Roots of Stagnation and Ways to Democratization 2.0: The
Indonesian Message
Olle Törnquist
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway
with Hasrul Hanif, Eric Hiariej, Willy Purna Samadhi, and Linda Savirani
Department of Political Science, University of Gadja Mada, Indonesia
Abstract
The supremacy of liberal democratization in the Global South is subject to increasingly
serious critique. This article discusses the main arguments in view of three rounds of
nationwide democracy surveys and follow-up studies (in cooperation between scholars and
reflective experts on the ground) in Indonesia, the relatively successful and largest new
democracy. The results indicate that the main arguments are insufficient. Initially, the
Indonesian democratization was more successful than expected. This reinforced the liberal
argument. Over the years, however, democratization has stagnated, and none of the main
schools of thought has been able to convincingly explain why. Our findings suggest that the
causes are at first hand rooted in the very compromises that generated the initial success of the
liberal model. These compromises shaped institutions that most of the powerful elite could
accept but which also consolidated their powers and generated vested interests in reducing the
space for further advances, in particular with regard to impartial and effective governance,
democratic organizations, and representation. Hence there is a need for a second generation of
democratization (2.0) that goes beyond the deficits of liberal strategy by fostering
transformative democratic politics to strengthen and open up space for reformist actors.
Keywords
Democratisation; democracy-assessment; representation; interest-representation; participation;
Indonesia
Introduction
For about three decades, the prime argument about liberal democratization in the Global
South has been that it can be crafted almost irrespectively of structural conditions. The
fundamentals have instead been internationally supported agreements between moderate elites
to contain not only reactionary groups but also popular mass movements and to favour
institutions towards liberal economy and governance to which the moderates can adjust.
However, the liberal thesis is subject to increasing doubts. Its own advocates acknowledge
unfavourable contextual cultures and the need for improved institution building with regard to
party systems and impartial governance in particular. 1 There is also a growing number of
harsher critics. Radical political economists maintain that the new liberal institutions are next
to formalities, because they continue to be dominated by oligarchs. Accordingly, real change
calls for more inclusive capitalism and radically altered power relations. 2 Meanwhile, moreetatist-oriented scholars argue that freedom and fledgling democracy generate conflicts and
corruption. Hence, democratic development presupposes firm rule of law and enhanced state
capacity, secured by enlightened dominant rulers. 3 In short, liberals are on the retreat, and
increasingly many experts argue that democratization is premature. But how valid are the
theses?
1
We contend that the best way to discuss the pros and cons of the contending arguments
is to abstain from picking examples that seem to verify the dissident positions and rather to
give the liberals the benefit of the doubt by focusing on what they deem important success
cases, such as Indonesia, 4 before examining them critically. However, we also assert that
informal practices and deliberative forms of governance (such as social-democratic-oriented
issue and interest representation and participatory local governance) must be added to the
liberal democratic institutions, because the latter otherwise tend to constitute the only “natural”
benchmarks in studies of the state of democracy. 5 Similarly, there is a need to add an analysis
of the extent to which the crucial institutions actually foster democracy, commonly defined as
popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. 6 This is an empirical issue
that cannot be taken for granted, especially not in new democracies. Most importantly, it is
necessary to substitute unbiased empirical studies of democratization for the frequent
normative assumption that liberal elitist pacts can overcome any authoritarian regime and any
democratic deficits. In other words, there is a need for studies over time and for the use of not
just one but several theories that can help explain democratization. These theories include
opportunity structures, the transformation of economic, social, cultural and other resources
into political legitimacy and authority, agenda setting, mobilization structures, and strategic
collective action. 7 Finally, of course, more-grounded studies to balance normative
assumptions call for better empirical sources. We argue that information over time from
embedded experts on the ground may substitute for cosmopolitan informants, especially until
there are more reliable data banks.
The critical reader may ask if this is not just another wish list of an important but
excessive number of variables and factors about which it is unrealistic to get reliable
information. Yet, the approach has proved viable between 2001 and 2015 in the case of the
largest of the new democracies, Indonesia. This is thanks to the cooperation between
committed scholars, journalists, and from seven to nine hundred local experts on the problems
of democratization on the central level and in carefully identified districts around the country
within frontlines such as efforts for human rights and better governance and labour rights. 8
The experts were selected in cooperation with well-reputed key informants who shared the
responsibility by not being anonymous. In addition, the frontlines were identified by the team
on the basis of previous studies. 9 Three national surveys with hundreds of questions
(answered during six-to-eight-hour-long interviews) have been combined with in-depth
conversations during thematic studies. Thanks to the trust in the research and the informants’
commitment, there were very few dropouts in the first two rounds of the project when the
momentum of democratization was still high. 10 All data are now made publicly available. 11
But although international comparisons with other databanks are thus possible and our own
thematic follow-up studies continue, the general results are clear enough. In this article, we
summarize the conclusions in view of the international discourse about democratization.
The empirical results indicate that the three dominant arguments (liberal, structuralist,
and etatist) are insufficient. The initial Indonesian democratization was more successful than
expected. This reinforced the liberal argument and refuted much of the harsh structuralist and
etatist critique. Over the years, however, democratization has stagnated, and none of the
schools of thought has really been able to explain why. Our findings suggest that the causes
are at first hand rooted in the very compromises that generated the initial success of the liberal
model. These compromises shaped institutions that most of the powerful elite could accept
but which also consolidated their powers and generated vested interests in reducing the space
for further advances, in particular with regard to impartial and effective governance,
democratic organizations, and representation of progressive interests and actors. Therefore,
we argue that there is a need for a second step of democratization (2.0) that goes beyond the
2
deficits of liberal strategy by fostering transformative democratic politics to strengthen and
open up space for reformist actors.
