INSTITUTT FOR STATSVITENSKAP V-2003
(Tirsdager 9.15-11.00, rom 1001 ES)
Kurs STV-605: Demokratiske regimer
Kursleder: Bjørn Erik Rasch i samarbeid med Håvard Strand og Camilla Gjerde
Kursets formål: Å gi en innføring i nyere (empirisk orienterte) institusjonelle, rasjonalistiske
modeller som er lansert med sikte på å forstå demokratiseringsprosesser, variasjoner i
demokratisk institusjonsutforming og demokratiske systemers virkemåte. Demokratiske
regimer — både nye og etablerte — blir også kontrastert med autoritære styreformer.
Forelesningene vil veksle mellom presentasjon av modeller på den ene siden, og forskjellige
typer modellanvendelser på den andre. Anvendelser, eksempler og illustrasjoner vil hentes fra
alle deler av verden (bl.a. knyttet til aktuelle hendelser og pågående forskning).
Forelesningsplan:
1. gang:
Innledning og oversikt
2-3. gang:
Demokratiteori: Hva er demokrati? Hvorfor demokrati? Hvordan «måle»
demokrati? Hvor utbredt er demokratiske styreformer? Hvilke land og
regioner henger igjen?
Litteratur:
Schumpeter (1942), Sen (1999), Rasch (2000), Sørensen (1997: kap 1 og 5),
Chehabi (2001), Diamond (1999), Burkhart og Lewis-Beck (1994)
Anbefalt:
Przeworski (1991: kap 1), Munck og Verkuilen (2002), Dahl (1956, 1998), Sen
(1999), Berg-Schlosser (2002), Lust-Okar og Jamal (2000), Mackie (1998), Radcliff
(1992)
4-6. gang:
Spillteori og teori om kollektive beslutninger: (1) Spillmodeller og
likevektsanalyse. (2) Preferanseaggregeirng. (3) Institusjoner.
Litteratur:
Anbefalt:
Hovi og Rasch (1993), Strøm (1994), Tsebelis (2002)
7. gang:
Kursoppgaven
Anbefalt:
Perry og Robertson 2002 (Comparative Analysis of Nations), King et al. (1994),
Grofman (2001), Førland 1996 (Drøft. Lærebok i oppgaveskriving)
8-11. gang:
Fra diktatur til demokrati: Revolusjon, forhandlet overgang, konstitusjoner
og politisk stabilitet
Litteratur:
Wintrobe (2001), Olson (1993), Berejikian (1992), Colomer (1991, 1995),
Geddes (1999), Przeworski (1991: Kap. 2), Hardin (1989), Tsebelis (2002),
Sørensen (1997), Chehabi (2001)
Anbefalt:
Kurrild-Klitgaard og Svendsen (2002), Colomer (2002), Mueller (1996), Karvonen
(1997) , Lust-Okar og Jamal (2002)
12. gang:
Oppsummering
Feld og Grofman (1987), Moser (1999), Rasch (1996, 2000), Tsebelis (1990: kap. 1),
Gerber og Morton (1998), Gates og Humes (1997), Gaubatz (1995)
Pensumlitteratur:
Berejikian, J. 1992. «Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem»,
American Political Science Review 86: 647-657.
11 s
Burkhart, R.E. og M.S. Lewis-Beck 1994. «Comparative Democracy: The Economic
Development Thesis», American Political Science Review 88: 903-910.
8s
Chehabi, H.E. 2001. «The Political Regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Comparative
Perspective», Government and Opposition 36: 48-70.
23 s
Colomer, J. 1991. «Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way», American
Political Science Review 85: 1283-1302.
20 s
Colomer, J. 1995. «A Transitive Transition», kap. 1, pp.13-26 i Game Theory and the
Transition to Democracy. The Spanish Model. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
14 s
Diamond, L. 1999. «Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over?», pp. 24-63 i Developing
Democracy. Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
40 s
Geddes, B. 1999. «What do we know about democratization after twenty years?» Annual
Review of Political Science 2: 115-144.
30 s
Hardin, R. 1989. «Why a Constitution?», i B. Grofman og D. Wittman, red. The Federalist
Papers and the New Institutionalism. New York: Agathon Press.
21 s
Hovi, J. og B.E. Rasch 1993. Strategisk handling. Innføring i bruk av rasjonalitetsmodeller
og spillteori. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (Ikke kap. 5 og 7.)
150 s
Olson, M. 1993. «Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development», American Political Science
Review 87: 567-576.
