Water for the Urban Poor:
C6te d'Ivoire's Experiment With Private and Informal Sector Cooperation
by
Anjali Mitter
B.A., Development Studies
Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island (1995)
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master in City Planning
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 1999
© 1999 Anjali Mitter
All Rights Reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT the permission to reproduce and to
distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part
Author
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
May 14, 1999
Certified by
Assistant Professor Jennifer Davis
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Associate Professor Paul Smoke
Chair, MCP Committee
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
JUL 1 9 1999
LIBRARIES
Water for the Urban Poor:
COte d'Ivoire's Experiment With Private and Informal Sector Cooperation
by
Anjali Mitter
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 14, 1999 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master in City Planning
ABSTRACT
The urban poor in developing countries, many of whom live in illegal squatter settlements at the
periphery of the city, often have insufficient access to affordable, clean water. Both public and private
utilities are often unable or unwilling to install piped water connections in these neighborhoods, and,
as a result, the poor tend to rely on individual, informal vendors who sell water at very high prices. In
an effort to bridge this service gap and provide the urban poor with easy and affordable access to water
without investing in costly infrastructure, some public utilities have tried to form agreements with
vendors to use them as an extension of their distribution network.
In an era of increasing private sector participation in water treatment and distribution, some private
companies are considering similar arrangements. This thesis presents the results of field-work
conducted in Abidjan, C6te d'Ivoire, where the private water utility has, since 1960, attempted to
forge a partnership with vendors in the informal sector. The system of "registered vending" that the
utility has implemented is promising in that, as long as the utility is prohibited by law from extending
the network into illegally settled neighborhoods, it enables the residents of these neighborhoods to
obtain at least a minimal amount of clean water. However, the system could be strengthened, and the
lessons learned from this experiment may be helpful for other private utilities considering similar
cooperative arrangements with water vendors in the informal sector.
Thesis Supervisor: Jennifer Davis
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people helped me develop, conduct and write up my research:
At MIT, I would like to thank Paul Levy for his unrelenting faith in me, Jennifer Davis for her support
and thoughtful commentary throughout the thesis process, and Meenu Tewari for her methodical
reading and patient dissection of the numerous iterations of my thesis proposal.
At the World Bank's Regional Water and Sanitation Group in Abidjan, I am especially indebted to
Annie Manou Savina for her cheerful and generous help and support during my fieldwork. I am also
grateful to Suzanne Andrea Reiff and Sylvie Debomy for their advice and to Matheos Woldu for
granting me the use of office space and equipment. I also want to thank Lucien Angbo in Abidjan and
Mukami Kariuki in Nairobi for helping me with the logistics of my trip. I also owe thanks to Mme.
Mady and the staff at ASAPSU for accompanying me during my fieldwork.
At the World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C., I am grateful to Tracey Osborne, Penelope
Brook-Cowen and Tova Solo for meeting with me and providing feedback on my ideas.
Many friends and family members also helped me during all phases of this work. I wish to thank Eloi
Traord and his family in Abidjan for their wonderful hospitality; Siddhartha Mitter, my brother, for his
insightful and knowledgeable commentary and suggestions; Jason Duva, my soon-to-be husband, for
his love, support, and confidence in me; and my parents for their support from afar.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.
ACCESS TO CLEAN WATER IN LOW-INCOME URBAN AREAS...................................................
6
2.
SERVICE PROVISION BY THE NON-INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR ...............................................
8
3.
PRIVATIZATION IN THE WATER SECTOR ...................................................................................
A)
B)
C)
REASONS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION......................................................................................
TYPES OF PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION......................................................
........................................
PRIVATE SECTOR APPROACH TO SERVING THE URBAN POOR
10
10
1
14
4.
POTENTIAL FOR PARTNERSHIP ....................................................................................................
15
5.
THE CASE OF ABIDJAN, COTE D'IVOIRE.....................................................................................
16
CHAPTER TWO: THE WATER SECTOR IN COTE D'IVOIRE
1.
INTRODUCTION TO C0TE D'IVOIRE AND ABIDJAN...............................................................
18
2.
HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE WATER SECTOR ............................................................
20
CREATIO N ...............................................................................................................................
A)
SO D E C I's
B)
C)
THE NATIONAL POTABLE WATER PROGRAM .........................................................................................
THE WATER SECTOR STRUCTURE...............................................................................................................
SECTOR PERFORMANCE IN COTE D'IVOIRE............................................................................
3.
A)
B)
O VERALL PERFO RM A NCE ........................................................................................................
...............................
ACCESS TO WATER IN ABIDJAN'S LOW INCOME AREAS .................
22
24
26
..---.......... 26
......... 28
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..............................................................................................................
4.
20
31
CHAPTER THREE: ABIDJAN'S REGISTERED AND ILLEGAL VENDORS
THE UTILITY'S PERSPECTIVE .......................................................................................................
