THE REGULATION OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE IN MASSACHUSETTS
by
William Samuel Huang
A.B.,
Harvard College
(1981)
Submitted
to the
Department of
Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the
Degree of
MASTER OF CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 1983
William S. Huang 1983
The author hereby grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce and
to
distribute
part.
copies of this thesis document in whole or
ii
hf \
7/
~"
Signature of Author:
fepartme
t of Urban Studies
May 23,
nd Planning
198/
Certified by:
ThesisSupervisor
Accepted by:
Head M.C.P.
MASSACHUSETTS INST CUTr
OF TECHNCLOGY
JUL 21 1983
LIRPAWMES
Committee
in
THE REGULATION OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE IN MASSACHUSETTS
by
William S. Huang
Submitted to the Department of
Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the
Degree of
Master of City Planning
May 1983
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the institutional and technical challenge posed by
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980. The 1980 Act permitted the formation of interstate compacts for low-level waste disposal;
and after January 1, 1986, any compact state that hosts a regional
disposal facility may exclude wastes from non-member states.
Although Massachusetts is among the top 10 U.S. low-level waste generators,
there are no operating disposal sites in the Northeast. If the Commonwealth began construction of a low-level waste disposal facility today,
it would not be operational by the 1986 deadline. In addition, shallow
land burial--the only licensed technology--has had a fifty per cent
practical failure rate and has never succeeded in an area with heavy
rainfall and a high water table.
Believing that this disposal technology is inappropriate for Massachusetts, the author argues that the Commonwealth should oppose the
L.L.R.W.P.A. of 1980, seeking an extension on the 1986 deadline. In
addition, Massachusetts should put pressure on the federal government
to develop and test disposal technologies appropriate for areas with
heavy rainfall and high water tables. Massachusetts should also seek
Agreement State status and place low-level radioactive waste disposal
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering. Finally, the state should develop interim storage capacity.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Lawrence S. Bacow
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Lawrence S. Bacow, and
my reader, Ann Rappaport of Massachusetts' Department of Environmental
Quality Engineering.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.........................................................1
CHAPTER 1
Radioactivity.-------....................
5................
Types of Radioactive Waste......................................12
CHAPTER 2
The History of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Regulation
in the United States, 1940's through 1980......................15
CHAPTER 3
Federal Involvement in Low-Level Waste Management after
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980.............30
CHAPTER 4
The Massachusetts Response to the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act of 1980.......................................38
CHAPTER 5
Waste Generation in Massachusetts: 1980 and Beyond...............50
CHAPTER 6
The Current Regulatory Framework.................................54
CHAPTER 7
Assessing the Regulatory System.......... ...------.............. 58
CHAPTER 8
Conclusion.......................................................66
iii
INTRODUCTION
I.
The
regulation
important
1.
two
Low-level
States
In
Levin
low-level
radioactive
waste
is
reasons:
A large percentage of the radioactive waste generated
in
the
United
States
is
considered
"low-level
radioactive waste."
The
failure to safely and effectively regulate
lowlevel radioactive waste damages the public perception
of both radioactive hazard and the nuclear industry.
2.
A.
for
of
the
radioactive
August
discussed
waste generation in the
1981 issue of Nuclear
the
definition
of
News,
United
George
"low-level
B.
radioactive
1
waste."
Act
According to
of
1980,
"radioactive
waste,
P.L.
waste,
material
as defined
Acts
1954."
low-level
radioactive waste
level
spent nuclear fuel,
(2) of the
waste.
This
discretion in classifying
are
Policy
low-level
those
is
radioactive
or byproduct
Atomic
Energy
Mine or mill tailings are not classified
Moreover,
sion--they
low-level
in Section lle
radioactive
considerable
waste.
96-573,
waste not classified as high
transuranic
of
the Low-level Radioactive Waste
definition
low-level
as
permits
radioactive
waste is defined only by exclu-
wastes
not
considered
in
other
categories.
Low-level
power
tissue
plants;
from
industrial
fairly
wastes
are
radioactive
the
routine wastes
scintillation
hospitals and research
radioactive wastes.
wide range of materials,
1
from
media
institutions;
nuclear
and
and
animal
most
While the category includes a
low-level radioactive
waste
typically
contains
only
a
tiny
fraction
of
radioactive
material.
In
1980,
90,928
cubic meters of low-level
radioactive
waste were disposed at the three commercial LLW disposal sites
2
in the United States.
About 50% of this waste was
generated
by
commercial power
research
plants;
institutions;
activities;
19% was produced by medical
22%
was
produced
by
and
industrial
and the remaining 9% was generated by U.S. Depart-
3
ment
of Energy
B.
activities.
The Regulation of LLW in the United States
The
successful regulation of
LLW in the United States
the critical problem facing the nuclear
of
industry.
Proponents
nuclear power argue that a safe and effective
would
LLW
policy
provide a foundation for a comprehensive nuclear
disposal
program
in the United
States--invalidating a
objection of opponents to nuclear power.
is
Moreover,
waste
major
although
the problem is less technically challenging than safe disposal
of
high
level wastes--in
fact,
technically
incompatible--
solving this problem would help re-build sagging public confi4
dence
of
in the the nuclear
industry.
low-level radioactive waste
health risks posed by LLW,
tively
small;
radioactive
tion,
and
sources
the
Finally,
the
regulation
is politically tractable.
although uncertain,
benefits of the
(cancer research,
uses
seem comparaof
treatment,
low-level
and detec-
for example) are tangible and politically safe.
2
The
II.
Given
tive
the growing shortage of burial space for
material,
become
a
low-level
critical
inactivity,
radioactive waste
policy
question.
radioac-
management
After
has
decades
of
the federal government has developed a wide array
of new policies within the last five years.
Faced
storing
with
either
what
they configure
as
a
choice
high-level or low-level waste,
the
between
NRC
has
5
begun de-regulating certain low-level
addition
to
this
semantic
source
radioactive wastes.
reduction,
the
NRC
In
has
supported a number of new waste treatments, using special evaporators
and
incinerators
to
decrease the
volume
of
LLW
requiring burial.
Finally,
imbalance
in
between
activities are
regulations
surface
attempt
waste
that
the
and
geographical
disposal,
waste
state
NRC
region formation and a series of
burial
Waste Policy Act of
compact
relieve
will permit the construction of
interstate compacts;
state
to
generation
leading toward
radioactive
Radioactive
of
an
sites.
The
provides
a
near-
Low-Level
1980 authorizes the
and as of January
which
new
1, 1986,
regional
creation
any interdisposal
facility may restrict its use to member states.
All of these actions will have public health
impacts; but
region formation poses the greatest problem for Massachusetts.
The
Commonwealth
before
must
find a place to dispose
the 1986 deadline;
Low-Level
Radioactive
of
its
LLW
and the regional commitment of the
Waste Policy Act of 1980
3
precludes
a
convenient deal with any state that currently hosts an
opera-
ting disposal facility.
This
paper will examine the institutional and
challenge
posed by the Low-Level
of
Chapter
1980.
and
health
the
1940's
L.L.R.W.P.A.
since
of
1980;
response
existing
1980.
waste
regulatory
2
examines
the
radioactive waste management in the U.S.,
Chapter
Chapter
the 1980 Act.
Massachusetts
Chapter
through the events
and
to
introduction to the nature
of radiation.
history of low-level
from
Radioactive Waste Policy Act
1 is a technical
threat
technical
4
chronicles
generation.
effectiveness of this system.
precipitated
3 describes federal
Chapter
framework;
that
the
actions
Massachusetts
5 is a brief overview
Chapter
6
of
describes
the
assesses
the
and Chapter 7
Finally,
the
Chapter 8 summarizes
the policy options currently available to Massachusetts.
The study will draw information from many sources,
ing
a
reports
broad
and
range
of government
documents
and
interviews with regulatory officials.
4
includ-
technical
CHAPTER 1
The
health
incompletely
nature of
hazards
of
understood.
radiation
However,
exposure
the
are
still
recognition of
the
radiotoxins is the basis of any social determination
of acceptable exposure levels and risk assessment.
Radioactivity:
All
matter is composed of atoms.
the number of neutrons and protrons
an atom has
an
optimal
stability
These atoms differ
in their
nuclei.
a ratio of protrons to neutrons that
range,
the atom is unstable;
When
is outside of
the atom
by ejecting radioactive emissions that
achieves
carry
away
excess
energy.
(alpha
particles composed of two neutrons and two protons
These
emissions can be subatomic
particles
beta particles composed of an electron and a massless
no)
or pure energy
gamma
rays
that
(gamma or x-rays.
in substance and effect;
X-rays are
the
or
neutri-
identical
the only difference
x-rays are man-made while gamma rays occur
Through these emissions,
in
to
is
naturally.).
radioactive atom eventually
de-
cays into a stable, non-radioactive element.
Radioactivity is a property of matter.
Unlike many other
chemical hazards, radioactive substances cannot be effectively
neutralized
however,
is
with
current
decay with time.
radioactive half-life:
sample
of
vity.
Unfortunately,
loses
technology.
The measure of
to lose half of
does not
it takes for
a
its radioacti-
imply that
all of its radioactivity in two half-lives;
5
does,
this rate of decay
the amount of time
radioactive material
this
Radioactivity
the
sample
during one
half life,
half of any remaining radioactivity is lost.
The half-lives of radionuclides vary from a fraction of a
second to millions of years.
clides
include
Some of the most common radionu-
tritium with a half-life of
thirteen
years,
Plutonium-239 with a half-life of 24,000 years, and Iodine-125
with a half life of 60.2 days.
There are
rads, and
rems.
radiation
second.
that
three units used to measure radiation:
The curie is an expression of the quantity of
in
terms
One
curie
of the number of atoms
that
decay
is that quantity of radioactive
decays such that
cond.
curies,
per
material
37-billion atoms disintegrate
per
se-
This is equivalent to the radioactivity in one gram of
pure radium.
In addition to this source-based definition,
"rems"
an
are used
object.
ionizing
from
a
factor,
that
Rads measure the amount of energy absorbed
and rems
radiation.
The
from
(roentgen
man) measure the amount of damage to human
dose of ionizing
calculated
and
to measure the amount of radiation received by
radiation per gram of material,
equivalent
"rads"
tissue
rem measurement
by multiplying the radiation dosage in rads
by
is
a
the RBE (relative biological effectiveness constant),
adjusts
for
the
biological
particular type of radiation.
emitted
by
by
the
10,
result
in ten times as
ray of equivalent energy.
As used colloquially,
radiation
caused
The RBE is based on gamma rays;
and alpha particles, with an RBE of
much exposure as a gamma
damage
"radiation" refers to the ionizing
x-ray machines and
6
nuclear
reactors.
ions
can
with
combining
interfere with normal
biological
creating
tissue,
functions:
chemical
abnormal
form
chemicals to
other
atoms,
When present in living
ions.
charged
electrically
these
of
radiation knocks electrons out
Ionizing
complexes, destroying cell structures, and fragmenting DNA.
In general,
ionizing radiation can have two effects: cell
If enough cells die,
destruction and mutation.
are usually required to kill
human being.
fatal,
but below 200 rems, the
children
Small
this number of cells
A single dose above 1000 rems
adult
cent.
radia-
Unless carefully targeted, large amounts of
will die.
tion
organism
an
and
survival rate
fetuses
are
is
in
an
always
is almost 100 per
more
considerably
6
vulnerable.
Cell mutation can manifest
ductive
cells
offspring;
are damaged,
and
cerous growths.
damaged
itself
in two ways.
If repro-
mutations will be passed
on
somatic cells may develop into
In this context,
it
can-
is important to note that
radiation effects may appear only years after exposure.
delays
of
As
varying
Alpha
weight,
making
20 years are not uncommon,
evaluation of
to
Time
diagnosis
and
radiation impacts particularly difficult.
external hazards,
abilities
to
different
types of radiation
penetrate tissues
particles are densely ionizing;
they cannot penetrate skin.
and
damage
but because
In contrast,
of
have
cells.
their
gamma rays
can travel long distances and still maintain sufficient energy
to
The penetration ability of
seriously damage cells.
particles is between these two extremes.
7
beta
In
addition
external
position,
inhaled.
radioactive
Radioactive
continuously
time.
to their ability to damage tissue
damage
sources may be
from
an
ingested
or
particles lodged within the body
surrounding tissue for long
periods
will
of
Ironically, the superior penetration abilities of gamma
rays make
it
less destructive
in this context;
less damage is
inflicted--albeit to a greater volume of tissue.
Finally,
other
radioactive
elements,
Because of
tive
Moreover,
non-radioactive isotopes
pathways for
within living tissue are complex
and
living organisms will tend to concentrate
isotopes
Man's
just as their
this quality, the biochemical
isotopes
tive
isotopes are able to combine
position
especially
far above their presence in
at
the
susceptible
end
to
of the
this
food
to the concentration of this isotope
effects
of
low-level
ionizing
chemical
has led
radiation
Laureate Dr.
of
him
in human bones and milk.
In
dangers
myriad.
makes
for example,
within the "apolitical" scientific
Nobel
radioac-
radioac-
The
disputed--even
1979,
can.
environment.
chain
phenomenon.
similarity of calcium and Strontium-90,
The
the
with
Rosalyn
community.
S. Yalow argued
radiation have been exaggerated
by
are
the
that the
various
media:
It
would be most unfortunate if laws,
regulations,
and
public
policies for our country were determined
by
the
mass hysteria secondary to the fictions,
fantasies,
and
philosophies
of the Fondas.
It is time for cool
heads
and the wisdom of proven facts to determine policy.7
Dr.
Yalow,
however,
based this conclusion on an analysis of
8
the
benefits and risks of the use of radioisotopes
and
research facilities.
disclaimer that
no
in medical
She prefaced her remark
with
the
"No one can state with certainty that there is
risk."
The
damage and diseases caused by radiation exposure are
8
identical
to
burns
indistinguishable from burns caused
are
ailments caused by other
radiation-induced
radioactivity.
background
any
mate,
In
Radiation
by
heat;
and
identical to cancer not caused by
addition,
radiation,
specific
(except
cancer is
factors.
because of
naturally
present
it is
impossible to determine whether
injury or cancer
is caused by man-made radiation
in cases of massive radiation doses).
We can
esti-
however, an aggregate number of additional cancers that
will be produced by an increase
fore,
in radiation exposure.