Three views on Indonesia and one in the making
The main Indonesian ways of thinking about democratization are closely related to the
international discourse. The liberal view is that Indonesia proves the possibility for rapid
democratization and that its problems, while real, are not worse than those anywhere else in
the Global South or during the early phases of democratization in North America and Europe.
Reforms such as more public funding of parties and efforts by civil-society activists and union
leaders to enter mainstream politics will eventually take the country towards full liberal
democracy. 12 More sceptical colleagues point to the challenges for popular aspirations 13 as
well as uphill institutional barriers and poor citizenship. 14
The contrary and increasingly influential political economy position is held by Marxistoriented scholars. 15 These scholars survey contemporary Indonesian politics and conclude that
little has changed since Suharto, except that the country is no longer ruled by a dictator but by
former members of his inner circle and their siblings and figureheads, who, according to
Slater, form political cartels. 16 In addition, the decentralization of state and politics has
enabled a wider circle of business actors to gain access to favourable contracts and
concessions through politics. In this view, therefore, Indonesia is an oligarchic democracy, the
reform of which requires a structural change. Marxists such as Max Lane see a potential for
accomplishing this in progressive unions and social movements, 17 but most political
economists, as well as progressive middle-class and business organizations, deem these far
too weak. The upshot of their structuralist analyses is therefore that a more-substantive
democracy in Indonesia must wait for the development of capitalism beyond accumulation
based on plunder and cheap labour and the consequent emergence of a business constituency
with an interest in predictable and transparent regulation through the rule of law. The third
much more conservative line of thinking has deep roots in Indonesia. It goes back to the late
1950s when the communists were expected to win elections and when the country (partly for
this reason) was deemed unfit for democracy. Samuel Huntington generalized the thesis by
arguing that modernization combined with liberal democracy generated conflicts and abuse of
power which turned into hotbeds for communist-led opposition. Therefore, liberties and
democracy must be preceded by the building of strong state institutions, which called for
“politics of order”. 18 This was the intellectual rationale for supporting Suharto’s mass killings
and thirty years of authoritarian rule, as well as the so-called middle-class coups in Latin
America; the one in Chile was even named “Operation Jakarta”. At present, however, the
international references are to Francis Fukuyama’s rephrasing of Huntington’s position that
there is a need for well-functioning states ahead of democratization. 19 And the political
corollary in Indonesia is a desire for “stronger leadership”, such as that offered in 2014 by the
then presidential candidate ex-general Prabowo Subianto, and for a depoliticization of public
governance. A fourth social-democratic-oriented position is possibly emerging out of studies
with reflective democracy activists, emphasizing the need for structural reforms. 20 But the
contours of this position are not yet clear. We shall return to this challenge in view of the
results in this article.
Unexpected advances
In the face of the initial survey, the conventional wisdom was that the informants among
experienced activists would be biased and overly critical. Therefore, when first being able to
scan the general data, our immediate reaction was that something must be wrong, or we might
3
be accused of working for the regime. In the end, though, there was no doubt: the activists
proved much more balanced and trustworthy than the Jakarta-based donors and political
pundits. The informants reported substantial advances with regard to civil and political
freedoms, including in the media and in the civil society. This applied for most parts of the
country (minus of course areas such as Papua and Aceh, plus special hot spots and individual
human-right problems). In fact, more than 50% of the informants said that the institutions
supposed to foster civil and political freedoms and elections performed reasonably well. Only
five years after the dictatorship, there were few signs of what many scholars had termed
“entrenched Asian values”, and Indonesia stood out as a beacon in Southeast Asia.
Moreover, although 75–90 per cent of the informants confirmed the common
understanding among experts and donors that the institutions to support the rule of law and
“good governance” were miserable, our informants deemed the core institutions about
representation of people and interests to be equally bad or worse. 21 Logically, of course, the
defunct representation was more serious than the deficits related to the rule of law and
governance, given that the first meant that there were few chances to improve on the latter
problems with democratic means. But who cared? Much of the democracy movement had lost
out on political representation in the early elections and turned to other ways of making a
difference. 22 And the mainstream experts (and our donors at the Norwegian and Swedish
embassies) were convinced that the problems of law and governance as well as the need to
improve representation could be handled by the elite itself, that international support for
various freedoms and human rights would prevent abuses, and that there was anyway no
realistic alternative among the pro-democrats.
Admittedly, this position was vindicated by a number of additional astonishing
conclusions from our surveys. First, most of the dominant actors actually adhered to the new
rules and regulations. Hence, democracy seemed to have become “the only game in town”,
and in accordance with the theories about the importance of institutions, the rule-abiding
former followers of Suharto would thus turn democrats. 23 Second, the main sources of
political power had shifted from the capacity to control means of coercion and public
administration to economic capital and good contacts (social capital). 24 Third, the muchdiscussed risk for economic collapse and balkanization in Indonesia after Suharto had been
contained by the emergence of a country-wide political community thanks to shallow yet
democracy-oriented institutions. These institutions provided local bosses and rebels with
sufficient space to abstain from outright obstruction. The ultimate proof was the peace process
in Aceh in 2005, much thanks to the emerging trust in the fledgling democratic institutions
along with the special rights in Aceh to participate in elections with local parties. 25 Fourth, the
pro-democratic movement had been unable to come together behind policy alternatives,
organize and mobilize, and make a difference in elections. Rather, it was now primarily
confined to lobbyism and activism in civil society. 26 Fifth, in addition, our informants in the
second survey made positive initial evaluations of the public attempts by the mid-2000 to
fight corruption and to improve representation through direct elections of political executives.