1.
A)
B)
C)
PRO CESS A N D FEES ...................................................................................................................................
........----.
T A RIFFS A N D PR ICES ................................................................................................................SO D EC I AND THE VENDORS.....................................................................................................................
ILLEGAL VENDORS' PERSPECTIVE ..............................................................................................
2.
A)
B)
C)
V END IN G M ETH O D S ..................................................................................................................................
R EVENU E AN D EXPEN SES ..........................................................................................................................
C O M PET ITION ............................................................................................................................................
REGISTERED VENDORS' PERSPECTIVE .....................................................................................
3.
A)
B)
C)
.......................................
...............
THE REGISTERED VENDORS' ASSOCIATION
REGISTERED VENDORS AND SO D ECI.....................................................................................................
C O M PET ITIO N ............................................................................................................................................
35
35
36
37
39
39
41
43
44
44
45
45
4.
HOUSEHOLDS' PERSPECTIVE............................................................................................................
46
5.
LIMITS TO THE SUCCESS OF WATER VENDING ..........................................................................
47
A)
B)
C)
D)
E)
L A CK O F INFO RM ATIO N.............................................................................................................................
LACK OF ORGANIZATION AMONG VENDORS ...........................................................................................
D IVERGENCE OF M OTIVES.........................................................................................................................
............
PHYSICAL AND TECHNICAL CONSTRAINTS...........................................
C ORRUPTIO N AND FRAUD..........................................................................................................................
47
49
50
50
51
CHAPTER FOUR: RECOMMENDATION AND IMPLICATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SODECI ..............................................................................................
1.
A)
B)
C)
D)
E)
F)
PROMOTE ORGANIZATION AND REPRESENTATION AMONG VENDORS ................................
INCREASE SODECI'S CONTROL OVER WATER VENDING .........................................................................
IM PROVE THE PUBLIC STANDPIPES .........................................................................................................
CREATE A RESALE POINT/STANDPIPE HYBRID..........................................................................................
.................................
FACILITATE ACCESS TO PRIVATE CONNECTIONS IN PLANNED NEIGHBORHOODS
...............
..............
.............
CONDUCT A PILOT STUDY FOR NETWORK EXTENSION ........
52
52
54
56
57
57
58
2.
SODECI AS A UNIQUE CASE ................................................................................................................
58
3.
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER UTILITIES........................................................................................
60
A)
B)
C)
D)
E)
F)
4.
..........................
AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION..........................................
ADM IN ISTRA TIVE CAPACITY .....................................................................................................................
V ENDOR REPRESENTATION .......................................................................................................................
P A RTN ER SH IP ............................................................................................................................................
B ULK W ATER PRICE FOR VENDORS..........................................................................................................
REDUCTION OF UNREGISTERED VENDING ...............................................................................................
62
63
63
63
64
64
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.......................................................................................
64
APPENDIX
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONS.................................................................................................
1.
A)
B)
G ENERA L Q U ESTIO N S................................................................................................................................
QUESTIONS REGARDING WATER VENDING...............................................................................................
66
66
66
2.
VENDOR SURVEY QUESTIONS...........................................................................................................
68
3.
SODECI INTERVIEW QUESTIONS......................................................................................................
70
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.
ACCESS TO CLEAN WATER IN LOW-INCOME URBAN AREAS
It is undisputed that low income urban areas in developing countries are poorly served by basic
infrastructure networks-safe
transportation, roads, electricity.
water, sanitation, solid waste collection
and disposal, public
Articles in journals and books pertaining to urban development
document the dire conditions in which the urban poor live in the developing world. These conditions
are of particular concern in the water and sanitation sector, where lack of access to adequate services
has severe health and economic implications: At least 170 million people in urban areas lack a source
of potable water near their homes, and nearly 350 million people in urban areas lack access to basic
wastewater collection and treatment facilities.' African cities have particularly low levels of water and
sanitation services; only 64 percent of the urban population have access to safe water, and only 14
2
percent of all urban households have private water connections.
This situation is projected to worsen dramatically in the next few decades, as urbanization continues
unchecked. The World Bank expects the number of urban poor, already at 400 million in the
developing world, to increase to one billion by 2020. Many of these urban poor will live in slum-type
settlements without legal recognition or secure tenure, a situation which tends to secure and aggravate
inadequate access to basic infrastructure.3
Providing conventional piped water supply services to the urban poor is a challenge for a number of
reasons. This thesis focuses on one city in one African country, but the characteristics it notes are
common in many parts of the world. Some of the reasons are physical in nature: Many of the urban
poor live in illegal squatter settlements at the periphery of the city, where there is no clear-cut road
system and no cadastral division of land. Sometimes the landscape includes steep slopes that preclude
the installation of a conventional piped network.