There-
we can examine the effects of low-level radiation expo-
sure--but only statistically.
The
on
disagreement within the scientific community centers
the difficulty of extrapolating the effects
exposure from the study of the
of
low-level
few cases when populations were
9
exposed
to
massive
doses
of
radiation
bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
during
atomic
bomb tests,
large
quantities
faces,
for example.
of
victims
the
American soldiers exposed
and British workers who
radium while
of
painting
ingested
luminous
watch
Two basic hypotheses are proposed to evaluate the effects
of
low-doses of radiation.
radiation
dose and
The linear model
assumes that the
incidence of radiation-induced cancer
9
are
directly
sumes
proportional;
that
while the linear-quadratic model
the risk of cancer decreases at
linear rate as dosage falls.
Sciences
tion,
greater
Report on the Biological Effects of Ionizing
while
the
than
In the 1980 National Academy of
the linear-quadratic model was adopted
risk,
a
as-
linear model was used
to
Radia-
for excess cancer
estimate
genetic
10
effects.
The N.A.S. report did acknowledge that significant
uncertainty
did
exist
in the predictions
of
low-dose
ef11
fects.
Recent studies of Nagasaki survivors strongly
support
the
12
linear
model and
its higher estimates
for
cancer
risk.
(It
is
important to note that the controversy has focused
on cancer
risk;
possible
genetic damage--despite the potentially greater
pacts.
Cancer
and there has been little public conflict over
is
the most feared disease
polarizing any discussion;
ties"--explicit
in
our
while the lack of human
physical evidence of
damaging
im-
society,
"monstrosi-
mutation--has
decreased concern over potential long-term genetic effects.)
The resolution of the modelling conflict,
not
however, would
solve the basic need to socially evaluate radiation
sure risks.
While a finding of "no-risk" would give radioac-
tivity a clear field,
risk level.
tion
that
expo-
the current debate centers on
issues of
Moreover, studies indicate that cumulative radia-
dosage is the significant measure--not single doses--and
there
is no threshhold or
safe level
for
radiation
expo-
13
sure.
The fact that only statistical
10
assessments are
pos-
sible
tends
to depersonalize the health risks;
makes the economic evaluations painfully explicit.
but
it
Any deci-
sion on an acceptable level must explicitly address the
of
the value of a human life.
11
also
issue
Types of Radioactive Waste:
The
several
current system for classifying nuclear
wastes
criteria to distinguish between categories:
uses
concentra-
tion of radioactive material, the source of the waste, and the
presence
of certain radioisotopes.
practical
meaning,
level waste,
mill
Although only four
have
five broad waste categories exist:
spent fuel,
high-
transuranic waste uranium mine
and
tailings, and low-level waste.
High
streams
fuel.
the
level
that
wastes are officially defined as
result from the
In April,
reprocessing of
and
spent
1977, however, President Carter,
political and technological hazards of
production
the
transport--especially
reactor
recognizing
routine
the
waste
plutonium
possibility
of
nuclear
reprocessing
of
As a
of
theft--indefinitely deferred commercial
14
spent fuel and the recycling of plutonium.
this decision,
level
waste.
spent fuel has come to be considered
High-level
high-intensity,
result
high-
wastes are generally liquids
penetrating
radioactivity.
These
with
liquids
usually contain hundreds to thousands of curies per gallon;
solidified
tion
into sludge,
saltcake,
or calcine, the concentra-
of radioactivity is much higher.
High level waste also
generates appreciable heat and must be handled
1980,
approximately
2,550
if
remotely.
cubic meters of high-level
15
By
waste
were being generated annually.
Transuranium-contaminated
more
wastes are
wastes
containing
that 10 nano-curies of transuranic nuclides per gram
material.
These
wastes
are produced by the bombardment
12
of
of
uranium and uranium products within reactors during spent fuel
reprocessing
and
production).
high-level
the
fabrication of plutonium
Although
waste,
far less
half-life of
pates
the
transuranic waste annually through the year
excavation
tailings
processing of uranium
contain
materials,
example, has
cubic
meters
16
2000.
mine and mill tailings are produced
and
they
half-lives.
only
naturally
ore.
through
Although
occurring
mine
tailings
of
the
these
radioactive
are generated in huge volumes and have
Moreover,
of
The federal government antici-
generation of approximately 529
Uranium
than
lifetimes
Plutonium-239, for
24,000 years.
weapons
radioactive
many transuranic wastes have
thousands of years or longer.
a
intensely
(for
entered
the
long
public
consciousness when it was discovered that they were being used
to
make
cement for home and school
Wyoming, and Utah.
Over
foundations in
Colorado,
four million cubic meters of tailings
17
are generated annually.
Low-level waste
into
any
standard
per
is defined as any waste that does not fit
of the preceding categories.
is a limit of
gram--the
numerical
dividing line between classification
decontamination
elements
as
low-
Low-level wastes include rinsing
fluids,
protective
radioactive
fluids and carcasses from medical
tests.
the past,
In
only
10 nanocuries of transuranic
level or transuranic waste.
and
The
clothing,
and
much material discarded
waste was simply suspected of being radioactive.
as
and
biological
low-level
As disposal
prices have risen, however, this practice has been dying out.
13
Unlike the waste
generated
in
almost
materials.
all
Generators
universities,
and
in other categories,
activities
include
wastes
generally
activity per cubic
tion
involving
nuclear
the federal
90,000
plants;
industrial
government.
average less than one
foot of material,
in radiotoxicity.
approximately
and
Moreover,
cubic
is
radioactive
power
laboratories, and hospitals; general
nuclear fabrication plants;
Low-level
low-level waste
curie
of
but there is wide variawaste values
meters of
are
huge--
commercial
low-level
18
waste and 45,000 cubic meters of defense waste annually.
Of
waste
the various radioactive waste
does
not
health threat.
are huge; and
categories,
necessarily pose the
However,
most
substances
Finally,
cial.
waste
disposal
These
public
the activities that generate low-level waste are
Moreover, most low-level
wastes are generated by civilian activities;
the
critical
low-level radioactive waste volumes
distributed throughout the country.
of
low-level
would
not
threaten
of low-level waste
and de-regulation
national
is private and
security.
commer-
institutional characteristics have made low-level
the center of the current debate.
14
CHAPTER 2
The
History of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Regulation in
United States, 1940's through 1980:
Significant
the
low-level radioactive waste generation began
in the United States during the development of the Atomic Bomb
in the 1940's.
The biological effects of ionizing
were
poorly
understood during this period;
push
toward
development
of the Bomb left
criticisms of disposal technology.
with
the
left
disposal
These
intense secrecy surrounding
scientists
coveries,
exclusively
consumed
and
in
the
little
frantic
room
for
combined
the Manhattan
Project,
hands
of
generators--
by their single-minded pursuit
administrators
radioactive
the
factors,
of
dis-
and support staff almost
com-
pletely ignorant of potential hazard.
level
and
radiation
As a result, many low-
waste disposal sites associated
with
the
19
Manhattan
Project
government
are
no longer known
has
asked for assistance
20
disposal
sites.
In 1975,
Project
contaminated
garbage
was
found
21
New Mexico motel.
Alamos,
At
the
end
of WW II,
;
in
and
the
locating
a cache
Manhattan
of
in a parking lot
with the passage of
plutonium
of
moted
the
control of nuclear technology,
development
of peaceful
uses
a
the
Energy Acts and the establishment of a tradition of
civilian
federal
Atomic
(nominal)
federal policy
of
Los
atomic
pro-
energy.
President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program supported and
subsidized
and
the development of atomic power plant
technology,
the spread of radioisotope use in biological research and
15
22
medical treatment.
began
in
1936
administered
The medical
uses of radioactive
when John Lawrence
and
the
isotopes
Berkeley
Group
Phosphorus-32 to a patient suffering from leuke-
23
24
mia.
The
X-rays
Atomic
medicine
had been used
Age,
however,
therapeutically
brought new prestige
and made radioisotopes,
check
Atomic
by
encouraged
"atomic
and
in
general
intended to capture
much as the atomic bomb had.
energy
was
funded
projects
systems
trash
Atomic
Peter
a
Metzger
the public
(flying reactors which
missile
also
called
imagination,
problem",
the use of
blank
favor,
In the post-War period,
investigated
in their exhaust),
The
political
a "solution in search of a
for aircraft
the
provided with
the development of what H.
gadgets"
nuclear
to U.S. scientists.
Energy Commission,
Congress
1896.
to
distributed by
Energy Commission, easily available
(The
since
atomic
and
atomic
well-
propulsion
spit-out
atomic
25
systems, and submarines.)
post-War period also
saw the initiation of the first
26
detailed research into the biological effects of
radiation.
During wartime, biomedical research was considered a necessary
but
definitely
ancillary activity.
limited to the level
safety.
The
volumes
became
Biological
research
was
necessary to protect personnel health and
"Atoms for
Peace" program implied
large
and the wide disseminiation of radionuclides;
clear that insufficient biological data was
waste
and it
available
27
to design programs to protect workers and the public.
From
important
the
perspective of national
regulatory
defense,
problems accompanied the
16
other
diffusion
more
of
this new technology outside of defense sectors;
tracking
system was developed to control
radioactive
for
materials--even
medical
Although
use
the distribution
radioisotopes intended
and freely distributed
a side-effect was
monitoring
tion--rationalized
before
the
the
fact
materials
that
requires
reactor,
nuclear
of radioactive substance use and
and
largely
self-policed
the production
a
cyclotron
or
large
and
of
visible
by
of
only
28
war.
to establish a tradition
incontrovertible demands of national security.
with
strict
developed primarily as a measure to prevent
proliferation,
careful
the
and a
of
genera-
the
then
This, combined
radioactive
source
superstructure--a
mining operation--provided
a
strong
regulatory base from which waste management could draw.
In
addition
nuclear
to its role
in promoting civilian
uses
of
energy,
disposal of
the AEC was exclusively responsible for
the
29
radioactive waste.
However, despite the careful
regulation
of radioactive materials and a growing recognition
of
health dangers,
attention
to
the Atomic Energy Commission paid
the disposal of
radioactive
publication A Nuclear Waste Primer,
noted
that
while
the
wastes.
1950's and 60's,
In
its
the League of Women Voters
federal government spent
produce nuclear weapons and commercialize nuclear
the
little
billions
to
power during
it spent only $300 million on
research
30
into
disposal
estimated
cent
techniques.
Senator Frank Church
of
that the AEC spent less than one tenth of one
of
its budget on the development or analysis
31
technology.
17
of
Idaho
perwaste
Recognizing
convenient,
the
federal government's
inexpensive,
solutions, the League of
32
policy as "benign neglect."
While
little damage has been done by past
loss
of
"benign"
Atomic
and
seems
confidence
uncooperative
tions
for
failures.
in
the
H.
(beyond the
government),
the
In his
book
attitudes of AEC officials toward
accusations
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
congressional watchdogs,
term
The
Peter Metzger chronicled the hostile
more effective disposal and
The
failures
unnecessarily charitable.
Establishment,
for
short-term
Women Voters characterized U.S.
public
predilection
were no better.
suggesof
the
Criticisms
past
AEC's
from the
National Academy of Sciences, state agencies, and the EPA were
33
routinely ridiculed or ignored.
A basic unwillingness to admit past errors was
because
compounded
the prestige of atomic energy--protected by technical
complexity,
national
security dogma,
and national pride
in
American science and technology--gave the A.E.C. and the Joint
Committee the power to
ignore criticisms.
More fundamentally, in the Union of Concerned Scientists'
Radioactive Waste,
Ronnie D.
contradictions
predictable failures of an agency
and
Lipshutz pointed out the
basic
charged
34
with both the promotion and the regulation of atomic energy.
While
the suggestion that the
federal government should 'only
regulate--not promote' technology
the
AEC's conflicting
were ignored.
The AEC
is extreme and
imperatives ensured
ahistorical,
that safety
issues
is not the only group to blame.
Scien-
tists and administrators interested
18
in promoting a new techno-
logy
will
always
dangerous
minimize potential hazards;
only because
the
AEC
there was no agency or group to
was
check
their excesses.
1940's and 1950's,
During the
responsible
the federal government was
radioactive waste.
for all
buried
in shallow pits or packed
sea.
Between 1946 and 1959,
Low-level waste
in steel drums and dumped
at
thousands of containers of low-
level waste were discarded at ocean waste dumps
lon
was
off the Faral-
Islands near San Francisco, off the Delaware coast, and
Boston harbor.
The U.S. stopped
in
the
1960,
and
issuing ocean dumping permits
last legal ocean dump was made
Current studies estimate that approximately 25%
are
leaking.
threat,
Although
they
illustrate
in
1970.
of these drums
they probably pose no
a history of
in
federal
pubic
health
deferral
and
35
haphazard planning in radioactive waste management.
In 1959,
allow
the Atomic Energy Acts of
states
to assume control of certain AEC licensing
regulatory functions.
was
enacted
1954 were amended
to
interest
to clarify the respective
in
atomic
responsibilities
of the states.. .and to provide a statutory means by which
AEC
could
and
According to the amendment, the program
"recognize the states'
energy activities,
to
relinquish to the states
the
(a) part of its
regulatory
the Agreement State Program,
the states
36
authority..."
had
no
wastes,
Under
authority over nuclear
exports
material
amendment,
large
and
imports,
reactors,
and quantities of
enough to sustain chain
however,
defense
reaction.
generated
fissionable
The
1959
did give states authority over byproduct
19
material
ties
(radioisotopes),
of
source material,
special nuclear material.
materials,
such as radium;
duced radioactive material.
the
state
could
naturally
and
occuring
accelerator-pro-
safety,
its agreement with the state.
states had entered
already
In the event of mismanagement by
and a threat to public health and
terminate
quanti-
All states were
responsible for the regulation of x-rays;
radioactive
and small
the
By
AEC
1980,
26
into the Agreement State program.
In 1962, as part of its commercialization policy, the AEC
licensed the
first non-federally controlled burial
facilities
36a
for
commercial,
privately-run
Flats,
low-level
disposal
Kentucky,
Hanford,
1967;
and Barnwell,
waste
Nevada,
Washington
in 1965;
Sheffield,
South Carolina in 1971.
industry,
for
site.