The anti-corruption measures delegitimized to some extent the mainstream parties and their
bosses and financiers. This paved the way for what James Manor in his studies of India in
particular has labelled post-clientelism. 27 Post-clientelism includes measures by the many
politicians who cannot anymore win elections barely on the basis of personalized patronclientelism that has been undermined by economic and social change. Hence, politicians have
to add strong-men practices and/or personality-oriented politics, populist ideas, and
mobilization to gain mass support, plus understandings with civil-society leaders and unions
to gain sympathies among educated middle classes and workers. From the second but
especially the third survey, it is obvious that, although much of the economic and social
powers of the Indonesian oligarchs and party bosses are intact, they have lost some of their
4
political legitimacy and authority and are not able to dominate like before. Moreover, only
about a quarter of the around 2000 dominant actors that our informants identified in 2013 fit
with the typical characteristic of an oligarch, that is, having their roots in the Suharto order.
The others were “new elites”, drawing on a comprehensive set of resources to gain political
legitimacy and authority. 28 The most successful of these leaders is of course the ex-mayor of
the Central Java town of Solo, then Governor of Jakarta and now President of the country,
Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. 29
In short, the political economy-oriented thesis that Indonesian democratization is
structurally constrained is certainly valid. But it only defines the playground and cannot
explain the positive outcomes. Similarly, the etatists are of course right in pointing to the
weak state capacity and notorious corruption; but this thesis cannot also account for
Indonesia’s economic advances and its ability to consolidate the state after Suharto. This
seems to be more due to decentralization and elite-driven liberal democratization than
anything like “politics of order”.
Stagnation, but why?
Meanwhile, however, democratization petered out, and the new puzzle was why. In spite of
disturbing signs such as reduced freedoms for religious and sexual minorities and problems to
meet and discuss controversial matters without being subject to intimidation, a majority of the
informants in 2013 still deemed liberties and the expansion of civil society to develop
positively. But these were the only exceptions. The main tendency was stagnation of the core
institutions of citizenship and law and especially governance and representation. Between 65
and 75 per cent of the informants said that the quality of these institutions had deteriorated or
stagnated. 30 There is particularly little trust in the legal system as well as in the established
parties and politicians. The partial exception is a few directly elected populist mayors and
governors, to whom we shall return.
Efforts were made to contain large scale corruption, but after some time, the then
President and former General Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono’s party and close aides, who had
promised to make a difference, proved to be up to the normal standards of Indonesian abuse
of power. Most recently, the Jokowi administration too has failed to defend the pro-active
efforts of the country’s anti-corruption agency. In short, it is not that the usual
recommendations to improve the electoral system and other institutions as well as to fight
corruption have not been tried but that the results are poor. Moreover, according to the third
survey, the rapid increase of dominant actors that adhere to the fledgling democratic rules and
regulations from the first to the second surveys has come to a full stop. 31 And just like in
football, even if all play be the same rules on the playground, the teams with financial
muscles tend to win. Therefore, when the actors adhere to the supposedly democratic
institutions, they rarely turn democrats. Worse still is that even pro-democratic activists who
feel they do not stand a chance within the political system tend to invent informal and
unregulated practices instead; we shall return to this. In short, the liberal strategy of
democratization has reached its limits, and the question is why.
It is certainly easy to agree with the political economists and etatists that poor structural
conditions and state capacity undermine better liberal democracy. But just like these sharp
theoreticians not so long ago failed to understand that democratization in Indonesia was
possible in the first place (compassionately dubbing those of us who did naïve idealists), they
are now unable to explain why more democracy would be doomed. There is little to suggest
that a significant deterioration of the structural conditions and institutional capacities has
barred further improvements. Stagnation may certainly occur because persistently poor
conditions make a more-advanced democratization difficult. But it is unacceptable to
5
conclude that it is impossible to advance until it has been shown that crucial causes for the
problems do not rest with the liberal strategy itself. Who is right?
The contending arguments can be examined empirically on the basis of the results from
our surveys and thematic studies. We have operationalized the crucial factors in the process of
democratization in terms of the actors’ political capacity to manage the conditions that
leading scholars suggest explain problems and options. This boils down to the capacity of the
actors (i) to handle exclusion and to gain inclusion in widely defined politics and governance,
(ii) to transform economic, social, cultural, and other sources of power into political
legitimacy and authority, (iii) to put their main issues onto the public and political agenda, (iv)
to include people into politics through mobilization and organization, (v) to foster popular
representation, and (vi) to develop effective political strategies to reach their aims. 32 Then,
how has liberal democratization affected these political conditions? If the liberal strategy has
not worked or even has been blocked, one may conclude that the stagnation of
democratization is due to structural constraints. But if the strategy has functioned largely
according to plan and the democratic outcome has anyway been poor, the causes for the
problems should at first hand be sought for in the strategy itself.
