed higher
than desirable. This initiates an in-cab
audible warning that requires a driver brake
application to avoid an automatic emergency
brake application. Should the driver fail to
respond to the warning and should an
automatic brake application apply, then the
driver must acknowledge the intervention in
order to gain release of and resume control
There are no impacts with complying with
the current RGS requirement. This
deviation requests enhanced performance
which is non-compliant with the standard as
written, but consistent with the objectives of
the standard.
The APC receiver originally used on the
Class 377/2 Electrostar vehicles are now
obsolete, thus requiring a new APC receiver
to be installed. Unipart rail have designed a
replacement for the existing APC receiver
which is to be dimensionally set-up in
exactly the same way as the now obsolete
version. This replacement APC receiver is
fitted on the Class 377/5, Class 378 and
Class 379 fleets, and derogations against
GM/RT2149 are already in place for these
fleets. In replacing any failed Class 377/2
APC receivers, and in the design of the APC
receiver for the new Class 377/6 and Class
377/7 fleets, there has been an intention to
maintain commonality with the Class 377/5
design, simplifying stores and maintenance
activities. Whilst the Class 377/6 vehicles
are currently being built for DC operation
only, the capability to operate under 25Kv
OLE has been considered in the design from
the start, and this includes the gauging
provision for all associated equipment,
based on the Class 377/5 design. Having
undertaken analysis of the in-service
conditions (static primary suspension
conditions of tare to crush, spring creep,
wheel wear, and set up tolerances), an
infringement to the APC Gauge (Appendix
FGW 150 units have been operating with
Step 2 sanding from 2008, this provided the
Drivers with a consistent as provision of
sanding when compared to the Class 158
and 166 also operated by FGW. When the
classes 143 and 153 were fitted with
sanders, these were also configured to step
2 sanding as soon as reasonably practicable
(as authorised by11/137/DGN). Sand
provision in step 3 and emergency is not
compatible with the defensive driving
techniques practiced by FGW Drivers. All
FGW Diesel Multiple Unit (DMU) traction is
currently able to apply sand in brake step 2;
this consistency allows a driver to respond
with confidence to a low adhesion incident
and apply sand before an incident develops.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
We know, from experience, that the
reduced acknowledgment period increases
the likelihood of late to cancel AWS/TPWS
activations. RSSB research has shown that
unnecessary AWS/TPWS interventions
reduce driver confidence in these systems
and increase the likelihood of TPWS reset
and continue events. Since the
implementation of the AWS system, the
infrastructure and train have changed in
many ways. The inclusion of TPWS and the
OSS+ at critical locations has significantly
reduced the risk from a SPAD. Virgin Class
390 and 221 tilting trains have speed
supervision from track mounted balises
through the Tilt Authorisation and Speed
Supervision (TASS) system. The numerous
braking systems cope very well with the
demands of the high speed Railway and
equally well under emergency braking. The
brake performance of the 221 and 390 fleet
under emergency braking following actual
late to cancel incidents is reproduced below
for both classes. [See charts]. The two
charts depict actual AWS late to cancel at
125 mph and the time and distance table
beneath each chart represents both values
taken from the moment AWS goes false and
the emergency brake applies to reaching full
In the condition where the leading unit has a
sand level of below 20%, sanding will be
enabled on both the leading and trailing
units. If the leading vehicle in either unit
detects wheel slide, sand will be dispensed
by that unit. If the leading vehicle detects
wheelspin, and the driver selects `Sand in
Traction', sand will be dispensed by that
unit. As such, both units will dispense sand
if both detect wheel slide and have sufficient
sand available. The likelihood of this
occurring is low, as the leading unit will
condition the railhead and so the trailing unit
is unlikely to experience wheel slide.
Wherever sand is applied, there will always
be at least eleven axles, and usually fifteen
axles, after the initial sand deposition point.
Therefore, it is considered that there is no
negative impact in terms of contamination of
the railhead, and so compatibility with the
railway system is unaffected.
This APC receiver has been designed to be
dimensionally set-up in exactly the same
way as the now obsolete version. This setup is in-line with the manufacturer's
recommendations, and adjusting this set-up
height may introduce the risk of the receiver
not functioning correctly. When the inservice conditions of the bogie (and
subsequently APC receiver) are analysed for
gauging purposes and compared to the
APC gauge as defined in Appendix C of
GM/RT2149, both a lateral infringement of
17. 25 mm and a vertical infringement of 24
mm to the gauge line is experienced.
Lateral Infringement: GE/GN8573 Guidance
on Gauging, Part E, defines a lower sector
vehicle gauge that can be used by vehicle
manufacturers to ensure compliance with
the relevant Railway Group Standards. After
considering all appropriate static and
dynamic movements (including tolerances
and vehicle maintenance), if the vehicle and
components on it are within the limits
defined in Part E of GE/GN8573, compliance
has been demonstrated. When the lateral
movements of the Class 377/2, Class 377/6
and Class 377/7 APC receiver are
superimposed against the Lower Sector
Vehicle Gauge as shown in Drawing Ref.
There is a theoretical risk of a unit coming
to rest on a quantity of sand that could
prevent the track circuit being shunted.
However, since the introduction of step 2
sanding, there have been no Wrong Side
Track Circuit Failure (WSTCF) attributed to
step 2 sanding on Class 150 (or any other
class operated by FGW with step 2
sanding). This monitoring has been
conducted with Network Rail's Regional
Fleet Engineer and Network Rail's Seasonal
Specialist. WSTCF has been reported for
other reasons, including rail head
contamination with sand deployed by Mobile
Operations Managers (MOMs), leaf and
cement from building works. These other
reports give confidence that this is robust.
These periodic meetings with Network Rail
will continue.
Applicant Organisation
West Coast Trains Ltd
Certificate Issue Date
18/10/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
03/10/2013
Deviation Status
Current
Selhurst Traincare Depot
19/07/2013
N/A
RST
24/05/2013
Current
Southern Railway Limited
19/07/2013
N/A
RST
24/05/2013
Current
First Great Western Limited
03/06/2013
N/A
RST
24/05/2013
Current
Page 64
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8000-HB8
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
IWA, COSS or PC blocking a line
Certificate Number
13-065-DGN
Title
Engineers' Possession Reminder (EPR)
Line Blockages
GERT8000-TS1
Seven
General Signalling Regulations
13-064-DGN
Engineers' Possession reminder (EPR) Line 13.2.4
Blockages
GORT3440
Two
Steam Locomotive Operation
13-059-DEV
Maximum Speed for Steam Locomotive
98466.
2.2.2.1
GORT3440
Two
Steam Locomotive Operation
13-058-DEV
Steam locomotive operation (TOPS 9851)
2.2.1.1 and 2.3.2.1
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
2.2
Scope
National. Will apply anywhere on the
Network Rail managed infrastructure where
EPR is provided.
Nature and Degree
The derogation will apply to the use of
Engineers' Possession Reminder (EPR) as
an alternative means of providing additional
protection for line blockages. In signalling
centre areas using Visual Display Units
(VDU) based signalling systems, modern
day axle counter train detection and working
under Track Circuit Block signalling
regulations. " The current rules concerning
line blockages mandate four methods of
additional protection: detonators,
disconnections, T-CODs, and tokens. In
signalling centre areas using axle counter
train detection and working under Track
Circuit Block signalling regulations, it is not
practicable to use T-CODs or tokens.
Moreover, with the introduction of clearer
line blockage rules in December 2010 and
Network Rail's continuing policy of
encouraging the use of line blockages in
preference to safe systems of work using
lookout warning, there has been a significant
increase in the number of line blockage
requests (between 25-135% on EMCC
workstations) which has highlighted
limitations with the other methods of
additional protection available. In the case
of disconnections, the average time for
completing the process between the
National. The deviation will apply anywhere Please note that this application is in
on Network Rail managed infrastructure
connection with previous temporary nonwhere EPR is provided. The deviation will
compliance Ref. 12/075/TNC (Tracker No.
apply to the use of Engineers' Possession
10547). The current rules concerning line
Reminder (EPR) as an alternative means of blockages mandate four methods of
providing additional protection for line
additional protection: detonators,
blockages. In signalling centre areas using disconnections, T-CODs, and tokens. In
VDU based signalling systems, modern day signalling centre areas using axle counter
axle counter train detection and working
train detection and working under Track
under Track Circuit Block signalling
Circuit Block signalling regulations, it is not
regulations.
practicable to use T-CODs or tokens.
Moreover, with the introduction of clearer
line blockage rules in December 2010 and
Network Rail's continuing policy of
encouraging the use of line blockages in
preference to safe systems of work using
lookout warning, there has been a significant
increase in the number of line blockage
requests (between 25-135% on EMCC
workstations) which has highlighted
limitations with the other methods of
additional protection available. In the case
of disconnections, the average time for
completing the process between the
signaller and signalling technician is 15
minutes and the process is vulnerable to
disruption or abandonment if the signalling
technician is called upon to attend to faults
and failures. Where detonators are used,
Any operation of Class 94xx Steam
This locomotive 9466 would have to be
Locomotive 9466 registered on TOPS as
restricted to a maximum permissible speed
98466 on Network Rail's managed
of 35 mph to comply with Table A of
infrastructure.
GO/RT3440 Issue 2. Historically, 9466 has
operated on Network Rail's managed
infrastructure at speeds up to 45 mph, and
further journeys have been contracted by
West Coast Railways with Network Rail and
planned on this basis.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The use of EPR to provide additional
protection is predicted to be possible without
introducing any significant new risks or
materially increasing the existing residual
risks associated with the four existing
methods of additional protection mandated
within the Rule Book. Furthermore, it
involves a minimal amount of procedural
change for the COSS, IWA and PC roles
and, in the case of signallers, they will be
utilising equipment and procedural
arrangements with which they are already
familiar for other purposes. The potential
benefits of using EPR by comparison with
other methods of additional protection have
been identified as follows: · A reduction in
the number of ground staff required to work
on or near the line to provide protection. · A
reduction in the time required to apply and
remove the protection because all the
resources necessary are located in close
proximity within the same signalling location.
This potentially increases the number of line
blockage opportunities available for carrying
out work that affects the safety of the line. ·
Removal of reliance on signalling
technicians who may not be available to deal
with line blockage disconnections if called to
deal with faults and failures. · A reduction in
The use of EPR to provide additional
protection is predicted to be possible without
introducing any significant new risks or
materially increasing the existing residual
risks associated with the four existing
methods of additional protection mandated
within the Rule Book. Furthermore, it
involves a minimal amount of procedural
change for the COSS, IWA and PC roles
and, in the case of signallers, they will be
utilising equipment and procedural
arrangements with which they are already
familiar for other purposes. The potential
benefits of using EPR by comparison with
other methods of additional protection have
been identified as follows: · A reduction in
the number of ground staff required to work
on or near the line to provide protection · A
reduction in the time required to apply and
remove the protection because all the
resources necessary are located in close
proximity within the same signalling location.
This potentially increases the number of line
blockage opportunities available for carrying
out work that affects the safety of the line. ·
Removal of reliance on signalling
technicians who may not be available to deal
with line blockage disconnections if called to
deal with faults and failures. · A reduction in
A maximum speed of 35 mph unduly limits
the operation of this locomotive to very
restricted diagrams. The locomotive has
been registered for operation at RSL since
May 1996, having operated without incident
on NRCI on a number of occasions. The ex
BR (W) fleet of 210 locomotives of this class
frequently operated diagrams requiring 50
mph maximum speeds in passenger traffic
with no records of derailments due to poor
riding. The locomotive has undergone
various assessments in 2007: · Safety and
satisfactory performance completed on
02/11/2007 by an accredited Vehicle
Acceptance Body having been fitted with
TPWS and OTMR. · Since the locomotive
has been de-registered for some time, it was
subject to a trial run as required by
GM/RT2003 on 01/11/2007. · Assessed for
ride quality and braking performance, and
for maximum speed on 01/11/2007: the
tests carried out showed that brake systems
were functioning and performing
satisfactorily; the ride performance was
excellent at all speeds up to 50 mph. A
derogation has been granted (Ref.
07/093/DGN), accepting the locomotive for
operation at a maximum speed of 45 mph
and this, together with the issue of a full VAB
Any operation of Class 8F steam locomotive This locomotive 48151 would have to be
This deviation is to prevent a number of
48151 registered on TOPS as 98851 on
restricted to a maximum permissible speed planned trains being cancelled, leading to
Network Rail's managed infrastructure.
of 35 mph to comply with Table A of
financial and reputational loss for the
GO/RT3440 Issue 2. Historically, 48151 has industry with no identified safety benefit,
operated on Network Rail's managed
though if more of this type of locomotive
infrastructure at speeds up to 50 mph, and
were to be permitted to operate, there
further journeys have been contracted by
would, over time, be an increased risk of
West Coast Railways with Network Rail and damaged track causing derailment requiring
planned on this basis.
increased inspection and maintenance to
prevent it. A control in this case is therefore
the fact that only one locomotive is involved.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
11/06/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
TOM
Lead SC Approval Date
21/05/2013
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
11/06/2013
N/A
TOM
21/05/2013
Current
West Coast Railway Company 11/06/2013
N/A
TOM
21/05/2013
Current
West Coast Railway Company 11/06/2013
N/A
TOM
21/05/2013
Current
Page 65
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
13-056-DGN
Title
Birkenhead North Station DDA Footbridge Island Platform lateral clearances and stair
widths.
RGS Clause
6.2.1, 6.2.2 b) and 6.2.3.
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
13-054-DGN
Flashing aspects for P468 signal at
Peterborough.
5.2.3.1
GKRT0045
Three
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
13-053-DGN
Flashing aspects for HM567 on the Down
Main in the Mirfield East Junction area.
GKRT0064
One
Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection and
Trapping
13-052-DGN
PN245 signal overlap length, Lancaster.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
As part of the DfT National programme for
step-free disabled passenger DDA
Compliance, the "Access for All" initiative,
the project remit is to replace the existing
station footbridge, Structure Number
CWK2/8, at Birkenhead North Station, which
provides the only access to the island
platform 1&amp;2. The proposed new
replacement footbridge will incorporate stepfree access to the platforms via DDA
compliant lifts, and also provide access to a
newly constructed car park adjacent to the
station. Working in partnership with DfT,
Network Rail, and Merseytravel PTE, the
local devolved concession organisation, it
has been mutually agreed that this project is
to be designed and delivered by Merseyrail
as a TOC delivered enhancement scheme.
Due to the very limited width of the existing
island platform, and the constrained railway
land footprint available at this location, there
is insufficient space to meet the dimensional
requirements of (a) GI/RT7016 regarding
usable platform width, (b) the DfT CoP
regarding the width of the stair access to the
platform, (c) NR/SP/ELP/27228 regarding
the dimensions of the lift car. In respect of
GI/RT7016, the new bridge will result in a
useable platform width of 2300 mm being
Signal 468 4(M) and 5(M) flashing aspects
routes, reading from the Up Fast to Platform
2 or 3, controlled by Peterborough PSB.
Nature and Degree
To ensure compliance major reconstruction
and remodelling of the station and related
track, signalling, telecoms, and third rail
traction power railway infrastructure would
need to be undertaken requiring an
investment of at least cœ8m- œ10m over
and above the level of funding available for
the core remitted footbridge replacement
and enhancement scheme.
5.2.3.1 (a)
Junction signal HM567 flashing aspects
route over crossover 2071A/B. Down Main
in the Mirfield East Junction area on ELR:
MVN2, 31m50ch.
Compliance could be maintained by
continuing to use approach release from red
on HM567. This control currently causes
trains approaching with a diverging route set
to decelerate excessively before
accelerating over the points. The controls
currently have a risk of anticipation and
acceleration towards the next signal that
could be at red. The permissible speed
over the crossover of 60 mph is not used,
reducing performance.
4.3.2
PN245 signal only. Platform 5 Lancaster
Station.
New routes are being provided to PN245
signal as part of S & C renewal work at
Lancaster Station. PN245 signal is an
existing signal that has no main route
approaches currently, and so no overlap. At
400 m on approach to PN245 signal, the line
speed is 40 mph; however, at 315 m on
approach, the line speed reduces to 10 mph
and stays at that speed up to the signal. To
comply with the 400 m requirement would
require either no overlap being provided to
the neck, extending of the neck to permit a
40 mph reduced overlap (minimum 80 m) or
reduction in line speed. These options were
considered (see section 11 - What other
options have been considered?) but would
affect performance of other routes and layout
or have a relatively large cost compared to
the safety benefit.
Compliance could be maintained by
continuing to use approach release from red
on P468. This control currently causes
trains proceeding from the Up Fast to
Platform 2 or 3 to decelerate to P468 at red
before the aspect is released to proceed
over 1243 and 1242 points. The controls
currently have a risk of anticipation and that
required trains to accelerate towards the
points after the signal clears due to 1243
points being 700 m from P468 signal. Train
Operating Companies have raised these
issues from performance and safety
perspective, and requested the controls are
amended.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The proposed footbridge stair width, and
width of the existing platform alongside the
new footbridge, will not be reduced relative
to the existing dimensions, and existing
signal sighting not adversely affected in
relation to present conditions. Line speeds
adjacent to the platform are relatively low
(Platform 1 - 15 mph, Platform 2 - 60 mph,
increasing from 35 mph just before the
station) and there is no regular booked
freight traffic over this route (freight speed
limits are 15 and 20 mph respectively). See
attached extract from Network Rail Sectional
Appendix within the Approval in Principle
Form 001 design submission document,
produced to Network Rail Form 001
template, referenced as Doc Ref:
NG8106/BIR Form 1 Date: February 2013,
appended to this application. The area of
reduced platform width alongside the
footbridge stair will only be used for access
to the front car of trains, and for access to
and from the proposed lift. Note: it may be
possible to place a three-car stop sign west
of the new footbridge, so the areas of
reduced platform width will only be used by
the extreme end doors and service door of a
discrete number of daily peak hours six-car
train services; however, this measure is not
The flashing aspect sequence will reduce
the risk of trains accelerating towards the
divergence after receiving a delayed aspect
release on the junction signal, as majority of
diverging trains will be signalled with the
flashing aspects rather than MAR. The
SPAD risk from anticipation on P468 is
reduced. Flashing aspects exist for a range
of different turnout speeds on this route,
including lower speeds, and driver route
knowledge is acceptable as the primary
means of speed control for this junction,
which has little potential for confusion with
other junctions in this area. Provision of
PSWI with AWS arrangement is considered
to adequately manage the over-speed risk at
the junction, and assist with driver route
knowledge as to what speed the flashing
sequence relates. Provision of MAY-FA can
have an impact on SPAD risk the signal after
the junction. Controls and TPWS have been
provided in line with current RGS to manage
these risks. In addition to the reduced
SPAD and derailing risk due to accelerating
to excess speed, the performance benefit of
this arrangement has been estimated at 90 s
when compared to current MAR
arrangements. Future S & C renewal is
planned to include improvements allowing
The flashing aspect sequence will reduce
the risk of trains accelerating towards the
next signal after receiving a delayed aspect
release on the junction signal, as the
majority of diverging trains will be signalled
with the flashing aspects rather than MAR.
The SPAD risk from anticipation on HM567
is reduced. Flashing aspects exist for a
range of different turnout speeds on this
route, including moderate speeds. Existing
linespeed on the approach to HM567 is only
5 mph below the lower limit of the
permissible speed approaching a
divergence of 40 mph or greater, as detailed
in table 23. The proposed use of flashing
aspects in this situation is compliant with
Network Rail Company standard
NR/L2/SIG/19609, Issue 1, section 10. 1.
1(e). Under MAY-FA, the driver will receive
earlier notification of a divergent route set
than under the existing MAR controls.
Therefore, the severity of the proposed noncompliance is minimal and driver route
knowledge is acceptable as the primary
means of speed control for this junction,
which is considered to have adequate
physical separation from other use of
flashing aspects on the route. Provision of
MAY-FA can have an impact on SPAD risk
Risk assessment for the reduced overlap
has been conducted as per requirements of
section 4. 9 of GK/RT0064 and considered
the overlap risk to be ALARP (see attached
SORA report Appendix F). Permissible
speed is very low (10 mph) and begins 315
m on approach to the signal and hence only
85 m short of the requirement. GK/RT0075
states that braking at 10 mph on a 1 in 100
fall gradient to be 118 m, thus the 400 m
approach distance is significantly more than
that required to actually stop at PN245.
TPWS is provided at the signal and will be
fully effective for train with up to 9%g
effective brakes. Trains with an emergency
brake of less that 9%g are mitigated by the
provision of a sliding buffer that will retard
the train in a controlled manner.
Applicant Organisation
Merseyrail Electrics 2002 Ltd
Certificate Issue Date
10/06/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
08/05/2013
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
21/05/2013
N/A
CCS
18/04/2013
Current
Network Rail
21/05/2013
N/A
CCS
18/04/2013
Current
Network Rail
21/05/2013
N/A
CCS
18/04/2013
Current
Page 66
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0044
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Controls for Signalling a Train onto an
Occupied Line
Certificate Number
13-051-DGN
Title
PN226(3C) and (4C) Route Controls Lancaster South.
GKRT0063
One
Approach Locking &amp; Train Operated
Route Release
13-050-DGN
GMRT2472
One
Data Recorders on Trains - Design
Requirements
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
5.3.2c, 5.3.2e, 5.3.3a
Scope
PN226(3C) and (4C) - Lancaster South.
New call on routes on an existing signal.
Nature and Degree
Permissive routes have been provided from
PN226 signals into platforms 4 and 5. The
call-on routes have been requested by the
operator for consistency with existing route
(1C) to the Down Platform, for use as
contingency in time of perturbation.
Complying will lead to a fair amount of nonstandard design within the interlocking. As
the current interlocking is Westpac, it does
not support all the controls as standard and
will require the controls to be free wired to
meet requirement of the current RGS. This
non-standard design will lead to
inconsistency with other permissive routes at
Lancaster 232, 234, 235, 239, 240, 241, 242,
245, 248 and 249 signals. This
inconsistency would also introduce a
technical complexity and cost that is
considered disproportionate to the risk being
managed by the controls. Estimated cost to
provide fully compliant controls would be in
the order of œ330k (design œ120k,
installation and testing œ180k (including
materials), project costs œ30k).
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
New permissive routes will be classified as Network Rail
`Emergency Use Only' (PP-X) in the section
appendix. This will limit the use of
permissive working, and only allow to be
used for contingency and not booked
moves. The principle is that provision for
emergency use is better than no route at all
or calling trains past a red signal.
Emergency (PP-X) use of the call-on routes
require the signaller to contact the driver
prior to setting, so mandating 5. 3. 3 a) by
procedure. This will be recorded as a
matter of course in box instruction that shall
also include instruction that 5. 3. 2 c) shall
be applied by signaller. Call-on moves were
assessed during the SORA process (see
SORA report Appendix F) where it was
agreed: "DA Representatives concluded
that these routes are only for contingency
use under the control of the signaller (better
to have a signalled move than calling past a
signal at stop) and no further mitigation
measures need to be put in place. " There
have been no reported incidents associated
with current controls in use at Lancaster.
Certificate Issue Date
23/05/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
18/04/2013
Deviation Status
Current
Reading Station Area - Unconditional Train 5.3
Operated Route Release (TORR) for routes
equipped with axle counters.
Reading Station Area Redevelopment
(RSAR) Project, routes equipped with axle
counters.
Provision of additional train detection
sections and/or treadles for the purpose of
TORR would incur additional costs for
provision and on-going maintenance. Also,
additional equipment would increase the
likelihood of any secondary risks that may
occur in the event of failure of the additional
equipment.
23/05/2013
N/A
CCS
18/04/2013
Current
13-048-DGN
Derogation against event recorder crash
protection requirements in GM/RT2472
Issue 1.
B5.2.1, B5.2.2, B5.2.3 and B5.2.4.
Extension of derogation Ref. 08/191/DGN
for up to twenty more Class 70 locomotives
manufactured and supplied by General
Electric in 2013-2014.
It is understood that the main purpose of the Network Rail
additional sequence was to address risks
associated with potential common mode
failures on track circuits sharing Insulated
Rail Joints (IRJs). The RSAR project is
using Thales axle counter train detection that
significantly reduces the risk of spurious
operation that might satisfy the Train in
Section Proving (TISP) and TORR
conditions. No specific risk has been
identified and, as such, no alternative action
proposed so, with less trackside equipment,
there is less maintenance required. As
such, this application offers a 'safer' railway
through less equipment, which would be
required trackside without the provision of
'Unconditional TORR'. The call-on routes
will require the approaching train to be
signalled in to the station at low speed as
the release of the call-on aspect will require
the train to be more or less at a stand to
release the call-on aspect in to the platforms
and will be undertaken by the berth track
section being occupied for a time. If the
driver of the train misjudges the requirement
of slowing down on the approach to the
signal in question (for the call on route) and
passes the signal at danger, then the train
protection equipment (TPWS) will enforce
The requirements set out in GM/RT2472
GE Transportation
Issue 1, Section B5. 2, are designed to
ensure that the stored data is retrievable
following physical damage as the result of a
crash. However, testing against the FRA
crashworthiness requirements has already
demonstrated that the integrity of the data
recorder is maintained whilst subjected to
the possible consequences of a crash.
Therefore, it is believed that the impact of
the use of the Wabtec TTX-IDR-03 data
recorder will be minimal. GE
Transportation's previous and extensive
experience with this model of data recorder
means that it has been possible to integrate
it into the design of the new locomotive in a
manner that offers the following benefits: ·
the design and installation is already proven
on other locomotive designs; · eliminates the
risk of interference with other train systems
that a new data recorder could introduce; ·
eliminates the risk of design errors that
integrating an unfamiliar item of equipment
could introduce; · reduces design costs and
testing requirements for the installation.
20/05/2013
N/A
RST
19/04/2013
Current
13-047-DGN
Derogation related to fire containment on
main engine.
2.12.3.2 and 2.12.7
For derogation 09/186/DGN, evidence was GE Transportation
provided as to why GE Transportation
believes that there is no practical difference
between the fire risk management
philosophy currently accepted on the fleet of
over 450 Class 66/67 locomotives that are
already in operation in the UK and the
proposed arrangement on the Class 70
locomotive. See discussion paper attached
to derogation 09/186/DGN for further detail.
20/05/2013
N/A
RST
19/04/2013
Current
In derogation Ref. 08/191/DGN (granted),
the use of a Wabtec Railway Electronics
TTX-IDR-03 data recorder was proposed;
which, whilst it is currently in use throughout
the USA, has not undergone testing against
the crash protection requirements set out in
Section B5. 2 of GM/RT2472. In order to
establish its suitability for use in the USA,
the data recorder has been tested and
shown to be compliant with the
crashworthiness requirements in the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) standard 49
FRA Part 229 - Locomotive Event
Recorders: Final Rule. A copy of the test
report for the TTX-IDR-03 data recorder is
attached. In order to demonstrate
compliance with the crash requirements of
GM/RT2472, this model of data recorder
would have to undergo testing, at a cost of
approximately œ59,400 (2009 figures). This
cost is made up of œ45,000 to undertake a
full suite of tests, and œ14,400 to purchase
nine data recorders on which to perform the
tests. Note that nine data recorders was the
quantity previously used to complete the
suite of tests against GM/RT2472 on the QTron data recorder. In addition, being
forced to fix RGS compliant OTMRs would
add further redesign costs, delay, and
Extension of derogation 09/186/DGN, to add The locomotive design is compliant to the
up to an additional twenty new Class 70
fire detection and prevention requirements in
locomotives, for use by unspecified
the Loc & Pas TSI and SRT TSI, for a diesel
operators (I. e. not just Freightliner as was freight locomotive. Therefore, this is
the case for the initial locomotives 70001 considered to fulfil the essential
70030). These will be built by GE
requirements in the Interoperability directive,
Transportation in 2013-2014.
in this regard. The risk is also similar to that
on the existing UK diesel freight locomotive
fleet. Compliance to the clauses in the RGS
would incur significant redesign (e. g.
increased thermal insulation and sealing etc.
of the engine cabinet), and face practical
difficulties, given the limit space and weight
available within the existing loco design.
Major redesign would also invoke significant
reassessment, on a loco that is otherwise
considered to be an `existing authorised
design' within the Loc & Pas TSI. Such
changes would also potentially have other
knock-on effects, e. g. increased heat within
the engine cabinet.
Page 67
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2100
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
Certificate Number
13-046-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
Derogation from GM/RT2100 to comply with Sections 6,7,8,9,10 and 12.
EN standards.
Scope
Fleet of heavy haul freight diesel-electric
locomotives to be manufactured and
supplied by General Electric (GE) in 2013
and 2014, to the maximum number of twenty
locomotives. This derogation is to extend
the scope of an existing derogation,
09/209/DGN, which originally gave
exemption to specific load cases and
requirements of GM/RT2100 Issue 3 for
thirty locos for Freightliner (applying EN
12663 and EN 15227 instead). The
requested extension is to cover up to a
further twenty class 70 locomotives, for
operation by unspecified operators.
GMRT2466
Three
Railway Wheelsets
13-045-DGN
Derogation to use steel grade - ER9 for a
wheel material.
2.9.1
Extension of scope of derogation Ref.
09/037/DGN (which was to Issue 2 of this
standard) to include up to twenty more Class
70 freight locomotives to be manufactured
by GE Transportation in 2013-2014 for
undisclosed operators, and to cover Issue 3.
GERT8030
Four
Requirements for Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS)
13-044-DGN
Use of TPWS equipment compliant with
GE/RT8030 Issue 2 for ten Class 70
locomotives.
Appendices F and H - All clauses
Up to 10 (ten) new Class 70 locomotives to
be manufactured by GE prior to September
2014 for unspecified operators.
GMRT2141
Three
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over
13-043-DGN
Dynamic modelling for the Class 70 dieselelectric locomotives, rather than testing on
Network Rail infrastructure.
D2
Extension of derogation Ref. 09/160/DGN to
the manufacture and supply of up to twenty
more Class 70 diesel-electric locomotives by
GE Transportation in 2013-2014.
GMRT2176
One
Air Quality and Lighting Environment for
Traincrew Inside Railway Vehicles
13-042-DGN
Extension of scope of derogation against the 5.1
requirement for cab fresh air flow.
This deviation application seeks to extend
Whilst the Class 70 locomotives are
No other impact identified.
the scope of derogation 09/213/DGN to the normally driver only operated, the cab has
manufacture and supply of twenty more
provision for a second man and is therefore
Class 70 locomotives by GE Transportation. required to meet 120 m3 per hour. The air
flow testing conducted by GE Transportation
has concluded that the rate of 120 m3 of
fresh air per hour is only achieved at speeds
of 23 mph and above. The measured air
flow when stationary is approx. 27 m3/hr and
increases with speed. In order to comply
with this requirement, GE Transportation will
have to undertake notable modifications to
the HVAC system, which will have a
significant cost and timescale impact on GE
Transportation's delivery targets. GE
Transportation has already delivered vehicle
numbers 70001-70030 to the UK market,
which have been in service without
significant complaint about this issue.
Increasing air flow through HVAC unit will
also have knock-on effects in terms of
compliance with the cab noise level limits in
the Noise Technical Specification for
Interoperability (TSI), which may further
increase the suite of modifications required.
It may also cause excessive draughts in the
cab at higher speed.
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
13-041-DGN
Derogation against GM/RT2130 to exhaust
the APU through the underframe.
Existing Class 70 locomotives (7000170030) and a further build of up to twenty
more Class 70 locomotives manufactured
and supplied by General Electric in 20132014 to be operated on Network Rail
infrastructure when outside a possession.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
3.1.1
Nature and Degree
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Whilst GM/RT2100 Issue 5 now includes
The locomotive design is compliant with the
reference to EN 15227 and EN 12663, other structural crashworthiness requirements of
aspects are different to those applied in
EN 15227 and the load cases of EN 12663,
2009 to the existing design, and the project and consequently with anticipated structural
entity wishes to use the clause in Section 10 requirements of the Loc & Pas TSI and
of GM/RT2100 Issue 5 which permits new
GM/RT2100 Issue 5. If this derogation
vehicles to be built to an existing authorised request is granted, then GE Transportation
design up June 2017. As the `existing
will be able to provide its prospective UK
design' had derogation 09/209/DGN applied operators with more Class 70 locomotives,
to it, it is considered appropriate to formally based on the design that is already in
extend that derogation to cover the new
service.
locomotives. GE Transportation plans to
manufacture and supply more Class 70
locomotives based on the existing design
(existing design being for vehicle numbers
70001 - 70030). This existing design was
built with consideration to GM/RT2100 Issue
3 and was granted derogation 09/209/DGN.
To comply with the latest issue of the
standard (GM/RT2100 Issue 5), GE
Transportation will need to significantly
modify the current design, and / or
undertake new testing (e. g. for windows
and windscreens, etc. ), leading to
significant additional costs and timescale
issues. This derogation request therefore
seeks the extension of the scope of the
existing derogation (09/209/DGN) on the
existing design for the manufacture of the
To achieve derogation 09/037/DGN, the
The impacts will be minimal, since the
project worked to GM/RT2466 Issue 2
performance characteristics of ER9 are
(August 2008) and complied with the suite of similar to R9T and AAR M-107 Class B, both
European Standards it identified. This
of which are, or have been, approved. The
provided some degree of "future proofing" at rim and web mechanical characteristics
that point in time for the design and, as a
(including minimum rim hardness) have
consequence, avoid both potential
some comparatively better properties when
difficulties with material sourcing for the
using ER9 rather than ER8. ER9 is harder
initial fleet and redesign work for any follow- than ER8 and has a higher Ultimate Tensile
on orders. The only material that is
Strength (UTS) and yield strength, and
approved in GM/RT2466 Issue 2 for the EN therefore is more resistant to Rolling Contact
suite of standards is ER8. However, the
Fatigue (RCF) and wear.
project wishes to use ER9 because it has
similar performance characteristics to the
material AAR M-107 Class B, which GE
Transportation uses as their standard
material for this application. It also assists
GE Transportation in their development of a
common bogie for both the UK and
mainland Europe, as ER9 is an already
approved material in Europe. GE
Transportation wants to use ER9 for this
application for the production of the new
class 70 locomotives. GM/RT2466 Issue 2
does not permit a `mix and match' between
different suites of standards, therefore it is
not permissible to simply apply AAR M-107
Class B material whilst using EN
requirements for the remainder.
Production of TPWS equipment that is
The equipment is proven to be compatible
validated as being compliant with
with UK infrastructure and does not
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 is not yet available. The introduce any new safety risks.
need to await availability is estimated to add
an additional four to six month delay in
project delivery and large costs of
integration design and installation. In
addition, this delay has major ramifications
due to the timescales imposed by other EU
Directives. The attached additional
explanation provides more details of this.
Derogation 09/160/DGN was granted to
N/A
permit GE Transportation to use a validated
dynamic model of the class 70 locomotives,
in place of undertaking real UK on-track
tests. This was subsequently done, and the
Class 70s have been in service operation
with Freightliner since late 2009. It is now
requested to extend the derogation to cover
additional new class 70 locomotives which
GE Transportation will be building in 20132014, and to include issue 3 of GM/RT2141,
as the original derogation was granted
against issue 2. This will enable the 2009
modelling and assessment / scrutiny to be reused for the new locos, avoiding UK based
on-track ride testing.
Due to the location of the APU and with the
limited amount of space available as a result
of compliance with locomotive gauge,
routing the APU exhaust so that it
discharges in a location which is compliant
with GM/RT2130 Clause 3. 1. 1 is difficult
and introduces a number of additional risks.
These are discussed in detail in the
supporting paper attached to 09/038/TNC.
Applicant Organisation
GE Transportation
Certificate Issue Date
20/05/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
19/04/2013
Deviation Status
Current
GE Transportation
20/05/2013
N/A
RST
19/04/2013
Current
GE Transportation
21/05/2013
N/A
CCS
18/04/2013
Current
GE Transportation Ltd
20/05/2013
N/A
RST
19/04/2013
Current
GE Transportation
20/05/2013
N/A
RST
19/04/2013
Current
The circumstances under which the APU will GE Transportation
be required to operate are very limited, and
the impact on the railway is considered to be
negligible. This is discussed in detail in the
supporting paper attached to 09/038/TNC. It
is also noted that many OTMs exhaust much
larger engines to the underframe, such as
MPVs.
03/09/2013
N/A
RST
19/04/2013
Current
Page 68
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2473
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles
Certificate Number
13-040-DGN
Title
Replacement header gear for Class 319
vehicle passenger door system.
RGS Clause
B6.1
Scope
As a result of both obsolescence and
reliability issues, Porterbrook Leasing
Company Ltd commissioned IFE Automatic
Door Systems (part of the Knorr-Bremse
Group) to redesign the passenger door
header gear for the class 319. The deviation
applies only to the door opening and closing
forces associated with this redesign.
GERT8000-TS2
Three
Track Circuit Block Regulations
13-038-DGN
Permissive Working - National
3.3.2
National
GKRT0094
One
Train Voice Radio Systems
13-035-DGN
Operational use of GSM-R Handheld as
mitigation against a failed fixed GSM-R cab
radio.
3.20.1 and 7.1.1
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
13-034-DGN
Thatcham LC: Deficient position of signal
T2855 relative to crossing.
2.1.1.3 a)
Operational use of a GSM-R OPH in driving The impact of complying with current RGS
cabs as a mitigation measure against failure requirements for the transportable radio
of the fixed cab mobile radio.
would be: · 3. 20. 1 - Full compliance would
result in a need for the CT3 number of the
existing fixed cab mobile radio to be
removed from the network by the TEC
before the OPH could be provisioned on the
network. This would negatively impact on
the speed of deployment of the equipment
and increase the risk of a negative impact on
performance. Also, in situations where a
maintainer is not readily available, the
programming of the CT3 number into the
OPH would need to be carried out by a
driver who, currently, is not trained to
undertake this function. This would be a
new procedure and may be prone to error as
the raw CT3 number need to be understood
by the driver; e. g. Cab A of unit 323001
would be 31632300101. This is considered
an unnecessary complication and likely to
cause confusion. · 7. 1. 1 - Full compliance
would need an OPH to be connected to the
main GSM-R antenna of the train. This
would introduce a disproportionately high
cost against a relatively small radio
performance benefit due to the costs
involved in modification of the train cab
environment; additionally, this also presents
Thatcham MCB - CCTV, ELR: BHL, Signal The RORI project is remitted to relock and
T2855, Reading Outer Relock &amp;
recontrol the signalling through this location,
Immunise (RORI) Project.
and renew the train detection equipment.
The existing LC protecting signal T2855 is in
a non-compliant position 22 m from
Thatcham LC. The project remit is in
compliance with the Signalling Compliance
Approach - Western Mainline Signalling
Renewal, Section 3. 1 (Signal profiles).
Form and layout of the L2855 signal is
unaltered, the project therefore does not
intend to move the signal to a compliant
position. Compliance would mean moving
signal 3 m, and also moving all associated
platform equipment such as DOO and car
stop markers. If T2855 is moved, the 3 m
required to achieve compliance with current
standards for DOO equipment would be
required to be followed. This would mean
that the stopping point should be ideally 25
m but minimum, subject to risk assessment,
15 m from the signal because of the
prominence of the signal 15 m likely be
acceptable. This means that trains would
stop at least 18 m further back than
currently; a six-car turbo (class 166) is 138
m in length and the usable platform length
would become less than this and as such
platform extension would be required.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The redesign incorporates a new sliding
cylinder which actuates the opening and
closing of the doors; the function is identical
to the previous design with the exception of
the forces; both incorporate a pushback
system. The peak closing force of the new
sliding cylinder is 327N and the peak
opening force is 389N; the pushback force is
128N. Whilst the closing and opening
forces of this cylinder is above the stated
300N peak force, the pushback force of
128N is within the specified 150N limit in 6c
above; this would act to limit the clamping
force when the doors were shut (or close to
being shut). The redesign is an
improvement on the existing design where
the close force of the cylinder is 341N and
push back is 143N. The opening force has
remained the same at 389N. After
discussion with the current supplier of door
header gear, it was stated that, in order to
comply with group standards, we would
need to redesign the pneumatic system and
include a control module with an obstacle
detection system as well as changing the
door cylinder from the existing duplex
design to a conventional cushion type. This
would have added considerable extra
complexity to the door system with the
MPVs are not currently listed as an
authorised vehicle permitted to operate
under 'Permissive Platform Arrangements'.
The current rules associated with the
operation of multi-purpose vehicles (MPVs)
prohibit them from being operated in
accordance with 'Permissive Platform
Arrangements'.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
A cost benefit analysis has been undertaken First Capital Connect Ltd
to understand the order of change required
to reduce injuries as a result of door trap
incidents to ALARP. This concluded that in
the very worst case and for a fifteen year
remaining life of the vehicles that there was
no case to redesign the doors. As such, the
approach taken was one to remove
obsolescence issues and use the synergy
created to gain any performance benefits of
the change. There is no impact to the
railway system as a result of the proposed
change. Implementing the new door header
gear will result in a system which is more
compliant to the current Railway Group
Standard than the existing design. It is
expected that there will be a reliability
benefit from fitting the new door header
gear.
Certificate Issue Date
20/05/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
19/04/2013
Deviation Status
Current
This derogation is to enable MPVs to be
Network Rail
included in the list of authorised vehicles
able to occupy a permissive platform line (as
per Rule Book Module TS2, Clause 3. 3. 2).
Platform lines 1, 2, 3 ECS (MPV), 5, 9 and 0.
Over the past three years, MPVs have been
operating under trial conditions to allow
MPVs fitted with CCTV cameras for
examinations of switches and crossings (S &
C); this approach reduces the need for
placing track workers at risk in complex
track areas if the optical camera train is not
utilised and inspections are undertaken on
foot. In addition to the CCTV MPV, other
MPVs have also (under trial conditions)
been allowed to occupy platforms under
'Permissive Platform Arrangements', in
order to allow greater flexibility in the
timetabling of MPVs for seasonal
preparedness. This flexibility allows more
track miles to be treated (Railhead), in turn
reducing the consequences of Poor
Railhead incidents including SPADs. A
permanent change in the Rule Book would
provide the benefits of these trials to be
appreciated across the industry. More areas
treated less risk of SPADs and station
overruns. Track inspections in complex
areas utilising the optical MPV removes the
With consideration of the foregoing, the
First ScotRail Ltd
level of impact / risk is considered to lie
within acceptable bounds because: · 3. 20.
1 - The use of the OPH is expected to be
infrequent (see Appendix B) due to the
predicted reliability of the installed fixed cab
radio. Operational rules permit a train to
operate without a radio in some
circumstances. Therefore, it is safer and
has performance benefits to run with an
OPH than with no radio. Operational rules
and procedures for the use of the OPH will
be implemented across the Network
stipulating that the OPH should be CT2
registered if an OPH is to be used, therefore
reducing the risk of non-identification / misscommunication. Signallers will be fully
briefed on the operational use of OPH radios
by drivers. This includes the unique engine
number that the OPH will have, I. e.
000xxxA; therefore, highlighting the identity
in advance and, if necessary voice
protocols, will be used to establish the
identity of the caller. · 7. 1. 1 - To support a
case for the operational use of OPHs as a
mitigation measure for failure of a fixed cab
mobile using its own antenna, a number of
test runs using similar performing (2 watt)
handheld equipment and laptop data
The project is not affecting level crossing
Network Rail
interface between road and rail from that
which currently exists. T2855 has been in
this non-compliant position for many years
with no known SPAD issues. The signal
would have been commissioned when 25
yards from the crossing was permitted
making this signal less that 1 yard defficient.
The risk of a collision on the crossing
because of the deficient position of the
protecting signal will be mitigated by
providing speed measuring treadles. Refer
to scheme plan Ref. 11-GW-019/03, version
2. 1. This will initiate the crossing sequence
in the event of a train approaching T2855 at
a speed which is likely to result in a SPAD.
13/05/2013
N/A
TOM
09/04/2013
Current
08/07/2013
N/A
CCS
21/03/2013
Current
CCS
21/03/2013
Current
11/04/2013
Page 69
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0192
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
Certificate Number
13-032-DGN
Title
Balne Lowgate LC: Deficient position of
signal D862 relative to crossing.
RGS Clause
2.1.1.3 a)
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
13-031-DGN
Burn Lane LC: Deficient position of signal
S875 relative to crossing
2.1.1.3 a)
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
13-030-DGN
Henwick Hall LC: Deficient position of signal 2.1.1.3 a)
S878 relative to crossing.
GKRT0192
Two
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
13-029-DGN
Heyworth LC: Deficient position of signal
D856 relative to crossing.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
2.1.1.3 a)
Scope
Balne Lowgate LC, ELR: ECM2, Mileage:
165m22ch, Linespeed: 125mph, D862 on
the Up Main controlled from Doncaster PSB.