Kentucky
example;
hoped
and Washington,
to
These
and
Maxey
New York
in
Illinois in
Various reasons
for each state's willingness to host a
disposal
Carolina
sites in Beatty,
waste.
were followed by West Valley,
1963;
were given
radioactive
radioactive
attract
Nevada,
already hosted large government nuclear
nuclear
and
South
research and
37
disposal
facilities.
This
regional
collection of disposal sites provided a
distribution,
much to be desired.
reasonable
but the disposal technology used left
In general, shallow land burial
involved
packing the waste in steel drums and cardboard boxes,
dumping
38
these containers into a trench, and covering them with dirt.
It
lose
was generally accepted that the containers
their
integrity--often within a few
20
would
years.
rapidly
Impermea-
bility
and
"ionic
the
soil
were
38a
expected
to
Problems
began in
covered
prevent underground
that
off-site,
shaken.
migration.
had migrated off
the
Maxey
disFlats,
Although only small amounts had been detected
previous
In
radionuclide
1972 when state and EPA investigators
radiation
Kentucky site.
pound
retention properties" of
1976,
assumptions
of trench
containment
were
the state added a 10 cent surtax on
each
of waste disposed at Maxey Flats,
effectively
pricing
39
the site out of the market.
In 1975,
Maxey Flats closed
of
soil
the
with
seepage.
rainwater
The trenches acted
and
the
Ironically, the silty, imper-
for which the site had been chosen was the
detected
filling
1977.
seepage was discovered at some trenches of
West Valley disposal facility.
meable
in
eventually
as
cause
bathtubs,
over-flowing.
The
facility is now closed, and the trenches are
routinely pumped.
This pumping will be required indefinitely,
and the perpetual
40
care
fund is woefully inadequate to
In
1978,
cover this expense.
Sheffield closed when the last licensed
trench
was filled and state residents refused to permit expansion
the
facility.
discovery
of
The
U.S.
Geological Survey noted
a previously unknown
that
of
the
layer of sand on the
site
The detection of radioactive leaks and the disposal
site
41
may have prompted the refusal.
closings
control
the
were
facilitated
by the AEC's
loss
over the disposal process during the
of
1970's.
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975,
partment
of
Transportation adopted packaging
21
exclusive
and
Under
the
De-
transport
regulations
for
radioactive materials.
Later,
routing regula-
42
tions were added to
the
EPA,
this list of DOT controls.
established
reorganization
plan,
In addition,
by President Nixon under a
government
was granted broad responsibilities
establishing general environmental
for
standards--including radia-
43
tion exposure
Most
the
levels.
important,
AEC had dealt
the
Commission
governmental
in 1974,
in the face of criticisms that
inadequately with waste disposal
had
subverted
the
checks and balances,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
was transfered
of
Energy
was
that
system
of
the AEC was superseded
by
AEC regulatory
to this new organization,
(then the
charged
traditional
and
authority
while the Department
Energy Resource and Development
with the promotion and
development
Agency)
of
nuclear
power.
By
1979,
only three of the six existing commercial dis-
posal sites were accepting waste.
Northeast
to
Transport costs soared for
and Midwest generators forced
to
ship their
wastes
the remaining sites in Hanford, Washington; Beatty, Nevada;
and Barnwell, South Carolina.
More important,
sure
against dumping and
loped
in the states still accepting waste.
increasing
South Carolina governor,
the
promise of
political pres-
resident discontent deve-
Richard
Riley,
campaigned with
reforms in South Carolina's radioactive
waste
44
policies.
their
Washington voters became increasingly
vocal
criticisms of the existing national waste disposal
tuation.
In 1980,
in
si-
Washington's Governor Ray opposed a state
22
referendum
to ban wastes from out-of-state generators.
where nuclear waste figured largely,
campaign
election.
The
referendum
passed,
lost
Ray
but was
In a
later
the
declared
44a
unconstitutional.
This
political
"states'-rights
climate
movement,"
created
initiated
a
radioactive
in
1979
waste
by
South
45
In May of 1979, Riley turned away
Carolina's Richard Riley.
tankers full of the first wastes from the Three-Mile
two truck
Island
clean-up.
This
unconstitutional) move,
did
was an unprecedented
(and
but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
not confront Riley.
It was later discovered
license.
extending
liquids
This
an
Next,
Riley
revised
had been solidified in an
action
these
disposal
Barnwell's
license,
existing ban on liquid wastes to
that
that
S.C.
wastes violated the standards of the Barnwell,
site
possibly
include
absorbing
effectively excluded all medical
even
material.
and
biological
research wastes.
1979, Riley met with Governor Ray of Washington
In July,
state and Governor
List of Nevada.
ban any violator of laws,
They agreed to
"mutually
rules or regulations concerning the
packaging and/or transporting of low-level nuclear wastes"; to
ask
collectively
Department
of
for better enforcement by the NRC
Transportation;
and to
press for
and
reforms
the
in
46
national
In
low-level radioactive waste policies.
the fall
of 1979,
Governor Riley announced that
the Barnwell site was
to be
revised
again--this
license
of
time
decrease the waste volume accepted at the site by
to
23
the
50
per
cent
over the next two years.
accompanied
by
a
price
Nuclear's
(the
facility)
profits,
private
volume
increase that would
firm
was
This
an
that
maintain
operated
the
effective statement
intention to make Barnwell a regional disposal
"the
path of
least
challenge
delicacy
of
the
price
47
action.
situation
closings
Recognizing
their position in South Carolina
increase),
This
Riley.
of
both
Chem-Nuclear did not
was
compounded
Beatty and
Hanford
by
Despite
the
the NRC
did
the
political
(and recognizing
protest
the
because
Riley's
simultaneous
of
violations and the detection of radiation leaks.
Radwaste,
Riley's
site instead of
resistance" for the nation.
Governor
Chem-
Barnwell
of
questionable constitutionality of this revision,
not
reduction,
packaging
In his book
Fred Shapiro noted that violations of the magnitude
justifying
closure
were not unusual and previously had
been
48
ignored
;
legally
valid.
but
the decision to close the disposal sites
While their collective decision
tacit agreement that sloppiness
ignored,
it
radioactivity
Canal
reflected
was
violated
a
in radwaste disposal should be
changing
public
attitudes
and toxic wastes in post Three-Mile
toward
Island/Love
America.
The resulting situation left medical
with no disposal sites in the U.S.
hazard
accumulated
in hospitals and
and biological waste
As barrels of radioactive
labs,
legislators
were
bombarded with letters and pleas from prestigious universities
and hospitals.
By November
1979, these pleas were given a new
24
urgency
when hospitals threatened to discontinue all
nuclear
49
services by the end of the year.
By singling out medical waste--by accident or design--the
three
governors
ally:
the
biological
harmful
had gained a powerful and
medical
profession.
The
very
wastes
prestigious
generated
research and medical applications tend to be
than
other
low-level radioactive
waste
notable exception of radioactive Iodine, a well
gen that collects
in the
thyroid).
by
less
(with
the
known carcino-
Moreover, the benefits of
the
use of radioisotopes in medicine are clear and
Few
people
would suggest that the problem of
dramatic.
medical
waste
generation should be solved by discontinuing nuclear services.
In
addition,
by
radioactivity,
the
emphasizing
crisis
the
medical
applications
of
altered the public perception
of
what "nuclear waste" was all about.
Finally,
the tone of pleas from medical
did not condemn the three governors.
Instead,
representatives
they advocated
the
development of a comprehensive waste policy for the
U.S.
50
and/or the de-regulation of the bulk of medical wastes.
By
the
end
of 1979,
the low-level
radioactive
waste
crisis was resolved by the warning that a continued resistance
by
the three governors would
result
in federal
intervention.
According to Fred Shapiro:
The NRC
prepare
let it be known that it had called on the DOE
a contingency plan for opening some of its
to
low-
level sites for commercial waste.
Not entirely by coincidence,
the three DOE sites selected were Hanford,
the
Nevada Test Site and the Savannah River Plant, which just
happen to adjoin, or in the case of Hanford, contain, the
three commercial sites at issue.51
25
Despite this apparent defeat,
in
restructuring the debate on low-level waste management
the U.S.
ment
As
was
tion.
of
the three governors did succeed
late as 1978,
low-level radioactive waste manage-
assumed to be a federal
In 1978,
Nuclear
government
Management recommended
take control of all
disposal,
responsibility--by
defini-
the Department of Energy Task Force for
Waste
"acquiring
in
that
the
Review
federal
low-level waste mangement
ownership and control" of all
and
existing
52
disposal
sites."
In another 1979
study,
the
President's
Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management concurred
with
this
plan,
urging a regional distribution of
disposal
53
facilities.
State
The
Planning
After
IRG also
recommended the formation of
Commission on Radioactive
1979, however, states'
recommendations
of
Waste
hearings before the Committee on Science and
Joseph
Hendrie,
Management.
rights figured prominently in
every major policy study.
chairman of the
NRC,
noted
the
In
the
the
1979
Technology,
Dr.
that his strategy
for low-level waste disposal had undergone a radical transformation:
"There
was
a while a year or two ago,
perhaps
before,
when
I
think I would have told you that I
thought
the
Federal Government should step in and take over the
low-
level waste disposal responsibilities across the country.
I
have changed
could
my mind on it.
do a perfectly good job.
out
there;
States."55
the
stuff
This was not a minor change.
lity
for the waste
levels of the NRC.
for
Dr.
It
seems to me the
States
The responsibility lies
generated
widely
The idea of "state
in
all
the
responsibi-
it generates" was new--especially at
high
It is difficult to pinpoint the motivation
Hendrie's change of heart,
26
although a later
remark
suggests
frustration with growing state and citizen criticism
of NRC policies:
"I think it would do them (the States) a lot of good
out
there
to
deal with these wastes and understand that
it
isn't
the
end of the world,
and that
there
are
very
reasonable
things
that can be done rather
simply with
this material to protect it.
I think it would be a very
useful way of dealing with it."56
While
bring
the
national
problem,
the
artificially generated "Crisis of
attention to the low-level radioactive
reflect
did
waste
federal government was powerful enough to
with any complaints or complainers.
simply
1979"
the
deal
The post-1979 shift
ongoing history of federal
may
deferral
waste management (or the recognition that the NRC,
which
in
did
57
not
even mann a 24-hour crisis hotline in 1980
was singu-
,
larly unequipped to undertake the administrative challenge
effective low-level
In
radioactive waste disposal.
a February 12,
1980 message to
Congress,
Carter directed the Department of Energy "to
states,
other government agencies,
zations,
establish
and
the
of
public,
regional
President
work jointly with
industry and other organi-
in developing national
disposal sites for
commerical
plans
to
low-level
58
waste."
In
August of 1980,
ment Program,
through
The National
Low-Level Waste Manage-
its prime contractor
EG&G Idaho,
Inc.,
published a strategic planning documnet entitled Managing
Level
Radioactive Wastes:
A Proposed Approach.
A task force
representing industry
(generators and site operators),
and state officials,
academics,
27
Low-
federal
and private consultants
was
formed to help develop the strategy.
The study anticipated a crisis in low-level waste manageby
ment
when waste generation would
the mid-1980's,
exceed
59
The
disposal capacity.
existing
were based on several
strategy
recommendations
premises, including the assumptions that
disposal is technically feasible and that disposal faci-
safe
60
lities must be regionally distributed.
Task
a
force recommendations centered on the development of
classification system based on
waste
total
(both
hazard
61
chemical
and
radioactive)
require
different disposal
release
would
technologies;
force
and
environmental
be recommended as a safe disposal
"pose no significant hazard to
wastes that
task
Different wastes classes would
.
option
62
the public."
also supported the use of volume reduction
for
The
tech-
63
niques and
interim storage.
Institutionally,
the
report recommended
that state
and
waste
federal governments divide responsibility for low-level
64
States would be responsible for the bulk of
disposal.
while the federal government would dispose of the most
waste,
radioactive material classified as "low-level".
the
the
report,
According to
"High-level waste repositories have been
desig-
65
nated
a
document
Federal responsibility."
was published,
Ironically,
when
this
low-level waste disposal was also
a
"Federal responsibility."
The
the
report supported the use of
siting process;
dered,
and while
incentives to
facilitate
regional compacts were
consi-
no mention of excluding wastes from non-compact states
28
66
was made.
During 1980,
the Congress attempted to develop and pass a
comprehensive waste policy act.
for high-level waste disposal,
on
December 13,
1980,
Unable to agree on
Congress finally passed a bill
that asserted that states are respon-
sible
for disposing of commercial
67
within their borders.
The bill,
Act of
1980,
disposal
waste
the
of
permits states to
low-level wastes
the Low-Level Waste Policy
form regional compacts for the
from non-member states after January
Energy.
1,
1986.
of
Finally,
the preparation of a report by the Department
The DOE report,
define
written to
assist
anticipated disposal capacity
existing commercial
ments of a
generated
of commercial waste and authorizes the exclusion
Act ordered
would
policies
the
needs;
States,
evaluate
sites; compare the transportation require-
regional system to present practices;
the capacity of DOE facilities to provide
commercially generated waste.
29
and evaluate
interim storage
for
CHAPTER 3
The
Low-Level
theoretically
power
Radioactive
transformed
Policy
Act
with a new role:
states
as
radioactive
federal
and
1980
state
After years
regulators found themselves
providing advice and technical assistance to
they
waste
following years,
of
the balance of federal
in low-level radioactive waste mangement.
with exclusive authority,
the
Waste
each
struggled
management
however,
to
plans.
develop
The
low-level
events
of
the
showed that the NRC was unable
to
function effectively in this new capacity.
Federal Involvement in Low-Level Waste Management after
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980:
Federal
management
involvement
did
not
relinquished
waste
disposal,
authority.
tion
that
low-level
end with the the
Waste Policy Act of 1980.
NRC
in
lost
Low-Level
very
for
low-level
little
of
Act,
the
radioactive
its
regulatory
Even under the Agreement State Program--the posimaximizes
a state's
regulatory
authority--state
regulations must be compatible with NRC rules.
the NRC,
waste
Radioactive
With the passage of the
responsibility
but
radioactive
As
set out by
"compatability" implies:
1.
States must have regulations essentially identical to
10 CFR Part 19, Part 20 (radiation dose standards and
effluent
limits) and those required
by
UMTRCA,
as
2.