More liberties than scope for democracy
Liberalization has been remarkably successful in undermining many of the privileges of the
military, old parties, and state-corporatist mass organizations. Formal citizenship rights tend
now to be equal, and few people and groups are explicitly barred from social and political
participation. The major problem is instead that authoritarianism and privileges have been
fought by the privatization of public affairs rather than equal participation in government and
governance. The citizen rights are more negative than positive. The capacity of the state and
the government to handle what people deem to be the most-crucial matters of public concern
such as employment and welfare have been reduced in favour of self-management through
non-state organizations and market-driven solutions. In spite of celebrated decisions such as
the implementation of a public-health programme, the state is still not able to deliver many of
the services, without talking about what people expect to happen. 33 This does not imply that
people expect everything to be taken care of by a new dictator like Suharto or benevolent
populist like Jokowi. They also like to control public governance. But the inclusion of people
in politics and governance, and also in civil society, is mainly by elitist incorporation, not
integration via people’s own organizations. And in spite of the advances, the freedom of
assembly and expression is upheld selectively and is mainly for the privileged and monied.
Citizen rights to associate are often used by groups that do not respect the rights of others, and
extremists are free to terrorize both principled intellectuals and victims of violations of human
rights. This is also undermining the media and the public discourse more generally. 34 In
addition, the politics of amnesia still applies to the long history of crimes against humanity.
The suppression of history in schools and public life holds back democracy; and altering this
has never been a priority in liberal democratization. 35
The primacy of economic and social capital
Meanwhile, a stunning outcome of the liberal strategy of democratization in Indonesia is that
political power no longer grows out of military and other coercive powers; our figures for the
dominant actors are well below 10 % of the responses. There are also clear signs of increased
importance of parliamentarians and especially elected political executives at the expense of
appointed bureaucrats. One major drawback is, however, the increasing significance of
economic resources in generating political legitimacy and authority. Access to huge economic
6
muscles is becoming a must within politics to finance services and campaigns. In fact, private
businessmen are not just financiers but in many cases also politicians. Most ordinary people
are barred from running as candidates because they do not have the formal education that is
required. Almost two decades after the dictatorship, civil public servants are still barred from
being politically active in their capacity as private citizens. This is particularly ironic when it
comes to teachers. They have of course been domesticated during decades of
authoritarianism. But their potential is significant given the outstanding historical importance
of culture and education in the country for national independence, rights, and democracy. In
addition, social capital in terms of good contacts is almost as important as economic
resources. Therefore, although Indonesian political power no longer grows out of the barrel of
the guns in tandem with crony businessmen and co-opted bureaucrats and technocrats,
businessmen themselves have taken over, along with spokespersons in media and politics and
associates within public administration, and they all rely on good contacts with each other.
In this context, the alternative actors too become increasingly dependent on financiers
and on being connected because their alternative economic and social power based on
organization and popular mobilization remains weak. Even their capacity to transform power
based on knowledge into political legitimacy and authority, which was crucial in the initial
process of democratization, has been reduced by commercialization and the growing interests
of dominant actors in influencing edited media, the supposedly more-equal social media, as
well as education and research. In short, the deterioration of knowledge-based alternative
politics and policies under monied liberalism has turned Indonesia into a stronghold of
postmodernist relativism where factual knowledge is subordinated to everyone’s right to their
own interpretation, as long as they have money and good contacts. 36
From single issues to demands for a welfare state
Liberal democratization has given priority to the politicization of a multitude of single issues,
rooted in scattered civil-society organizations and unions with their own special agendas and
a remarkable inability to build common platforms and develop broader alternative
perspectives. Meanwhile, old dominant actors have thus retained ideological hegemony when
it comes to comprehensive agendas. Aside from propagandistic statements, there has been a
particularly serious lack of alternative economic-reform agendas. The radical shift during
recent years in priorities among activists and people in general towards broader questions of
economic development and welfare policies (documented in our third survey) is therefore
quite surprising and must be seen as a reaction against the drawbacks of the liberal
democratization. In fact, most of the activists (including many of our informants) who used to
negate the state and “dirty politics” and celebrated the liberal emphasis on civil society and
self-management now ask politicians and governments to consider more-decent wages, the
development of a welfare state, and environmentally responsible compromises to handle
chaotic urban growth. It is true that Jokowi was particularly skilful in framing these concerns
during his periods as mayor of Solo and governor of Jakarta, but no politician has been able to
neglect the new demands. In the 2014 presidential elections, even authoritarian-oriented
former General Prabowo co-opted radical unions, environmentalists, and farmer groups that
had run out of funds and ideas (and naively thought they would be able to make use of him),
and he was almost able to win. Therefore, in spite of the growing importance of social
democratic demands, the dominant politicians have managed to stay in command and retain
hegemony, whereas the movements based on popular interest and activists remain short of
alternatives and are tailing behind; we shall return to this. 37
Avoiding mass movement
7
The foremost pillar of the liberal strategy of democratization – to contain popular mass
mobilization in favour of moderate elitist compromises – was easy to implement in Indonesia.
Its huge popular movements and the only modern mass-based party (the reformist third
largest communist party in the world) had already been eliminated by the Suharto regime, and
the new democracy movement itself was elitist and fragmented. Instead of trying to alter this,
liberal democrats held back the re-emergence of broad membership-based movements and
organization in favour of localized and single-issue-oriented citizen organizations and unions.