Nature and Degree
The project is remitted to renew Balne
Lowgate LC from MCG to MCB-OD crossing
type as part of a scheme to reduce the
number of signal boxes in the LNE area.
The existing LC protecting signal D862 is in
a non-compliant position 23m from the Balne
Lowgate LC. To comply would require D862
moving by at least 27m to a position 50m
from the crossing. A move is technically
possible, but would introduce a certain
degree of unfamiliarity and additional route
learning/familiarisation that may introduce
risk, as drivers are familiar with the current
position of the signal. The estimated total
cost of œ215k is fairly high when compare to
alternative proposal.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The project is not affecting level crossing
interface between train driver and crossing
from that which currently exists. D862 has
been in this non-compliant position for many
years with no known SPAD issues. If the
signal was at 50 m from the crossing, the
train would have to be travelling at 20 mph
to give 5 seconds red road lights before train
arrives at the crossing. The Stowmarket
treadle is positioned such that a train
travelling up to 50 mph will still give at least
5 seconds of red road lights before train
arrives at the crossing, thus improving
SPAD mitigation. Using statistical data from
the Signal Assessment Tool (SAT), the
probability of a SPAD travelling 50 m is only
7% less than travelling 23 m. This minor
increase in probability of the SPAD reaching
the crossing would only slightly improved
SPAD risk at the crossing if a compliant
signal position was provided. This
additional risk of a collision on the crossing
will be mitigated by longer warning times
provided by `Stowmarket' controls and
overrun treadles when train approaches at
red signal. Further information on impact
can be found in the supporting Risk
Assessments.
Burn Lane LC, ELR: TCW1, Mileage:
The project is remitted to renew Burn Lane The project is not affecting level crossing
170m70ch, Linespeed: 75mph, S875 on the LC from MCG to MCB-OD crossing type as interface between train driver and crossing
Dn Selby controlled from Selby West SB.
part of a scheme to reduce the number of
from that which currently exists. S875 has
signal boxes in the LNE area. The existing been in this non-compliant position for many
LC protecting signal S875 is in a nonyears with no known SPAD issues. If the
compliant position 23 m from the Burn Lane signal was at 50 m from the crossing the
LC. To comply would require S875 moving train would have to be travelling at 20 mph
by at least 27 m to a position 50 m from the to give 5 seconds red road lights before train
crossing. A move is technically possible,
arrives at the crossing. The Stowmarket
but would introduce a certain degree of
treadle is positioned such that a train
unfamiliarity and additional route
travelling up to 50 mph will still give at least
learning/familiarisation that may introduce
5 seconds of red road lights before train
risk, as drivers are familiar with the current arrives at the crossing, thus improving
position of the signal. The estimated total
SPAD mitigation. Using statistical data from
cost of œ215k is fairly high when compare to the Signal Assessment Tool (SAT) the
alternative proposal.
probability of a SPAD travelling 50 m is only
7% less than travelling 23 m. This minor
increase in probability of the SPAD reaching
the crossing would only slightly improved
SPAD risk at the crossing if a compliant
signal position was provided. This
additional risk of a collision on the crossing
will be mitigated by longer warning times
provided by `Stowmarket' controls and
overrun treadles when train approaches at
red signal. Further information on impact
can be found in the supporting Risk
Assessments.
Henwick Hall LC, ELR: TCW1, Mileage:
The project is remitted to renew Henwick
The project is not affecting level crossing
172m20ch, Linespeed: 75 mph, S878 on the Hall LC from MCG to MCB-OD crossing
interface between train driver and crossing
Up Selby controlled from Selby West SB.
type as part of a scheme to reduce the
from that which currently exists. S878 has
number of signal boxes in the LNE area.
been in this non-compliant position for many
The existing LC protecting signal S878 is in years with no known SPAD issues. If the
a non-compliant position 26 m from the
signal was at 50 m from the crossing, the
Henwick Hall LC. To comply would require train would have to be travelling at 20 mph
S878 moving by at least 24 m to a position
to give 5 seconds red road lights before train
50 m from the crossing. A move is
arrives at the crossing. The Stowmarket
technically possible, but would introduce a
treadle is positioned such that a train
certain degree of unfamiliarity and additional travelling up to 50 mph will still give at least
route learning/familiarisation that may
5 seconds of red road lights before train
introduce risk, as drivers are familiar with
arrives at the crossing, thus improving
the current position of the signal. The
SPAD mitigation. Using statistical data from
estimated total cost of œ215k is fairly high
the Signal Assessment Tool (SAT) the
when compare to alternative proposal.
probability of a SPAD travelling 50 m is only
7% less than travelling 26 m. This minor
increase in probability of the SPAD reaching
the crossing would only slightly improved
SPAD risk at the crossing if a compliant
signal position was provided. This
additional risk of a collision on the crossing
will be mitigated by longer warning times
provided by `Stowmarket' controls and
overrun treadles when train approaches at
red signal. Further information on impact
can be found in the supporting Risk
Assessments.
Heyworth LC, ELR: ECM2, Mileage:
The project is remitted to renew Heyworth
The project is not affecting level crossing
162m55ch, Linespeed: 125mph, D856 on
LC from MCG to MCB-OD crossing type as interface between train driver and crossing
the Up Main controlled from Doncaster PSB. part of a scheme to reduce the number of
from that which currently exists. D856 has
signal boxes in the LNE area. The existing been in this non-compliant position for many
LC protecting signal D856 is in a nonyears with no known SPAD issues. If the
compliant position 26 m from the Heyworth signal was at 50 m from the crossing, the
LC. To comply would require D856 moving train would have to be travelling at 20 mph
by at least 24 m to a position 50 m from the to give 5 seconds red road lights before train
crossing. A move is technically possible,
arrives at the crossing. The Stowmarket
but would introduce a certain degree of
treadle is positioned such that a train
unfamiliarity and additional route
travelling up to 50 mph will still give at least
learning/familiarisation that may introduce
5 seconds of red road lights before train
risk, as drivers are familiar with the current arrives at the crossing, thus improving
position of the signal. The estimated total
SPAD mitigation. Using statistical data from
cost of œ215k is fairly high when compare to the Signal Assessment Tool (SAT) the
alternative proposal and would worsen the
probability of a SPAD travelling 50 m is only
existing distance (844 m) to Barcroft LC
7% less than travelling 26 m. This minor
which this signal also protects.
increase in probability of the SPAD reaching
the crossing would only slightly improved
SPAD risk at the crossing if a compliant
signal position was provided. This
additional risk of a collision on the crossing
will be mitigated by longer warning times
provided by `Stowmarket' controls and
overrun treadles when train approaches at
red signal.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
31/05/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
16/05/2013
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
31/05/2013
N/A
CCS
16/05/2013
Current
Network Rail
31/05/2013
N/A
CCS
16/05/2013
Current
Network Rail
31/05/2013
N/A
CCS
16/05/2013
Current
Page 70
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GORT3056E
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Movement of Freight Trains
Certificate Number
13-028-DGN
Title
Higher priority Freight trains.
RGS Clause
E4.2
Scope
National.
Nature and Degree
Currently, Freight trains are restricted to
class 4, 6, 7, 8, dependant on the
permissible speed of the train and wagons.
We currently have a number of train
services on the network conveying high
consequence and perishable goods. At
certain times, and also in line with transit
requirements, there needs to be a way of
defining these services as having a higher
priority (but not necessary a higher speed).
By changing the headcodes to become a
class 3, with a suitable route briefing pack,
the trains can be managed differently on the
network, and treat with higher priority where
allowed.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Identification of the current and future freight Network Rail
services that convey high consequence and
perishable goods. These services need to
be amended in the working timetable and
any other requirements changed to allow the
services to operate. A proposal has been
submitted via a "proposal for change
document - SDP 1226". Previous
conversations on the subject have taken
place with all the main Freight Operators,
including DB Schenker, Freightliner, Direct
Rail Services, GBRf and Colas. Due to a
specific incident in 2012 involving high
consequence goods, a new requirement for
the conveyance of this traffic has led to an
urgent requirement to address the issue.
DB Schenker has requested that a specific
train has a different headcode with
immediate effect, and Direct Rail Services
have shown considerable support for the
perishable goods that they carry. Also,
discussions with the Network Rail Freight
Director and his team have taken place, and
they are looking into any commercial issues
that may arise with the change.
Certificate Issue Date
01/03/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
TOM
Lead SC Approval Date
05/02/2013
Deviation Status
Current
GORT3056A
Two
Introduction and Classification of Freight
Trains
13-027-DGN
Higher priority Freight trains.
A2.1
National.
Currently, Freight trains are restricted to
class 4, 6, 7, 8, dependant on the
permissible speed of the train and wagons.
We currently have a number of train
services on the network conveying high
consequence and perishable goods. At
certain times, and also in line with transit
requirements, there needs to be a way of
defining these services as having a higher
priority (but not necessary a higher speed).
By changing the headcodes to become a
class 3, with a suitable route briefing pack,
the trains can be managed differently on the
network, and treat with higher priority where
allowed.
Identification of the current and future freight Network Rail
services that convey high consequence and
perishable goods. These services need to
be amended in the working timetable and
any other requirements changed to allow the
services to operate. A proposal has been
submitted via a "proposal for change
document - SDP 1226". Previous
conversations on the subject have taken
place with all the main Freight Operators,
including DB Schenker, Freightliner, Direct
Rail Services, GBRf and Colas. Due to a
specific incident in 2012 involving high
consequence goods, a new requirement for
the conveyance of this traffic has led to an
urgent requirement to address the issue.
DB Schenker has requested that a specific
train has a different headcode with
immediate effect, and Direct Rail Services
have shown considerable support for the
perishable goods that they carry. Also,
discussions with the Network Rail Freight
Director and his team have taken place, and
they are looking into any commercial issues
that may arise with the change.
01/03/2013
N/A
TOM
05/02/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-026-DGN
Lewes station, Down Siding - Equipment in
overrun risk zone.
6.3.1.1
The position of the gate line is dictated by its
position in relation to the existing over bridge
stairs (a minimum run off of six metres is
required from the bottom of the stairs to
avoid queuing up them) and also the need
for visibility for platform staff to dispatch
trains. The position of the existing ramp and
steps from the platform would mean
passengers exiting the gates would have to
make a 90 degree turn to exit the station
which would cause congestion on both the
ramp and platform and also obscure the
view for train dispatch.
N/A
INS
06/03/2013
Current
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-022-DGN
Elstree and Borehamwood station platform 2- 6.2.2
3 - reduced platform width at lift shaft and
stairs
The existing layout is shown on drawing
Southern Railway
5437/02/06. The risk weighting factor
(calculated using the methodology in
Appendix A of GI/GN7616 - Guidance on
Station Platform Geometry Issue One
December 2010) is 81. 28. The proposed
layout is shown on drawing 5437/02/07. The
risk weighting factor (calculated using the
methodology in Appendix A of GI/GN7616 Guidance on Station Platform Geometry
Issue One December 2010) is 81. 28. The
analysis shows that the risk within the buffer
stop overrun remains the same and is
unaffected by the proposals.
For the installation of a new footbridge and The action taken as previously described
Network Rail
lifts at Elstree &amp; Borehamwood station has been undertaken to try to achieve
following design iterations, a derogation
compliance or minimise the effect of the
against platform width is required. For
required derogation. Minor degree - A
linespeeds less than 100 mph, the minimum reduction of 60 mm below the requirements
clear dimensions to the platform edge to the of NR/L2/TRK/2049 and GI/RT7016 will be
nearest face of the building structure shall
provided over a limited length of platform.
be 2500 mm, only 2440 mm will be provided The reduction covers the 6 m length of the
over limited lengths. The Access for All
lift shaft and LMR and approximately 5 m of
works at Elstree and Borehamwood Station platform adjacent to the lower flight of the
require the installation of a new footbridge
stairs.
and lifts on all platforms. The central island
platform, Platforms 2 and 3, are of limited
width. If the 3000 mm required clearance on
Platform 3 is provided, the clear platform
width on Platform 2 will be 2440 mm a
reduction of 60 mm below the requirements
of the standards.
12/03/2013
GIRT7016
Lewes station. The deviation applies to the
construction of a set of steps and installation
of a ticket vending machine within the 20 m
overrun from the buffer stops to the down
siding at Lewes Station (as shown on
drawings: 5437/02/06 and 5437/02/07).
New access steps: Located in Area A
"High" risk zone. New Ticket Vending
Machine: Located in Area A "High" risk
zone. The Down Siding can only be
accessed by use of a Ground Frame and
there are very few movements that will be
approaching the buffer stops during normal
operating hours.
The lift shaft, lift machine room, and
footbridge stair on Platform 2-3 at Elstree
and Borehamwood station will have reduced
clearance on the Platform 2 side only.
22/03/2013
N/A
INS
06/03/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-019-DGN
Euston station platform 18 - reduced buffer
stop overrun risk zone
Geographical scope is the southern end of
Euston platform 18. Existing platform 18
buffer stop and secondary units. Proposed
new equipment is a Modular Sliding Friction
Buffer Stop currently as used at Euston
platforms 5 and 6. Please refer to attached
drawing Ref. BBRTS DWG No. 141977.
The project seeks to replace the existing
buffer stop and install the new unit 11 m
closer to the terminal wall. This brings
existing structures, specifically some
unoccupied rooms, inside the overrun risk
zone. It also brings an existing roof support
column closer to the buffer stop face.
Please see attached drawing B90308-DRGCIV0002 for details of the areas affected and
the attached reports. Our requirements to
become compliant, without a derogation,
would entail major station or track
restructuring. As part of the Grip 3 report, a
risk assessment has been carried out that
supports the proposal.
26/04/2013
N/A
INS
06/03/2013
Current
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
6.3.2.1
The unoccupied rooms behind the platform Network Rail
end wall have a zero weighting as per risk
assessment process outlined in GC/RC5633
and GI/GN7616, and therefore have zero
impact on the risk assessment process with
regards risk of fatality to passengers, staff
&amp; members of the public (please see
report attached). Furthermore, the southern
end of platform 18 is rarely frequented by
members of the public. The existing
combined roof support/OHLE column is the
last column of the trainshed roof. All the
other columns are within the derailment risk
zone, approximately 1. 5 m from the nearest
rail. Moving the buffer stop back by 11 m
will bring the second till last column out of
the overrun risk zone and into the derailment
risk zone and bring the last column from 17
m to 6 m behind the buffer stop face. · The
proposed Buffer stop arrangement is
already in use on platforms 5 and 6 at
Euston with similar stopping tolerances.
The buffer stop will reduce the trains speed
by the same amount as the current buffer
stop arrangement within a reduced sliding
distance. · The rooms behind the platform
end wall are unoccupied as detailed within
the reports attached. · The southern end of
platform 18 is rarely frequented by members
Page 71
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
13-017-DGN
Title
Selhurst Station - extension of platforms;
reduced platform recess.
RGS Clause
11.1.4
Scope
Selhurst Station is located approximately 9
miles 31 chains from London. Equipment
involved: station platforms, bridge girders.
GKRT0045
Two
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
13-015-DGN
Performance Category for Colour Light
Signals at London Bridge (Medium-Range
Signals).
2.2.1.10 and 2.2.1.11
Permit use of medium range colour light
signals for signals in the London Bridge
area. London Bridge re-signalled area
including all lines from stations: Charing
Cross/Cannon Street/Farringdon/London
Bridge Platforms 8-16, to stations: Deptford,
St Johns, Brockley and Queens Road
Peckham'.
GKRT0075
Two
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
13-014-DGN
Minimum Braking Distances MLN1 for
Reading Outer Relock.
2.3.1
· Reading Outer Relock &amp; Immunise
(RORI) West, B & H Project Area · Reading
Outer (West) MLN1 41m 60ch to 51m 50ch ·
Up Main - T832 (Appendix B & C), T824
(Appendix B & C), T816 (Appendix B), T808
(Appendix B), T800 (Appendix B), T792
(Appendix B), T784 (Appendix B) · Down
Main - T821 (Appendix B & C), T829
(Appendix B & C), T837 (Appendix C), T845
(Appendix C) · Up Relief - T786 (Appendix
B), T794 (Appendix B), T802 (Appendix B),
T810(Appendix B), T818(Appendix B),
T826(Appendix B), T834(Appendix B) ·
Down Relief - T831 (Appendix B), T823
(Appendix B). · Reading Outer (B & H )
BHL 38m 70ch to 56m 09ch · Up Westbury T2856 (Appendix B).
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
13-013-DGN Revised
25-10-2013
Derogation to GM/RT2130 Issue 3 for the
MPVs (Base vehicle, including Open-line
MPVs and Wagons of the Network Rail High and In-Possession cabs), Wagons (InOutput OLE Construction System (HOPS).
Possession cabs on wagons): · Clause 2.1
Vehicle fire performance categories · Clause
2.2 General requirements (except clause
2.2.4) · Clause 2.3 Safeguarding continued
operation in the event of fire · Clause 2.7
Equipment cubicles and equipment cases ·
Clause 2.9 Material fire performance
categories and selection · Clause 2.10
Layered materials and assemblies (except
clauses 2.10.6 and; 2.10.7). MPVs and;
Wagons (Working equipment, including
Work Modules and Welfare Modules): · All
clauses.
GERT8030
Four
Requirements for Train Protection and
Warning System
13-012-DGN
TPWS enhanced functionality for three
Class 66 locomotives converted for use in
the UK.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Appendix F and Appendix H
This application is to permit non-compliance
with the RGS standard clauses of
GM/RT2130 Issue 3 as identified in 6b
above (RGS clauses) for the following
vehicles. MPV vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB): ·
99 70 9131 010 - 9 · 99 70 9131 013 - 3 · 99
70 9131 021 - 6 · 99 70 9131 022 - 4 · 99 70
9131 023 - 2. Type 2 (HOPB): · 99 70 9131
001 - 8 · 99 70 9131 005 - 9 · 99 70 9131
006 - 7 · 99 70 9131 011 - 7. Type 3
(SNPB): · 99 70 9131 015 - 8 · 99 70 9131
018 - 2 · 99 70 9131 020 - 8. Type 4
(HNPB): · 99 70 9131 003 - 4. Type 5
(SORB): · 99 70 9131 014 - 1. Wagons:
Type KFA: · 99709131002-6 · 997091310042 · 99709131008-3 · 99709131009-1 ·
99709131012-5 · 99709131016-6 ·
99709131017-4 · 99709131019-0. Type
JNA: · NLU 29024.
Nature and Degree
Sussex Train Lengthening Project involves
the extension of platforms on the Sussex
suburban route (ELR: BTH2) to accept tencarriage length trains (from eight-carriages).
Selhurst Station is sited some 9 miles 31
chains from London. The useable length of
Platform 1 (Down Slow) is to be extended on
the London End by 26. 350 m and Platform 2
(Up Slow) is to be extended by 43. 950 m to
203 m. This involves extending the platform
over a 20 m length of the existing girders of
an underline bridge. It is not reasonably
practicable to provide a compliant solution:
in order to comply with all of the RGS
requirements the existing bridge decks
forming Dagnall Park underbridge VTB1
55A would require reconstruction. The site
is constrained by the current track geometry
and the current railway corridor boundaries.
The track layout and geometry constraints to
the immediate north and south of the station
are carried by a series of arches and
underbridges on the North by Dagnall Park
Road Underbridge, and on the South by
A213 Selhurst Road Underbridge. It is only
possible to extend towards the North over
Dagnall Park Road Bridge. The proposed
platform extensions at these locations are
proposed to be supported by new platform
Use of signals to Category 1 or 2 are not the
most appropriate solution at London Bridge
due to the risk of read-across and readthrough there.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Low severity issue. Passengers waiting for Network Rail
trains in the morning peak spread out along
the platform. The station entrance is at the
opposite end of the platform, with the waiting
room and canopied area about half way
along. The maximum platform length
proposed to have non-compliant
recess/refuge provision is approximately 24
m. The maximum distance from a compliant
refuge will therefore be no greater than
approximately 12 m. The non-compliance is
at the opposite end of the platform from the
station entrance, beyond the waiting room
and canopied area which are about half way
along.
Certificate Issue Date
03/04/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
06/03/2013
Deviation Status
Current
The workshop recommended two types of Network Rail
signal: medium-range, narrow-beam and
medium-range, wide-beam. Note that
medium-range, wide-beam signals achieve
the same performance as conventional
filament lamp signals fitted with a
spreadlight lens, which have been in use for
a significant period. Medium-range, widebeam colour light signal: · 400 m,
performance, up to +/-10 degrees off axis
with a gradual reduction in intensity outside
of this range. Medium-range, narrow-beam
colour light signal: · 400 m, performance up
to +/- 3 degrees off axis with a sharp drop in
intensity outside this range. The mediumrange signals will be developed via the
product acceptance process and adhere to
Network Rail Standard `Product Introduction
and Change' - NR/L2/RSE/100/05, Issue 1.
20/03/2013
N/A
CCS
21/02/2013
Current
To make signals compliant would require
significant changes to the layout and position
of all signals on the routes. It is not
considered reasonably practicable to make
compliant with the standard requirements as
the costs of moving signals and further
driver route knowledge outweighs any safety
benefit, and would delay roll out of ERTMS
and electrification on the route. See
attached Signalling Compliance Approach
Western Mainline Signalling Renewal, and
Tracker 11067 Supportive Information.
As there will be no change to the
Network Rail
operational railway, maintaining the current
signal positions (and non-compliance) is
considered to have a minimal impact. As
detailed within Risk Assessment Report Reading Outer Re-signal and Immunise
(RORI) - Appendix C, each signal identified
by SDG Service Braking Model has been
reviewed and considered as part of the risk
assessment process in the development of
the scheme, and it has been concluded that
current signal position is acceptable. It is
not considered reasonably practicable to
make compliant with the standard
requirements as the costs of repositioning
signals and further driver route
knowledge/learning outweighs any safety
benefits of moving signals a few metres.
Speeds and Signals were reviewed as part
of the introduction of HSTs in the late 1970s.
Revision of speed was considered
unnecessary and unacceptable from a
performance point of view. See attached
Signalling Compliance Approach Western
Mainline Signalling Renewal, section 3. 1
(Signal positions, spacing and sighting), and
Tracker 11067 Supportive Information.
Use of the alternative actions are considered Windhoff Bahn- und
to deliver an equivalent level of control and Anlagentechnik GmbH
safety and will not require any further
ongoing actions or operational constraints.
20/03/2013
N/A
CCS
21/02/2013
Current
12/03/2013
N/A
Rolling Stock
04/10/2013
Current
The TPWS equipment fitted to these three GB Railfreight Ltd
locomotives would be identical to that fitted
to the remainder of the fleet of Class 66
operated by GB Railfreight. The applicant
believes that the TPWS equipment is in fact
identical to all other Class 66s owned and
operated by other freight companies in the
UK. Given the number of occasions when
Class 66s are hired from one freight
operator to another, or when one FOC driver
drives another FOC's locomotive as part of
their normal duties, consistency between
locomotive fleets is important. As these
Class 66s will be operated as part of a
nationwide fleet, use of consistent TPWS
equipment minimise the risk of confusion
and errors, particularly in emergency
situations. A consistent TPWS MMI, buttons
and indicator lights is considered to offer the
clearest interface to drivers.
20/03/2013
N/A
CCS
21/02/2013
Current
In travelling/transit mode, these MPVs will
be compliant with the Technical
Specifications for Interoperability (TSI)
requirements, including the Locomotive and
Passenger TSI. In addition, they will be
compliant with all applicable Notified
National Technical Rules (NNTRs) to cover
open points and specific cases, and ensure
compatibility with the GB mainline system
(Network Rail managed infrastructure).
GMRT2130 is a listed NNTR and the
application for derogation (12/167/DGN)
originally sought non-compliance with
Clause 2. 9. The current application has
been expanded to include additional clauses
as detailed in 6b above (Clause
requirements). Within GMRT2130 Issue 3,
there are a number of requirements that are
neither related to TSI Open points/Specific
cases nor compatibility with the GB system.
These requirements have comparable
requirements within the suite of TSIs,
therefore compliance with these RGS
requirements duplicates the TSI
assessment. Consequently, additional effort
and cost will be expended both in respect of
production of the evidence of compliance
and in its subsequent assessment by the
Designated Body. It is also possible that,
Fitting of TPWS equipment to three Class
TPWS equipment that is validated as
66 locomotives, numbers 92 70 0066 747-1, compliant with the requirements of
92 70 0066 748-9 and 92 70 0066 749-7 to
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 is not available. The
allow operation in the UK. It is proposed to two suppliers of TPWS equipment are
fit these three locomotives with TPWS
developing and testing suitable equipment
equipment compliant with Issue 2 of
but it will not be available during the
GE/RT8030.
conversion and delivery programme for
these three locomotives. The impact of
complying with the current RGS requirement
would be to delay significantly the
introduction to service of these three
locomotives, with a consequent effect upon
the ability of GB Railfreight to provide
traction for UK railfreight services. Were the
equipment available, a considerable amount
of design and re-engineering would be
required prior to fitment, particularly within
the cab area, leading to these three
locomotives having a significantly different
cab arrangement to the remainder of the
fleet in the UK.
Page 72
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2461
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and On-Track Machines.
Certificate Number
13-011-DGN
Title
Derogation to GM/RT 2461 Issue 1 Sanding system for Windhoff MPV on-track
machines.
RGS Clause
Clause 8.5 - System testing facility Clause
9.1 - Delivery to the rail head Clause 9.3.1 Braking mode.
Scope
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard clauses
of GM/RT2461 Issue 1 as identified in 6b
above, for the following MPV vehicles. Type
1 (SOPB): · 99 70 9131 010 - 9 · 99 70 9131
013 - 3 · 99 70 9131 021 - 6 · 99 70 9131
022 - 4 · 99 70 9131 023 - 2. Type 2
(HOPB): · 99 70 9131 001 - 8 · 99 70 9131
005 - 9 · 99 70 9131 006 - 7 · 99 70 9131
011 - 7 . Type 3 (SNPB): · 99 70 9131 015 8 · 99 70 9131 018 - 2 · 99 70 9131 020 - 8.
Type 4 (HNPB): · 99 70 9131 003 - 4.
GERT8035
Two
Automatic Warning System (AWS)
13-010-DGN
Derogation to GE/RT 8035 Issue 2 Automatic Warning System (AWS) for
Windhoff MPV on-track machines.
Clause 2.6.8.2
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS standard clause of
GE/RT8035 Issue 2 as identified in 6b
above, for the following MPV vehicles: Type
1 (SOPB): · 99 70 9131 010 - 9 · 99 70 9131
013 - 3 · 99 70 9131 021 - 6 · 99 70 9131
022 - 4 · 99 70 9131 023 - 2. Type 2
(HOPB): · 99 70 9131 001 - 8 · 99 70 9131
005 - 9 · 99 70 9131 006 - 7 · 99 70 9131
011 - 7. Type 5 (SORB): · 99 70 9131 014 1.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
13-009-DGN
Derogation to GM/RT2000 Issue 3 for the
MPVs of the Network Rail High Output OLE
Construction System (HOPS)
See details of RGS clauses in Appendix 1.
Type 1 (SOPB): · 99 70 9131 010 - 9, · 99
70 9131 013 - 3, · 99 70 9131 021 - 6, · 99
70 9131 022 - 4, · 99 70 9131 023 - 2. Type
2 (HOPB): · 99 70 9131 001 - 8, · 99 70
9131 005 - 9, · 99 70 9131 006 - 7, · 99 70
9131 011 - 7. Type 3 (SNPB): · 99 70 9131
015 - 8, · 99 70 9131 018 - 2, · 99 70 9131
020 - 8 . Type 4 (HNPB): · 99 70 9131 003 4. Type 5 (SORB): · 99 70 9131 014 - 1.
GMRT2400
Four
Engineering design of on-track machines
13-008-DGN
Non-provision of lifeguards on an OTM
operating as lead vehicle in a possession.
3.25.12
GERT8000-TW1
Eight
Preparation and movement of trains General
13-007-DGN
Higher priority Freight trains.
Section 2
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The MPV test facility is situated in the
drivers cab, not on the underframe, and the
basis of the Network Rail High Output OLE
Construction System (HOPS) Project design
is to utilise read-over (existing) design
systems and equipment that are proven in
application wherever possible. To comply
with the standard will entail a number of
design changes to be implemented, with no
significant improvement in safety or
functionality. The MPVs have four axles
only. Two powered axles are fitted to one
bogie and two non-powered axles are fitted
to the other bogie. The axles of the powered
bogie are fitted with sanding units outboard
of each wheel. The group standard was
written to accommodate conventional twocar units with a total of eight axles. Without
a complete redesign and re-build of the
MPVs, it is not possible to comply with the
requirements of the standard. The stopping
distance under low adhesion conditions is
naturally lengthened, and it can get out of
driver's control, unless mitigations are
considered. The option not to fit sanding for
braking is therefore not acceptable. (See
also previous approved derogation
(11/137/DGN) which described two low
speed collisions involving Class 142 multiple
TPWS equipment that is validated as
compliant with the requirements of
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 is not available. The
two suppliers of TPWS equipment are
developing and testing suitable equipment
but it will not be available during the
construction and delivery programme for
these machines. The functionality required
to achieve compliance with the requirements
of clause 2. 6. 8. 2 of GE/RT8035 Issue 2
forms part of the new generation TPWS
equipment and is not currently available.
The impact of complying with the current
RGS requirement would be to significantly
delay the project to introduce this type of
machine to the UK.
Applicant Organisation
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
Certificate Issue Date
20/03/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
15/02/2013
Deviation Status
Current
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
20/03/2013
N/A
CCS
21/02/2013
Current
Use of the alternative actions are considered Windhoff Bahn- und
to deliver an equivalent level of control and Anlagentechnik GmbH
safety and will also not require any further
ongoing actions or operational constraints.
22/03/2013
N/A
RST
15/02/2013
Current
Installation of an on-track plant type device Windhoff Bahn- und
that meets the requirements of RIS-1530Anlagentechnik GmbH
PLT Issue 4 may pose a risk when the
vehicles are in travel mode outside
possession. In order to mitigate this risk, the
design will be retractable or removable.
Evidence of compliance with RIS-1530-PLT
when the machine is working within a
possession and other standards when
travelling outside a possession will be
submitted to the NoBo/DeBo/CP in support
of demonstrating conformance of the
vehicles to all required standards. The use
of this alternative action is considered to
deliver an equivalent level of control and
safety that will not require further actions or
operational constraints.
Currently, Freight trains are restricted to
Identification of the current and future freight Network Rail
class 4, 6, 7, 8, dependant on the
services that convey high consequence and
permissible speed of the train and wagons. perishable goods. These services need to
We currently have a number of train
be amended in the working timetable and
services on the network conveying high
any other requirements changed to allow the
consequence and perishable goods. At
services to operate. A proposal has been
certain times, and also in line with transit
submitted via a "proposal for change
requirements, there needs to be a way of
document - SDP 1226". Previous
defining these services as having a higher
conversations on the subject have taken
priority (but not necessary a higher speed). place with all the main Freight Operators,
By changing the headcodes to become a
including DB Schenker, Freightliner, Direct
class 3, with a suitable route briefing pack,
Rail Services, GBRf and Colas. Due to a
the trains can be managed differently on the specific incident in 2012 involving high
network, and treat with higher priority where consequence goods, a new requirement for
allowed.
the conveyance of this traffic has led to an
urgent requirement to address the issue.
DB Schenker has requested that a specific
train has a different headcode with
immediate effect, and Direct Rail Services
have shown considerable support for the
perishable goods that they carry. Also,
discussions with the Network Rail Freight
Director and his team have taken place, and
they are looking into any commercial issues
that may arise with the change.
04/03/2013
N/A
PLT
07/02/2013
Current
01/03/2013
N/A
TOM
05/02/2013
Current
These MPVs will be compliant with the
Technical Specifications for Interoperability
(TSI) requirements, including the
Locomotive and Passenger TSI. In addition,
they will be compliant with all applicable
Notified National Technical Rules (NNTRs)
to cover open points and specific cases, and
ensure compatibility with the GB mainline
system. They will also operate off transEuropean Network (TEN) routes and
therefore the complete suite of RGSs is
applicable. Within these RGSs, there are a
significant number of requirements that are
not directly related to TSI open points,
specific cases or compatibility. These
requirements have equivalent or
comparable requirements within the suite of
TSIs, therefore compliance with these RGS
requirements duplicates the TSI
assessment. Consequently, additional effort
and cost will be expended both in respect of
production of the evidence of compliance
and in its subsequent assessment by the
Designated Body. It is also possible that,
due to the differences in the detail of the
requirements, conflicts might exist that either
prevent full compliance with both the TSI
and RGS clauses, or necessitate a more
complex design. Due to both the additional
This application applies to existing KFA and The retro design and fitting of lifeguards
Falcon wagons modified and re-classified as compliant with the standard would be
OTMs to form part of the Network Rail High extremely difficult since the wagons are
Output OLE Construction System (HOPS)
fitted with traditional freight bogies which
that will be hauled in train formation when
were not designed as a leading bogie to
travelling to and from site, and either hauled carry lifeguards. The associated costs with
or propelled when working in a possession the design and testing of a compliant retro fit
or work site. This application applies to the lifeguard are also considered prohibitive and
following vehicles when propelled as the
for these reasons, it is considered
leading vehicle. KFA wagons: ·
unreasonable to comply with the quoted
99709131002-6 · 99709131004-2 ·
RGS clause.
99709131008-3 · 99709131012-5 ·
99709131016-6 · 99709131017-4 ·
99709131019-0 · 99709131009-1 (not to be
fitted with lifeguards). Falcon wagon: ·
99709131007-5.
National.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Operation of the test facility from the driving
cab requires the driver to actuate the test
from the cab and then check that sand has
been discharged to the rail head. However,
this can be done as part of the normal train
preparation as is current practice. The
requirements of GM/RT2461 regarding
sanding positions with regard to wheelsets
and sand deposition rates were based on
ensuring that the train applying sand, and
the train following the train applying sand
would be detected, I. e. would operate track
circuits. However, the other key requirement
is that the sanding system is effective. In
considering the impact, the Project has
reviewed the history of the fitment of sanding
systems to the Class 142 DMU fleet (two-car
MU with a total of four axles). Extensive
testing was carried out to investigate the
effect of sanding with regards to track
circuits for these units. These tests
supported the derogation for these
lightweight units with a reduced number of
wheel sets. The Project has concluded that,
under transit arrangements, the impact of
the MPV design with sanding devices to the
leading wheel set at significantly increased
axle loads (20 tonnes), compared to the
Class 14X forward of the first axle, is
The TPWS/AWS installed on these
machines would have the same functionality
as on all relevant self-propelled Windhoff
machines supplied to the UK. The annual
mileages covered by On-Track Machines
when transiting is significantly lower than for
locomotives and multiple units. Almost all
transit moves are undertaken outside peak
traffic hours. The reliability of the current
design of equipment is extremely good and
the lack of ability to separately isolate AWS
is not seen as causing any significant
increase in risk.
Page 73
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8035
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Automatic Warning System (AWS)
Certificate Number
13-004-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
AWS caution acknowledgment period for
2.8.5.1
Class 350/4 operated by First Transpennine
Express
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
13-002-DGN
Streatham Common Station, Platform 2 (Up
Slow line at Country end.) - platform width.
GMRT2400
Four
Engineering Design of On Track Machines
12-234-DGN
Volumetric mixers proof and fatigue loading. 3.25.6
GERT8035
Two
Automatic Warning System (AWS)
12-233-DGN
Non-provision of AWS at HS1 to Network
Rail Interface for Class 92 locomotives.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
7.2.1 (b), 7.4.1
2.2.2.1
Scope
Nature and Degree
The derogation being sought would apply to Experience has shown that the rate of
Class 350 / 4 EMUs operated by First
occurrence of late to cancel AWS/TPWS
Transpennine Express.
incidents increases when the AWS
acknowledgement period is set at two
seconds. The response of the brakes is
almost instantaneous. It is now intended to
construct the new Class 35/4 EMU with a
maximum speed capability of 110 mph.
These units will be operated by First
Transpennine on the West Coast Mainline
from Manchester, Liverpool to Glasgow /
Edinburgh and return. The construction and
introduction of this fleet will increase
capacity on the afore-mentioned route,
furthermore allowing FTPE to cascade
Class 185s currently on this route to the
Transpennine route, again dramatically
enhancing capacity. Under the current
requirements of clause 2. 8. 5. 2
(GE/RT8035), it would be required to
introduce these units with a two second
AWS audible warning cancellation
timescale. This would introduce
inconsistency with the reset timescales of
the other FTPE traction fleets (others being
2. 7 seconds). This inconsistency will result
in late AWS cancellations occurring on the
Class 350/4 units in service. These late
cancellations will introduce safety risk and
Streatham Common Station: Station
The Sussex Route Suburban Train
platform - Platform 2 (Up Slow line at
Lengthening project seeks to increase
Country end).
passenger capacity over selected routes by
increasing train lengths from eight to ten
cars. This requires platform extensions on
the Slow Lines at a number of stations
including Streatham Common. Streatham
Common station comprises four platforms
as follows: · Platform 1 - Down Slow. ·
Platforms 2/3 - Up Slow/Down Fast. ·
Platform 4 - Up Fast. The main station
entrance is located on the Down side at
approximately the middle of the station with
inter platform access via a footbridge
located towards the Country end. A
footbridge (bridge No. 39 at 6m 50ch)
provides a secondary access on the Up side
onto Greyhound Lane. At the London end of
the station, the junction with the Streatham
Spurs is at the end of the Slow Lines
platforms. At the Country end, the railway is
crossed by an overbridge (bridge No. 40 at
6m 51ch - Greyhound Lane) which comprise
two spans over the Slow and Fast Lines
respectively with a tapered pier in the
interval between the Up Slow and Down
Fast lines. The interval between the Up
Slow and Down Fast reduces beyond the
overbridge. · Platform 2 is to be extended at
Balfour Beatty's volumetric concrete mixer
Balfour Beatty has installed a pair of
as defined in the attached description.
volumetric concrete mixers from a highway
Vehicle number NLU93264.
based vehicle onto a container flat railway
wagon. The mixer modules do not meet the
fatigue requirements of Rail Group Standard
GM/RT2400 issue 4 section 3. 25. 6 (body
mounted equipment). The manufacturer
advises that if the side walls of the hoppers
are strengthened to meet the standard, it will
quickly lead to failure of the hopper side
panels and frame. Additionally, the
manufacturer advises that strengthening the
side walls will reduce the effectiveness of
the vibrators leading to an uneven mix
quality. (See attached letter dated
14/05/2012 from NuRock limited). The subframe on which the hoppers are mounted
similarly fails to meet requirements of the
standard. Complying with the current RGS
requirement would mean the mixer will not
be suitable for purpose and Balfour Beatty
would not be able to continue to use it.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
We know, from previous incident frequency,
that the reduced acknowledgement period
increases the likelihood of late AWS
cancellations and subsequent emergency
stops. RSSB research has shown that
unnecessary AWS interventions reduce
driver confidence in the system. Reducing
the AWS acknowledgement time means
less time for the driver to view and consider
a fixed signal aspect, or speed sign, etc. ,
before acknowledging the warning. It is
therefore desirable to afford the maximum
time to the driver before cancelling the AWS
enabling greater assimilation of the signal /
sign being viewed. It should also be noted
that, at many signals on the West Coast
Main line, the prevailing distance from the
AWS magnet to the fixed signal exceeds the
180 metres laid out in GE/RT8035. The
impact of 2. 7 seconds, compared to the two
seconds, is mitigated by the additional
distance provided between these signals
and the AWS equipment. Furthermore
many signals and permanent speed
restrictions on the routes these units will
operate are fitted with TPWS to mitigate any
driver error on approach. Any marginal
increase in operational risk, should the AWS
reset timescale be expanded, is mitigated by
The overall objective of the Sussex Route
Suburban Train Lengthening project is to
increase passenger capacity and reduce
overcrowding while maintaining or
improving safety. At Streatham Common,
the scheme will be developed to ensure that
the track and platform design of the
extended platform will be compliant with the
requirements for stepping distances,
passing and lateral clearances. The length
of platform with limited width is at the
country end of the station beyond the
position of the main station entrance.
AF042, AF046 and AF048 signals on Up
and Down CTRL/NLL Connection.
At the boundaries between CTRL managed
infrastructure and Network Rail managed
infrastructure in the St Pancras area, the
distant signals are not provided with AWS
since these signals are controlled by CTRL
and within a CTRL designated AWS gap
area. The non-provision of AWS was
accepted by the CTRL SRP with the support
of Eurostar and Southeastern. As a
consequence, CTRL signals leading to the
Network Rail interface on the CTRL/NLL
Connection are not fitted with AWS and are
therefore not compliant with GE/RT8035
clause 2. 2. 1 b). A current derogation
covers this issue (07/099/DGN, Tracker No.
4733) that details the use of the KVB, as
being mitigation for the non-provision of
AWS on the distant signal. It is intended to
run Class 92 freight trains, which are not
fitted with this KVB system, along the
CTRL/NLL Connection. To comply with the
current derogation would require fitment of
KVB to Class 92 or provide AWS in line with
Clause 2. 2. 2. 1 b) on the distant signal
approaching NL1117 that has previously
been deemed to `introduce additional risks'
and `complicate the changeover process'.
The cost and complexity of fitting AWS far
outweighs the potential safety benefits.
Applicant Organisation
First / Keolis Transpennine
Express
Certificate Issue Date
20/03/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
21/02/2013
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
10/07/2013
N/A
INS
08/05/2013
Current
The impacts of allowing significant
Balfour Beatty Rail R Plant Ltd 24/05/2013
permanent deformation of the aggregate
hopper following critical acceleration levels
determined in BS EN 12663-1: 2010 are
crack formation and possible structural
failure. The daily inspection regime which
has been put in place will ensure earliest
signs of failure are spotted and inspections
will be carried out following any rough shunt.
Restrictions preventing haulage in freight
trains of the loaded vehicle will reduce the
risk further. Consultation has taken place
with the Network Rail client. GM/RT2400
issue 5 Draft 2i (August 2012) is expected to
become mandatory and hence the
alternative actions for the remaining
components of the mixer module are in
accordance with current industry best
practice.
N/A
PLT
10/04/2013
Current
Trains leaving the high speed line bound for Network Rail
Network Rail infrastructure (via the NLL
connection) will have the AWS/TPWS
switched on and proved operational during
the changeover between TVM430 cab
signalling and lineside signalling. The
speed of approach to each of the stop
signals is low (25 mph maximum).
Additionally, TPWS is provided at the stop
signals and this has been designed to be
effective mitigation at controlling overruns at
NL1117. Lineside signage has been located
at each interface to remind the driver he is
entering an AWS fitted area and appropriate
signs are provided for the traction
configuration changeover at NL1117 on the
NLL Connection. As a further current
mitigation, all trains must stop at signal
NL1117 on the NLL Connection, which is the
first NR signal. While stopped at this signal,
the driver must change the cab configuration
from BR HSL to BR AC mode. This again
switches on the AWS and TPWS and
performs a self-test of both systems. The
movement of trains onto the North London
Line connection from CTRL is under the
control of the North London Line signaller at
Upminster Signalling Control Centre.
Routes to the NLL connection are requested
N/A
CCS
24/01/2013
Current
02/05/2013
Page 74
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
12-231-DGN
Title
Hayes and Harlington, platforms 2 and 3 reduced platform width at new fenceline
RGS Clause
6.2.2
Scope
144. 3 m of 1. 4 m high grey galvanised
fencing to restrict access to the main line
side of the island platform (platforms 2 and
3) at Hayes and Harlington; of this 144. 3 m,
9 m would be out of compliance and is what
the derogation relates to. There will be five
sliding gates within the fence to allow
access and egress where necessary
between the main lines and relief lines.
These gates will be left open in the rare
occasions where services need to call on the
main line platforms at the station and will be
left open for all of the time that the station is
unmanned, such as overnight.
GERT8073
Two
Requirements for the Application of
Standard Vehicle Gauges
12-230-DGN
Ecofret `Triple set' wagons - calculation of
side wind loads for W10 gauge.
1.2.7.6 and 2.1.2.5
This derogation covers the Ecofret wagons
which are being introduced in service in
Winter 2012. These wagons are configured
as a `Triple set' consisting of three vehicles,
two outer vehicles of car kind code FWA(A)
outer and one 'inner vehicle of car kind code
FWA(B), design code IFE966. This
derogation covers only inner wagon as the
outer wagons have already been granted a
derogation number 12/088/DGN. The
wagons are fitted with SCT bogies and are
required to carry 9' 6'' high containers in the
W10 gauge.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
12-229-DGN
Derogation for a Steam Locomotive
The clauses against which non-compliances Operation of the following preserved Steam
are sought can be found in Appendix 2 of
Locomotive on all lines, as agreed by the
this document.
