United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
Report to the Co-Chairman, Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, U.S.
Senate
March 2009
DRUG CONTROL
Better Coordination
with the Department
of Homeland Security
and an Updated
Accountability
Framework Can
Further Enhance
DEA’s Efforts to Meet
Post-9/11
Responsibilities
GAO-09-63
March 2009
DRUG CONTROL
Accountability Integrity Reliability
Highlights
Highlights of GAO-09-63, a report to the
Co-Chairman, Caucus on International
Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate
Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland
Security and an Updated Accountability Framework
Can Further Enhance DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11
Responsibilities
Why GAO Did This Study
What GAO Found
Given the global context of the war
on drugs—coupled with growing
recognition since September 11,
2001 (9/11), of the nexus between
drug trafficking and terrorism—the
mission of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and efforts
to forge effective interagency
partnerships and coordination are
increasingly important. GAO was
asked to examine, in the context of
the post-9/11 environment, DEA’s
(1) priorities, (2) interagency
partnerships and coordination
mechanisms, and (3) strategic plan
and performance measures. GAO
reviewed DEA policy, planning, and
budget documents and visited 7 of
DEA’s 21 domestic field offices and
3 of its 7 regional offices abroad—
sites selected to reflect diverse
drug-trafficking threats, among
other factors. GAO also contacted
other relevant federal agencies—
including U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and
U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP)—and various
state and local partner agencies.
Since 9/11, while continuing its primary mission of enforcing U.S. controlled
substances laws, DEA has supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts by
prioritizing narcoterrorism cases—drug-trafficking cases linked to terrorism—
and by implementing other policies and actions, such as collecting terrorismrelated intelligence from confidential informants and foreign partners. Also,
DEA is using a new enforcement authority to pursue and arrest
narcoterrorists—even those who operate outside the United States.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the
Attorney General and the Secretary
of Homeland Security take actions
to enhance the effectiveness of (1)
interagency partnerships involving
DEA, ICE, and CBP and (2) the
multiagency Special Operations
Division and the OCDETF Fusion
Center. DOJ agreed. DHS
responded that discussions with
DOJ are ongoing. DHS neither
explicitly agreed nor disagreed
with GAO’s recommendations but
suggested revisions to the wording,
which GAO did not make.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on GAO-09-63.
For more information, contact Eileen Larence
at (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov.
Because most of the nation’s illegal drug supply is distributed by Mexican
drug organizations, DEA’s partnerships and coordination with Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) agencies that have border-related missions–ICE
and CBP—are important. However, an outdated interagency agreement–and
long-standing disputes involving ICE’s drug enforcement role and DEA’s
oversight of that role—have led to conflicts and the potential for duplicative
investigative efforts. Another interagency agreement, predating CBP’s
formation under DHS, has led to operational inefficiencies, as reflected in a
bifurcated process for handling illegal drugs seized at the nation’s borders.
That is, drugs seized by CBP between ports of entry are to be referred to DEA,
but drugs seized at ports of entry are to be referred to ICE. According to CBP,
an updated agreement that specifies a standardized process would be more
efficient and less confusing. Further, in conducting the war on drugs, an
important interagency coordination mechanism is the Special Operations
Division, a DEA-led intelligence center that targets the command and control
capabilities of major drug-trafficking organizations. Another coordination
mechanism is the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)
Fusion Center, which collects and analyzes drug-trafficking and related
financial information and disseminates investigative leads. However, ICE is
providing limited information to the Special Operations Division and is not
participating in the OCDETF Fusion Center. As a result, according to DEA,
these coordination entities are not as effective as they could be. Resolution of
these interagency issues necessitates involvement by both the Attorney
General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, given that their respective
departments’ component agencies have been unable to reach mutually
acceptable agreements. Notably, because of links between drug trafficking
and terrorism, DEA has established new partnerships with the Department of
Defense (DOD), especially in Afghanistan, where they share intelligence and
DOD provides airlift and other support for DEA operations.
DEA’s strategic plan has not been updated since 2003; also, DEA’s annual
performance plans do not provide results-focused measures for assessing the
agency’s post-9/11 activities, such as counterterrorism efforts. A current and
comprehensive strategic planning and performance measurement framework
would help to ensure accountability by providing crucial information to DEA’s
senior leadership for making management decisions and to the Congress and
the administration for assessing program effectiveness. In February 2009, DOJ
reported that it was reviewing DEA’s updated strategic plan.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
1
Results in Brief
Background
Since 9/11, DEA Has Adopted New Policies and Utilized a New
Enforcement Authority to Assist in Counterterrorism Efforts and
Respond to Changing Global Drug Threats While Addressing
Resource Constraints
DEA Partners with Federal, State, and Local Agencies, and though
Some Partnerships Have Improved since 9/11, Others Continue
to Have Conflicts and Inefficiencies
DEA Coordinates Activities and Leverages Resources through
Multiagency Task Forces and Intelligence Centers; However,
Two Centers Are Less Effective Because ICE Is Not Providing
All Relevant Intelligence
DEA Has Improved Its Strategic Plan and Performance Measures;
However, They Do Not Reflect the Agency’s Current Direction
and Programs and Are Insufficient to Measure Progress and
Guide Future Investments
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
6
10
Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
58
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Justice
69
Appendix III
Comments from the Department of Homeland
Security
71
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
74
Appendix IV
Page i
17
24
44
50
53
54
55
GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Tables
Table 1: Drug-Related Intelligence Centers—Missions and
Participating Agencies
Table 2: DEA Field Divisions; Other Federal Agencies; and State,
Local, and Tribal Agencies Visited by GAO at Domestic
Locations
Table 3: Federal and Foreign Agencies and Personnel Interviewed
by GAO at International Locations
Table 4: National Sheriffs’ Association’s Drug Enforcement
Committee Members Interviewed by GAO
Table 5: Multiagency Task Forces and Intelligence Centers Visited
by GAO
46
61
62
65
66
Figures
Figure 1: Map of DEA’s Domestic Divisions
Figure 2: Map of DEA’s International Regions
Figure 3: DEA Enacted Budget Authority for the Salary and
Expenses Account
Figure 4: DEA Authorized and Actual Full-time Equivalent
Positions, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2007
Figure 5: Department of State Obligations under Interagency
Agreements with DEA, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007
Figure 6: DOD Obligations under Interagency Agreements with
DEA, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2007
Page ii
13
15
22
23
39
41
GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Abbreviations
ATF
CBP
CPOT
DEA
DHS
DOD
DOJ
FBI
FTE
GPRA
HIDTA
ICE
MOU
OCDETF
ONDCP
PTO
USMS
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
consolidated priority organization target
Drug Enforcement Administration
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Defense
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
full-time equivalent
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
memorandum of understanding
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
Office of National Drug Control Policy
priority target organization
U.S. Marshals Service
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Page iii
GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
March 20, 2009
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Co-Chairman
Caucus on International Narcotics Control
United States Senate
Dear Mr. Co-Chairman:
Illegal drugs and drug abuse remain a problem in the United States. In
2007, 114 million Americans—46 percent of the U.S. population over the
age of 12—reported having used illegal drugs at least once in their lifetime
and about one-third of these individuals (36 million Americans) reported
having used illegal drugs during the previous year, according to
government estimates.1 Revenue generated from illegal drug trafficking is
estimated to have topped $64 billion in 2000.2 In addition, in 2002, the most
recent year for which estimates were published, drug use was estimated to
cost the U.S. economy over $180 billion annually in health care costs, lost
productivity, and other costs.3
The diversity of illegal drugs and their sources make drug control efforts
challenging. Drugs consumed in the United States include substances
grown and produced domestically, such as marijuana; smuggled from
other countries, such as cocaine; and diverted from legal uses to be used
illegally, such as oxycodone. While marijuana and methamphetamine are
produced domestically, the distribution of those drugs and drugs smuggled
into the country are increasingly controlled by Mexican drug-trafficking
organizations. Although some drugs, such as MDMA, commonly known as
ecstasy, enter the United States through the northern border and by other
means, most drugs are smuggled through the southern border with
Mexico. Also, the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy noted that because
1
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies,
Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings,
NSDUH Series H-34, DHHS Publication No. SMA 08-4343 (Rockville, Md.: 2008). These are
the most recent data available.
2
Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, What America’s
Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988-2000 (Washington, D.C.: December 2001). These are
the most recent data available.
3
Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, The Economic
Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-2002 (Washington, D.C.: November 2004).
Page 1
GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
of interdiction successes in the transit zone—a 6 million square mile area
that includes Central America, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the
eastern Pacific Ocean—South American drug traffickers are increasingly
using West Africa as a gateway to Europe and North America. In addition,
according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the
Department of Justice (DOJ) component agency dedicated to enforcing
the controlled substances laws of the United States through targeting and
disrupting drug-trafficking organizations, the illegal use of pharmaceutical
drugs has become an increasing concern in recent years.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), within the Executive
Office of the President, directs the nation’s counternarcotics policy and is
responsible for developing the annual National Drug Control Strategy, a
three-part strategy that aims to (1) prevent drug use before it starts,
(2) intervene and heal those who use drugs, and (3) disrupt the market for
illegal substances. DEA, as the federal law enforcement agency dedicated
to enforcing the controlled substances laws of the United States, plays a
role in the third objective of the strategy—disrupting the market for illegal
substances. In particular, DEA seeks to investigate and arrest drug
traffickers and help prepare prosecutions.
In fiscal year 2007, DEA operated under a $2 billion budget with 9,309
positions to work toward those goals.4 DEA operates through 227
domestic field offices that encompass all 50 states and also has an
international presence overseas with 87 foreign offices in 63 countries. To
accomplish its mission domestically and internationally, DEA partners
with other federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and other DOJ components, as well as U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
offices. DEA coordinates with federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies directly and through task forces, particularly task forces in the
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program and
the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.5 DEA also
4
DEA’s $2 billion budget for fiscal year 2007 does not include funding or positions
reimbursed through agreements with other federal agencies.
5
OCDETF task forces are short- and long-term task forces made up of federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies that target identified organizations linked to the major
drug-trafficking organizations most responsible for the nation’s drug supply. HIDTA task
forces, funded and managed by ONDCP, are made up of federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies that combat local and regional drug problems that are beyond the
control of local law enforcement.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
coordinates international drug control efforts with the Departments of
State and Defense and host-country governments in foreign locations.
While the fight against illegal drugs is ongoing, the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 (9/11) prompted the FBI to reprioritize policies and
programs to support counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, DEA has
found links between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers—in
particular, terrorist organizations using drug trafficking and related
proceeds to fund terrorist activities. As a result, agencies that formerly
focused on preventing and investigating traditional crimes, such as drug
trafficking, have taken on new homeland security responsibilities.
Because of ongoing concerns about drug abuse and trafficking, the
changing landscape in counternarcotics enforcement, and the links
between drug trafficking and terrorism, you asked us to review changes to
DEA in the years following 9/11. This report examines (1) post-9/11
changes to DEA policies, strategies, and authorities to support national
counterterrorism efforts and address evolving global drug threats;
(2) changes to DEA’s partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies
with counternarcotics responsibilities since 9/11, and any effects of those
changes; (3) mechanisms DEA uses to coordinate and avoid duplication
with partner agencies; and (4) the extent to which DEA’s strategic plan
and performance measures have changed to reflect the post-9/11
environment.
To understand the larger drug control context, we reviewed policy and
planning documents obtained from ONDCP, including the National Drug
Control Strategy, and we interviewed relevant ONDCP officials. Also, to
obtain additional perspectives on these topics, we conducted a literature
search of congressional hearings, DOJ Office of the Inspector General
reports, and other published materials. We reviewed DEA budget
documentation for fiscal years 2000 through 2009 and other relevant
agency documentation. We interviewed DEA officials, including the Chief
of Operations and the Chief of Intelligence, at DEA headquarters, and the
Special Agent-in-Charge of the Special Operations Division.6 Also, we
6
Functional since 1994, the DEA-led Special Operations Division was established to target
the command and control capabilities of major drug-trafficking organizations. Originally,
the division was operated exclusively by DEA and DOJ’s Criminal Division, but other
federal agencies soon became partners, beginning with the FBI in 1995, followed by the
U.S. Customs Service in 1996. Presently, additional partners include the Internal Revenue
Service; the U.S. Marshals Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Page 3
GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
conducted site visits and spoke with special agents-in-charge and other
officials at 7 of DEA’s 21 domestic field divisions.7 We selected these sites
to reflect diverse characteristics, including (1) drug-trafficking and
consumption threats identified by the 2008 National Drug Threat
Assessment (e.g., marijuana, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine);
(2) geographic differences such as border and nonborder areas, urban and
rural areas, and federally recognized Indian reservations; and (3) locations
with and without OCDETF and HIDTA representation. While the
information obtained during these visits cannot be generalized to all of
DEA’s domestic field divisions, the information provided valuable insights
into a variety of drug enforcement issues and mechanisms. For
perspectives on DEA’s international presence, we spoke with officials at
DEA’s regional offices in Mexico and Thailand, two countries in which
DEA has had long-standing operations and partnerships, as well as in
Afghanistan where DEA resources have been increased in recent years.
Also, we spoke by telephone with a DEA official in Brussels, Belgium, to
better understand DEA’s new attention to drug trafficking in West Africa;8
and the Regional Director of DEA Bogotá, where DEA has had a presence
since 1972, about changes since 9/11 and partnerships with other federal
agencies there. While the information obtained during these visits cannot
be generalized to all of DEA’s foreign field offices, they provided valuable
insights into DEA’s operations, partnerships, and coordination overseas.
To understand how DEA partners and coordinates with other federal
agencies, we reviewed counternarcotics documentation, including
interagency agreements and agency directives, and interviewed officials
from
•
DEA and other DOJ components, including the FBI; the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the U.S. Marshals
7
DEA operates 21 domestic field division offices that are responsible for overseeing DEA’s
efforts in the respective geographic areas of responsibility. We visited the following
domestic field divisions: Detroit, Michigan; Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; New
York, New York; Phoenix, Arizona; Seattle, Washington; and St. Louis, Missouri (see table 2
in app. I).
8
Because the Country Attaché of DEA’s office located in Lagos, Nigeria, was unable to
speak with us, we spoke with the Assistant Regional Director for the Europe Region,
whose area of responsibility includes West Africa.
Page 4
GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Service (USMS); the Executive Office for OCDETF; and the OCDETF
Fusion Center;9
•
two DHS components—ICE and CBP;
•
the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, and the respective U.S. embassies’ Narcotics
Affairs Sections in Bangkok (Thailand), Bogotá (Colombia), and Kabul
(Afghanistan); and
•
the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and
Global Threats.
In states where we visited DEA’s domestic field divisions, we also
interviewed officials from DEA’s principal federal partners and at least one
state, local, or tribal law enforcement agency (see table 2 in app. I). In
addition, we conducted telephone interviews with 17 of the 27 members of
the National Sheriffs’ Association’s Drug Enforcement Committee (see
table 4 in app. I). These 17 members, while not representative of all local
law enforcement, provided us additional insights into DEA’s partnerships
and coordination with local law enforcement. Although DEA partners with
agencies that have counternarcotics roles that focus on interdiction, such
as the U.S. Coast Guard, we do not discuss DEA’s partnerships with those
agencies in this report because DEA does not focus on interdiction
activities. We compared DEA’s strategic plan, performance measures, and
interagency coordination activities with recommendations made in the
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (9/11 Commission Report) and the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA),10 and interagency
coordination practices recommended by GAO.11 Appendix I contains
additional details about our objectives, scope, and methodology.
9
The OCDETF Fusion Center, which began operating in fiscal year 2006, was created to
enhance the overall capacity of the OCDETF program to engage in intelligence-driven law
enforcement by combining the analytical resources and intelligence information of the
OCDETF member agencies and others. The center collects and analyzes drug-trafficking
and related financial information and disseminates investigative leads to OCDETF
participants.
10
Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285.
11
GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Enhance and Sustain
Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through March 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief
In the years since 9/11, DEA has given top priority to narcoterrorism cases
(drug cases linked to terrorism) and changed existing procedures as well
as used new policies and authorities to support this shift in focus.