10 s
Przeworski, A. 1991. «Transitions to Democracy», pp. 51-99 i Democracy and the Market.
Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
49 s
Rasch, B.E. 2000. Demokrati — ideer og organisering. (Kap. 1, 5 og 6.) Bergen:
Fagbokforlaget.
64 s
Schumpeter, J. 1942. «Another Theory of Democracy», kap. 22 i Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy. London: Counterpoint.
15 s
Sen, A. 1999. «Democracy as a Universal Value», Journal of Democracy 10 (3): 3-17.
15 s
Strøm, K. 1994. «The Presthus Debacle: Intraparty Politics and Bargaining Failure in
Norway», American Political Science Review 88: 112-127.
16 s
Sørensen, G. 1997. Democracy and Democratization. Processes and Prospects in a Changing
World. Boulder: Westview Press.
160 s
Tsebelis, G. 2002. Veto Players: An Introduction to Institutional Analysis. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. (Innledning + Del II)
170 s
Wintrobe, R. 2001. «How to understand, and deal with dictatorships: an economist’s view»,
Economics of Governance 2: 35-58.
24 s
Sum pensum:
840 s.
Utfyllende kursinformasjon legges ut på: http://folk.uio.no/berasch
Fra grunn- og mellomfag er følgende sentrale:
Lijphart, A. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Parformance in
Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rasch, B.E. 2000. Demokrati — ideer og organisering. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
Anbefalt litteratur:
Perry, R.L. og J.D. Robertson 2002. Comparative Analysis of Nations. Quantitative
Approaches. Boulder: Westview Press.
King, G., R.O. Keohane og S. Verba 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in
Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Abizadeh, A. 2002. «Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four
Arguments», American Political Science Review 96: 495-509.
Achen, C.H. og L.M. Bartels 2002. «Bling Retrospection. Electoral Responses to Drought,
Flu and Shark Attacks.» Paper, APSA Annual Meeting, Boston.
www.apsanet.org/mtgs/proceedings.cfm
Adams, J. 2001. Party Competition and Responsible Party Government. A Theory of Spatial
Competition Based upon Insights from Behavioral Research. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Barros, R. 2002. Constitutionalism and Dictatorship. Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980
Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Berg-Schlosser, D. 2002. «Indicators of Democratization and Good Governance as Measures
of the Quality of Democracy — A Critical Appraisal». Phillips-University, Marburg.
Bianco, W.T. 2001. American Politics. Strategy and Choice. New York: W.W. Norton.
Butler, D. og Ranney, A. (red.) 1994. Referendums Around the World. The Growing Use of
Direct Democracy. London: Macmillan.
Cohn, J. 1999. «Irrational exuberance. When did political science forget about politics?», The
New Republic, Oct. 25, pp. 25-31.
(www.tnr.com/archive/1099/102599/coverstory102599.html)
Congleton, R.D. 2002. Att förbätra demokratin. SNS Förfatningsprojekt. Stockholm: SNS
Förlag.
Colomer, J.M. 2002. Strategic Transitions. Game Theory and Democratization. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Cox, G. og M.D. McCubbins 1993. Legislative Leviathan. Party Government in the House.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cronin, T.E. 1989. Direct Democracy. The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall.
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Dahl, R.A. 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Dahl, R.A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dahl, R.A. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dershowitz, A. 2002. Why Terrorism Works. Understanding the Threat, Responding to the
Challenge. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Diamond, L. 1999. Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Dixit, A. og S. Skeath 1999. Games of Strategy. New York: W.W. Norton.
Döring, H. red. 1995. Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St.
Martin’s Press. [ www.uni-potsdam.de/u/ls_vergleich/ (se under “forschung”)]
Elgie, R. 2002. «The politics of the European Central Bank: Princiapl-agent theory and the
democratic deficit», Journal of European Public Policy 9: 186-200.
Elster, J. 1993. «Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open
Sea», Public Administration 71: 169-217.
Elster, J. red. 1998. Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J. 2000. Ulysses Unbound. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Feld, S. og B. Grofman 1987. «Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in
n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games: An Intuitive Geometric Approach», American Journal
of Political Science 31: 709-28.
Ferejohn, J., J.N. Rakove og J. Riley red. 2001. Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fischer, M.E. red. 1996. Establishing Democracies. Boulder: Westview Press.
Gates, S. og B.D. Humes 1997. Games, Information, and Politics. Applying Game Theoretic
Models to Political Science. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.