NRAB and subsequently by the Licensed
Operator. B1 Class locomotive built in 1947
for the LNER Railway by the North British
Locomotive Co. Locomotive no. 61306
`Mayflower. TOPS No. 98506 Painted No.
61306 Class / Power Classification 5 Wheel
Arrangement 4-6-0 Maximum Speed 75
mph.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
12-228-DGN
Derogation for a Steam Locomotive
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-227-DGN
Gravesend Station platforms 1, 2 (new
platform) and 3 (existing platform 2).
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
A fence is planned to be added along the
island platform at Hayes and Harlington
which serves the Down Relief and Up Main
Lines. The purpose of the fence is to
achieve a greater degree of physical
separation between the lightly used main
line platform face and the highly used relief
line platform, because Hayes and Harlington
is a suicide "Hot Spot" which has seen nine
fatalities take place since 2006. The
majority of these fatalities involved a
member of the public stepping from the
island platform into the passage of a train on
the adjacent main lines. Providing the fence
will make it less easy for the public to
access the main line side of the fence (which
is generally not used) and, more importantly,
make it visibly clearer, should someone
access that side, so that preventative action
can be taken. Details of the proposed fence
are as follows: · 135. 3 m of which would be
new fencing within compliance · 9 m of
which would be new fencing which would be
out of compliance. The fence would contain
four 3 m sliding gates and one 4 m sliding
gate to allow access and egress between
the main and relief sides of the island
platform where necessary. The line speed
on the adjacent lines to the island platform at
One of the requirements for the W10 gauge
from GE/RT8073 appendix F shows a
second dynamic gauge line that includes the
effect of a wind loading. Although the W10
and W12 gauges are shown with an
additional gauge for dynamic movements
with wind, there is no information or other
guidance given in either GE/RT8073 or
GE/GN8573 on how to calculate the effect of
wind on a vehicle, such that it can be
compared against the relevant gauge line.
Various sources of information were sought
on this issue, but no one contacted at
Network Rail, RSSB or other industry
experts could shed light on the method to be
used for this assessment. Therefore, a
reasonable approach was derived as follows
by calculating the moment on the vehicle
due to the wind loading using the
methodology from GM/RT2142 issue 3
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to Roll-Over
in Gales. Calculations have been carried
out (see report Ecofret Gauging with Wind
Calculation - calculation 170902C02B)
based on the approach set out in section 9
of this certificate - Proposed alternative
actions, which show that the Ecofret FWA(B)
(triple inner ) wagons with SCT bogies are
within the gauge line for W10 gauge set out
It would not be practical to revise the RGS to
include steam locomotives, due to their wide
diversity of design from modern traction
units and the general scarcity of technical
information now available to prove their
compliance or otherwise. In a number of
recent re-issues of RGS, specific
exemptions for steam locomotives, shown in
the previous issues, have been withdrawn,
increasing the number of non-compliances
for which derogation has now to be sought.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Nine metres of fencing will be closer to the Network Rail
platform edge than the standard dictates;
however, the main line platforms are little
used (normally used only during diversions
as a result of engineering work on the Relief
Lines) and the fence will restrict public
access to this side of the platform when the
main lines are not being used by stopping
services. Access to the area where
clearance is less than standard will therefore
be minimal. The fenceline was agreed at a
site visit on the 30th of August between
Network Rail, Birse Rail, FGW and BTP
attendees listed below: · Network Rail:
Operations Risk Advisor, Works Delivery
Manager, Performance Improvement
Manager · British Transport Police: Crime
Reduction and Architectural Liaison Officer ·
First Great Western: Head of Safety, Project
Interface Manager, Station Manager.
Approval for the fence-line has been gained
by all parties present and, additionally, by
two cross-industry groups: the Community
Safety Partnership Group and Fatality
Working Groups. Both the BTP and the
Samaritans approve of the plans and similar
fencing schemes have been successful in
preventing fatalities at stations elsewhere in
the country, such as those in place at Purley,
It is suggested that the intention of
GB Railfreight Ltd
GE/RT8073 is to use a mean side wind
speed with an appropriate gust speed. All
other requirements to demonstrate
compliance with W10, including
requirements for static gauge and dynamic
movements, will be complied with.
As indicated in Appendix 7 of this
document. The preserved steam locomotive
is of a type that ran safely over the British
railway infrastructure since its introduction in
1942 and continued until its withdrawal from
revenue service. The locomotive was one of
the first locomotives to operate on BR under
the `return to steam' project in the 1970's
and had a history of reliable service. The
locomotive is intended for Heritage
Operation only. In order to achieve
compliance with RGS the cost would be
prohibitive and such engineering change
would also destroy the locomotive's
fundamental nature and authenticity as a
"heritage" vehicle. Making the locomotive
compliant would, in many instances, be
impractical because of the bulk and location
of the locomotive boiler.
The clauses against which non-compliances Operation of the following preserved Steam It would not be practical to revise the RGS to As indicated in Appendix 7 of this
are sought can be found in Appendix 2 of
Locomotive on all lines, as agreed by the
include steam locomotives, due to their wide document. The preserved steam locomotive
this document.
NRAB and subsequently by the Licensed
diversity of design from modern traction
is of a type that ran safely over the British
Operator. LMS Jubilee class steam
units and the general scarcity of technical
railway infrastructure since its introduction in
locomotive No. 45596 `Bahamas'. TOPS
information now available to prove their
1934 and continued until its withdrawal from
No. 98696 Painted No. 45596 Class / Power compliance or otherwise. In a number of
revenue service in 1966. After undergoing
Classification 6P Wheel Arrangement 4-6-0 recent re-issues of RGS, specific
overhaul the locomotive continued to
Maximum Speed 75 mph. This section has exemptions for steam locomotives, shown in operate for on BR lines at speed of up to
been revised to correct the TOPS number
the previous issues, have been withdrawn,
75mph until 1994. The locomotive is
from 98966 to 98696.
increasing the number of non-compliances intended for Heritage Operation only. In
for which derogation has now to be sought. order to achieve compliance with RGS the
cost would be prohibitive and such
engineering change would also destroy the
locomotive's fundamental nature and
authenticity as a "heritage" vehicle. Making
the locomotive compliant would, in many
instances, be impractical because of the
bulk and location of the locomotive boiler.
7.2.1, 2.1.2, 6.3.1 and 11.1.3
Gravesend Station platforms 1, 2 (new
platform) and 3 (existing platform 2) ELR
HDR Mileage: 23m 51ch.
This is an application for an amendment to
the derogation obtained July 2011 for
Gravesend Station No. 11/069/DGN,
Tracker No 8775. This application reflects
the complete derogation requested. This is
an application for deviation from four
clauses of Railway Group Standard
GI/RT7016 for the proposed platform
extensions at Gravesend Station: Clause 7.
2. 1 - Platform Width Clause 2. 1. 2 Platform Curvature Clause 6. 3. 1 - Buffer
Stop Over Run Clause 11. 1. 3 - Platform
Cross Falls Clause 7. 2. 1 - Platform Width
(Platform 1 and 2 only): Approximately the
last 40 m of the extension to Platforms 1 and
2 will taper from 2. 5 m to approximately 2. 1
m, and the short linking walkway between
Platform 1 and the new Platform 2 will be 2.
0 m wide only. Platform 3 is compliant with
respect to width, however. Clause 2. 1. 2 Platform Curvature (Platforms 1, 2 and 3)
The new island platform and the extensions
to the existing platforms will all have a radius
in places of below 1,000 m, and as low as
270 m at the Country end for approximately
90 m of the platform length. Stepping
distances are compliant throughout,
however, for all classes of rolling stock
operated by Southeastern over the route.
Certificate Issue Date
22/03/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
06/03/2013
Deviation Status
Current
05/03/2013
N/A
INS
08/01/2013
Current
West Coast Railway Company 06/02/2013
Ltd
N/A
RST
18/01/2013
Current
West Coast Railway Company 18/06/2013
Ltd
N/A
Rolling Stock
28/06/2013
Current
N/A
INS
06/03/2013
Current
Due to the physical constraints of the
Network Rail
station, it is impracticable to provide a
compliant solution to GI/RT7016. A HAZOP
risk assessment has been jointly undertaken
by Network Rail and Southeastern to
evaluate the possible risks associated with
deviation from clauses 7. 2. 1, 2. 1. 2 and 11.
1. 3, and to consider possible additional
operational controls to mitigate those risks.
A separate technical buffer stop risk
assessment (GC/RT5633) has been carried
out by the designer in accordance with
standards. The risk assessments took into
account operator knowledge of passenger
footfall and pedflow at each location.
Network Rail and Southeastern have
subsequently jointly concluded and agreed
that the risks associated with the proposed
deviations from GI/RT7016 are, in fact,
tolerable and can be maintained ALARP by
adopting and implementing the additional
mitigating operational controls identified
through the HAZOP risk assessment
process. The output of the risk assessments
is set out in Appendices C and D of the
attached document. Southeastern, as Duty
Holder, fully supports and endorses this
application (see Appendix E of attached
document). For the purposes of the
22/03/2013
Page 75
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
12-224-DGN
Title
Southall Platform 1, Down Main line reduced platform width.
RGS Clause
6.5, 7.2 and 7.4.
GMTT0088
One
Permissible Track Forces for Railway
Vehicles
12-222-DGN
Reduction of Operational Diameter for
wheels of 102 tonne GLW Wagons with
TF25 Bogies.
5.2 c)
GERT8082
One
GSM-R Cab Mobile, Great Britain Open
Interface Requirements (Rapid Response)
12-220-DGN
HMI on/off control arrangement for a GSM-R 3.3.2.7 b)
Transportable Radio.
GERT8035
Two
Automatic Warning System (AWS)
12-210-DGN
SN199 AWS Position.
2.2.1.7 and 2.2.1.10
GKRT0063
One
Approach Locking &amp; Train Operated
Route Release
12-209-DGN
West Hampstead Train Approaching
Approach Locking Release with Conditional
Double Red
Appendix A - A4
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
Great Western Main Line (MLN1) Southall
Platform 1, Down Main line.
Nature and Degree
At Southall station, Platforms 1 and 2 serve
the Main lines (linespeed 125 mph) while
Platforms 3 and 4 serve the Reliefs
(linespeed 80 mph Down Relief, 85 mph Up
Relief). Platform 1 is on the north face of an
island platform of solid infill construction with
brick riser walls; Platform 1's wall is
corbelled for the final 10 m of the London
end of the Platform. The northern face is
currently operational and serves the Down
Main line. The southern face is no longer
operational and is adjacent to the Southall
Down Yard lines (linespeed 15 mph); there
is no physical barrier to this platform face.
The proposed Crossrail service will operate
a 205 m-long ten-car service using
Platforms 3 and 4 during normal operations
(the Relief Lines) and Platforms 1 and 2
during perturbed situations when the Relief
Lines are out of use. As part of the
proposed works at Southall, it is planned to
extend Platform 1 by 59. 175 m; this
extension will be single face only (as shown
in Drawing No WSN1B-ECV-DRG-AEA000201 A02). Since Platform 1 serves the
Down Main line (linespeed 125 mph), the
requirement for platform extensions is a
width of 3000 mm, with any lighting columns
being the same distance away from the
102 tonne GLW HAA and MJA wagons fitted This is an extension upon derogation
with TF25 bogie operated by Freightliner
Certificate Number 01/082/DGN (issued
Ltd.
23/04/2001) allowing operation at 25. 4
tonne axle load on wheel diameters of
between 840 mm and 790 mm giving a Q/D
value of 0. 158 at the lower diameter, and an
extension to the previously granted
temporary non-compliance 09/127/TNC. It
is proposed to reduce the permitted wheel
diameters from 790 mm to 770 mm last
turning and from 778 mm to 764 mm at
scrapping, giving a Q/D value of 0. 165 at
the scrapping diameter. Currently,
Freightliner holds a derogation (Certificate
Number 01/082/DGN issued 23/4/2001) for
these vehicles to operate at full load on
wheel diameters of between 840 mm and
790 mm (which would demonstrate noncompliance to clause 5. 2(c)).
GSM-R Transportable Radios proposed to The impact of complying with current RGS
be used by drivers, in cabs, on all of the GB requirements for the transportable radio
Railway Network that has or will have GSM- would be: Complying with clause 3. 3. 2. 7
R coverage.
part b would require a software change
which would introduce a grossly
disproportionate cost when considering the
intent of the main clause 3. 3. 2. 7 is satisfied
and the transportable is a different
application to the fixed cab mobile
installation that is implied by the standard.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
No action plan is being put in place since
the alternatives are deemed as
impracticable. There is no impact on
existing services. Low. Platform 1 will not
be used by a stopping Crossrail service
unless the relief lines are out of service. As
such, it is unlikely that trains will be using
Platform 1 during peak hours.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
31/01/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Infrastructure
Lead SC Approval Date
08/01/2013
Deviation Status
Current
06/12/2012
N/A
RST
26/07/2012
Current
East Coast Main Line
Company Ltd
19/12/2012
N/A
CCS
06/12/2012
Current
Network Rail
10/01/2013
N/A
CCS
06/12/2012
Current
Network Rail
10/01/2013
N/A
CCS
06/12/2012
Current
Investigations undertaken (Interfleet Report Freightliner Heavyhaul Ltd
ITLR-T22695-002 refers) show that reducing
the wheel diameter to this level will have
minimal deviation from the allowances made
in the previous derogation (Certificate
Number 01/082/DGN issued on 23/4/2001)
and further to show that such a derogation
will have negligible effect on the rail contact
stress. Previously, the derogation
application was declined in favour of a
temporary non-compliance by Infrastructure
Standards Committee due to the lack of
knowledge relating to Q/D ratios as an
effective measure of contact stress.
Freightliner understands that a research
project is underway.
With consideration of the foregoing, the
level of impact / risk is considered to lie
within acceptable bounds because: · The
transportable has been developed as a
temporary mitigation against fixed cab radio
failure, not as a permanent solution. It is
proposed that the transportable is used for
as short amount of time as reasonably
possible to minimise against the loss of
DSD, PA and OTMR connectivity. · The
Transportable achieves the intent of clause
3. 3. 2. 7, although it has a different
configuration to the two options presented in
clauses 3. 3. 2. 7 a) and 3. 3. 2. 7 b). · This
specific requirement ceases to be a
mandatory in the proposed new Train Voice
Radio Standard. In this respect, the
transportable is compliant with the draft
Train Voice Radio Standard GK/RT0094
Issue 1 that is intended to replace
GE/RT8082 in 2013.
SN199 is on Down Relief Line located 4
To provide a compliant solution would
Impact of alternative action meets all of the
3/4m + 6ch on MLN1. The proposed AWSs require SN199 not to be repositioned at this requirements of 2. 2. 1. 4, 2. 2. 1. 5, 2. 2. 1. 6
will be on Down Relief and Down Goods
stage, and proposed signal spacing would
and 2. 2. 4, but does increase the time and
lines - (see attached plan extract).
not be achievable due to signal spacing
distance to greater than that defined in 2. 2.
constraints, or the temporary junction
1. 7. It is recognised that, due to train
positioned towards London, which would
drivers using signal AWS position to assist
mean the required standage would not
with stopping at signals, the distance is
achieved on the Goods Lines. Both options important and, if the magnet cannot be
would have significant cost in
placed at the standard distance, a longer
implementation when compared to a minor distance is generally better than a shorter
increase in AWS distance.
one. When passing a yellow aspect, drivers
are told to slow to a speed appropriate to
stop from the AWS when the AWS sounds
the train is then braked to a stand. This is
particularly important at night where the
distance to the signal is very difficult to
judge. For passenger trains, the yellow to
AWS speed is about 25 mph and for freights
is 5 or 10 mph. Due to the S & C, a
compliant solution is not possible, the above
is the reason for selecting a position at a
greater distance than the standard
requirement rather than one that is less than
the standard (147 m as shown on the
scheme plan). This position has been
endorsed by SSC as per 2. 2. 1. 11 as the
most suitable position.
Eight pairs of signals affected in the West
To provide a compliant solution would
Impact of the provision of a conditional
Hampstead PSB control area as part of the require extending the train approaching look- double red, means that the distant aspects
Midland Mainline Linespeed Improvement
back for an additional signal section due the then moving one signal back. See
Project. Look back arrangements apply to
requirement for provision of Conditional
consultation report for full details. However,
the inner signal approach locking release
Double Red (CDR) sequence. The CDR is the outer signal has an aspect only level of
only. · Inner WH61 outer WH59 (Down Fast required as part of the project for SPAD
control (designed to extend the influence of
approach to Radlett Junction) · Inner WH54 mitigation due to the increase line speeds
the TPWS) and that signal does not require
outer WH56 (Up Fast approach to Radlett
proposed. Provision of this additional
to any additional interlocking provision.
Junction) · Inner WH84 outer WH86 (Up
section, in most cases at West Hampsted
When the junction is not available or
Fast approach to Harpenden Junction) ·
PSB area, would involve significant
replaced, the outer signal will be held at red
Inner WH112 outer WH114 (Up Fast
alterations to existing interlocking and
only until the approaching train has passed a
approach to Leagrave Junction) · Inner
lineside infrastructure due to current
TPWS (OSS) at a position on the approach
WH134 outer WH136 (Up Fast approach to interlocking boundaries. Such changes
to the outer signal. Under these
Flitwick Junction) · Inner WH143 outer
would be substantial and disproportionate to circumstances, the outer signal will always
WH141 (Down Fast approach to Bedford
the benefits offered - see attached
clear (therefore effectively acting as a more
South Junction) · Inner WH156 outer
consultation report.
robust inner junction signal). Because the
WH158 (Up Fast approach to Bedford South
outer signal will always clear on the
Junction) · Inner WH162 outer WH164
approach of the train, the stopping position
(Bedford North Junction).
of the train is therefore at the same place as
it would be prior to the provision of CDR
controls. If the signal was put back, while a
driver may be `surprised' by a reversion, no
additional hazard arises because the outer
signal will always clear as the train
approaches, permitting the train to proceed
to the same position at which the driver was
planning to stop anyway. The release of
locking on the inner signal following a signal
reversion will be mitigated by the TPWS
Page 76
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2142
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to Roll-Over 12-202-DGN
in Gales
Title
RGS Clause
Derogation against GM/RT2142 Issue 3
2.1.1.1 b)
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to Roll-Over
in Gales.
Scope
· Wagon Type Code: Tafoos · Description:
102t Biomass Hopper Wagons for UK Use
Only · Vehicle Number Range:
83700698001-0 to 83700698501-9.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-201-DGN
Stalybridge Station Proposed Platforms 4
and 5 - reduced platform width.
7.2.1 (b), 7.3.1 (b), 7.4.1
Stalybridge Station Proposed Platforms 4
and 5. ELR MVL2 7M1527yds to MVL2
1557yds Down Huddersfield Line.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-200-DGN
Brighton Station - Overrun risk zone.
6.3.1.1
As shown on drawing 5374/CC/02/01 Rev
ORR. Excess Fare and Information Booth:
Side in Area C "Low" risk zone Retail Unit
12: Side in Area C "Low" risk zone.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-198-DGN
Southall station fencing between platforms
2/3 - reduced platform width.
6.2.2
The scope of the deviation relates to 123. 4
m of 1. 4 m high grey galvanised fencing to
restrict access to the main line side of the
island platform (platforms 2 and 3) at
Southall; of this 123. 4 m, 10. 1 m would be
out of compliance. There will be five sliding
gates within the fence to allow access and
egress where necessary between the main
lines and relief lines. These gates will be left
open in the rare occasions where services
need to call on the main line platforms at the
station and will be left open for all of the time
that the station is unmanned, such as
overnight.
GCRT5112
Two
Rail Traffic Loading Requirements for the
Design of Railway Structures
12-195-DGN
Limehouse Station Platform 2 - loading on
lift shaft.
7.1.2 and 7.1.3
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The impact of complying with Issue 3 of
GM/RT2142 would be a combination of a
reduction in the operating speed below 75
mph (tare) and an increase in tare mass.
The ability for these vehicles to run at 75
mph is a significant advantage to the owner /
operator when securing paths on the
network. Equally, the client requires the
wagon to carry the maximum possible
payload, and this is achieved by reducing
the tare mass as much as possible
(estimated at 29. 25t). Increasing the tare
mass to comply with this standard would
significantly compromise the payload
capacity of the wagon. Alternatively, to
comply with the standard, the side area of
the vehicle would need to be reduced, as
this is the major factor in calculation. This
could only be achieved via major redesign of
the vehicle structure leading to a reduction
of the carrying capacity of the vehicle. The
vehicle would then be uneconomic to
operate.
Stalybridge Station Platforms 4 and 5. A
new bay platform, Platform 5, is to be
constructed adjacent to existing Platform 1
(which will be renumbered as Platform 4).
The proposed permanent way alignments at
the Ashton end of the station restrict the
usable width of these new arrangements:
on the shared double face Platform 4 and 5
to 3915 mm tapering from 4000 mm over a
2160 mm distance (at the end of Platform 4);
on single face Platform 5 to 2050 mm
tapering from 2500 mm over a 9440 mm
distance at the end of Platform 5. The
proposed platform layout is shown on
drawing No. 664687-CIV-DRG-0001-C01A1 'Stalybridge Station Platform Extension
General Arrangement'. An overview of the
area can be seen in drawing
'SP&amp;C_LNW_002_Stalybridge version
5. 0. pdf'. The proposed commissioning
date is November 2012.
Excess Fare and Information Booth would
be limited in size and configuration and
could not provide all welfare and security
requirements for staff working in the booth,
preventing Gateline reconfiguration
proceeding. Passenger facilities worsen
and business case for project fails due to
removal of Retail Unit 12.
A fence is planned to be added along the
island platform at Southall which serves the
Down Relief and Up Main Lines. The
purpose of the fence is to achieve a greater
degree of physical separation between the
lightly used main line platform face and the
highly used relief line platform because
Southall is a suicide "Hot Spot". Southall
station has witnessed eight fatalities in the
past five years, six of which have occurred
since the start of 2011. The majority of these
fatalities involved a member of the public
stepping from the island platform into the
passage of a train on the adjacent Up Main
line. Providing the fence will make it less
easy for the public to access the main line
side of the fence (which is generally not
used) and, more importantly, make it visibly
clearer should someone access that side so
that preventative action can be taken.
Details of the proposed fence are as follows:
· 92 m of which would be removing an
existing non-compliant fence and replacing it
with a compliant fence · 21. 3 m of which
would be new fencing within compliance ·
10. 1 m of which would be new fencing
which would be out of compliance. The
fence will contain four 3 m sliding gates and
one 4 m sliding gate to allow access and
Limehouse Station Platform 2 - proposed lift The proposed lift shaft at Limehouse Station
shaft.
on platform 2 will be located at a minimum
distance of 3. 1 m from the nearest running
rail. It is not proposed to design the lift shaft
against train impact loading due to the
insufficient space to cater for the additional
member sizes. The existing platform
consists of a timber beam and GRP slab
construction, supported on steel I-beams
that span between the brick walls of the
station building. Substantial increase in
member sizes will either mean that the lift
size will be reduced making the lift noncompliant (it has already been value
engineered for the smallest practical
compliant solution) or the shaft size is
increased, further reducing the platform
edge clearance from the proposed structure
(which is already the subject of derogation
Ref. 12/194/DGN - Tracker No. 11528), any
increase will affect passenger flows and
potentially increase the safety risk to
passengers using this platform.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The proposed action allows WH Davis Ltd to WH Davis Limited
deliver the project as required by the
customer. We do not believe there is any
additional safety risk to the railway with the
introduction of these vehicles as there are a
significant number of vehicles that fail the
current requirements of this standard
already in service with proven service
history such as the HYA coal hoppers. The
alternative action is included in RSSB
Research Project T961 as a recommended
change to the standard.
Certificate Issue Date
21/12/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
30/11/2012
Deviation Status
Current
Low severity. The minimum width of the
Network Rail
platforms is sufficient to accommodate the
maximum anticipated passenger usage and
the possibility of allowing for the detraining
of passengers. The key factors considered
were: Safe accommodation of passenger
access/egress (including emergency
evacuation), circulation, waiting and
boarding/alighting in respect to the potential
hazard from the platform edge or passing
trains. Safe accommodation of operational
activity, e. g. station management and
maintenance. Safe arrangement and
positioning of structures, platform furniture
and equipment. The non-compliant section
of Platform 4 lies beyond the extent of a ninecar train positioned at the nine-car stop
board and so is unlikely to be routinely used
by passengers. Most of the non-compliant
section of Platform 5 lies beyond the extent
of the trains that will use the bay platform
and stop at the normal 2 m stopping
distance from the buffer stop. The proposed
non-compliances affect short sections of
platform at the remote end from the station
entrance. The maximum number of
passengers using the section of platforms is
anticipated to be small and so the risks to
passenger access/egress, circulation and
The existing layout is shown on drawing
Southern Railway
5374/SK/57. The risk weighting factor
(calculated using the methodology in
Appendix A of GI/GN7616 Guidance on
Station Platform Geometry Issue 1,
December 2010) is 27. 87. The proposed
layout is shown on drawing 5374/CC/02/01
Rev ORR. The risk weighting factor
(calculated using the methodology in
Appendix A of GI/GN7616 Guidance on
Station Platform Geometry Issue 1,
December 2010) is 25. 54. In addition, a
road-by-road analysis of risk has also been
carried out. Roads 3 and 6 are unaffected
by the proposals. All possible risks to
Roads 4 and 5 (I. e. not including the
supporting columns for the roof) have been
eliminated by the proposals. Roads 2 and 7
have a marginal increase in risk where the
building encroach on the "Low" risk zone.
08/03/2013
N/A
INS
14/11/2012
Current
11/01/2013
N/A
INS
14/11/2012
Current
Not applicable as the requirements cannot Network Rail
be followed due to the location of the
staircase at the station as outlined. 10. 1 m
of fencing will be closer to the platform edge
than the standard dictates; however the
main line platforms are little used (normally
used only during diversions as a result of
engineering work on the Relief Lines) and
the fence will restrict public access to this
side of the platform when the main lines are
not being used by stopping services.
Access to the area where clearance is less
than standard will therefore be minimal. 92
m of existing fencing on the platform would
be brought into compliance as a result of the
works. The fenceline has been agreed at a
site visit between Network Rail, Birse Rail,
FGW and BTP attendees listed below: ·
Network Rail: Operations Risk Advisor,
Works Delivery Manager, Performance
Improvement Manager · BTP: Crime
Reduction and Architectural Liaison Officer ·
First Great Western: Head of Safety, Project
Interface Manager, Station Manager · Birse
Rail: Delivering the project. Approval for
the fence-line has been gained by all parties
present and additionally by two crossindustry groups, the Community Safety
Partnership Group and Fatality Working
Low Severity: The diagram on the
Network Rail
derogation report attached (figure 3,2)
shows that the mitigating factors for not
designing the lift shaft for collision loading
are: Curved permanent way (tracks) away
from the proposed lift shaft Slow line speed
(20 mph) at this station Existing
infrastructure would fail first (e. g. platform)
The lift shaft size would become too large to
fit into the proposed space at platform level.
The track curves away from the lift so the
likelihood of derailment towards the
proposed lift shaft is minimal; the line speed
is also very slow at this station, so it is highly
unlikely that a derailed train would ever
reach the lift shaft. Further information is
contained within the derogation report
(attached to this submission).
12/12/2012
N/A
INS
14/11/2012
Current
12/12/2012
N/A
INS
14/11/2012
Current
Page 77
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
12-194-DGN
Title
Limehouse Station Platform 2 - platform
width.
RGS Clause
6.2.2 b)
Scope
Limehouse Station Platform 2 - platform
width at proposed lift shaft.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-193-DGN
Kew Bridge Station Platform 2.
7.2.1b
Kew Bridge Station Platform 2.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-190-DGN
Ealing Broadway Station Platform 4, Up
Relief line - platform width.
6.2.2
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-189-DGN
Conon Bridge: length of station platform
5.1.1
GKRT0192
One
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
12-185-DGN
Signals PT249 and PT449 Distance to
Llanelli East Level Crossing.
2.1.1.3
Great Western Main Line (MLN1) - Ealing
It is proposed to construct a new (escape)
Broadway Station Platform 4, Up Relief line. footbridge at Ealing Broadway station. The
required minimum clearance of this
footbridge to the edge of the platforms is 2.
5 m (line speed up to 100 mph). Due to
space constraints at Platform 4, the
maximum available distance between the
new footbridge and the edge of the Platform
(to the Up Relief Line) is 2. 1 m. The length
of this substandard width is about 10 m and
is located some 18 m from the eastern end
of Platform 4 (around 150 m from the
passenger entrance to the platform).
Pedestrian flow analysis did not identify any
congestion issues at this part of the platform
with the anticipated passenger numbers
(Year 2026 + 28% growth); furthermore, no
safety issues were identified regarding the
evacuation of passengers in the event of a
fire. This reduced platform width only
affects the first car of a ten-car (Crossrail)
train.
Conon Bridge, between Dingwall and
The Highland Council initially proposed a
Inverness: length of station platform.
new station between Muir of Ord and
Dingwall on the Wick line, on behalf of the
Council, Halcrow carried out an appraisal in
2006 which demonstrated strong economic
benefits and Scott Wilson Railways Ltd
carried out a feasibility study which
determined that after considering a number
of alternative locations, the new station
should be built on the site of the old Conon
Bridge Station (approximately 16m 660y). In
conjunction with the Highlands and Islands
Strategic Transport Partnership (HITRANS),
The Highland Council promoted and funded
GRIP 1-4, work subsequently deferred due
to financial constraints. Following the award
of development funding from Scottish
Government in 2011 to the now principal
promoter, HITRANS engaged Network Rail
to develop the project to GRIP Stage 5, the
intention being that HITRANS would then
seek funding for implementation in future
years. The requirement to accelerate
delivery of the project has subsequently
been identified in order to assist in
mitigating the impact to the travelling public
of significantly disruptive road closures of
the A9 (Kessock Road Bridge refurbishment
works where due to road re-surfacing there
Signals PT249 and PT449 protecting Llanelli The Llanelli project will involve the renewal
East Crossing situated at 225 miles 14
of Llanelli East MCB-CCTV and Llanelli
chain, Pilning to Fishguard Harbour (ELR
West MCB to MCB-OD and the control of
SWM2).
these crossing transferred from Llanelli
West Ground Frame to Port Talbot Power
Signal Box. Llanelli East level crossing is to
be converted to MCB-OD operation. The
level crossing protection signals are
positioned as shown below: · PT249 Up
main is positioned 22 metres from Llanelli
East level Crossing. Should PT249 be
repositioned 3 metres further from Llanelli
East crossing, the signal would not provide
the required standage for the train service
using Llanelli station, due to train standing
on Llanelli West crossing. · PT449 Dn Main,
wrong direction move from the Dn main
platform to the Up main is 13 metres from
Llanelli East Level Crossing. Should PT449
be repositioned 12 metres further from
Llanelli East crossing, the signal would not
provide the required standage for the train
service using Llanelli station for the
reversing move over 960 points. Due to the
close proximity of Llanelli station, these
signals can't be moved due to the train
service and the type of train stock being
used.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The proposed lift shaft on Platform 2 at
Limehouse Station will be located a
minimum distance of 2180 mm from the
platform edge. (See figure 2. 1 of attached
derogation report and details contained
within it). The platform will not be closed
during construction. Why meeting the
standard is not practicable: There is no
scope to locate the proposed lift to Platform
2 outside of the current station boundary due
to the adjacent road network, railway over
bridge and high concentration of existing
infrastructure. There is also little opportunity
to reconfigure the station concourse
internally without significant redevelopment
and investment. The existing layout of the
station concourse, coupled with the
extremely tight site constraints, has therefore
dictated the proposed layout of the lift shaft
on Platform 2. This prescribed location has
not only resulted in a bespoke lift shaft but
reduced clearances to the existing platform
edge to below the required levels set out in
Railway Group Standards. It should be
noted that there is currently a high
concentration of existing station
infrastructure on Platform 2 that does not fall
in line with relevant design standards. The
current line speeds at the station are very
Low risk. The country end of the platform
(where the extension is located) is lightly
used as passengers tend to join or alight
nearer the exit which is at the London end.
The waiting shelter and customer
information screen are also near the
entrance. The extension only takes two cars
of a train set hence footfall will be low in the
area of non-compliance. The reduced width
is only 100 mm less than the minimum width
of 2500mm and is marginal.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Low Severity, given that the existing bridge Network Rail
parapet (2. 14 m from the platform edge)
and canopy columns (1. 83 m from the
platform edge) are currently worse than the
proposed lift shaft edge (2. 18 m) from the
platform edge. The proposed lift shaft does
not, as a consequence of its position, move
passengers flows any further towards the
platform edge than existing obstructions
such as the bridge parapet and existing
platform columns. The waiting area will be
relocated to the London end of the station
via a new purpose built waiting shelter to the
rear of the platform. The proposed location
has been agreed by all stakeholders as the
only solution that will fill the project remit (lift
to Platform 2). The location is supported by
the Train Operator Company (TOC) c2c and
Network Rail. A HAZOP study was
conducted with the TOC and Network Rail
Safety Staff and is attached as a supporting
document.
Certificate Issue Date
12/12/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
14/11/2012
Deviation Status
Current
South West Trains have confirmed their
acceptance.
Network Rail
13/06/2014
N/A
INS
14/11/2012
Current
Due to space constraints imposed by the
Network Rail
location of existing infrastructure, it would
not be reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution. Low severity.
Restrictions to passenger safety and
movement are minimal - the footbridge is at
the far end of the platform from the entrance,
and pedestrian flow modelling demonstrates
that there will be adequate circulation
available between the stairs and the
platform edge (taking account of the future
growth in usage). During construction, this
footbridge will be used for short periods
when the main footbridge is unavailable; the
main flow of passengers will be along
Platform 4 and straight onto the bridge via
the stairs, and so have little impact on the
area of limited clearance, in front of the
proposed stairs.
12/12/2012
N/A
INS
14/11/2012
Current
First ScotRail already have operational
Network Rail
procedures in place for a 15 m platform at
Beauly Station and have operated this for 10
years without incident, and the conductors
and drivers are all trained and briefed
accordingly and are very familiar with the
operation. Projected passenger numbers
for Conan Bridge are in the region of 25%
less than at Beauly. The risk assessment
information also shows the severity of
derogation from standard is low and
supports this application. As defined in
section 4. Risk Assessments provided.
06/11/2012
N/A
INS
12/09/2012
Current
All practical mitigations have been
Network Rail
considered and applied to the scheme plan.
Due PT249 signal provision of SPAD
mitigation any impacts of the reduction in
distance from the crossing are minor. The
SPAD mitigation proposed would provide
adequate warning time (5s of flashing RTLs)
to vehicular traffic for train approaching
PT249 and trains starting away from Llanelli
will be mitigated by good sighting of the
signal and view of the crossing. Due to the
low speed of proposed use of the PT449
signal, any increase in distance will have
minor reduction in crossing risk.
27/11/2012
N/A
CCS
08/11/2012
Current
Page 78
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GCRT5021
RGS Issue Number
Five
RGS Title
Track System Requirements
Certificate Number
12-184-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
Use of Turn-back facility at Horsforth - Track 2.8.2
gradient.
Scope
Use of turn-back facility at Horsforth.
Nature and Degree
The scheme involves the construction of a
turn-back facility at Horsforth. The turn-back
facility is to be positioned between Horsforth
station and Bramhope Tunnel on the route to
Harrogate and is mainly to cater for a fourcar 15X train or equivalent. This forms part
of a larger Department for Transport (DfT)
requirement to increase the passenger
service between Horsforth and Leeds with
an aim to reduce congestion of the train
service. The turn-back facility will also allow
access for plant from the stabling point to
the running line. The track gradient is 1 in
80 rising toward Harrogate, steeper than the
required 1 in 500 where trains are planned
to turn back in the facility. The exceptions
stated concerning non-use by On-Track
Plant (OTP) and On-Track Machines
(OTMs) have now been reviewed, and this
derogation extends the deviation Ref.
09/189/DGN (Tracker No. 6720) to permit
use by these machines.
GKRT0064
One
Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection and
Trapping
12-183-DGN
Signal BH58 Overlap Length.
4.2.1
BH58 Signal, Up Slow Line (LEC4)
protecting Basford Hall Junction.
The application of this derogation is against
an existing deficiency which has been
submitted as a result of a change in speed.
This deviation is for the future linespeed
increase from 75 mph to 100 mph. This
deviation is also to be extended to cater for
the future linespeed increase from 75 mph to
100 mph. Compliance would require
relocation of the Insulated Rail Joints and
associated track circuit alterations at a cost
of approximately œ40k, with very little
overall safety improvement. No work is
currently planned in the area as part of
linespeed improvements.
GKRT0192
One
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
12-182-DGN
Signal SC8464 Distance to Nantwich
Crossing
2.1.1.3
Signal SC8464, on the Shrewsbury to Crewe
Modular Signalling Pilot Scheme, protecting
Nantwich MCB-OD Up Approach (wrong
direction).
GK/RT0192 requires SC8464 at the end of
the Down platform at Nantwich to be 25 m
from the crossing. The site arrangements at
Nantwich do not allow the 25 m distance to
be easily achieved, as the end of the
platform is only 18 m away from the crossing
and is in close proximity to the passenger
access/egress to the platform. Options for
compliance would involve non-standard
signal structures which would, despite
possible use of lightweight structures and
thinking, still be up to œ20k. Any option that
involved platform extension would cost
œ10k per metre. A review of the cost and
benefits of compliance has been undertaken
as per the attached Safety Justification
document and comparison to other sites.
This has shown that the cost benefit of
compliance to GK/RT0192 is only a few
hundred pounds.
GKRT0045
Two
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
12-181-DGN
Signal WS6299 exceeding 800m for
signalling of a divergence.
3.1.1.4
Junction Signal WS6299 and associated
splitting banner signal protecting Trent
Valley No. 1 Junction, provides route
information to either the Down Slow or the
New Down Stafford Goods Loop, exceeding
the 800 m rule for signalling of a divergence.
GKRT0063
One
Approach Locking &amp; Train Operated
Route Release
12-180-DGN
Cardiff Area TORR Release Conditions.
5.3
Cardiff Area Signalling Renewal (CASR)
project area. Routes without required
number of track sections.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Mitigation proposed involves the use of
classes of rolling stock that have design
features and braking systems capable of
remaining stationary on any gradient up to 1:
30 that make their use whilst braked within
the facility operationally safe. Operational
restrictions will be put in place to ensure that
the driver applies the brake and removes
the key before transferring to the opposite
end of the train. The rolling stock proposed
automatically applies the parking brake
when the driver removes the key. The Train
Operating Company (TOC) will put further
operational mitigation measures in place for
the operation of their rolling stock
(supporting document attached). A
Sectional Appendix Instruction will ensure
that only agreed rolling stock with an airbraked system capable of holding on a 1: 30
gradient will use the turn-back facility and
use of the facility for stabling will be strictly
prohibited. The driver will stay with the train
at all times and only leave the train whilst
changing cabs, thus limiting the risk of brake
failure over time. On-Track Plant will not be
stabled on the turn back facility. The siding
will be used as a headshunt only for access
to/from the stabling point and the running
line.
This is an existing deficiency for the current
permissible linespeed of 75 mph. The safe
overrun distance (SOD) is 260 m, which
negates the overlap being at 177. 4 m as a
train is more likely to be using the junction
that standing ahead of BH58 under the
current service pattern. BH58 signal has
TPWS+ and was deemed ALARP for
existing and higher line speed by DA
committee upon review of this signal at DA
workshop held for the proposed line speed
increase. No further mitigation measures
were deemed necessary. The signal has
good sighting, with available reading
distance in excess of 500 m with a required
reading distance of 357 m at the proposed
higher linespeed.
Nantwich Down Platform signal SC 8464 is
a Wrong Direction signal for Up moves over
the crossing, there is no main signalled
routes that approach to the Down Platform
from the Up direction, all approaches are via
shunt signal. Positioning the signal and
associated modular housing off of the
platform retains the current platform length
and passenger access. Due to the low
proposed use of the signal, the provision of
SPAD mitigation for train approaching
SC8464 any impacts of the reduction in
distance from the crossing are minor.
Further justification and review of position is
contained in the attached Qualitative Safety
Justification and Cost Benefit Analysis. In
summary, the SPAD mitigation proposed
would provide adequate warning time (5s of
flashing RTLs) to vehicular traffic for train
approaching SC8464 and trains starting
away from Natwich will be mitigated by good
sighting of the signal and view of the
crossing.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
11/11/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
14/11/2012
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
27/11/2012
N/A
CCS
08/11/2012
Current
Network Rail
27/11/2012
N/A
CCS
08/11/2012
Current
The factors preventing WS6299 from being
positioned closer to the new divergence are:
· Rickerscote OLE Neutral section exclusion
zone is between 840 m and 500 m from the
new divergence · Achieving compliant signal
sighting. 5 seconds uninterrupted cannot be
achieved between 500 m and 320 m from
the new divergence (320 m is the distance
from the new divergence to a 225 m overlap
length clear of the RBS3 clearance point).
To achieve compliance with the 800 m rule,
the signal would either need to be positioned
in the Neutral section (as it is today) or
ahead of the neutral section, where
compliant sighting cannot be achieved and
the overrun risks, with the proximity of Trent
Valley No. 1 Jcn, would be intolerably high.
There is the potential for a driver to forget
Network Rail
that they have been signalled for the 30 mph
Goods Loop and not the 60 mph Down
Slow. To mitigate these concerns, the
project is reinforcing the positive indication
of the route to the Goods Loop with an MAYFA approach and a splitting banner on the
junction signal. Additional benefits of
moving the signal further away from Trent
Valley No. 1 Junction are: · By also
adjusting the position of WS6297 (the signal
approaching WS6299), signal spacing can
be regularised. · The TPWS protection is
effective for all line users with respect to
protecting a SPAD at WS6299 from
reaching the converging conflict at Trent
Valley No. 1 Jcn. · The signal, and its
associated splitting banners can be better
sighted at the new proposed position.
27/11/2012
N/A
CCS
08/11/2012
Current
There are a number of routes on the project
where the paucity of train detection sections
would require additional detection elements
solely for the purpose of TORR. Provision of
these sections would incur additional costs
for provision and ongoing maintenance.
Also, additional track sections would
increase the likely hood of any secondary
risks that may occur in the event of failure of
the additional equipment.
It is understood that the main purpose of the Network Rail
additional sequence was to address risks
associated with potential common mode
failures on track circuits sharing IRJ's. The
CASR project is using Frauscher FAdC axle
counter train detection that significantly
reduces the risk of spurious operation that
might satisfy the TISP and TORR conditions.
See also attached HAZID which was
conducted by the modular project. This has
been reviewed and remains valid for the
CASR application because the traffic levels
were not deemed a mitigation.
27/11/2012
N/A
CCS
08/11/2012
Current
Page 79
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
12-178-DGN
Title
Alton and Aldershot stations - reduced
platform widths at liftshafts.
RGS Clause
6.2.1 and 6.2.2 b)
Scope
The deviation relates to the need to locally
reduce the available platform width to less
than 2,500 mm, measured from the platform
edge to the face of the liftshaft cladding.
This will extend along the platform for the
length of the lift, approximately 3,000 mm.
The design currently sits, with dimensions
now finalised, at GRIP4-5. Specifically, this
relates to the following platform locations. ·
Aldershot Station - island platform 2/3 (see
drawing for outline design dimensions). ·
Alton Station - island platforms 2 (SSWT)
and 3 ( Watercress Line ) (see drawing for
outline design dimensions).
Nature and Degree
In both cases, the existing island platform
widths are insufficient to accommodate the
necessary sixteen person lift car and
supporting structure without building into the
distance of between 2,500 mm and 1,950
mm. The locations chosen are best placed
for sighting and all other issues. Further
investigation at commencement of outline
design has shown that the originally
assumed locations initially positioned the
liftshaft at the same location as potential
disabled train access/exit doors on the train,
thus restricting the use of mobile PTI ramps.
The relocation now avoids this conflict.
Please refer to location plans and site plans
given as Attachment 1 to this Application.
GERT8035
Two
Automatic Warning System (AWS)
12-177-DGN
Separate Isolation of AWS for Plasser
&amp; Theurer Tamping Machine.
2.8.5.2
Plasser &amp; Theurer 09-4x4/4S Tamping
Machine Number 99 70 9128 001-3.
TPWS equipment that is validated as
compliant with the requirements of
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 is not available. The
two suppliers of TPWS equipment are
developing and testing suitable equipment
but it will not be available during the
construction and delivery programme for this
machine. The functionality required to
achieve compliance with the requirements of
clause 2. 6. 8. 2 of GE/RT8035 Issue 2 forms
part of the new generation TPWS equipment
and is not currently available. The impact of
complying with the current RGS requirement
would be to significantly delay the project to
introduce this type of machine to the UK.