Specifically, while DEA continues to focus on counternarcotics efforts,
DEA modified its policies to prioritize narcotics investigations that have
links to terrorist organizations and to require that informants who provide
drug-related intelligence be questioned at least quarterly to collect
terrorism-related intelligence. DEA is also pursuing narcoterrorists using a
new enforcement authority authorized as part of the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which criminalizes
“narcoterrorism”—drug trafficking in support of terrorism—even if it
occurs outside the United States.12 As of October 2008, use of this authority
had resulted in the indictment of four individuals. To further enhance the
coordination of counternarcotics and terrorism intelligence, a component
of DEA rejoined the intelligence community. DEA made strategic
modifications to focus on major drug-trafficking organizations, their
financial infrastructures, and global drug threats. For example, DEA has
made drug-trafficking organizations most responsible for the smuggling of
illegal drugs into the United States the top investigative priority after those
cases that involve links to terrorism. In fulfilling its counternarcotics
mission while taking on new responsibilities and addressing other
challenges since 9/11, DEA’s inflation-adjusted budget increased by less
than 1 percent during fiscal years 2002 through 2007. As a result, during a
self-initiated hiring freeze that lasted from August 2006 until December
12
This enforcement authority was enacted in March 2006 as section 122 of the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192,
225 (2006). It is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 960a.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
2007,13 DEA pursued fewer narcotics-trafficking cases and reduced some
programs.
DEA partners domestically with federal, state, and local agencies, and
internationally with federal and host-country agencies; however,
partnerships have changed since 9/11 and outdated interagency
agreements have led to conflicts with ICE and operational inefficiencies at
CBP. In October 2005, we reported that agencies can more effectively
coordinate by leveraging resources, agreeing on roles and responsibilities,
establishing compatible policies and priorities for operating across agency
boundaries, and monitoring the status and results of these efforts.14 DEA
partners with DOJ components such as the FBI, USMS, and ATF, and
reprioritizations and reorganizations since 9/11 have improved some of
these partnerships. However, DEA’s partnerships with DHS component
agencies—ICE and CBP—are less clearly defined. An outdated
interagency agreement that does not reflect ICE’s current organization and
responsibilities—coupled with long-standing jurisdictional disputes
involving ICE’s drug enforcement role and DEA’s oversight of ICE’s drugrelated investigations—have led to conflicts between DEA and ICE that
remain unresolved. Without an updated interagency agreement between
DEA and ICE, there is potential for duplicative investigative efforts and
concern that officer safety could be compromised. Also, while DEA and
ICE have cross-designation procedures for giving ICE agents authority to
pursue counternarcotics cases, the procedures have proven to be
inefficient and problematic, which has led to fewer ICE agents being
designated to assist in counternarcotics efforts. Another interagency
agreement—predating CBP’s organization under DHS—has led to
operational inefficiencies at CBP for handling illegal drugs seized at the
nation’s borders and referring related intelligence to DEA. Without an
updated interagency agreement between DEA and CBP, these operational
inefficiencies are likely to continue. Applicable interagency agreements
involving DEA, ICE, and CBP have not been updated or amended and
there is no monitoring process in place to ensure that new agreements will
be reached. Internationally, DEA partners with the Department of State to
13
DEA ended the hiring freeze following enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). According to the explanatory
statement accompanying DEA’s appropriation, the Congress provided funding above the
President’s request in order to enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze. 153 Cong. Rec. H15741,
H15799 (2007).
14
See GAO-06-15.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
provide counternarcotics training and related support to other nations.
Also, DEA has new and evolving partnerships with DOD in Afghanistan,
Africa, and Central Asia where linkages exist between narcotics
trafficking, DEA’s area of expertise, and terrorist activities.
DEA continues to use multiagency task forces and intelligence centers to
coordinate counternarcotics investigations and operations with other law
enforcement entities, avoid duplication, and leverage partner agency
resources; however, there are limitations to the effectiveness of the
Special Operations Division because ICE is not providing all of its drugrelated information.15 Also, ICE is not participating in the OCDETF Fusion
Center. DEA participates with federal, state, and local law enforcement in
the OCDETF program to jointly target major drug-trafficking organizations
and the HIDTA program to coordinate investigations and operations in
regions with significant drug-trafficking problems. According to officials
we interviewed, these multiagency task forces are effective for leveraging
limited resources to target multijurisdictional drug-trafficking
organizations. DEA has a lead role in the Special Operations Division and
the OCDETF Fusion Center, which bring together the intelligence and
analytical resources of federal agencies with counternarcotics roles to
detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to illegal drug trafficking and, in
some cases, terrorist activity. The 9/11 Commission Report asserted that
information sharing and the use of all relevant sources of information are
critical for combating threats to the United States. However, though ICE
leadership is aware of this, and DEA has discussed it, ICE has continued to
provide limited information to the Special Operations Division and is not
participating in the OCDETF Fusion Center. ICE officials acknowledged
that ICE does not share all of its most sensitive data, such as some
confidential informant information and bank account information, with
the Special Operations Division. DEA officials noted that other agencies,
such as the FBI, do share sensitive information with the division, and DEA
has demonstrated that it can adequately protect the information. Also, the
DEA officials stressed that such information facilitates being able to
“connect the dots” during investigations of major drug-trafficking
organizations. Regarding nonparticipation in the OCDETF Fusion Center,
the ICE officials said that although ICE has made various concessions
15
While other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have special operations
divisions, for the purposes of this report, Special Operations Division refers to the DEA-run
intelligence coordination center. Because of the sensitivity of intelligence coordinated by
the Special Operations Division, we do not identify specific intelligence that is provided to
the center in this report.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
relating to the information data set that ICE is willing to share with the
center, none have been acceptable to DEA and, thus, negotiations are at an
impasse. According to DEA, absent full participation by ICE, the Special
Operations Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center are unable to most
effectively identify links to and target major drug-trafficking organizations.
DEA’s strategic planning and performance measurement framework—
which consists of a multiyear strategic plan and annual performance
plans—has improved over time in response to previous criticisms;
however, DEA’s strategic plan has not been updated since 2003 and does
not reflect all of the program and policy changes the agency has made
since 9/11, particularly in reference to DEA’s role in supporting the
nation’s counterterrorism efforts—efforts that have received increased
DEA focus and funding since 9/11.16 As such, the strategic plan does not
fully reflect the intended purpose of providing a template for ensuring
measurable results and operational accountability. DEA’s 2009 annual
performance plan does include four performance measures of the agency’s
counterterrorism efforts—measures such as the number of intelligence
products completed by DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence.
However, these measures do not provide a basis for assessing the effects
of DEA’s efforts, such as the prevention of specific terrorist actions.
Having an up-to-date strategic plan and results-focused annual
performance plans could improve DEA’s efforts to provide the Congress,
the administration, and other policymakers with information needed to
assess the agency’s progress, help inform future funding and program
decisions, and ensure that the agency is achieving its part of the National
Drug Control Strategy.
To enhance collaborative efforts to combat narcotics trafficking, we are
recommending that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security jointly develop a new interagency agreement or other mechanism
to clarify their respective departments’ counternarcotics roles and
responsibilities, particularly the roles and responsibilities of DEA, ICE,
and CBP, and monitor the implementation of the new agreement or other
mechanism and make any needed adjustments. We are recommending that
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security develop
more efficient cross-designation procedures—that is, procedures for
16
In its February 6, 2009, written comments on a draft of this report, DOJ noted that DEA
has submitted to the department for review and approval an updated strategic plan (for
fiscal years 2009-2014), which includes additional language that supports the post-9/11 goal
of addressing counterterrorism.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
granting ICE agents authority to pursue counternarcotics cases. Also, we
are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) direct ICE
to contribute all relevant drug-related information to the Special
Operations Division and fully participate in the OCDETF Fusion Center
and (2) ensure that ICE fully responds. Finally, we are recommending that
the Administrator of DEA update the agency’s strategic plan to more fully
and accurately reflect the agency’s post-9/11 responsibilities and activities
and also establish appropriate performance measures that provide a basis
for assessing progress. On February 6, 2009, in commenting on a draft of
this report, DOJ concurred with our recommendations. On March 9, 2009,
DHS responded to our draft report asserting that the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General have begun meeting
regularly in order to enhance coordination between DHS and DOJ on a
range of issues, including those addressed in this report. While neither
explicitly agreeing nor disagreeing with our recommendations, DHS
suggested several revisions to the wording of the recommendations, which
we considered but did not make. We believe that implementation of our
recommendations will help to ensure continued progress in addressing
long-standing issues.
Background
DEA is the nation’s federal agency dedicated to drug law enforcement.
DEA was created in 1973 as a result of Department of Justice
Reorganization Plan No. 2 and Executive Order 11727.17 Basically, the
President proposed the “creation of a single, comprehensive Federal
agency within the Department of Justice to lead the war against illicit drug
traffic,” namely DEA, which consolidated the drug enforcement functions
performed by legacy DOJ components and by the Department of the
Treasury (Treasury).18 The implementing executive order authorized the
Attorney General, through DEA, to coordinate the enforcement of U.S.
drug laws among all executive branch departments and agencies, requiring
those agencies to assist DEA on drug enforcement efforts when requested.
17
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974), is
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 1, along with the accompanying President’s Message to Congress.
Executive Order No. 11727 appears at 38 Fed. Reg. 18357 (1973).
18
As discussed in more detail later in this report, Reorganization Plan No. 2 preserved
Treasury’s authority to conduct drug searches, seizures, and arrests “at regular inspection
locations at ports of entry or anywhere along the land or water borders of the United
States,” provided that any evidence or persons seized by Treasury officials are turned over
to the Attorney General.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Today, DEA works to disrupt and dismantle the leadership, command,
control, and financial infrastructure of major drug-trafficking
organizations. DEA uses a multifaceted approach that includes
investigating narcotics cases and preparing them for prosecution;
managing a national drug intelligence program to collect, analyze, and
disseminate drug intelligence; enforcing counternarcotics laws involving
the diversion of legally produced substances for illegal purposes; and
coordinating with and leveraging the resources of international, federal,
state, and local partners.
DEA’s operations are conducted under a framework comprising four
strategic areas: (1) domestic enforcement, (2) international enforcement,
(3) state and local assistance, and (4) diversion control.19
19
Diversion control is the detection, prevention, and elimination of the diversion of legal
drugs, such as pharmaceuticals, to the illegal drug market.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Domestic Enforcement
DEA works to eliminate drug use and trafficking domestically with a
multijurisdictional approach that focuses federal, state, and local
resources to disrupt and dismantle drug-trafficking organizations. DEA
investigates, arrests, and refers to prosecution individuals associated with
these drug-trafficking organizations. DEA also collaborates with federal,
state, and local law enforcement partners; develops intelligence through
court-ordered wiretaps, confidential informants, and other sources; and
utilizes asset forfeiture authorities.20 As of September 30, 2008, DEA had
6,023 personnel based in domestic field offices, which included 3,809
special agents.21 These personnel operate from 227 domestic field offices,
which are organized under 21 divisions that encompass the nation (see
fig. 1).
20
21 U.S.C. § 881 provides that proceeds from drug-related crimes, as well as property used
to facilitate certain crimes, are subject to forfeiture to the government in order to ensure
that criminals do not benefit financially from their illegal acts.
21
Domestically, as of September 30, 2008, DEA also employed 2,487 employees at
headquarters and operational support facilities, such as the El Paso Intelligence Center,
OCDETF Fusion Center, the DEA-led Special Operations Division, and laboratories.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Figure 1: Map of DEA’s Domestic Divisions
18
2
18
3
13
5
14
19
9
17
6
11
21
9
9
16
15
4
1
7
12
8
10
20
Atlanta Field Division
1
Houston Field Division
8
Phoenix Field Division
15
Boston Field Division
2
Los Angeles Field Division
9
San Diego Field Division
16
Chicago Field Division
3
Miami Field Division
10
San Francisco Field Division
17
Dallas Field Division
4
Newark Field Division
11
Seattle Field Division
18
Denver Field Division
5
New Orleans Field Division
12
St. Louis Field Division
19
Detroit Field Division
6
New York Field Division
13
Caribbean Field Division
20
El Paso Field Division
7
Philadelphia Field Division
14
Washington, D.C. Field Division
21
Sources: GAO (analysis, map art), MapResources (map), DEA (data).
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
International Enforcement
Since the majority of illegal narcotics are produced outside the United
States and smuggled into the country, DEA has established the largest
federal law enforcement presence overseas to disrupt and dismantle the
world’s most significant drug-trafficking organizations where they are
located. As of September 30, 2008, the agency’s 616 foreign-stationed
personnel included 427 special agents, operating from its foreign offices.
DEA’s foreign field offices are divided into seven regions (see fig. 2).
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Figure 2: Map of DEA’s International Regions
6
1
5
Ankara
Rome
7
San Juan
Mexico City
2
Bogotá
Bangkok
3
4
La Paz
7
1
NORTH AND CENTRAL
AMERICA REGION
Belize
Canada (2 offices)
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico (11 offices)
Nicaragua
Panama
Regional office:
Mexico City, Mexico
2
CARIBBEAN REGION
Barbados
Dominican Republic
Haiti
Jamaica
Netherlands Antilles
Puerto Rico
Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago
3
ANDEAN REGION
Colombia (2 offices)
Ecuador (2 offices)
Peru
Venezuela
Regional office:
Bogotá, Colombia
4
SOUTHERN CONE
REGION
Argentina
Bolivia (4 offices)
Brazil (2 offices)
Chile
Paraguay
Regional office:
La Paz, Bolivia
5
EUROPE / AFRICA
REGION
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
France
Italy (2 offices)
Netherlands
Nigeria
Poland
South Africa
Spain
Switzerland
United Kingdom
6
Regional office:
Rome, Italy
MIDDLE EAST /
CENTRAL ASIA REGION
Afghanistan
Cyprus
Egypt
Greece
India
Pakistan (2 offices)
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkey (2 offices)
Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan
Regional office:
Ankara, Turkey
7
FAR EAST REGION
Australia
Burma
China
Hong Kong
Japan
Laos
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Thailand (3 offices)
Vietnam
Regional office:
Bangkok, Thailand
Regional office:
San Juan, Puerto Rico
Source: GAO (map art), Map Resources (map), DEA (data).
DEA’s foreign offices conduct bilateral drug investigations with hostcountry counternarcotics agencies, coordinate international drug
intelligence, train foreign law enforcement agency personnel in drug
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
enforcement methods, assist with domestic U.S. counternarcotics
investigations that have international links, liaise with foreign
governments and law enforcement agencies, and collaborate on drug
investigations and other efforts with other U.S. law enforcement activities,
as needed.
State and Local Assistance
To ensure a consistent national approach to drug law enforcement, DEA
trains state and local law enforcement officers. DEA’s training is designed
to enhance the capabilities of state and local law enforcement in
investigative techniques, intelligence gathering, and cleanup of toxic
laboratories associated with the production of illegal substances such as
methamphetamine. DEA also manages DOJ counternarcotics grant
programs that provide assistance to state and local law enforcement.
Diversion Control
The mission of DEA’s Diversion Control Program is to prevent, detect, and
investigate the redirection of controlled pharmaceuticals (such as
narcotics, stimulants, and depressants) and certain listed chemicals (such
as ephedrine) into the illicit market, while ensuring that adequate supplies
are available to meet medical, scientific, and other legitimate needs. To
achieve this mission, the program’s investigative resources are focused on
identifying, targeting, disrupting, or dismantling diverters of licit
controlled substances and chemicals at the domestic and international
level. The program is funded through the Diversion Control Fee Account,
which consists of registration fees paid by licensed pharmacies and
wholesale distributors of licit controlled substances.22 Because we focused
on DEA’s efforts to disrupt and dismantle the market for illegal drugs, we
do not address the Diversion Control Program or the diversion of legal
drugs in this report.
22
For fiscal year 2008, the account total was $239 million.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Since 9/11, DEA Has
Adopted New Policies
and Utilized a New
Enforcement
Authority to Assist in
Counterterrorism
Efforts and Respond
to Changing Global
Drug Threats While
Addressing Resource
Constraints
In the context of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism, DEA changed
some policies and strategies to assist in counterterrorism efforts and
respond to global drug threats, such as prioritizing narcotics cases with
links to terrorism, collecting terrorism-related intelligence from
confidential sources, utilizing a new law enforcement authority, and
participating in the intelligence community. In addition, in order to most
effectively use resources, DEA has focused investigations on narcoticstrafficking organizations most responsible for smuggling illegal drugs to
the United States, and has targeted these organizations’ financial
infrastructures. While increasing its counterterrorism efforts and
maintaining its traditional role of pursuing narcotics traffickers, DEA
operated under a relatively flat budget and implemented a temporary
hiring freeze to address resource constraints, which led to the pursuit of
fewer narcotics cases.