States
implemented by Part 40.
should adopt other regulations to maintain
a
"high degree of uniformity with NRC regulations."67
While
this situation permits some freedom to tailor rules
local
needs,
of
to
the NRC regulations effectively limit the range
possible strategies
that a state may employ.
30
A
complete
demand-based
the
only
radioactive waste disposal
policy action is creation of
disposal),
where
system for
for example,
incentives
would be unthinkable
precise environmental
(in
which
for
safe
in this context
standards must be met and
records
must be kept.
Although
most
states
Program is successful,
feel
that
the
Agreement
in a 1982 National Governors'
State
Council
report,
many
criteria
sometimes directs state resources towards those areas
added
that "the
necessity of meeting NRC review
in which they will be judged by NRC and away from what
states
67a
consider
In
more pressing
problems."
early
the Nuclear Regulatory
1981,
regulated
certain
According
to
Commission
concentrations of tritium
the current regulations,
Title
and
10,
de-
Carbon-14.
Chapter
1,
20.306:
Any
licensee
may dispose of
the
following
licensed
material without regard to its radioactivity:
(a)
0.05 microcuries or less of hydrogen-3 or
carbon-
14,
per
gram of medium,
used for liquid
scintillation
counting; and
(b)
0.05 microcuries or less of hydrogen-3 or
carbon14, per gram of animal tissue averaged over the weight of
the entire animal....68
The
scintillation fluid and contaminated animal carcasses de-
regulated
by
this
change accounted for 43
and
9
percent,
69
respectively, of all
Amy
Goldsmith
institutional wastes
of the Massachusetts
(by volume).
Nuclear
Referendum
Committee
argues that any increase in
into
atmosphere or sanitary sewer system should
posed.
the
70
Similarly,
radioactive
emissions
be
op-
in the Spring 1982 issue of Business and
31
Society Review,
Lorna Salzman attacked the NRC de-classifica-
tion program, accusing the government and industry of ignoring
public
health
particularly
in an effort to minimize disposal costs.
dramatic metaphor,
she compared the effects
this de-classification program to
and
slowly raising
Doctors
Technology
however,
the temperature,
testifying
hearings
on
In a
placing a frog
boiling
in cold water
71
to death.
it
in the 1979 Committee on Science
Low-Level
of
Radioactive
Waste
and
Burial,
emphasized the relative harmlessness of the radioac-
tive material used in biological research.
Nobel
laureate Dr.
Rosalyn Yalow testified:
We
must
make
distinctions among bombs
and
fallout,
nuclear
reactors and disposal of their wastes,
and
the
safe
handling
and waste problems
associated
with
the
medical uses of radioisotopes.
It is only the last which
I will consider today....The problem of radioactive waste
disposal
from
hospitals
and medical centers is
not
a
problem.
To quote a very distinguished former President,
"all we really have to fear is fear itself."72
Dr.
Yalow
went
on to note that the
naturally present
the
of
quantity
of
Carbon-14
in the "non-radioactive" garbage produced by
VA Hospital where she worked was comparable to the amount
that radioisotope present in the radioactive waste produced
73
by
the hospital nuclear services.
0.1
microcuries
of Carbon-14 are naturally present
74
living human being.
tions
of
regulated
She also commented
It should be noted that the
Carbon-14
differ
by
four
or
five
any
concentra-
in living human tissue and the
substances
in
that
now
de-
orders
of
magnitude.
Despite
the
debate,
the
it
predilection for anecdote on both sides
is
important
32
to
recognize
that
of
the
Massachusetts medical
than
and
institutional community shipped less
20 curies annually of
liquid
scintillation
radioactive animal
fluid
carcasses
in the two years before
and
the
de-
75
classification
program
began.
Massachusetts generators
76
1979.
Given that the de-
shipped a little over 20 curies in
classified material
is the least radioactive waste this
lation
an
generates,
environmental
estimate
release
insignificant,
seems
of 8
generous.
While
this
is
Moreover,
of
not
of
since radioac-
Hydrogen and Carbon behave just as their non-radioactive
isotopes,
no
excessive
elements should appear
concentration of
in human organs.
these
environmentalists
oppose
what
they perceive
77
decision to de-classify for convenience.
There
radioactive
While the most recent
de-classifications may pose no immediate health
that
curies
it pales next to the hundreds of thousands
curies shipped by industrial users.
tive
additional
popu-
hazard,
as
is general agreement within the medical
the
many
NRC's
community
the chemical hazard posed by scintillation fluid is
more
78
significant
than
studies have shown
radioactive hazard,
form an
its
radiological
Moreover,
that when organic solvents are buried
with
the two may interact in burial trenches to
ionically neutral compound.
contained by the
toxicity.
This compound will not be
ionic retention properties of soil,
and rapid
79
subsurface migration will occur.
It
is
de-classify
places
this
important to note,
however,
that the decision to
the radioactive component of scintillation
liquid under the jurisdiction of
33
the
fluid
hazardous
waste
management system.
technique
for
organic
Moreover,
solvents
incineration techniques will
into
the
is
standard
disposal
incineration.
Standard
release much of the radioactivity
the atmosphere, and any residue will probably have a much
higher radioactive concentration than the original liquid.
During
cation,
they
the comment period for the proposed
a
group of sanitation workers expressed concern that
might
face an increased occupational
radioactive
However,
de-classifi-
wastes
no
hazardous
discharged
inquiry
waste
was
into
made
the
hazard
workers
concentration
radioactivity in the wastes is much more likely.
information
the
80
system.
sewer
regarding
system--where
from
in
the
of
the
No detailed
is available on the effects of the
de-regulation
on the handlers of hazardous waste.
Ironically,
biological
could
the
wastes
de-classification
and
of the
medical
the system of incentives
and
it
creates
produce a viscious circle that would defeat the
purpose
of the regulatory system.
tions,
organic
lated
labs
could
solvent
levels.
exactly
In order to meet minimum concentra-
dilute radioactive hazard
in
sufficient
(or water) to lower concentrations to unreguThe total
the same,
radioactivity of the
however;
and
material,
if volume reduction
is
techno-
logies are used by the hazardous waste system, the result will
be
gas or solid releases that contain all of that
vity--potentially
at
higher concentrations
than
radioactithe
waste
collected.
The NRC regulations specify that an
34
(unenforceable) maxi-
mum
of
flushed
five curies each of Carbon-14 and Hydrogen-3
may be
81
into sanitary sewers
; but there are no limits on the
total amount of
management
radioactivity shunted
system
as
a
result
into
of
the hazardous waste
the
de-classification
program.
There
of
the
is no ongoing NRC study to
investigate the
impacts
interaction of the solvents and radioactivity in
the
hazardous waste stream.
The
NRC program to establish de-minimus
levels
was
ap-
82
proved by the U.S.
and
the National
Task Force on Radioactive Waste
in 1980
;
Low-Level Waste Management Program supported
82a
the development of de-minimus
certain
levels.
De-classification of
concentrations of Technicium-99 and
Sulphur-35
cur-
83
rently is under consideration.
In
June,
Program,
1981,
EG&G
the National
Idaho,
Inc.,
Low-Level Waste Management
published
Managing
Low-Level
Radioactive Wastes: A Technical Analysis.
The report analyzed
the
Managing
seven
issues
from their 1980 report
Radioactive Wastes--A Proposed Approach.
alternative
each
The report presented
solutions to each of several major
alternative
was
accompanied by a
anticipated effects of the scenario.
Low-Level
problems;
description
of
and
the
The analysis considered
Effects on Generators and Consumers, Effects on Transportation
and Disposal
Sites,
Direct Effects on Government, and Effects
on
Occupational
of
the analysis generally supported the recommendations
Exposure and Public Safety.
in the Program's 1980 Proposed Approach.
35
The conclusions
made
The 1980 recommenda-
tion
to
divide
control
between
the
governments was excluded to accommodate
of the
Low-Level
Waste
federal
and
state
the political
reality
Policy Act of 1980.
In the autumn of 1981,
the NRC proposed amendments to 10
CFR 61 to provide for the separation of
low-level wastes
into
84
three categories.
the
classification system includes a recognition of
stability,
Any
Despite the common misinterpretation that
the three-way system considers only radioactivity.
chemical
before
or physical instability is assumed
consideration
amendments
wastes
in the
represented the
classification
Barnwell,
chemical
system
S.C.,
classification
first attempt to
for
low-level
neutralized
system.
standardize
radioactive
had previously barred medical
the
waste.
and bio-research
(because of their chemical hazard and the
between organic solvents and
These
interaction
radioactive materials
previously
85
described
),
attempted
to
and
Hanford,
Washington
had
unsuccessfully
86
However,
no
classification
special
an
exclude wastes from sources in other
unified system for low-level
existed;
and
no
radioactive
provisions
treatment of particular wastes.
were
The
very
in the 1980
NRC defined Class A
low activities.
These wastes need not
meet
stable
is more radioactive and requires a
Class C intruder waste
36
for
(but not
segregated waste as wastes
that will ensure container integrity.
stable waste form.
made
Proposed Approach.
requirements
waste
waste
The new proposal was
effort to move toward the type of system proposed
most highly recommended)
states.
with
stability
Class
B
structurally
is the most active
species
to
that can still be considered
stability requirements,
deeper
burial
trench
that
years
more
be
or
additional barriers be
after closure of the
than 500 milirems.
In addition
Class C waste would require
includes certain
disposed
low-level.
employed
isotopes which,
site,
more
for
any
than
100
could cause an exposure
Finally,
that
of
any mixture of wastes would
of as if it were all of the highest category
in
87
the mixture.
A.
though
Goldsmith criticizes this system as
she
admits
that it does acknowledge
waste is not homogeneous.
she believes,
inadequate,
that
al-
low-level
Not only are the categories broad,
but insufficient instructions are given for the
88
proper treatment of the different types of waste.
Despite
system
Land
these objections,
has been written into
the three-way
the Licensing
Disposal of Radioactive Waste.
disposal--the
technology considered
classification
Requirements
Moreover,
for
shallow land
in this document--is
the
only certified disposal technology.
The
Low-Level Waste
government
waste.
from
However,
regulatory control,
Policy Act of
responsibility
because
for
1980 freed the
low-level
federal
radioactive
the federal government
maintained
the States have been forced to depend
on
the NRC and DOE to provide the guidelines and technical assis-
tance for their disposal and management programs.
tance has been slow and inadequate;
deadline without the resources to
policies.
37
This assis-
and the States face a 1986
formulate relevant
disposal
CHAPTER 4
The Massachusetts response
The
passage
to the L.L.W.P. Act of
of the Low-Level Waste Policy Act
placed Massachusetts in a awkward position.
generator
existed
its
of low-level
nearby.
waste
radioactive waste,
within
1986,
Western states,
the Commonwealth or
both
Although a major
no
disposal
site
in a
nearby
be
state
Unlike Southern or
an existing
facility and
still
within the principle of regional disposal expoused
the
of
Massachusetts could not simply make an agree-
with a state that housed
remain
1980
a new facility had to
with which a compact could be established.
ment
of
For Massachusetts to contine to dispose
after January 1,
built--either
1980:
Low-Level Waste
Policy Act and the
State
by
Planning
Council on Radioactive Waste Management.
Moreover,
state
environmental officials
and
resources
were already committed to the development of a coherent chemical
hazardous waste management system and the
task of writing and testing Chapter
time-consuming
21D, a new hazardous waste
facility siting act.
In
House
ture.
the Spring of 1981,
industrial generators
6877 as an emergency bill to the Massachusetts legislaIntended
to provide a siting mechanism for
radioactive waste disposal facilities,
the
submitted
recently
hazardous
passed
waste
Chapter
21D;
legislation
had
low-level
the bill was based
and large pieces
been
copied
of
on
the
wholesale.
Despite its similarities to the politically successful Chapter
21D,
House
Bill 6877 lacked the political support
38
that
its
model gained
and
through a lengthy process of public participation
input.
Most
important,
many felt
that,
despite
urgency of the low-level radioactive waste problem,
the
was
a
too
important to be dealt with exclusively on
level.
In
Committee
a
on
memo submitted to
Low Level Waste,
the Massachusetts
Committee Member
the
issue
crisis
Oversight
Michael
S.
Baram wrote:
"The
bill is not an emergency measure and should not
be
enacted
as~and
"emergency
law"
as
provided
in
the
preamble.
There is no evidence to support this designation, and it appears to be no more than an effort to sell
the bill on the basis of alleged urgency and to
unjustifiably
secure expedited treatment of the bill and legislative
acceptance of its several questionable
features.
Further.. .emergencies are usually a basis for
dispensing
with
public
notice and opportunity to contest
matters,
etc...."89
House
6877
was withdrawn,
setting
up
Waste.
The Commission,
year
the Special
and Chapter 738 was
Legislative Commission
formed
substituted,
on
at the end of 1981,
authorization and included representatives of
government,
and
the
public.
Low-Level
The Commission
is
had a one
industry,
currently
90
awaiting
re-authorization for a second year.
In August,
1981,
the Coalition of Northeastern Governors
(CONEG) resolved to pursue the formation of a regional compact
to solve
the problem of disposal of low-level waste
in their
states.
necticut,
shire,
Delaware,
New Jersey,
Vermont),
The Coalition,
includes
generating states.
generated
representing 11 states
(Con-
Maine, Maryland, Massachusets, New HampNew York, Pennsylvania, Rhode
six
of
the top twenty
Island, and
low-level
waste
During the period 1979 to 1981, Coalition
39
member
states
generated
one third
of
the
total
national
91
volume.
Although they began work as a single group,
the negotia-
tions
called
for
the
development
of
"a
compact
agree92
ment(s)"
,
acknowledging
that the Coalition
members
might
decide
to
form more than one compact.
provision
meant that the
More
important,
this
formation of a compact was not
con-
tingent on the participation of all Coalition members.
From
limited
In
its
to
inception,
the
Coalition's
the construction of a disposal
a Draft Work Plan dated November 5,
included
a
large
encouragement
of
number
"the
of
generated
in the region" and
ment
commercial low level
of
were
not
site for the region.
1981,
management
reduction
goals
of the
the
Coalition
goals,
including
amounts
of
ensuring "the ecological
waste
manage-
radioactive waste generated
in
93
the
region."