GERT8030
Four
Requirements for the Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS)
12-176-DGN
TPWS Enhanced Functionality for Plasser
&amp; Theurer Tamping Machine.
Appendix F Appendix H
Plasser &amp; Theurer 09-4x4/4S Tamping
Machine Number 99 70 9128 001-3.
GMRT2466
Three
Railway Wheelsets
12-173-DGN
Supply of axles for 20 new Class 350
2.1.1, 2.8.1, 3.3.1.1-3 and 3.3.2.2
Electric Multiple Units (EMU) to a preexisting design in accordance with Siemens
Strategy for the Introduction of Additional
Vehicles to an Existing Design, 27/01/2012
Issue 1.
128 axles to be supplied for fitment to: · 10
x Class 350/3 for First Transpennine
Express and · 10 x Class 350/4 London
Midland.
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
12-172-DGN
Fire Performance and Emergency Lighting
10 x Class 350/3 for First Transpennine
Express and 10 x Class 350/4 London
Midland.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
2.2.3, 2.2.4 b) and Part 4
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Drawings prepared to GRIP stage 4 are
attached in Attachment 1 to the rear of this
Application. No practical alternatives to this
Application for Deviation have been
identified, to provide a DDA compliant lift
facility. The railway authorities are charged
with taking all reasonable measures to
provide a DDA accessible railway and
obviously maintaining health and safety
standards. The existing island platforms on
both stations were not originally designed to
accommodate a liftshaft, and the local
reduction in width, to accommodate this, is
therefore somewhat inevitable. All other
impacts, I. e. signal sighting, have been
considered as part of the design process,
but the platform width reduction, to no less
than 1,950 mm, cannot be designed out
without major station and track redesign. Of
note, at both stations, permissible train
speeds are significantly less than 100 mph.
At Alton, trains are approaching a buffer
stop at the country end of the platform
(SSWT) and London end (Watercress Line).
With reference to the DTP Accessible Train
Station Design For Disabled People - A
Code of Practice - v3, section W2, Platforms
- platform design: · W2. 2 - the minimum
width of platform without obstacles shall be,
The TPWS/AWS installed on this machine
would have the same functionality as on all
self-propelled Plasser &amp; Theurer
machines supplied to the UK since October
2004. The annual mileages covered by OnTrack Machines when transiting is
significantly lower than for locomotives and
multiple units. Almost all transit moves are
undertaken outside peak traffic hours. The
reliability of the current design of equipment
is extremely good and the lack of ability to
separately isolate AWS is not seen as
causing any significant increase in risk.
Applicant Organisation
Stagecoach South Western
Trains Limited
Certificate Issue Date
23/01/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
14/11/2012
Deviation Status
Current
Plasser UK Ltd
30/11/2012
N/A
CCS
08/11/2012
Current
TPWS equipment that is validated as
compliant with the requirements of
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 is not available. The
two suppliers of TPWS equipment are
developing and testing suitable equipment
but it will not be available during the
construction and delivery programme for this
machine. The impact of complying with the
current RGS requirement would be to
significantly delay the project to introduce
this type of machine to the UK.
The TPWS installed on this machine would Plasser UK Ltd
have the same functionality as on all selfpropelled Plasser &amp; Theurer machines
supplied to the UK since October 2004. The
annual mileages covered by On-Track
Machines when transiting is significantly
lower than for locomotives and multiple
units. Almost all transit moves are
undertaken outside peak traffic hours. The
maximum speed of this machine (60 mile/h)
is lower than all locomotives and multiple
units with the exception of heavy haul freight
locomotives. As a result, the risk posed by
the "reset and proceed" phenomenon is
lower for On-Track Machines. This machine
will pose no greater risk than that for all
Plasser &amp; Theurer machines
introduced into service in the UK since
October 2004.
30/11/2012
N/A
CCS
08/11/2012
Current
Siemens are in the process of supplying of
twenty new four-car EMUs that, with the
exception of certain internal layout
differences and other minor changes, will be
identical to the existing Class 350/2
(`Desiro') EMUs presently operated by
London Midland. A strategy outlining
approach to be taken in the assessment of
the new units, including the methodology
and actions required to meet the approvals
requirements for the introduction of the new
EMUs of an existing design into passenger
service, has been approved by the Rolling
Stock Standards Committee at its meeting
held on the 17/02/2012. The strategy
requires consideration of new standards and
changes to existing standards made in the
period between the introduction of the
original vehicles and the present. The
strategy and some particularly high risk (to
the project) structural non-conformances
were also presented to the Rolling Stock
Standards Committee in February 2012 and
were acknowledged and regularised by the
issue of derogation No 12/014/DGN. This
second stage derogation, in accordance with
the above strategy, addresses of the design
that have been identified together with
changes of Railway Group Standards as
Siemens are in the process of supplying of
twenty new four-car EMUs that, with the
exception of certain internal layout
differences and other minor changes, will be
identical to the existing Class 350/2
(`Desiro') EMUs presently operated by
London Midland. A strategy outlining
approach to be taken in the assessment of
the new units, including the methodology
and actions required to meet the approvals
requirements for the introduction of the new
EMUs of an existing design into passenger
service, has been approved by the Rolling
Stock Standards Committee at its meeting
held on the 17/02/2012. The strategy
requires consideration of new standards and
changes to existing standards made in the
period between the introduction of the
original vehicles and the present. The
strategy and some particularly high risk (to
the project) structural non-conformances
were also presented to the Rolling Stock
Standards Committee in February 2012 and
were acknowledged and regularised by the
issue of derogation No 12/014/DGN. This
second stage derogation, in accordance with
the above strategy, addresses of the design
that have been identified together with
changes of Railway Group Standards as
There is no predicted adverse impact
Siemens plc
arising from the introduction of the new
trains with wheelsets non-compliant to
GM/RT2466 Issue 3 as they are
mechanically similar to the existing Class
350/2 EMUs operated by London Midland,
which were manufactured in 2008-2009 and
are demonstrably safe and reliable. The
class 350/2 fleet is a relatively modern
design and the proposed additional vehicles
will not introduce any negative risks to third
parties and the risks to passengers will be
comparable to existing trains.
28/01/2013
N/A
RST
30/11/2012
Current
There is no predicted adverse impact
arising from the changes to the design that
affect the fire performance or emergency
lighting.
31/01/2013
N/A
RST
26/10/2012
Current
Rail Systems Proposals
Page 80
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2100
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
Certificate Number
12-171-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
Supply of seats for 20 new Class 350
6.2.1.2 and 6.2.4.1-3
Electric Multiple Units (EMU) to a preexisting design in accordance with Siemens
Strategy for the Introduction of Additional
Vehicles to an Existing Design, 27/01/2012
Issue 1.
Scope
10 x Class 350/3 for First Transpennine
Express and 10 x Class 350/4 London
Midland.
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
12-168-DGN
Derogation to Engine Exhaust Requirements 3.1.1
defined in GM/RT2130 Issue 3 Clause 3.1.
Windhoff Multi-Purpose Vehicle (MPV).
GMRT2141
Three
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over
12-164-DGN
Derogation to GM/RT 2141 Issue 3 Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over - Use of
Computer Simulation in lieu of UK Ride
Tests.
GMRT2100
Five
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
12-163-DGN
Derogation to GM/RT2100 Issue 4 Clauses 5.4 and 5.5
5.4 and 5.5 - MPVs for the High Output OLE
Construction System (HOPS).
This application is to permit noncompliance with the RGS as identified in 6b
above. The requirements of Appendix C will
be met; however, the requirements of
sections D. 1, D. 2, D. 3 and D. 4 of
Appendix D will not be met due to the use of
a validated simulation in lieu of on-track ride
tests. Derogation is sought for the following
MPV vehicles: Type 1 (SOPB): · 99 70
9131 010 - 9 · 99 70 9131 013 - 3 · 99 70
9131 021 - 6 · 99 70 9131 022 - 4 · 99 70
9131 023 - 2. Type 2 (HOPB): · 99 70 9131
001 - 8 · 99 70 9131 005 - 9 · 99 70 9131
006 - 7 · 99 70 9131 011 - 7. Type 3
(SNPB): · 99 70 9131 015 - 8 · 99 70 9131
018 - 2 · 99 70 9131 020 - 8. Type 4
(HNPB): · 99 70 9131 003 - 4. Type 5
(SORB): · 99 70 9131 014 - 1.
The MPV and wagon vehicle numbers are
the following: Type 1 (SOPB): · 99 70 9131
010 - 9 · 99 70 9131 013 - 3 · 99 70 9131
021 - 6 · 99 70 9131 022 - 4 · 99 70 9131
023 - 2. Type 2 (HOPB): · 99 70 9131 001 8 · 99 70 9131 005 - 9 · 99 70 9131 006 - 7 ·
99 70 9131 011 - 7. Type 3 (SNPB): · 99 70
9131 015 - 8 · 99 70 9131 018 - 2 · 99 70
9131 020 - 8. Type 4 (HNPB): · 99 70 9131
003 - 4. Type 5 (SORB): · 99 70 9131 014 1. Wagon: · 99 70 9131 019 - 0.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
All clauses
Nature and Degree
Siemens are in the process of supplying of
twenty new four-car EMUs that, with the
exception of certain internal layout
differences and other minor changes, will be
identical to the existing Class 350/2
(`Desiro') EMUs presently operated by
London Midland. A strategy outlining
approach to be taken in the assessment of
the new units, including the methodology
and actions required to meet the approvals
requirements for the introduction of the new
EMUs of an existing design into passenger
service, has been approved by the Rolling
Stock Standards Committee at its meeting
held on 17/02/2012. The strategy requires
consideration of new standards and
changes to existing standards made in the
period between the introduction of the
original vehicles and the present. The
strategy and some particularly high risk (to
the project) structural non-conformances
were also presented to the Rolling Stock
Standards Committee in February 2012 and
were acknowledged and regularised by the
issue of derogation No 12/014/DGN. This
second stage derogation, in accordance with
the above strategy, addresses of the design
that have been identified together with
changes of Railway Group Standards as
The Windhoff Multi-Purpose Vehicle (MPV)
will operate in transit mode on the Network
Rail Managed Infrastructure as well as selfpowered within a Possession. The MPV
Main Engine exhaust direction is as depicted
in Figure 2 below and is therefore in an area
that GM/RT2130 states should be avoided.
[See Figure 2 and drawing showing Exhaust
Outlet Pipe]. The MPV main engine is under
floor mounted between the bogies. The
exhaust system outlet is downwards towards
the track and outwards as depicted. The
MPV design concept for the construction
and maintenance of the upper part of the
railway infrastructure in terms of the
modules that can be accommodated would
be severely compromised if the exhaust
system outlet was in compliance with
GM/RT2130. The primary purpose of the
HOPS is to construct the Overhead Line
Equipment and supporting structures and
requires machinery and operative to work at
height. A number of structures would be
required to facilitate the installation of a
compliant exhaust system and this would
severely impact the functionality of the
HOPS MPV.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
There is no predicted adverse impact
arising from the introduction of the revised
seat fixing arrangements of the alternative
seating arrangements.
Applicant Organisation
Siemens plc
Certificate Issue Date
28/01/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
30/11/2012
Deviation Status
Current
The performance requirements of the
HOPS has resulted in the selection of an
exhaust outlet direction that is proven in
application and accepted as in compliant
with European Standards. However, the
impact of using this design has been
considered and the following summarises
this work: The MPV is an On-Track Machine
and will tend not to stop in Railway Stations.
It is acknowledged that there is a low risk to
the public as the machine passes through a
station and to track workers along the way.
However, with the exhaust outlets is below
the platform level any particles from the
exhaust will be very unlikely to cause harm;
for example, the worst case would be eye
irritation to the public and track workers, but
this is considered improbable. The risks to
the HOPS Ground Crew Operatives with the
exhaust arrangement being mounted under
the floor are seen as very low as they will be
aware of the position of the outlet. For the
MPV Operatives that are working on the
upper part of the railway infrastructure, the
risks from the exhaust system are greatly
reduced compared to an RGS compliant
design. The track record of operations of
other OTM that have previously been
granted a deviation because they have
Static validation of wheel unloading using
It is considered that there is no significant
dQ/Q test and bogie rotation, X-factor, would impact on safety. Computer ride simulation
be required. Additionally, on-track ride tests and analysis is an established methodology.
to validate resistance to derailment would
A similar approach has been used for two
have to be carried out in the UK. It would
other On Track Machines with simulation
therefore be necessary to transport several validated against ride tests in Switzerland
MPV vehicles to the UK for testing. This
(see derogations 04/169/DGN and
would increase timescales and impose
10/133/DGN) and for eight other machines
significant additional costs.
with simulation validated against ride tests in
Austria (see derogations 02/097/DGN,
03/283/DGN, 03/284/DGN, 03/326/DGN,
05/033/DGN, 05/041/DGN, 06/128/DGN,
and 09/194/DGN). The MPV vehicles do not
have novel suspension or running gear and
are proven in-service. A number of similar
MPV vehicles are in operation in the UK on
Network Rail managed infrastructure.
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
01/03/2013
N/A
RST
26/10/2012
Current
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
03/07/2013
N/A
RST
02/08/2013
Current
GM/RT2400 Issue 4 Clause 3. 22. 1 states
that, although OTM are excluded from the
scope of GM/RT2100, doors, door handles,
steps, handrails and railings shall meet the
requirements of 5. 4 and 5. 5 of GM/RT2100
Issue 4. There are two issues with the MPV
design in this respect, described below.
MPV Steps: the design of the MPVs for the
High Output OLE Construction System
(HOPS) is based on the use of read-over
designs that are proven in application (29
ea. MPV delivered since 2008 / no incidents
reported) and approved as in conformance
to European standards for On-Track
Machines. The MPV Platform Mounted
Equipment (access from the vehicle deck)
defined by Windhoff is, in the main, based
on commercial off the shelf equipment that
are already utilised in European Railway
Infrastructure maintenance and renewals
activities, I. e. similar case in comparison to
existing Road Rail Vehicles (RRVs) and
excavators in use (in possession). Clause 5.
5: MPV Cab Doors, Door Handles,
Handrails and Railings will be demonstrated
as in compliance with GM/RT 2100 Issue 4.
However, the MPV Steps have been
designed to be in conformance with the PAS
&amp; LOC TSI and as a result the design
Windhoff Bahn- und
Anlagentechnik GmbH
12/03/2013
N/A
RST
26/10/2012
Current
The operator of the MPVs for the High
Output OLE Construction System (HOPS)
and Network Rail HOPS Project are aware
of the alternative action that is to
demonstrate compliance with the LOC
&amp; PAS TSI for the steps and use of
commercial off the shelf equipment for
platform mounted equipment.
Page 81
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8030
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Requirements for the Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS)
Certificate Number
12-162-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
Fitment of Train Protection and Warning
Appendix F
System (TPWS) to factory train MultiPurpose Vehicle (MPV) On-Track Machines
(OTM) that is in conformance with
GE/RT8030 Issue 2.
Nature and Degree
The High Output OLE Construction System
(HOPS) project timescales require the
procurement of in-service systems and
equipment with a proven track record of safe
and reliable design. The Windhoff MPV
design is frozen in many areas, including the
design of the TPWS installation which is in
accordance to GE/RT8030 Issue 2. The
project risks associated with the delivery of
TPWS that is not validated at the point of
fitment to the vehicles represents
unacceptable risk to the project and has the
potential to cause severe delay.
GMRT2400
Four
Engineering Design of On Track Machines
12-161-DEV Revised
16-01-2014
Derogation to GM/RT2400 Issue 4 Clause
3.25 - Structural Requirements
The MPVs being delivered to the Network
Rail High Output OLE Construction System
(HOPS) Project are designed to be
compliant with the current Loc &amp; Pas
TSI and referenced EN standards.
Evidence of this compliance will be provided
to, and reviewed by, the projects Notified
Body (NoBo), Designated Body (DeBo) and
Competent Person (CP) as appropriate.
The requirements of the Loc &amp; Pass
TSI and referenced EN standards are
similar but not identical to the requirements
of the sub-clauses of Section 3. 25 of
GM/RT2400. However, it is considered that
the intent of the RGS has been met, and
compliance with the specific requirements of
GM/RT2400 will not provide any additional
safety, engineering or operational benefits.
GMRT2400
Four
Engineering Design of On Track Machines
12-160-DGN Revised
02-10-2013
Derogation to Crane Stability Requirements
defined in GM/RT 2400 Issue 4 - Clause
3.13.2.
3.13.2
GERT8000-TW5
Three
Preparation and Movement of Trains:
Defective or Isolated Vehicles and On-Train
Equipment
12-159-DGN
Allowing a unit to enter service with a
defective sander.
28.1
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
The 10 vehicles affected by this deviation
are: · 99709131001-8 · 99709131005-9 ·
99709131006-7 · 99709131010-9 ·
99709131011-7 · 99709131013-3 ·
99709131014-1 · 99709131021-6 ·
99709131022-4 · 99709131023-2. The
deviation applies to the MPVs of the high
output Overhead Line Electrification (OLE)
Construction System (HOPS) that are
designated OTMs. These OTMs will
operate in "transit mode" on the UK National
Rail Network. During the procurement
phase, it has been identified that the various
suppliers of TPWS equipment did not
produce any systems that are in
conformance with GE/RT8030 Issue 3. The
reason being that GE/RT8030 Issue 4 has
now been released and an Issue 3 system
would not be in conformance with Issue 4.
Windhoff has investigated the availability of
TPWS equipment that is in conformance to
GE/RT8030 Issue 4, and there is a risk that
a "validated" system will not be available in
the timescales required for deployment of
the Factory Train. Windhoff has designed
the installation for the Unipart supplied
TPWS that is in conformance with
GE/RT8030 Issue 4. It is anticipated that the
system will have gained product approval
Clause 3.25.1 - General Requirements
This application is to permit nonClause 3.25.2 - Load Factors Clause 3.25.3 - compliance with the RGS standard clauses
On-track Machine Bodies - Proof Loads of GM/RT2400 Issue 4, as identified above,
Longitudinal Loads Clause 3.25.4 - On-track for the following MPV vehicles. Type 1
Machine Bodies - Proof Loads - Vertical
(SOPB): · 99 70 9131 010 - 9 · 99 70 9131
Loads Clause 3.25.5 - On-Track Machine
013 - 3 · 99 70 9131 021 - 6 · 99 70 9131
Bodies - Fatigue Loads Clause 3.25.6 022 - 4 · 99 70 9131 023 - 2. Type 2
Equipment Attached to On-track Machine
(HOPB): · 99 70 9131 001 - 8 · 99 70 9131
Bodies Clause 3.25.9 - Lifting and Jacking
005 - 9 · 99 70 9131 006 - 7 · 99 70 9131
Points Clause 3.25.10 - Bogie Structures
011 - 7. Type 3 (SNPB): · 99 70 9131 015 Clause 3.25.11 - Equipment Attached to
8 · 99 70 9131 018 - 2 · 99 70 9131 020 - 8.
Bogie Frames
Type 4 (HNPB): · 99 70 9131 003 - 4. Type
5 (SORB): · 99 70 9131 014 - 1. Wagons
(KFA) now classified as OTM: · 99 70 9131
019 - 0.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Windhoff and the Operator are satisfied that Windhoff Bahn- und
the fitment of TPWS System to the MPV that Anlagentechnik GmbH
is in conformance to GE/RT8030 Issue 2 but
capable of being fitted with a GE/RT8030
Issue 4 system is a pragmatic solution that
does not pose significant risk to the Railway
Group.
Certificate Issue Date
27/11/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
08/11/2012
Deviation Status
Current
It is not considered that compliance with the Windhoff Bahn- und
Loc &amp; Pas TSI and referenced EN
Anlagentechnik GmbH
standards rather than the identified subclauses of GM/RT2400 Issue 4 Section 3.
25, will have any impact on the safe
operation or maintenance of the MPVs. The
HOPS Project have considered the impacts
of the alternative actions in relation to the
current RSSB and Railway Group initiatives
to align the UK RGS (GM/RT2400) for the
Engineering Design of On-Track Machines
(OTMs) in Travelling Mode with the
Technical Specifications for Interoperability
(TSI) and Euro Norms (ENs). The project
has reviewed the latest draft of GM/RT2400
Issue 5 and RIS 1702 as part of the
compilation of this application. The
following extract from GM/RT2400 Issue 5
Draft 2h dated July 2012 issued for
consultation by the RSSB is considered
relevant to this application since the
requirements align with the current design of
the MPVs. Strength of vehicle structure: ·
The static frame strength of on-track
machines shall comply with BS EN 14033-1:
2011, clause 6. 2. · The dynamic frame
strength of on-track machines shall comply
with BS EN 12663-1: 2010, clause 6. 6. ·
Attachments to the on-track machine frame,
Clause 3. 13. 2 Stability Characteristics:
The requirements set out in Clause 3. 13. 2 The High Output OLE Construction System Amey Fleet Services Ltd
Note: all cranes on the Multi-Purpose
can be achieved by the cranes that are
(HOPS) Operator and Network Rail HOPS
Vehicles (MPVs) of the High Output OLE
being utilised on the MPVs of the High
Project are aware of the alternative action
Construction System (HOPS) are classified Output OLE Construction System (HOPS),
that is proposed and endorse the proposal.
as Loader Cranes. Stability requirements
but this will create a significant reduction in The Operator will ensure that the necessary
relate to both operating free on rail at vehicle operational capability available to the HOPS operational processes and procedures are
stand-still and travelling whilst craning.
Project. This is particularly significant in
aligned to a design that is in conformance to
Vehicles to which this application refers:
those MPVs where the specification requires recognised and proven ENs. Note:
Windhoff no RSL Crane MEWP (Palfinger) a crane and a Mobile Elevated Work
Windhoff has been informed that key
1. 1. 1/2721 99709131001-8 PKR 800 - 1. 1. Platform (MEWP) to be installed on a
members of the UK Railway Group are
3/2721 99709131003-4 PKR 800 - 1. 1.
vehicle and used quasi-simultaneously. It is aware that the crane stability requirements
5/2721 99709131005-9 PKR 800 - 1. 2.
therefore proposed instead to design the
defined in GM/RT2400 Issue 4 are not
1/2726 99709131006-7 Hitachi - 2. 1. 1/2721 vehicles in accordance with BS-EN14033aligned to the proven engineering principles
99709131011-7 PK 85002 PA 360 2. 1.
Part 2: 2011. To quantify the difference in
that are now defined in the proposed
3a/2721 99709131013-3 PK 29002 - 2. 2.
operational capability when using the
alternative European Standards. It is widely
1/2721 99709131014-1 PKR 290 - 2. 2.
different standards, sample calculations for anticipated that stability requirements for
2/2721 99709131015-8 PK 12502 PA 360 2. two crane types are set out in the Table
cranes operating in "Working Mode" within a
2. 4/2721 99709131018-2 PK 12502 PA 360 below: Crane Ref: PK29002D PK85002D
Network Rail Managed Infrastructure
3. 1 /2721 99709131022-4 PK 12502 PA
Max reach (m): 14,5 13,5 Effective hook
possession will be changed and aligned to
360.
load (kg): 1,500 5,300 Test load BSthose being applied by the Crane installed
EN12999: 2,270 6,625 Test load
on the MPVs of the High Output OLE
GM/RT2400 Iss 4: 3,500 7,950 Loss in
Construction System (HOPS).
performance: 54% 20%
16/01/2014
N/A
RST
18/10/2012
Current
02/10/2013
N/A
PLT
19/10/2012
Current
Northern, on occasion, may require a unit to
enter service with a defective sander to
facilitate the units working to a location
where it can be repaired. To do this,
Northern plan to have the defective unit
coupled in rear of another unit which is fully
fit for service, or to ensure that the unit is so
turned that the defective sander is on the
rear vehicle of the unit. The way in which
the sanders work means that the defective
unit coupled in rear would not be required to
lay sand as the only vehicle which will
deposit sand is the leading vehicle of the
train. This effectively makes it irrelevant that
the sander is defective on the rear unit. This
would also be the case if a two car unit was
so turned that the defective sander was on
the rear vehicle. Northern require the
deviation to allow a unit with a defective
sander to enter service providing that the
defective sander is not on the leading
vehicle. The sander on the leading vehicle
must be working.
31/10/2012
N/A
TOM
16/10/2012
Current
As the rule is currently written should a unit There are no safety implications with this
fail at a location with a defective sander, it is derogation.
impossible to comply with the rules to get
the unit moved to a location where it can be
fixed. It is also noted that, in the proposed
tranche changes to Module TW5, the rules
quoted are being withdrawn.
Northern Rail
Page 82
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
12-157-DGN
Title
Harold Wood Station OLE Structure 15/01
on Platform 4 (Down Electric) - reduced
platform width.
RGS Clause
6.5.2 and 6.5.3
GKRT0045
Two
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
12-156-DGN
Buffer Stop Light Position - Crystal Palace
(Plat 3 &amp;5) &amp; Clapham Junction
(Plat 1).
2.5.3.4 a) and; d), and 2.5.3.5
GMRT2100
Five
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
12-154-DGN
Window being fitted into two new air intake 5.3.3.1b)
filter panels replacing the sliding front doors
on a Mk3 DVT.
The scope of this application applies to the
following MK3 DVTs vehicle numbers:
82111, 82124, 82129 and 82145.
The deviation applies to a window being
fitted into two new air intake filter panels
replacing the sliding front doors on a Mk3
DVT for the Network Rail PLPR project.
This panel provides an air supply for the
new Generator set being fitted to the vehicle
(see illustration attached). The original brief
for the work was to remove the existing
windows from the doors and re-use them in
the new filter door. This proved impractical
as the existing windows cannot be removed
from the doors intact due to the method
used for installing and securing the windows
in the original installation. The number of
vehicles required for the contract is only
four, with two windows per vehicle, so a
small quantity exacerbates supply issues. A
new production of the existing design would
not meet the Group Standard requirements.
We have sought alternative windows and
the result is that shown in Appendix 2.
GKRT0060
Four
Interlocking Principles
12-151-DGN
ESOC provision for Marston Vale VHLC
Interlockings
The VHLC interlocking areas for the
Bedford to Bletchley(B2B) line that were
commissioned in 2004 are: · Feny Stratford
· Bow Brickhill · Woburn Sands · Aspley
Guise · Ridgmont · Lidlington · Marston ·
Stewartby Green Lane · Stewartby
Brickworks · Forders Sidings · Wotton
Broadmead · Kempston Hardwick ·
Bedfords St Johns, plus new interlocking recontrolling the flyover junction. All are
controlled from the MCS control system at
Marston Vale Signalling Control Centre, with
the new interlocking being added to the
current MCS operators' workstation at
Marston Vale CC.
This application has been identified as part
changes proposed to add flyover junction to
Marson Vale by provision of new VHLC
interlockings controlled from Marston Vale
SCC. Provision of ESOC for the flyover
junction only will create inconsistencies from
an operational point of view. It can be
argued that the full B2B line should be
retrofitted, this is not practical and no
justified on the basis of supporting
information gathered. Considering the B2B,
including the flyover junction, due to the
distributed nature of the VHLC interlocking,
implementation of ESOC would require the
provision of fifteen control paths, and
because the interlockings are located
remotely from the control system, an
additional fifteen diverse paths, for control.
The implementation would be an onerous,
both in term of design time and cost. The
implementation of ESOC requires line side
cables along the B2B route, 32 miles to be
installed, that is a major contributor to the
high cost. The architecture of the VHLC is
such that the provision of the ESOC would
require a complicated arrangement for the
delivery of the controls between the control
system and the various distributed remote
interlockings.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
C8.1.2
Scope
Harold Wood Station OLE Structure 15/01
on Platform 4 (Down Electric).
Nature and Degree
Platform 4 (Down Main) at Harold Wood
station is being extended eastwards to
accommodate ten-car (205 m length)
Crossrail trains. The extension of this
platform will result in the existing overhead
line structure 15/01 being engulfed by the
platform extension. The distance between
the face of this structure and the platform
edge will be 1960 mm (I. e. less that
minimum distance of 2500 mm required by
Clause 6. 5. 2) and 40 mm less than the
2000 mm stated in Clause 6. 5. 3. (The
derogation is based on a GRIP 4 level of
design. Detailed design and setting out
details will be produced as part of GRIP 5
and the opportunity will be taken to establish
whether a 2000 mm platform is achievable. )
The new structure leg could be located
behind the new platform extension to
provide more than 3000 mm clearance, but
this would result in a loss of parking which is
considered unacceptable as well as
requiring a longer extension to the existing
portal boom. The structure 15/01 was
installed in 1939 as part of the GE
Electrification and its slender construction
might not meet current structural standards.
It is probable that a completely new portal
structure over the Up and Down Electric
· Crystal Palace - Platform 3 · Crystal Palace To comply with the requirement of the
- Platform 5 (Existing) · Clapham Junction - standard would introduce inconsistency with
Platform 1.
the position of the lights at different buffer
stops regularly approached by LOROL
drivers. The Train Operating Companies
(TOCs) have requested white lights rather
than red to avoid driver confusion mistaking
them for main light signals and for
consistency with other buffer stops. The
TOCs who regularly use the platforms have
requested the proposed arrangement of the
buffer stops lights as part of the Signal
Sighting Process that reviewed the
approach to the buffers.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
It is not deemed practicable to provide a
Network Rail
compliant solution. (The opportunity will be
taken at the detailed design stage (GRIP 5)
to further investigate whether a 2000 mm
clearance can be provided. ) Low. The
overall width of the platform extension is 3
metres, the restricted clearance only applies
over the 150 mm width of structure 15/01.
Structure 15/01 is located at the eastern end
of Platform 4 (Down Electric) in the vicinity of
the second coach from the front. The station
entrance and exit is at the west end of the
station and passengers alighting and
boarding at Harold Wood will tend to use the
rear portion of the train rather than the front
portion. The location of the structure 15/01
is therefore not within that part of the
platform where passenger density is
greatest. The residual risk to passengers is
deemed to be very low.
Certificate Issue Date
12/12/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
14/11/2012
Deviation Status
Current
The arrangement for which derogation is
Network Rail
sought is that which is in place in other
locations and drivers are used to
approaching such buffer stop arrangements.
The buffer stop light position provides an
additional 3 metres of margin for the driver
before the buffer stop would be struck. A
train striking the lights/mounting post is not
considered to constitute a significant risk, as
the posts that the lights are mounted are
hinged and designed to be collapsible, and
windscreen glass on the trains using the
platforms shall comply with ATOC code of
practice ACOP/EC/01003, which includes
that, in the event of a windscreen suffering
impact damage, no glass spall should enter
the driver's cab area. Buffer stop lights are
considered as the limit of the movement
authority not the buffers and drivers are
used to the arrangement at other locations
and meet with LOROL driving standards
policy. Impact of buffer stop is low - see
attached buffer stop risk assessments. The
TOCs consulted as part of the signal
sighting process consider this to be a safer
arrangement than the arrangements
required for strict compliance with standards
- see attached signal sighting forms. The
TOCs who will regularly use the platforms
We propose the use of the window detailed Brush Traction
in Appendix 2. This window meets the 3kPa
requirement of GM/RT2100 Issue 5 Section
5. 3. 3. 1 d), but not the 6kPa of part b.
31/10/2012
N/A
CCS
12/10/2012
Current
15/10/2012
N/A
RST
28/09/2012
Current
The likelihood of a failure of a part of the
Network Rail
system where the signalman could not
replace a signal to 'ON' and where the
remote interlockings would not do this
automatically, is very remote. During
failures of the communication links to the
interlocking, the interlocking will
automatically revert to 'All Signals On' status
without signallers' interaction. A diverse
communication route for path protection has
been provided. There is a risk that, in
providing ESOC for the flyover interlocking
only, the signaller could be misled into
thinking that all signals in the control area
will be replaced. The likelihood of a failure
of a part of the system where the signalman
could not replace a signal to 'ON' and where
the remote interlockings would not do this
automatically, is very remote. It is also worth
noting that the new VHLC at Bletchley
Flyover Junction has one train working
controls between MV64/66 and MV63, which
is the portion of the Up Bletchley / Down
Bletchley that passes over the flyover.
These controls only allow one train at a time
onto this section to which the extension
proposed is being provided.
31/10/2012
N/A
CCS
12/10/2012
Current
Page 83
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2130
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
Certificate Number
12-150-DGN
Title
Derogation for the manufacture and supply
of 26 new Class 66 locomotives as an
existing design, retaining the existing degree
of fire performance.
RGS Clause
2.3 Safeguarding continued operation in the
event of fire 2.5 Reducing the risk of fire
development 2.7 Equipment cubicles and
equipment cases 2.9 Material fire
performance categories and selection
Scope
Supply of maximum 26 class 66 vehicles to
the existing design as authorised for service
in the UK (with the exception of minor
changes to the engine to comply with tier 3A
emissions requirements, fitment of GSM-R
voice radio and cab air cooling equipment).
Nature and Degree
Compliance with the full requirements of
GM/RT2130 would require the manufacture
to reconsider the existing vehicle fire
performance and obtain additional
compliance information for components and
design features of the existing class 66
design. The design costs of performing a
full design review of the locomotive will add
significant costs for a small quantity of
locomotives, and the delays in manufacture
incurred would impact on supply of
locomotives before the 2014 deadline for
supply of the class 3A emissions compliant
engine. Uncertainty over the necessary
compliance to be achieved affects
commercial negotiations and the ability to
achieve manufacture before the 3A engine
deadline. Use of alternative components or
other design changes would have an impact
on provisions of spares and maintenance
costs.
GMRT2100
Five
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
12-149-DGN
Derogation for the manufacture and supply
of new Class 66 locomotives with vehicle
bodyshell structures, bogies and glazing
designed in accordance with GM/RT2100
Issue 2.
Complete document
Supply of maximum 26 class 66 vehicles to
the existing design as authorised for service
in the UK (with the exception of minor
changes to the engine to comply with tier 3A
emissions requirements, fitment of GSM-R
voice radio and cab air cooling equipment).
GMRT2141
Three
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to
Derailment and Roll-Over
12-148-DGN
Computer Simulation in place of On Track
Ride Testing.
Appendix D (Acceptance using method 2).
Plasser 09-4x4/4S Tamping Machines.
GM/RT2100 clause 10. 2. 4 permits the
manufacture of an existing design of
authorised vehicle. This derogation is to
ratify the use of the existing structural design
against GM/RT2100 issue 2. Compliance
with the full technical requirements of
GM/RT2100 issue 5 would require a large
scale redesign of the vehicle body structure
and running gear to meet changes in crash
worthiness and other requirements. Such a
revision would incur large design
development and manufacturing costs and
would introduce delay. The costs for such a
redesign are disproportionate for the limited
number of vehicles that can be supplied with
the 3A emissions level engine. Timescales
for such a redesign would cause significant
delays and prevent use of the existing
engine under the emissions directive. As a
consequence the order would not be
economically viable and GBRf would seek to
procure alternate locomotives. This would
entail continued or extended use of aged
locomotives with increased operating cost
and a lower level of compliance for
crashworthiness, driver comfort, noise etc.
Compliance with clause 10. 2. 4 permits the
build of further vehicles to an existing
authorised design. The existing design
In order to deliver the machine into the UK
by rail, it must be certificated in advance of
leaving Austria. The alternative of delivery
by road prior to a UK ride test is impractical.
GERT8035
Two
Automatic Warning System (AWS)
12-144-DGN
AWS caution acknowledgment period for
Class 350 (all subclasses) operated by
London and Birmingham Railway Company
Limited.
2.8.5.2
The Derogation being sought would apply to
all Class 350/1, 350/2 and 350/3 operated by
London And Birmingham Railway Company
Limited.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
12-143-DGN
Deviation against GM/RT2000 for the reintroduction of 8 KFA (Y) wagons
6.6.1.c) and 6.6.2 b) paragraph 2
The deviation applies to eight KFA wagons
from the following eleven wagons: 93242,
93243, 03244, 93245, 93254, 93256, 93258,
93260, 93263, 93276, and 93280. These
wagons will be used as part of the High
Output Plant System being developed to
electrify parts of the national network.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
The rate of occurrence of late to cancel
AWS/TPWS incidents increases when the
AWS acknowledgement period is set at 2
seconds. London Midland applied for
derogation previously for Class 350/2s
operating at speeds up to 100 mph, which
was subsequently regularised by the
changed requirement brought about by
clause 2. 8. 5. 2 of GE/RT8035 Issue 2.
There is a proposal to increase operating
speeds of Class 350/1 and yet to be built
class 350/3 to increase capacity and service
frequency on the west coast south routes
with a consequent worthwhile reduction in
journey times. The timetabled mileage for
operating at 110 mph on a weekly basis for
Class 350/1 is 18. 83% of the class 350/1
total mileage and 12. 37% of the total 350
fleet mileage. Under the current
requirements of clause 2. 8. 5. 2 of
GE/RT8035, London Midland will have to
apply an AWS acknowledgement period of 2
seconds to its class 350/1 and 350/3 units.
For consistency, and to avoid further
confusion for drivers, the 2 second period
would also be applied to class 350/2s, even
though the standard allows 2. 7 seconds for
100 mph capable units.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
There are currently over 380 class 66
locomotives operating in the UK. The
existing class 66 have an excellent fire safety
record and the existing fire performance
would be retained. It is considered that the
risk is suitably managed through other
mitigating factors, specifically when
operational the locomotives are manned by
trained personnel only and other design
features on the locomotive reduce the
likelihood of a fire starting. Given that the
Class 66 fleet is a relatively modern design
and the proposed additional locomotives will
be very similar to these locomotives, it can
be concluded that the introduction of the
additional locomotives on GBRf operations
will not introduce any adverse risks to third
parties. Economic procurement of
additional class 66 enables cost effective
operation of rail services to attract additional
freight traffic onto the rail Network and to
service existing demand. The Railway
Interoperability Directive and LocPas TSI
recognise the costs and timescales to
achieve compliance with Interoperability
requirements and permit existing designs to
be manufactured until 2017. Note: the
design is the same as that of the existing
locomotives currently in service.
There are already more than 380 class 66
locomotives authorised to operate on the GB
Network. The additional 26 locomotives
would maintain the current level of safety
and compatibility on the Network. The class
66 has proven to have a good safety record
and structural integrity during derailment.
Driver safety would be maintained at current
levels. The existing class 66 fleet has not
exhibited structural problems and structural
integrity throughout the loco service life is
expected to be retained. Given that the
Class 66 fleet is a relatively modern design
and the proposed additional locomotives will
be very similar to these locos, it can be
concluded that the introduction of the
additional locomotives on GBRf operations
will not introduce any adverse risks to third
parties. Procurement of further class 66
locomotives enables common interworking
with the existing locomotive fleet and
optimisation of existing maintenance
capabilities and component supplies.
Economic procurement of additional class
66 enables cost effective operation of rail
services to attract additional freight traffic
onto the rail Network and to service existing
demand. The Railway Interoperability
Directive and LocPas TSI recognise the
See attached risk assessment.
Applicant Organisation
GB Railfreight Ltd
Certificate Issue Date
15/10/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
28/09/2012
Deviation Status
Current
GB Railfreight Ltd
15/10/2012
N/A
RST
28/09/2012
Current
Plasser UK Ltd.
27/11/2012
N/A
RST
28/09/2012
Current
06/12/2012
N/A
CCS
06/12/2012
Current
24/10/2012
N/A
RST
28/09/2012
Current
We know, from experience, that the
London and Birmingham
reduced acknowledgment period increases Railway Company Limited
the likelihood of late to cancel AWS/TPWS
activations and. in turn. RSSB research has
shown that unnecessary AWS/TPWS
interventions reduce driver confidence in
AWS/TPWS and increase the likelihood of
TPWS reset and continue events. Reducing
the AWS acknowledgement time means
less time for a driver to assimilate a signal
aspect before acknowledging the warning. It
is desirable to afford the driver the maximum
time to properly assimilate the signal aspect
prior to acknowledging the AWS warning. It
should also be noted that, on the West
Coast South, the prevailing distance from
the AWS magnet to the signal is 230 metres
rather than the standard requirement of 180
metres as laid out in GE/RT8035. The
impact of 2. 7 seconds compared to 2
seconds is mitigated by the additional
distance provided by between the AWS
magnet and signals on the West Coast
South and, in addition, the West Coast
South is fitted with TPWS at signals
protecting conflicts and selectively with
TPWS + at higher speed/risk signals. Any
marginal increase in risk is effectively
mitigated by the above considerations. The
These wagons are 60' container flats and
There will be no detrimental impact of the
Network Rail
were part of an order for approximately two alternative actions; the vehicles will be
hundred vehicles delivered by Rautarukki of maintained in accordance with Railway
Finland in 1987. Forty vehicles from the
Group Standards and Network Railway
order were modified with strengthened
Policy and Standards.
headstocks by Network Rail for use as part
of the Rail Delivery Train and then
transferred for use to make up the Rail Head
Treatment Train wagon fleet until 2005/2006,
all of which are currently registered nonoperational. Edinburgh District Council
currently operates a small fleet of these
vehicles for the waste disposal services.
These have been operational continuously
for the period whilst the Network Rail owned
vehicles are non-operational. Due to the
age of these vehicles, a significant amount
of work would be required to demonstrate
that the existing wagons comply with the
mandatory requirements contained in the
current RGS. This would be further
complicated by severely limited availability
of original design information.
Page 84
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2461
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and On-Track Machines
Certificate Number
12-137-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
Position of Sand Delivery System on Plasser 9.1
09-4x4/4S.
Scope
Plasser 09-4x4/4S Tamping Machines.
Nature and Degree
For operation in braking mode, sand shall
be delivered to the railhead by the leading
vehicle only for all train formations (including
multiple formations), at a location forward of
the third axle and after the second axle, in
the direction of travel. To meet the
requirements of GM/RT2461, one of the
sanding units (on each side of the machine)
would need to be mounted on the satellite
unit. When the machine is tamping, the
continuous action (a feature of this type of
tamper) is achieved by the satellite unit
moving semi-independently of the main
machine. This means that the sanding units
and their hoppers would have to be mounted
on the Satellite Unit and this has potential
implications for the safe riding of the bogie
supporting the satellite unit. Additionally,
special sand delivery systems would have to
be designed to fit on the satellite bogie and
these would have to withstand the working
environment of the satellite unit in close
proximity to the tamping banks.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The 09-4x4/4S Tamping Machine is
Plasser UK Ltd
mounted on five bogies, each with two axles,
a total of ten axles. By mounting the sand
delivery system in advance of the fifth axle
for travel in the working direction, there
would still be six axles in rear of the delivery
system. This meets the requirement of the
third paragraph of clause 9. 1. It is therefore
considered that this system would still meet
with the spirit of the RGS requirements and
there is therefore no impact.
Certificate Issue Date
08/11/2012
GIRT7033
Two
Lineside Operational Safety Signs
12-136-DGN
Trial car stop markers
Section AK, B10.1, B10.2.
South West Trains proposes the use of car
stop signs not currently included in RGS
GI/RT7033 as required by section B10 of
that RGS.
South West Trains (SSWT) (in association
with Network Rail Wessex Route) is seeking
ways to reduce station instances of trains
stopping short on platforms. Sign AK104z
(with TOC variations) is the design of car
stop marker generally used on stations.
South West Trains has, over time,
significantly reduced the number of car stop
markers on its stations; however, the
number of trains stopping short on platforms
remains unacceptably high. Changes in the
design and colour of way-finding signage
now means car stop markers are becoming
less conspicuous in some instances. Car
stop signs are small and can sometimes be
difficult to discern amongst other signage.
SSWT currently has a deviation Ref.
11/161/TNC which it is seeking to extend
beyond 30/09/2012 while a derogation is
considered for the use of these signs.
(NOTE: SSWT also has a further deviation
Ref. 11/160/TNC which will not be extended
and the trial signs associated with this
deviation will be removed).
The car stop markers are larger than
Stagecoach South Western
existing signage (the size is multiplied up
Trains Ltd (trading as South
from existing design). The specification of
West Trains)
the designs also includes a slight tilt when
the sign is installed to pick up ambient
lighting, especially at lamp columns where
existing signs often do not pick up the light
making them difficult to see at night. The
trial signage is currently in place (or
planned*) at the following locations: Ashford
(Surrey); Moreton; Staines (*); Branksome;
New Milton; New Milton; Brookwood (*);
Parkstone(*); Sway; Christchurch;
Portchester; Swaythling; Esher; Redbridge;
Whitton (*); Godalming; St. Deny's;
Wimbledon; Hinton Admiral (*); Salisbury;
Woking; Millbrook; Southampton Airport
Parkway; Worplesdon. This list includes a
number of locations with high number of
stop short incidents. See Appendix A for
design of car stop markers.