DEA Contributes to the
Global War on Terrorism
by Giving Top Priority to
Cases with Links to
Terrorism, Adapting
Intelligence Collection and
Sharing Policies, Pursuing
Narcoterrorists, and
Rejoining the Intelligence
Community
According to DOJ officials, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, DEA and
other federal law enforcement agencies were asked to leverage their
resources and ongoing efforts to assist in counterterrorism and homeland
security efforts. In 2002, with the implementation of the Global War on
Terrorism, DEA implemented policies to prioritize counternarcotics cases
that have links to terrorism. To further support the nation’s
counterterrorism efforts, DEA headquarters also mandated that DEA
agents periodically (at least every quarter) question all of the agency’s
worldwide network of confidential informants (approximately 5,000) to
determine whether they have information related to terrorist organizations
or plots. According to DEA, confidential informants have provided
valuable information on terrorists groups, for example, in Afghanistan
where this information has thwarted hostile acts against U.S. personnel
and interests. In 2003, DEA also instituted procedures that require agents
to share terrorism-related information with partner agencies and the FBI’s
Joint Terrorism Task Forces to further ensure intelligence coordination
and participate in the determination of linkages between terrorists and
narcotics traffickers.23 These procedures require that DEA agents and
agents-in-charge (1) immediately pass terrorism-related information to the
local FBI office and Joint Terrorism Task Force; (2) forward information
23
Joint Terrorism Task Forces are partnerships between the FBI and other federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
to relevant state and local law enforcement; (3) in foreign offices,
immediately pass the information to relevant government agencies that are
part of the respective U.S. embassy; (4) notify DEA headquarters of the
information and the agencies with which information was coordinated;
and (5) pass information to the Special Operations Division. These
protocols were reiterated most recently in 2004. A senior DEA official
reported that these protocols help to leverage interagency resources and
enhance the nation’s counterterrorism efforts.
DEA is directly contributing to counterterrorism efforts by pursuing
narcoterrorists—those who fund terrorist activities with proceeds from
narcotics trafficking—through the use of a new enforcement authority.
Section 122 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 960a) expands federal jurisdiction for drug
crimes committed outside the United States, where the prohibited drug
activity is for the purpose of funding any person or organization that has
engaged or engages in terrorist activity or terrorism.24 As a practical
matter, the provision expanded the reach of U.S. law enforcement beyond
U.S. borders by granting extraterritorial jurisdiction to investigate, indict,
and seek the extradition of narcoterrorists worldwide. While DEA has
pursued drug-trafficking organizations identified as having links to
terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, commonly known as FARC, DEA officials reported that prior to
the passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005, and specifically 21 U.S.C. § 960a, DEA was unable to charge
traffickers outside the United States unless it could prove that they
intended to traffic narcotics to the United States. This proof requirement
does not appear under the new provision, which made trafficking
narcotics to any destination with the intent to fund terrorist activities
prosecutable in U.S. federal courts. According to DEA officials,
approaches to applying the new provision are still being explored because
of its recent enactment, the complexity of international investigations and
relations, and the continuously developing partnerships with foreign law
enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, the officials stressed that the new
authority is an important tool in the counterterrorism fight because most
countries generally accept the illegality of drug trafficking and the danger
of allowing drug-trafficking organizations to flourish. Because of this
general agreement, in some countries, DEA has leveraged its relationships
24
In general, extraterritorial jurisdiction would exist under 21 U.S.C. § 960a based on a
sufficient connection between U.S. interests and the offender or his or her offense.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
with host governments to arrest and extradite traffickers on narcotics
charges in cases where terrorism charges could prove divisive for relations
with the host country. As of October 2008, DEA reported that four
individuals had been charged under 21 U.S.C. § 960a.
Additionally, a component of DEA, the Office of National Security
Intelligence, joined the intelligence community in 2006 to better
coordinate drug- and terror-related intelligence. DEA was a member of the
intelligence community until it was removed in 1981 in conjunction with
then-ongoing efforts to separate the federal government’s intelligence and
law enforcement functions. The 9/11 Commission Report identified
intelligence and information sharing as two of five key areas that the
federal government needed to improve to decrease the likelihood of a
terrorist attack in the future. DEA and intelligence community agencies
recognized that DEA can contribute unique narcotics and terrorismrelated intelligence to the intelligence community. For example, DEA
collects intelligence from confidential informants, judicial wiretaps, and
foreign law enforcement partners—sources that may not be available to
other intelligence community partners. Since becoming an official member
of the intelligence community in 2006, DEA’s Office of National Security
Intelligence has established liaison positions at various intelligence
community components, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, and also
provides reports to intelligence community partner agencies—selfinitiated reports as well as reports generated in response to specific
requests. For example, DEA reported in April 2008 that it provides partner
agencies approximately 130 terrorism-related intelligence reports per
month. According to senior officials at DEA, membership in the
intelligence community has provided a link that ensures that terrorism and
narcotics intelligence is coordinated with all intelligence community
partners. Further, according to a recent DOJ Office of the Inspector
General report, intelligence community partners find DEA’s intelligence
valuable in their efforts to examine ongoing threats.25
25
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, The Drug
Enforcement Administration’s Use of Intelligence Analysts, Audit Report 08-23
(Washington, D.C.: 2008).
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
DEA Modified Strategies to
Target, Disrupt, and
Dismantle the Most
Dangerous DrugTrafficking Organizations
and Their Financial
Infrastructures
While DEA made a number of changes to its policies and procedures to
reflect the nation’s and law enforcement’s counterterrorism priority
following 9/11, DEA made additional strategic modifications to focus on
the most serious drug traffickers and their financial infrastructures.
According to DEA’s Chief of Operations, prior to 9/11, DEA pursued major
drug-trafficking organizations; however, the adoption of the consolidated
priority organization target (CPOT) strategy has focused drug enforcement
efforts on the narcotics-trafficking organizations most responsible for the
importation of illegal drugs into the United States. The CPOT list was
launched by the Executive Office for OCDETF in 2002 as part of a
comprehensive drug enforcement strategy that uses the expertise of
multiple federal law enforcement agencies to identify and target the most
significant drug-trafficking organizations and their components. According
to a senior official in the Executive Office for OCDETF, since 2002, the
Executive Office for OCDETF has managed the CPOT selection process,
set the selection criteria, and maintained responsibility for the
dissemination of the CPOT list. DEA has reported that by targeting
organizations with the greatest effect on the U.S. drug supply, DEA is
maximizing the use of limited resources.
All 46 of the narcotics-trafficking organizations on the CPOT list are based
in countries outside the United States. DEA has added personnel to
foreign offices, and plans to increase the number of foreign-deployed
personnel as funding allows, to pursue CPOT organizations where they
operate. DEA officials have described their efforts of pursuing drug
traffickers abroad before their illegal narcotics can arrive in the United
States or at the nation’s borders as “expanding the border.” From fiscal
years 2000 through 2007, DEA increased the number of agents stationed in
foreign offices by 14 percent, to 427 positions, and foreign intelligence
specialists by 28 percent, to 67 positions. DEA increased the number of
agents in regions where DEA has identified new and emerging drug
threats, such as in the Middle East, East Asia, and South and Central
America, and has plans to further increase its presence in these regions.
In order to increase DEA’s resources in foreign offices, the administration
decreased some domestic programs to focus resources on the CPOT
program. For example, mobile enforcement teams, teams of 8 to 12 agents
who deploy to assist local law enforcement with drug problems or
traffickers that cannot be addressed with local resources, were eliminated
from DEA’s 2005 and subsequent budget requests to focus resources on
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
higher priorities, including the CPOT strategy.26 Likewise, Demand
Reduction, a program that uses DEA’s expertise to assist state and local
law enforcement with efforts to prevent and reduce illegal drug use, was
eliminated from DEA’s budget requests beginning in 2005.
In 2003, the DEA Administrator made financial investigations one of the
top priorities for DEA, articulating that attacking the financial
infrastructure of drug-trafficking organizations was essential to fully
dismantling them. Accordingly, the Administrator made financial
investigations a required component of every narcotics investigation. To
implement this, DEA established the Office of Financial Operations and
provided agents with specialized training on financial operations. Also,
DEA charged the Office of Financial Operations with being the point of
contact for the financial services industry as well as federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies. With the emphasis on investigating the
financial infrastructures of drug-trafficking organizations, DEA has
reported denying $7 billion in revenue to drug-trafficking organizations
from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007.27
While DEA’s Role Has
Expanded to Include
Assisting in
Counterterrorism Efforts,
Resource Constraints and
a Self-Imposed Hiring
Freeze Have Affected Its
Ability to Pursue Some
Narcotics Targets
While DEA has implemented changes, such as assisting in
counterterrorism efforts and focusing on CPOTs, it has done so in the
context of resource constraints and a self-imposed hiring freeze, which
have affected its ability to pursue some narcotics targets. To maintain
funding for operations in the context of a relatively flat budget, DEA
implemented a hiring freeze that lasted from August 2006 until December
2007, when DEA began operating under its fiscal year 2008 appropriation.
DEA has reported that as a result of the hiring freeze and other factors, it
pursued fewer CPOT-linked priority target organization (PTO) and nonPTO cases.28
26
In 2008, DEA received funding to reinstate mobile enforcement teams in 10 DEA
domestic field division offices—Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark,
Philadelphia, San Diego, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.
27
Revenue denied is the sum of DEA’s worldwide asset seizures and the production value
of drug seizures.
28
PTOs are those drug-traffikcing organizations that have an identified hierarchy engaged
in the highest levels of drug trafficking, drug money laundering operations, or both and
have a significant international, national, regional, or local impact upon drug availability.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Since 9/11, DEA has received limited additional funding to support specific
programs that assist in counterterrorism efforts. As such, DEA’s new
strategies and policies generally have been undertaken with few additional
resources. DEA’s direct funding for salaries and expenses increased by
approximately $280 million during the fiscal years following 9/11—from
$1.48 billion in fiscal year 2002 to $1.76 billion in fiscal year 2007 (see fig.
3).29 However, after adjusting for inflation, that increase amounts to less
than 1 percent per year, on average. Additionally, figure 3 shows that
DEA’s budget has been relatively flat from 2002 to 2007 after adjustment
for inflation and even experienced slight decreases from fiscal years 2003
through 2004 and from fiscal years 2005 through 2006.
Figure 3: DEA Enacted Budget Authority for the Salary and Expenses Account
Dollars (in millions)
2,000
1,800
1,729
1,775
1,768
1,772
1,768
1,790
1,757
1,619
1,689
1,639
1,600 1,530
1,551
1,585
1,481
1,400
1,360
1,200 1,256
1,000
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Fiscal year
Not adjusted for inflation
Adjusted for inflation
Source: GAO analysis of DEA and ONDCP data.
Note: Data exclude the DEA Diversion Control Fee Account.
29
For this analysis, we did not include funding from the Diversion Control Fee Account,
which consists of fees charged to DEA registrants, such as legal manufacturers,
distributors, dispensers (including physicians), importers, and exporters of controlled
substances and listed chemicals.
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
From fiscal years 2000 through 2005, DEA received annual authorizations
to increase the number of personnel it could employ. However, DEA has
reported that because of budget constraints, it was unable to increase the
actual number of onboard staff and concurrently maintain the agency’s
operations. As shown in figure 4, although DEA was authorized to increase
the number of personnel on board by more than 8 percent from 7,336 in
fiscal year 2000 to 8,025 in fiscal year 2007, the actual number of personnel
on board was lower in 2007 than in 2000.
Figure 4: DEA Authorized and Actual Full-time Equivalent Positions, Fiscal Years
2000 through 2007
FTE
8,500
8,250
8,157
8,018
8,025
8,000
7,661
7,515
7,500
7,412
7,336
7,225
7,131
7,063
7,000
7,087
6,973
7,122
7,071
6,921
6,500
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Fiscal years
Actual FTE
Authorized FTE
Source: GAO analysis of DEA and ONDCP data.
Note: Data exclude full-time equivalents (FTE) funded through the DEA Diversion Control Fee
Account.
In August 2006, to address budget limitations while maintaining priority
programs and operations, DEA elected to institute a hiring freeze, which
remained in effect until December 2007. A senior DEA official explained
that DEA chose to defer hiring and streamline programs for efficiency in
addition to non–priority program cuts noted above. According to DEA
estimates, as a result of the hiring freeze, there are now approximately 220
to 225 fewer special agents operating in the field. DEA noted, for example,
that during the hiring freeze, the agency trained only one class of new
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
agents, whereas the agency typically trains four to nine classes of new
agents each year. Also, according to DEA, the reduction in the number of
agents resulted in a 22 percent decrease in the number of special agent
investigative work hours dedicated to CPOT-linked cases during fiscal
year 2007 compared to fiscal year 2006. Further, DEA reported that
because of the hiring freeze, 34 percent fewer CPOT-linked PTOs were
identified and 41 percent fewer were disrupted or dismantled in fiscal year
2007 than targeted in DEA’s goal. Likewise, the agency reported that it
pursued 8 percent fewer non-PTOs—organizations of lower priority to
DEA—from the first quarter of fiscal year 2006 to the first quarter of fiscal
year 2008.
The hiring freeze ended in December 2007 with enactment of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, which provided additional funding
to enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze. 30 DEA reported that from January 6,
2008, through September 27, 2008, it hired 150 special agents and 189
nonagents and held four special agent training classes. DEA has reported
that it intends to hire an additional 200 special agents and 550 nonagents in
fiscal year 2009.
DEA Partners with
Federal, State, and
Local Agencies, and
though Some
Partnerships Have
Improved since 9/11,
Others Continue to
Have Conflicts and
Inefficiencies
DEA partners with other federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies to leverage counternarcotics resources. DEA partners with DOJ
components, such as the FBI, USMS, and ATF, and reprioritizations and
reorganizations since 9/ 11 have improved some of these partnerships.
DEA also partners with DHS law enforcement agencies, such as ICE and
CBP on narcotics-smuggling cases, but outdated interagency agreements,
among other reasons, have led to conflicts with ICE and operational
inefficiencies at CBP. DEA continues to partner with the Departments of
State and Defense, and these partnerships have evolved in regions such as
Afghanistan, Africa, and Central Asia. Finally, DEA leverages the
manpower and intelligence resources of state and local law enforcement
agencies while also partnering with these agencies to provide training and
other resources.
30
Pub. L. No. 110-161, Division B, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). According to the explanatory
statement accompanying DEA’s appropriation, DEA received additional funding above the
President’s budget request to enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze. 153 Cong. Rec. H15741,
H15799 (2007).
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
DEA Continues to Build
Collaborative Partnerships
and Clearly Define Roles
and Responsibilities with
Other DOJ Law
Enforcement Agencies
Since 9/11, DEA has made progress in partnering with other DOJ law
enforcement agencies—the FBI, USMS, and ATF—on investigations,
intelligence sharing, and operations, and more clearly defining roles and
jurisdictional responsibilities within DOJ. While DEA and the FBI have
long partnered to enforce the counternarcotics laws of the United States,
the events of 9/11 led the FBI to revise its priorities and shift resources
from traditional crime enforcement activities, such as counternarcotics, to
counterterrorism and other issues. For example, while the FBI had 2,078
positions dedicated to counternarcotics prior to 9/11, the number had
reduced to 600 positions by the end of fiscal year 2006—and 86 percent of
the 600 positions were funded under the OCDETF program. According to
the Chief of the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division, as a result of this
reduction, the FBI has pursued fewer drug cases. For example, DOJ
statistics show that the FBI referred 40 percent fewer drug cases to U.S.
Attorneys and participated in 44 percent fewer OCDETF investigations in
fiscal year 2007 compared with fiscal year 2000. According to DEA and FBI
officials at headquarters and in field offices, before 9/11, DEA and the FBI
had conflicts caused by investigational overlap. Since 9/11, the FBI’s focus
on counterterrorism efforts has reduced such overlap with DEA, and FBI
officials report that they collaborate more with DEA directly and through
other mechanisms. For example, senior DEA agents and a supervisory FBI
agent in field offices reported that the two agencies have improved their
relationships through efforts such as the OCDETF program, which
leverages the resources of the FBI, DEA, and other agencies.