While it is impossible to completely
management and disposal
clearly
encompassed
regional
to
disposal facility.
was
the rhetoric of the Coalition
more than just the speedy
integrate disposal
there
issues,
siting
into radioactive substance
anywhere
in
the
"management site"
the
a
management,
superiority
"management system" over a simple "disposal program".
that
of
In addition to the basic desire
a recognition of the political
interesting
isolate
term "disposal site" does
text of the
Draft
Work
Plan.
of
a
94
It is
not
The
appear
term
is used throughout the document.
The next year saw a series of studies and public informa-
tion/participation
programs.
40
In
October,
1981,
the
Massachusetts Department of Public
Health,
Radiation
Control
Program, obtained U.S. Department of Energy funding to develop
a
low-level radioactive waste management plan for the
The grant
and
a
state.
included provisions for a public information program
"consensual"
interest
groups
planning
process.
process
and
through
which
Massachusetts
stakeholders could participate
The Department of
Center
for Negotiation and Public
group
that
included
various
environmental and public
Public
Policy,
waste
Health
Inc.
in
the
and
the
worked with a
generating
industries,
interest groups, medical and academic
96
institutions, and affected State agencies.
In
October,
1982,
under a subcontract
report
on
Management
cent,
the
Inter/Face Associates,
from EG&G Idaho,
Massachusetts
Survey.
Inc,
working
Inc, completed the final
Low-Level
With a response
Radioactive
rate of almost
Waste
100
per
the survey provided the first comprehensive information
available on Massachusetts' low-level waste generators.
In
November,
planning
the
management
was jarred by the passage of the Nuclear
Initiative
Question Number Three.
included
publicity
editorials
Despite these efforts,
margin.
tions
Both regulatory officials
League of Women Voters opposed Question Three;
well-organized
General
state
radioactive waste
Referendum,
and
1982,
The
in
campaign
Boston
against
and
New
the
referendum
York
newspapers.
Question Three was passed by a 2 to
referendum
requires
both voter
approval
Court certification of certain findings as
for
(1)
and a
the construction and
41
operation
of
1
and
precondiany
new
nuclear
power
plant
facility and/or
low-level
(2) participation in
waste disposal or storage facility and
regional
low-level waste compact.
exemption for a disposal
radioactive
a
The referendum includes an
facility for waste generated "through
97
medical
applications and bio-research."
to Amy Goldsmith of the Massachusetts
According
Nuclear
Referendum Campaign/Committee, the organization that sponsored
referendum,
the
voter
indicated
poll
radioactive waste
Question
of
history
With
non-
with
the
a
low-level
Goldsmith believes that the passage
with
the
radioactive waste management in the U.S.
requirement of a
guarantees public
Three
concern
reflects public dissatisfaction
of low-level
its
public
issue.
Three
a
initiated after
failed to evoke legislative action and
referendum
binding
Three was
Question
state-wide
referendum,
Question
waste
involvement in the radioactive
98
issue.
While this is one valid interpretation,
the
radioactive
waste component of the referendum may have passed only because
it
was
Question
level
linked
to the issue of nuclear power
radioactive waste disposal
have
waste
a
sites.
issue;
based their decision on the
issue,
blow
siting.
Three dealt with both nuclear power plants and
volatile and highly political
may
plant
Reactor siting
lowis
a
and although some voters
low-level
radioactive
many probably cast their "Yes" vote primarily as
against nuclear power.
Because the two
combined in a single referendum,
public sentiment toward either
42
issues
it is difficult to
alone.
were
pinpoint
According
to
Rich Smith of the
Energy
Committee,
the
passage of Question Number Three in Massachusetts damaged
the
Commonwealth's position in then ongoing CONEG negotiations and
currently
threatens ratification of the compact by the
state
99
legislature.
mutual
The
trust
negotiation
relationship was
and the understanding that each state
same chance of eventually housing a disposal
that
at
least superficially
roulette).
based
site
had
the
(a sentiment
resembles the rules
The November referendum and the
of
Russian
roadblocks that
placed before siting a facility in Massachusetts changed
equal
footing.
sent
to
given
it
that
Moreover, now that the CONEG compact has been
the
questionable
on
states
whether
for
legislative
Massachusetts can
the requirement that a state-wide
approval,
enter
it
the
is
compact,
referendum be
passed
before joining.
If
Massachusetts'
participation
unconstitutional, the state must either
to
accept its waste,
or site
a more likely outcome.
its
that
own
guarantees
compact
is
find a compact willing
The latter
is
In the event that Massachusetts sites
facility without a regional compact,
states--the
rulings
the
its own facility.
it will not be permitted to
other
in
Low-Level
it is
possible
exclude wastes generated
Waste
Policy
Act
of
exemption from Price-Anderson interstate
only if a compact with a minimum of three
in
1980
commerce
states
is
established.
In
December
Preliminary
Report
of
1982,
Regional
43
CONEG
completed
Facilities
for
its
Draft
Low-Level
Radioactive
Waste:
An
Overview.
various technologies available for
treatment and disposal.
The
shallow
reduction
land
is
assessed
the
low-level radioactive waste
study examined the economic costs
associated with volume reduction,
and
The report
burial.
interm storage
It should be noted
techniques,
that
not a disposal technology--the same
volume
amount
of
radioactivity is present after compaction or incineration,
and
isolation of the reduced volume is still necessary.
The
study concluded that,
logies increased the
and
while volume reduction techno-
risk of contamination to
increased personnel exposure,
stantially
reduce
the
environment
the techniques could
the demand for disposal space
sub-
within
the
100
region.
More important,
the study concluded that the large fixed
costs associated with shallow land burial disposal sites meant
significant
single
the
economies
regional
of scale.
According to the study,
site designed to
serve all or a
majority
"a
of
region offers the most cost effective disposal option for
per unit costs...Once the capacity of the facility drops below
50%
of the regional waste volume,
cubic
foot costs
increase
101
fairly
steeply...."
Given
that
the
rules
of
membership can be compared with the rules of Russian
the
compact
roulette,
CONEG report confirmed that the gun only had to be
fired
once.
In February 1983,
Health
completed
Management
its
the Massachusetts Department of Public
Proposed Low-Level
Plan for the Commonwealth of
44
Radioactive
Massachusetts.
Waste
The
report
tions
included both a series of general
and
a list of "next steps"
setts waste problem.
to
policy
recommenda-
for managing the
Massachu-
Report recommendations include proposals
study both the health impacts of volume reduction
techno-
logies and the short-term options available to meet the
anti102
cipated
1986
crisis.
The DPH also recommended
that
it
remain
the principal state regulatory agency for
radioactive
materials, while the Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs
should have primary responsibility for development of a siting
103
process.
The DPH suggested the institution of a program to
reduce generation volumes and
recommended that the state
seek
104
Agreement
design
State
and
status.
Finally,
implementation
of
a
the DPH suggested
comprehensive
the
monitoring
105
program throughout the management system.
According to
interim
storage and
radioactive
proposal
of
the
industry
She notes that more precise waste classiimportant concerns of the
Referendum Committee,
consideration in the DPH report.
"consensual
(1)
incinerators to burn
reducing waste volumes--the
separation,
Nuclear
the DPH plan amounts to:
(2) retro-fitting of
materials,
for years.
fication and
setts
the Goldsmith,
process",
Massachu-
are given only
passing
Although the DPH claimed
a
Goldsmith maintains that the interests
the environmental groups represented
Massachusetts Nuclear
Referendum
(The Sierra Club
and
Committee--incorrectly
called the "Nuclear Petition Referendum" in the DPH draft) are
not
apparent
in the draft plan released by
Because the plan is still only a "draft",
45
the
Department.
MNRC cannot "make a
106
big
stink" about the
In
process.
February,
Governors
1983,
approved
a
the
Coalition
Northeast
Radioactive Waste Management Compact.
the
coalition
will
any
Congress.
government
The eleven governors in
their
will
Compact
Northeast
respective
If approved by all of the states
(Note
between
the
the Compact will go on for approval by
the
It
is
generally assumed that
the
federal
rubber stamp any Compact that complies
the spirit of the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of
The
Low-Level
amendments will have to be worked out
states involved),
U.S.
Northeastern
Interstate
submit the Compact to
state's legislatures.
that
of
language
Interstate
calls for
Low-Level
the
with
1980.
creation
Radioactive
of
Waste
the
Commis-
107
sion.
from
This Commission would consist of one
each
member
state,
appointed by
the
representative
state
Governor
108
according
that
to procedures peculiar to that state.
Any state
hosts a disposal facility will have two members
on
the
109
Commission
while it houses an operating facility.
General
110
Commission
decisions will be based on majority
the
that
event
available
an
insufficient number
of
vote.
In
facilities
and no member state volunteers to house a
are
regional
waste
facility, the Commission, by two-thirds vote, may desig-
nate
any
111
entering
party state
the Compact,
to serve as a
state.
Before
each state must repeal any legislation
that conflicts with the Compact;
show that it
112
state.
host
and each state is required to
is able to site a facility if selected as a
46
host
In
March,
through
the
Coordinated
the
Northeast
Massachusetts
through
A.
Radwaste Network
Nuclear
was
Referendum
Goldsmith
of
formed
Committee.
MNRC,
the
Network
113
developed a list of objections to the Compact.
The Network
believes
placed
that
insufficient
environmental
burial--the
suited
concerns.
emphasis
They
maintain
water table.
sible
been
that
shallow
only certified technology--may be singularly
to the compact region with
geology
has
its heavy rainfall
land
un-
and high
They argue that even gross macroscreening of the
and hydrology has not been done and that it
is
that there is no environmentally sound site within
compact
on
region.
Rich
generally concurs,
Smith
of
the
Special
posthe
Commission
pointing out that shallow land burial
has
113a
had a 50 per cent
The
failure rate.
Network
also
for
review,
provisions
sovereignty.
They
believes that
public
argue
there
are
participation,
that stricter
fees
inadequate
and
and
state
liability
assurances are essential, especially in light of past problems
in
establishing
radioactive
any
waste disposal sites.
radioactive
source
financial responsibility
waste
reduction;
Northeast
management
and they wish to
Interstate
for
leakage
from
The Network believes that
system
should
emphasize
limit the powers
Low-Level Radioactive Waste
of
the
Commission
with a system of checks and balances.
Finally,
the Network objects to
the use of economic
political considerations in site selection.
only
environmental
They believe that
and safety issues should be part
47
and
of
the
siting process.
Many
of
the
Network's criticisms
valuable--although
any
interstate
compact
individual
state
Commission
powers
representatives
governors
they fail
to
is
to
valid,
and
a
substantial
loss
of
of
The Network's desire to limit
especially
given
that
the Commission will be appointed
of member states--not elected.
experiences of West Valley clearly
enormous
legitimate
recognize that the nature
requires
sovereignty.
are
In
state
by
the
addition,
the
illustrate the
potentially
problem of establishing financial responsibility for
radioactive leakage.
Their final
The Network
commitment
objection, however,
is simply obstructionist.
may intend it only as a symbolic statement
to
environmental
safety;
however,
that exclusively considers environmental
potential
their
philosophy
obscures
the
"technical goal" of no leakage is rooted
judgment
and
Moreover,
would
criteria
benefits of radioactive materials
stated
use--followed
use.
fact
in an
the
Moreover,
that
implicit
their
value
framework.
the Network's stated philosophy
the termination of all
by
a
analysis
ignores
a particular political and economic
strictly observed,
require
any
of
costly isolation
of
radioactive
already
substance
contaminated
material.
Meanwhile,
Three,
there have been two attempts to alter Question
now Chapter 503.
deration,
has
House 2768,
currently under consi-
proposed an amendment to Question Three
exemption section,
changing the wording to
48
say "in
in the
connection
with
medical
and bio-organic
research" instead
of
"through
114
medical applications and bio-research."
conceivably
the
broaden the medical
production of medical
This change
exemption section to
isotopes.
include
New England Nuclear,
major manufacturer of medical isotopes,
cent
could
produces over
90
a
per
of the curie content of Massachusetts low-level radioac-
115
tive waste.
As of this writing,
state of Maryland;
the
Compact to
the Compact has been approved by the
and Governor Dukakis
is planning to
the Massachusetts legislature sometime
the next few weeks.
49
submit
within
CHAPTER 5
The
the
regulatory options available to
volume
borders.
may
and character of the waste generated
States with minimal waste production,
be able to
Understanding
make
a state are shaped by
within
its
for example,
ignore the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980.
its generators can help Massachusetts regulators
informed decisions on the future of low-level
radioactive
waste in the Commonwealth.
Waste Generation
Three
1980 and Beyond
hundred and ninety facilities
currently
result
in Massachusetts:
licensed
in
to
low-level
industrial,
use radioactive
radioactive
123 medical,
in Massachusetts are
materials
waste
51 academic,
that
may
generation
(189
25 governmental, and 2
116
nuclear
reactors)
ninety
facilities
radioactive
waste
;
of these potential
actually ship waste to licensed
waste disposal sites.
(about
half
methods--such
as
generators,
of all
decay
about
low-level
The remainder produce
generators)
or
use
no
alternative
to background--to dispose
of
their
117
waste.
The
approximately 300,000 cubic
Massachusetts
feet of waste produced by
makes it one of the top ten generators
in
the
118
country.
This
given
that
Massachusetts
has only two nuclear reactors--one with a
very
small capacity.
Advisory
is
particularly
remarkable
In a November 1980 report,
the Massachusetts
Council on Radiation Protection estimated
that
the
Commonwealth
produces between 40 and 50 per cent of the total
New
volume.
119
England
Based on figures
50
from
EG&G
Idaho,
Inc.,
total
Massachusetts
generated 36 per cent of the New England
(Connecticut,
York,
Rhode
state CONEG
Maine,
Island,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
and Vermont) and
regional total in 1981.
20 per cent of the
Within the CONEG region,
Massachusetts is the third
largest generator after
120
nia and New York, respectively.
Although
states,
the
CONEG
rate of waste
predicts
11
increase will
Pennsylva-
vary
that Massachusetts will
between
remain
the
third
largest
generator within the region through
the
year
121
2000.
CONEG calculations include reactor waste from the 22
existing
reactors
struction,
level
and the 11 reactors currently
under
con-
but do not include any decommissioning waste
(Low-
waste generated when a nuclear
decommissioning
waste
cleaning solutions.).
includes
power plant closes down;
contaminated
machinery
Given these assumptions, CONEG
that
Massachusetts' annual waste generation will
122
over 75 per cent between 1981 and 2000.