The population is often transient, the dwellings
1 Dillinger, William, Decentralization and Its Implications for Service Delivery, World Bank, Urban
Management Program, 1994, p. 6
2 Water Utilities Partnership, Rapport de 'Atelier du 28-30 Juillet, World Bank/UNDP, 1998, p. 5
3 Kessides, Christine, World Bank Experience with the Provision of Infrastructure Services for the Urban Poor:
Preliminary Identification and Review of Best Practices, World Bank, Washington D.C., January 1997, p. 1
impermanent; it is often impossible for a utility to draw up customer files or plan a layout for
infrastructure networks.
Technical obstacles are compounded with a political anti-poor bias. National and local governments
are subject to stringent fiscal and financial conditions and tend to protect the interests of groups with
greater political leverage. Thus the wealthy and middle class are often served, while the poor are left
4
to fend for themselves, despite the fact that they represent the largest percentage of the population.
This political reality is also evidenced by administrative constraints to serving the poor. Outdated
regulations regarding land use and zoning, for example, reinforce practices that do not allow
5
alternative means of access to infrastructure services by the poor. In addition, governments often lack
up-to-date and accurate information on who the poor are, where they live, and what their actual needs
and preferences are. The actions of even well-intentioned governments are thus often not well
targeted. Finally, in areas of spontaneous, improvised and temporary housing, authorities are loathe to
6
"legalize" the development and therefore avoid the official recognition that public services entail.
International pressures have sometimes aggravated these factors. During the course of the past two
decades, the poor have suffered from the consequences of structural adjustment programs developed
and mandated as loan conditions by international financial institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Such programs, instituted with the purpose of ensuring that the debts incurred
by developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s would be paid back, have had effects in every
aspect of social, political and economic development in these countries. The poor have often suffered
the brunt of economic adjustment policies which, at times, call for reducing spending on such crucial
services as education and infrastructure.7
With respect to water in particular, the fact that the water utilities of developing countries, usually
public entities, are often fraught with inefficiencies aggravates existing conditions. Municipal water
utilities often fall into a "low-level equilibrium trap": due to the low prices they charge in order to
make water accessible, municipalities do not have the large sums necessary to invest in expanding and
maintaining often decaying infrastructure and cannot keep pace with the rapid growth of the urban
4 Menendez, Aurelio, Access to Basic Infrastructure by the Urban Poor, EDI Policy Seminar Report No. 28,
World Bank, Washington DC, 1991, p.7
Ibid., p. 21
6 Lyonnaise des Eaux, Alternative Solutions for Water Supply and Sanitation in Areas with Limited Financial
Resources, Compagnie Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, Paris, 1998, p. 22
7 Macharia, Kinuthia, Social and Political Dynamics of the Informal Economy in African Cities-Nairobi and
Harare, University Press of America, Inc., Oxford, 1997, p. 29
population.
inefficient.
8
As a result, water is often of poor quality, and service is limited, unreliable, and
Large amounts of water, often nearing 50 percent of supply, are lost in distribution
through leaks, and bill collection methods are frequently haphazard and highly corrupt.'
These
utilities are also often viewed as "government employment programs," burdened by political
considerations with oversized staffs of poorly trained employees.
These factors, coupled with the
prevalence of unrecovered subsidies designed to "help" the poor, make for very low levels of cost
0
recovery, further limiting the possibility for investment in infrastructure and service improvements.'
While all urban residents are affected by these conditions, the poor, often living at the periphery of the
city beyond the reach of the network, suffer the consequences disproportionately.
Limited funds mean that there is little incentive for water utilities to provide service to poor
neighborhoods.
The extension of water mains to marginal urban areas requires considerable
investment and implies supplying low-income groups whose ability to pay for the service is often low.
Connection costs are often too high for low-income households to connect to the system; when they do
connect, they tend to cause high customer management costs to the utility. The level of bad debts
among the poor is higher because of their inability to save money and budget for periodic bills. Small
bills combined with high collection costs make these neighborhoods a financial drain for the utility.
When service is extended into poor neighborhoods to reach customers who can pay, illegal measures
taken to tap into the network result in fraudulent consumption and further financial losses to the
utility."
2.