Gaubatz, K.T. 1995. «Intervention and Intransitivity. Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the
Use of Military Force Abroad», World Politics 47: 534-54.
Geddes, B. «The Effect of Foreign Pressure on the Collapse of Authoritarian Regimes».
Paper. Department of Political Science, UCLA.
Gerber, E. og R.B. Morton 1998. «Primary Election Systems and Representation», Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization 41: 304-324.
Gjerde, C. 1997. Flertallsvalg og presidentstyre — en problematisk kombinasjon? Analyse av
presidentvalgmetoders konsekvenser i Latin-Amerika. Hovedoppgave. Oslo: Institutt for
statsvitenskap.
Green, D.P. og I. Shapiro 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. A Critique of
Applications in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Grofman, B. 2001. «Introduction: The Joy of Puzzle Solving», kapittel 1 i B. Grofman, red.
Political Science as Puzzle Solving. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Hadenius, A. 1992. Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hallerberg, M. 2002. «Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions», International
Organization 56: 775-802.
Halliday, F. 2002. Two Hours that Shook the World. September 11, 2001: Causes and
Consequences. London: Saqi Books.
Hammond, T.H. 1996. «Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance», Governance 9:
107-185.
Heller, W.B. 2001. «Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in
Multiparty Parliaments», American Journal of Political Science 45: 780-798.
Hernes, G. og K. Nergaard 1989. Oss i mellom. Konstitusjonelle former og uformelle
kontakter Storting - Regjering. Oslo: FAFO.
Hinich, M.J. og M.C. Munger 1997. Analytical Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hovi, J. og B.E. Rasch 1996. Samfunnsvitenskapelige analyseprinsipper. Bergen:
Fagbokforlaget.
Huntington, S.P. 1991. «How Countries Democratize», Political Science Quarterly 106: 579616.
Huntington, S.P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Kalyvas, S.N. 1999. «Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria»,
Rationality and Society 11: 243-285.
Kalyvas, S.N. 2000. «Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies. The Case of
Religious Parties», Comparative Politics __:379-398.
Karvonen, L. 1997. Demokratisering. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
Keech, W.R. 1995. Economic Politics. The Costs of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Keman, H. red. 2002. Comparative Democratic Politics. London: Sage.
Kiewiet, D.R. og M.D. McCubbins 1991. The Logic of Delegation. Congressional Parties
and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Krehbiel, K. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: Michigan
University Press.
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. og G.T. Svendsen 2002. «Rational Bandits. Plunder, Public Goods, and
the Vikings.» Upublisert. Odense: Syddansk Universitet.
Lijphart, A. (red.) 1992. Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Linz, J. og A. Stepan 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Linz, J. og A. Valenzuela red. 1994. The Failure of Presidential Democracies. (2 vol.)
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Longley, L.D. og D.M. Olson (red.) 1991. Two Into One. The Politics and Processes of
National Legislative Cameral Change. Boulder: Westview Press.
Lupia, A. og M.D. McCubbins 1998. The Democratic Dilemma. Can Citizens Learn What
They Need to Know? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lust-Okar, E. og A.A. Jamal 2002. «Rulers and Rules. Reassessing the Influence of Regime
Type on Electoral Law Formation», Comparative Political Studies
Mackie, G. 1998. «All Men Are Liars: Is Democracy Meaningless?», i J. Elster, red.
Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maletz, D.J. 2002. «Tocqueville’s Tyranny of the Majority Reconsidered», Journal of Politics
64: 741-763.
Marks, G. 1992. «Rational Sources of Chaos in Democratic Politics», pp. 47-69 i G. Marks og
L. Diamond, red. Reexamining Democracy. Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset.
London: SAGE.
Martin, L.W. og R.T. Stevenson 2001. «Government Formation in Parliamentary
Democracies», American Journal of Political Science 45: 33-50.
McCubbins, M.D. og T. Schwarz 1987: «Congressional oversight overlooked: police patrols
versus fire alarms», pp. 426-440 i M.D. McCubbins og T. Sullivan (red.), Congress. Structure
and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Opprinnelig i American Journal of
Political Science 28 (1984): 165-179.]
McCubbins, M.D. og T. Sullivan (red.) 1987. Congress. Structure and Policy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
McLean, I. 2001. Rational Choice and British Politics. An Analysis of Rhetoric and
Manipulation From Peel to Blair. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McLean, I. 2000. «Review Article: The Divided Legacy of Mancur Olson», British Journal of
Political Science 30: 651-668.