During our field visits, DEA special agents-in-charge of the Los Angeles,
Phoenix, and Seattle field offices told us that DEA collaborates with the
FBI on counternarcotics and counterterrorism intelligence, often via
participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces, OCDETF task forces, and
investigations involving gangs. For example, DEA and the FBI partnered
on an investigation targeting gang and drug activity in Los Angeles that
resulted in the indictment of 20 defendants in November 2007.
Additionally, two senior FBI field agents indicated that they regularly use
information-sharing tools, such as the DEA-led Special Operations
Division, to ensure that information is coordinated with DEA and other
agencies on counternarcotics investigations. Senior officials at DEA
headquarters also indicated that the FBI’s participation in the Special
Operations Division was vital, given that the FBI provides terrorism case
information as well as counternarcotics intelligence.
In three countries—Colombia, Mexico, and Thailand—DEA and the FBI
collaborate through Resolution 6, an agreement whereby FBI agents are
posted in DEA’s offices in these countries to jointly conduct investigations
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
of multijurisdictional and international drug-trafficking organizations.31
FBI agents in these locations reported that their collaboration with DEA
facilitated cooperation and reduced the risk of duplicative or overlapping
investigations. Additionally, both agencies report to the U.S. ambassador
within the respective embassy, and U.S. government policy is that DEA is
the primary point of contact for all counternarcotics investigations in
foreign countries.
DEA also partners with USMS and ATF on relevant counternarcotics
cases. Each agency’s defined role in such investigations and participation
in coordination mechanisms, such as OCDETF task forces, have helped to
facilitate collaboration. As the principal federal agency responsible for
locating and apprehending fugitives, USMS primarily coordinates with
DEA on the apprehension of narcotics fugitives and suspects indicted on
narcotics charges. The Attorney General issued a policy in 1988 that allows
DEA to turn over its fugitive apprehension responsibilities to USMS. By
leveraging the resources of USMS, DEA can use its special agents on other
investigative priorities.
ATF also has a defined role focusing on the firearms aspect of
counternarcotics investigations, which facilitates collaboration with DEA.
Because ATF’s mission includes, among other things, enforcing U.S. laws
regulating firearms and explosives, a senior ATF official reported that the
agency does not conduct independent, complex narcotics investigations;
however, suspects involved in firearms-trafficking cases often are involved
in or have links to drug-trafficking organizations. As such, firearms
investigations often evolve to incorporate a narcotics component.
However, according to senior officials at ATF headquarters and field
offices, when cases develop more complex linkages to narcotics
trafficking, such as cases involving international drug-trafficking
organizations, ATF either invites DEA to participate or turns those cases
over to DEA. Senior ATF officials representing offices in New York and
the western region of the United States reported that they collaborate well
with DEA because ATF has a clearly defined role that is distinct from
DEA’s, which reduces duplicative investigative efforts.
31
Resolution 6 is a 1994 joint resolution between DEA and the FBI designed to enhance
their coordination of international narcotics cases. Under Resolution 6, FBI agents are
assigned to DEA foreign field offices to conduct counternarcotics investigations.
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Also, in providing technical comments on a draft of this report in January
2009, DOJ noted that DEA agents were participants—in either a full-time,
part-time, or as-needed capacity—in 31 ATF task forces (referred to as
Violent Crime Impact Teams).32 The department noted that DEA has
requested an enhancement for its fiscal year 2010 budget to create 36
special agent positions to further support these teams.
DEA Partners with DHS
Component Agencies;
However, Outdated
Interagency Agreements,
among Other Causes, Have
Led to Conflicts with ICE
and Operational
Inefficiencies at CBP
In carrying out its counternarcotics mission, DEA partners with related
DHS component agencies, ICE and CBP. However, an outdated
interagency agreement and long-standing jurisdictional disputes have led
to conflicts between DEA and ICE, with the potential for duplicating
investigative efforts and compromising officer safety.33 Another
interagency agreement—predating CBP’s organization under DHS—has
led to operational inefficiencies at CBP regarding the reporting and
disposal of illegal drugs seized at the border.
DEA and ICE Partner on
Counternarcotics Efforts,
Although an Outdated
Interagency Agreement and
Long-standing Jurisdictional
Disputes regarding Roles and
Responsibilities Have Led to
Conflicts
DEA and ICE partner on drug enforcement efforts; however, conflicts
exist because the applicable interagency agreement has not been updated
since 1994 to reflect organizational and other changes, and long-standing
disputes over ICE’s drug enforcement role and DEA’s respective oversight
exist. Specifically, these disputes date back to DEA’s and ICE’s
predecessor agencies, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and
the U.S. Customs Service (Customs), which was then a component of
Treasury.34 According to the President’s message to the Congress that
accompanied Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, DEA was created “to
32
Initiated in 2004 by DOJ and ATF, the Violent Crime Impact Team program is designed to
reduce homicides and other firearms-related violent crime in selected cities. See
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections
Division, Review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ Violent
Crime Impact Team Initiative, I-2006-005 (Washington, D.C., May 2006).
33
According to DEA and other federal, state, and local agencies that we contacted,
overlapping operations resulting from investigations that are not coordinated can lead to
high-risk incidents, including the possibility of injured or killed law enforcement officers.
34
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred Customs and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, with the exception of certain functions, to the newly created DHS.
Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 403, 412, 441, 451(b), 462, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178, 2179-2180, 2192, 2196,
2202-2205 (2002). DHS established ICE by combining the criminal investigators from
Customs and the criminal investigators from the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
which had been a component of DOJ. The remaining elements of Customs and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service were reorganized into, among other agencies, CBP.
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serve as a single, comprehensive Federal agency within the Department of
Justice to lead the war against illicit drug traffic.” Among other things, the
reorganization plan transferred all of Treasury’s drug-related intelligence,
investigative, and law enforcement functions to the Attorney General, and
by delegation, DEA, except to the extent that they relate to searches and
seizures of drugs and the apprehension and detention of suspects at
“regular inspection locations at ports of entry or anywhere along the land
or water borders of the United States.” The plan further required Treasury
officials to turn over drug-related evidence and suspects to the Attorney
General. Thus, although Treasury remained responsible for interdicting
drugs and drug suspects at ports and borders, it retained drug-related
intelligence, investigative, and law enforcement functions only to the
extent that those functions relate to searches and seizures of drugs, or the
apprehension or detention of persons in connection therewith at ports and
borders. All other drug-related intelligence, investigative, and law
enforcement functions were to be the responsibility of DEA.
While Reorganization Plan No. 2 was intended to clarify counternarcotics
roles and reduce conflicts between DOJ and Treasury component
agencies, disputes continued. As a result of these disagreements, DEA and
Customs sought clarification on a variety of issues, including Customs’
jurisdiction over counternarcotics cases, from DOJ’s Office of Legal
Counsel, which is responsible for addressing questions of legal authority
among executive branch agencies, among other things. In addressing the
disagreement over Customs’ drug enforcement jurisdiction, the Office of
Legal Counsel stated that the role of Customs in drug enforcement was
limited to interdictions at the international borders of the United States
and that as a result of the reorganization plan that created DEA, Customs
did not have independent authority to carry out drug investigations.35 The
Office of Legal Counsel further stated that under 21 U.S.C. § 873(b), the
Attorney General is authorized to request assistance from other federal
agencies in carrying out Title 21 enforcement duties and that it is the duty
of those agencies to furnish assistance. The Office of Legal Counsel further
observed that Customs agents may participate in drug investigations, but
that the Attorney General required Customs agents to work under the
supervision of DEA when doing so.36 This principle is embodied in DOJ’s
35
Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney
General, “United States Customs Service Jurisdiction” (June 3, 1986).
36
Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Joseph R. Davis, Chief
Counsel, DEA, “Authority of the United States Customs Service to Participate in Law
Enforcement Efforts Against Drug Violators” (June 11, 1985).
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regulations, which authorize “cross-designated” federal law enforcement
officers to undertake “drug investigations under the supervision of the
DEA.”37
In an attempt to resolve their differences, DEA and Customs negotiated a
memorandum of understanding (MOU), the most recent version of which
was completed in 1994, to set forth the policies and procedures by which
DEA would cross-designate Customs (now ICE) agents to enforce Title
21.38 The stated purpose of the MOU was to enhance the overall drug
enforcement strategy by empowering cross-designated Customs agents to
enforce Title 21;39 promote coordination, communication, and cooperation;
and avoid dangerous, confrontational, and duplicative activities between
the two agencies. Among other things, the MOU specifically restricted
cross-designated Customs agents to investigating individuals and
organizations involved in the smuggling of controlled substances across
U.S. international borders or through ports of entry. It prohibited Customs
agents, even once cross-designated, from using Title 21 authority to
perform domestic or nonsmuggling counternarcotics investigations.
Disputes about how to interpret the 1994 MOU continue to hinder
collaboration between DEA and ICE. First, while the MOU authorizes
cross-designated ICE agents to investigate individuals and organizations
involved in drug smuggling across U.S. international borders or through
ports of entry, the MOU does not include any parameters for what
constitutes a border or port-of-entry smuggling investigation. ICE officials
have stated that ICE’s border enforcement authority extends to all ICE
investigations of drug trafficking that have a demonstrated link to the
border, including investigations that lead to the nation’s interior. However,
a senior ICE official also acknowledged that determining what defines a
demonstrated link to the border often relies upon agent experience. DEA’s
view of what constitutes a border or port-of-entry smuggling investigation
37
28 C.F.R. subpart R, app., § 11.
38
Titled “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Drug Enforcement Administration
and the United States Customs Service to Implement Title 21 Cross-Designation Policies
and Procedures,” the 1994 MOU was the core document incorporated into the parties’
Cross-Designation Manual, which also included a variety of other implementing
documents. Upon the creation of DHS and the reorganization of Customs, ICE became a
party to this agreement.
39
As reflected in the MOU, Title 21 of the United States Code contains the country’s
controlled substances laws, including the Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act of 1970.
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is narrower in scope. According to both DEA and ICE officials, this lack of
clarity has led to disagreements between DEA and ICE regarding the
difference between drug enforcement connected to the border and related
smuggling violations versus domestic enforcement of U.S. drug laws.
Further, ICE has stated that it is increasingly difficult to separate drugsmuggling investigations from alien smuggling investigations because the
same organizations often participate in both types of smuggling. For
example, during an ICE operation conducted against an alien smuggling
organization along the Southwest border in May 2007, ICE agents
discovered that the organization was also trafficking in marijuana.
Second, DEA and Customs, and later, ICE, have disagreed on the scope of
supervision that DEA is to exercise over ICE counternarcotics
investigations under the MOU. While the MOU recognizes that crossdesignated Customs agents are to work under DEA supervision when
conducting counternarcotics investigations, it also states that “such
supervision shall be general in nature.” DHS, in a January 2008 proposal to
the Office of Management and Budget advocating concurrent authority for
ICE to investigate counternarcotics crimes, noted that “One bureau cannot
effectively supervise, in the long term, what amounts to a significant part
of another bureau’s resources, policy, programs, and activity.” Further, an
ICE unit chief stated that under the current MOU, DEA’s oversight of drug
investigations among federal agencies is based on an “antiquated process,”
which is cumbersome, slow, and ineffective. This ICE official also
expressed concern that DEA intends to increase its supervision of ICE
agents who conduct counternarcotics investigations. DEA, meanwhile,
noted that its primary concern is that counternarcotics investigations are
coordinated across agencies.
Third, a 1999 addendum to the MOU identified DEA as the primary point
of contact for all counternarcotics investigations that involve the
cooperation of foreign law enforcement agencies. However, according to a
senior DEA official, ICE does not always coordinate its international drugrelated investigations with DEA country offices, and the official provided
us examples of five occurrences of this from 2005 through 2006. As a
result, according to DEA’s Chief of Operations, DEA’s relationships with
some foreign law enforcement authorities were negatively affected. ICE’s
Director of Investigations responded that two of the five investigations
were not narcotics cases, two others were coordinated with DEA domestic
offices as required by the MOU, and one had been coordinated with
foreign government authorities responsible for border security. The U.S.
ambassadors in two countries where these events occurred expressed
concern about the disputes, and asked DEA and ICE to improve
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coordination to avoid adversely affecting other collaborative law
enforcement efforts with these countries.
ICE and DEA also disagree about certain restrictions on ICE’s authority to
collect foreign drug intelligence under the terms of a 1975 MOU.40 This
MOU states that Customs (now ICE) has primary responsibility for
intelligence gathering on smuggling activities and supports DEA in
investigating drug smuggling and trafficking. The MOU further states that
nothing in the agreement precludes Customs (ICE) from gathering
information from the air and marine community related to the transporting
of contraband, and that the agency will continue to coordinate with and
gather information from foreign customs services on all smuggling
activities. However, the agreement states that Customs officers may not
employ an informant for counternarcotics efforts without DEA’s prior
approval. ICE maintains that these provisions preclude ICE’s 200 special
agents assigned to 52 foreign offices throughout the world from
developing drug-smuggling intelligence. ICE officials have stated that ICE
must rely upon DEA to provide international drug-smuggling intelligence
to assist in their border security missions, which limits their effectiveness.
DEA disagrees with this interpretation of the 1975 MOU, stating that the
1975 MOU does not prohibit ICE from collecting drug intelligence, but
rather prohibits ICE from employing an informant without prior
agreement and concurrence from DEA.
There have been negotiations to revise the MOUs between DEA and ICE to
resolve the above disputes and reflect the reorganization of Customs into
ICE, but these negotiations have been unsuccessful. For example, in 2004,
DEA requested that the MOU be renegotiated to address various
operational issues and reflect the reorganization of the government under
the Homeland Security Act of 2002; however, the negotiations between
DEA and ICE were unsuccessful and the agencies continue to operate
under the terms of the existing MOU. DEA has reported that DHS is
seeking to expand its authority to independently pursue counternarcotics
investigations, which would fragment the nation’s counternarcotics
efforts. ICE officials, meanwhile, have reported that DEA desires to
increase its supervision of ICE agents and operations and that ICE is
unable to effectively accomplish its mission because it is hampered by
40
The 1975 MOU is titled “Memorandum of Understanding between the Customs Service
and Drug Enforcement Administration on Operating Guidelines.” The parties incorporated
this MOU into their Cross-Designation Manual along with the 1994 MOU.
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requirements to coordinate with and be supervised by DEA on
counternarcotics investigations. As mentioned previously, DHS submitted
a legislative proposal in January 2008 to the Office of Management and
Budget advocating that ICE be granted authority to enforce U.S. drug laws
independent of DEA, so that ICE could investigate all narcotics-smuggling
crimes and thereby unify DHS border security. DEA, in its response
opposing the proposal, expressed concern that approval of the proposal
would fragment the federal government’s drug enforcement efforts and
would reduce cooperation and coordination of investigations—as had
been the case before Reorganization Plan No. 2 established DEA. Further,
DEA responded that it was not clear how or if the concurrent authority
would ameliorate the current jurisdictional and interagency conflicts.
According to ICE, as of October 2008, the Office of Management and
Budget had not submitted the proposal to the Congress because DHS and
DOJ did not agree on a resolution to the proposal. As a result, the two
agencies still operate under the guidelines established by existing MOUs.
In October 2005, we reported that agencies can more effectively
collaborate by leveraging resources, agreeing on roles and responsibilities,
and establishing compatible policies and priorities for operating across
agency boundaries; our report also noted the importance of monitoring
these activities.41 While senior officials in certain DEA and ICE field offices
that we visited have established positive working relationships with their
counterparts to improve the effectiveness of partnerships, these efforts are
not institutionalized as a consistent practice at all locations. For example,
in Mexico City, where drug trafficking is prevalent, DEA and ICE officials
agreed that the relationship between the two agencies has strains and DEA
officials reported that a new MOU could improve the relationship by
clarifying roles and responsibilities. Additionally, representatives of two of
the state enforcement agencies we spoke with expressed concern about
the poor working relationship between DEA and ICE and the resulting
potential for compromising counterdrug operations. While safety and
duplicative investigations are concerns for all law enforcement entities,
without establishing effective collaboration practices with mutually
defined roles, responsibilities, and shared goals, there is a greater
likelihood for duplication between the agencies and incidents that could
threaten law enforcement officer safety. Further, because the
disagreements between ICE (formerly Customs) and DEA have a long
history, resolution may not be reached absent focused attention by the
41
See GAO-06-15.