28/09/2012
GMRT2473
One
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail vehicles.
12-135-DEV
Emergency brake override indication
B11.4
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus 40 additional Class 377/7 vehicles.
There are considered to be no negative
Southern Railway Limited
impacts of the proposed design as it is a
continuation of the existing Class 377
design, to which drivers are already
accustomed. The design adequately warns
the driver that an emergency brake override
has been made.
08/01/2014
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
12-134-DEV
Self-closing cab-saloon door
2.5.5
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus 40 additional Class 377/7 vehicles.
It is considered that there is no negative
impact of this non-compliance since train
crew are already used to closing the cabsaloon door. Therefore, a fire barrier is
always maintained.
Southern Railway Limited
GMRT2461
One
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and On-Track Machines
12-133-DEV
Sanding on second, trailing unit
9.1
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus 40 additional Class 377/7 vehicles.
To comply with this requirement extra
functionality would have to be added to an
existing indicator, or an additional indicator
would have to be added to the driver's desk.
In either case, changes to the units'
schematics and wiring would be needed to
illuminate the indicator when an emergency
brake application had been overridden. The
change would make the cab desk different
from the existing Class 377 fleet, and would
require additional training for the driver; the
additional desk indicator could be confusing
to drivers used to the existing Class 377
desk.
At the outer ends of a train the cab/saloon
door forms part of the fire barrier between
the cab and the passenger saloon, and it is
locked shut to prevent passenger access to
the cab. This door is not self-closing. To
comply with the clause a closing device
would have to be added to the door. It is
considered that if such a device was fitted,
train crew could rely on the device, and may
not check that the door is securely closed.
There is a risk that the closing device would
shut the door, but not fully, which presents a
risk to the train security. It should be noted
that when the cab is in the middle of a
multiple formation the cab/saloon door is
locked in the converted position, preventing
passenger access to the cab controls, and a
compliant gangway door operates as part of
the fire barrier.
This deviation requests enhanced
performance which is non-compliant with the
standard as written, but consistent with the
objectives of the standard.
In the condition where the leading unit has a Southern Railway Limited
sand level of below 20%, sanding will be
enabled on both the leading and trailing
units. If the leading vehicle in either unit
detects wheel slide, sand will be dispensed
by that unit. If the leading vehicle detects
wheelspin and the driver selects `Sand in
Traction', sand will be dispensed by that
unit. As such, both units will dispense sand
if both detect wheel slide and have sufficient
sand available. The likelihood of this
occurring is low, as the leading unit will
condition the railhead and so the trailing unit
is unlikely to experience wheel slide.
Wherever sand is applied, there will always
be at least eighteen axles after the sand
deposition point. Therefore, it is considered
that there is no negative impact in terms of
contamination of the railhead, and so
compatibility with the railway system is
unaffected. This functionality has been
developed to increase the safety of the
railway in conditions of extremely poor rail
head adhesion, having a positive impact on
overall system performance.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
31/08/2012
Deviation Status
Current
CCS
12/09/2012
Current
N/A
Rolling Stock
06/12/2013
Current
08/01/2014
N/A
Rolling Stock
06/12/2013
Current
08/01/2014
N/A
Rolling Stock
06/12/2013
Current
Page 85
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2130
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
Certificate Number
12-132-DEV
Title
Emergency lighting positions.
RGS Clause
4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.6
Scope
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus 40 additional Class 377/7 vehicles.
GMRT2130
Three
Vehicle Fire, Safety and Evacuation
12-131-DEV
Continued operation after a fire.
2.3.3
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus 40 additional Class 377/7 vehicles.
GMRT2161
One
Requirements for Driving Cabs of Railway
Vehicles
12-130-DEV
Windscreen wiper arm position
6.2.6
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus 40 additional Class 377/7 vehicles.
GERT8035
Two
Automatic Warning System (AWS)
12-129-DGN
TPWS functionality on Class 377/6 fleet.
The deviation splits into a number of
sections, all related to Appendix F of
GE/RT8030 and one clause of GE/RT8035.
There are a number of areas where full
compliance is not achieved: Individual
Isolation of AWS / TPWS: GE/RT8035
2.6.8.2.
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus a contract option for additional 40
vehicles.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
· Light above doorway: There is limited
space above each doorway due to the UK
loading gauge and the space requirements
of the door header gear. To fit emergency
lighting directly above each bodyside door,
the lighting unit would have to be fitted
between the doorgear and the header gear
trim panel, moving the trim panel lower.
This would reduce the door throughway
height, which is already lower than that
required by GM/RT2473 clause B5. 1. 2; a
separate derogation is raised to this clause.
The lower doorway would increase the risk
of passenger striking their head, and would
impede evacuation. · Controls and signage
in field of illumination: The door controls
and signage are located on standbacks to
the side of the doorways, and back from the
door itself. It is not possible to have a single
light pointing at the door threshold and at the
controls. Therefore, multiple lights would be
required. This would contradict the
objective of not attracting passengers to the
vestibule (as described in GM/RT2531 note
RC024). · Provide lighting for charging
photo-luminescent signage: As above, this
would require a bright light directed at the
signage, which would emphasise the
emergency egress device and encourage
To comply with Clause 2. 3. 3, it would be
necessary to provide significant protection of
systems and/or redundancy to enable the
units to operate for 15 minutes after the
outbreak of a fire. Control cabling in any
area judged to be vulnerable would need to
be protected by some form of shielding.
Some systems may need redundancy with
cabling routed in separate locations. To
achieve this, there would be significant
design changes and additional equipment.
This would add significant cost to the
project. In addition, maintenance of the
vehicles would be changed and in some
cases hindered by the extra protection.
To comply with the standard would require a
change to the wiper arm, to incorporate a
`dog-leg' design. This would necessitate
that Class 377/6 units have a different spare
part from existing Class 377s operated by
Southern.
There are two areas of impact from
complying with the RGS requirements: ·
The manufacturing and validation timescales
for compliant TPWS equipment do not meet
the overall Class 377/6 programme and
would lead to a project delay. · Achieving
full compliance with the requirements would
require a number of design changes from
the Class 379 and Class 377/5 designs, on
which the Class 377/6 design is based.
These changes would have a significant
impact on the project, and are likely to delay
the project. Enhanced TPWS equipment is
being manufactured by two suppliers, but
both suppliers' equipment is still under
development and testing. Delivery of the
equipment is required in September 2012,
which cannot be achieved. Full validation of
the equipment would be required to support
certification for on-track testing in May 2013.
There is no assurance that suppliers'
validation programmes will definitely
achieve these dates. The Class 377/5 and
Class 379 units were fitted with Thales Mk. 1
TPWS control units. Modifying these
designs to achieve full compliance with
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 would require: ·
installation of a new control unit, which,
depending on the supplier, may be
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
It is considered that there are no negative
Southern Railway Limited
impacts from the Class 377/6 emergency
lighting design. Position of lights and
illumination of controls: GM/RT2130
(together with guidance note GM/RC2531)
has two reasons for requiring emergency
lights above the door and not in the centre of
the vestibule. · Firstly, it should avoid
encouraging passengers towards the
vestibule. This is not applicable to vehicles
such as Class 377/6 where the vestibules
are at 1/3 and 2/3 positions in the vehicle
and there is no full partition between seating
the passenger seats. Any lighting in the
vestibule, at the centre or the doorway, will
be visible to passengers. The proposed
location of lighting will create even lighting
along the vehicle, without attracting
passengers to any area. · Secondly, lighting
from the centre would mean that passengers
created shadows over any equipment they
tried to use since the light would be behind
the passengers. The position of the lighting
on Class 377/6 minimises this issue within
the space constraints of the doorway. The
problems with shadows are minimised due
to the position of the normal and emergency
door controls (and passenger emergency
alarm) on standbacks and not directly
It is considered that there is no negative
Southern Railway Limited
impact from complying with the SRT TSI
instead of GM/RT2130. The requirement of
the SRT TSI is considered to be an
appropriate requirement for the Class 377/6
units.
Certificate Issue Date
08/01/2014
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Rolling Stock
Lead SC Approval Date
06/12/2013
Deviation Status
Current
09/01/2014
N/A
Rolling Stock
06/12/2013
Current
When the proposed wipers are in the
Southern Railway Limited
parked position (I. e. when not in use) part
of the support arms for the wiper blade
obscures part of the primary vision area, low
down and to the right of the driver's vision.
This obscured part of the driver's sight lines
(taken from the driver's seat position)
measures 94 mm upwards and 48. 5 mm to
the left of the bottom right corner of the
primary vision area. The attached drawing
3EER400014-6151 indicates the obscured
portion of the windscreen from the exterior
perspective of the cab, although the
dimensions are as observed from the
driver's seat position. The area obscured is
required by case (a) of the sightlines
required for seated drivers, I. e. : · A view of
the track (at rail height) at 5 m beyond the
vehicle buffers (or vehicle end) for vehicles
subject to frequent coupling and uncoupling
activities. · The wiper arm will slightly
obscure the right-hand rail (from the driver's
perspective). A small movement of the
driver's head to the left will allow the
obscured area to be viewed. Case (b) lineside signals - and case (d) - a view of the
track in the distance - are not obscured.
There are no known negative impacts from
the current design. The infringement is
Individual Isolation of AWS/TPWS:
Southern Railway Limited
GE/RT8030 requires that TPWS can be
isolated, which can be achieved by isolating
the whole AWS / TPWS. GE/RT8035
requires that AWS can be isolated
independently from the TPWS, which cannot
be achieved. Providing separate isolation
would permit one system to be maintained if
the other fails, while a unit is taken out of
service. The Mk. 3 control unit does not
permit separate isolation. Given that the Mk.
3 unit contains reliability improvements and
that the Class 377/6 units will operate
relatively short distances from depots
(compared to freight locomotives or Intercity
trains) there is not considered to be any
significant impact from not providing
isolation.
08/01/2014
N/A
Rolling Stock
06/12/2013
Current
17/09/2012
N/A
CCS
16/08/2012
Current
Page 86
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GERT8030
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Requirements for the Train Protection and
Warning System (TPWS)
Certificate Number
12-128-DGN
Title
TPWS functionality on Class 377/6 fleet
RGS Clause
The deviation splits into a number of
sections, all related to Appendix F of
GE/RT8030 and one clause of GE/RT8035.
There are a number of areas where full
compliance is not achieved: · Enhanced
Functionality - Identification of type of
AWS/TPWS brake application: GE/RT8030
App. F - F.2.1.2/.3/.5, F.2.3.2/.3/.5-.9,
F.2.4.1, F.3.4.1.6 · Enhanced Functionality Separate brake application
acknowledgement and brake reset:
GE/RT8030 App. F - F.2.8.1-.4, F.2.9.1-.3,
F.3.3.2/.3, F.3.3.4.1-.5 · Audible Alerts and
Warnings GE/RT8030 App. F - F.2.7.1.1-.7,
F.2.7.2.1-.3, F2.7.3.1/.2/.5, F.3.4.1.2/.6,
Appendix H · AWS Fault Handling
GE/RT8030 App. F - F.3.4.1.3/.4 · AWS
Power-up Test Fault Indication GE/RT8030
App. F - F.2.5.3 · Enhanced OTDR Interface
GE/RT8030 App. F - F.3.5.1 · Control Unit
Not Backward Compatible GE/RT8030 App.
F - F.3.6.1 · Design and; Labelling of
Existing Controls GE/RT8030 App. F F.2.6.5, F.2.10.1-.4/.6/.7 · No set-up per Unit
GE/RT8030 App. F - F.3.6.2.
Scope
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus a contract option for additional 40
vehicles.
GERT8035
Two
Automatic Warning System (AWS)
12-127-DGN
AWS alarm audibility
2.6.4.1 b)
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus a contract option for additional 40
vehicles.
GMRT2473
One
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail vehicles.
12-126-DEV
Ready to start pushbutton texture /
functionality.
B8.4.2
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus 40 additional Class 377/7 vehicles.
GMRT2473
One
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles.
12-125-DEV
Doorway vertical throughway.
B5.1.2
GKRT0044
One
Controls for Signalling a Train onto an
Occupied Line
12-123-DGN
York Station Permissive Controls - Y205,
Y211,Y213 Signals.
5.3.3
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
There are two areas of impact from
complying with the RGS requirements: ·
The manufacturing and validation timescales
for compliant TPWS equipment do not meet
the overall Class 377/6 programme and
would lead to a project delay. · Achieving
full compliance with the requirements would
require a number of design changes from
the Class 379 and Class 377/5 designs, on
which the Class 377/6 design is based.
These changes would have a significant
impact on the project, and are likely to delay
the project. Enhanced TPWS equipment is
being manufactured by two suppliers, but
both suppliers' equipment is still under
development and testing. Delivery of the
equipment is required in September 2012,
which cannot be achieved. Full validation of
the equipment would be required to support
certification for on-track testing in May 2013.
There is no assurance that suppliers'
validation programmes will definitely
achieve these dates. The Class 377/5 and
Class 379 units were fitted with Thales Mk. 1
TPWS control units. Modifying these
designs to achieve full compliance with
GE/RT8030 Issue 4 would require: ·
Installation of a new control unit, which,
depending on the supplier, may be
To comply with this clause, it would be
necessary to raise the volume of the AWS
from that set for all other Class 377s. This
would make the Class 377/6 units
inconsistent and could cause complaints
from drivers due to the AWS being
uncomfortably loud. There would also be
considerable cost with re-designing the
AWS installation and re-validating the new
volume.
The new Class 377/6 units will operate
alongside Southern's existing fleet of Class
377s, which are designed as follows: · The
'ready to start' pushbutton is not textured
(and neither is the surround), because the
control is located close to the textured 'door
close' pushbutton at most locations. · The
'ready to start' pushbutton on the saloon
guard's control panels is only active when all
the passenger doors are closed. · The
`ready to start' pushbutton in a cab will
operate irrespective of the status of the
passenger doors. Changing the design to
comply with the RGS requirements would
introduce inconsistency across Southern's
fleet, and would prevent the `ready to start'
pushbutton in the non-active cab from
functioning. Complying with the RGS would
also make the design inconsistent with the
Rule Book, GE/RT8000/SS1, Station Duties
and Train Dispatch, Issue 2.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The partially-enhanced Mk. 3 control unit
Southern Railway Limited
will not achieve a number of functions and
features required by Appendix F of the
GE/RT8030 Issue 4. However, the
proposed Class 377/6 design is considered
to adequately manage the known risks and
issues with TPWS, as summarised in
document 3EER400017-1076. · Enhanced
Functionality - Identification of type of
AWS/TPWS brake application: Issue 4
requires that the cause of the AWS/TPWS
brake application is identified to the driver.
Additional indicators are required for this
purpose. This function assists the driver in
diagnosing the cause of a brake application
when communicating with the signaller, and
highlights when a SPAD has occurred. The
proposed design will not have the enhanced
DMI and will not identify the source of brake
application, but will remind the driver to
speak to the signaller, and will warn the
driver that a SPAD may have occurred. If
the driver contacts the signaller, it will be
possible to determine if a SPAD has
occurred. · Enhanced Functionality Separate brake application
acknowledgement and brake reset: Issue 4
requires that separate actions are required
to acknowledge the brake application and to
The non-compliance is considered to have
Southern Railway Limited
no negative impact. Extensive testing and
service experience has shown that the
proposed level is effective and is tolerable
for drivers. The safety of the railway is
unaffected as, in the event of the driver
failing to hear the audible indication and
respond accordingly, the brakes
automatically apply.
Certificate Issue Date
17/09/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
16/08/2012
Deviation Status
Current
17/09/2012
N/A
CCS
16/08/2012
Current
The alternative actions are not considered to Southern Railway Limited
have any adverse affect on safety. The
proposed design increases the level of
safety, as guards are already familiar with
the design, and all passenger doors have to
be closed prior to the guard giving the
`ready to start' signal. When the guard is in
the rear cab and the cab door is open,
traction cannot be taken until the cab door is
shut as the door interlock circuit will not be
made.
08/01/2014
N/A
Rolling Stock
06/12/2013
Current
Class 377/6 (26 five-car trains / 52 cabs)
plus 40 additional Class 377/7 vehicles.
To comply with this clause would require the
doorway to be enlarged by approximately 10
mm. This would require the car body design
to be changed, and new structural validation
of the car body design would be needed.
Door header gear would have to be moved
upwards and the door design altered. New
interior trim would be needed for the new
installation. This would add significant cost
to the units.
A door throughway height of 1900 mm (in
Southern Railway Limited
accordance with GM/RT2473) permits a
92nd percentile male to board the train
without ducking. The proposed alternative
action would result in a minimum door
throughway height of 1880 mm, which
permits an 87th percentile male to board the
train without ducking. The nominal height of
the throughway of 1890 mm permits a 90th
percentile male to board the train without
ducking. A door throughway height of 1880
mm permits a >99th percentile female to
board the train without ducking. Note that,
once the door threshold is passed, the
minimum ceiling height is 2060 mm. While
this deviation will be a minor inconvenience
to those males above the 87th percentile
height, we do not consider that this
alternative has any safety or operational
impact. All anthropometric data is taken
from People Size 2008 and includes a 40
mm shoe correction.
08/01/2014
N/A
Rolling Stock
06/12/2013
Current
York Station; YORKSTH and YORKNTH1
SSI interlocking systems. Permissive routes
as listed below, applying to Platform 11 as
we;; as 9 and 10 for the Section 7 routes: ·
Y205(C)C1, Y205(C)C2, Y205(C)C3,
Y205(C)D1, Y205(C)D2, Y205(C)E ·
Y207(C)A, Y207(C)B, Y207(C)C ·
Y211(C)C1, Y211(C)C2, Y211(C)C3,
Y211(C)D1, Y211(C)D2, Y211(C)E ·
Y213(C)C, Y213(C)D · Y629(S)A, Y629(S)B,
Y629(S)C.
Adding the full controls to comply would
need a significant extension to the SSI
equipment as it is currently close to
maximum memory capacity. The cost would
be disproportionate to the safety benefits.
Controls onto an occupied line are not
Network Rail
included in the original set of requirements
to which controls in York Station interlocking
systems are currently implemented.
Existing arrangement have been in place for
twenty-two years, while interlocking
principles have been further developed,
resulting in existing controls not being in line
with current standards. A HAZOP workshop
has been convened to assess risk of
controls onto an occupied line not being
provided in the interlocking. Based on the
conclusions of the workshop, the severity of
the non-compliance is low, since it is
currently mitigated by Signal Box
instructions, which reinforce provisions of
Rule Book Module TS2 regarding
permissive working. Only a violation of
these rules would result in a potential
collision situation. The risk of ARS action
has been considered and the conclusion is
that the risk is low. There is no precedent
for such breach of regulations in York
Station. The risk of not providing the
controls listed in GK/RT0044 section 5. 3. 3
is also mitigated by the fact that all
permissive movements at York station are
timetabled and are non-passenger
movements only that are used for the joining
18/09/2012
N/A
CCS
16/08/2012
Current
Page 87
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0045
RGS Issue Number
Two
RGS Title
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
Certificate Number
12-122-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
Stafford Station, flashing aspects for LS3585 5.2.3
Down Fast to Platform 3 MAY-FA.
GIRT7033
Two
Lineside Operational Safety Signs
12-121-DGN
Platform Countdown Markers at _, « and ¬
mile on the approach to a station
Section AK and B10, B10.1, B10.2, B10.3
and; B10.4
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
12-115-DGN
Derogation against RGSs for UK Light
Locomotive
See details of RGS clauses in Annex 1.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-104-DGN
Hackney Central - extension of existing ticket 6.2
hall along same plane to allow gate line
extension
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
Stafford Station, LS3585 signal MAY-FA to
Platform 3.
Nature and Degree
Compliance would either require one of the
following options : MAR controls applied:
stopping trains would take longer to clear
the Down Fast into platform 3, which would
be considered a worsening of the
capacity/headway arrangements currently in
place. Reduction of the Approaching EPS
linespeed to 75mph: bringing EPS speed in
line with table 23 (75 mph approach, 25 mph
divergence). This would be a worsening of
the Down Fast capacity/headway
arrangements currently in place. 3 )
Increase the turnout speed from 25 mph to
the 40 mph: bringing it in line with table 23
(85 mph approach, 40 mph divergence).
This option had to be discounted due to
track realignment restrictions at Stafford.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Currently approaching Stafford station from
the south, there is a flashing aspect
sequence on the Down Fast with existing
signal SD4-83 having an MAY-FA route into
platform 3. The MAY-FA sequence was
overlayed onto the existing signal
arrangement within the last 10 years by the
WCRM project. The addition of the
sequence was to clear the Down Fast of
passenger trains as quickly as possible.
Operations have indicated to the Stafford
Area Improvements project team that they
would wish to retain this facility, as have
Virgin Trains during signal sighting and
consultation activities. The approach speed
is 75/85EPS with a turnout speed of 25 mph.
The predominant users of the MAY-FA
sequence would be capable of driving to the
85 mph EPS speed, therefore the
divergence speed is non-compliant with
table 23. However, as the EPS capable
trains have enhanced supervision and
braking capabilities, it is felt that in this case
exceeding the upper limit by 10 mph does
not introduce any additional risks. The
junction signal and flashing signals are to be
located in identical positions to the current
signalling arrangement. Exit signal
(SC5591) has been moved by 24 m, further
Network Rail Scotland Route.
Network Rail and First ScotRail propose the Additional sign applicable to First ScotRail
design of an alternate new sign not currently trains only. First ScotRail views the use of
included in RGS GI/RT7033 as required by station approach markers as one of the
section B10 of that RGS. First ScotRail (in measures for mitigating against station
association with Network Rail Scotland
overruns and instances of 'fail to call' where
Route) is seeking ways to reduce station
misjudgement is a factor. First ScotRail is
overruns and instances of 'fail to call' where continuously reviewing its Professional
misjudgement of braking distance is a
Driving Policy and route learning
factor. Sign AK102 allows for markers from documentation over affected routes to brief
300 m on the approach to a location (with
locations that may be difficult to stop at.
additional markers up to 600m if required). Detail below provides some relevant
These signs are considered insufficient
statistics from the Network Rail Wessex
distance from the station to give drivers
Route where overruns have generally
advance information of a station that could
reduced since the introduction of station
be difficult to stop at.
approach markers to provide a reference
point for drivers to judge their braking. At
locations where station approach markers
are provided in other Network Rail Routes,
some locations have seen a significant
reduction in station overruns: · Chandlers
Ford - Installed October 2005: No further
station overruns · Whimple - Installed
February 2006: Prior thirteen overruns,
since one overrun (2008 - late braking) ·
Rowlands Castle - One station overrun in
2010 (driver forgetting station stop) · Liss No further overruns/SPAD's attributed to
misjudgement · Only Earley continues to
suffer station overruns (four in 2009, three in
Diesel locomotives, known as UK Light,
The UK Light locomotive will be compliant Use of the alternative actions are considered
supplied by Vossloh Espa¤a S. A. for
with the Technical Specifications for
to deliver an equivalent level of control and
operation by Direct Rail Services Ltd (limited Interoperability (TSI) requirements, including safety and will also not require any further
to a maximum of 41 units). The UK Light
the Locomotive and Passenger TSI. In
ongoing actions or operational constraints.
locomotive is based on the existing
addition, it will be compliant with all
EUROLIGHT design.
applicable Notified National Technical Rules
(NNTRs) to cover open points and specific
cases, and ensure compatibility with the GB
mainline system. It will also operate over off
trans-European Network (TEN) routes and
therefore the complete suite of RGSs is
applicable. Within these RGSs, there are a
significant number of requirements that are
not directly related to TSI open points,
specific cases or compatibility. These
requirements have equivalent or
comparable requirements within the suite of
TSIs, therefore compliance with these RGS
requirements duplicates the TSI
assessment. Consequently, additional effort
and cost will be expended both in respect of
production of the evidence of compliance
and in its subsequent assessment by the
Designated Body. It is also possible that,
due to the differences in the detail of the
requirements, conflicts might exist that either
prevent full compliance with both the TSI
and RGS clauses, or necessitate a more
complex design. Due to both the additional
This non-compliance relates to horizontal
Complying with the existing RGS
The Risk Assessment undertaken by the
clearance between the platform edge and an requirement will make it impossible to install LOROL Safety team identified that the
extension to the existing building on Platform the urgently required ATG extension without current escape rates from the station are as
2 at Hackney Central station. The existing
demolishing the existing wall interfacing with follows: Before ATG Installation: Booking
building is to be extended on the same
the platform, which would result in the
Hall: 1650m wide; 132 persons per minute
plane to enable the installation of an
footprint of the ticket hall being reduced and Total: 132ppm, or 6. 76 minutes for 892
extended ATG gate line. The extension runs therefore worsening the overcrowding which passengers (Crush Loaded 378 Capitalstar).
parallel to the platform and does not
is currently witnessed on a frequent basis.
In the worst case scenario of the evacuation
encroach further towards the platform edge Crowding will be further worsened by the
of a crush-loaded four-car train, the station
than the existing building. The extended
Access for All lift installation which is
can be evacuated in 6. 76 minutes. The
ticket hall and ATG array will ease crowding currently taking place at the station and
installation of the new extended gateline
significantly and improve passenger flows
which will encourage additional mobility(which will be open first to last service) will
around the station.
impaired customers to use an already
introduce an additional means of escape
crowded ticket hall.
with the existing side gate being brought into
use as an emergency gate (on magnetic
locking linked to the gateline EMO).
Calculation of time it would take to evacuate
a crush-loaded four-car train with the new
layout is demonstrated as follows: After
ATG Installation: Booking Hall: 1650mm
wide, 132 persons per minute Platform 1
Side Gate: 1200mm wide; 96 persons per
minute Total: 228ppm, or 3. 91 minutes 892
passengers (Crush Loaded 378 Capitalstar).
Therefore, the introduction of the new gating
array will have no negative effect on the
evacuation from the station and will in fact
improve evacuation times from those
currently achievable.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
05/09/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
16/08/2012
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
29/11/2012
N/A
CCS
16/08/2012
Current
Direct Rail Services Limited
14/08/2014
N/A
Rolling Stock
25/07/2014
Current
Overground House
12/12/2012
N/A
INS
14/11/2012
Current
Page 88
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2400
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Engineering Design of On Track Machines
Certificate Number
12-103-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
Palfinger crane operators cab door lock and 3.22.1 b) and 3.6.2
window.
GERT8082
One
GSM-R Cab Mobile, Great Britain Open
Interface Requirements
12-102-DGN
Derogation against GE/RT8082 call quality
requirements for GSM-R Radio installations
using single handset Cab Audio Control
Units.
3.9.1, 3.9.2, 3.9.3, 3.9.4, 3.9.5 and 3.9.7
GORT3413
One
Provision of Information and Signs for
Access on the Railway
12-100-DGN
Signing of authorised access points to
running lines.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-097-DGN
Rochester Station (New) - Platform
horizontal curvature.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-092-DGN
Cardiff Central Station proposed Platform 8 - 2.1.2
170m 26c - 170m 34c, SWM2. Horizontal
curve radius
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
Balfour Beatty's Plasser General Purpose
TRAMM 98215
Nature and Degree
Balfour Beatty is installing a new Palfinger
crane in place of the original crane on the
Plasser General Purpose TRAMM. To meet
requirements of the standard, the company
will expend money needlessly to replace
original equipment supplied lock and glass
in the crane access door. Due to the
working methods implemented not meeting
requirements of the clauses in the standard
imports no increased risk to either network
or operating staff.
Use of the existing Whiteley/BTROS TD500 This deviation applies to the use of the
handset or the equivalent replacement DAC existing handset (Whiteley/BTROS TD500)
handset in place of a single GSM-R handset or equivalent replacement (DAC) in place of
on the Class 357 Electrostar fleet operated
a dedicated GSM-R handset on the Class
by c2c. A standard GSM-R installation
357 Electrostar fleet, noting that the existing
utilises a dedicated GSM-R handset for
handset and CACU arrangement will not
radio communication function. However,
pass the test requirements in the clauses
vehicles currently fitted with a single handset identified in section 6.
will have their Cab Audio Communication
Unit (CACU) modified to allow the existing
single handset to work in conjunction with
the GSM-R radio, thus maintaining the
existing arrangement whereby all cab audio
functions are managed through a single
handset. It should be noted that the scope
of this deviation is similar to that for
derogations 09/285/DGN and 10/048/DGN,
which also relate to the use of a single
handset and CACU arrangement which
cannot pass the test criteria as set out in
section 6 above.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Allowing the proposal to accept the standard Balfour Beatty Rail
crane as built introduces no risk to staff or
Renewals/Plant Development
infrastructure.
Certificate Issue Date
12/09/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Plant
Lead SC Approval Date
15/08/2012
Deviation Status
Current
There are no negative impacts of the
Network Rail
alternative actions. This is because
maintaining the use of a single handset
reduces the level of change effected by the
introduction of the GSM-R radio to the Class
357 cab design, thereby maintaining current
driver practice of controlling voice
communications through a single handset.
31/07/2012
N/A
CCS
12/07/2012
Current
2.1.3 and 3.1.3
National.
The standard requires that all access points
on Network Rail Managed Infrastructure are
fitted with a sign. Other than access points
on West Coast Main Line (WCML) and
some other ad hoc areas, this is not the
case. It is believed that this requirement
was captured in Group Standards as a
retrospective requirement following the
example of the WCRM project, but that this
was never affected in reality. A significant
number of access points do not have signs
and there is no intention to provide these
signs. The cost of fitting signs at all access
points has been estimated at œ10 million.
The benefit cost ratio is estimated at 0. 18,
such that a nationwide programme of fitment
currently lacks a suitable business
justification. Additionally, access points
represent only a small proportion of the
points of access to the network, which
include level crossings and station platform
ends. There is currently no requirement to
sign these. Finally, the fitment of signs does
not take account of the direction that
Network Rail has set out through Project
ORBIS, which is to provide information
direct to the user via handhelds.
A requirements capture form has been
Network Rail
completed by the Safety Change Leader for
Project ORBIS, such that the information
requirements referred to in Clause 2. 1. 3
are incorporated into the project for delivery
via handhelds. Staff have alternative means
to identify their location and track access is
covered by a planning process The BCR for
the fitment of signage across the network is
not sufficient to justify a national programme
of fitment with an estimated benefit cost ratio
of 0. 18.
13/08/2012
N/A
TOM
24/07/2012
Current
2.1.2
Rochester Station (New), Corporation
Street, Rochester, Kent.
It is proposed to provide a new threeplatform station at Rochester. The proposed
platforms (1 and 2/3) are located on a curve
with a radii of less than 1000 m. Platform 1
will serve the existing Up Chatham line (Upbound trains only) with a proposed
linespeed of 30 mph. Platform 2 will serve
the existing Dn Chatham line (bi-directional
traffic) with a proposed linespeed of 30 mph.
Platform 3 will serve a new Dn Rochester
Loop (approx. 600 m long) and
accommodate both passenger and freight
services through the station. Linespeed is
also proposed to be no more than 30 mph
and is also proposed to provide bidirectional facility. Current track radii
through the existing Up and Dn Chatham
lines ranges from straight down to the
tightest point of 347 m radii at 33 m 0608
yds on the Dn Chatham line. In addition to
the platforms, a new bespoke station
building will also be provided. It should be
noted that the proposed platforms will have
compliant stepping distances. It would not
be reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution.
Relatively minor. · Platform 1 (Up
Network Rail
Chatham) minimum radius = 369 m:
Working from the Country End to London
End: 70 m compliant to GI/RT7016
(straight) into 30 m transition, into 70 m of
435 m radii, into 30 m transition, into 55 m of
369 m radii. · Platform 2 (Dn Chatham)
minimum radius = 420 m: Working from the
Country End to London End; 75 m compliant
to GI/RT7016 (straight) into 30 m transition,
into 120 m of 420 radii, into 30 m transition.
· Platform 3 (Down Rochester Loop)
minimum radius = 316 m: Working from the
Country End to London End; 80 m compliant
to GI/RT7016 (straight) into 30 m transition,
into 30 m of 500 m radii, into 30 m transition,
into 85 m of 316 m radii. The proposed
platform solutions will have compliant
stepping distances. The platform curvature
has been subject to risk assessment
involving an expert judgement panel
including representatives from Network Rail
and Southeastern. In summary, it was
identified that hazards such as falling from
platform onto track, and between platform
edge and train would be mitigated in the
same way as any other station, through
appropriately designed platform waiting
areas and circulation routes. The possibility
Cardiff Central Station proposed Platform 8 - As part of the Cardiff Area Signalling
Low. Stepping distances will be compliant, Network Rail
170m 26c - 170m 34c, SWM2. Horizontal
Renewal (CASR) project, enhancement
and Arriva Trains Wales station
curve radius
works will be undertaken at Cardiff Central management will be involved with the
Station. This includes the construction of an positioning of TRTS/RA equipment.
additional Platform (8) to serve the Valley
Locating the proposed platform on a radius
Lines network. This Platform will be 154 m below 1000 m will provide all rolling stock
long and be located on a new track (Down
with compliant stepping distances.
Barry Loop) at 170 m 26c - 170 m 34c,
SWM2. The geometric constraints of the
site, the requirement to mate with the
existing station buildings, and the
characteristics of the railway infrastructure
do not provide reasonable opportunity to
provide a compliant solution. The horizontal
alignment of the new platform will replicate
the existing Platform 7 alignment with a
compound curve with radii varying between
400 m and 790 m, with sections of the
platform being on straight or above 1000 m
radii. (Note that the stepping distances to
the modified lengths of Platform 7 are
compliant. )
20/08/2012
N/A
INS
11/07/2012
Current
07/08/2012
N/A
INS
11/07/2012
Current
Page 89
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
12-091-DGN
Title
Caerphilly Station. Structures located within
the overrun risk zone.
GERT8073
Two
Requirements for the Application of
Standard Vehicle Gauges
12-088-DGN
Ecofret FWA(A) (twin outer) wagons with
1.2.7.6 and 2.1.2.5
SCT bogies and a 9'6'' high x 2500 mm wide
container side wind loading for application to
W10 gauge
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
12-087-DGN
Derogation for a Steam Railmotor Vehicle
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-086-DGN
Finsbury Park Station - Extremity of Platform 7.2.1
5 extension to northern end, Down Slow 1
line, Country Bound
GKRT0064
One
Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection and
Trapping
12-083-DGN
Reduced overlap on M499 signal at
Holytown Junction
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
6.3.2.1
6.6.3 and Appendix H1 a)
4.2.1
Scope
Nature and Degree
Caerphilly Station. Structures located within The Cardiff Area Signalling Renewal
the overrun risk zone.
(CASR) Project involves enhancement
works at Caerphilly Station. These works
include the construction of a 150 m long bay
platform (from the top of the ramp to buffer
stop). It is proposed that the bay platform
will terminate at a Friction Buffer Stop with a
7 m slide length. Canopy support columns
will be located 12. 4 m behind the buffer
face and an occupied station office will be
located about 21 m from the buffer face.
Thus the proposed arrangements do not
comply with Clause 6. 3. 1. 1 of GI/RT7016.
To achieve a minimum of 20 m clearance,
the starter signal and new S & C (turnout
and crossover) would have to be moved by
15 m towards the Country. This will have an
impact on platform standage: based on 6 x
23. 710 m long carriages, plus 2 m stopping
distance and 5 m for "inaccurate stopping
distance" requires at least 149. 260 m length
of platform. The platform would not
therefore be long enough for its intended
usage, but extending the platform would
require the repositioning of S & C and affect
the position of a RRV access point, thereby
restricting maintenance activities. It is not
therefore deemed practicable to provide a
compliant solution.
This derogation covers the Ecofret wagons
The requirements for the W10 gauge from
which are being introduced in service in
GE/RT8073 appendix F show a second
Autumn 2012. These wagons are
dynamic gauge line that includes the effect
configured as a `Twin set' consisting of two of a wind loading. Although the W10 and
vehicles of car kind code FWA(A) outer,
W12 gauges are shown with an additional
design code IFE966. The wagons are fitted gauge for dynamic movements with wind,
with SCT bogies and are required to carry 9' there is no information or other guidance
6'' high containers in the W10 gauge.
given in either GE/RT8073 or GE/GN8573
on how to calculate the effect of wind on a
vehicle, such that it can be compared
against the relevant gauge line. Various
sources of information were sought on this
issue, but no one contacted at Network Rail,
RSSB or other industry experts could shed
light on the method to be used for this
assessment. Therefore a reasonable
approach was derived as follows by
calculating the moment on the vehicle due to
the wind loading using the methodology
from GM/RT2142 issue 3 Resistance of
Railway Vehicles to Roll-Over in Gales.
Calculations have been carried out (see
report Ecofret Gauging with Wind
Calculation - calculation 170902C02A)
based on the approach set out in section 9
of this certificate which show that the Ecofret
FWA(A) (twin outer) wagons with SCT
bogies are within the gauge lines for W10
gauge set out in GE/RT8073 Appendix F.
Operation of the following preserved Steam It would not be practical to revise the RGS to
Railmotor on lines, as agreed by the NRAB include steam powered vehicles, due to their
and subsequently by the Licensed Operator. wide diversity of design from modern
· GWR Steam Railmotor Number 93 · TOPS traction units and the general scarcity of
No. 99093 · Painted No. 93 · Class / Power technical information now available to prove
Classification 1P · Wheel Arrangement 0-4- their compliance or otherwise. In a number
0 + Bo · Maximum Speed 25 mph.
of recent re-issues of RGS, specific
exemptions for steam powered vehicles,
shown in the previous issues, have been
withdrawn, increasing the number of noncompliances for which derogation has now
to be sought.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
It is not deemed to be reasonably
Network Rail
practicable to provide a compliant solution.
Low. The low entry speed into the bay
platform, coupled with signal protection,
minimises the probability and consequences
of an impact with the infrastructure located
behind the buffer stop. The proposed CASR
signalling system is designed to stop all nonfreight trains hitting the buffer stop. Based
on 25 mph linespeed, the Signalling &amp;
Control system (TPWS) will stop all nonfreight trains hitting the buffer stop. The
control measures are designed to prevent
any train impacting the building. The
canopy is a "side" canopy, and the location
under the side canopy can be fenced off to
reduce any possible risk of passengers
waiting in the overrun zone.
Certificate Issue Date
01/03/2013
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
08/01/2013
Deviation Status
Current
It is suggested that the intention of
GE/RT8073 is to use a mean side wind
speed with an appropriate gust speed.
27/09/2012
N/A
INS
11/07/2012
Current
As indicated in Appendix 7 of this
West Coast Railway Company 11/07/2012
document. The preserved steam railmotor Ltd
is of a type that ran safely over the British
Railway infrastructure since its introduction
in 1903 and continued until its withdrawal
from revenue service in 1935. The vehicle is
intended for Heritage Operation only. In
order to achieve compliance with RGS, the
cost would be prohibitive and such
engineering change would also destroy the
vehicles fundamental nature and authenticity
as a "heritage" vehicle. Making the vehicle
compliant would, in many instances, be
impractical because of the design of the
vehicle and the location of the boiler and
driving controls. The risk of SPADs is
mitigated by the presence of two people in
the cab. In addition, two data GPS devices
will be installed, one in each cab. The
moquette used for the seats was a
previously approved railway material.
Finsbury Park Station. Clause 7. 2. 1 The current capacity of Finsbury Park
It would be impractical to provide a
Network Rail
21/06/2012
Extremity of Platform 5 extension to northern Station is to be enhanced by the construction compliant solution. Low risk: see attached
end, Down Slow 1 line, Country Bound.
of extensions to Platforms 3 and 5, and the risk assessment. The substandard platform
refurbishment and extension of platform 0/- width is limited to a 10. 5 m length at the end
1. The extensions will form 245 m long
of Platform 5, and this area is unlikely to
platforms. The width of the proposed
experience peak passenger crowding.
extension to Platform 5 will taper down to 1.
81 m; the usable length of the substandard
width of platform is 10. 6 m. The width of
the platform at the position of the last vehicle
passenger door is 1. 91 m.
Full overlap on M499 signal at Holytown
The planned S & C Renewal at Holytown
The signal is adequately sighted on a falling Network Rail
28/09/2012
Junction, Scotland.
Junction will increase the overlap to 177 m
gradient of 1: 117. The speed rises from 60
from the current 162 m. Options to achieve to 65 mph approximately 400 m before the
compliance identified are: Movement of
signal and after passing the previous signal.
signal to make the overlap compliant would If the line speed remained at 60 mph, then a
require full signal sighting and, due to site
reduced overlap of 135 m would be
conditions, the probable addition of a banner sufficient. The adjustment of the TPWS
repeater, Redesign of the junction however reduces the risk of a SPAD reaching the
this is not possible within the physical
point of conflict and there is no history of
confines without significant reductions in
SPADs at the signal. An overrun risk
speed, Extension of the overlap through the assessment has been undertaken and it has
S & C which would impact on route capacity, been agreed that, rather than the enhanced
Provision of a restricted approach (creating TPWS described, the relocation of the
a restricted overlap) which would be
existing equipment will produce similar
unacceptable to the train operators, Reduce safety benefits.
the speed on approach to M499 which would
not be acceptable to operations.
N/A
RST
22/06/2012
Current
N/A
Infrastructure
16/05/2012
Current
N/A
CCS
14/06/2012
Current
Freightliner Group
Page 90
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0192
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
Certificate Number
12-082-DGN
Title
Provision of protecting signal less than 25m
from MCB-Obstacle Detector (OD) at
Huncoat Station
GKRT0192
One
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
12-080-DGN
GKRT0045
Two
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
2.1.1.3
Scope
PN401 signal situated on the Up approach
to Huncoat MCB-OD (Engineer's Line
Reference FHR5 17 miles 36 chains).
Nature and Degree
As part of the East Lancashire Level
Crossing Renewal Scheme, Huncoat MCB
is being converted to MCB(OD). The
current protecting signal in the Up direction
is PN401 (located about 260 m from the
crossing) slotted by Huncoat No. 6 lever.
The signal is located prior to the station
platform. The change to MCB-OD and the
control of the area remotely leads to a
preferred position of a protecting signal as
close as reasonable to the crossing (to
support the management of degraded
working) and preferably between a station
and the crossing to reduce road closure
time. Positioning the signal 25 m from the
crossing would place it in the vicinity of a
passenger shelter which would need to be
relocated and require either a bracket signal
or the station entrance to be extensively
modified. The extra costs of the work are
estimated at œ150,000 for the extra platform
extension and change to signal structure.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The likelihood of a forward route not being
Network Rail
available is low and hence it is not
considered that the potential for a SPAD is
significant. There are benefits to the
passengers of keeping the train stopping
position closer to the entrance. The risk of a
train approaching (and then passing at
danger) the signal at red and entering a
road crossing with road users still on the
crossing are mitigated by the auto lower
sequence being triggered when the train is
on the approach to the crossing. An
independent risk assessment has been
undertaken for the Level Crossing and the
report is attached.
Certificate Issue Date
10/07/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
14/06/2012
Deviation Status
Current
Provision of protecting signal less than 25m 2.1.1.3
from Brierfield MCB-Obstacle Detector (OD)
level crossing
PN552 signal situated on the Up approach
to Brierfield MCB-OD Up Approach
(Engineer's Line Reference GJC 24 miles 16
chains).
The likelihood of a forward route not being
available is low due to this being a single
line and hence it is not considered that the
potential for a SPAD is significant. There
are benefits to the passengers of keeping
the train stopping position closer to the
entrance. The risk of a train approaching
(and then passing at danger) the signal at
red and entering a road crossing with road
users still on the crossing are mitigated by
the auto lower sequence being triggered
when the train is 125 m from the crossing.
An independent risk assessment has been
undertaken for each Level Crossing and
reports are attached.
Network Rail
10/07/2012
N/A
CCS
14/06/2012
Current
12-078-DGN
Close Door and Right Away Indicators on
platforms 2, 7 and 8 at Victoria Station.
Appendix C, Section C.1.1
CD/RA Indicators on platforms 2, 7 and 8 at
Victoria Station.
N/A
CCS
14/06/2012
Current
Sutton Station Platform 3 and Platform 4 horizontal curves and minimum platform
width.
2.1.2 and 7.2.1 b
Sutton Station Platform 3 and Platform 4 horizontal curves and minimum platform
width
No alternative measures are planned as the Network Rail
risks are considered to be mitigated by the
controlled lighting levels within the station. It
should be noted that the reading distance of
these indicators is governed by the lighting
conditions, the size of the characters and the
visual acuity of train drivers. The 65 m
distance is based on a worst case
combination of lighting levels (which affect
contrast) and driver eyesight (with the vast
majority of drivers exceeding the minimum
requirement). The arrangements have been
supported by the Signal Sighting
Committee. The controlled light levels
within the station mean that the indicator is
visible at 68 metres in the worst instance.