Money, J. og G. Tsebelis 1992. «Cicero’s Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative
Perspective», International Political Science Review 13: 25-43.
Morrow, J. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Morton, R. 2000. Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models
in Political Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moser, P. 1999. «The Impact of Legislative Institutions on Public Policy: A Survey»,
European Journal of Political Economy 15: 1-33.
Mueller, D.C. 1996. Constitutional Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mueller, D.C. 1997. Perspectives on Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Munck, G.L. og J. Verkuilen 2002. «Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy. Evaluatiing
Alternative Indices», Comparative Political Studies 35: 5-34.
Munger, M.C. Analyzing Policy. Choices, Conflicts, and Practices. New York: W.W. Norton.
Nordlinger, E.A. 1977. Soldiers in Politics. Military Coups and Governments. Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Norris, P. 2002. Democratic Phoenix. Reinventing Political Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Olsen, J.P. 1983. Organized Democracy. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Powell, G. Bingham 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy. Majoritarian and
Proportional Visions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Przeworski, A. 1991: «The Games of Transition», i S. Mainwaring m.fl. (red.), Issues in
Democratic Consolidation. The New South American Democracies in Comparative
Perspective. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Przeworski, A. 1999. ”Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defence”, pp. 23-55 i I.
Shapiro og C. Hacker-Cordón, red. 1999. Democracy’s Value. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. (33 s.)
Przeworski, A., S.C. Stokes og B. Manin red. 1999. Democracy, Accountability, and
Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Przeworski, A. et al. 2000. Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and WellBeing in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Radcliff, B. 1992. «The General Will and Social Choice Theory», The Review of Politics pp.
34-49.
Radcliff, B. og E. Wingenbach 2000. «Preference Aggregation, Functional Pathologies, and
Democracy: A Social Choice Defence of Participatory Democracy», The Journal of Politics
62: 977-998.
Rasch, B.E. 1987. «Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament», Public
Choice 52: 57-73.
Rasch, B.E. (red.) 1993. Symbolpolitikk og parlamentarisk styring. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Rasch, B.E. 1996. «Presidentstyrets utfordringer. Demokratisk institusjonsutforming i LatinAmerika og Chile», Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift 12: 187-216.
Rasch, B.E. 2000. «Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe»,
Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 3-23.
Rasch, B.E. og K. Midgaard (red.) 1994. Representativt demokrati. Spilleregler under debatt.
Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Remmer, K.L. 1989. Military Rule in Latin America. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
Reynolds, A. red. 2002. The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict
Management, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Riker, W. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism. A Confrontation Between the Theory of
Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco: Freeman.
Shapiro, I. og C. Hacker-Cordón, red. 1999. Democracy’s Value. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Schelling, T. 1978. «Hockey helmets, daylight saving, and other binary choices», s. 213-243 i
Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: W.W. Norton.
Sen, A. 1999. Development and Freedom. New York: Anchor Books.
Shepsle, K.A. og M.S. Bonchek 1997. Analyzing Politics. Rationality, Behavior, and
Institutions. New York: Norton.
Shin, D.C. 1994. «On the Third Wave of Democratization. A Synthesis and Evaluation of
Recent Theory and Research», World Politics 47: 135-70.
Shiu, G. og D. Sutter 1996. «The Political Economy of Tiananmen Square», Rationality and
Society 8: 325-342.
Shugart, M.S. og J.M. Carey 1993. Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and
Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge University Press.
Stewart, C. 2001. Analyzing Congress. New York: W.W. Norton.
Stordrange, B. 1988. Fra premisser til kompromisser. Om Stortingets lovbehandling. Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget.
Tsebelis, G. 1990. Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Tsebelis, G. 1995. «Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism», British Journal of Political Science
25: 289-325.
Tsebelis, G. 2000. «Veto Players and Institutional Analysis», Governance 13: 441-474.
Tsebelis, G. og J. Money 1995. Bicameralism. Manuskript. Kommer på Cambridge
University Press.
Tullock, G. 2002. «Undemocratic Governments», Kyklos 55: 247-264.
Weingast, B.R. og W.J. Marshall 1988. «The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets», Journal of Political Economy 96:
132-163.
Weingast, B.R. 1996. «Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives», pp. 167-190 i
R.E. Goodin og H.D. Klingemann, red. A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wittman, D. 1995. The Myth of Democratic Failure. Why Political Institutions Are Efficient.
Chicago: Chicago University Press.