The space was thus wide open for the moderate elite to dominate popular mobilization
through the old socio-religious organizations, alumni associations, clientelistic networks, and
established parties. Partially as an outcome of our initial conclusion that the post-Soeharto
democracy movement was as “floating” as Suharto wished the people to be under his reign by
being short of class basis and political organization, 38 the alternative actors have since then
tried numerous ways of “going politics” by building more-grounded issue and interest
organizations. Yet, this has largely been on the basis of the already-existing special priorities
of the already-existing myriad of civil society groups and unions plus cadre parties. The two
major outcomes have thus been either to give priority to lobbyism, media campaigns, and netbased activism or to link movements and civil-society groups to the new populist political
leaders and certain parties – to get access to funds and mass organizations and to reach out to
ordinary people and give their principals a chance to run in elections. So far, there have been
few signs of a positive outcome in terms of broad independent mobilization and
organization. 39 We shall return to the brief exception of the successful alliance in 2010–2012
of enlightened unions, other interest and civil-society organizations, and progressive
politicians in favour of the new national health system.
Constrained representation
A major achievement of liberal democratization has been the dismantling of the
authoritarian system of corporatist representation. However, in addition to avoiding mass
organizing from below, the liberal advocates have branded movement-based parties oldfashioned and unrealistic and ruled out social democratic interest-group representation. The
major alternative has been civil society, and religious-and-ethnic-group-based lobbying and
networking in addition to local direct participation and populist dialogues. As for political
parties, moreover, the mainstream liberals did not just bar Marxist parties (in spite of their
crucial role in fighting colonialism and repression) while accepting Suharto’s old party and
right-wing and religious groups. Most seriously, they also supported extremely stringent
conditions for parties to be allowed to run in elections. The basic requirement for being
allowed to run in even a local election is that a party is able to convince the authorities that it
is physically present in the country at large. Therefore, since the size of Indonesia is almost
equivalent to the size of the European Union, the European equivalent would be where, for
example, a German or Swedish party wanting to run in local elections would first have to
build up (and finance) branches in almost all the other European countries too. For anyone
without massive economic resources, it is thus next to impossible to build and participate in
elections with an alternative democratic party in Indonesia. One reason for these exclusionary
rules was to consolidate a unified political system. But even that mission is now completed;
and in view of the fact that Indonesia is best compared with India, which has not disintegrated
in spite of decentralization and plural laws on parties and elections, the main reason for the
exclusionary rules probably was and still is the protection of the privileges of the established
parties. Even as local parties were allowed in Aceh as part of the internationally brokered
peace accord in 2005, the democratic opening was soon undermined without significant
8
critique from the liberals inside and outside the country. As reformists advanced within the
new democratic space, the conservative former-rebel leaders were given special benefits that
undermined their reformist opponents in return for abstaining to resume armed struggle and
for mobilizing votes for the president and his party in the national elections. Meanwhile, there
have certainly been other efforts to counter crooked parties and related leaders; but the main
liberal strategy has been to introduce individual candidates in the context of party lists and to
promote direct elections of political executives. The effect thereof has been even more
personality-oriented money politics. The only exceptions are the few progressive candidates
that have been elected as members of mainstream parties and to the Regional Representative
Council and also as Village Leaders, Regents, Mayors, and Governors. But the Council is
powerless, and the parties and elected executives are mainly at the mercy of bosses and
powerful financers. Leaders such as Jokowi may certainly balance the influence of their
patrons and financiers through cooperation with popular movements and activists, and there
could be more of that. But so far, the movements and volunteers behind Jokowi have not been
granted institutionalized democratic representation, only “populist transactionalism”,
including access to populist leaders who tend to project themselves as reincarnations of
Sukarno. The increasing number of advisory boards and commissions on issue such as
corruption, human rights, and planning are potentially more important as linkages between
state and society. But the members are selected in their individual capacities and appointed in
accordance with the vested interests of the parliamentarians and executive politicians. Hence,
the members cannot act as representatives of democratic issue and interest organizations and
other communities. 40
Bypassing democratization
When it comes to the actors’ political strategies to reach their aim, the major effect of liberal
democratization is simply that there are very few reformist strategies in the first place, that is,
plans for step-wise advances like building a particular alliance in order to promote a certain
reform, which in turn may enable a wider coalition of actors to implement a follow-up reform
that may promote more inclusive development, better welfare systems, improved education,
and more democracy. Most of our informants look like question marks when we ask them.