The renewal of the CD/RA banner indicators
is to provide operational improvements by
allowing trains to be dispatched more
efficiently. The sighting of the CD/RA
banner indications was undertaken in
conjunction with the re-sighting of the
platform starting signals; the sighting of the
latter will be greatly improved by this
scheme as read across/read through was a
known problem within the station area, and
this has been eliminated with the new
alignment and arrangement of signalling
elements on the platform starting signals.
It would not be reasonably practicable to
Network Rail
provide a compliant solution. Due to site
constraints, such a solution would require
substantial and expensive construction
works to support deep cuts into the cutting
slopes bounding the platforms, and the
rebuilding of the station overbridge. Low
severity. Passengers waiting for trains in the
morning peak spread out along Platform 3.
The station staircases to the platforms and
the waiting room/canopied area are about
half way along the platforms. Overcrowding
at the Country ends of Platform 3 and 4 is
therefore unlikely. Low risk to passengers:
the station is not subject to crowding or
congestion problems in normal
circumstances. Compliant stepping
distances will be provided.
10/07/2012
12-071-DGN
As part of the East Lancashire Level
Crossing Renewal Scheme, Brierfield MCB
is being converted to MCB (OD). The
current protecting signal in the Up direction
is Brierfield No. 1 signal located prior to the
platform. The change to MCB-OD and the
control of the area remotely leads to a
preferred position of a protecting signal as
close as reasonable to the crossing (to
support the management of degraded
working) and preferably between a station
and the crossing to reduce road closure
time. Positioning the signal 25 m from the
crossing would place it in the vicinity of a
passenger shelter, and would require either
a bracket signal or the station entrance to be
extensively modified and the platform to be
extended. The extra costs of the work are
estimated at œ190,000 (extra signal
structure costs and platform extension).
At Victoria station, three CD/RA banner
indicators on the terminal platforms 2, 7 and
8 will be outside of the 65 metres readability
that this standard allows in certain
circumstances: · VS3R(3)-CD-RA(3) will be
67 metres away from the driver of a two
carriage train; · VS15R(4)-CD-RA(4) will be
66 metres away from the member of
platform dispatch staff who uses the TRTS
buttons; · VS17 will be 68 metres from the
driver of an eight carriage train. Additional
indicators could be installed, but the whole
life cost, particularly in terms of installation
and maintenance, is wholly disproportionate
to the benefits. The platform would become
extremely cluttered in certain locations
where large numbers of commuters would
be trying to exit the platforms. The driver
and platform dispatch staff may also be
distracted by too many indicators being in
view conveying the same indication. In the
case of VS3R(3)-CD-RA(3), new stop
markers could be installed for a two carriage
train on the approach to the buffer stops to
seek compliance to the 65 metres
readability. This solution would severely
affect the platform's capacity by limiting the
length of any train that would be able to
share this platform with a two carriage train.
Clause 2. 1. 2 requires platforms to have a
minimum curvature of 1000 m. Clause 7. 2.
1b) requires a minimum 2. 5 m wide single
face platform for adjacent line speeds of less
than 100 mph. The Sussex Train
Lengthening Project involves extending the
platforms on the Sussex suburban route to
accept ten-carriage length trains (from eightcarriage length trains). As part of this
project, at Sutton Station it is proposed to
construct a 42. 88 m long extension at the
Country End of Platform 4, and a 36. 94 m
long extension at the Country end of
Platform 3. Due to site constraints, the
useable platform width for both platforms is
proposed to be a minimum of 2. 0 m on a
curve radii of 475 m. Stepping distances
will be compliant. The existing horizontal
alignments through Platforms 3 and 4 are
about 366 m and 376 m respectively. The
proposed extensions are situated on an
average radius replicating the existing
horizontal alignments of the Up Wallington
(Platform 3) and the Down Wallington
(Platform 4) lines.
18/07/2012
N/A
INS
16/05/2012
Current
Page 91
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
12-070-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
Reading Station Platforms 5 and 6:
6.3.1 and; 6.3.2
permanent new structures within the overrun
risk zone.
Scope
Reading Station Platforms 5 and 6:
permanent new structures within the overrun
risk zone. Third rail DC electrification.
Platforms used for South-West Trains
services between Reading and London
Waterloo and for First Great Western
services to Gatwick. Platforms to be
lengthened to accommodate twelve-car
formations. Overall length of platforms is
285 m with an operational length of 265 m.
Both platforms are fitted with friction grip
sliding buffers and buffer stop lighting.
TPWS buffer stop over speed protection is
fitted. Approach speed into the platforms is
15 mph.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-067-DGN
Cheam Station Platform 1: minimum width of 7.2.1 b)
single-faced platform
Cheam Station Platform 1: minimum width
of single-faced platform.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-066-DGN
Epsom Downs - single faced platform:
2.1.2, 7.2.1
platform on a horizontal curve and minimum
width of the platform.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-065-DGN
Wakefield Westgate Station - Up main
platform; minimum platform width
Epsom Downs - single faced platform:
Clause 2. 1. 2 requires station platforms to
platform on a horizontal curve and minimum be located on horizontal curves with radii
width of the platform.
less than 1000 m. Clause 7. 2. 1b) requires
a minimum 2. 5 m wide single face platform
for adjacent line speeds of less than 100
mph. The aim of the Sussex Train
Lengthening Project is to extend the length
of existing station platforms on the Sussex
suburban route from eight- to ten-carriage
platforms without reducing the number of
trains able to utilise the route. Epsom
Downs is a terminal station with a single line
and single faced platform. The useable
length of the platform will be extended by 45
m (at the London end) to 205 m. The
extension is constrained by the boundary
fence line and the need to maintain a public
footpath to the rear of the platform. The
existing platform and track alignment is to
be maintained and the proposed platform
extension at the London end is to be situated
on curve of 720 m radius, and the width of
the platform at its narrowest point will be 1. 8
m. Stepping distances are compliant.
Because of the limited land available to the
rear of the existing platform, it would not be
reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution: such a solution would
require either an Order under the Transport
Wakefield Westgate Station - Up main
Wakefield Westgate Station consists of two
platform; minimum platform width.
single faced platforms serving the Up main
and Down loop on the Doncaster to Leeds
section of the East Coast Main Line (DOL2).
The Up platform is to be extended at its
Country (Leeds) end by 11. 346 m to
accommodate ten-car IEP services. The
line speed is 45 mph. Behind the platform is
Wakefield Signalling Relay room, which is
accessed via a pathway which runs at the
back of the existing platform ramp. The
pathway is formed by a large covered cable
route (which carries a considerable number
of signalling cables into the relay room),
beyond which lies a large troughing route
(which again forms part of the pathway and
contains a considerable number of cables).
Due to the presence of the existing cable
route, it is not reasonably practical to
provide a minimum platform width of 2500
mm. It is proposed to provide an extended
platform with a width of 1. 9 m: this matches
the width of the existing platform ramp that
the extension will replace. Due to the
constraints imposed by the existing cables, it
would not be reasonably practicable to
provide a compliant solution.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
7.2.1. b)
Nature and Degree
The columns to the existing canopies on
Platforms 5 and 6 at Reading Station are
located within the overrun risk zone. Due to
site constraints these columns cannot be
relocated without substantial reconstruction
and reconfiguring of the platforms and track.
The available overall width of the platform
behind the re-positioned buffer stop with
new canopy columns along the line of the
previous columns is insufficient to allow the
columns to be repositioned outside the
overrun risk zone. This results in three of
the canopy columns being located within the
5 m exclusion zone (within the Overrun Risk
Zone). The distance from the projected
centre line of the track to the centreline of the
columns is 4641 mm on Platform 5 and 4946
mm on Platform 6 side. Platforms 5 and 6
are not of equal width. The original situation
at the buffer stop ends of platforms 4A and
4B, prior to the RSAR project remodelling
works, was non-compliant to Clause 6. 3. 1:
the distance from the existing buffer on
platform 4B to the escalator/stairs/lift
machinery room behind the buffer was about
5 m, and the existing main station canopy
roof columns were within the overrun risk
zone behind platform 4A. Impact walls had
been installed behind the buffers. The
Clause 7. 2. 1 b) requires a minimum 2. 5 m
wide single face platform for adjacent line
speeds of less than 100 mph. Sussex Train
Lengthening Project involves the extension
of platforms on the Sussex suburban route
(ELR: BTH2) to accept ten-carriage length
trains (from eight-carriages). As part of this
Project, at Cheam Station it is proposed to
extend the useable length of Platform 1 on
the London End by 28. 5 m (from 172. 5 m to
201 m); of which 5 m will have a compliant
width of 2. 5 m and the remaining 23. 5 m
length will have a minimum width of 1. 8 m.
The existing horizontal alignment through
Platform 1 is straight.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Due to the constraints of the site, it would
Network Rail
not be reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution. Details of the risks
introduced by this non-compliance, and
other options are described in the
application. Low risk: the three columns
behind the buffer stops are 359 mm within
the exclusion zone on Platform 5 side and 54
mm within for Platform 6 side. The risk of an
overrun resulting in an impact by rolling
stock on a canopy column is considered to
be very low.
Certificate Issue Date
01/06/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
16/05/2012
Deviation Status
Current
It would be impracticable to provide a
Network Rail
compliant solution. Low severity.
Passengers waiting for trains in the morning
peak spread out along the platform. The
station entrance is at the opposite end of the
platform, with the waiting room and
canopied area about half-way along. This is
a lightly used station, and the risk to
passengers generated by the sub-standard
width of the platform is deemed to be
acceptable.
07/08/2012
N/A
INS
16/05/2012
Current
Low severity. This station is lightly used.
Network Rail
Passengers waiting for trains in the morning
peak spread out along the platform. The
station entrance is at the opposite end of the
platform, with the waiting room and
canopied area about half way along. Epsom
Downs is a lightly used station and the risk
to passengers generated by this deviation is
deemed to be acceptable. Compliant
stepping distances are provided along the
platform extension.
13/09/2012
N/A
INS
16/05/2012
Current
The risk to passengers generated by the
Network Rail
non-compliance is deemed to be
acceptable. The Up platform is to be
extended by 11. 346 m at the Country end at
a substandard width of 1. 9 m. This will be
at the rear of the train in the normal direction
of travel and will only impact upon the
rearmost door of the final carriage. This
would be positioned 4 m from the end of the
platform extension with the train position at
the stop board. The platform length has
been determined using normal 5 m stopping
tolerances - a 1 m overshoot and 4 m
undershoot to the stop board position. It is
anticipated that passenger numbers wishing
to board or alight from the affected door will
be low. Wakefield Station is the first stop for
Leeds to London services. The affected
door is both at the furthest point from the
entrance to Wakefield station and at the
London terminus and should not attract
significant numbers of passengers.
Similarly, any commuters making the 12
minute Leeds to Wakefield journey are
unlikely to occupy the platform extension as
it is at the furthest point from the station exit.
The restriction will only impact upon ten-car
IEP services. The existing platform is of
sufficient length for all other current
07/08/2012
N/A
INS
16/05/2012
Current
Page 92
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2142
RGS Issue Number
Three
RGS Title
Certificate Number
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to Roll-Over 12-063-DGN
in Gales
Title
RGS Clause
Resistance of Railway Vehicles to Roll-Over 2.1.1.1 b)
in Gales - FXA Wagon to Carry 60' long x
9'6" high containers.
Scope
FXA wagons carrying 60' long x 9'6''
containers.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-062-DGN
Arlesey station: Up slow platform - items
6.5
located less than 2000 mm from the platform
edge.
Arlesey station: Up slow platform - items
It is proposed to extend the Up slow platform
located less than 2000 mm from the platform at Arlesey Station on the East Coast Main
edge.
Line by 80. 5 m to accommodate twelve-car
Thameslink services to and from London
Kings Cross. The width of the extended
platform is 3. 0 m. OLE E59/14 is located
within the Up cess 37. 0 m from the
proposed Country end of the extension. The
mast lies within the footprint of the proposed
extension and supports a headspan
crossing all four tracks of the East Coast
Main Line from which is suspended the 25kV
OLE. All lighting columns and other signage
within the extension will be positioned not
less than 2. 5 m from the platform edge. To
the rear of the proposed platform is the
existing station car park. An Armco barrier
will be used to protect the platform from
vehicular collision. The line speed on the
Up slow line is 80 mph.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
12-059-DGN
Derogation for Ex. London &amp; North
6.6.3
Eastern Railway K4 Class 5P6F 2-6-0 steam
locomotive TOPS No. 98642 `The Great
Marquess'.
Operation of the following preserved Steam
Locomotive on all lines, as agreed by the
NRAB and subsequently by the licensed
operator: Ex. London and North Eastern
Railway Class K4 TOPS No. 98642 Painted
No. 61994 Name: `The Great Marquess'
Power Classification: 5P6F Wheel
Arrangement 2-6-0 Maximum Speed 50 mph
/ 45 mph tender first.
GKRT0045
One
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
12-058-DGN
Flashing aspects on the approach to
TN4917 signal, Beeston near Nottingham
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
5.2.3.1
Nature and Degree
Non-compliance to minimum acceptable
intrinsic roll-over wind speed for FXA
wagons carrying 60' long x 9'6" high
containers (Equivalent to three 20' or a 20'
plus a 40' containers). The FXA wagon is a
reduced deck height version of the FCA/FYA
wagons allowing transit of 9'6" high cube
containers in W10 gauge. To comply to the
minimum acceptable roll-over wind speed of
30. 8 m/s as stipulated in GM/RT2142 Issue
3, it would not be possible to transport 60'
long of 9'6" high containers, unless the
wagon speed was limited to 45 mph in the
tare condition (60' long of 9'6" empty
containers); this would restrict the use of the
wagon to transport empty 9'6" containers,
resulting in a loss of business.
Steam locomotives are in a minority group
and subject to the restrictions in GM/RT2000
for "Heritage Vehicles". This preserved
steam locomotive is of a type that ran safely
over the London North Eastern Railway and
British Railways infrastructure since their
introduction in 1936, and continued until
withdrawal from revenue service in 1961.
Locomotive 61994 entered service in July
1938 and withdrawn in December 1961.
The locomotive is intended for heritage
operation only. In order to achieve
compliance with RGS, the cost would be
prohibitive and such engineering change
would also destroy the locomotive's
fundamental nature and authenticity as a
"heritage vehicle". Making the locomotive
compliant would, in many instances, be
impractical because of the bulk and location
of the locomotive boiler. The following list
summarizes the Railway Group Standards
where K4 class steam locomotive 61994,
`The Great Marquess', does not meet the
requirements, either wholly or in part, or
where sufficient data is unavailable to prove
or disprove compliance. Where no
reference is made to a Railway Group
Standard, the locomotive is considered
compliant. RGS numbers: GE/RT8014 Iss
Flashing aspect sequence on approach to
Compliance would require the provision of
Signal TN4917 located near Beeston, routes approach release from red on TN4917 C(M)
TN4917 C(M) and E(M) read on to the Down &amp; TN4917 E(M) routes, which would
and Up Nottingham Slow lines respectively. further reduce the speed of freight trains
adding a significant delay to clearing the
Down and Up Nottingham lines on this busy
route, thereby reducing freight capacity. The
cost of this delay will vary between œ0. 00
(no delay) to œ109. 15 per minute per train
for EMT Passenger Trains. There is also
the risk that freight trains may need to
accelerate after the signal clears.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The FXA wagon has been compared to the
FEA (B) type wagon; the wagons have
similar side area and reference height.
However, the FXA tare weight is greater by
4. 8 tonnes. During the process of
comparing the FXA to the FEA wagon, a
query relating to minimum acceptable
intrinsic roll-over wind speed of 30. 8 m/s
was discussed with RSSB, who advised that
research project T961 was underway to
examine non compliances to GM/RT2142
Issue 3. Following recommended actions
arising from the RAIB report into the
detachment of containers in strong winds at
Hardendale and Cheddington, the FEA (B)
wagon was reviewed and found not to
comply with requirements of GM/RT2142
Issue 3. More recently, calculations were
produced for a new build of coal hopper
assessed against GMRT2142 Issue 3, which
also showed that the wagon was noncompliant. Calculations undertaken on the
same vehicle to GM/RT2142 Issue 2 gave a
compliant result with some margin. These
results raised concerns regarding the
acceptance limit within GM/RT2142 Issue 3
which resulted in research project T961
`Investigation of freight vehicle aerodynamic
performance in accordance with
Given the minor degree of non-compliance,
the risks involved during construction works,
the increase in risk of collision from vehicles
were the mast to be relocated and the
associated costs of the works, it is not
considered reasonably practicable to
relocate the mast. Mast E59/14 is
positioned 37. 0 m from the proposed
country end of the extended Up (slow)
platform at a distance of circa 1965 mm from
the proposed platform edge which is 35 mm
less than 2000 mm required for an isolated
column. The restriction will only affect
passengers boarding the rear two carriages
(Four passenger doors) only of any twelvecar services using the platform. The minor
severity of the non-compliance to mast
E59/14 (up side) is mitigated by the virtue
that its position is towards the northern end
of the platform and will affect only the trailing
two carriages of twelve-car services. Given
that the area of platform beyond the
restriction affects the rear of the train,
remote from the station entrance at Arlesey
and also from the terminus exit at Kings
Cross, passenger numbers passing the
restriction point will not be high. As a
London commuter station, during the worst
case (am) peak for the Up direction,
A fundamental part of the business portfolio
of DB Schenker (UK) Ltd is the operation of
the steam locomotive hauled Special Train
services that were vested into rail express
systems on the privatisation of British Rail.
The planned operation of K4 locomotive
61994 in North East Scotland during May
2012 forms a key part of an eight-day steam
hauled tour of Great Britain. This is a very
costly operation for the promoter and DB
Schenker. The choice of locomotive takes
into account the fact that the DB Schenker
already authorised steam locomotives are
too heavy for the Inverness to Kyle route. It
is of note that the planned operation will
satisfy the Maximum Loading Table for the
route, as set by the DB Schenker Engineer
and Operations Standards Manager and
agreed with Network Rail. The operation
will be vacuum-braked from Inverness
northward and the selected DB Schenker
footplate crew will receive refresher training
prior to the operation. The following
contingences and initiatives will be in place:
· Dual-braked class 37 locomotive will be
standing by at Inverness · Through air pipe
has recently been fitted and tested on
locomotive 61994 · DB Schenker FTR
Examiner will carry out additional functional
The use of flashing aspects MAY-FA on this
section of railway approaching the Down
and Up Nottingham Slow lines would be a
benefit as it will give freight train drivers the
earliest possible indication that they are
being signalled into the loops clear of the
main line. This will allow drivers of trains
signalled onto the slow lines to regulate their
speed more effectively, thus reducing any
delay to following services. This method of
signalling has been introduced at the
request of the Operations Department to
prevent any possible delay, as this section of
line caters for seven trains per hour. The
compliant solution is to provide approach
release from red, which was discounted due
to the need to reduce the speed of freight
trains when approaching the junction with
the potential to then accelerate towards the
junction. The diverging speed on the routes
on to the Up and Down Nottingham Slow
lines are the same at 25 mph, and therefore
the drivers' expected actions are the same
for both routes and reduces the SPAD risk
from anticipation. The approach at this
junction is consistent with the signalling
controls provided at other junctions within
the East Midlands Signalling Renewal area
and future proofs against the junction being
Applicant Organisation
DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd
Certificate Issue Date
07/06/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
25/05/2012
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
28/06/2012
N/A
INS
16/05/2012
Current
DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd
16/05/2012
N/A
RST
27/04/2012
Current
Network Rail
28/05/2012
CCS
17/05/2012
Current
Page 93
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0192
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Level Crossing Interface Requirements
Certificate Number
12-055-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
Position of Signal T894 at Littlehaven station 2.1.1.3
less than 25m from level crossing edge.
Scope
Signal T894 located at the Up end of
platform 1 at Littlehaven station controlled
from Three Bridges.
Nature and Degree
Signal T894 is currently positioned 25 m
from the crossing edge. However, the
crossing is being upgraded from manned
gates to manned gates remotely monitored
by CCTV. In order to bring the roadway and
associated footpaths into compliance, the
edge of the crossing needs to be moved
approximately 3 m closer to the protecting
signal. Repositioning the signal would
require a re-evaluation of the stopping
position of trains in the platform, an
extension to the platform and construction
work in the vicinity of the signal to allow
passenger access and exit at considerable
cost compared to benefits. The sole
passenger access to the platform is from the
roadway adjacent to the level crossing and
up the platform ramp past the signal.
GKRT0041
One
Track Circuit Block
12-054-DGN
Provision of alternative emergency alarm
between fringe signalboxes during
stageworks on Modular Signalling projects.
6
Modular Signalling is designed to be
deployed on secondary routes which cannot
justify conventional power signalling due to
low density traffic patterns and rural
business. These will generally be classified
no higher than a Conventional TENS route
and typically unclassified. This application
is generic in nature for modular schemes
where the modular signalling will be
introduced in stages with temporary fringes.
Initial deployment will be on the pilot route of
Ely to Norwich, specifically at Harling Road.
It is technically possible to provide an
emergency alarm between the control centre
for the modular signalled area and the
adjacent box, however the fringe is typically
in use for a few weeks and, therefore, the
costs and risks associated with providing a
communications link and the temporary
alterations to both signalling centres is
disproportionate to the risks being
managed.
GKRT0045
Two
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
12-051-DGN
Use of "X" indication on Signal SN132 for
main class route at Old Oak Common.
2.3.2.5
GKRT0051
One
Single Line Control
12-049-DGN
Non provision of separate replacement
facilities on PN254 and PN257 distant
signals at Preston (Bare Lane)
Part H, clause 6.6.4
GKRT0075
Two
Lineside Signal Spacing and Speed
Signage
12-043-DGN
Non provision of AWI boards between
Elephant &amp; Castle and Blackfriars
3.3.1.4
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The objective of the distance between the
Network Rail
protecting signal and the level crossing is
understood to be to provide sufficient time
for the crossing system to respond to a
SPAD at the protecting signal and provide a
warning to road users, hence reducing the
risk that a train will collide with a road
user/vehicle. The controls proposed (often
referred to as Stowmarket controls) cause
the crossing sequence to commence as the
train approaches the signal at red. In normal
circumstances, by the time the train has
stopped in the station and completed station
duties, the signaller will be able to set the
forward route and operate the crossing clear
control. This will provide no appreciable
delay to road users and reduce the length of
the time the crossing is closed, as opposed
to requiring the crossing closed prior to an
approach to T894.
This proposal has been reviewed and
Network Rail
agreed with the Network Rail Operations
Principles and Standards Manager, a
representative of the Network Rail
Professional Head of S & T Engineering and
a representative of the Network Rail
Professional Head of Ergonomics as part of
the development of a method of temporary
fringe working for Modular Signalling
schemes (minutes attached). The ethos of a
Modular Signalling scheme is for the period
between staged commissioning's to be
short, as the short durations of the
commissioning periods allow track access to
be obtained more easily than for a traditional
resignalling. It is not intended that a period
of temporary fringe working will exceed two
weeks, but it is recognised that,
exceptionally, a duration longer than this
may be necessary. This extended situation
has also been reviewed with the OP & S
Manager, and the representative for S & T
Engineering and Ergonomics. T hey agreed
that the use of mobile phones for extended
periods in the context of a lightly used line
did not present an unacceptable risk. The
first application, at Harling Road on the Ely Norwich route will be for a period of
approximately five months. All level
Signal SN132 , Engineers Line Reference
The project proposes to use the single
No change in overall risk to the operational Network Rail
MLN1 approx. 2¬ miles.
character 'X' indication in a standard
railway - more risk (driver confusion) is likely
indicator for main route SN132C(M). SN132 to be introduced if other indications are used
is on the Carriage Line. This route is not
to achieve compliance with current standard.
towards a limit of shunt, but is for wrong
Non-compliance has been granted for
direction moves up to the Down Relief Line several similar SI "X" indications on this
main aspect signal SN126. The position of project and others. The indications to
this signal is cramped due to it being
drivers in this area have been considered
sighted under a bridge and in the space
and agreed by the TOC/FOC
between two lines. The Signal Sighting
representatives. These indications present
Committee has asked for the signal to be
the least possible confusion to drivers and
mounted at circa 2 m height. This is to
that 'X' is commonly used to indicated routes
make it distinguishable from signal SN134
to 'Wrong Direction' signals. Nonon the UR. PLJI and double character
compliance to clause 2. 3. 2. 5 c) will not
indicators have been considered; they don't reduce the safety of the signalling system.
fit at proposed height. The other main route All main aspect routes from SN132 are the
on this signal is towards the Up Relief Line same speed which is 25 mph. The next
for which "U" is proposed. "R" would not be signal ahead on the main aspect routes is at
appropriate for up moves on the DR
527 and 537 m from SN132. They are fitted
because "R" is normally used for moves on with TPWS and GW ATP.
the right direction Relief Line. "D" is used
for the Depot Line on other signals within
200 m of SN132.
Preston (Bare Lane) Signals PN254 and
The two track signalling arrangements
Replacement of the Distant signals due to
Network Rail
PN257
between Bare Lane and Morecambe are
lamp failure in the associated Stop signals
unusual in that both lines are independent
would be provided for automatically within
single lines designated Up &amp; Dn
the interlocking. These signals are distant
Morecambe and Up &amp; Dn Heysham.
signals reading up to Stop signals protecting
The Up &amp; Dn Morecambe is currently
Bare Lane MCB (CCTV) level crossing. No
controlled under One Train Working
risk has been identified which would be
(Without Staff) arrangements with sequential mitigated by the provision of separate
Track Circuit operation. The Up &amp; Dn replacement facilities. It is considered that
Heysham is currently controlled under One the requirement to provide a separate
Train Working (With Staff) arrangements
replacement switch does not offer any
with sequential Track Circuit operation.
significant reduction in risk.
Under the proposed scheme, both single
lines will become One Train Working
(Without Staff). The proposed works
include conversion of the Up Distant Signals
PN254 and PN257 to worked colour lights
from the existing Distant Marker Boards.
Both signals shall repeat the Stop Signals
protecting Bare Lane LC (PN262 and PN259
respectively). During development, the
requirement to provide replacement facilities
for PN254 and PN257 was discussed, with
reference to GK/RT0060 - Interlocking
Principles, Clause C. 7. 4 - Control of
Distant Signals, Paragraph 2, which states:
"A replacement switch shall also be
provided for distant signals reading from
absolute block sections or where reading up
The sections of Up Holborn Fast and Up
The placement of the Advanced Warning
It is not considered appropriate for the
Network Rail
Holborn Slow between Loughborough
Indicators would position them either in front introduction of AWI boards between
Junction and Blackfriars Junction where the of a signal or between an AWS and its
Elephant &amp; Castle and Blackfriars as
speed reduces from 60 mph to 50 mph to 40 signal - both of which are not permitted. It
the project believes the standard has been
mph to 30 mph.
would also not be possible to provide
written around higher line speeds where
compliant AWS magnets if these were
their application would be more beneficial.
required. This would increase clutter and
On the Thameslink Programme, the signals
potential driver confusion thus reducing
are closely spaced and compliance with the
driveability.
standard would breach the signal sighting
standards. The project believes that there
no additional risks by not installing the AWIs,
as the current route does not have any fitted
today with virtually the same speed profile.
The current speed reduction / signage have
been employed on the route between
Loughborough Junction and Blackfriars
Junction for many years and the Thameslink
resignalling does not fundamentally amend
the speed reduction within the short section.
Given the risk to signal sighting standards,
the project believes retention of the current
practice is applicable in this situation.
Certificate Issue Date
03/05/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
19/04/2012
Deviation Status
Current
03/05/2012
N/A
CCS
19/04/2012
Current
03/05/2012
N/A
CCS
19/04/2012
Current
03/05/2012
N/A
CCS
19/04/2012
Current
10/04/2012
N/A
CCS
22/03/2012
Current
Page 94
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2483
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Visibility Requirements for Trains
Certificate Number
12-039-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
Scope
Use of TSI/EN Compliant Head, Marker and C2.1 C2.3.1 C2.4 Appendix 3 Tables 2, 4, 5, Use of Interoperable Constituent head,
Tail Lights on non-TENS Routes
8 and 10 Appendix 4 Table 11
marker and tail lights complying with the CR
Locomotive and Passenger TSI and
EN15153-1 on Harsco Model C rail grinders
for operation on the GB network non-TENS
routes. Vehicles affected:
DR79266/DR79276 to DR79268/DR79278
inclusive.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-038-DGN
Clapham Junction Station Platform 1 - Buffer 6.3.2.1
stop overrun risk zone
GKRT0045
One
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
12-037-DGN
Non-provision or route indications for
straight routes on VS1230 and VS1268 at
Blackfriars.
5.1.2.4
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
12-036-DGN
Derogation for a Steam Locomotive
The clauses against which non-compliances Operation of the following preserved Steam
are sought can be found in Appendix 2 of
Locomotive on all lines, as agreed by the
this document.
NRAB and subsequently by the Licensed
Operator. LMS Black 5 steam locomotive
no. 44767 `George Stephenson'. TOPS No.
98567 Painted No. 44767 Class / Power
Classification 5P5F Wheel Arrangement 4-60 Maximum Speed 60 mph.
GIRT7033
Two
Lineside Operational Safety Signs
12-034-DGN
Utilisation of miniature permanent speed
indicator for Urlay Nook Up 60 mph PSR
Appendix A, Section AD: Sign AD01m
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The previous light designs, which comply
with Group Standards, are not compatible
with the requirements of the CR Loc & Pas
TSI or EN 15153-1: 2007. The head, marker
and tail lights designed to meet the
requirements of the TSI (for running on GB
TENs routes) and EN 15153-1: 2007, which
have been certified as Interoperable
Constituents, do not comply with
GM/RT2483. The design and manufacture
of a lights which comply with GM/RT2483
and the CR Loc & Pas TSI is uneconomic for
a small quantity of vehicles. There is no
space on the vehicle end for installation of
two sets of headlights. Switching from one
type or performance of headlight to another
when transferring from TENs to non-TENs
routes (or vice-versa) would be confusing for
operators. The headlight flashing
requirements in EN 14033-1 differ from
GM/RT2483.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Head, marker and tail lights complying with Harsco Rail Ltd
the requirements CR Locomotive and
Passenger TSI are now required to be
installed on new rolling stock for operation
on GB TENs routes, I. e. the majority of
higher speed lines including WCML, ECML,
MML, GWML etc. (Head, marker and tail
lights which comply with EN15153-1: 2007
also comply with the CR Loc & Pas TSI).
However, the requirements of the CR Loc &
Pas TSI, EN 15153-1 and EN 14033-1 differ
from GM/RT2483 in the following respects
with relevance to the Harsco EU rail grinder
type (which is limited to 60 mph): · C2. 1
and C2. 3. 1 (c) and (d): The TSI/EN
lighting arrangement of two lower head
lights with full/dimmed headlight differs from
the day time and night time headlight
arrangement specified in GM/RT2483. · C2.
4: EN 14033-1 requires an alternate
headlight flash function with a frequency of
2Hz, whereas GM/RT2483 specifies 40
cycles +/-10% per minute synchronised. ·
Tables 2 and 5: The GM/RT2483 maximum
day and night time headlight luminosities in
the vertical plane above 2 degrees up are
not specified in the CR Loc & Pas TSI or EN
15153-1 and, therefore, are not required
parameters for the TSI/EN headlights. The
Buffer stop at terminal end of Platform 1 at
To facilitate improvements to the
A buffer stop risk assessment has been
Network Rail
Clapham Junction Station. Signal W304.
environment on Platforms 1 and 2 at
undertaken in accordance with GC/RC5633
Existing Platform 1 canopy columns.
Clapham Junction Station a number of
and GI/GN7616 to support this application.
interventions are proposed by Network Rail The Estimated Weighted Equivalent
(funded by Transport for London). This
Fatalities (EWEF) figure per 100 years will
includes the relocation of the buffer stop at
increase by a small amount as a result of the
the terminal end of Platform 1. The aim of
proposed relocation and remains below the
this proposal is to: Reduce the interchange 0. 03 lowest threshold. Based on the
distance between East and West London
numerical risk-assessment method
Line trains stabled on Platform 1 and 2
described in GC/RC5633 , relocating the
respectively. Encourage more passengers train stop position on Platform 1 will have a
disembarking from West London Line
negligible impact upon the Estimated
services on Platform 1 to use the footbridge Weighted Equivalent Fatalities (EWEF)
for cross-platform interchange. Equalise the figure per 100 years. The benefits
split of passengers using the two sets of
associated with more evenly distributing
stairs down to the subway and the station
passengers between the stairs down to the
exit below. The London end staircase is
subway and encouraging more use of the
currently more congested as a consequence footbridge to cross between platforms rather
of the existing train stop position. A
than the subway will reduce the probability
derogation is sought to enable the relocation of crushing injuries to passengers at peak
of the buffer stop to be in a position 10 m
times.
from the terminal end of the platform. This
will introduce Signal W304 into the overrun
risk zone, 13 m from the buffer face (a single
post signal structure mounted on the London
end of Platform 2). Achieving compliance
would require the recently constructed signal
W304 on the end of Platform 2 to be
reconstructed away from the platform end.
Signals VS1230 and VS1268 are the Outer
It is proposed to relax this condition for
The approach to Blackfriars Bay Platforms
Network Rail
Home Signals to the approach to Blackfriars signals VS1230 and VS1268 at Blackfriars, reduces to 20 mph and the signals are
New Bay Platforms. The line speed has
where the provision of an indication for all
within the high capacity core area.
reduced from 30 mph to 20 mph at these
routes would lead to confusion to the drivers. Therefore, the drivers are approaching more
signals, and all movements (straight or
Southeastern Trains considered that the
cautiously and with route knowledge; there
diverging) are also at 20 mph.
provision of a straight ahead route indication should be no ambiguity to the routing of the
would lead the driver to believe the route
train. The signals in question are fitted with
was available right into Blackfriars Bay
SRIs as a recommendation by the signal
Platforms with the potential to disregard
sighting committee, and the legends
signals VS1266 and VS1228. Although the displayed were accepted by all
new Blackfriars layout does resemble the
representatives of that process. The final /
current London Bridge approaches, the
overall Thameslink scheme plan (without
TOCs are concerned the straight ahead
these indications) was subjected to the SAT
route indication will make the signals in
/ DA process with no issues identified. The
advanced multi SPAD signals.
project feels the current standard has been
incorrectly written and does not allow for the
non-indication of straight ahead routes which
were allowable in previous standards.
It would not be practical to revise the RGS to
include steam locomotives, due to their wide
diversity of design from modern traction
units and the general scarcity of technical
information now available to prove their
compliance or otherwise. In a number of
recent re-issues of RGS, specific
exemptions for steam locomotives, shown in
the previous issues, have been withdrawn,
increasing the number of non-compliances
for which derogation has now to be sought.
The scope of the derogation is limited to the A replacement 60 mph Permissible Speed
proposed new 60 mph PSI at 7 m 12 chains Indicator (PSI) Sign AD02m (450 mm x 450
(SSF DSN1US712U) on LER DSN1 for
mm) has been proposed for project 115545
Urlay Nook.
(Urlay Nook Re-control to Bowesfield) by the
Signal Sighting Committee at the position of,
and fixed to, the post of proposed new B963
signal to comply with GE/RT8037 clause C1.
5 in preference to the requirement with
GI/RT7033 Appendix A which specifies the
use of Sign AD01m (900 mm x 900 mm).
GE/RT8037 clause C1. 5 states "Lineside
signs, required to be observed by a driver
for the purpose of controlling the train, shall
be positioned so as not to create
unnecessary distraction from the driver's
primary role of observing signals. So far as
is reasonably practicable, signs shall not be
positioned between the signal and its
associated AWS or within 50 m beyond the
signal. If the sign has AWS equipment
associated with it, the sign shall be
positioned such that the AWS for the sign
does not fall between the signal and its AWS
equipment. Where this is not achievable,
the sign shall be positioned at the signal and
consideration shall be given to the size,
lateral position and reflective properties to
ensure that all the information displayed is
proportionate and that no part is so
Certificate Issue Date
21/03/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
RST
Lead SC Approval Date
15/03/2012
Deviation Status
Current
11/04/2012
N/A
INS
07/03/2012
Current
19/04/2012
N/A
CCS
N/A
Current
As indicated in Appendix 7 of this
West Coast Railway Company 05/04/2012
document. The preserved steam locomotive Ltd
is of a type that ran safely over the British
railway infrastructure since its introduction in
1947 and continued until its withdrawal from
revenue service in 1967. The locomotive is
intended for Heritage Operation only. In
order to achieve compliance with RGS, the
cost would be prohibitive and such
engineering change would also destroy the
locomotive's fundamental nature and
authenticity as a "heritage" vehicle. Making
the locomotive compliant would, in many
instances, be impractical because of the
bulk and location of the locomotive boiler.
N/A
RST
16/03/2012
Current
It is not deemed practicable to provide a
Network Rail
900 mm x 900 mm AD01m sign at signal
B963, as the additional cost to locate the PSI
in a position that avoids unnecessary
distraction from the driver's prime purpose
of observing signals will be disproportionate
to the benefit gained. The practice of using
Sign AD02m in this circumstance is
widespread across Network Rail
infrastructure with no known reported issues
when used as a PSI for an increase in
permissible line speed, and meets the
requirements within 'Signal Positioning and
Visibility' Clause C1. 5 and associated
guidance within GE/GN8537. The risk of the
60 mph PSI being misread leading to a train
travelling at incorrect line speed is low
because the readability requirement of
minimum 4 seconds within GI/RT7033
AD01m is exceeded at the approach speed
of 50 mph (89 m at 50 mph). Additionally, if
the sign is not read, it will result in a train
travelling at 50 mph rather than the
permitted 60 mph, although driver route
knowledge should mitigate the likelihood of
this occurring. There are no level crossings
or speed dependant signalling infrastructure
that would be affected by a train travelling at
less than permissible line speed.
N/A
CCS
22/03/2012
Current
10/04/2012
Page 95
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2161
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Requirements for Driving Cabs of Railway
Vehicles
Certificate Number
12-032-DGN
Title
Fitment of GSM-R - Steam Locomotives
Operated by Applicants that are mainline
operated
RGS Clause
7.2.1 (j)
Scope
The scope of the deviation is to include the
following Steam Locomotives operated by
the applicants that are Mainline Registered:
TOPS No. / BR No. : 98429 / 75029; 98466
/ 9466; 98476 / 76079; 98536 / 4936; 98549 /
4965; 98564 / 61264; 98572 / 5972; 98577 /
30777; 98605 / 62005; 98625 / 30825; ;
98642 / 61994; 98690 / 5690; 98713 / 70013;
98715 / 46115; 98728 / 5029; 98743 / 5043;
98767 / 34067; 98801/ 6201; 98802 / 71000;
98809 / 60009; 98819 / 60019; 98824 / 6024;
98828 / 35028; 98834 / 46233/6233; 98851 /
48151; 98863 / 60163; 98872 / 60103; 98898
/ 60007; 98505 / 45305; 98531 / 45231;
98507 / 45407; 98571 / 44871. [See table for
more details].
Nature and Degree
It would not be practical to revise the RGS
to include steam locomotives, due to their
wide diversity of design from modern
traction. Steam Locomotives are in a
minority group, and subject to the
restrictions in GM/RT2000 for "Heritage
Vehicles". The cab environment of a steam
locomotive is a noisy environment.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
With consideration of the foregoing, the
level of impact / risk is considered to lie
within acceptable bounds because: · For a
steam locomotive to be included, it has to be
registered and maintained to operate safely
on the mainline. · Steam locomotives are
limited to a maximum of 15,000 miles per
year. · On steam locomotives, there is
always a second-man (fireman) and often a
traction inspector on the footplate who will
be trained and assessed as competent to
operate the radio.
Applicant Organisation
Certificate Issue Date
West Coast Railway Company 13/03/2013
Ltd, North Yorkshire Moors
Railway Enterprises plc, DB
Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Rolling Stock
Lead SC Approval Date
15/02/2013
Deviation Status
Current
GERT8080
One
Train Radio Systems for Voice Related
Messaging Communication
12-031-DGN
Fitment of GSM-R - Steam Locomotives
Operated by Applicants that are mainline
operated.
5.2.11 and 5.2.17
The scope of the deviation is to include the
following Steam Locomotives operated by
the applicants that are Mainline Registered:
TOPS No. / BR No. : 98429 / 75029; 98466
/ 9466; 98476 / 76079; 98536 / 4936; 98549 /
4965; 98564 / 61264; 98572 / 5972; 98577 /
30777; 98605 / 62005; 98625 / 30825; 98642
/ 61994; 98690 / 5690; 98713 / 70013; 98715
/ 46115; 98728 / 5029; 98743 / 5043; 98767 /
34067; 98801/ 6201; 98802 / 71000; 98809 /
60009; 98819 / 60019; 98824 / 6024; 98828 /
35028; 98834 / 46233/6233; 98851 / 48151;
98863 / 60163; 98872 / 60103; 98898 /
60007; 98505 / 45305; 98531 / 45231; 98507
/ 45407; 98571 / 44871; 98746 / 34046;
98700 / 70000. [See table for more details].
It would not be practical to revise the RGS
to include steam locomotives, due to their
wide diversity of design from modern
traction. Steam Locomotives are in a
minority group, and subject to the
restrictions in GM/RT2000 for "Heritage
Vehicles". The cab environment of a steam
locomotive is a noisy environment.
With consideration of the foregoing, the
level of impact / risk is considered to lie
within acceptable bounds because: · For a
steam locomotive to be included, it has to be
registered and maintained to operate safely
on the mainline. · Steam locomotives are
limited to a maximum of 15,000 miles per
year. · On steam locomotives, there is
always a second-man (fireman), and often a
traction inspector on the footplate who will
be trained and assessed as competent to
operate the radio.
West Coast Railway Company 17/05/2012
Ltd, North Yorkshire Moors
Railway Enterprises plc, DB
Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd
N/A
Control Command and Signalling
21/02/2013
Current
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-028-DGN
Stalybridge station Platforms 1 and 3 horizontal alignment
2.1.2
Stalybridge station Platforms 1 and 3
horizontal alignment
Stalybridge Station The Up Huddersfield line
alignment along part of the proposed
Platform 1 has a 550m radius: the length of
the non compliant radius is 131m. The
Up/Down Middle line alignment along part of
the proposed extended Platform 3 has a
575m radius: the length of the non
compliant radius is 59m.
11/04/2012
N/A
INS
07/03/2012
Current
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-027-DGN
St Neots Station Platforms 1, 2, 3 and 4:
reduced platform clearance to structures
6.2.2
17/05/2012
N/A
INS
07/03/2012
Current
GERT8000-TW3
Two
Preparation and movement of locomotive
hauled trains (including HSTs, push-pull,
postal, parcels)
12-025-DGN
Class 67 Running Light Engine and Hauling
Short Trains at Permissible Speeds
2.1
22/03/2012
N/A
TOM
06/03/2012
Current
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-021-DGN
Beccles station - currently unused platform - 2.1.2
Horizontal track alignment.
20/09/2012
N/A
INS
07/03/2012
Current
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Given the physical constraints on this site, it Network Rail
would not be practicable to provide a
compliant solution. Within the design
consideration has been given to; · Platform
stepping distances · Platform clearances ·
Visibility along the length of the train The
degree of non compliance is not considered
severe; the lengths of the non-compliant
curves are short and occur towards the ends
of the platforms. The proposed platform 1 is
on the inside of the non- compliant curve,
and so visibility along the train is not
considered to be a problem. The noncompliant radii on Platform 3 is on the
outside of the curve at the East end of the
Platform and visibility along the platform will
not be affected. The non-compliance should
not introduce an unacceptable risk to users
of the station.
St Neots Station Platforms 1, 2, 3 and 4:
It is proposed to install a new footbridge at
Site constraints are such that compliant
Network Rail
reduced platform clearance to structures.
St Neots station. The scheme is funded
platform clearances cannot be achieved
primarily by outside parties (Council and
whilst ensuring that sufficient stair widths are
Property Developer) as part of a Section 106 provided to safely evacuate passengers
agreement to improve the station and
from the station in case of emergency.
access for passengers. The new bridge
Despite the narrow clearances, the risk to
offers a significant improvement on the
passengers is deemed to be acceptable. St
station facilities and offers level access for
Neots station is a category D station, and so
disabled passengers. The bridge is to be
there are no significant passenger volumes
sited at the widest point of the platform,
using the facilities. With the mitigations
whilst avoiding OLE structures, existing
previously noted, it is believed that any
station buildings and other operational
potential safety risk associated with the
equipment. At this point, the platform widths reduced clearances will be reduced to an
are: · Platform 1/2 : 7. 2 m (1. 7 m
acceptable level.
remaining width with compliant clearances),
· Platform 3/4: 7. 4 m (1. 9 m remaining
width with compliant clearances). To fulfil
the emergency evacuation requirements at
the station, the staircases must have at least
the clear width of the existing staircases.