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Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security. Until these
issues are resolved, it will be difficult for DEA and ICE to ensure that
shared objectives are achieved and resources are used effectively.
Another source of disagreement between DEA and ICE concerns the
cross-designation of ICE agents. First, in accordance with a ceiling
established in conjunction with the terms of the existing MOU, a maximum
of 1,475 ICE agents can be cross-designated at a given time. According to
ICE officials, this maximum limits ICE’s ability to accomplish its mission
because agents who are not cross-designated cannot pursue borderrelated drug-smuggling investigations into the United States. Further, ICE
officials noted that the number of agents permitted to be cross-designated
(1,475) was chosen when Customs had only 3,500 criminal investigators,
whereas ICE currently has more than 6,000 agents.
DEA, in response to our inquiry, reported that ICE has not demonstrated
the need for—or asked for—additional cross-designations for its agents.
According to DEA, as of January 2008, 1,256 ICE agents were crossdesignated—below the 1,475 maximum—and as of October 2008, DEA
reported that it did not have any outstanding cross-designation requests
from ICE.
However, ICE officials told us in October 2008 that it had submitted to
DEA a list of 120 ICE agents for cross-designation but had received no
response. ICE reported that the names of some agents on the list had been
submitted for cross-designation as many as three times and others were
submitted as far back as 2002. ICE further reported that the current
process of submitting paper cross-designation requests to DEA field
offices, which then are to forward the requests to DEA headquarters for
approval, has resulted in misplaced and mismailed requests. DEA
responded that ICE’s primary liaison to DEA had not reported problems
with the cross-designation process or outstanding requests. In January
2009, in commenting on a draft of this report, ICE expressed an opposing
view. Specifically, ICE stated that its agents—assigned to DEA in a liaison
capacity—have on numerous occasions brought to the attention of DEA
headquarters management that cross-designation requests were not being
forwarded from local DEA offices to DEA headquarters. Also, in its
comments, ICE noted that DEA currently did not have a liaison officer
assigned to ICE headquarters as directed by the 1994 MOU.
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DEA and CBP Share NarcoticsSmuggling Intelligence and
Coordinate Activities;
However, Procedures for
Handling Illegal Drugs Seized at
the Nation’s Borders Predate
CBP’s Organization under DHS
and Are Not Standardized
DEA and CBP also partner on drug enforcement efforts, and senior
officials in DEA and CBP headquarters and field offices report that they
have improved their coordination since 9/11 by sharing more narcoticssmuggling intelligence and collaborating on counternarcotics efforts.
However, procedures for handling illegal drugs seized at the nation’s
borders predate CBP’s current organization under DHS and are not
standardized.42
CBP is responsible for, among other things, seizing illegal drugs at the
nation’s borders—at ports of entry and between the ports of entry.
According to DEA’s Chief of Operations and senior officials at CBP
headquarters, the two agencies have improved their coordination in the
years since 9/11. For example, senior officials at CBP headquarters and
field offices reported that DEA is providing more intelligence to CBP that
is useful for its drug interdiction efforts. The Chief of Intelligence
Operations for CBP’s Tucson Sector (Office of Field Operations) reported
that DEA is more closely coordinating on counterdrug operations that
cross the border with Mexico. Also, CBP is coordinating with DEA by
providing staff and intelligence to DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center, a
tactical intelligence coordination center, which has improved the
coordination of drug and smuggling intelligence according to DEA and
CBP officials there.
According to CBP officials, despite improved coordination and partnership
between CBP and DEA, agreements between the two agencies have not
been updated to reflect the merging of several border security agencies
into CBP and ICE as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Prior to
the formation of DHS, CBP’s drug-related enforcement responsibilities
between the ports of entry were primarily handled by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service’s Border Patrol, while drug-related enforcement
responsibilities at the ports of entry were handled by inspectors with
42
CBP was created in 2003 by combining, among other things, the port-of-entry and borderrelated resources and missions of Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
See Reorganization Plan Modification for the Department of Homeland Security, H.R. Doc.
No. 108-32 (Feb. 4, 2003).
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Customs. 43 However, while an agreement existed between DEA and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service that outlined the handling of illegal
drugs seized between the ports of entry, the agreement has not been
updated to reflect the formation of DHS. Also, in providing technical
comments on a draft of this report, CBP noted that there are no formal
agreements for how illegal drugs seized at the ports of entry are to be
handled. Generally, the absence of updated agreements can be attributed
largely to the considerable challenges faced by DHS upon its
establishment in March 2003—challenges associated with the
reorganization, transformation, and management of assembling 22
separate federal agencies and organizations with multiple missions and
cultures into one department.
Today, agents with CBP’s Office of Border Patrol, which operates along
the nation’s borders between the ports of entry, follow drug seizure and
intelligence guidelines laid out in a 1996 MOU between DEA and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Specifically, the MOU outlines
that Border Patrol agents are to turn over to DEA all drugs and related
intelligence seized at the border between the ports of entry. However,
CBP’s Office of Field Operations, which operates at the nation’s ports of
entry, has no formal agreements with DEA and, as a result of legacy
operations from Customs, Office of Field Operations’ agents turn over all
drugs seized at ports of entry to ICE.44 According to a program manager in
CBP’s Office of Field Operations, this bifurcated process has led to
inefficiencies and confusion. The official added that a standardized
process for handling drugs seized by CBP along the U.S. international
borders would be more efficient and less confusing. Similarly, DHS’s
43
In its technical comments on a draft of this report, ICE noted that prior to the creation of
DHS both Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service shared responsibilities
for interdicting illegal immigrants and contraband at the border. ICE explained that (1)
Border Patrol agents operated between the ports of entry with a primary mission of
interdicting illegal aliens and contraband and (2) Customs also employed Customs patrol
officers who operated between the ports of entry with a primary mission of interdicting
narcotics. ICE noted that even today, it employs Native American Customs patrol officers
(known as the “Shadow Wolves”) on the Tohono O’Odham Indian Nation in Arizona.
Further, ICE noted that prior to the creation of DHS, inspectors of Customs and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service were cross-designated at ports of entry to enforce
both customs and immigration laws.
44
Under current procedures, when an ICE agent is notified by CBP that a seizure has
occurred at a port of entry, the ICE agent is to respond, process the evidence, and conduct
an investigation. According to ICE, in this scenario, ICE does not turn over the narcotics to
DEA; rather, ICE provides a copy of the report of investigation and the violator’s
biographical information for input into DEA’s database.
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Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, the policy arm for the
department’s counternarcotics efforts, has expressed concern regarding
the handling of illegal drugs seized by DHS components at the nation’s
borders. Further, the broad scope of CBP’s responsibilities reinforces the
need for standardizing the handling of illegal drugs seized. For example,
the following are noted in CBP’s Performance and Accountability Report
for fiscal year 2007:
•
CBP is responsible for protecting more than 5,000 miles of border with
Canada, 1,900 miles of border with Mexico, and 95,000 miles of
shoreline.
•
More than 46,743 CBP employees manage, control, and protect the
nation’s borders at and between 327 official ports of entry. The Border
Patrol’s 20 sectors encompass 142 stations nationwide and 34
permanent checkpoints.
•
In fiscal year 2007, CBP processed over 400 million passengers and
pedestrians and more than 25 million sea, truck, and rail containers
and seized over 1.7 million pounds of illegal drugs.
The bifurcated process of CBP’s referrals to either ICE or DEA adds
additional complexities to an already complicated system, and a
standardized process of referring drug-related investigations could help
streamline and strengthen CBP’s role and limit confusion and
inefficiency.45 Agreed-upon roles and responsibilities and compatible
policies are important elements to a collaborative working relationship.46
Establishing effective collaboration practices could improve the collective
efforts of DEA, CBP, and ICE to address the smuggling of illegal narcotics.
45
In its technical comments on a draft of this report, DEA noted that the present MOU is a
legacy issue for CBP that affects coordinating drug seizures at the border but does not
affect cooperative efforts between DEA and CBP. DEA commented that the two agencies
have an excellent working relationship.
46
GAO-06-15.
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DEA Benefits from
Department of State
Counternarcotics
Assistance, and the
Department of State
Benefits from DEA’s
Counternarcotics
Expertise, Including New
and Evolving Efforts in
Afghanistan
Since 9/11, DEA has continued to benefit from the Department of State’s
support of DEA’s international counternarcotics programs and foreign
offices, as well as the department’s support of the international law
enforcement community in general.47 Via interagency agreements, the
department assists DEA’s international operations in a variety of ways,
including ordering equipment to develop the capacity of DEA’s foreign law
enforcement partners, administering DEA funding provided to foreign
countries, and funding DEA training of foreign law enforcement agencies.48
However, funding with which the Department of State reimburses DEA for
certain expenditures, such as training, has fluctuated greatly, which affects
DEA’s long-term training strategies. The department has benefited from
DEA’s law enforcement expertise and procedural guidance on
international counternarcotics programs and from DEA’s foreign
partnerships, such as DEA’s role in Afghanistan.
Among other things, the Department of State provides foreign assistance
to support other countries’ efforts to build counternarcotics and law
enforcement capacities, which ultimately benefits DEA agents as they
conduct bilateral drug investigations with their foreign counterparts. DEA
also may leverage the use of aircraft, wiretapping equipment, and other
equipment or facilities provided to host-country law enforcement by the
Department of State. In Afghanistan and other countries, the department
funds the operations and maintenance of sensitive investigative units,49
which partner with DEA to conduct bilateral drug investigations.
According to DEA officials, the Afghan Sensitive Investigate Unit is a
critical component of DEA’s efforts to disrupt and dismantle drugtrafficking organizations operating in Afghanistan.
47
DEA coordinates with the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs in Washington, D.C., and the department’s Narcotics Affairs
Sections in U.S. embassies abroad, which receive program guidance and funding from the
bureau.
48
The interagency agreements we reviewed stem from two different sources of authority.
The Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, authorizes agencies to enter into agreements, such as
reimbursable agreements or MOUs, for the interagency provision of goods and services.
Further, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. § 2291 et seq.)
authorizes similar interagency agreements for foreign assistance purposes. See 22 U.S.C. §
2392(b).
49
Sensitive investigative units are groups of host-nation investigators that DEA polygraphs,
trains, equips, and mentors to conduct bilateral drug investigations and collect
counternarcotics intelligence. DEA, with Department of State assistance, supports 11
sensitive investigative units, including one in Afghanistan.
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DEA also trains foreign law enforcement counterparts under interagency
agreements with the Department of State. DEA has trained foreign law
enforcement officers since 1969 to improve their capability, knowledge,
and motivation to pursue high-level international narcotics investigations
and to increase foreign law enforcement cooperation. Specifically, DEA
trains foreign law enforcement through its in-country and regional training
programs and at regional international law enforcement academies.50
According to DEA’s Office of Training, DEA trained nearly 1,400 foreign
law enforcement officers in fiscal year 2007 through interagency
agreements with the Department of State.
While the Department of State continues to provide administrative,
financial, and logistical support to DEA country offices, the department’s
obligated funding to DEA for counternarcotics training activities via
interagency agreements was 54 percent less in fiscal year 2007 than in
fiscal year 2001, and has fluctuated greatly over that time period (see fig.
5). The department reported that these fluctuations are a result of other
department priorities. In addition, Department of State officials also
reported that there is no guarantee that an embassy’s request for DEA
training will be granted. DEA reported that the fluctuations in funding
most affect its bilateral training programs with other countries. DEA
indicated that a reliable annual funding base would improve its ability to
provide a consistent number of courses annually and develop training
programs that build upon previous training sessions. A DEA training
official stated that DEA country attachés have also increased their efforts
to coordinate with the Narcotics Affairs Sections at U.S. embassies to
mitigate the fluctuations in the Department of State’s requests for DEA
training activities in other countries.
50
Funded by the Department of State, international law enforcement academies are a
collaborative effort among U.S. law enforcement agencies, including DEA, to provide law
enforcement training and technical assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies.
International law enforcement academies are located in Bangkok, Thailand; Budapest,
Hungary; Gaborone, Botswana; San Salvador, El Salvador; and Roswell, New Mexico.
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Figure 5: Department of State Obligations under Interagency Agreements with DEA,
Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007
Dollars (in thousands)
4,000
3,861
3,545
3,500
3,000
2,500
1,974
2,000
1,782
1,599
1,500
1,024
1,000
663
500
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Fiscal year
Source: GAO summary of DEA and Department of State data.
While the Department of State has supported DEA’s international
counternarcotics programs, foreign offices, and law enforcement training
efforts, the department has also benefited from DEA’s law enforcement
expertise and narcotics intelligence. According to DEA and Department of
State officials at headquarters and foreign posts, DEA serves as a technical
consultant to the department on funding decisions for law enforcement
projects requested by host governments. In addition, DEA uses its law
enforcement expertise to identify competencies that the Department of
State should include in training curricula to improve the capacity of
foreign law enforcement agencies. Finally, DEA and Department of State
officials reported that DEA provides intelligence that the department uses
to better target resources to support host-country governments’ efforts,
such as in Colombia where the Department of State uses DEA intelligence
in its efforts to eradicate coca and poppy, necessary precursors for
cocaine and heroin, respectively.
Senior DEA and Department of State officials at headquarters and
embassies we visited in Bangkok and Kabul reported that in general their
roles in international counternarcotics efforts were distinct and clearly
defined. While DEA’s primary emphasis internationally is on bilateral drug
investigations, the Department of State emphasizes capacity building of
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foreign law enforcement agencies. DEA and Department of State officials
reported that they cooperate well through regular meetings (e.g., monthly
or biweekly meetings) to share information and coordinate law
enforcement activities at the respective embassies.
DEA and DOD Continue to
Share International
Counternarcotics
Intelligence, DOD Provides
Support to DEA, and Their
Partnership Is Evolving in
Afghanistan and
Elsewhere
DEA and DOD continue to share international counternarcotics
intelligence and, as both agencies recognize and address linkages between
narcotics traffickers and terrorists, are developing new and evolving
partnerships in Afghanistan, Africa, and Central Asia. Prior to and since
9/11, DOD has provided domestic support for counternarcotics operations
to DEA and its federal, state, and local counterparts.51 For example,
according to DEA and DOD officials, National Guard intelligence analysts
work in HIDTA investigative support centers, described further below, to
provide DEA and its federal, state, and local partners with linguistic or
intelligence analysis skills.
Since 9/11, DEA has increasingly partnered with DOD as both agencies
have shifted resources to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The DOD and DEA
partnership has evolved in Afghanistan as DOD has increased funding to
DEA counternarcotics efforts via interagency agreements, implemented
programs that build the capacity of DEA law enforcement partners, and
provided limited operational support for DEA’s bilateral drug
investigations, such as airlift and evacuation assistance. According to
senior DEA and DOD officials in Afghanistan, DOD previously viewed
counternarcotics and counterterrorism as separate issues; however, DOD
now recognizes narcotics trafficking as a threat to U.S. national security
interests because of the relationship between narcotics trafficking and
terrorist-financing networks. DOD enters into agreements with DEA for
counternarcotics law enforcement training programs, travel expenses for
training program instructors, and support of DEA personnel assigned to
DOD. As illustrated in figure 6, DOD components—including the Office of
51
DOD is authorized to provide specific types of support to civilian law enforcement
officials in the form of information sharing, as well as facility and equipment loans and
associated personnel support. See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-374. DOD policy generally
encourages cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials in a manner consistent with
the needs of national security and military preparedness and in accordance with applicable
law and other principles limiting direct military involvement in searches, seizures, arrests,
or other similar civilian law enforcement activities. See DOD Directive 5525.5, sections 4
and E.4.1.3. In addition to providing support to civilian law enforcement, DOD also serves
as the lead agency to detect and monitor the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into
the United States. 10 U.S.C. § 124(a).
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the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics,
Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, as well as several joint
interagency task forces—have increased obligations to DEA under
interagency agreements from $456,000 in fiscal year 2003 to over
$2.5 million in fiscal year 2007, an increase of 455 percent.