SERVICE PROVISION BY THE NON-INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR
Because water is a basic need for survival, the under-served poor find alternate ways to obtain some
on a daily basis, ironically often at a high price.' 2 Some illegally hook into the existing distribution
lines, thus further crippling the water utility itself. Others tap surface water sources such as canals,
streams, rivers or lakes that are frequently unsafe and rife with disease vectors. Frequently, they pay
8 World Bank, "Environmental Priorities for Development and Sanitation and Clean Water," World
Development Report, Washington, D.C., 1992, p. 106
9 Brook Cowen, Penelope, "Private Sector Participation in the Reduction of Unaccounted-for-Water,"
Infrastructure Note No. WS 15, World Bank, Transportation, Water and Urban Development Department,
Washington, D.C., September 1994, p. 1
10 Haarmeyer, David and Ashoka Mody, "Tapping the Private Sector: Approaches to Managing Risk in Water
and Sanitation," in the Journal of Project Finance, Vol. 4 No. 2, Summer 1998, p. 8
" Lyonnaise des Eaux, op. cit., p. 21
12 World Bank 1992, op. cit., p. 100
high prices to private vendors who sell water in plastic containers (jerricans) for up to 50 times more
13
per gallon than the price charged by the municipal utility.
These water vendors form a part of what is commonly referred to as the "informal" sector.
Their
activities are usually illegal, often as a result of outdated regulations designed to eliminate any
competition that the water company might face. Macharia (1997) defines the informal sector as "those
small scale business activities that operate without direct state regulation. They are considered illegal
because they do not pay taxes and they operate in spaces not zoned for what they do. They are illegal
but not illegitimate in the eyes of society...The small scale businesses of my definition face
harassment from city and local council police, yet they are a viable and dynamic part of the national
Other terms used to designate this informal economy include underground, noneconomy.""
institutional, shadow, parallel, black market, second, off the books, submerged, and hidden."
Whatever the term used, this is a market open to competition in which activities are outside statutory
and institutional frameworks; production, if there is any, is generally on a small scale and employs
6
unskilled labor. Activities in this sector generally require fairly low levels of initial investment.'
Water vendors obtain water either from public taps provided by the water company, from untreated
sources such as rivers and canals, from their own private water connections, or from wells they bore
themselves. They frequently deliver water to homes by hauling it on foot, in carts, by bicycle, or, in
more large-scale operations, in tanker trucks. In the case of private individuals reselling water from
their home connections, neighborhood consumers sometimes fetch the water themselves at the resale
point. Such water vending is widespread in cities: in Ouagadougou, 60 percent of the water
7
distributed by the utility is then redistributed by water vendors.'
Similarly, 35 percent of the
population in Jakarta obtains some portion of its water from vendors and in Ho Chi Minh, 34 percent
8
of the population at the city's periphery uses vendors.'
More often than not, these vendors charge very high prices for their water. The government or water
utility has limited means to control these prices. In Jakarta in 1988, vendors were collectively making
'
Ibid.
1
Macharia, op. cit., p. 39
" Jenkins, Jerry, (ed.), Beyond the Informal Sector-Including the Excluded in Developing Countries, Institute
for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, 1988, p. 5
16 Lyonnaise des Eaux, op. cit., p. 32
17 Ibid., p. 34
18 Ibid., p. 91
about $20 million annually, almost twice the revenues of the municipal water company. 19 Of the price
paid by households to vendors, about 50 percent was surplus available to vendors as profit. These
high prices explain why the poor end up paying the most for their water, sometimes up to 20 percent
of their income.
these prices.
20
In areas where there is no piped water system, the poor have no choice but to pay
In areas where a piped water connection is technically feasible, the use of more
expensive alternative solutions is explained by the system of daily payment for a limited amount of
water that precisely covers household requirements as opposed to a monthly or tri-monthly billing
system that is poorly adapted to daily expenditure management. 2
In addition, the initial connection
fee often proves to be a significant obstacle to obtaining a private connection.
3.
PRIVATIZATION IN THE WATER SECTOR
a) Reasons for private sector participation
Accepting that they are not in a position to remedy the dire financial situation of their water utilities
and provide more extensive, reliable service themselves, many municipalities in developing countries
have turned to the private sector to take charge of their water supply systems. The inefficiency of
public utilities has led to an average cost recovery of only 35 percent in the water sector of developing
countries. 2 Governments have indulged in heavy borrowing and, therefore, have scarce capital to
spend on operation and maintenance. What little they do have, they tend to spend on new construction
in visible areas so as to give the appearance of a healthy sector to donor agencies and political bodies,
23
rather than on network extensions in poor neighborhoods or maintenance of existing infrastructure.
In many cases, they have failed to meet local demand and needs. The belief that private management
would be more efficient and boost utility performance due to market pressures has led governments,
faced with tightening financial constraints and ever-growing populations, to appeal to the private
sector. Many donor agencies have also, in recent years, been advocating an increase in private sector
involvement in infrastructure provision. From the government's perspective, the overall goals of
private sector participation have been to expand service coverage and raise its quality, generate
Lovei, Laszlo and Dale Whittington, "Rent-seeking in Water Supply", Water and Sanitation Note No. WS-5,
World Bank, Washington D.C., May 1991, p. 1
20 World Bank, 1992, op. cit., p. 3
21 Lyonnaise des Eaux, op. cit., p. 10
22 Rivera, Daniel, Private Sector Participation in the Water Supply and Wastewater Sector: Lessons from Six
Developing Countries, World Bank, Washington D.C., September 1996, p. 49
23 Rondinelli, Dennis A., and John D. Kasarda "Privatizing Public Services in Developing Countries: What Do
19
We Know?", in Business in the Contemporary World, Vol.3 No. 2, Winter 1991, p. 104
resources to finance future investments, increase economic efficiency, and introduce technological
advances.