This gives an overall construction width of
approximately 2. 3 m, and thus the available
space on each platform results in reduced
clearances. The fast lines (Platforms 2 and
3) are both 125 mph linespeed, and so the
minimum platform clearances are to be
achieved (as far as reasonably practicable)
to minimise the risk associated with the
aerodynamic effects of passing trains. The
This deviation applies to all light engine and Rule Book TW3 was written for the situation This alternative action will allow better use of Arriva Trains Wales/Trenau
short train movements of class 67
where locomotives had a braking
line capacity when operating light engine or Arriva Cymru Limited
locomotives by Arriva Trains Wales on
performance worse than the coaches they
with short formations of coaches. It will also
Network Rail infrastructure. Arriva Trains
were hauling. The class 67 is a modern
reduce rescue times in the event of a
Wales seeks to permit class 67 locomotives locomotive with braking performance that
locomotive hauled train failure on Arriva
running as light engine or hauling three or
exceeds curve A3 of GM/RT2042 (for use on Trains Wales routes. This approach is
less coaches to run up to the permissible
lines signalled to GK/RT0075 Appendix C). reasonable since the brake performance of a
line speed (it is noted that clause 2. 2 of
Therefore, this Rule Book assumption is not class 67 is sufficient for all signalled routes
TW3 already contains an exemption to allow appropriate to the class 67 locomotive.
on Network Rail infrastructure. The class 67
class 67 locomotives hauling four or more
Complying with the current RGS results in : is fitted with automatic sanders and modern
coaches to operate up to the permissible
Under utilisation of track capacity due to
WSP system to minimise the risk of poor rail
line speed).
reduced running speeds of class 67 running adhesion. Arriva Trains Wales drivers will
light engine. Increased rescue times for
be briefed on this derogation pending
rescuing failed trains with a class 67
planned revision of TW3 to permit this.
locomotive.
Beccles station - currently unused platform. It is proposed to reinstate the existing
As the platform is only being reinstated for Network Rail
Horizontal track alignment. A separate
redundant platform at Beccles station, as
trains of length 100 m or less and the
application (12/020/DGN - Tracker No.
part of the Beccles Loop project on the East platform is on the inside of the curve,
9756) has been made to cover the nonSuffolk (ESK) line. The track radius of the
conductors/drivers should have no problem
compliant size of the recess beneath the
loop is 371 m at this location.
observing the whole train whilst on the
platform.
platform. No station mirrors or monitors are
required to achieve this. A HAZOP study
was undertaken, involving the Railway
Undertaking (RU), where it was identified
that there were no significant risks in
bringing the redundant platform back into
operational use. The RU agreed that all the
risks identified were manageable to
acceptable levels using current operating
procedures for this route. The severity of the
non-compliance will not introduce an
unacceptable risk to users of the platform.
Risks to passengers are deemed to be
acceptable.
Page 96
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
12-020-DGN
Title
Beccles station - size of recess beneath out
of use platform
RGS Clause
11.1.4.1
Scope
Beccles station - size of recess beneath out
of use platform. A separate application
(12/021/DGN - Tracker No. 9907) has been
made to cover for the non-compliant
horizontal track alignment (clause 2. 1. 2 of
GI/RT7016).
Nature and Degree
It is proposed to reinstate the existing
redundant platform at Beccles station, as
part of the Beccles Loop project on the East
Suffolk (ESK) line. The refuge at these
locations is formed of four staggered
courses of brickwork beneath the existing
coper, forming an average overhang of
approximately 100 mm. It would not be
reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution along the full length of the
second platform at Beccles. To provide a
compliant recess, the existing platform wall
would need to be demolished and re-built
further away from the track. This would
significantly disrupt the operation of the rail
network, and require possessions which
would affect the East Suffolk Line.
GKRT0063
One
Approach Locking &amp; Train Operated
Route Release
12-017-DGN
Improved risk management at mechanical
signalboxes supervising a controlled level
crossing where approach locking (or
equivalent) is not currently provided on the
protecting signals or the level crossing
directly through barrier inhibition.
3, 4.1, 4.2 and; 4.2.1, A2.
Mechanical signalboxes supervising a
controlled level crossing where approach
locking (or equivalent) is not currently
provided on the protecting signals or the
level crossing directly.
A risk has been identified with 118
mechanical signalboxes with controlled level
crossings (gates or barriers) directly
supervised and protected by signals
controlled from the signalbox. Historically,
the signaller was required to observe the
passage of trains and not replace protecting
signals until the train had passed all
moveable infrastructure. Approach locking
is not provided at these locations. The
application of conventional approach locking
to the protecting signals would require
bespoke design, the addition or modification
of train detection and a change in the
method of working. The cost of applying
conventional approach locking has been
estimated at œ47M and, due to the bespoke
design at each site, it would not be possible
to address the safety risk in a timely manner.
GIRT7016
Four
nterface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
12-016-DGN
Barnes Station, Platform 3 &amp; 4. Platform extension and recess
11.1.4.1
Barnes Station, Platform 3 &amp; 4.
GKRT0060
Four
Interlocking Principles
12-015-DGN
Locking level controls between L44 signal at Appendix 1, Table 2, Item 1
Metropolitan Junction and Blackfriars
Interlocking on the Blackfriars Spur Lines.
Ronnie Bignell, Network Rail (Thameslink
Programme), C/O Chris Folwell, 5th Floor,
Desk 19, 40 Melton Street, London NW1
2EE
GMRT2100
Four
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
12-014-DGN
Derogation for the manufacture and supply
of new Class 350 Electric Multiple Units
(EMU) with vehicle bodyshell structures,
bogies and glazing manufactured in
accordance with GM/RT2100 Issue 3.
Supply of 20 new four-car EMUs.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Please refer to `Supporting Paper for LM
TPE Class 350 Issue 1'
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
A HAZOP, involving the Railway
Network Rail
Undertaking (RU) and other affected
stakeholders, showed that there were no
significant risks in bringing the redundant
platform back into operational route. The
RU agreed that all the risks identified were
manageable to acceptable levels using
current operating procedures for this route.
The severity is considered low - see risk
assessment. Points to note: · Access for
maintenance is restricted to periods when
trains are not running: the area between the
platforms will not be used for inspection and
maintenance purposes whilst trains are
running, so the absence of a refuge will not
affect any risk arising from undertaking
maintenance activities. · No visibility
problem: as the platform is being reinstated
for use by trains less than 100 m long and
the platform is on the inside of the curve,
conductors/drivers should have no problem
observing the whole train at the platform
should a passenger slip / fall onto the track.
· The platform surfacing along the
operational platform will be renewed as part
of these works: this will reduce the risk of
slips/falls on the platform. · There is a low
probability of overcrowding on the platform:
a station usage report has been compiled by
This addresses a risk which has arisen
Network Rail
where a number of mechanical boxes rely on
the signaller following the rules to not
replace signals until a train has passed all
moveable infrastructure within a route.
Following an error by a signaller, it has been
decided that the signaller should be
supported by a solution which prevents the
level crossing being opened once a train has
been signalled towards it. This needs to be
achieved quickly at a number of sites. The
proposed solution is considered to meet the
safety objectives of approach locking and
has been subject to a range of assessments
and HAZIDs. It is estimated that this will
reduce the cost by œ233,346 per crossing
safety saving the industry a total of œ23M
whilst, in Network Rail's opinion, delivering
an equivalent safety benefit to the
application of approach locking (taking
account of the faster provision).
Certificate Issue Date
20/09/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
07/03/2012
Deviation Status
Current
06/03/2012
N/A
CCS
23/02/2012
Current
Platform extension works at Barnes Station
required the Down fast and Down slow lines
to be slewed to provide a sufficient width to
the island platform. The works involved
alteration of a 51. 57 m length of Platform 3
(Down Fast), and a 77. 67 m length of
Platform 4. Prior to the works, Platforms 3
and 4 comprised a riser wall and fill infill; the
former had no recess beneath the coper,
whereas the latter had a 300 mm recess
below the coper. Through widening of
Platform 3 (See DRG-0905), a recess of
between 0 to 300 mm was constructed over
a 30 m length. The coper was realigned for
the first 12 m (see section A) and an oversail
block provided with the realigned coper over
the remaining 18 m section (see section B &
C). At Platform 4, the track was slewed
towards the platform, and this required
cutting the platform back (See DRG-0906).
Because of the time limits imposed by
working within the possession, a 42. 5 m
length of the platform was demolished and
rebuilt (compliant) with precast units, but on
a 20 m or so length the oversail block was
cut back (see Section C) and on a 20 m or
so length the copers were realigned (see
Section D). Given the limitations of the
length of the available possession, it was not
Compliance would require significant
alterations in London Bridge to provide
locking level slots including panel changes,
with safety benefits much less than the cost
of the alterations.
Due to the constraints of the site, it was not Network Rail
practicable to provide a compliant solution
within the timeframe of the project. A
compliant solution would have required the
abandonment of the agreed possessions
and a resheduling of the works. It would
have taken some time to agree the
resheduling, and it still might not have been
practicable to provide a compliant solution.
Low risk to passengers using the Platforms.
Although a non-compliance has been
introduced to Platform 4, the situation has
been much improved on Platform 3. The
lengthening of the platforms might also
improve safety by reducing passenger
density on the platforms. The numbers of
passengers using the London End of Down
Platform 3 and 4 are low. The risk to
passengers is low.
11/04/2012
N/A
INS
07/03/2012
Current
Following the HazID meeting, the stage
Network Rail
scheme plan has been drafted and reviewed
by MSRP, including Kent and Sussex route
Ops and the recommendations made by the
HazID report were endorsed. Given the
uncertainty of the final Thameslink layout in
this area and the knowledge the second
phase of Thameslink will be replacing the
interlockings, it made sense to defer any
modifications until the second phase of the
project as apposed to wasting money on
abortive work with no real gain. The current
fringe arrangements have been in place for
many years and no significant risks were
identified during the HazID Workshop.
08/03/2012
N/A
CCS
23/02/2012
Current
Siemens are in discussion with the
Department for Transport (DfT) regarding
the supply of 20 new four-car EMUs that,
with the exception of certain internal layout
differences and other minor changes, will be
identical to the existing Class 350/2
(`Desiro') EMUs operated by London
Midland. The proposed new EMUs shall be
operated by London Midland (10 four-car
units) and First Transpennine Express (10
four-car units) along their respective
operational routes. A strategy outlining the
methodology and actions required to meet
the approvals requirements necessary for
the introduction of the new EMUs into
passenger service has been presented to
the RSSB via letter 20111222-LET-RSSB.
The strategy considers new standards and
changes to those standards made in the
period between the introduction of the
original vehicles and the present. This
derogation meets part of the strategy
requirement and seeks acceptance of
deviations from the specific mandatory
requirements of GM/RT2100 Issue 4 (and
the standards referenced within the specific
clauses) to permit the manufacture of the
new EMUs and their entry into passenger
service. A full technical description of the
The proposed new EMUs are mechanically Siemens plc
similar to the existing Class 350/2 EMUs
operated by London Midland, which were
manufactured in 2008-2009 and were
proven to be demonstrably compliant with
GM/RT2100 Issue 3. Given that the Class
350/2 fleet is a relatively modern design and
the proposed additional vehicles will be very
similar to these vehicles, it can be concluded
that the introduction of the additional trains
on London Midland and First Transpennine
Express routes will not introduce any
adverse risks to third parties and the risks to
passengers will be comparable to existing
trains. Siemens confirm that they have not
raised any concerns regarding the structural
integrity of the Class 350/2 fleet currently in
passenger service. Please refer to
`Supporting Paper for LM TPE Class 350
Issue 1' for full details.
06/03/2012
N/A
RST
17/02/2012
Current
Page 97
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GMRT2400
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Engineering Design of On-Track Machines
Certificate Number
12-008-DGN
Title
Non-provision of lifeguard on an On-Track
machine that operates self-propelled only
when in a possession.
RGS Clause
3.25.12
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
12-007-DGN
Re-introduction of KFA (Y) wagons to
service
6.5
GKRT0044
One
Controls for Signalling a Train onto an
Occupied Line
11-209-DGN
Platform Sharing at Peterborough Station.
5.1.3
Existing Signals P421, P423, P466, P468
&amp; P470 controlling movements into
existing and new platforms. New Signal
P799.
GKRT0064
One
Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection and
Trapping
11-208-DGN
Non Provision of trapping protection for
platforms at Nottingham Station and from
Eastcroft Siding.
6.1.1
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
11-206-DGN
Limited operation of Windhoff Channel
Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) Multi-Purpose
Vehicles (MPVs) for inspection of the
Overhead Line Equipment (OLE) in the
Ashford station and immediate surrounding
area.
Please refer to `Supporting Paper for CTRL
MPV OLE Inspection Issue 1' for a list of
affected RGSs.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
The deviation applies to the Railvac vehicle
(99 70 9515 001-4), which is an On-Track
Machine (OTM) that is hauled in train
formation and operates self-propelled only
when in a possession. The Railvac OTM is
formed from the conversion of an existing 90
tonne GLW flat wagon, by the addition of the
Railvac equipment and an in-possession
only drive system. When in train formation,
the Railvac OTM is effectively a freight
wagon and, as such, is never a leading
vehicle. The scope of the deviation was
extended on 20/03/2014 to also apply to the
following five new RailVac machines, which
are on the same design as the previously
approved scope for the above vehicle. · 99
709 515 002-2 · 99 709 515 003-0 · 99 709
515 004-8 · 99 709 515 005-5 · 99 709 515
006-3.
KFA (Y) wagons NLU93264 and NLU93274
(RSL Design Code KF055C). Used as OnTrack Machines, the two wagons were
registered non-operational in 2009 and 2005
respectively due to date limitations
associated with the modules mounted on the
wagons.
Nature and Degree
The retro design and fitment of lifeguards to
the Railvac vehicle would be extremely
difficult as the Y25 LS series bogie is a
traditional freight bogie which was not
designed as a leading bogie to carry
lifeguards. The costs associated with the
design and testing of a compliant lifeguard
are considered prohibitive as, at this stage,
the Railvac is a one-off design.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Installation of an OTP type, non-metallic, stiff GB Railfreight (GBRf)
rubber strip device that meets the
requirements of RIS 1539 Issue 2 may pose
a risk when the Railvac is in transit mode. In
order to control these risks, the design will
be retractable / removable to ensure it
cannot pose a risk when the vehicle is in
transit mode as a Wagon.
Certificate Issue Date
12/03/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
Plant
Lead SC Approval Date
09/04/2014
Deviation Status
Current
These wagons are 60' container flats and
were part of an order for approximately 200
vehicles delivered by Rautarukki of Finland
in 1987. Initially, they were used for freight
services before being used by Network Rail
as part of the Rail Head Treatment Train.
Roughly, 25 vehicles from the order were
used by Network Rail for this purpose, all of
which are currently registered non
operational. 167 of the remaining vehicles
are registered as operational, but all have
had the original Gloucester GPS20 bogies
changed for Sambre et Meuse VNH1
bogies. Consequently, these wagons have a
different RSL Design Code (KF010D) from
NLU93264 and NLU93274 which still have
GPS20 bogies. See section 13 (Additional
Actions and Observations) for further
information on the reason for the change of
bogies. The purpose of re-introducing these
wagons in to service is to utilise them with
Balfour Beatty's TRAMM vehicles to deliver
the Northwest Electrification project. The
wagons themselves would be used to host a
purpose-built volumetric cement mixer and
carry steel sections of the OLE structure.
The TRAMM has a maximum speed of 40
mph and so this would be the maximum
speed of the wagons in this application. The
The total distance from the signals
controlling the movements to the second
train to the commencement of the platform
shall not be greater than 600m as per
existing non-compliance 04-010-NC
(Tracker No 4652). Two new platforms are
to be provided at Peterborough which will
require new permissive moves to be
undertaken from new and existing signals. 4
existing platforms are to be altered in length.
These platforms require permissive moves
today from existing signals and some will
have new permissive moves from new
signals. The most appropriate position for
the protecting signals (taking account of the
line speed of the main lines) is for the
signals to be greater than 600m from the
platforms. Compliance would either require
extra signals leading to non standard aspect
sequences with delayed clearance or the
prohibition of platform sharing.
The alternative actions will implement the
process set out in GM/RT2000 and ensure
that the wagons are re-introduced into
service without an increase to the level of
risk on the railway. They will not have any
impact on any third parties. The reintroduction of these wagons will enable
Balfour Beatty to utilise a purpose built
volumetric concrete mixer hauled by a
TRAMM to deliver the Northwest
Electrification project. This will maximise
time on site and deliver significantly higher
quantities of concrete with minimum waste
when compared to other potential solutions.
Balfour Beatty Rail Ltd
05/03/2012
N/A
RST
17/02/2012
Current
A DA and a permissive working workshop
has been undertaken and signal sighting
has been completed, and the risks were
deemed to be ALARP. Following the
upgrade works, the station will fall into four
distinct parts: · P1/2 · P4 · P5 · P6/7.
Network Rail
24/02/2012
N/A
CCS
26/01/2012
Current
Nottingham Station Platforms 1 to 7 (west
end) and the Down Eastcroft siding.
The Down Eastcroft Siding could be
provided with trap points or a derailer
however the falling gradient of 1: 290
towards the buffer stops, the track layout
and the slow speeds in the areas make this
an expensive provision. Provision of
trapping protection at the west end of all the
platforms is not practicable due to the
constrained nature of the layout with a
constricted overbridge. Any solution is likely
to introduce more risk from the derailment
especially since in the event of a SPAD it
could be a passenger train which is
derailed. An alternative is to ban the
stabling of trains for extended periods (e. g.
overnight) however this has been custom
and practice and this location for at least 20
years.
The Down Eastcroft Siding is located on a
Network Rail
gradient of 1 in 290 that falls away from exit
of the siding and for compliance with clause
6. 1. 1 trap points should be fitted to prevent
unauthorised or unintentional movements
fouling running lines. However with the
falling gradient any rolling stock that runs
away will do so towards the buffer stop and
not proceed to a position that results in
fouling running lines. Any unauthorised
movement resulting in a SPAD of TN4022
signal is mitigated against by the fitment of a
TPWS TSS loop at this signal. The platform
lines within Nottingham station are located
on a 1 in 270 gradient. These platform lines
are regularly used for the stabling of
unattended rolling stock. The rolling stock
stabled within Nottingham station is multiple
units of modern design with parking brakes.
Therefore unintentional run away
movements are extremely unlikely to take
place. Unauthorised movements are
controlled by the provision of TPWS TSS
loops on all platform starter signals which
are shown to be fully effective as detailed in
the Signal Overrun Risk Assessment
(SORA) report.
02/08/2012
N/A
CCS
26/01/2012
Current
The issue of RSSB Deviation 11/053/DGN
on 17/05/2011 allowed the CTRL MPVs to
operate unladen (without modules fitted) at
low speed in the Ashford station area to
access Ashford works and the Class 395
(`Javelin') depot for wheel turning. Network
Rail has subsequently requested the MPVs
to be approved with modules fitted to allow
the OLE in the Ashford station area to be
inspected, this being the only section of
overhead line (OLE) on Network Rail
infrastructure in the area. This derogation
seeks acceptance of deviations from the
verification requirements of GM/RT2000 and
other RGSs to allow the MPVs to operate,
whilst carrying modules in the Ashford
station area. The increased mass,
additional routes and implications of
operating the MPVs as On-Track Machines
are considered in the document `Supporting
Paper for CTRL MPV OLE Inspection Issue
1'.
Complying with RGSs would require a
significant amount of verification work and it
is likely that this would result in a number of
modifications. Such modifications are not
considered necessary as it is considered
that the risks associated with noncompliance or not fully verifying
performance can be adequately controlled
given the small number of vehicles (four,
operating as two pairs) and the limited
geographical scope of operation. As well as
resulting in significant costs, this
assessment and any modification work
would also require a considerable amount of
time to complete. Network Rail would like to
use the MPVs as soon as possible to allow
the inspection work to be undertaken.
Given that the Windhoff Tranche 1 and
Balfour Beatty Rail Limited
Tranche 2 MPVs operated by Network Rail
have safely operated on Network Rail
infrastructure for the past ten years, and the
CTRL MPVs are very similar to these
vehicles, it is not anticipated that any
adverse impacts on 3rd parties will occur as
a result of this deviation. The MPVs will
operate with modules fitted, as they do on a
routine basis on CTRL infrastructure. The
gauging issues have been agreed between
Network Rail's gauging team following a
Clear Route analysis with the largest module
fitted.
28/03/2012
N/A
RST
20/01/2012
Current
Page 98
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
,Interface between Station Platforms,,
,Track and Trains,
Certificate Number
11-204-DGN
Title
Kirk Sandall, New Shelter Panels
RGS Clause
6.4.2
GCRT5033
Two
Terminal Tracks - Requirements for Buffer
Stops, Arresting Devices and End Impact
Walls
11-202-DGN
Huntingdon station bay platform 1 - Buffer
stop arrangement
2.1.1.4 and 2.3.1.2
GMRT2100
Four
Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures
11-201-DGN
Structural strength of burst through door
panels
6.5.2.2
GMRT2161
One
Requirements for Driving Cabs of Railway
Vehicles
11-200-DGN
Class 319 - Visibility from Driving Cab
6.1.1 Seated Drivers, Case (b)
GCRT5112
Two
Rail Traffic Loading Requirements for the
Design of Railway Structures
11-195-DGN
North face of the new West Hampstead
Thameslink Station - piled foundation.
7.1.2
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
The Island platform is 5000 mm wide. The
shelter currently gives 2500 mm clearance
each side and the shelter does not provide
any protection to passengers. The panels
will protrude 500 mm each side so
clearance will now be 2000 mm each side
and provide passengers with protection from
the elements.
A new DfT compliant footbridge is to be
installed at the station to provide improved
access to station facilities. The location to
be installed is within 20 m of the buffer stop
location. A deviation has previously been
submitted and agreed (Ref. 11/028/DGN Tracker No. 8527). A condition of this
derogation (see section 9) was to replace
the existing fixed buffer stop with a energy
absorbing sliding buffer. A buffer stop risk
assessment was included with this deviation
and has been attached for information. The
design has determined that, owing to the
limited occupancy, the rate of retardation
must be greater that that stated in the
standard.
Replacement vestibule door for No. 2 end
on ScotRail class 156 diesel multiple units
featuring a burst through element. The
design is described in drawings UR-EG30001 Issue P2, UR-EG-3000 Issue P32
Issue P2, UR-EG-30003 Issue P3, UR-EG30004 Issue P2 and UR-EG-30005 Issue P3.
Nature and Degree
If we comply with the RGS, then it is
impossible to provide a shelter which
provides any sort of protection from the
elements from either side. The proposal
outlined solution best suits compliance and
provides a solution for passenger protection
at a station which is particularly exposed.
Clause 2. 1. 1. 4: Four-car units will
decelerate at a maximum rate of 0. 364g
(greater than the 0. 25g permitted by
Railway Group Standards). Eight-car units
will decelerate at an average rate of 0. 192g
(greater than the 0. 15g permitted by
Railway Group Standards). Clause 2. 1. 1.
4: The available occupancy is limited to 8
m. This cannot be increased by moving the
new buffer closer to the exit signal due to
existing restricted standage for eight-car
units. Major signalling and track works
would be required. The occupancy cannot
be increased behind the existing buffer as
this would require the platform to be
reconstructed and reconfiguration of OLE
structures. The proposed footbridge and
existing station buildings would also be
affected. Clause 2. 3. 1. 2: Proposed track
radius for section behind the buffer stop is
2445 m.
In order to comply with recommendation 76
(option 3) of the Cullen enquiry into the
Southall and Ladbroke Grove accidents, the
vestibule door is to be equipped with a burst
through panel to aid egress in the event that
a Class 156 vehicle is involved in an incident
that leads to all internal doors on a vehicle
requiring opening against gravity.
Compliance with the requirements of
GM/RT2100 Issue 4 are as follows: "6. 5. 2.
2 Interior glazing shall withstand without
failure the following ultimate load cases.
Where both sides of the glazing are
accessible by passengers or traincrew, the
load cases shall be applied to both sides
independently. The glazing shall remain
intact and in position throughout the
application and removal of the loads. The
ultimate load cases are: A concentrated
perpendicular load of 2. 5 kN applied over
an area of 0. 1 m x 0. 1 m at any position on
the surface. A pressure of 2. 5 kPa applied
over its entire surface plus a concentrated
perpendicular load of 0. 8 kN applied over
an area of 0. 1 m x 0. 1 m at any position on
the surface. " Compliance with the above
requirements would necessitate a stiffer
rubber section resulting in either difficulty or
inability to remove the burst through
Class 319 wiper modification.
First Capital Connect (FCC) proposes to
improve the reliability of the windscreen
wiper system by the following. ·
Development of the existing wiper motor to
improve sweep consistency, wiper arm
security, and the prevention of GRP/blade
impacts · Replacement of the wiper arm
with a more robust design that incorporates
an anti-life device · Replacement of the
existing blade with an improved version to
provide more effective cleaning of the
windscreen statically and at speed. Due to
this change to `cab facilities', a review of
GM/RT2161 was undertaken by Interfleet
Technology Limited. During this review, a
sightline drawing was produced which
shows a dimensional representation of the
Class 319 windscreen to GM/RT 2161
section 6. 1. 1. Case (a) is obscured by the
top of the existing desk. Case (b): The view
of signals at 6. 0 m height above rail is
obscured by the existing destination
indicator and sunblind. And in the event of
rain, the wiper system will not clear the top
section directly below the sunblind. The
new wiper system follows the almost
identical sweep area as the existing system
apart from a very small area at the top
sweep arc (see drawing ITL-T28627-001 at
North face of the new West Hampstead
During the installation of one of the piled
Thameslink Station Building located on the foundations to the new West Hampstead
SPC1 line (Hendon Line) between 3m1540y Thameslink Station Building, one of the
and 3m1570y (see drawing N280-HYD-DRG- 450mm diameter piles could not be installed
AR-000001), particularly the pile group at
in the designed location due to unforeseen
the intersection of gridlines 4 and A (see
obstructions within the ground. The piled
drawing N280-HYD-DRG-CV-000010).
foundation was redesigned and reconfigured
to support the loads applied by the building,
but the altered design led to one pile within
the group now being located within 4. 5m of
the nearest cess rail (see pile P51 on
drawing N280-HYD-DRG-CV-000010). The
volume of reinforcing steel required for the
pile to resist the mandated impact load in
GC/RT5112 could not be accommodated in
this pile: a compliant solution would have
required the installation of a larger and
deeper pile.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The actions will ensure that there is a
reasonable clearance from the platform
edge at the shelters longest point (2000
mm), whilst giving the passengers the
chance to shelter from conditions in behind
the new panels. Passengers when seated
inside the shelter will be sat 2300 mm from
the platform edge.
Clause 2. 1. 1. 4: The limits of deceleration
in Group Standards are specified for
passenger safety/comfort reasons.
However, the current operating rules at
Huntingdon do not permit passenger stock
to enter the bay with passengers on board.
Therefore, in the event of a buffer overrun,
the stock will be empty with only train crew
on board. Whilst designed with a higher
deceleration rate than the normal limits, the
new sliding friction buffer will still bring the
train to rest in a fully controlled manner and
will offer significant safety improvement over
the existing (defective) fixed buffer. Clause
2. 3. 1. 2: The proposed track radius of
2445 m is relatively flat, the corresponding
versine over the 8 m buffer occupancy
length is only 3 mm, therefore the occupancy
length of track can be considered to be
nominally straight and is within installation
tolerance of straight track (+/-15 mm
between 10 m offsets or difference between
overlapping 20 m chords). The proposal to
implement a sliding buffer stop offers a
significant safety improvement on the
existing fixed buffer stop which is in poor
condition. The present use of the bay
platform is for empty trains only. That is,
only train crew and driver will be aboard the
The new Emergency Egress Panel
Assembly is specifically designed to aid
egress in the event that a Class 156 vehicle
is involved in an incident that leads to the
internal doors on a vehicle requiring opening
against gravity. The new panel assembly is
designed to comply with recommendation
76 (option 3) of the Cullen enquiry into the
Southall and Ladbroke Grove accidents.
The design is described in drawings UR-EG30001 Issue P2, UR-EG-3000 Issue P32
Issue P2, UR-EG-30003 Issue P3, UR-EG30004 Issue P2 and UR-EG-30005 Issue P3.
Applicant Organisation
Northern Rail Limited
Certificate Issue Date
10/02/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
10/01/2012
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
21/03/2012
N/A
INS
10/01/2012
Current
First ScotRail
06/03/2012
N/A
RST
20/01/2012
Current
FCC expects a significant improvement in
First Capital Connect
the reliability of the windscreen wiping
system. These changes will result in greatly
improved driver visibility with less
distraction, due to the wiper blade and arm
no longer striking the GRP window surround
or lifting off the windscreen.
03/02/2012
N/A
RST
20/01/2012
Current
Very low. The affected pile (pile P51) is one Network Rail
of 49No. piles that form the foundation of
the building. All other piles are located 4.
5m or further from the nearest cess rail. The
piles are protected by the existing reinforced
concrete retaining wall which runs parallel to
the running line, the compressible filler and
a concrete arch behind the retaining wall. In
the event of a collision due to the derailment
of a train, the retaining wall and concrete
arch will bear the brunt of the impact, with
the wall also acting as a robust kerb to
protect the pile and guide the derailed train
back towards the intended direction of
travel. In the event of an impact, 48 of the
piles supporting the station lie outside the
zone where it is deemed necessary to
design for impact loading. Pile 51 is 3. 9m
away from the nearest rail and an impact
that would compromise its integrity would
not result in the catastrophic failure of the
building.
20/12/2011
N/A
INS
16/11/2011
Current
Page 99
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0045
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
Certificate Number
11-194-DGN
Title
Reduced Readable Distance of Dual
Legend OFF Indicators at Faversham,
Margate and Ramsgate Stations.
RGS Clause
2.4.5.7
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-191-DGN
Alexandra Palace Station.
2.1.2
GMRT2473
One
Power Operated External Doors on
Passenger Carrying Rail Vehicles.
11-188-DGN
Power Door Mk3 Trainsets with Manually
Operated SDO System.
B12
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-187-DGN
Finsbury Park Station: minimum horizontal
curve, useable width of platform and
minimum width of recess beneath platform.
2.1.2, 7.2.1, 11.1.4
GERT8082
One
GSM-R Cab Mobile, Great Britain Open
Interface Requirements (Rapid Response)
11-186-DGN
Cab Mobile v2, Pre defined message
acknowledge - FTN/GSM-R Project
4.2.5.4, 4.3.3.2 Table 4.3
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Scope
This non-compliance application relates to
Faversham, Margate and Ramsgate
stations. These stations are within the area
of the EKR1 Project which is undertaking a
full resignalling of the area bounded by
Sittingbourne, Minster and Kearsney stations
and virtually all signalling equipment in the
area is new. The specific equipment
affected is listed below: Faversham: ·
Platform 1: EK4332/4339 R(1) and
EK4332/4339 R(2) · Platform 3:
EK4335/4336 R(1) and EK4335/4336 R(2) ·
Platform 4: EK4333/4338 R(1) and
EK4333/4338 R(2). Note that a pair of
identical OFF indicators are already in
service on platform 2 at Faversham having
been installed as part of the EKR1 Project's
stage works in 2009 and will remain in
operation following commissioning of the
new signalling system. These indicators are
the subject of derogation certificate number
09/218/DGN. Margate: · Platform 1 EK5109/5122 R(1) and EK5109/5122 R(2) ·
Platform 2 - EK5111/5120 R(1) and
EK5111/5120 R(2) · Platform 3 EK5118/5113 R(1) and EK5118/5113 R(2).
Ramsgate: · Platform 1 - EK4982/5178 R(1)
and EK4982/5178 R(2) · Platform 2 EK4984/5176 R(1) and EK4984/5176 R(2) ·
Alexandra Palace Station - enhanced
capacity of Platforms. ELR: ECM1, 4 m
1716 yards Platforms 0/1: Proposed Up
Slow 1 and Up Slow 2 lines. London bound:
track radii of 750 m-790 m over the southern
80 m of the proposed platforms. Line speed
35/60 mph. Operational length of platforms
170 m.
Nature and Degree
Two potentially compliant options were
identified to meet the requirement to be
capable of displaying both legends
simultaneously as below: · Option 1: Utilise
pairs of standard BR 1651 Part 2 Indicators
to form the required indications stacked
vertically. · Option 2: Utilise pairs of
standard BR 1651 Part 2 Indicators to form
the required indications grouped
horizontally. All the indicators are to be
installed beneath existing platform canopies
which places a restriction on the available
headroom without extensive alterations to
the canopies. It should be noted that the
canopies were constructed in the 19th and
early 20th centuries and that both
Faversham and Ramsgate stations have
listed building status. Site survey identified
that option 1 is not possible without either
altering the height of the platform canopies
or reducing the clearance between the
underside of the indicators and the platform
surface to a non-compliant figure. The
former course of action is not reasonably
practicable for cost and listed building
consent reasons and the latter could result in
head injury to passengers and staff and also
to the lower legend becoming obscured by
people on the platform. Option 1 was
It is proposed to enhance the capacity of
Alexandra Palace Station through (a) the
construction of an additional platform
serving the proposed Up Slow 2 line, and
(b) the modification and remodelling of the
existing platform 1 serving the Up Slow 1
line. The site is constrained by the track
geometry imposed by the multi-span
overbridge ECM1/30, Buckingham Road, to
the north of the station. The provision of a
compliant solution would require extensive
permanent way realignment and
reconstruction of this overbridge.
10-off MK3 trainsets operated by Chiltern
Chiltern Railways plans to introduce 4-off
Railways comprising of DVT + GFW + (5-6) Mk3 trainsets into service from March 2012.
x TSO + cl 67 Where DVT = Driving Van
This fleet will be grown with passenger
Trailer GFW = Galley First Wheelchair TSO demand with a maximum of 10-off Mk3
= Trailer Standard Open cl 67 = Class 67
trainsets by the end of the Chiltern Railways
locomotive.
franchise in 2021. These trainsets will be
unique for Mk3 trainsets due to the
installation of powered bodyside doors to
reduce boarding times, improve safe access
to these vehicles and aid accessibility.
These trainsets will be limited to specific
routes by their NRAP certificate due to
widened footsteps. Chiltern Railways has
included a guard operated Selective Door
(SDO) System in the train design to allow
selected doors to be opened, should the
trains be required to stop in service at short
platforms. This Derogation seeks
permission to use a manual SDO system
following risk assessments and ORR
consultation. GM/RT2473 requires
installation of a fully automatic SDO system
to control the opening of doors and limit the
opening to doors that are on a short
platform. All other fleets that have automatic
SDO systems in use on the UK mainline
network benefit from: Economies of scale
from use on fleets of over 500 vehicles
(Southern class 377 &amp; South Eastern cl
Finsbury Park Station: · Platform 1 The capacity of Finsbury Park Station is to
minimum horizontal curve · Platform 5 be enhanced by: (a) extending Platforms 3
useable width of platform · Platforms - 0, 3
and 5 and (b) extending and refurbishing the
and 5 - minimum width of recess beneath
currently disused island platform 0/-1. To
platform.
cater for twelve-car trains, the platforms are
to be extended to a length of 245 m. The
site is constrained by the existing track
geometry and boundaries of the station. The
station is elevated above the surrounding
ground and, at the north and south of the
station, the lines are carried over a series of
bridges over two main roads. Extending the
platforms (in either direction) will affect the
adjacent highways. Extending the platforms
at the northern end of the station will have
the least requirements for reconstruction
works, but it would be impracticable to
provide a compliant solution. Due to the
constraints on the site, it would be
impracticable to provide a compliant
solution. Details of the proposed
arrangements are provided in the attached
risk assessment. The refurbished/extended
Platform -1, serving the Up Goods lines,
occupies a 525 m radius curve at its
northern end to a 935 m curve at its southern
end; these curves are separated by a 75 m
long straight section. The width of the
proposed extension to Platform 5 will taper
National.
Cab Mobile v2 can also receive and send
the Acknowledgement in the CONNECT (4.
2. 5. 4). Pre-defined message acknowledge
does not include the Functional ID (4. 3. 3. 2
Table 4. 3). 4. 2. 5. 4: It is not practical to
constrain Cab Mobile v2 to only send the
Acknowledge in the Disconnect or Release
Complete given that Acknowledgement in
the CONNECT is a desirable feature and
supported by the network. 4. 3. 3. 2 Table 4.
3: The functional ID is sent in the SETUP
and thus also sending the functional ID with
the Acknowledge (I. e. in the DISCONNECT
or CONNECT) would serve no purpose. It is
thus not practical to incur the cost/timescale
impact of enhancing enhance Cab Mobile v2
to support this.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
The impact of the reduced readable
Network Rail
distance has primarily been mitigated by
careful consideration of the interface
between the OFF indicator position and
routine operations on the platforms affected
as detailed below. Car stop marker boards
are provided at various points along the
platforms to optimise stopping positions for
trains of less than 12 cars (the maximum
formation being used only during peak
hours) taking account of signal visibility,
position of canopies/platform waiting
facilities for passengers and platform access
routes such that shorter formation trains will
generally use the central sections of the
platforms which are well covered by the
OFF indicators as noted above. As part of
the briefing of their staff on the changes to
the signalling system being commissioned
at Christmas 2011 Southeastern shall
include guidance on the need to stand in a
position from which an OFF indicator,
appropriate starting signal (or banner
repeater where provided) can be clearly
read when dispatching trains. Train
services on this route are currently
comprised of the following types of trains:
Electrostar (class 375) units from which the
guard can dispatch the train from
Low severity. The minimum radii of the
Network Rail
proposed Platform 0/1 is 750-790 m; this
curve extends over the southern 80 m end of
the Platform before transitioning into a
straight alignment to the north. Over the
length of the non-compliant (radii) Platform,
the platform edge offsets will be aligned to
provide compliant stepping distances.
Certificate Issue Date
15/12/2011
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
15/12/2011
Deviation Status
Current
10/02/2012
N/A
INS
16/11/2011
Current
The proposed alternative action will allow
Chiltern Railway Company Ltd 06/02/2012
Chiltern Railways to bring the Mk3 trainsets ("Chiltern Railways")
with powered doors into service as planned
and for them to be used at short platforms
following platform specific risk assessments
and ORR consultation. The manually
operated SDO system is reasonable since:
The fleet is small (4 trainsets at present with
an expected maximum of 10 trainsets as the
fleet grows), and the cost of a fully automatic
SDO system is not justified by the cost given
the relatively small fleet and the reduced life
compared to a new train. A derogation
would not have been required to operate
Mk3 HST vehicles with slam doors using the
CDL SDO system since this has
"grandfather rights". However, a derogation
is required to operate the Mk3s with
powered bodyside doors, although these are
fully compliant with GM/RT2473 in all other
respects and offer significant safety &amp;
accessibility improvements compared to
existing Mk3 vehicles. Other vehicles fitted
with manually operated SDO systems
operate over these routes. These fleets
include Classes 170, 172/2 and 172/3,
although the function of the SDO system is
different.
N/A
RST
20/01/2012
Current
Low risk - see attached risk assessment.
Network Rail
The risk to passengers generated by these
non-compliances is deemed to be
acceptably low. The proposed substandard
width area of platform 5 is relatively small
and would not be readily used during the
normal operation of the platform. In
addition, the sub-standard width area is to
the departure end of the platform and, as
such, the position of door opening would be
in an area of acceptable platform width.
Additional mitigation measures such as
warning signage can be adopted if
considered necessary to advise of the
platform width restrictions.
27/02/2012
N/A
INS
16/11/2011
Current
No impact - the function is carried out as
effectively and is compliant with the TSI.
12/01/2012
N/A
CCS
15/12/2011
Current
Network Rail
Page 100
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
11-183-DGN
Title
RGS Clause
New waiting shelter(s), clearance to platform 6.2.2 b
edge(s)
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-182-DGN
West Croydon Station, Platform 1 - Buffer
stop overrun.
6.3.1
GKRT0045
One
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
11-180-DGN
Non provision of route indications for shunt
moves from Salford Crescent Station
platform starter signals
5.1.2.5
GKRT0045
One
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
11-179-DGN
Non-standard Legends for OFF Indicators at 2.4.5.2
Ramsgate Station.
GKRT0044
One
Controls for Signalling a Train onto an
Occupied Line
11-178-DGN
Excess Call-On Distance from EK5126
Signal at Margate.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Part B, 5.1.3
Scope
This derogation relates to horizontal
clearances between the platform edge(s)
and proposed new waiting shelter(s) at
stations listed below: Arriva Trains Wales is
proposing to replace the existing waiting
shelters at a number of locations which
currently are within 2500mm from the
platform edge. Site constraints do not allow
for the installation of the new proposed
shelters to achieve the RGS. Therefore we
are seeking derogation from the RGS to
install on the existing footprint: · Fairwater Two platforms - 2 new shelters proposed.
Line speed 55mph. · Danescourt - Two
platforms - 2 new shelters proposed. Line
speed 55mph
Nature and Degree
The existing shelters at the named stations
in section 7 are all within 2500mm of the
platform edge. Each location has its own
difficulties to allow the TOC to comply with
the RGS requirement for the following
reasons: Generally: The shelter width is
1600mm from the centre line of each post, in
calculating the proposed distance to
platform edge 1700mm has been used as
the overall shelter width from outside of post
to outside of post. · Fairwater (Platform to
Coryton) - The existing shelter is 2. 17m
from the platform edge. The existing shelter
is 1. 56m in width; the proposed new shelter
is 1. 7m in width and therefore reduces the
current position by 140mm. · Fairwater
(Platform to Radyr) - The existing shelter is
2. 21m from the platform edge. The existing
shelter is 1. 53m in width; the proposed new
shelter is 1. 7m in width, and therefore
reduces the current position by 170mm. ·
Danescourt (Platform to Coryton) - The
existing shelter is 2. 18m from the platform
edge. The existing shelter is 1. 54m in
width; the proposed new shelter is 1. 7m in
width, and therefore reduces the current
position by 160mm. · Danescourt (Platform
to Radyr) - The existing shelter is 2. 23m
from the platform edge. The existing shelter
Application for deviation against clause 6. 3. Existing platform dividing wall will continue
1 of GI/RT7016 with respect to buffer stop
to encroach upon overrun zone. However,
overrun at West Croydon Station. Platform the vast majority of the zone will be
1 is required to be extended by 11m at the
permanently fenced off from all passengers
Country end, thereby requiring the buffer
with no thoroughfare permitted. The
stop (and 20m x 10m buffer stop overrun
remainder and vast majority of the buffer
zone) to be moved back by the same
overrun zone will be securely enclosed by
distance. The existing adjacent platform
the platform dividing wall and adjacent
dividing wall between Platforms 1 and 3
palisade fencing, preventing any
already lies partly with in the overrun zone
thoroughfare.
(4. 2m from the track centreline), but the wall
curves towards Platform 1 at the Country
end, and this distance will be reduced to 3.
2m at the far end of the 20m zone.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
· Fairwater - To comply with RGS the land
Arriva Trains Wales
behind the shelters would require the
construction of a supporting wall and new
concrete base to enable the proposed
waiting shelter to be located the required
2500mm from the platform edge. The
construction of supporting walls will have
serious cost implications to the funding of
the proposed programme. Diversion of
existing cabling would also be required. ·
Danescourt (Platform to Coryton) - To
comply with RGS the land behind the
shelters would require the construction of a
supporting wall and new concrete base to
enable the proposed waiting shelter to be
located the required 2500mm from the
platform edge. The construction of
supporting walls will have serious cost
implications to the funding of the proposed
programme. Diversion of existing cabling
would also be required · Danescourt
Platform to Radyr) - To comply with RGS the
land behind the shelters would require the
demolition and subsequent construction of a
supporting wall and new concrete base to
enable the proposed waiting shelter to be
located the required 2500mm from the
platform edge. The demolition / construction
of a supporting wall will have serious cost
On the basis of the proper risk assessments Network Rail
having been undertaken, the Project Team
(together with the affected operators) is
satisfied that the risks to all passengers on
the adjacent platforms and on a train
entering the station are ALARP.
Certificate Issue Date
13/12/2011
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
16/11/2011
Deviation Status
Current
15/12/2011
N/A
INS
16/11/2011
Current
Salford Crescent Station at approx. 1_ miles The existing signals are not provided with
on MVE1. Signals MP505 &amp; MP507.