They rather think of strategies in terms of calculations on how to gain the best-possible
contacts within state and politics, to thus get access to influential political positions and as
much public resources as possible, in order to foster their own interests, projects, and
organizations outside the state and government. The idea of developing reform proposals, and
to mobilize the widest-possible support for them, and for their impartial implementation
through improved state and government services, seems to be almost alien among alternative
actors. Actually, our empirical evidence suggests that dominant actors are more capable of
developing comprehensive strategies to gain legitimacy and authority and to thus win
approval and elections, after which they may not just gain access to public positions and
resources but also get things done through the government. Under liberal democratization, the
alternative actors are simply so weak that their prime focus is lobbying and “getting access”
to resources for their activities outside the state and government, not trying to win elections or
building mass organizations and broad alliances. In the short run, these shortcuts are morerational ways to gain some results than to fight along a long and demanding democratic route
that may be next to blocked. Perhaps worst in this context is that few, if any, actors build
strategies that address and try to improve on the major problems that have been identified
above. 41
Emerging alternatives
9
Empirical evidence suggests, thus, that the lack of further democratic progress is not at first
hand due to structural constraints or poor state capacity but occurs because the initially
successful liberal strategy has (i) fought privileges and authoritarianism with privatization and
markets rather than extended the scope for democratic politics, (ii) enhanced the importance
of elite-dominated economic and social capital to gain political authority and legitimacy, (iii)
fostered single-issue activities among scattered civil-society organizations, paving the way for
continuous ideological hegemony of the old elite regarding how to govern the country, (iv)
discouraged mass-based politics to enable elite compromises and individualized media
activism, lobbying, and networking, (v) neglected the representation of crucial interests and
ideas that might promote democratization, opening up instead for the elitist incorporation of
favourite groups, populism, and “direct democracy”, and (vi) ignored strategic reforms,
including regarding the most important problems of democratization, opening up instead for
efforts to penetrate the state and get access to benefits and resources for activities outside the
public governance. What should be done?
Many political economists and etatists continue to insist that a better democracy
presupposes a structural change, less inequalities, and a more efficient state. There is much to
this, but do we really know that stronger actors of change cannot emerge and alter the poor
conditions by way of democratic reforms? Historically, it is certainly true that the stronger
progressive actors in northern America and especially in northern Europe grew out of
comprehensive industrial development, strong labour movements, compromises with farmers
and middle classes, and growth coalitions with equally well-organized employers—all of
which spurred better public governance and extensive welfare policies. And there is little to
suggest that the rapid but uneven and tortuous development in countries like Indonesia would
generate similar processes. Labourers as well as large sections of the middle classes are
weakened by the neo-liberal informalization of employment conditions while those who are
better off are doing well. And much of the international competition and investors’ priorities
are still based on plunder and low wages. In spite of this, however, our results from Indonesia
and international comparisons suggest that the political freedoms in combination with new
conflicts open up for alternative routes to a collective action and democratic advances. 42
First, the increasing number of national and international actors who wish to reduce the
reliance on extraction of resources and exploitation of cheap labour in favour of growing
markets through inclusive development need more rule of law and less corruption. It is true
that many of them express their admiration for more “stability” and even the partial return to
“politics of order” rather than more functional democracy. But the fact that the supposedly
enlightened autocrats and administrators (who, in this view, are expected to introduce better
governance) have often continued to abuse power and to benefit from corruption and
extractive rather than inclusive growth is generating second thoughts. 43 If so, it may not be
impossible to foster broad national and international coalitions in favour of better
representation and increased political capacity in favour of inclusive growth and improved
governance.
Second, our empirical studies indicate that the so-far fragmented and weak actors of
change in Indonesia might be able to build the kind of broader counter movements against the
tortuous economic development that Karl Polanyi identified. 44 The chaotic urban growth has
fostered compromises between sections of business, middle classes, and urban poor. Many of
them wish to build more liveable cities by fighting the accumulation of capital through
dispossession of citizens from land and other resources. The most well-known cooperation
was brokered by Jokowi in Solo on Central Java and in Jakarta before he was elected
president. Moreover, organized workers begin to realize that they have to link up with the
increasingly many contract and self-employed labourers to stand a chance in fighting for more
10
jobs and better welfare schemes and counter the informalization of employment relations.
This was the background of the broad movement for the national public-health insurance.
Numerous middle-class people who work under precarious conditions are also worried and in
favour of public welfare. Their willingness to pay taxes for such services (instead of seeking
private solutions) presupposes, of course, trust in actors advocating effective and impartial
public administration. But the same applies to the coalitions for liveable cities as well as to
the wider alliances among labourers in favour of better work and welfare schemes. Therefore,
all these movements may add demands for better public governance. Most importantly, such
broad unity in favour of well-implemented reforms towards decent work relations and welfare
may foster a wider and better-organized collective action, which in turn is fundamental for
democratic routes to economic improvements through the historical social-growth pacts that
preceded comprehensive welfare states. As concluded in a recent study on “Reinventing
Social Democratic Development”, 45 this would thus be an upside-down scenario. By
comparison with the Scandinavian history of social-growth pacts between well-organized
representatives of capital and labour, which generated capacity and interest (even among
employers) in welfare reforms that also fostered economic development, the possible scenario
in countries in the Global South with uneven development is that struggles for rights, welfare,
and impartial implementation may pave the way for growth pacts. The signs of such
potentials in Indonesia remind partly of the recent dynamics that carried the Indian Common
People’s Party (AAP) into local government in New Delhi. 46
As testified by the immediate challenges in both Indonesia and India, however, counter
movements and organized politics and governance are not the same. There is an increasing
need not just for facilitating the emerging attempts at broader alliances but also for policy
development, democratic organizing, and capacity to govern. This calls for support through
transformative politics and policies that generate better conditions for change. 47 But what can
be done?