This
through
waste
of
volume could be reduced by thirty
incineration techniques.
predicts
increase
compaction or between 60 to 75 per cent
adoption
and
per
by
cent
through
Both volume
the
reduction
123
methods carry some risk of radiation release.
The
waste
characteristics
generated
within the
Commonwealth
has
two
that are critical to policy development:
(1)
there
is a wide range of radioactive
waste
with
Waste
generation sites are not evenly distributed
the
state
intensity
in
generated
distinct generator/waste subcategories,
and are concentrated
51
and
(2)
throughout
in regions unsuitable
for
a
waste disposal
Despite
the
bulk
cent of
facility.
the regulatory population of approximately
of radioactivity in Massachusetts
the curie content
400,
waste--97.3
in 1981--is generated by
per
radiophar-
124
maceutical
production.
Moreover these generators produced
125
only
6.4
per cent of the 1981 waste volume.
Led
by
New
England Nuclear,
a world distributor of radiopharmaceuticals,
there are only 11
licensees for
in the
radiopharmaceutical production
state.
While
relatively
the waste generated by radiopharmaceutical use
is
harmless,
as
the materials used
in and generated
byproducts of production of these radionuclides are very
gerous.
In his
dan-
1981 book Radwaste, Fred Shapiro worte:
"Not
all the medical wastes that still find their
way
to the low-level commerical repositories are radioactively
as
innocuous as scintillation-counting
liquids
and
animal carcasses, however.
At Barnwell, Ott told me that
"some of the hottest stuff we get" comes from the production
of
radioisotopes
and the fabrication
of
medical
radiation sources, primarily cobalt 60."126
The
two nuclear
per cent of
reactors in the Commonwealth produced
2
the curie content and 18 per cent of the volume of
127
Massachusetts waste shipped in 1981.
academic
volume
Finally,
medical and
generators produced approximately 7 per cent of
and
less than 0.2 per cent of the
curie
content
the
of
128
Massachusetts waste in that year.
Although this population
generates only a small amount of radioactivity,
the number of
129
licensees
is
large--approximately 170.
Industrial
uses
other than radiopharmaceutical production accounted for almost
75
per
cent of the volume and less than 0.7 per cent of
52
the
130
curie content of waste shipped
The
small.
in 1981.
population
of
Massachusetts regulatees
is
Moreover,
it
includes
number
a
very
small
fairly
of
generators who
produce large amounts of radioactivity in small
volumes;
remainder of generators
the
large volumes of much less
In
produce
intensely radioactive waste.
addition to this distinct segmentation of the
tory population and the waste they generate,
to
comparatively
note
that
it
is
the majority of waste generators
important
are
in
eastern part of
the state and areas of high population.
that
radioactive waste disposal
low-level
regula-
the
Given
facilities must
be
131
sited
in
in rural areas,
it is likely that any facility built
Massachusetts would be in
the western part of the
Common-
wealth.
In
this
policies
can
context,
flexibility
emergency
example,
in
procedures.
source
generators only.
medical
is
be targeted toward
regulatory population.
tial
it
that
waste
mangement
particular segments
of
the
This option gives regulators substan-
designing
regulatory
frameworks
In the event of another
reduction
Since
clear
might be
imposed
crisis,
on
and
for
industrial
they generate so litte radioactivity,
licensees might be allowed
services.
53
to continue normal nuclear
CHAPTER 6
The Current Regulatory
The
regulatory framework for
low-level
Transportation,
Other
the Department of Energy,
actors include State
radioac-
the Department
waste in Massachusetts includes the NRC,
tive
of
current
Framework:
and
Police required to
the
spot
EPA.
transport
violations.
The Department of Energy has the lead role for developing
DOE
is
In addition, the
to states.
a program of technical assistance
responsible for promoting peaceful
energy.
This
mission in
role was
uses
of
nuclear
inherited from the Atomic Energy Com-
1974 when AEC regulatory authority was
transferred.
132
to the NRC and the AEC was disbanded.
The
DOE
provides studies
on
waste
generation,
treatment technologies, and disposal needs.
is
done
through contracts with EG&G of
Northeast,
through
studies
of
Inter/Face Associates,
Inc.
Much of this work
Idaho.
waste generation
waste
were
Within
the
subcontracted
of Middletown, Connecti-
133
cut.
The NRC was granted regulatory authority under the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974
developed
a
management
disposal;
93-438).
set of
and
rules
it is
also
The Commission has
controlling
waste
responsible
for
and monitoring organizations that handle controlled
material.
restrict
comprehensive
and
licensing
(P.L.
In
or
transferred
the
event of rule
revoke a license.
to
a
state
violations,
This licensing
agency through the
54
the
NRC
role
Agreement
can
can
be
State
Program
initiated
in 1959.
Twenty-six states are
currently
134
enrolled
The
in the Agreement State Program.
Department of Transportation regulates the
developed
The DOT
including radioactive waste.
of hazardous materials,
has
transport
regulations that prescribe packaging of
waste
135
and the routing of waste carriers.
The
EPA
criteria,
is responsible for
including
establishing
protection
radiation
environmental
standards
geared
toward the protection of populations and the environment.
EPA
has
dosages
promulgated standards for both
to populations and limits on
maximum
The
permissible
radioactive
emissions.
The Agency is currently developing environmental standards for
136
low-level
radioactive waste disposal.
In regulations released
in December,
1982, the NRC esta-
blished the basis of a new low-level radioactive waste management
system.
described
that
uses
137
waste.
In
in
addition to the
Chapter Three,
manifests
three-way
classification
this system includes a
to track the
movement
of
program
radioactive
The manifest system considers three groups: genera-
tors; shippers and/or processors; and disposal facility operators.
only
Rules are provided
prepackaged
waste
for both waste transporters who ship
and waste processors
who
treat
or
shipment
of
reprocess waste before shipment.
According
to
the new 10 CFR 20.311,
each
radioactive waste to a licensed land disposal
accompanied
facility must be
by a shipment manifest identifying the
55
generator
and
tranporter.
The
manifest
must
also
indicate
completely as possible" the composition of the waste
including both radionuclide content and chemical
Wastes must be
identified as Class A,
of the waste generator;
shipment,
composition.
B, or C.
The manifest must be certified by an authorized
tative
"as
represen-
and the generator is required
to conduct a quality control program to ensure compliance with
regulations.
Upon shipment, one copy of the manifest must be forwarded
to
the
intended recipient;
acknowledge
alternatively,
a
collector
receipt of the waste upon transfer.
One
the manifest must always accompany the shipment.
tor
is
required to retain both a copy of
documentation
receive
of acknowledgement.
waste
consolidation
must
manifests must be appended.
be
ommitted
different
certify
generators'
accompany
reflecting
sources.
The collector
nothing has been done
certification.
the
investigation.
waste,
prethe
Generator
if the new manifest includes all of the
that
and
The original generator manifests
quired information for each package.
must
manifest
a shipper of
prepare a new manifest
of wastes from
The genera-
intended recipient
initiate an
Upon shipment to a disposal facility,
packaged
copy of
If the generator does not
acknowledgement of receipt from the
within one week, the generator must
may
the
may
to
One copy of this
licensee
invalidate
manifest
and another must be forwarded
re-
to
the
must
the
shallow land disposal facility operator.
A
waste processor
is required to prepare a new
56
manifest
to
accompany the waste;
and the processor beomes responsible
for the waste and the validity of
If
the disposal
the manifest.
facility operator does not
waste within sixty days of the advance manifest,
must notify the generator,
the collector, and the
receive
the
the operator
Director of
the nearest NRC regional office.
If
ledge
the land disposal facility operator does not
receipt to the
acknow-
shipper within 20 days of transfer,
shipper must initiate an
investigation into the matter.
57
the
CHAPTER 7
Assessing the Regulatory System:
It
is
important
Criticism and Suggestions
to note that the new
manifest
system
involves the NRC only in the event of a lost shipment;
wastes
are
not
routinely tracked by any
addition,
while
governmental
the manifests must be
could conceivably falsify documents,
agency.
certified,
In
middlemen
ultimately disposing
of
less waste than they receive from generators.
The
manifest system also
of waste generators.
account for
relies heavily on the good will
It is difficult,
the amount of radioactivity handled
Many facilities can generate
reactors and cyclotrons);
that
and
actually transported
receive
licensed
in this context,
to the site.
material
waste genera-
Labs and hospitals
can always
"is
claim
that
can be
released into
sewers or the hazardous waste stream.
any
in the animal".
tracking system seems particularly inappropriate in
where a certain amount of material
tary
(including
to the amount of radioac-
unaccounted for radiation "has decayed" or
The
by a licensee.
radioactivity on site
tion does not necessarily correspond
tivity
if not impossible, to
labs
sani-
In this setting,
filling out manifests becomes a meaningless exercise.
The system does, however,
the
waste they produce;
combined
tion
that
threaten
and
force generators to think about
the consciences of
generators--
with personnel exposure guidelines and the
a negative public perception
all
of
use--have been fairly reliable
recogni-
radiation
in
controlling
contamination of the environment from generation sites.
58
could
Despite
its deficiencies,
the radioactive waste manage-
ment system has been more successful
mental
cern
regulation programs.
with
regulated
nuclear
Only
materials
in the
relatively
carefully
of
national
and careful records are kept to
unauthorized persons do not
high
radiation
AEC
interests
acquire
education level of radiation
helped maintain this system of checks.
of
the
licensed individuals and groups can purchase
and use radioactive materials;
that
environ-
While they expressed little con-
radioactive waste management,
security.
ensure
than most other
them.
The
personnel
Finally,
has
public fear
has prevented the widespread use and
abuse
of
radionuclides.
Radioactive emissions have been produced
the
failure
of
intentionally
(arguably
illegal
problem--unlike
inadequate)
waste
the
disposal
case of hazardous
by accidents and
safety
measures;
has not been
chemical
a
but
major
waste.
It
should be noted that the growing commercialization of biological
research
and
the demand
change that situation.
of
legal disposal
for
radiopharmaceuticals
may
Moreover, the rapidly increasing cost
(from $28
to about $200/30 gallon
drum
in
138
recent
years
)
may
provide an
additional
incentive
for
illegal disposal in the future.
The primary problems in low-level waste
revolve
around
generation
disposal,
(1) disposal sites and the need to
coordinate
with appropriate disposal technologies and
safe packaging and transport of radioactive
wastes.
then,
(2) the
Contro-
versy in low-level waste disposal has centered on the failures
59
of
legal
disposal and the inadequacies of isolation
techno-
logy.
Safe Packaging and Transport:
The
much
regional distribution of disposal sites will
resolve
issue--if
only
because
highway
miles.
this
the controversy around
of
radioactive
waste
will travel
have been developed
programs
transport of
fewer
Other
and
to encourage safe packaging
radioactive waste.
new manifest program may improve past sloppiness
The
radioactive waste packaging.
low-level
By forcing the genera-
responsibility has been placed
tor to
certify safe packaging,
on
single party--a party that has a great deal to lose
a
its disposal privileges are suspended.
this
system,
enforcement
the
by
however,
regulators.
transport
safety issue.
certify
waste
noted
Barnwell,
that
South
that
that their waste packaging complies
with
shipments
they
Despite the
are not inspected
Fred
to
two of the major waste shippers
Carolina disposal
terminals near the disposal site.
facility
(Tri-State
Chem Nuclear)
Shapiro wrote:
is
checked by workers of the trucking firm there,
139
of
its
correction
until
In his book Radwaste,
Transit and Home Transportation Co.
journey."
address
requirement
arrive at the disposal site.
Shapiro
of
depends entirely on the strictness of
the manifest system does not directly
regulations,
if
The effectiveness
Moreover,
generators
in
Only after careful
the
Motor
maintained
"The trailer
scrutiny
at the end
and
of problems was waste moved the last few yards
60
C.
the
to
the
Barnwell gate where
ment.
While
this
regulatory officials check the
subversion
of
the
inspection
shipsystem
developed in a period when the shippers--not the
generators--
had
the manifest
primary responsibility for waste packaging,
system
does
not
protect against the
continuation
of
this
practice.
It
seems
adapted
this new
manifest
was
from the EPA's "cradle to grave" tracking system
for
chemical waste.
the
division
disposal
Despite superficial
processes
(including
the
similarities
tri-partite
between generators-shippers/processors-disposal
operators),
the
sizes of the two
very different.
waste
that
program
hazardous
between
likely
systems
In addition,
have
radically
incentives.
In their
NRC
to
failed
regulatory populations
the hazardous and
different
are
radioactive
of
existing
enthusiasm to follow the EPA's lead, the
recognize that the primary
system attempts to
sets
site
issue the
manifest
address--illegal disposal--is currently not
a major problem in nuclear waste management.
Viewed
in this
light,
an unproductive additional
resources
might
the manifest system appears to
expense to generators.
have been better spent to
be
Regulatory
enforce
existing
rules on packaging requirements, using spot checks of waste in
transit to confirm that NRC and DOT rules have been observed.
The
relatively
regulation
small number of shipments
possible;
not endanger national
radioactive
waste
makes
direct
and the release of shipment routes will
security.
Moreover,
clear marking
packages is required by both the
61
of
manifest
system
and
existing regulations,
waste easy for
inspectors.
making
Finally,
identification
the
integrity of
of
waste
containers can be easily checked with a geiger counter.
Isolation Technologies:
Solutions
lie
in
to
the technical problems of waste
improved
amount of waste
disposal techniques and
requiring disposal.
reduction
of
the
Because of the wide range
of materials classified as "low-level waste",
solution
isolation
the most obvious
is to apply the appropriate disposal
technology
to
each type of waste.
Given
the segmentation of the regulatory population
the wastes they generate,
recently
the three-way classification system
developed by the NRC seems adequate
radionuclide hazard of low-level waste.
classification is needed to address
hazard
and
materials
The
"total
and
analysis
of
chemical
more
ela-
issues of chemical
and
radioactive
in the waste.
need for developing classification systems based
waste hazard" has been recognized
1981,
program;
interaction
to deal with the
However,
borate
the
and
EG&G Idaho,
their
Inc.