A movement toward private participation in infrastructure in general started in the 1980s, beginning
with the power, transportation and telecommunications sectors. In the water supply sector, the turn
toward the private sector came a decade later. The water sector entails certain risks that made private
companies wary at first of entering the market: water sector assets require large investments that
amortize over long periods of time, and have limited or no resale value. In addition, the condition of
2
the actual infrastructure is difficult to determine as most of the assets are located underground. s
Finally, the water sector is prone to government intervention and subsidies, thus undermining the
potential for profit. However, in time, the desire of municipalities to shift some of their burden in the
water sector to private companies coincided with the expansion plans of several large French and
British water conglomerates such as Lyonnaise des Eaux, Vivendi (formerly Companie G6n6rale des
Eaux) and Thames Water.2 6 As a result, the late 1980s saw the beginning of a wave of private sector
participation in the water sector around the world, especially in Latin America, East Asia and Africa.
Privatization is especially attractive to large cities experiencing substantial population and economic
expansion.2 7 However, the weakness of domestic capital markets in many developing countries means
that private investors are still selective in their participation in water sector projects. Their hesitancy is
heightened by evidence that public policy concerning water utilities remains high on the political
agenda even after the private sector has entered the picture by virtue of the fact that water is viewed as
both an economic and social good.28
b) Types of private sector participation
Privatization is a general term that refers to a host of different private sector participation
arrangements, summarized in Table 1. The simplest form is a service contract, in which a public water
company contracts with a private firm to provide specific services such as meter reading, billing and
24
Beecher, Janice A., "Water Utility Privatization and Regulation: Lessons from the Global Experiment" in
Water International,Vol. 22, 1997, p. 55
Brook Cowen, Penelope, "Getting the Private Sector Involved in Water-What to Do in the Poorest of
Countries," In Private Sector Note No. 102, World Bank, Private Sector Development Department, Washington,
D.C., January 1997, p. 1
26 Beecher, op. cit., p. 56
27 Rondinelli, op. cit., p. 102
28 Rivera, op. cit., p. 49
25
collection. The water company retains ownership of the assets, is responsible for all investments as
well as operation and maintenance, and bears all risk. The private company is compensated either on a
time basis, on a lump sum, cost-plus-fee or fixed-fee basis, or proportional to some pre-defined
physical parameters such as amount of water sold. Most service contracts are for a maximum of 5
years.
29
Management contracts resemble service contracts with the exception that the contractor assumes
overall responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the system, and makes all day-to-day
operational decisions. Compensation on the basis of physical parameters such as volume of water sold
can provide the contractor with an incentive to improve productivity and reduce unaccounted-forwater. However, as under a service contract, the private firm assumes none of the commercial risk.
3
Management contracts are generally for about 5 years.
Lease contracts are more comprehensive than service or management contracts. A public authority
leases the facilities to a private firm which assumes responsibility for operation and maintenance of
the system. In addition, the contractor finances working capital and the replacement of components.
It collects tariffs from customers, retains an agreed compensation, and pays the remainder to the public
Commercial risk is often transferred to the lessee, who has an incentive to improve
coverage, increase productivity and implement an effective billing and collection system if its fee is a
authority.
percentage of billable water actually delivered and paid for. Such contracts usually last 8 to 15 years,
with a possibility of renewal.31
Build-operate-transfer (BOT) and its offshoots (build-own-operate, build-own-operate-transfer, etc.) is
frequently employed for specific capital investments such as wastewater or potable water treatment
plants in countries with limited financial resources and urgent needs for specific facilities. Often, the
public authority must guarantee a certain demand, such as a volume of water to be treated. Under a
BOT contract, the investment is usually quite large and the period of the contract is long enough to
allow for the recuperation of capital expenditures.
At the end of the contract, the private company
32
transfers the facility back to the government.
29 Triche, Thelma, "Private Participation in Water Supply," World Bank, Water and Sanitation Note No. WS- 1,
December 1990, p. 2
30 Ibid., p. 3
3 Ibid.
3
Haarmeyer, op. cit., p. 6
Concession contracts resemble lease contracts with the exception that the concessionaire must finance
investments in addition to working capital. The private firm agrees to transfer the fixed assets to the
government at a specified future date. Both lease and concession contracts offer the best opportunities
for the development of local capacity. Because of incentives to reduce costs, the operating firm is
more motivated than under service or management contracts to develop local capacities so that local
staff can eventually replace what is usually expatriate staff.