Figure 6: DOD Obligations under Interagency Agreements with DEA, Fiscal Years
2000 through 2007
Dollars (in thousands)
3,000
2,527
2,500
2,060
2,000
1,500
1,117
1,000
456
500
182
0
0
0
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Fiscal year
Source: GAO summary of DEA data.
In addition to the obligated amounts shown in figure 6, DOD has provided
other funding to support DEA’s efforts. For example, in fiscal years 2004 to
2007, DOD provided $226.9 million for training and equipping (and
building a facility for) the Afghan National Interdiction Unit. Also, DOD
provided funding for DEA to train the Afghan Sensitive Investigative Unit
at the DEA training facility in Quantico, Virginia.
Senior DEA and DOD officials reported that the agencies’ relationship in
Afghanistan continues to evolve, is mutually beneficial, and has been
helped by the fact that each agency has a distinct and clear mission in
Afghanistan. While DEA has benefited from DOD’s interagency funding,
capacity building, and operational support, DEA’s Chief of Intelligence
reported that DOD has benefited from DEA intelligence, which has helped
to thwart several attacks in Afghanistan. DEA reported that it seeks to
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further improve coordination with DOD by placing additional liaison
officers and intelligence research specialists at DOD commands.
DEA Partners with State
and Local Law
Enforcement Agencies to
Leverage Manpower and
Intelligence While
Providing Training and
Other Support
DEA partners with state and local law enforcement agencies to leverage
the manpower and intelligence that they provide, while supplying them
with counternarcotics training and other support, such as intelligence
about drug-trafficking organizations that operate across jurisdictional
boundaries. DEA partners with state and local law enforcement agencies
through the DEA state and local task force program. The program partners
DEA agents and state and local law enforcement officers in permanent
task forces to investigate and develop cases against significant local drugtrafficking organizations that have links to regional and international
organizations. State and local law enforcement agencies receive three
primary benefits from participating in task forces: (1) DEA, in most cases,
reimburses state and local agencies for officer overtime related to
participation in task force efforts; (2) state and local law enforcement
officers receive federal credentials, which allow the officers to pursue
narcotics investigations outside of their local jurisdictions; and (3) state
and local law enforcement agencies receive a percentage of assets seized
as the result of successful operations. According to senior officials at DEA
headquarters and in field offices such as New York, working with state and
local law enforcement officers in a task force environment gives DEA
access to knowledge about the local area and provides additional
personnel for counternarcotics efforts. As of the end of fiscal year 2007,
DEA reported that there were a total of 118 DEA state and local task
forces, with 1,401 state and local officers, and DEA reimbursed the
respective agencies for overtime for 1,133 state and local task force
officers.
While the state and local law enforcement agencies receive benefits from
working in a task force environment, some state and local law
enforcement agencies expressed concern about decreased federal funding
for such task forces. Specifically, representatives from 11 state and local
law enforcement agencies commented that if federal funding for local drug
task forces continues to decrease, their ability to pursue narcotics cases at
the local level would be affected.
In addition to the state and local task force program, DEA also coordinates
directly with state and local law enforcement agencies to share
information. For example, DEA provides information to state and local
law enforcement agencies on imminent enforcement operations to avoid
disrupting investigations and to ensure officer safety. Of the
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representatives of 16 state and local agencies that do not participate in
task forces that we spoke with, representatives of 12 said that they
nevertheless communicate directly—via telephone or face-to-face
conversations—with DEA before conducting narcotics enforcement
operations to ensure the safety of their officers. Those same 12 agencies
reported that DEA coordinates with them before conducting operations.
However, regarding the other 4 agencies, one official noted that DEA has
not operated in his jurisdiction, while officials at the other 3 agencies
reported that DEA did not always provide notification of narcotics
enforcement operations—an issue that occurred regularly for 2 of the
agencies. Officials at these 2 agencies expressed concern that the safety of
their officers could be jeopardized if communication were not improved.
DEA also provides training to state and local law enforcement officers,
including (1) clandestine laboratory training, which instructs state and
local law enforcement officers how to identify, protect, and dispose of
hazardous materials encountered in methamphetamine laboratories;
(2) commander training for state and local drug units; and (3) basic
narcotics investigative techniques. Of the 35 state and local law
enforcement agencies whose representatives we spoke with, 20 reported
that they had participated in DEA’s training courses. Seven of those 20
reported participating in clandestine laboratory training, the most
commonly attended course. State and local law enforcement officers we
spoke with in rural jurisdictions reported that DEA training was
particularly valuable because, as part of the training, DEA contributed
equipment to trainees for use in their home jurisdictions.
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DEA Coordinates
Activities and
Leverages Resources
through Multiagency
Task Forces and
Intelligence Centers;
However, Two
Centers Are Less
Effective Because ICE
Is Not Providing All
Relevant Intelligence
DEA coordinates with other federal law enforcement agencies and, in
some cases, state and local law enforcement agencies, on multiagency task
forces and in intelligence centers that target drug-trafficking organizations
operating at the regional, national, and international levels. As in its state
and local task forces, DEA coordinates with and leverages the personnel
and resources of other agencies in drug enforcement efforts through
OCDETF and HIDTA task forces, which comprise DEA, other federal law
enforcement agencies, and in the case of some task forces, state and local
law enforcement agencies. DEA also coordinates intelligence,
investigations, and drug enforcement operations with federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies through intelligence centers to avoid
duplicative efforts and ensure officer and agent safety. However, ICE is
not fully participating in two of these intelligence centers—the Special
Operations Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center. The lack of full
participation by ICE limits the ability of these interagency entities to most
effectively investigate major drug-trafficking organizations.
DEA Uses Task Forces to
Coordinate with and
Leverage the Resources of
Federal, State, and Local
Agencies to Target
Regional, National, and
International DrugTrafficking Organizations
DEA works with multiagency task forces in the OCDETF and HIDTA
programs to coordinate efforts and leverage the resources of federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies. OCDETF task forces—typically casespecific, temporary task forces—leverage the resources of federal law
enforcement agencies and, for certain cases, state and local law
enforcement to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the drug-trafficking and
money-laundering organizations most responsible for the nation’s supply
of illegal drugs—particularly CPOTs. For example, on some task forces,
DEA leverages the expertise of the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal
Investigation Division to investigate complex drug money-laundering
cases. Generally, DEA participates in a majority (about 90 percent) of
OCDETF task forces and usually has a leadership role. During fiscal year
2007, for instance, DEA led or co-led 81 percent of all OCDETF
investigations.
DEA also coordinates with federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies through task forces in 28 geographic areas across the country
that have been designated as HIDTAs—that is, areas identified as having
drug-trafficking problems that exceed the resources of state and local
agencies. In particular, HIDTA task forces focus on drug-trafficking
organizations that operate within a particular region of the United States
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
but affect drug distribution across the nation.52 Unlike OCDETF task
forces, which do not require the participation of state or local law
enforcement, HIDTA task forces require the participation of at least one
federal and one state or local agency. HIDTA task forces also require
participating agencies to operate out of shared work facilities (otherwise
known as collocation) and interact freely with other participants
(otherwise known as commingling). As required by the ONDCP
Reauthorization Act of 2006, DEA participates in each HIDTA intelligence
support center and, therefore, each HIDTA.53 However, DEA is not
required to and does not participate in every HIDTA task force. For
example, in fiscal year 2007, DEA participated in 62 of the Southwest
Border HIDTA’s 111 task forces. According to ONDCP, in fiscal year 2007,
DEA provided fewer agents to participate in HIDTA task forces because of
the hiring freeze. Additionally, according to officials at ONDCP
responsible for managing the HIDTA program, DEA is unable to provide
full-time agents to HIDTA task forces in rural areas because of resource
limitations.
Senior DEA officials responsible for the Miami, New York, and Seattle
field offices reported that working through OCDETF and HIDTA task
forces has improved collaboration between DEA and other participating
agencies and helped DEA leverage the personnel resources and knowledge
that other participating agencies bring to drug enforcement. For example,
according to the DEA Associate Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York
field office, the participation of DEA, ICE, and the Internal Revenue
Service in the permanent OCDETF task force in New York has led to
better cooperation and reduced conflicts on money-laundering
investigations related to drug-trafficking organizations. Also, a local law
enforcement official responsible for counternarcotics efforts in Tampa
(Florida) stated that participating in HIDTA task forces allowed for greater
52
HIDTAs are designated by the Director of ONDCP in consultation with the Attorney
General, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and the Treasury, the heads of the National
Drug Control Program agencies, and relevant governors to determine whether (1) an area
is a significant center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or
distribution; (2) state, local, and tribal law enforcement have dedicated resources to the
problem; (3) drug-related activities are having a significant impact on the area and other
areas of the country; and (4) a significant increase in federal resources to the area is
necessary to combat drug and drug-related activities. 21 U.S.C. 1706(b)(1), (d). Each
HIDTA may have multiple task forces, and each task force may have different participating
federal, state, and local agencies.
53
ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-469, § 301, 120 Stat. 3502, 3518-24,
codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1706.
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access to federal funding, improved cooperation with DEA, and increased
the ability to share law enforcement resources locally, such as the joint
monitoring of judicial wiretaps targeting drug traffickers.
DEA Uses Multiagency
Intelligence Centers to
Coordinate Intelligence
and Investigations;
However, the Special
Operations Division and
the OCDETF Fusion
Center Are Less Effective
Because ICE Is Not
Providing All of Its DrugRelated Intelligence
DEA and other federal agencies and, in some cases, state, local, and
foreign law enforcement agencies coordinate intelligence and investigative
efforts against drug-trafficking organizations through multiagency
intelligence centers such as the Special Operations Division and the
OCDETF Fusion Center. However, the effectiveness of these two centers
is limited because ICE is not sharing all of its drug-related intelligence.
Intelligence fusion centers are collaborative efforts to detect, prevent,
investigate, and respond to criminal and, in some cases, terrorist activity.
Drug intelligence fusion centers provide a centralized location where DEA
and other law enforcement agencies share drug-related intelligence with
the goals of linking ongoing investigations and targeting major drugtrafficking organizations. In addition, the 9/11 Commission Report stressed
that sharing all available information from relevant sources is critical to
assessing and responding to threats. Table 1 identifies key
counternarcotics intelligence centers and their lead agencies, missions,
and participating agencies.
Table 1: Drug-Related Intelligence Centers—Missions and Participating Agencies
Intelligence center
and
lead agency
DEA-led Special Operations
Division
Lead agency: DEA
OCDETF Fusion Center
Lead agency: DEA
Mission of intelligence center
Participating agencies
(1) Coordinates intelligence received from sources
worldwide and provides information to partner
agencies to support ongoing investigations against
drug-trafficking organizations. (2) Assists DEA’s
domestic field divisions in building national conspiracy
cases by using multijurisdictional wiretaps.
(3) Coordinates ongoing counternarcotics
investigations across federal law enforcement
agencies.
DEA, FBI, USMS, ATF, DOJ Criminal
Division, National Drug Intelligence Center,
ICE, CBP, Internal Revenue ServiceCriminal Investigation, Central Intelligence
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S.
Southern Command, Joint Interagency Task
Force-South, Joint Interagency Task ForceWest, U.S. Special Operations Command,
National Security Agency, and United
Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime
Agency.
(1) Conducts cross-agency integration and analysis of
drug and related financial intelligence to create
comprehensive, strategic intelligence assessments of
major drug-trafficking organizations. (2) Passes leads
to OCDETF participants in the field to assist in
developing more comprehensive investigations of
major drug-trafficking organizations.
DEA, El Paso Intelligence Center, FBI,
USMS, ATF, National Drug Intelligence
Center, U.S. Coast Guard, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, and Internal
Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation.
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Intelligence center
and
lead agency
Mission of intelligence center
Participating agencies
(1) Provides real-time tactical intelligence to federal,
state, and local law enforcement regarding the
networks of drug-trafficking organizations operating in
the United States. (2) Provides access to the
intelligence bases of all federal law enforcement
agencies to assist in developing probable cause to
search vehicles for drugs during traffic stops by state
and local law enforcement. (3) Provides training to
state and local law enforcement on interdiction
techniques. (4) Serves as the repository for
information about drugs seized in the United States.
DEA, FBI, ATF, USMS, National Drug
Intelligence Center, DHS, CBP, ICE, U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Secret Service, Internal
Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation,
Department of the Interior, DOD, National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Joint
Interagency Task Force-South, Joint
Interagency Task Force-North, Texas Air
National Guard, Texas Department of Public
Safety, El Paso County Sheriff’s Office, and
El Paso Police Division.
Conducts counter-illicit-trafficking operations in the
Caribbean and eastern Pacific by detecting and
monitoring illicit air and maritime targets, fusing
intelligence from various sources, providing
Lead agency: U.S. Coast Guard information to law enforcement and military agencies,
and promoting regional security cooperation.
U.S. Coast Guard, DEA, FBI, National Drug
Intelligence Center, CBP, ICE, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency, National Security Agency, National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, U.S. Army, U.S.
Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps,
United Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime
Agency, and components of foreign
a
militaries.
HIDTA Intelligence Support
Centers
Varies across the 28 HIDTAs, but includes
DEA and usually includes other federal law
enforcement agencies and state or local law
enforcement agencies.
El Paso Intelligence Center
Lead agency: DEA
Joint Interagency Task ForceSouth
Lead agency: Varies
Deconflicts partner and nonpartner agency HIDTAregion-specific counternarcotics operations and, in
some cases, ongoing investigations to avoid
duplicative efforts and ensure officer safety.
Sources: DEA and ONDCP.
a
Other foreign militaries include the British, Dutch, French, and Spanish navies as well as military
support provided by nations in Latin America. Because of the sensitive nature of these nations
partnering with the United States on military endeavors, we are not specifically identifying these
nations in this report.
The usefulness of these intelligence centers to target drug-trafficking
organizations is only as good as the information that participating agencies
contribute to them. The 9/11 Commission Report asserted that intelligence
sharing is critical to combat threats to the United States and that
intelligence analysts should utilize all relevant sources of information.
While DEA has reported good coordination with and participation by
relevant federal agencies in most of the above centers, DEA officials have
reported that ICE is not submitting all of its drug-related intelligence to the
Special Operations Division, and that ICE does not participate in the
OCDETF Fusion Center.
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The DEA Special Agent-in-Charge of the Special Operations Division
reported that while ICE provides staff and some data to the center, ICE
agents are not submitting all drug-related intelligence necessary to ensure
that cases do not overlap and efforts are not duplicated. The DEA official
stated that not submitting all relevant information limits the usefulness of
the Special Operations Division in supporting ongoing investigations. For
example, during the course of a DEA investigation in New York, DEA
determined that ICE agents working on an overlapping investigation had
not provided relevant drug-related intelligence to the Special Operations
Division but had provided it to a local intelligence center. Because DEA
agents coordinated with the local intelligence center, DEA became aware
of the information and coordinated the investigations. In this case, not
routinely providing the drug-related intelligence to the Special Operations
Division resulted in overlapping investigations and could have resulted in
officer safety concerns.
ICE reported that it has been a participant in the Special Operations
Division since 1996 and is providing information obtained from judicial
wiretaps related to narcotics investigations. Further, ICE reported that in
recognition of the importance of the Special Operations Division’s primary
purpose—which is to deconflict and prevent investigative overlap and
thereby minimize the inherent threat to officer safety—ICE has dedicated
10 agents to the division, plus a GS-15 Supervisory Special Agent to serve
as the division’s Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge, and also contributes
$2 million annually to the support the division’s functions and capabilities.
Moreover, ICE noted that in addition to its managerial responsibilities, ICE
regularly attends Special Operations Division coordination meetings in
which agencies with investigative overlap meet face-to-face to discuss
investigative strategy, prosecutorial venue, and agency roles.
As further evidence of its support, ICE pointed out a July 2000 policy
memorandum—from the Acting Assistant Commissioner of Customs to
the agency’s special agents-in-charge and other managers—stating that use
of the Special Operations Division was mandatory in order to coordinate
Customs’ counternarcotics investigations with DEA, FBI, and the Internal
Revenue Service. More recently, in September 2008, during the course of
our review, the Director of ICE’s Office of Investigations issued a policy
memorandum to all of the agency’s field offices, specifying that agents
should submit information to the Special Operations Division when the
information is “significant enough to warrant focused investigative action.”