Technical
for years.
explicitly recommended
Analysis
included
considering effects of a "total hazard"
tion system.
According to
an
on
In 1980
such
a
economic
classifica-
EG&G,
"Classification
by total hazard would
result
in
substantial increases in waste handling and recordkeeping
requirements
for generators.
No changes in transportation operations would be required.
The volume of
waste
shipped to disposal sites would decrease, while the final
62
curie
inventory
at such sites would increase.
No
new
technologies
would be required for this system of
waste
classification,
though many generators would have to use
technology directed toward managing the toxic
components
of their waste.
Because the total-hazard classification
system is deemed desirable buy the states, development of
interstate compacts and new regional disposal sites would
be enhanced.
The costs of waste management and disposal
to
generators and consumers would increase substantially
in
comparison with current practice.
The
occupational
exposure
of personnel employed by generators
would
increase, whereas population risks would decrease... .141
EG&G
supported
this type of system because
best
assessment
142
needed."
Defending
of
the
environmental
it "provides
protection
the
that
is
their decision to use a system recognizing only
radioactive hazard, the NRC claimed
up
that chemical hazard makes
142a
only a little of the waste they handle
.
More to
the
point,
the
NRC wrote:
"The
Commission
has
stated
publicly
on
several
occasions
that
if
it were
technically
feasible
to
classify
waste
by
total hazard,
then
it
would
make
eminently good sense to do so.
We do not now know of any
scheme for such classification..."143
This
is a valid claim,
but the development of such a
"total
hazard system" must be a priority of the NRC.
In
addition to
grate chemical
between
this technical change,
and radioactive waste
the two regulatory
we need to
issues.
inte-
The differences
populations--size,
character
of
generators, and the existing regulatory complex--make separate
regulation advantageous.
and
However,
there has been considerable
dysfunctional conflict between the radioactive and chemi-
cal hazard systems in recent years.
The
example,
NRC de-classification of
dumped
scintillation
fluid,
for
new material on the chemical hazardous waste
63
system;
and
radioactive
interaction
components
effects between
the
chemical
and
of the waste could pose problems
for
hazardous waste regulators.
The decision to de-classify cer-
tain concentrations of tritium and Carbon-14 was made
extensive
without
investigation of the effects of de-regulation on the
chemical hazardous waste system.
In
the
public
arena,
radioactive and
chemical
spokesmen often undermine one another's positions.
waste
Within the
radioactive waste literature,
constant references are made to
the
by
144
'greater
hazard
Goldsmith of the Mass.
posed
chemical
wastes.'
A.
Nuclear Referendum Committee commented
that
in Minnesota the hazardous waste
facility siting
was
aided by constant reminders that
'this is not radioactive
process
145
waste.'
Regulators must discard the
public
reduce
fears
is
to compare
idea that the way
hazards
to
other
to
existing
dangers.
Coordination
of
the two regulatory systems
ease disposal facility siting.
ments,
waste
also
In addition to fiscal
could
induce-
for example, communities willing to host a radioactive
disposal
facility might be exempted
from
when
it comes time to site a hazardous waste
the
two
systems
are
linked,
this kind
consideration
facility.
of
Unless
bargaining
is
impossible.
Massachusetts
tive
also needs to integrate low-level radioac-
waste production and disposal.
In
this
context,
Commonwealth would benefit from Agreement State status.
latory
authority
would
permit
64
Massachusetts
to
the
Regumore
effectively encourage source
reduction,
potentially
limiting
waste generation.
Moreover,
ship
without Agreement State status,
the relation-
between waste generation and disposal could
become
adversarial--with
nuclear
uses
resulting
that
a
disposal
while
the
federal government
the state struggles
waste volumes.
to
are
encouraging
deal
with
the
The Supreme Court recently decided
state can block reactor construction
facilities
potentially
available
for
until
adequate
high-level
Despite this significant victory for States'
rights
waste.
in nuclear
waste management, Agreement State status would still be useful
for
Massachusetts--especially given the huge volume of
waste
it generates.
In
Task
the recent draft of the Massachusetts DPH
Force noted
enforcement
ledgeable
make
of
the
that Agreement State status would facilitate
regulations,
create a body of
in radiation matters within the
regulation
plan,
of
licenses more
146
needs.
65
people
Commonwealth,
responsive
to
knowand
generator
CHAPTER 8
Conclusion:
The
history
characterized
of
radioactive
public
suffering
concern with the radwaste
from
the problem.
issue
has
been
a
issue.
The
AEC,
the contradictions of an agency charged
with
The NRC,
on
out
short-term solutions to assauge
both promoting and regulating radioactive
the
disposal
by continual attempts to shunt the problem
of sight--to find economical,
growing
waste
materials,
ignored
created in the mid-1970's, dealt with
crisis level and was unable
to
develop
a
coherent and powerful policy.
In
the
book Radioactive Waste,
Ronnie Lipshutz
recom-
mended the establishment of a central agency, dedicated exclusively to the regulation of radioactive waste.
Lipshutz,
According
to
past failures were partially the result of institu-
tional inadequacies.
The AEC's conflicting mandates permitted
147
poor waste management
; and Lipshutz saw the same problem in
the current DOE and NRC.
The events of recent years suggest a genuine governmental
concern
it
for the low-level radioactive waste issue.
is possible that the NRC's decision to
transfer
However,
disposal
responsibility to the states--in the face of a 1986 deadline-is
another example of the past pattern of defferal and
sponsibility.
cisms,
the
irre-
While it may not silence general public critiLow-Level
Waste Policy Act of 1980
quelled
the
three most vocal opponents of the NRC--South Carolina, Nevada,
and
Washington
state--and
officially absolved
66
the
NRC
of
responsibility.
Some
skeptics view the L.L.W.P. Act of
1980 as a gauntlet
149
thrown
in the face of states demanding empowerment.
interpretation, however, implies that the NRC was
give up control of low-level
NRC's
strategy to
1979 shows that the
deal
with any opponents.
structure
unwilling to
radioactive waste mangement.
force the re-opening of disposal
late
This
The
sites
in
Commission clearly had the power
to
While the "Crisis of 1979" did re-
the debate around low-level
waste,
the NRC
permit-
ted--even encouraged--this change.
The current problem in Massachusetts centers on the NRC's
1986 deadline.
shallow
Even if Massachusetts began construction of a
land disposal facility today,
the site would not
be
operational by the January 1, 1986 deadline;
and even the most
rudimentary
and
environmental,
geological,
feasibility studies have not been done.
sides
only
hydrological
Individuals on
of the controversy admit that shallow land
certified disposal
150
Massachusetts.
technology--may be
burial--the
unsuitable
The technology has a 50 per cent
both
for
practical
failure rate; and the technique has never succeeded in an area
with
heavy
rainfall and a high water table.
Standards
for
above-surface engineered facilities probably will not be ready
by
1986--and certainly not in time for implementation by
the
Commonwealth before the 1986 deadline.
Although
might
the
deadline has spurred
action--action
that
have been indefinitely deferred in state legislatures-67
the artificial crisis created by the NRC has produced a situa-
tion in which thoughtful and judicious action is unlikely.
Moreover,
issues of local control and public
participa-
tion have been trampled in the rush to meet the 1986 deadline.
What
was
"Crisis"
obstensibly
has
important issue of
been shelved indefinitely.
"environmentalist"
tionist";
the most
has
become
and Question Three,
In
synonymous
the
this
with
1979
setting,
"obstruc-
which requires a public referen-
dum before Massachusetts sites a facility or enters a compact,
is seen as a hinderance that should be avoided or circumvented
if possible.
Alternatives:
Massachusetts can follow either of
(1)
develop
and
Commonwealth
The
could oppose the federal
regional disposal facilities for
(2)
strategies:
mandate
radioactive
Opposition
waste;
the
1986
can
1980, attempting to site a facility.
take one of two
forms:
an
deadline or otherwise modify
attempt
the
Act;
opposition of the basic principle of state responsibility
low-level
The
to
Massachusetts can comply with the Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Act of
change
two broad
to
or'
for
radioactive waste.
fact that Massachusetts radiopharmaceutical
produc-
tion--which generates the bulk of the Commonwealth's dangerous
waste--provides
ful
these drugs for the entire nation is a power-
argument for a national solution to the
problem;
low-level
waste
and much as three states held the country for ransom
in 1979, Massachusetts could potentially back its demands with
68
the
threat
that
discontinued
until
radiopharmaceutical
based
itself
on
if
However,
Act
the principle that each state should decide
for
wants
the
many
waste
generating
benefits
of
were discontinued
today,
Nuclear
of
large
nuclear
uses were
because of vigorous federal support.
example
Even
technology.
implemented
power plants are a particularly
this problem;
require
dramatic
de-commissioning a nuclear
the vigorous federal
only
if these activities
amounts of waste would
will produce enormous quantities of waste.
between
be
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
it
disposal.
would
adequate disposal facilities are located.
In addition,
is
production
reactor
The contradiction
promotion of nuclear
technology
and the exclusive state responsibility for waste could be used
to argue
If
for
repeal or
Massachusetts
alteration
of the
L.L.R.W.P.A.
decides to comply with
Waste Policy Act of 1980,
can site a facility immediately,
shallow-land
burial regulations.
disposal
CONEG
This process
within Massachusetts
The
using the
would
membership or "going-it-alone"--i.e.
facility
Low-Level
several choices are available.
Commonwealth
either
the
of 1980.
without
new
imply
siting
a
cooperation
from other states.
There are advantages
low-land
to each scenario; however, the shal-
burial technology is both unreliable and effectively
irreversible--radioactive
waste
cannot be easily retrieved if
buried with this
leakage
technology
is detected.
In this context, the risks of attempting immediate siting
are
too
great.
Moreover,
this option
69
would
require
the
circumvention
of the public participation both central to the
democratic process and mandated by Question Three.
Alternatively, Massachusetts could decide to wait for the
new regulations for engineered disposal
structures).
This would
facilites
(disposal in
imply "going-it-alone",
because the
Compact
cannot wait for these new regulations
Interim
storage
for
to
be
issued.
of all Commonwealth waste would be
required
the implementation of this alternative.
Recommendations:
The Commonwealth should not attempt
disposal
facility,
geology
should
options,
addition,
immediately site a
although macro-screening of hydrology
begin.
the state
to
Given
the
is unequipped to
Massachusetts
should
existing
and
technological
site a safe facility.
not join the CONEG
compact.
While Compact membership could mean that no facility would
built
in
the
willingness
150a
state,
and
participation also requires
ability
to
expedite
In
both
disposal
be
the
facility
siting.
Massachusetts
should enter the Agreement State
Program.
151
The
licensing procedure takes a minimum of two years
if the Commonwealth applies now,
status
by '1986.
start-up costs,
calculates
it can have Agreement
Agreement State status is useful
reasons outlined in Chapter 7;
;
and
State
for
the
and although there will be some
the Massachusetts Department of Public Health
that most of the program operations can be
152
by user fees.
70
funded
Using
NRC
estimates that
guidelines,
the Department of
Public
Health
5-8 technical staff would be needed to maintain
153
the
existing Commonwealth nuclear licenses.
gests that the existing Radiation Control
to
The DPH
sug-
Program be
expanded
include the new Agreement State responsiblities.
Because
of staff overlap,
would
the Department estimates that this strategy
mean only 2-3 additional
technical personnel
would
be
154
required.
In The Agreement State Program,
the
advantages
for
licensees
Holmes Brown pointed out
of
centralizing
radiation
155
programs
has
in a single
agency.
Although the
a radiation control program,
DPH
the Department has signifi-
cant credibility problems within the Commonwealth;
Draft
Plan has alienated environmental
that
the
groups.
and
I
their
recommend
the Commonwealth place the new regulatory program within
Department
agency
that
facility
of
Environmental
and
Quality
Engineering--the
currently handles hazardous waste
siting.
In
problems of the DPH,
of
currently
trade-offs
disposal
addition to avoiding the public
this strategy would permit
between
the
low-level
and
image
coordination
radioactive
and
hazardous chemical waste management systems.
The Commonwealth should also:
the
Low-Level
encourage
engineered
the
Radioactive
speedy
structures;
Waste
(1)
Policy
development
and
fight for revision of
(3)
of
Act
new
develop
of
1980;
(2)
regulations
for
interim
storage
capacity.
Massachusetts
should resist the
71
L.L.R.W.P.A.
of
1980.
The 1986 deadline is unreasonable;
and the public will be the
big losers if this deadline is strictly observed.
refuses
to
an extension,
the federal government should be asked
provide disposal space
in DOE sites until adequate disposal
capacity for commercial waste is created
The
and
in each state.
1980 Act was built on a shaky theoretical
the
basic rationale and
challenged.
assumptions of the
Moreover, other states will
participate
and
If Congress
in
this "state revolt;"
Northeastern
foundation;
Act
can
be
likely be willing to
Many of the
Midwestern
states are having similar problems with
the
1986 deadline.
Given
the history of low-level waste management,
it
is
possible that the states would do a better regulatory job than
the
federal government.
would
be
desirable;
In this context,
but
exclusive state
provide
disposal--especially
regional
system--is too large a burden.
In
the
addition,
federal
promised
within
the
state
regulation
responsiblity
constraints
the Commonwealth should publicly
government to provide the
and needed.
Inadequate
technical
of
to
a
pressure
assistance
information is available on a
number of questions including: the effects of adding low-level
radioactive
materials
requirements
for
to
the
designing
hazardous
and
siting
waste
an
stream;
and
above-surface
engineered disposal facility.
Finally,
interim
currently
the Commonwealth should work toward
storage
facilities.
Several
private
maintain facilities for interim storage.
72
developing
licensees
Reactors
have
received a five year extension for on-site disposal
storage;
and
"Crisis of
laboratories
1979,"
and
are beginning
hospitals,
tion,
for
example--in
remembering
to exploit alternate
technologies--decay to background,
and
compaction,
the
disposal
and incinera-
anticipation of another emergency
in
156
1986.
By encouraging these
the
amount of
event
of
volume,
state
a
disposal crisis.
interim
not
waste has been
facility--remembering
facility
site
incentives to facilitate
example,
disposal
that
any
will
site.