MI and the destination is a fan of 2 sidings of
equal length. The destination is unaffected
by the alteration. Provision of indicators
would require alterations within the
interlocking, additional cable cores,
alterations within the location cases for
signals which are only being relocated.
The sidings are used to park tampers and to Network Rail
occasionally turn back Northern Trains
empty stock when margins do not exist
within Salford Crescent Station. FOCs do
not currently use this siding. The safety
implications of not providing new MIs are
considered to be negligible. The existing
non-provision is being perpetuated. No
additional risk is being imported. No call-on
class routes exist at these signals. It should
also be noted that the sidings to which the
shunt routes apply are very rarely used.
07/12/2011
N/A
CCS
17/11/2011
Current
The standard only permits the use of "UP"
Network Rail
and "DN" as directional identifiers for OFF
indicator legends. Movements leaving either
end of the platforms at Ramsgate are Up
direction movements and hence compliance
with the standard would result in either: the
legends for both directions being identical
(and hence useless) or a need to define a
Down departure direction which would
cause confusion or drive a change of line
designations across a significant area.
Compliance is therefore not considered to
be appropriate in this case. Alternative
directional identifier legends have been
proposed which provide clarity as to the
direction in which a movement has been
authorised for this location. The direction
description elements of the OFF indicator
legends will not be compliant with
GK/RT0045. However, they will provide a
clear identification of the direction of the
movement which has been authorised.
Compliant legends cannot be used as trains
leaving either end of Ramsgate station are
travelling in an Up direction and GK/RT0045
only permits the use of "UP" and "DN" as
directional identifiers. The alternative
directional identifiers proposed have been
selected so as to use distinctive character
Margate Station - EK5126 signal to Platform Network Rail already has a national nonIt is considered that the only practicable
Network Rail
4.
compliance (certificate number 04/010/NC) means of achieving compliance would be to
which extends the maximum required
relocate EK5126 signal towards Margate
distance between the signal controlling the
such that its overlap required 2325
movement of the second train and the
crossover locked normal. This is
platform to 600m. The protecting signal is
considered to be unduly operationally
positioned to provide good signal visibility
restrictive given the low level of usage of the
and compliant braking distances for through call-on class route and therefore a nontrains. Compliance would require one of the compliance is sought to permit the use of
following: - relocation fo the signal to a sub- call-on class movements from EK5126
optimal position, the prohibition of platform signal for platform sharing purposes with the
sharing which would be operationally
signal in excess of 600m from the platform
restrictive, Provide an additional signal
for the life of the installation. The signal is
between EK5126 and the platform, Extend
285 metres further from the platform than the
the platform towards Ramsgate, Provision of standard (and 85m further than the existing
a mid-platform signal.
national non-compliance) permits. The new
interlocking has been designed in
accordance with modern principles and
consequently requires a first train to be
detected within the platform and for the
second train to have been occupying the
berth track section at EK5126 signal for a
period of time (GUD occupied for 25
seconds) to obtain the proceed aspect for
the call on class route. The initial speed of
the train entering the route is therefore
controlled to an appropriate level. The
subsidiary aspect on EK5126 signal can only
be cleared for call on class routes and
07/12/2011
N/A
CCS
17/11/2011
Current
07/12/2011
N/A
CCS
17/11/2011
Current
OFF indicators provided at Ramsgate
station.
Compliant indications would result in the
OFF indicators for both directions reading
"OFF UP" since the direction changes in the
middle of the platform with up lines
departing both ends.
Page 101
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
11-177-DGN
Title
Corbridge Station, platforms 1 and 2:
clearance of structures to the edge of the
platform.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-176-DGN
GKRT0064
One
Provision of Overlaps, Flank Protection and
Trapping
GKRT0044
One
GKRT0045
One
Scope
Corbridge Station, platforms 1 and 2:
clearance of structures to the edge of the
platform.
Nature and Degree
NEC2/73 footbridge links platforms 1 and 2
of Corbridge Railway Station. The
footbridge is adjacent to the western face of
railway overbridge NEC2/72, including a link
span between the overbridge to footbridge
NEC2/73. The condition of Corbridge
Station footbridge is such that it has to be
replaced. The bridge is currently closed to
the public. The staircase on Platform 1 is
supported on scaffolding to allow public
access from road level to the platform, and
the stairs on Platform 2 are supported on
scaffolding. To meet planning requirements
and site constraints, it is proposed to
reconstruct the footbridge on a like-for-like
basis, but using steel rather than wrought
iron. In constructing a like-for-like
replacement, the width of the existing
platforms limits the clearance between the
platform edge and the footbridge. The
existing (non-compliant) platform edge
clearances are 1798 mm and 1998 mm on
platforms 1 and 2 respectively.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
Minor: the existing (admittedly nonNetwork Rail
compliant) platform clearances will not be
reduced. Relatively low risk: the like-for-like
replacement does not worsen the existing
platform clearances.
Certificate Issue Date
22/03/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
10/01/2012
Deviation Status
Current
New waiting shelter(s), clearance to platform 6.2.2 b
edge(s)
This derogation relates to horizontal
clearances between the platform edge(s)
and proposed new waiting shelter(s) at
stations listed below: Arriva Trains Wales is
proposing to replace the existing waiting
shelters at a number of locations which
currently are within 2500mm from the
platform edge. Site constraints do not allow
for the installation of the new proposed
shelters to achieve the RGS. Therefore we
are seeking derogation from the RGS to
install on the existing footprint: Maesteg Single platform - 1 new shelter proposed.
Line speed 25mphEwenny Road - Single
platform - 1 new shelter proposed. Line
speed 35mph Garth - Single platform- 1 new
shelter proposed. Line speed 40mphSarn Single platform - 1 new shelter proposed.
Line speed 50mph Fernhill - Single platform 1 new shelter proposed. Line speed 40mph
Penrhiwceiber - Single platform - 1 new
shelter proposed. Line speed 50mph
Treforest Estate - Island platform - 1 dual
shelter proposed. 40mph.
N/A
Infrastructure
16/11/2011
Current
Non provision of trapping protection in
Immingham East area.
6.1.1
No provision of trapping protection from
Eastern Jetty, Freight Terminal Sidings and
Ridley's Sidings in Immingham East SB
control area.
Maesteg - To comply with RGS the land
Arriva Trains Wales
behind the shelter would require the
construction of a supporting wall to enable
the proposed waiting shelter to be located
the required 2500mm from the platform
edge. The construction of a supporting wall
would have a big impact on the DDA ramp
which is located behind the existing shelter
and would also reduce the width of the ramp
and therefore make it unsuitable for
wheelchair users etc. The land adjacent to
the ramp is not in Network Rail's ownership.
Ewenny Road - To comply with RGS the
land behind the shelter would require the
construction of a 1. 38m high wall on an
embankment to enable the proposed waiting
shelter to be located the required 2500mm
from the platform edge. The construction of
the 1. 38m high wall will have serious cost
implications to the funding of the proposed
programme. Garth - To comply with RGS
the land behind the shelter would require the
construction of a supporting wall to enable
the proposed waiting shelter to be located
the required 2500mm from the platform
edge The construction of a supporting wall
will have serious cost implications to the
funding of the proposed programme. Sarn To comply with RGS the land behind the
The existing arrangement has been
Network Rail
considered to be reasonably practicable due
to the following specifics: Line speed of only
30mph. The re-signalling scheme does not
encompass Ulceby North Jcn. It is evident
that there are no existing trapping
arrangements in place against the freight
only line from the junction to the renewal
area. The current junction protecting signal
UJ19 is provided with TPWS TSS (Proved
to be effective @ 6%g with 10second free
wheel time). There are two rising gradients
between Humber Road Junction and Ulceby
North Junction. (1: 176 and 1: 300 giving a
maximum net height gain of 2. 2m to be
overcome). The risk of vehicles running
away from the Immingham East Junction
area has been eliminated by the rising
gradient and distance to Ulceby Junction approximately 6 miles away.
20/12/2011
11-175-DGN
07/12/2011
N/A
CCS
17/11/2011
Current
Controls for Signalling a Train onto an
Occupied Line
11-174-DGN
Permissive moves into Nottingham platform 5.1.3
4.
Nottingham Station permissive movements
into platform 4 from signals TN4961,
TN4963, TN4965 &amp; TN4967.
The existing shelters at the named stations
in section 7 are all within 2500mm of the
platform edge. Each location has its own
difficulties to allow the TOC to comply with
the RGS requirement for the following
reasons: Generally: The shelter width is
1600mm from the centre line of each post, in
calculating the proposed distance to
platform edge 1700mm has been used as
the overall shelter width from outside of post
to outside of post. The shelter width is
1800mm from the centre line of each post, in
calculating the proposed distance to
platform edge 1900mm has been used as
the overall shelter width from outside of post
to outside of post. Maesteg - The existing
shelter is 2. 22m from the platform edge.
The existing shelter is 2. 09m in width; the
proposed new shelter is 1. 9m in width and
therefore improves the current position by
190mm, however this would still not achieve
the 2500mm rule. Ewenny Road - The
existing shelter is 2. 21m from the platform
edge. The existing shelter is 1. 83m in
width; the proposed new shelter is 1. 7m in
width, and therefore improves the current
position by 130mm, however this would still
not achieve the 2500mm rule. Garth - The
existing shelter is 2. 17m from the platform
This is an existing non compliance in that
trap points are not currently provided at the
exit of the Eastern Jetty in order to provide
trapping protection for the passenger line at
Ulceby North Junction. Given the overall
rising gradient between the area under
consideration and Ulceby North Junction,
the low speeds involved and the constraints
of the site in providing trap points on the
Eastern Jetty, it is proposed to perpetuate
the existing arrangements. Additionally, it is
proposed to remove the existing trap points
on the connections to the Freight Terminal
Sidings and Ridley's Sidings as part of the
re-signalling project. The removal of these
trap points has been subject to Risk
Assessment in the form of SORA and
Reduced Overlap RA which considered the
immediate safety risk arising from a collision
with a de-railed train. The removal of the
trap points has also been reviewed on a cost
benefit basis.
The position of the protecting signals is fixed
by the topography of the area and the only
compliant solutions are not to provide the
new Platform 4 or to prohibit permissive
moves using the new platform.
A Risk Assessment has been completed for Network Rail
the permissive working which confirmed that
the risk from the proposed method of
working is acceptable. There is adequate
sighting on the approach to platform for a
train to stop short of the platform due to the
low speed of 15 mph. The alternative of not
providing call-on moves from these signals
would result in having to authorise non
signalled movements in the event of having
movements enter the platform when
occupied during perturbed working. The
position light routes could also be used in
accordance with the rule book in degraded
situations when there is a track circuit failure
in the platform instead of the risks
associated with authorising the driver to
pass a signal at danger.
07/12/2011
N/A
CCS
17/11/2011
Current
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
11-173-DGN
Non provision of route indicators on shunt
signals leading to Riverside Sidings,
Northampton
· Signal RY1216 is located on the Down
Northampton Fast ELR ref HNR, approx. 66
1/4 MP. · Signal RY1220 is located on the
Down Goods Loop ELR ref HNR, approx. 66
1/4 MP.
RY1216 and RY1220 are existing signals.
Compliance requires provision of
alphanumeric miniature indicators for all
seven routes from signals RY1216 and
RY1220, plus the addition of a further MI to
signals RY1028, 1030, 1036 and 1038.
Provision of indicators is constrained by SSI
capacity; in order to complete the work there
would be a requirement to adjust the SSI
interlocking boundary at great cost
(Northampton interlocking is at full capacity,
having 55 TFMs today). The Northampton
Re-control Project is converting the hand
points at Riverside Sidings to Clamplock
operation, thus affecting the controls from
position light ground signals RY1216 and
RY1220.
Signalled in accordance with standards
Network Rail
circa 1991. The signal route already exists
today. The project is providing clamplock
electrical detection rather than hand points
and consider this a betterment. Compliant
with standards applicable at the time the
existing signalling was brought into service.
The provision of clamplocks with full
detection rather than handpoints and the
sidings are fully track circuited for signaller
indication purposes only. The likelihood and
consequence of incident through nonprovision of miniature indicators for these
routes is seen as low, therefore further risk
reduction measures are not necessary. No
incident reports have been recorded.
24/05/2012
N/A
CCS
17/11/2011
Current
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
6.2.2 and 6.5.3
5.1.2.6
Page 102
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0060
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interlocking Principles
Certificate Number
11-172-DGN
Title
Non provision of distant signal replacement
switch or train detection on modular
signalling routes.
GERT8000-TW3
Two
Preparation and movement of locomotive
hauled trains (including HSTs, push-pull,
postal, parcels)
11-169-DGN
Class 67 Running Light Engine &amp;
2.1
Hauling Short Trains at Permissible Speeds
Restrictions in the following table apply to
locomotive-hauled trains in the formation
shown and all locomotives running light.
Table lists maximum permitted speeds
against permissible line speeds.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-168-DGN
Clapham Junction Station Platform 15:
horizontal track alignment through station
Platforms
2.1.2
Clapham Junction Station Platform 15:
horizontal track alignment through station
Platforms.
The Sussex Train Lengthening Project will
extend the station platforms on the Sussex
suburban route (ELR: VBT1) to accept tencarriage trains. The useable length of
Platform 15 is to be extended from 165. 9 m
to 203 m: the extension will be towards the
London end of the station. The existing
horizontal alignment through Platforms 14
and 15 has left hand curves at the London
end, reversing into right hand curves and
then reversing again into left hand curves at
the Country end of the platforms. The left
hand curves tie into S & C both at the
London and Country ends of the platforms.
The existing horizontal track alignment along
the proposed extension of the London end of
Platform 15 has a maximum radius of 952
m; thus without realigning the track, the
platform extension will have a radius of
curvature of less than 1000 m. To provide a
compliant horizontal curve flatter than 1000
m would necessitate a complete
reconstruction of the Platform, including the
relocation of the existing subway access and
staircase and lift to the existing footbridge.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-165-DGN
Clapham Junction Station Platform 16 location of platform furniture; useable width
of single faced platforms.
6.4.2 and; 7.2.1
Clapham Junction Station Platform 16 location of platform furniture; useable width
of single faced platforms.
GIRT7033
Two
Lineside Operational Safety Signs
11-162-DGN
Station approach countdown markers in the
South West Trains, Network Rail Wessex
route.
Section AK, B10 to B10.2
South West Trains proposes the design of a
new sign not currently included in RGS
GI/RT7033 as required by section B10 of
that RGS for the use on the South West
Trains Network Rail Wessex Route.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
C7.4
Scope
Modular Signalling Schemes.
Nature and Degree
Modular signalling is designed to be
deployed on secondary routes which cannot
justify conventional power signalling due to
low density traffic patterns and rural
business. These will generally be classified
no higher than a Conventional TENS route
and typically unclassified. Distant signal
replacement will be undertaken by the action
of replacing the home signal (the distant
signal will act as an auto-distant) and not by
the use of a separate device (for Modular
signalling this would be a control on the
VDU screen) or track section. The cost of
compliance has been estimated at up to
œ10k per scheme.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The controls applied to distant signals for
Modular Signalling will be: All lamps in
signals ahead proved lit (the stop signal)
Any separate track sections up to the stop
signal proved clear (this would generally be
where a berth track is present for approach
control purposes; this track section would
also act as a replacement track section for
the distant which, in the view of the RSSB,
would be a suitable method to be compliant
with GK/RT0060 Clause C7. 4). The distant
would display a yellow aspect if the
associated stop signal was at red and a
green aspect if the stop signal was at green.
The distant signal would be replaced when
the stop signal is replaced which would
either be as a result of the train passing the
stop signal (normal signal disengagement),
the forward route being 'pulled' or the
application of SGRC (SGRC is being
provided with one button per signalling
island).
The current RGS was written for the historic This alternative action will reduce rescue
situation where locomotives had a braking
times for failed locomotive hauled trains on
capability worse than the coaches they were Chiltern Railways routes and allow better
hauling. The class 67 is a modern
use of available line capacity since a cl 67
locomotive with braking capability better
running light engine or hauling a short train
than the figure 3 curve of GM/RT2042 (for
can run at the permissible speeds. This
use on lines signalled to GK/RT0024
approach is reasonable since the brake
appendix 3) and therefore this RGS
capability of a cl 67 is sufficient for all
assumption is not appropriate to the cl 67
signalled routes on Network Rail
locomotive. Complying with the current
infrastructure. The class 67 is fitted with
RGS results in: · Under utilisation of track
automatic sanders and modern WSP
capacity due to reduced running speeds of systems to minimise the risk of poor rail
cl 67 running light on ECS movements. ·
adhesion. Chiltern Railways drivers will be
Increased rescue times for rescuing failed
briefed on this derogation pending planned
trains with a cl 67 locomotive.
revision of TW3 to permit this.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
04/01/2012
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
17/11/2011
Deviation Status
Current
The Chiltern Railways
Company Ltd ("Chiltern
Railways")
25/11/2011
N/A
TOM
08/11/2011
Current
Low severity: marginal non-compliance of
Network Rail
less than 1000 m radius over a length of
about 40 m. Passenger safety will not be
significantly affected by the non-compliance.
22/03/2012
N/A
INS
16/11/2011
Current
As part of the Sussex Route Surburban
Train Lengthening project, Platform 15
(Down Brighton Slow Line) at Clapham
Junction is to be extended to accommodate
10-car trains (presently it accommodates 8car trains). Platforms 15 and 16 make up a
double-faced island platform except for a
short single-faced section of Platform 15 at
the London end. It is necessary to raise the
level of the copers on Platform 15 to provide
a compliant stepping distance. This
requires the introduction of a step on the
island platform (15/16) and an
accompanying protective fence. As a
consequence the width of the first 30m of
Platform 16 will be less than 2. 5m: the
minimum width will be 2. 0m. Similarly, the
distance of a 30m length of the fence from
the edge of Platform 16 will be less than 2.
5m. The speed of trains through Platforms
15 and 16 will remain at 20mph.
Within the scope of the project (timetable
Network Rail
and cost) it is not reasonably practicable to
provide a compliant solution. The degree of
risk to users of the network associated with
the non-compliance is low. Relatively low:
the risk to users of the network is deemed to
be acceptable. The overall objective of the
Sussex Route Suburban Train Lengthening
project is to increase passenger capacity
and reduce overcrowding whilst maintaining
or improving safety. The works at Clapham
Junction will provide an extended platform
that is compliant with regard to stepping
distances, passing and lateral clearances.
Currently, Platform 15 is non-compliant with
regard to both horizontal and diagonal
stepping distances. These non-compliances
will be eliminated and thereby improve
safety, and outweigh any risks generated by
the introduction of a narrow platform.
15/12/2011
N/A
INS
16/11/2011
Current
South West Trains (in association with
Wessex Route) is seeking ways to reduce
station overruns where misjudgement of
braking distance is a factor. Sign AK102
allows for markers from 300m on the
approach to a location (with additional
markers up to 600m if required). These
signs are considered insufficient distance
from the station to give drivers advance
information of a station that could be difficult
to stop at.
South West Trains views the use of station South West Trains
approach markers as one of the measures
for mitigating against station overruns where
misjudgement is a factor. South West
Trains is continuously reviewing its
Professional Driving Policy and route
learning documentation over affected routes
to brief locations that may be difficult to stop
at. Section 13 of this form provides some
relevant statistics where overruns have
generally reduced since the introduction of
station approach markers to provide a
reference point for Drivers to judge their
braking. Proposed locations for station
approach signs The current proposals for
the signs at Kempton Park and Claygate are
recommendations from the South West
Trains Autumn Preparedness Group. Both
these locations had a high instance of station
overruns during the leaf fall season in 2009.
It is proposed that these signs become
permanent installations. Design of sign Sign
AK102 has been used as a basis for the
station approach signs - although
dimensions have been modified to allow
inclusion of a place name. The station
approach sign to have a white reflective
background (Class 1 reflectivity or better)
with black lettering and red numerals.
10/11/2011
N/A
CCS
20/10/2011
Current
Page 103
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0045
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
Certificate Number
11-158-DGN
Title
Use of Standard Alphanumeric Indicators at
SN324 and SN326 with theoretical 80mph
approach.
GKRT0045
One
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
11-156-DGN
This non-compliance application relates to
5.1.2.4
EK5126 signal at Margate station only.
Margate station is within the area of the East
Kent Resignalling Phase 1 Project which is
undertaking a full resignalling of the area
bounded by Sittingbourne, Minster and
Kearsney stations and all signalling
equipment in the area is new. The existing
track layout in the Margate area is not being
significantly altered.
This non-compliance application relates to
EK5126 signal at Margate station only.
Margate station is within the area of the East
Kent Resignalling Phase 1 Project which is
undertaking a full resignalling of the area
bounded by Sittingbourne, Minster and
Kearsney stations and all signalling
equipment in the area is new. The existing
track layout in the Margate area is not being
significantly altered.
GKRT0045
One
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
11-154-DGN
Hayes Station, SN281 non-provision of SI
route indication for straight on route
5.1.2.4.c)
SN281 - 17 135m - approx. 10 1/2 mp - Up
Relief, MLN1
GIRT7033
Two
Lineside Operational Safety Signs
11-153-DGN
Termination boards at a high risk low
adhesion site
B10
National.
The standard currently shows a
'commencement board' for a site of low
adhesion, but there is nothing that refers to a
termination board (picture of sign attached).
There are currently a number of sites on the
Western route where both a commencement
board and termination board are located to
inform drivers of the extent of a site of low
rail adhesion. Without the termination
board, the driver will have no visible (line
side) indication of where the site of low rail
adhesion will end.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-151-DGN
Leagrave Station Platform 2 Extension:
Platform Width
7.2 and 7.4
Platform 2, Down Slow, line speed 85mph.
It is proposed that the first 6. 3m of the
single face platform extension at the C/E will
taper from 2500mm to 2319mm at the
platform end. Platforms are constructed but
are not in use: they are due to come into
operation in 2012. It is not considered
reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution Platform 2: A 239. 5m
platform has been provided for 12 car class
377 trains (243m long). The area of noncompliance will affect the first 7. 3m of the
1st carriage.
Extensive reconstruction would be required
to provide a compliant solution. With the
train stopping 1m beyond the stop board,
only the first passenger door will be in an
area of platform where the width is below
2500mm.
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
RGS Clause
Appendix C.1.1
Scope
Nature and Degree
SN324 - 20 108m, SN326 - SN326 20 115m, The project proposes to use Standard
HLL.
Indicators (performance category 2) on
signals SN324 and SN326 when the
approach speed is theoretically 80mph. The
permitted speed reduces approximately
200m in advance of the signals to 50mph.
Whilst it would be technically feasible to
widen the tunnel sections in this area to gain
the space required for PLJI, it would be
necessary to remove the existing tunnel roof
to do so. If the tunnel was enlarged a
complicating issue is the waste site through
which the tunnel is constructed - with
methane barriers between the waste and the
tunnel. Track access is limited due to the
intensive HEx service. These works would
be prohibitively expensive and disruptive. A
reduction of speed has also been
considered, but the 80mph is necessary for
Crossrail and Heathrow Express
service/time table resilience.
As part of the East Kent Resignalling Phase
1 Project the lines through Margate station
are to be resignalled. Trains approaching in
the Up direction may be routed into either
along the Up Thanet line to platform 3 (a
through line) or into the terminal Up Bay line
(platform 4). The new signal which shall
control this junction (to be numbered
EK5126) is to be provided with a standard
alphanumeric route indicator which shall
display a route indication only for the
divergent route into terminal platform 4.
This is non-compliant with part c) of
GK/RT0045 clause 5. 1. 2. 4 as all the routes
lead to station platforms. EK5126 signal is
positioned on a straight section of line and
has been assessed during the signal
sighting process as being visible from the
signal in rear which is 780m away and the
line speed on the approach is 80mph. The
divergent route into terminal platform 4 is to
be approach controlled from red. A
standard route indicator is a category 2
device which means that it is required to be
readable at 250m from the signal at a
maximum speed of 60mph. Clause 5. 1. 3.
3 of GK/RT0045 requires that, where
practicable, junction signals are arranged so
that a driver can read the route indication at
Standards require a SI into a bay platform,
however the main line route speed is 60mph
which would require the signal to be
approach controlled to ensure readability.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Whilst the enhanced readability of PLJIs is
advantageous in many situations, there is no
advantage gained here due to the curved
tunnel approach with limited signal visibility.
These signals are only visible from approx.
220m (there is a Banner Repeater signal in
rear of each of the signals affected). The
tunnel environment aids signal readability
due to the lack of daylight and visual
distraction. The distant and banner repeater
signals acting as countdown markers for the
main signals. Both signals will have ATP
loops on approach, and in use for ALL
trains. SN324C(M): A standard indicator is
currently used on this signal. Due to the
addition of a third route at Heathrow Tunnel
Junction, it is not possible to retain the
existing junction signalling unchanged. The
position of this signal is cramped due to it
being in the cut and cover part of the
Heathrow Tunnels squeezed between the
tunnel wall and the kinematic envelope.
There is insufficient space to use PLJIs (nos.
1 and 4 would now be required). It is
proposed to use a Standard Indicator on this
signal for all three routes. SN326C(M): This
signal currently has a position 4 PLJI for the
main route crossing to the Down Airport (up
direction). Due to the addition of a third
The fact that the divergent route reads up to
the buffer stops in a terminal platform
precludes the use of a position light junction
indicator in order to comply with the
requirements of Network Rail Company
Standard NR/L2/SIG/19609 as was
identified during a review of draft scheme
plans by the Network Rail Major Schemes
Review Panel (see item 142 on the East
Kent Phase 1 Signalling Renewals MSRP
Meeting Minutes version 3. 4) and so a
standard alphanumeric indicator was
substituted. This was designed to provide
an indication only for the divergent route due
to the readability performance of a category
2 device being insufficient for use with an
unrestricted main aspect sequence at this
particular location. This configuration was
compliant with the standards in force at the
time at which the scheme received Approval
in Principle (June 2009). The requirement to
display a route indication for all routes from
a signal provided with a standard route
indicator when at least one of those routes
leads into a platform was introduced with the
publication of GK/RT0045 in February 2010
by which time detailed control table design
and signal erection had commenced. The
existence of this non-compliance was
Although other indications could be
provided this signal has been considered by
the Signalling Design team and Signal
Sighting Committee. In the wider context of
the Stockley Scheme Plan, it is felt that no
indication for the straight route at 60mph has
a clear meaning and a 'B' for the 25mph
entry to the Bay is the clearest arrangement.
This also complies with 5. 1. 2. 4. b).
Another signal [for a slow speed approach]
shows "UR" for this destination. The
equipment on SN281 signal is restricted due
to it being on a drop cage from a gantry
therefore a double indication would be
difficult. U and R individually would not
uniquely define the destination. It is
suggested that the standard should be
amended to permit omission of SI
indications for highest speed route even if it
is through a platform. Amend 5. 1. 2. . 4. . c)
to say "If all routes are into a terminus
station. " The indications to drivers in this
area have been considered and agreed by
the TOC/FOC representatives. These
indications present the least possible
confusion to drivers.
In preparation for this autumn (2011), the
Western route is looking to inform drivers of
a low rail adhesion risk site (both lines) at
Camborne station. For this to be effective,
the driver needs to be made aware of the
location where the low adhesion conditions
commence and the location where the risk
site ends. The installation of the
commencement and termination boards at
Camborne is as a result of a risk
assessment into Truro and Camborne level
crossing arrangements. Removal of the
termination board would not assist train
drivers.
The majority of the platforms comply with
GI/RT7016. The Designed Platform
Extensions comply with sizing requirements
in normal and perturbation scenarios. The
affected area affects the first door only of the
1st carriage where passenger density will be
at its lowest. The non-compliant areas will
have strip lighting mounted on solid fences
so as not to create pinch points.
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
10/11/2011
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
20/10/2011
Deviation Status
Current
Network Rail
10/11/2011
N/A
CCS
20/10/2011
Current
Network Rail
10/11/2011
N/A
CCS
20/10/2011
Current
Network Rail
20/04/2012
N/A
CCS
23/02/2012
Current
Network Rail
21/10/2011
N/A
INS
16/11/2011
Current
Page 104
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GKRT0045
RGS Issue Number
One
RGS Title
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
Certificate Number
11-149-DGN
Title
Junction signalling arrangements in the
Down direction at Hitchin
RGS Clause
5.2.3.3
Scope
Flashing aspect sequence approaching
K699 signal at Hitchin
Nature and Degree
The flashing double yellow would need to
be displayed on K679 signal which currently
displays a flashing single yellow for the
south junction when 689 is set for the
divergent route. This would lead to a noncompliance with 5. 5. 1. 1 d) of the standard
as it would be an overlapping flashing
aspect sequence. The alternative would be
to provide an alternative method of junction
signalling for either K689 or K699, however
there are physical constraints preventing
splitting distants and the use of MAR
(approach release from red) at either
junction would be operationally restrictive
and not enable the planned timetable to be
delivered.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
Applicant Organisation
A driver being signalled through the south
Network Rail
junction from Down Fast to Down Slow will
receive a normal aspect sequence which is
fully compliant. Additionally the routing will
be confirmed by 689 PRI which can display
a Position 0 or Position 1 arrow. A driver
being signalled through the north junction
from the Down Fast to either the Down Slow
or the Down Flyover will receive a steady
double yellow on 679, a Position 0 arrow on
689 PRI, a flashing single yellow on 689, a
Position 1 or 2 arrow on 699 PRI (note that
697 PRI can not also be illuminated). The
arrangements enables: - trains on the Down
Fast to be signalled into the Down Slow
platform quickly to clear the Down Fast for
following trains, trains on the Down Fast to
be signalled via the north junction to the
Down Flyover with minimal loss of speed
hence clearing the Down Fast quickly,
drivers to clearly establish which junction
they are being routed through. There is
sighting of K689 from K679.
GMRT2000
Three
Engineering Acceptance of Rail Vehicles
11-148-DGN
Derogation Steam Locomotive
6.6.3 and Appendix H1
Operation of the following preserved Steam
Locomotive on all lines, as agreed by the
NRAB and subsequently by the Licensed
Operator. GWR 57xx Class 0-6-0PT Steam
Locomotive TOPS No. 98452 Painted No.
L94 (7752) Class / Power Classification 4F
Wheel Arrangement 0-6-0T Maximum
Speed 45 mph.
It would not be practical to revise the RGS
to include steam locomotives, due to their
wide diversity of design from modern
traction units and the general scarcity of
technical information now available to prove
their compliance or otherwise. In a number
of recent re-issues of RGS, specific
exemptions for steam locomotives, shown in
the previous issues, have been withdrawn,
increasing the number of non-compliances
for which derogation has now to be sought.
Steam Locomotives are in a minority group,
and subject to the restrictions in GM/RT2000
for "Heritage Vehicles".
GCRT5112
Two
Rail Traffic Loading Requirements for the
Design of Railway Structures
11-147-DGN
Edinburgh Waverley Station; Platforms 8
and 9 Market Street Footbridge Support
Columns; Design of Structures to Resist
Collision Loads
7.1.2.3
Edinburgh Waverley Station; Platforms 8
and 9, Market Street Footbridge Support
Columns; Design of Structures to Resist
Collision Loads.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-146-DGN
Bushey Station Platform 3 (former Down
7.2.1 and 11.1.4
Fast Line Platform): minimum platform
width, and width of recess beneath platform.
As indicated in Appendix 7 of this
document. The preserved steam locomotive
is one of 862 locomotives of its class which
ran safely over the British railway
infrastructure since its introduction by the
Great Western Railway in 1930 and
continued until its withdrawal from revenue
service with London Transport in 1971. The
locomotive is intended for Heritage
Operation only. In order to achieve
compliance with RGS the cost would be
prohibitive and such engineering change
would also destroy the locomotive's
fundamental nature and authenticity as a
"heritage" vehicle. Making the locomotive
compliant would, in many instances, be
impractical because of the bulk and location
of the locomotive boiler.
Relatively low as the infrastructure adjacent
to the columns does shield the columns from
impact. The design achieves a resistance to
collision loads of 440kN at 3. 0 m above
ground (against 500kN specified) and
400kN at 1. 2 m above ground (against
200kN specified). It is considered that the
risk of a train derailment itself is minimal
and, in the extremely unlikely event this
should occur, the mitigating factors,
described in section 9 - Proposed alternative
actions render the chances of a derailment
leading to bridge collapse to be extremely
small. The Corporate Social Responsibility
profile of the company is also increased by
maintaining the integrity of Edinburgh
Waverley Station as a listed building, and by
retaining the serviceable parts of the station as opposed to being replaced
unnecessarily. The proposed solution will
minimise the impact on station users, in
particular limiting the amount of time that the
New Street car park lift is out of action for
disabled access. All of the above will be
achieved with a minimal risk due to the
factors detailed earlier in this form. In
particular, it is felt that the low line speeds
together with the design against
disproportionate collapse means that, even
Due to site constraints, it is not reasonably
practicable to provide a compliant solution.
Low risk to passengers. Based on London
Midland figures, the number of passengers
alighting at Platform 3 will be less than 40
(see attached data on current passenger
usage). The reduced width is deemed to be
adequate for the number of passengers
likely to alight on the proposed noncompliant length of the platform.
GKRT0045
One
Lineside Signals, Indicators and Layout of
Signals
11-144-DGN
Provision of route indicators on WH1019,
WH1014, WH1034, WH3005, WH3010,
WH3016 &amp; VS3022 (Thameslink Core
Area)
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
5.1.3.3 and 5.1.3.4
By inspection, the current bridge dating
from 1901 is non-compliant with clause 7. 1.
2. 3. The bridge is to be replaced in
2011/12 and it will not be possible to locate
support columns out with the hazard zone or
to achieve the design load resistance
specified in clause 7. 1. 2. 3. As the existing
bridge is to be taken out of passenger use in
October 2011; no immediate action is
planned. In constructing the new bridge, it is
not reasonably practicable to comply for the
reasons (refer to attached drawing C1555200-019-rev00 and photos 1-4 to crossreference column numbers with locations): ·
Space constraints mean that support
columns 1, 2 and 3 cannot be moved further
from the cess rail. It is not possible to bear
the bridge directly onto the main train shed
wall between platforms 9 and 10, as the
ability of the wall and foundations to sustain
this cannot be confirmed. · Due to pile
congestion, the columns cannot be designed
to withstand the necessary loading. · Due to
the station's Grade A listed status and
location within a World Heritage Site, the
new bridge is subject to strict architectural
guidelines which require a slim and
unobtrusive structure. OLE clearances and
DDA compliance with floor levels are
Bushey Station: minimum platform width,
The aim of the project is to bring back into
and width of recess beneath platform.
operational use the existing disused
Bushey Station is located on the junction of Platform 3 at Bushey Station. The
the West Coast Mainline (LEC1) and the DC reinstatement of this platform will require a
lines (CWJ) between Euston and Watford
minimum usable platform length of 88m to
Junction Station. The former Down Fast line accommodate four-car trains. Trains are
platform, Platform 3, has been disused for
planned to stop at the station only when the
over a decade. It is proposed to reinstate
Slow lines are blocked every other week to
this platform into operational use when
enable maintenance to be undertaken on the
maintenance works are being undertaken on WCML. The stopping services are expected
the WCML.
to be: Monday to Friday, 3 trains after 22:
00; Saturday, 3 trains after 20: 00; Sunday, 5
trains hourly between 0700 and 1200.
Compliant stepping distances will be
provided in accordance with GI/RT7016 and
also the design of the platform reinstatement
will comply with requirements of
GE/RT8025. At the southern end of the
station, Platform 2 is approximately 750mm
higher than Platform 3 and there is an
existing brick retaining wall separating the
two (refer to Photos 1 &amp; 2). Due to the
constraint of the site, an 18. 0m length at the
southern end of Platform 3 will have a width
of less than 3000mm, the minimum width
will be 2200mm. The position of the existing
platform riser wall in relation to the track
does not have sufficient clearance to provide
the required recess beneath the platform
Signal Numbers WH1019, WH1014,
The majority of the Thameslink Core route
WH1034, WH3005, WH3010, WH3016
is contained within tunnels, where clearance
&amp; VS3022.
is tight and we have been unable to install
Standard Indicators (SI) on the junction
protecting signal. All new signals have been
signal sighted and the site restrictions limit
the project to the use of Miniature Indicators
(MI) instead. Compliance with 5. 1. 3. 3
would require that the junction signals were
held at red until the Category 5 MI is
guaranteed to be readable (65m). This
would restrict the speed of trains and
increase the number of trains approaching
red aspects with the potential of SPADs.
Certificate Issue Date
07/10/2011
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
CCS
Lead SC Approval Date
22/09/2011
Deviation Status
Current
West Coast Railway Company 24/10/2011
Ltd
N/A
RST
06/10/2011
Current
Network Rail
02/04/2012
N/A
INS
14/09/2011
Current
Network Rail
21/10/2011
N/A
INS
14/09/2011
Current
The previous standard GK/RT0031 gave the Network Rail
category rating for the MI's as category 3 100m viewable distance. We consider it
appropriate to not approach control these
signals because: - The Core Route line
speed is a maximum of 30mph. Inadequate
clearances for alternative indicators
Performance and SPAD risk from applying
standard The distance from the sighting
point of the signal to the AWS is an
adequate distance to bring a train under
control. The signal size / type as signal
sighted is adequate at this line speed and
provide suitable reading distance. 100m
sighting distance in use today along the
route. the route indicators are in limited
natural daylight. the route indicators will not
be used for normal running. This was a
requirement of the sighting committee who
were satisfied with the readable distance of
the indicators. A HazID (attached) did not
identify any additional risks in this approach.
07/10/2011
N/A
CCS
22/09/2011
Current
Page 105
Deviations Register
RGS Number
GIRT7016
RGS Issue Number
Four
RGS Title
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
Certificate Number
11-143-DGN
Title
Letchworth Station: clearance of isolated
column to platform edge
RGS Clause
6.5
Scope
Letchworth Station: clearance of isolated
column to platform edge.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-142-DGN
Caerphilly Station - new support to existing
footbridge
6.2.2 b) and 8.1 b)
Caerphilly Station, new support to existing
footbridge.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-141-DGN
Cardiff Queen Street Station, Platform 5 reduced depth of clearance under platform
edge.
11.1.4.1
Cardiff Queen Street Station, Platform 5:
reduced depth of clearance under platform
edge.
GIRT7016
Four
Interface between Station Platforms, Track
and Trains
11-140-DGN
Down Barry Platforms 6 and 7: location of
buildings and structures on platforms.
6.2.2 b)
GMRT2461
One
Sanding Equipment Fitted to Multiple Units
and on-track Machines
11-137-DGN Revised
21-11-2011
Fitting manually operated sanders with
sanding rate of 2kg/wheel/min to classes
14X and 153 units.
9.1, 9.3.1
Current Deviations Register as at 09 May 2016
Nature and Degree
The Up platform at Letchworth Station is to
be extended by 51. 6m to accommodate 12car train services to/from London Kings
Cross. The platform is to be 2. 75m wide
along its length: the width is restricted by
the topography of the site (it is located in a
cutting). OLE mast EC55/22 is located in
the Up cess, 23m within the proposed
London end of the extension at the base of
the cutting slope. The mast lies within the
footprint of the proposed extension and
supports a cantilever from which is
suspended the 25kV OLE for the Up line.
As it stands, the mast will have a 1933mm
clearance to the edge of the proposed
platform. The line speed on the Up line is
85mph. Due to the topography of the site, it
is impracticable to provide a compliant
solution.
As part of the Cardiff Area Resignalling
Renewal scheme a new bay platform is to
be provided at Caerphilly Station. There is
an existing footbridge spanning the station
that is owned by a Third Party. The bridge
does not provide rail passengers access to
the platforms; it is a means for non-rail
passengers to cross the tracks without
accessing the station. The bridge has a
clearance between the existing platform
edge and its support in excess of 2500mm,
and a clearance between the platform level
to the underside of the lowest structural
member in excess of 2500mm. It is
proposed to install a new platform and
relocate the footbridge support to the centre
of this to give clearances of 2315mm to each
side of the support to the platform edge.
See attached drawing 5091070-RLS-CSE0006-A02. This will also provide a minimum
headroom to the bay platform side of
2230mm - increasing to 3046mm over a
1000mm length. The length of the platform
affected will be kept to a minimum and will
comprise the width of the column (outline
design sizes 305x305 UC). During
construction, hoardings will be required to
undertake the works but this will have no
effect as this area of the platform is nonAs part of the Cardiff Area Resignalling
Project (CASR), a number of enhancements
are being provided to support an increase in
train frequency. A key part of these
enhancements is the plan to reinstate the
disused platform at Cardiff Queen Street
Station (to the West Side) to be named
platform 5. The new platform will support
the proposed Up Llandaff Loop line. The
current platform spans two subways: ·
Passenger Subway - CAM (1 m 9. 5 ch) 200
mm substandard over a length of 5 m ·
Luggage Subway - CAM (1 m 13. 75 ch) 200
mm substandard over a length of 4 m At
these locations, the front face of the
passenger subway is built into the front face
of the platform. Due to the requirements of
the new P-way alignment, the platform wall
will be reconstructed to provide a compliant
300 mm overhang but, due to their location,
it will only be possible to provide a 100 mm
recess over the length of the subways.
Risk Assessment/Safety Justification
The signal CF2947 is to be positioned at
170. 5mp -92m serving Down Barry
(Platform 7 side
As part of the Cardiff Area Signalling
scheme, it is necessary to install a cantilever
structure on Platforms 6 and 7. The
proposed position of this structure will not
provide the minimum lateral clearance of
2500 mm. The proposed clearances are
2478 mm and 2412 mm for platforms 7
&amp; 6 respectively.
National - class 14X and 153 units
Both types of units considered here have 4
axles only. The group standard was written
to accommodate conventional 2 car units
with a total of eight axles. For Classes 14X
&amp; 153 units, without a complete
redesign and rebuild, it is not possible to
comply. The stopping distance under low
adhesion conditions is naturally lengthened,
and it can get out of driver's control, unless
mitigations are considered. The option not
to fit sanding for braking is not acceptable
due to the risks described below. Two
incidents occurred just over three months
apart, in each case a class 142 unit collided
with a stationary train in a platform, when the
class 142 unit was permitted to occupy a
part of a platform already occupied by
another train in normal working. On
03/10/2009 unit 142016 forming 2D11
passed signal T895 at danger and collided
with 1S07, an IC 225 set, in platform 4 at
Darlington station. Damage was minor and
no serious injuries occurred. The cause was
rail contamination with leaf residue believed
to have been exacerbated by the IC225 set
on the approaches to Darlington station
following high winds carrying leaves from far
away to the site of the station approach
which did not have a history of low adhesion
Applicant Organisation
Network Rail
Certificate Issue Date
27/10/2011
Certificate End Date
N/A
Lead SC
INS
Lead SC Approval Date
14/09/2011
Deviation Status
Current
The restricted space at the station does not Network Rail
make it reasonably practicable to provide a
compliant solution. Low risk - the scale of
the non compliance for clearance is 185 mm
to either platform face and up to 270 mm
vertically. The proposed bay platform 1 is
provided with a buffer stop, and so trains will
be travelling towards a stop at a maximum
permissible speed of 25mph. The existing
Platform 1 (Proposed Platform 2), servicing
the Dn Rhymney has a 50 mph line speed.
The length of platform affected is 305 mm
(based on the proposed 305x305 UC being
confirmed at GRIP 5-8). The track is
straight coming from the Cardiff direction
with good sighting changing to a 2050 m
radius curve at the bridge. The reduced
headroom will be highlighted to the public
via signage and black and yellow barrier
tape. It is considered that there is an
insignificant risk to passenger safety.
22/12/2011
N/A
INS
14/09/2011
Current
Low risk to passengers. Relatively short non- Network Rail
compliant lengths, and low line speed of
proposed Up Llandafff Loop (20mph).
22/12/2011
N/A
INS
14/09/2011
Current
The restricted space on the platform
Network Rail
precludes the provision of a compliant
solution. Low risk. The proposed
arrangements will not introduce an
unacceptable risk to passengers using the
platform. The non-compliances are 22 mm
on platform 7 and 88 mm on platform 6 over
a length of 610 mm. The line speed through
the station is 20 mph, the track is straight
and there is good visibility at the location.
The risk to passenger safety has been
assessed to be insignificant.
There are three consequences of adopting Network Rail
the proposed alternative: The sand delivery
rate will give an enhanced braking rate in
low adhesion conditions equivalent to an
increase of 3% g above the prevailing
adhesion level. Due to the reduced number
of axles on the units under consideration the
train will stop with all wheels likely to be on
the sand deposited by the same train. There
is a risk that train detection may be lost. The
increase in adhesion following the
deposition of sand by these units is in line
with that seen on all other multiple units
fitted with san