The DEA Special Agent-in-Charge of the Special Operations Division
reported that—before issuance of the September 2008 memorandum—ICE
agents were not submitting all drug-related intelligence to the Special
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Operations Division. In January 2009, the DEA Special Agent-in-Charge
reported that the amount of drug-related data submitted by ICE agents to
the Special Operations Division increased after issuance of the September
2008 memorandum; however, the DEA official noted that despite the 2000
and 2008 memorandums, ICE agents continue to withhold some drugrelated intelligence data.
ICE officials acknowledged that ICE does not share all of its most
sensitive data, such as some confidential informant information and bank
account information, with the Special Operations Division. DEA officials
stated that without this information, the division cannot effectively
“connect the dots” to follow all potential investigative leads and go as far
as possible in identifying linkages to major drug-trafficking organizations.
The DEA officials also said that other agencies, such as the FBI, do share
such information and DEA has demonstrated that the agency can
adequately protect it.
ICE officials also acknowledged that ICE does not participate in the
OCDETF Fusion Center, although negotiations about ICE’s participation
have been ongoing since December 2005. ICE officials reported that the
agency does not participate in the OCDETF Fusion Center because there
is not agreement on the conditions for participation—including the types
of data ICE will provide to the center and how sensitive confidential
source information will be safeguarded. ICE officials said that although
ICE has made various concessions relating to the information data set that
ICE is willing to share with the center, none have been acceptable to DEA
and thus negotiations are at an impasse. As additional perspective, the ICE
officials noted that ICE has participated in working groups concerning the
operational and technical development of the OCDETF Fusion Center
since fall 2003. Since that time, however, the ICE officials noted that the
mission of the center “has changed dramatically and ICE now finds itself
stuck in negotiations between assisting DEA to a degree ICE finds
unnecessary and protecting the identities of its sources.”
In October 2008, senior ICE officials reported that the agency is willing to
provide the same types of data to the OCDETF Fusion Center that other
participating agencies provide. The ICE officials noted, however, that the
Executive Office for OCDETF was asking ICE to submit more types of
data than other partners, including the FBI. In separate responses to our
inquiry, the Director of the Executive Office for OCDETF and DEA’s
Assistant Administrator and Chief of Intelligence reported that neither
OCDETF nor DEA has asked ICE to provide more data than other
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agencies and that ICE has objected to providing the same types of
information as other agencies.
DEA stated that it is unable to most effectively target major drugtrafficking organizations and avoid duplicative investigative efforts
because ICE is not providing all drug-related information to the Special
Operations Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center. Therefore, until DEA
and ICE resolve this impasse, investigations into drug-trafficking
organizations may be affected and duplication of investigative efforts may
occur.
DEA Has Improved Its
Strategic Plan and
Performance
Measures; However,
They Do Not Reflect
the Agency’s Current
Direction and
Programs and Are
Insufficient to
Measure Progress and
Guide Future
Investments
DEA’s strategic planning and performance measurement framework,
particularly its strategic plan and annual performance plans, have seen
improvements since we and DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General
reviewed and identified problems with previous versions. However, the
framework does not reflect all of DEA’s activities, in particular, those
undertaken to assist in counterterrorism efforts. DOJ is required to engage
in strategic planning and performance planning under GPRA, and requires
that component agencies (including DEA) develop strategic plans and
annual performance plans that contribute to department-level plans to
fulfill GPRA requirements.54 DEA uses a multiyear strategic plan that
presents DEA’s missions and long-term goals, objectives, and strategies55
and annual performance plans that lay out the agency’s annual budget and
describe the agency’s major programs, annual strategies, performance
measures, and expectations for the programs for strategic planning and
performance measurement.
DEA’s strategic plan links to DOJ’s long-term strategic plan and serves as
the DEA strategic planning and performance measurement framework’s
long-range planning document. Specifically, the strategic plan defines
what DEA seeks to accomplish, presents the strategies DEA plans to use
to achieve desired results, and provides a basis for measuring the agency’s
success in achieving the stated goals and objectives. According to DEA,
54
GPRA requires federal agencies—defined as executive departments, such as DOJ—to
develop strategic plans and annual performance plans. However, related guidance advises
that component agencies, such as DEA, should develop goals and measures that are linked
with the parent agency’s strategic goals.
55
At the time of our review, DEA’s most current strategic plan covered fiscal years 2003 to
2008 but had not been updated since 2003.
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the strategic plan is the template for ensuring measurable results and
accountability in day-to-day operations. The plan consists of a mission, to
enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United
States; a general goal, to contribute to DOJ’s goal to reduce the availability
of drugs in America; four strategic goals: (1) disrupt and dismantle
international PTOs, (2) disrupt and dismantle domestic PTOs, (3) assist
state and local agencies with drug enforcement, and (4) reduce the
diversion of licit drugs; and goals, objectives, and strategies for each of the
four strategic goals.
DEA’s annual performance plans are to be updated as part of each fiscal
year’s congressional budget submission to provide the strategic planning
and performance measurement framework’s direct linkage between DEA’s
longer-term goals defined in the strategic plan and the day-to-day activities
of its managers and staff. The annual performance plan submitted with
DEA’s 2009 congressional budget justification includes performance
measures that are linked to the four strategic goals in the strategic plan.
In May 1997, we reported that strategic planning is a continuous process
and leading management practice in strategic planning provides that
though plans may cover a specific time period over several years, plans are
to be updated and revised every 3 years.56 We have also reported that
strategic plans should align an agency’s activities, core processes, and
resources to support mission-related outcomes. Further, in 1997 we
reported that strategic plans help an agency to maintain a consistent sense
of direction and serve as a foundation for the most important things an
agency does each day by communicating goals and strategies throughout
an agency and assigning accountability to managers and staff for goal
achievement. With regard to annual performance plans, we reported in
1998 that performance plans submitted to the Congress are to reflect an
agency’s annual performance goals and measures, and that the process of
setting annual targets and measuring progress enables agencies to show
clear relationships between overall goals and daily operations within the
agency.57
56
GAO, Agencies’ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate
Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16 (Washington, D.C.: May 1997).
57
GAO, Managing for Results: Agencies’ Annual Performance Plans Can Help Address
Strategic Planning Challenges, GAO/GGD-98-44 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 1998).
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DEA’s strategic planning and performance measurement framework, while
improved over previous efforts, has not been updated and does not reflect
some key new and ongoing efforts. For example, while DEA is assisting in
counterterrorism efforts through policies requiring that agents collect
terrorism information from confidential informants and refer terrorismrelated intelligence to intelligence community partners, and DEA also has
strategies to pursue narcoterrorists and coordinate intelligence through
participation in the intelligence community, DEA’s strategic plan has not
been updated since 2003 to reflect these efforts.58 As such, the strategic
plan does not fully reflect the intended purpose of providing a template for
ensuring measurable results and operational accountability. DEA’s 2009
annual performance plan does include four performance measures
regarding counterterrorism efforts: (1) the percentage of bilateral
investigations initiated in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southwest
Asia regions; (2) the number of counternarcotics operations conducted by
foreign-deployed advisory support teams in conjunction with the Afghan
Counter Narcotics Police/National Interdiction Unit; (3) the number of
Afghan National Interdiction Unit officers trained by foreign-deployed
advisory support team agents and deployed; and (4) the percentage of
counterterrorism-related products completed by DEA’s Office of National
Security Intelligence and the Special Operations Division. However, these
measures do not provide a basis for assessing the results of DEA’s
counterterrorism efforts—efforts that include giving top priority to
counternarcotics cases with links to terrorism and pursuing
narcoterrorists.
DEA has also reported that its coordination and collaboration with other
federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies are essential to
its work. However, DEA’s strategic planning and performance
measurement framework does not reflect the importance of such efforts.
For example, while DEA’s strategic plan and the 2009 annual performance
plan list strategies to coordinate with domestic and foreign law
enforcement, these documents do not have measures of the results of this
coordination.
58
In its February 6, 2009, written comments on a draft of this report, DOJ noted that DEA
has submitted to the department for review and approval an updated strategic plan (for
fiscal years 2009-2014), which includes additional language that supports the post-9/11 goal
of addressing counterterrorism.
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An updated strategic plan that includes long-term goals, objectives, and
strategies and complete annual performance plans that list the measures
used to gauge performance, could assist the Congress, the administration,
and other stakeholders in assessing the effectiveness of funded DEA
activities, such as counterterrorism and coordination efforts.
Conclusions
Given the evolving and global context of illegal drug trafficking—coupled
with competing demands for limited law enforcement resources and the
complexities of investigations that target major drug-trafficking
organizations—effective partnerships between DEA and other law
enforcement agencies at all levels of government are necessary for
conducting the war on drugs. Effective partnering has become
increasingly important since 9/11, with growing recognition of the nexus
between drug trafficking and terrorism.
Moreover, because most of the nation’s illegal drug supply is produced and
smuggled from abroad, DEA’s partnerships with DHS component agencies
(ICE and CBP) that have border-related missions are particularly
important. Yet, the operational underpinnings of DEA’s partnerships with
ICE and CBP—the applicable interagency agreements (MOUs)—predate
the formation of DHS and have not been successfully revised. The impasse
between DEA and ICE in negotiating a new MOU has lasted for several
years and involves significantly differing views regarding roles and
responsibilities. Also, the process to cross-designate ICE agents for
conducting counternarcotics investigations is inefficient and has resulted
in fewer agents being available to conduct such investigations.
Furthermore, while there have been memorandums or policy directives
from management regarding ICE’s (and previously Customs’) participation
and information sharing in the Special Operations Division, ICE is not
sharing all of its sensitive drug-related data with the division, even though
DEA asserts that adequate protections are in place, as evidenced, for
example, by the FBI’s willingness to share its sensitive information.
Likewise, ICE is not participating in the OCDETF Fusion Center largely
because of an impasse in negotiations regarding the types of data that ICE
would provide. Absent ICE’s full participation, the Special Operations
Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center are not as effective as they could
be, according to DEA. Further, the DEA and CBP partnership can be
strengthened to limit inefficiencies and confusion by revising the existing,
bifurcated process for handling illegal drugs seized by CBP at the nation’s
borders—a process that differs for seizures at ports of entry and seizures
between ports of entry.
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Effective coordination and partnerships between DOJ and DHS would
help to fulfill the nation’s counterdrug strategy. As such, the joint
involvement of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security would be useful not only for developing a new MOU or other
mechanism to clarify counternarcotics roles and responsibilities between
the departments, but also for developing processes for monitoring its
implementation and making any needed adjustments.
Finally, in considering revisions to its strategic plan, DEA has not
incorporated post-9/11 responsibilities and activities, or established
appropriate performance measures that provide a basis for assessing
progress to their goals. A comprehensive and current strategic planning
and performance measurement framework would help ensure
accountability by providing information to DEA’s leadership for making
organizational and management decisions and to stakeholders, such as the
Congress and the administration, for tracking resources and assessing the
effectiveness of the war on drugs.
Recommendations for
Executive Action
To further enhance interagency collaboration in combating narcotics
trafficking—and its links to terrorist organizations or activities—and to
help ensure integrated policy and program direction across all parts of
DEA, we are making five recommendations. Specifically, we recommend
that
•
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly
and expeditiously develop a new MOU or other mechanism to
(1) clarify their respective departments’ counternarcotics roles and
responsibilities, particularly those of DEA, ICE, and CBP, (2) provide
efficient procedures for cross-designating ICE agents to conduct
counternarcotics investigations, and (3) standardize procedures for
handling illegal drugs seized at the nation’s borders and making
referrals to DEA;
•
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security develop
processes for periodically monitoring the implementation of the new
MOU or other mechanism and make any needed adjustments;
•
the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) direct ICE to contribute all
relevant drug-related information to the Special Operations Division
and (2) ensure that ICE fully responds;
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Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
•
the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) direct ICE to participate in the
OCDETF Fusion Center and (2) ensure that ICE fully responds; and
•
the Administrator of DEA update the agency’s strategic plan to more
fully and accurately reflect the agency’s post-9/11 responsibilities and
activities and also establish appropriate performance measures that
provide a basis for assessing progress.
On January 5, 2009, we provided a draft of this report for comment to DOJ,
DHS, the Department of State, DOD, and ONDCP.
In its written comments, dated February 6, 2009, DOJ concurred with our
recommendations. DOJ commented that it will continue its efforts to
establish a mutually agreeable MOU with DHS and also noted that a
mechanism for monitoring ongoing implementation of such an agreement
must be an essential part of the MOU. Also, DOJ commented that it stands
ready to facilitate ICE’s participation in the Special Operations Division
and the OCDETF Fusion Center.
In reference to our final recommendation, DOJ commented that DEA has
submitted to the department for review and approval an updated strategic
plan (for fiscal years 2009-2014), which includes additional language that
supports the post-9/11 goal of addressing counterterrorism. DOJ also
noted that the updated strategic plan includes performance measures
related to DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence and that DEA was
in the process of evaluating further performance measures related to
CPOTs and PTOs that are linked to terrorist organizations. DOJ did not
provide us an estimated date for completing departmental vetting of DEA’s
updated strategic plan.
The full text of DOJ’s written comments is reprinted in appendix II. DOJ
also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this report
where appropriate.
In its written comments, dated March 9, 2009, DHS noted that the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General have begun
meeting regularly in order to enhance coordination between DHS and DOJ
on a range of issues, including those addressed in this report. While
neither explicitly agreeing nor disagreeing with our recommendations,
DHS suggested several revisions to the wording of the recommendations
that we make solely to the Secretary of Homeland Security or jointly to the
Secretary and the Attorney General. For instance, DHS commented that—
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as the two departments work together to clarify roles and
responsibilities—the new agreements reached by the departments might
not take the form of an updated MOU or other mechanism that continues
the current practice of cross-designation. Rather, DHS noted that a wide
range of options could be explored for making best use of DHS’s law
enforcement and border enforcement authorities and resources. We
believe that the language of our first recommendation, which calls for
development of a “new MOU or other mechanism” is sufficiently broad to
provide for a wide range of options that DHS and DOJ can jointly consider
for ensuring effective interagency collaboration.
Also, in its written comments, DHS suggested that because the form of any
new arrangement is still under discussion with DOJ, our second
recommendation should be stricken—that is, the recommendation that the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security develop
processes for periodically monitoring the implementation of the new MOU
or other mechanism and make any needed adjustments. We believe that
irrespective of the form of any new arrangement, implementation of the
recommendation will help to ensure maintenance of continued progress in
addressing long-standing issues.
Regarding ICE’s involvement with the Special Operations Division and the
OCDETF Fusion Center, DHS commented that DOJ and DHS are
discussing issues of mutual information sharing and participation. Noting
that it expects to address these issues in the manner most likely to ensure
officer safety, efficient use of federal resources, and success in the
ultimate goal of combating drugs and the related crimes, DHS offered
some alternative language for the wording of our recommendations. We
believe that the constructive intent of our recommendations—which is to
generate action to enhance interagency collaboration in combating
narcotics trafficking—is more important than the nuanced wording of the
recommendations. Moreover, going forward, both DHS and DOJ have an
opportunity to clearly articulate—to applicable congressional committees,
as required by 31 U.S.C. § 72059—the substantive implementation actions
taken in response to our recommendations.
59
Specifically, 31 U.S.C. § 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written
statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and to the House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform not later than 60 days from the date of the report and to the
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency’s first request for
appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.
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The full text of DHS’s written comments is reprinted at appendix III. DHS
component agencies, ICE and CBP, provided technical comments that we
incorporated in this report where appropriate.
On January 27, 2009, the Department of State’s Director of the GAO
Liaison Office, Bureau of Resource Management, responded by e-mail that
the department had no comments. On January 12, 2009, DOD’s Office of
the Inspector General responded by e-mail that the department had no
comments. On January 16, 2009, ONDCP’s Deputy General Counsel
responded by e-mail that the office had no comments.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the
report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, State, Defense, the Office of
National Drug Control Policy and other interested parties. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to discuss
the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-6510 or
larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.
GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in
appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Eileen Larence
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Objectives
Scope and
Methodology
In response to a request from the Co-Chairman of the Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, we examined
•
changes to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) policies,
strategies, and authorities post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) to support
national counterterrorism efforts and address evolving global drug
threats;
•
changes to DEA’s partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies
with counternarcotics responsibilities since 9/11 and any effects of
those changes;
•
mechanisms DEA uses to coordinate and avoid duplication with
partner agencies; and
•
the extent to which DEA’s strategic plan and performance measures
reflect the post-9/11 environment.