Beyond concessions lies divestiture, the full privatization of assets. Such a form of private sector
participation in the water sector has only occurred in England and Wales.34
Table 1
and their allocation of responsibilities
participation
sector
for
private
options
main
The
Public
Public
1-2 years
Public
Public and
nrivate
Private
Public
Public
3-5 years
Public
Private
Public
Shared
8-15 years
Private
Private
Private
Private
Public
Private
Private
Private
20-30
years
25-30
years
Private
Private
Private
Private
Public
Indefinite
Chile (Santiago)
India (Madras)
Gaza
Trinidad and Tobago
Guinea (17 cities)
Poland (Gdansk)
Malaysia (Johor)
Australia (Sydney)
Argentina (Buenos Aires)
C6te d'Ivoire
Philippines (Manila)
England and Wales
Source: Penelope Brook Cowen, "The Private Sector in Water and Sanitation-How to Get Started", in Public
Policy for the Private Sector, Note No. 126, World Bank, September 1997
Different countries have adopted different approaches to privatization in the water sector. Even within
countries at similar income levels, the nature and extent of private sector participation vary widely. In
the United States, less than 20 percent of the population is served by privately managed water utilities,
and a smaller portion of the population is served by privately owned assets.
Public-private
35
partnerships, however, are common in Europe, predominantly in France and the United Kingdom. In
the United States and in France, control of drinking water quality is exercised by central agencies,
3
3
Triche, op. cit., p.4
Haarmeyer, op. cit., p. 6
while the provision of service and the control of its cost and quality are the responsibility of individual
municipalities. In both countries, the assets are still publicly owned. In the United Kingdom, the
centralized Office of Water Services licenses and monitors a number of private companies that not
36
only provide service but also own the infrastructure.
In developing countries, private sector participation in water is on the rise in all forms except
divestiture. Service and management contracts offer a way to improve operational and service
performance while preparing a utility for fuller privatization options. Some low-income countries,
such as Guinea and Trinidad and Tobago, begin with a management contract during which the
37
government has time to address tariff and regulatory issues, and build up to a concession contract. In
addition, because they often do not require tariff increases or significant downsizing of staff,
management contracts are often politically more acceptable than more comprehensive privatization
contracts such as concessions.
While service contracts are not designed to address managerial inefficiency or underinvestment,
concessions and leases are. However, as they demand more from government in terms of commitment
and preparation, they are mostly to be found in middle-income countries with considerable
38
administrative capacity such as Argentina and Malaysia.
c)
Private sector approach to serving the urban poor
Evaluations of projects involving private sector participation in the water sector suggest that the
involvement of the private sector has often resulted in efficiency gains. The private sector has been
able to reduce water losses in many cases, and to improve revenues and mobilize new sources of
investment finance. As a result, some private companies, especially those operating under a
concession contract, the most "private" of them all short of complete divestiture, have boosted the
pace of system expansion. 39 However, in terms of delivering affordable service to low income
households, the private sector has encountered the same technical, institutional and financial
Ibid., p. 4
Triche, Thelma, "The institutional and regulatory framework for water supply and sewerage: public and
private roles," World Bank, Water and Sanitation Note No. WS-9, Jan 1993, p. 2
3 Brook Cowen, Penelope, "The Private Sector in Water and Sanitation - How to Get Started," World Bank
Group, Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Network, Note No. 126, September 1997, p. 4
38 Ibid., p. 3
39 World Bank, "Toolkits for Private Participation in Water and Sanitation," Transportation, Water and Urban
Development Department, Washington D.C., 1997, p. 1
3
36
challenges as the public sector arising from the lack of an urban fabric with a clear-cut road system,
frequent illegal occupation of land, and high infrastructure costs compared to the ability of households
to pay.
40
Thus, whereas municipal water sectors in developing countries have benefited from an infusion of
cash and management expertise under private sector participation, the involvement of the private
sector has failed to remedy the situation for the poor. Given that access to safe and affordable piped
water still lies beyond the reach of many under privatized systems, independent water providers such
as vendors are still prevalent in many cities, and the poor are still paying high prices for their meager
supplies of water.41
4.
POTENTIAL FOR PARTNERSHIP
Given the inability of water utilities, both public and private, to provide the urban poor with adequate
access to clean water, and given the prevalence of water vendors who continue to sell water despite
their illegal status, professionals in the water field have recently begun considering the idea of linking
water utilities with vendors. In essence, this idea is tantamount to "institutionalizing" the informal
water vending sector so that utilities may rely on vendors to fulfill their distributional roles in areas
where, for the reasons discussed above, the utilities are unable or unwilling to do so.