Conclusion: Democratization 2.0
Democratization must enter a second phase. The first phase was characterized by the
engagement of powerful actors in modest reform agendas and the building of those primarily
liberal institutions that they could accept. The second phase that we advocate must also
engage the wider concerns and interests that have been marginalized but are needed to tackle
the remaining major problems of limited governance reforms and the poor representation of
actors of change. We suggest that the main priority of democratization 2.0 should be the
promotion of democratic representation that complements liberal democratic elections and
freedoms. Initially, it was natural to confront the authoritarian state and to fight for freedoms
against the abuse of power that was granted in the struggle against colonialism but then
negated again. By now, however, the Indonesian state (centrally and locally) reminds of a
partially looted and poorly managed house with two entries only, one back door for the
employees recruited by the insiders and one front door where entry is restricted to the political
elite and their financiers who can succeed in general elections. The restricted admittance
makes most actors try all possible alternative ways of getting in and get access to the
remaining resources and capacities, such as by way of “good contacts” with the insiders or by
breaking a window or climbing the balcony. No means of penetration are impossible; the
terms for them vary, including lobbying, corruption, and “transactional politics”; and they are
used by traditional and populist actors. Even unions, other popular organizations, and citizen
associations adjust, as do intellectuals. This art of bypassing the problems of democracy is of
course rooted in power relations but also in collective action, that is, nobody changes until
others do. Hence, there have to be more doors to state and organized politics. And admission
11
must be democratically regulated to contain confrontation as well as looting and new
penetration but also to foster cooperation between state and society through representation of
the important ambitions and interests in favour of progressive change. This may be possible
by the inclusion of relevant democratic unions, employers’ associations, and civil-society
organizations in the development and implementation of reforms towards effective
governance and welfare schemes that promote inclusive development. The policy areas are a
matter of priority and must certainly be decided by politicians elected on the basis of citizens’
preferences. But Suharto’s top-down appointment of delegates as well as the current selection
in accordance with the vested interests of crooked politicians should be replaced by impartial
and transparent public facilitation of representatives selected by and accountable to those who
build nation-wide democratic issue and interest organizations. The sources of inspiration may
include the Scandinavian and Brazilian experiences as well as the possibilities to expand the
International Labour Organization’s principles of tripartite labour-market negotiations to
other sectors as well. In view of these insights, the democratic representation of the crucial
but neglected issues and interests has the potential to extend the scope for democratic politics
and contain the abuse of powers among politicians and bureaucrats, as well as to enhance the
capacity of actors of change to gain legitimacy and authority, develop comprehensive policies,
and be accepted on the political agenda, form broad democratic membership-based
organizations, and develop democratic strategies and representation of the neglected issues
and interests. Support may be provided by already-active groups, related politicians, and
international development, labour, and prodemocracy organizations. This may be combined
with engagement for the combination of decent working conditions, welfare, and sustainable
growth and need not be partisan in relation to political parties. But democratically stronger
issue and interest organizations are of course the best base for the development of less-elitist
and oligarch-driven parties. 48
Finally, what are the implications for democratization analyses? Indonesia does not
equal the Global South, of course, but it is a major critical case of liberal democratization. We
have been able to rely on fairly extensive surveys and follow-up studies over a decade and a
half, and the results are clear. The main problems are sufficiently well established, and it is
time to abstain for a while from new huge democracy assessments and correlations of the
factors involved in favour of focusing on whether and how the drawbacks of liberal
democratization can be overcome.
12
Notes
1
See, for example, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 and 3 (2002), and 26, no. 1 (2015).
2
See, for example, Bastian and Luckham, Can Democracy be Designed?
3
See, for example, Mansfield and Snyder, “The Sequencing ‘Fallacy’”; and Fukuyama, Political Order and
Political Decay.
4
Diamond, “Indonesia’s Place in Global Democracy”.
5
The institutions we have focused on are (i) equal and inclusive citizenship in relation to well-defined public
affairs, (ii) rule of law (including international law and UN conventions), (iii) equal justice, (iv) Full universal
human rights (including basic needs), (v) democratic political representation through parties and free and fair
elections, (vi) right-based citizen participation in public governance, (vii) institutionalized channels for interestand-issue representation and participatory local governance, (viii) local democracy made real in combination
with relevant influence at other levels, (ix) democratic control of instruments of coercion (including private
forces), (x) transparent, impartial, and accountable governance, (xi) government’s independence and capacity to
make decisions and implement them, (xii) freedom of and equal chances to access public discourse, culture, and
academia within the framework of human rights, and (xiii) citizens’ democratic self-organizing.
6
Beetham et al., International IDEA Handbook.
7
For details and references, see Törnquist, Assessing Dynamic Democratisation.
8
The first round of studies was conducted by investigative journalists (led by Stanley Adi Prasetyo) and the
research organization Demos (directed by the late Asmara Nababan with in particular A E Priyono, Willy Purna
Samadhi, Attia Nur, and Debbie Prabawati) and supported by leading democracy activists (such as the
assassinated alternative Nobel Price Laurent Munir and the late Th Sumartana) in cooperation with the
University of Oslo, UiO, (through Olle Törnquist and his international partners). Because it was difficult to
attract committed engagement of qualified Indonesian academicians (well-paid to serve international donors), the
second round of studies was designed to involve cooperation by concerned scholars at the University of Gadjah
Mada, UGM, (including Aris Mundayat and Nicolaas Warouw). In face of the third round, however, new leaders
of Demos opted for reducing the academic requirements, and there were internal problems at UGM; therefore,
new institutional arrangements at UGM were inevitable but made it difficult, again, to combine the priorities of
established academicians and other scholars and activists. Financial support has been provided by Norwegian
public sources and equivalent initial funding from Sweden and the Ford and Tifa Foundations.