We reviewed the National Drug Control Strategy to gain context for DEA’s
role in supporting the objective of disrupting and dismantling the market
for illegal substances.1 To obtain additional perspectives on DEA’s role in
enforcing the counternarcotics laws of the United States, we conducted a
literature search of congressional hearings, Department of Justice (DOJ)
Office of the Inspector General reports, and other published materials. We
interviewed DEA officials, including the Chief of Operations and the Chief
of Intelligence, at DEA headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. During these
interviews, DEA identified agencies it partners with and mechanisms it
uses to coordinate its activities with other agencies.2 We also visited a
nonprobability sample of DEA’s domestic field divisions and foreign
country offices to discuss changes to DEA since 9/11 and how DEA
1
The three national priorities for combating narcotics in the United States are stopping
drug use before it starts, intervening and healing America’s drug users, and disrupting and
dismantling the market for illegal drugs. Our scope excludes the first two priorities.
2
Within the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area, we interviewed officials at DEA; the
Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the
U.S. Marshals Service; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; the Office of National Drug Control Policy; the Department of State’s Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; and the Department of Defense’s
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and
Global Threats.
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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
partners with other entities (see tables 2 and 3).3 At the domestic
locations, we interviewed other federal, state, and local law enforcement
officials to better understand how DEA coordinates with other agencies.
Although the information obtained cannot be generalized as representative
across the nation, we selected these domestic locations because they
represent or include (1) diverse geographical areas, including border and
nonborder areas, urban and rural areas, and Indian tribe reservations;
(2) various drug-trafficking and consumption threats (e.g., marijuana,
crack cocaine, and methamphetamine); and (3) locations with and without
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) and High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) representation.
To understand DEA’s focus on international operations and coordination
with other U.S. government agencies abroad since 9/11, we interviewed
DEA officials and other federal officials at five international locations (see
table 3). We spoke with officials in Mexico City, Mexico; Bogotá,
Colombia; and Bangkok, Thailand, because DEA has had long-standing
operations and partnerships in those countries. Also, in each of these three
countries, DEA has a regional office and a Resolution 6 team, a program
that colocates Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents in DEA offices
overseas to combat drugs. We visited DEA’s country office in Afghanistan
because DEA reportedly had shifted substantial resources to Afghanistan;
created major new programs in-country, such as the Foreign-deployed
Advisory and Support Team program; and developed stronger
relationships with U.S. government agencies there, particularly with the
Department of Defense (DOD). In addition, DEA mentors and trains
sensitive investigative units in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and
Thailand. Also, we spoke by telephone with a DEA official in Brussels,
Belgium, to better understand DEA’s new focus on drug trafficking in West
Africa.4
We did not discuss DEA’s partnerships with interdiction agencies, such as
the U.S. Coast Guard, in detail in this document because DEA is not the
lead agency in U.S. interdiction activities. Additionally, while DEA is
3
Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a
population, because in a nonprobability sample some elements of the population being
studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
4
Because of unforeseen circumstances, the Country Attaché of DEA’s office located in
Lagos, Nigeria, was unable to meet with us. However, we were able to speak with the
Assistant Regional Director for the Europe Region, whose area of responsibility includes
West Africa.
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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
responsible for monitoring the diversion of legal, controlled substances for
illegal use, we did not review diversion control activities because they are
not appropriated activities and DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General
recently issued a report on DEA’s use of the diversion control fee
account.5 More details about the scope and methodology of our work
regarding each of the objectives are presented in the following sections.
5
The diversion control fee account consists of registration fees paid by licensed
pharmacies and wholesale distributors of licit controlled substances. See, for example,
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s Use of the Diversion Control Fee Account, I-2008-002 (Washington, D.C.:
February 2008).
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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Table 2: DEA Field Divisions; Other Federal Agencies; and State, Local, and Tribal Agencies Visited by GAO at Domestic
Locations
Other law enforcement agencies visited
DEA field
a
divisions visited
Location
Federal agenciesb
Detroit
Detroit, MI
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE)
Miamic
Columbus, OH
FBI
State, local, and tribal agencies
•
Michigan State Police
•
Wayne County Sheriff’s Office
•
Columbus Police Department
Mansfield, OH
Not applicable
•
Mansfield Police Department
Newark, OH
Not applicable
•
Licking County Sheriff’s Office
Miami, FL
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), FBI, ICE, U.S. Marshals
Service
•
Miami-Dade County Police
Department
Tampa, FL
Not applicable
•
•
Tampa Police Department
Hillsborough County Sheriff’s
Office
New York
New York City, NY
ATF, FBI, ICE
•
New York City Police Department
Phoenix
Phoenix, AZ
Not applicable
•
Tucson, AZ
CBP, FBI, ICE
•
Arizona Department of Public
Safety
Maricopa County Sheriff
Pima County Sheriff’s Office
Sacaton, AZ
Not applicable
•
Gila River Indian Community
Police Department
Sells, AZ
Not applicable
•
Tohono O’Odham Nation Police
Department
Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
ATF, FBI
•
St. Louisd
Des Moines, IA
Not applicable
•
California Bureau of Narcotics
Enforcement
Iowa Department of Public Safety
Marshalltown, IA
Not applicable
•
Marshall County Sheriff’s Office
Seattle, WA
CBP, ICE
•
King County Sheriff’s Office
•
Seattle
Source: GAO.
a
The geographical scope or area of responsibility of a DEA field division can encompass several
states (e.g., the Detroit Division’s area of responsibility includes Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio). Thus,
a DEA field division, in addition to having a division office location, may also have district offices or
other posts of duty. The specific locations we visited are noted in the table.
b
Locations where we did not contact other federal agencies during our visits are denoted by “not
applicable.”
c
In addition to visiting DEA’s Miami Division, we also visited and spoke with DEA officials at the
Tampa District Office.
d
While we did not visit DEA’s St. Louis Division, we visited and spoke with officials at DEA’s Des
Moines Resident Office, which is part of the St. Louis Division.
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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Table 3: Federal and Foreign Agencies and Personnel Interviewed by GAO at International Locations
Country
City
Agencies and personnel interviewed
Afghanistan
Kabul
British Serious Organized Crime Agency, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command
Afghanistan, U.S. Defense Attaché, DOJ, DEA, U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission
(DCM), FBI, U.S. Joint Interagency Coordination Group, U.S. Department of State’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State)
Belgium
Brusselsa
a
DEA
Colombia
Bogotá
DEA, FBI, ICE, State
Mexico
Mexico City
ATF, DEA, DOJ, FBI, ICE
Thailand
Bangkok
DEA, DCM, FBI, ICE, State
Source: GAO.
a
Denotes agencies contacted via telephone or video conference. All other interviews were conducted
in person.
Changes to DEA Policies,
Strategies, and Authorities
Post-9/11 to Support
National Counterterrorism
Efforts and Address
Evolving Global Drug
Threats
To ascertain changes to DEA’s policies, strategies, and authorities since
9/11 to support national counterterrorism efforts and address evolving
global drug threats and how DEA has contributed to the Global War on
Terrorism, we reviewed
•
DEA budget data for fiscal years 2000 through 2007, including DEA’s
congressional budget justifications;
•
DEA documents relating to the hiring freeze;6
•
DEA staffing data;
•
provisions of the Controlled Substances Act (Title 21 of the U.S. Code),
including sections 959 and 960a that provide extraterritorial
jurisdiction to DEA;
•
DEA case statistics on investigations linked to consolidated priority
organization targets and Department of State–designated foreign
terrorist organizations;
6
Beginning in August 2006, DEA initiated a hiring freeze to address funding constraints
created in part by unfunded pay increases and budget rescissions. The hiring freeze ended
in December 2007 with enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. Pub. L.
No. 110-161, Division B, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). According to the explanatory statement
accompanying DEA’s appropriation, DEA received additional funding above the President’s
budget request to enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze. 153 Cong. Rec. H15741, H15799
(2007).
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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
•
DEA guidance and standard operating procedures for conducting
financial investigations and collecting and forwarding information on
cases with terrorism links to the intelligence community; and
•
documents related to DEA’s programs that assist other law
enforcement agencies, such as DEA’s mobile enforcement teams.
We also interviewed DEA officials and other federal, state, and local law
enforcement officials about changes to DEA’s strategies, policies, and
activities since 9/11 and the effects of these changes on DEA and other law
enforcement entities.
Changes to DEA’s
Partnerships with Federal,
State, and Local Agencies
with Counternarcotics
Responsibilities since 9/11
and the Effects of Those
Changes
To determine changes to DEA’s partnerships with federal, state, and local
agencies with counternarcotics responsibilities since 9/11 and the effects
of those changes, we interviewed officials at
•
DEA, including DEA’s Chiefs of Operations and Intelligence and other
headquarters and field personnel, to gain perspective on changes to
DEA’s partnerships and coordination since 9/11 and the effects of
these changes;
•
other DOJ components, including the FBI; the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the United States Marshals Service;
and the Executive Office for OCDETF;
•
two Department of Homeland Security components that have
counternarcotics responsibilities—U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection;
•
the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs and the respective U.S. embassies’ Narcotics
Affairs Sections in Bangkok (Thailand), Bogotá (Colombia), and Kabul
(Afghanistan); and
•
DOD’s Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats.
We also interviewed officials at selected state and local partner agencies
that have perspectives on changes to federal agencies’ drug control
missions after 9/11. Details on locations visited and federal agencies
whose officials we interviewed are included in tables 2 and 3. In addition,
we reviewed various documents, including
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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
•
GAO, Inspector General, and Congressional Research Service reports
on DEA’s partner agencies (e.g., reports on the FBI’s transformation
after 9/11);
•
DEA and other agency budget data for fiscal years 2000 through 2007,
including data on reimbursable authority provided to DEA;
•
memorandums of understanding between DEA and partner agencies
and other documentation illustrating changes to agencies’
counternarcotics strategies and activities and relationships with DEA
since 9/11; and
•
data from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys and the Executive
Office for OCDETF for fiscal years 2000 through 2007 illustrating
changes in the number of narcotics cases brought by federal law
enforcement agencies.
To better understand DEA’s partnerships and coordination with state and
local law enforcement, we
•
reviewed budget documents and other information for fiscal years
2000 through 2007 provided by DEA officials responsible for state and
local efforts and managing field offices illustrating (1) DEA funds
allocated to support state and local programs and (2) trend data
regarding the number of state and local officers assigned to
interagency task forces;
•
interviewed DEA officials responsible for state and local efforts at
headquarters and the field to collect information on changes to DEA’s
work at the field offices;
•
interviewed officials at selected state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies within proximity to the DEA offices we visited
(see table 2); and
•
conducted a telephone survey of 17 of the 27 members of the National
Sheriffs’ Association’s Drug Enforcement Committee who agreed to
participate (see table 4).7
7
The National Sheriff’s Association is a nonprofit organization that provides programs for
sheriffs, their deputies, chiefs of police, and other law enforcement professionals to raise
the level of professionalism within the criminal justice field. The primary purpose of the
association’s Drug Enforcement Committee is to provide a forum to discuss and address
the issues that sheriffs’ offices face when combating illegal drugs.
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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Table 4: National Sheriffs’ Association’s Drug Enforcement Committee Members
Interviewed by GAO
State
City
Agencies interviewed
Alabama
Brewton
Escambia County Sheriff’s Office
Arkansas
Wynne
Cross County Sheriff’s Office
Florida
Labelle
Hendry County Sheriff’s Office
Orlando
Orange County Sheriff’s Office
Dahlonega
Lumpkin County Sheriff’s Office
Georgia
Illinois
Wheaton
Dupage County Sheriff’s Office
Kentucky
Glasgow
Barren County Sheriff’s Office
Minnesota
Rochester
Olmsted County Sheriff’s Office
North Carolina
Morganton
Burke County Sheriff’s Office
Ohio
Hamilton
Butler County Sheriff’s Department
Pennsylvania
Towanda
Bradford County Sheriff’s Office
South Dakota
Sioux Falls
Minnehaha County Sheriff’s Office
Texas
Orange
Orange County Sheriff’s Office
Vermont
Bennington
Bennington County Sheriff’s Office
Burlington
Chittenden County Sheriff’s Office
Wisconsin
Jefferson
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office
Wyoming
Sundance
Crook County Sheriff’s Office
Source: GAO.
Note: We contacted all 27 members of the National Sheriffs’ Association’s Drug Enforcement
Committee and were able to complete interviews with 17 members who were available during the
period that we conducted our telephone survey.
We then compared DEA’s partnerships with federal, state, and local
agencies with past GAO recommendations on practices that can enhance
and sustain collaboration among federal agencies.8
8
See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Enhance and Sustain
Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Mechanisms DEA Uses to
Coordinate and Avoid
Duplication with Partner
Agencies
To understand the mechanisms DEA uses to coordinate and avoid
duplication with partner agencies, we first interviewed DEA officials to
identify the task forces and intelligence centers used by DEA. We then
interviewed federal, state, and local officials at various multiagency task
forces and intelligence centers to discuss their effectiveness at
coordinating efforts and avoiding duplication (see table 5). We also
reviewed memorandums of understanding between DEA and other law
enforcement entities governing their relationships at task forces and
intelligence centers and other agency documents illustrating resources
dedicated to task forces and intelligence centers for fiscal years 2000
through 2007. We then compared DEA’s and partner agencies’
coordination efforts with recommendations on information sharing made
in the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report) and Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government.9
Table 5: Multiagency Task Forces and Intelligence Centers Visited by GAO
State or country
City
Afghanistan
Kabul
Arizona
Tucson
Task force or intelligence center
•
U.S. Border Management Task Force
•
Interagency Operations Coordination Center
•
Southwest Border HIDTA
District of Columbia
Metropolitan area
•
Florida
Key West
•
DEA-led Special Operations Division
National Joint Terrorism Task Force
OCDETF Fusion Center
Joint Interagency Task Force-South
Michigan
Detroit
•
Michigan HIDTA
New York
New York
•
New York/New Jersey HIDTA
Texas
El Paso
•
El Paso Intelligence Center
Thailand
Bangkoka
•
Joint Interagency Task Force-West
Washington
Seattle
•
Northwest HIDTA
•
•
Source: GAO.
a
We interviewed a representative from the Joint Interagency Task Force-West in Bangkok, Thailand;
however, the task force is headquartered at the U.S. Pacific Command (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii).
9
GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
The Extent to Which DEA’s
Strategic Plan and
Performance Measures
Reflect the Post-9/11
Environment
To determine the extent to which DEA’s strategic plan and performance
measures reflect the post 9/11 environment, we reviewed
•
the National Drug Control Strategy prepared by the Office of National
Drug Control Policy,
•
DEA’s most recently available strategic plan (Strategic Plan: Fiscal
Years 2003 – 2008) and DEA’s annual performance plans for 2008 and
2009, and
•
DOJ’s Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007 – 2012.
We discussed the development and implementation of DEA’s strategic
plan with responsible DEA officials and then compared DEA’s strategic
plan and related performance measures with requirements of the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), GAO’s
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,10 and GAO’s
recommended practices for implementing GPRA.11
Data Reliability
To assess the reliability of statistical information and budget data we
obtained from DEA and partner agencies—such as budget authority and
full-time equivalent personnel data, number of case referrals to U.S.
Attorney’s offices, and performance data—we discussed the sources of the
data with agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the
compilation of data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of this review.
We did not review or assess information relating to specific instances of
intelligence sharing between DEA and other federal agencies, primarily
because such information involves ongoing counterterrorism
investigations or intelligence community activities.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through March 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
10
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
11
See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and
Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
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Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Justice
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Justice
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Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Justice
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Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the
Department of Homeland Security
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Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security
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Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Eileen Larence, (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, Danny Burton, Assistant Director,
and Sean Lovitt, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment.
John Bagnulo, Shannon Finnegan, and Ryan MacMaster contributed
significantly to all aspects of this report.
Michele Fejfar assisted with methodology and data reliability.
Willie Commons and Christine Davis provided legal support.
Sally Williamson assisted in report development.
(440642)
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GAO-09-63 DEA and the Drug War after 9/11
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