This
locality that
promise
and
interim
(High-level
the
siting
be
inter-
their selection as a
could be prevented
with
hosts
storage
an
interim
be exempted from consideration as a
facility.
to never site a permanent
disposal facility in that locality.
logical
a
many localities might fear that wil-
for a hazardous waste disposal
cannot
site
that
solution
the
reduced
initiate procedures to
preted as weakness--eventually leading to
promise
this
to host an interim storage facility will
permanent
in
in "interim storage" for decades.).
For
lingness
To accommodate
replace a permanent
DEQE could use
process.
should
disposal
must
The
the Commonwealth can reduce
interim storage that will be necessary
Massachusetts
storage
trends,
a
potential
(Note that
radioactive
we
waste
Given the stringent geo-
hydrological requirements for a
disposal
site,
there may be little freedom in selecting a location within the
Commonwealth.)
73
Above all,
of
this
the Commonwealth must avoid a crisis treatment
problem.
wastes,
Because of the longevity
Massachusetts
residents
of
radioactive
will have to live with
implications of current decisions for many years.
find a way to
chusetts,
buying
pact
the
time
solution
temporarily handle the waste generated
than
Commonwealth
to
can
soften the
1986
re-formulate the problem to permit
If we
or
"going-it-alone"
technology.
74
with
can
in Massadeadline,
a
the currently available no-win choices of
membership
the
better
com-
inadequate
FOOTNOTES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
George B.
Levin.
"Low-level radioactive waste management
in
the
U.S.:
A proving ground." Nuclear
News.
(August
1981) p.72
Ibid.
p.72
Ibid.
p.72
John Payne.
"Low-level wastes: much wasted time." Nuclear
News. (May 1981) p. 33
(November 1980)
p.
News Briefs." Nuclear News.
"Nuclear
203
6.
Ronnie Lipshutz.
Union of Concerned Scientists.
Radioactive Waste:
Politics,
Technology, and Risk.
(Cambridge,
Mass. : Ballinger Publishing Co.
: 1980)
p.15
7.
Hearings
before
the Subcommittee on Energy Research
and
Technology.
and
Production of
the Committee on Science
U.S.
Congress.
House of
Representatives.
Low-Level
: U.S.
(Washington, D.C.
Nuclear Waste Burial Grounds.
Government Prini
Offie
: 1980)
96th Cong. 1st Session
8.
Bill
Serial #96.80
Rados.
August 1979)
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
(November 7, 1979)
p. 49
"Primer on Radiation."
FDA Consumer.
(July-
p. 5
F.C.
Finlayson and Edward P. Radford.
Emergency Planning Zone
Selection
of
Nuclear Power Plant.
(Suffolk county,
Draft of Basis for
forte Shoreham
New York : October
1980)
p. 14
Ibid.
p. 14
Thomas
P.
Radioactive
Report #369.
Smith.
A
Planner's
Guide
to
Low-Level
Waste Disposal.
Planning Advisory Service.
(Chicago : American Planning Association
July 1982) p. 7
Ibid.
p. 14
Lipshutz.
p. 20
Marcus
A. -Rowden.
"Nuclear Regulations
and
National
Energy
Policy:
Solving the Outstanding Problem."
from
Management
of
Low-Level Radioactive
Waste,
Volume
I.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Melvin W. Carter,
A. Alan Moghissi,
editors (Pergamon Press : 1979) p. 4
Smith.
p. 6
Ibid. p. 6
Ibid.
p. 6
Ibid.
p. 6
19.
20.
21.
Lipshutz. p. 125
Ibid.
p. 125
Ibid.
p. 125
22.
Richard G.
Hewlett and Francis Duncan.
Atomic
Shield,
States
II:
A History of the United
1947/1952.
Volume
(University Park and London :
Atomic Energy Commission.
23.
and Bernd
Kahn
The Pennsylvania State University Press : 1969) p. 96-115
Uses of
"The Medical and
Biological
H.D.
Bruner.
75
24.
Radioisotopes."
Atomic
Energy and
Law:
Interamerican
Symposium.
(Rio Piedras,
Puerto Rico
School of Law,
University of Puerto Rico
1960)
P. 35
Elof Axel Carlson.
Genes,
Radiation , and Society: The
Life and Work of H.J.
Muller.
(Ithaca :~Cornell UnTv
Press :
25.
H.
1981)
p. 12
Peter Metzger.
Simon and Schuster
The Atomic Establishment.
26.
Hewlett and Duncan. p.
27.
28.
Ibid.
Ibid.
p. 113
p. 80
29.
Linda
Risks
Cohen.
"Who Pays the Bill:
from Low-Level Nuclear Waste
Resources Journal.
30.
(New York
T1972) pp. 199-237
113
Insuring Against the
Disposal."
Natural
v.21, #4 (October 1982)
p. 775
League of Women Voters Education Fund.
A Nuclear
Waste
Primer.
(Washington, D.C.
League of Woment Voters
31.
1980) p. 26
Metzger.
p. 147
32.
League of Women Voters Education Fund.
33.
Metzger.
34.
Lipshutz.
35.
Ibid.
36.
U.S.
Public
Law
86-373.
An Act to Amend
the
Atomic
Energy
Act of 1954,
as amended with respect to cooperation witfistates.
(September 23, 1959) S. 2568
p.
26
p. 195
p.
173
p. 125
36a.
Cohen.
p. 775
37.
Ibid.
pp. 775-776
38.
Metzger. p. 155
Lipshutz pp. 132-134
38a.
39.
Fred C.
Shapiro.
Radwaste.
(New York
Random House
1981) pp. 147-148
pp. 148-151
40.
Ibid.
41.
Tbi.
p. 146
42.
Smith. p. 10
43.
Ibid.
p. 10
44.
Shapiro.
p. 153
44a.
Ibid.
153
45.
Ibid.
p. 153
46.
and
Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Energy Research
Production
of
the Committee on Science and
Technology.
47.
48.
p. 7
Shapiro.
p. 157
Ibid.
pp. 156-157
49.
E.
50.
(December
Hearings
Michael
Production
51.
52.
53.
55.
56.
Blake.
"Feeling the Pinch."
Nuclear
1979) p. 48
before the Subcommittee on Energy Research
of
the Committee on Science and
News.
and
Technology.
pp. 29-57
Shapiro.
p. 168
Shapiro.
p. 168
Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Energy Research
and
Production
of the Committee on Science
and
Technology.
pp. 68-69
Ibid.
pp. 69-70
p.73
Ibid.
76
57.
Shapiro.
58.
The
National Low-Level Waste Management
Program.
EG&G
Idaho, Inc.
for the U.S. Department of Energy.
Managing
Low-Level
Radioactive Wastes:
A Proposed
Approach.
A
Program
Document Prepared to Assist the U.S.
Government
in
Formulating
National Policy and
to
Solicit
Public
Comment and Discussion.
(August 1980) p. iii
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
Ibid.
Ibid.
TbT3.
Ibid.
Tbid.
Tbd.
Ibid.
Ibid.
67.
U.S.
Public
Policy Act.
67a.
67b.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
pp.
p.
p.
156
2
4
54
54
54
48-49
49
25
Law 96-573.
Low-Level Radioactive
(December 22, 1980) S. 2189
Waste
Holmes
Brown.
The Agreement State Program:
A
State
Perspective.
(Committee on Energy and Environment
of
the National Governors' Association : January 1983)
p.
39
Ibid.
p. 4
Code
of Federal Regulations 1982.
Title 10,
Chapter 1,
20:306~
The
National Low-Level Waste Management
Program.
EG&G
Managing
for the U.S. Department of Energy.
Idaho, Inc.
Low-Level Radioactive Wastes:
A Technical
Analysis.
A
Reference Document that Analyzes Technical Issues in LowLevel Waste Management.
(June 1981)
p. 30
Massachusetts
Nuclear
Interview Amy
Goldsmith of the
Referendum Committee.
April 1983.
Lorna Salzman.
"Bad Solutions to Radioactive Pollution."
Business and Society Review.
341 (Spring 1982) p. 35
Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Energy Research
and
Production
of the Committee on Science
and
Technology.
p. 47
Ibid.
Ibid.
p. 48
p. 48
75.
Inter/Face
Associates,
Inc.
Final
Report
on
the
Massachusetts
Low-Level
Radioactive
Waste
Management
Survey.
(October 1982)
Table 17
76.
77.
Ibid.
Table 17
Salzman. pp. 33-34
78.
Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Energy Research
and
Technology.
Production of
the Committee on Science and
pp. 56 et. al.
Lipshutz. pp. 132-134
Federal Register.
V. 46, #47
p. 16232
p. 16234
81. Ibid.
79.
80.
82.
82a.
(Wednesday March 11,
1981)
Ra-diation Policy Council Task Force on Low-Level RadioacPosition Paper: Report of the Task Force on
tive Waste.
Low-Level Radioactive Waste.
(August 1980)
pp. 3-4
The
National Low-Level Waste Management
Program.
EG&G
77
Idaho,
Inc. for the U.S.
Department of Energy.
Managinj
Low-Level Radioactive Wastes:
A Proposed Approach.
pp.
41-42
83.
Salzman.
84.
University Radiation Safety Officer. (April 1983)
"NRC Draft Regulations on burial published for comment."
p.
34 and Interview with Bob Johnson
Nuclear News.
(September 1981)
85.
Shapiro.
p. 154
p. 153
86. Ibid.
Federal Register.
87.
p. 57473
1982)
V.
47,
Harvard
pp. 133-136
#248
(Monday,
December
27,
88.
Interview with Amy Goldsmith
89.
"Memo to Massachusetts Oversight ComMichael S.
Baram.
mittee on Low-Level Waste (July 21, 1981) p. 1
Interview with Amy Goldsmith
Group.
CONEG
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Working
for
LowReport Regional Facilities
Draft
Preliminary
Level Radioactive Waste: An Overview.
(December 1982) p.
2
CONEG
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Working
Group.
"Draft Work Plan." (November 5, 1981) p. 1
90.
91.
92.
93.
Ibid.
94.
Interview with Rich Smith of Massachusetts' Special Commission on Low-Level Radioactive Waste.
April 1983
Scott R.
Bander and Margaret
E.
Goldstein.
Low-Level
Waste
Project
Staff,
Department
of
Public
Health,
Massachusetts
DPH Radiation Control
Program.
Proposed
the
Waste
Management
Plan
for
Low-Level
Radioactive
#
DE-AC07Contract
Massachusetts.
of
Commonwealth
and
EG&G
U.S.
Department of Energy
761D01570
between
96.
Idaho,
97.
p.1
Inc.
(February 1983)
Massachusetts Nuclear Referendum Committee.
on S1205 and H.2768 for MNRC testifiers."
"Fact Sheet
98.
Interview with Amy Goldsmith.
99.
100.
Interview with Rich Smith.
Group.
CONEG Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Working
An
Regional Facilities for Low-Level Radioactive Waste:
Overview.
p. 27
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
Ibid.
p. 26
Bander and Goldstein. p. 17
p. 17
Ibid.
Ibid.
p. 17
Ibid.
p. 17
Interview with Amy Goldsmith
107.
Working
Group.
Waste
Radioactive
Low-Level
CONEG
Northeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Manage-
Official Draft
108.
109.
110.
ment Compact.
Ibid.
p. 12
Ibid.
p. 12
Ibid.
p. 12
111.
Ibid.
p.
112.
Ibid.
p. 25
113.
"Issues that Need
Radwaste Network.
Northeast
Changed or Introduced into the Notheast Compact."
(February 1983)
p. 12
24
78
to
be
113a.
Interview with Rich Smith.
114.
Massachusetts Nuclear Referendum Committee.
on S.1205 and H.2768." (1983)
115.
Inter/Face Associates.
Table 16
"Fact Sheet
116.
Inter/Face Associates.
117.
Ibid.
118.
Massachusetts
Advisory Council on Radiation Protection.
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management in Massachusetts:
(November
of
Massachusetts.
Report
to
the Governor
119.
120.
1980)
Ibid.
Table
2
Table 1
Summary
p. 10
CONEG Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Working
Group.
Regional Facilities for Low-Level Radioactive Waste.
p.
121.
122.
123.
6
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
124.
125.
Inter/Face Associates.
Ibid.
Table 15
126.
Shapiro.
127.
Inter/Face Associates.
128.
129.
130.
Ibid.
Ibid.
I5i.
131.
Federal
p. 6
p. 6
pp. 4-5
Table
16
p. 161
Tables 15 and
16
Tables 15 and 16
Tables 15 and 16
Tables 15 and 16
Register.
v.
47,
#248
(Monday,
December
27,
1982) p. 57471
132.
Smith.
133.
134.
Inter/Face Associates.
F.N.
Brennenan and S.N. Salomon.
The Role of the State
in the Regulation of Low-Level Radioactive Waste.
U.S.
Nclear Regulatory Commission,
NUREG-0962
(March 1983)
p. 10
135.
p. 5
Smith.
136.
137.
Brennenan and Salomon.
Federal Register.
v.
p. 10
p. 2
47,
#248
(Monday,
December 27,
1982) p. 57471
138.
139.
141.
Interview with Bob Johnson, Office of Radiation Protec-
tion, Harvard University.
Shapiro. p. 144
April 1983
The
National Low-Level Waste Management
Program,
EG&G
Idaho, Inc. for the U.S. Department of Energy.
Managing
Low-Level Radioactive Wastes: A Technical Analysis.
pp.
41-42
142.
The
National Low-Level Waste Management
Program,
EG&G
Idaho,
Inc.
for
the
U.S.
Department
of
Energy.
Managing
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A
Proposed
142a.
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Ibid.
p. 57455
143.
Federal
144.
1982)
p. 57455
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and
Register.
Production
v.
47,
#248
(Monday,
on the Committee on Science and
79
December 27,
Technology.
p.
56
145.
146.
Interview with Amy Goldsmith.
Bander and Goldstein.
pp. 19-20
147.
Lipshutz.
149.
150.
150a.
151.
Interview with Amy Goldsmith.
Interviews with Amy Goldsmith and Rich Smith.
Coalition
of Northeastern Governors.
Low-Level Waste
Policy Working Group.
Northeast Interstate
Low-Level
p. 25
Radioactive Waste Management Compact.
Bander and Goldstein.
p. 20
152.
153.
154.
155.
Ibid.
pp. 21-22
Tb3.
p. 21
TiTTd.
p. 21
Brown.
p. 4
156.
Interview with Bob Johnson.
p. 173
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