9
Törnquist, Prasetyo, and Priyono, “Floating Democrats”.
13
10
For details, see Törnquist, Assessing Dynamic Democratisation.
11
See http://pwd.polgov.id/.
12
Mietzner, “The Sequencing ‘Fallacy’”; cf. Horowitz, Constitutional Change and Democracy.
13
Aspinall, “The Irony of Success”; Aspinall, “The Triumph of Capital?”; and Caraway and Ford, “Labour and
Politics under Oligarchy”.
14
Nordholt, “Decentralisation in Indonesia”; Van Klinken, “Patronage Democracy in Provincial Indonesia”;
Tomsa and Ufen, Party Politics in Southeast Asia; and Berenschot, The Political Economy of Clientelism.
15
Winters, Oligarchy; Winters, “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia”; Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising
Power in Indonesia; and Robison and Hadiz, “The Political Economy of Oligarchy”.
16
Slater, “Democratic Careening”.
17
Lane, Decentralization and It Discontents.
18
Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay”.
19
Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay.
20
See, for example, Törnquist, Prasetyo, and Priyono, “Floating Democrats”; Priyono, Samadhi, and Törnquist,
Making Democracy Meaningful; Samadhi and Asgart, “A Decade of Reformasi”; Törnquist, Assessing Dynamic
Democratisation; and partly Caraway and Ford, “Labour and Politics under Oligarchy”.
21
Subono, “Deficit Democracy”; cf. Samadhi and Asgart, “A Decade of Reformasi”.
22
Subono, Priyono, and Samadhi, “The Floating and Marginalised Democrats”.
23
Priyono and Subono, “Oligarchic Democracy”; Törnquist, Assessing Dynamic Democratisation, ch. 3.
24
Priyono and Subono, “Oligarchic Democracy”; Subono and Samadhi, “Towards the Consolidation”.
25
Cf. Törnquist, Prasetyo, and Birks, Aceh: The Role of Democracy.
26
Subono, Priyono, and Samadhi, “The Floating and Marginalised Democrats”; Karyadi, “Populist Shortcut to
Progress?”; and Nur and Törnquist, “Crafting Representation”.
27
Manor, “Post-clientelist Initiatives”.
28
Savirani, A, “Consolidated State”.
29
For Jokowi’s roots in Solo, see Pratikno and Lay, “From Populism to Democratic Polity”.
30
Hanif and Hiariej, “Democratic Institutions”; Savirani, A. “Demands for Welfare Rights”.
31
Subono and Samadhi, “Towards the Consolidation”; Hanif and Hiariej, “Democratic Institutions”.
32
For details, see Törnquist, Assessing Dynamic Democratisation.
33
Savirani, “Demands for Welfare Rights”.
14
34
Hiariej, “The Rise of Post-Clientelism”.
35
Törnquist, “The Politics of Amnesia”.
36
Priyono, Samadhi, and Törnquist, Making Democracy Meaningful, data appendix; Subono and Samadhi,
“Towards the Consolidation”; Samadhi and Warouw, Building Democracy on the Sand, data appendix; Savirani,
“Consolidated State”; and Hiariej, “The Rise of Post-Clientelism”.
37
Savirani, “Demands for Welfare Rights”; Samadhi and Törnquist, “Bypassing the Problems of
Democratisation”.
38
Törnquist, Prasetyo, and Priyono, “Floating Democrats”.
39
Törnquist, Prasetyo, and Priyono. “Floating Democrats”; Törnquist, “The Political Deficit”; Priyono and
Subono, “Oligarchic Democracy”; Subono, Priyono, and Samadhi, “The Floating and Marginalised Democrats”;
Nur and Törnquist, “Crafting Representation”; Törnquist, Tharakan, and Quimpo, “Popular Politics of
Representation”; Hiariej, “The Rise of Post-Clientelism”; Samadhi and Törnquist, “Bypassing the Problems of
Democratisation”; and Djani et al., Beyond Populist Transactionalism.
40
Priyono and Subono, “Oligarchic Democracy”; Priyono, Samadhi, and Törnquist, Making Democracy
Meaningful; Karyadi, “Populist Shortcut to Progress?”; Nur and Törnquist, “Crafting Representation”; Törnquist,
Tharakan, and Quimpo, “Popular Politics of Representation”; Törnquist, Prasetyo, and Birks, Aceh: The Role of
Democracy; Törnquist, “Stagnation or Transformation in Indonesia”; Hiariej, “The Rise of Post-Clientelism”;
Samadhi and Törnquist, “Bypassing the Problems of Democratisation”.
41
Samadhi and Törnquist, “Bypassing the Problems of Democratisation”; Djani, Tanjung, Tjandra, and
Törnquist, Beyond Populist Transactionalism.
42
Samadhi and Törnquist, “Bypassing the Problems of Democratisation”; Törnquist and Harriss, “What are the
Prospects”.
43
Cf. Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail.
44
Polanyi, The Great Transformation.
45
Törnquist and Harriss, Reinventing Social Democratic Development.
46
Harriss, “What are the Prospects”.
47
Törnquist and Harriss, “What are the Prospects”.
48
Samadhi and Törnquist, “Bypassing the Problems of Democratisation”; Savirani et al., “Recommendation”;
Djani, Tanjung, Tjandra, and Törnquist, Beyond Populist Transactionalism.
15
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