Tacit arrangements between public water utilities and water vendors already exist in certain cities in
the developing world, including Jakarta, and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The Indonesian
government legalized the resale of water in Jakarta in 1990 in an effort to deregulate the market,
introduce competition so as to lower prices, and acknowledge the central role that this informal,
private water market was playing. Domestic users are allowed to resell water if they have a meter and
if they sell the water in buckets. If they desire a storage tank, they must invest in its construction
themselves. The prices at these resale points, which are unregulated, are lower than those charged at
public supply points or by vendors who deliver water to the home. They are determined by supply and
demand which in turn are determined by the reseller's proximity to a standpipe, the number of other
resellers in the area, periods of water scarcity, etc. 42 Similarly, the National Water and Sanitation
Office in Ouagadougou has, since 1987, officially acknowledged the social value of the services
Lyonnaise des Eaux, op. cit., p. 6
4' Ibid., p. 24
42 Ibid., p.
79
40
vendors provide given that 50 percent of the population in outlying neighborhoods as well as some
households in more central areas obtain at least some of their water from them. As a result, vendors
distribute 60 percent of the water the company produces. 43
The Office established a working
arrangement with the carters, but in this case the agreement is more tacit than formal.44
While these arrangements have, so far, occurred primarily between public utilities and the informal
sector, some private companies are now beginning to consider similar arrangements. For example,
Lyonnaise des Eaux, a large French company involved in water provision in countries around the
world, has recently published a report entitled "Alternative Solutions for Water Supply and Sanitation
in Areas With Limited Financial Resources." In it, the company examines the idea of partnering with
other groups to provide access to water in low income areas.4 5 The company specifically considers the
possibility of partnering in the short term with the informal sector: "The non-institutional sector
generally has conflicting relations with the water services company: although their activities
complement each other, they are also in competition. Without attempting to abolish the role of private
water vendors in the short or medium term, the aim is to foster the gradual integration of noninstitutional suppliers."4 6 While their ultimate goal is often to provide a private connection to each
household, private utilities realize that this goal may take years to fulfill.
In the meantime, a
partnership with vendors may represent a promising interim way to improve access to water for the
poor. 47
5.
THE CASE OF ABIDJAN, COTE D'IVOIRE
While discussion in the Lyonnaise report and among water sector professionals regarding a
partnership between a private water company and the informal sector is still speculative, one private
water utility has, for a number of years, put this hypothetical idea into practice. The water company in
the West African country of C6te d'Ivoire, the Soci6t6 de Distribution de l'Eau de C6te d'Ivoire
43
Ibid., p. I11
44 Ibid.
Ibid., p. 22
Ibid., p. 70
47 It is important to note at this point that this idea of integrating the non-institutional suppliers differs from the
frequently discussed notion of "formalizing" the informal sector. In the case of the water sector, utilities are
promoting the idea so as to improve the provision of a basic service to the urban poor, and to improve their own
service and financial performance. Most discussions regarding "formalizing" the informal sector differ from this
idea in three ways: they are generated by development professionals working for international financial
institutions, multilateral organizations, and NGOs; they refer to a different informal sector dominated by smallscale production and trade activities, often referred to as "microenterprises"; and they have as a principal goal
poverty alleviation through training and job creation.
45
46
(SODECI) is unusual in that it has been private since its formation in 1960 when the country obtained
its independence from France. As the first private water company in Africa, and indeed in much of the
developing world, it has attracted a lot of attention in the water field and is considered quite a success.
Despite relatively high rates of coverage in the capital city of Abidjan, however, the utility for a
number of reasons has not been able to keep pace with rapid urban growth. As a result, vendors,
currently estimated at 1,500 to 2,000, are prevalent in the city. Given the size of this "informal" water
vending sector, SODECI decided in the early 1960s, soon after its formation, to attempt to
institutionalize the activity through a system of legalized water vending. Resigned to the need for
water vendors, SODECI tried to establish a link with some of the vendors by allowing them to
"register" with the utility as vendors.
Today, legal and illegal vending take place in tandem in most of the city's poorer neighborhoods. At a
time when private water utilities are considering partnering with the informal sector to expand and
improve service, it is important to look to SODECI's experience with vendors.
The research I
undertook was aimed at evaluating this experience. In particular, I wanted to determine the exact
nature of this arrangement and how it came about; what its goals were and how successful it has been
in reaching them; whether and how it should be improved; and what lessons can be drawn from it for
other utilities.
Following this introduction, this thesis comprises three chapters. Chapter Two presents the historical
background of SODECI's formation, the current structure of the water sector in C6te d'Ivoire, and the
main principles that shape this sector. The chapter goes on to describe the city of Abidjan and its
water supply situation, as well as the methodology employed for this study. Chapter Three presents
the case study findings, including the perspectives of the various stakeholders on water vending in
Abidjan, and the current constraints to the system's full success. Finally, Chapter Four presents some
recommendations for SODECI and the implications of this case for other utilities, and concludes with
some directions for future research.
CHAPTER 2
THE WATER SECTOR IN COTE D'IVOIRE
1.
INTRODUCTION TO C6TE D'IVOIRE AND ABIDJAN
C6te d'Ivoire is located on the Atlantic Coast of West Africa, with a population approaching 15
million and growing at an annual rate of 3.6 percent. The country's gross domestic product in 1997
was US $10 billion, and per capita income the year before was US $600.48 Colonized by the French in
1893, it gained independence in 1960. In contrast to most of its neighbors, C6te d'Ivoire achieved
sustained economic growth and prosperity after independence.
Its success was largely due to the
policies of its first president, F6lix Houphout Boigny, who encouraged French technicians to stay and
help develop the country. Houphouet Boigny also aggressively promoted agricultural development by
founding the Syndicat Agricole Africain (African Agricultural Union), an organization that won
improved conditions for African farmers and formed the nucleus of what is now the country's
democratic party. The country's main exports today remain coffee, cocoa and timber.4 9
The country's development is characterized by three distinct phases: early growth through the late
1970s, during which economic growth was rapid but accompanied by growing inequality in the
distribution of consumption and income; prolonged recession from 1979 to 1993, during which
average incomes and living standards fell and poverty rose; and a second period of growth following
the devaluation of the currency in 1994.50
Compared to many developing countries, COte d'Ivoire has outstanding infrastructure.
The roads
extend far into the country from Abidjan, the capital. Telecommunications networks are good, and
real estate development is proceeding at a fast pace. The electricity and water sectors are some of the
most successful in Africa, and the country anticipates significant investments in petroleum. While
subjected to structural adjustment reforms in the early 1990s, after a currency devaluation in 1994
C6te d'Ivoire focused on public investment programs, with significant spending both on human capital
and infrastructure.
This investment was made possible by the devaluation, increased aid flows,
rigorous macroeconomic policies, and fortuitous international commodity prices.
In addition, the
48
US Department of State, www.state.gov/wwwlbackground-notes/cote-d_ivoire_0798_bgn.html
41
50
Ibid.
World Bank, Poverty in Cote d'Ivoire-A Framework for Action, Washington D.C., 1996, p. iii
private sector has, for a number of years, been active in the electricity, water and telecommunications
sectors.
C6te d'Ivoire
o
80
0
50
160
320
480km
100
200
300miles ...
* - - ---....
-.....
-.
...
GUINEAOdiinO
....
.
.
..
S..
. .. ... ... .-.ee.+.+
----..........
-..... . ..... *..*.e...*e.e.
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a
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US
Department
-
-- :tmoao
of State, op. cit.
19
------
r
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Bnouou
C6te d'Ivoire's population is 45 percent urban. This urban population, with close to 3 million in the
capital city of Abidjan on the coast and another 3 million in several other cities, is growing at an
annual rate of 3.8 percent.
52
Abidjan, while benefiting from a master plan, has been overwhelmed by
in-migration from rural areas and less prosperous neighbors, and as a result is experiencing a severe
housing shortage.
Because of this shortage, 18 percent of Abidjan's population lived in 72
"unplanned" neighborhoods in 1990, the most recent year for which such data are available. The
government considers as unplanned any neighborhood in which there is no individual numbering of
plots and no cadastral divisions of land. These unplanned neighborhoods are often characterized by
illegal occupation of land and virtual non-existence of any infrastructure. They are often located at the
periphery of the city. The housing stock in these areas consists of poorly constructed shacks, often
clustered around a shared yard in which most household activities, such as washing and cooking, take
place. Despite what is considered world-wide a successful water sector, access to clean water in these
areas is, at best, difficult and expensive.
2.
HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE WATER SECTOR
The provision of water supply in developing countries tends to be a public service.
Usually, a
national, public utility holds a monopoly over water treatment and distribution as well as network
construction and maintenance. The system is centralized and state-run, leaving little room for local
input or management. In C6te d'Ivoire, however, the sector has for years been managed by a private
entity, the Soci6t6 de Distribution de l'Eau de C6te d'Ivoire (SODECI), or C6te d'Ivoire Water
Distribution Company.
a) SODECI's creation
In the 1930s and 1940s, following C6te d'Ivoire's occupation by the French, the structure of the
country's water sector mirrored that found in France: each municipality ran its own water supply
network, under state supervision. 53 By 1956, however, it was clear that such a system was inefficient,
and many municipalities did not have the technical, financial or managerial wherewithal to provide
adequate service.
In addition, many rural and semi-rural areas were without any service at all. In
1956, therefore, the authorities of several municipalities decided to form an agreement granting an
Bi, Goueti, "SODECI Institutional Framework, Oraanization and Results in the Management of Water Supply
and Sewage Services," Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, 1996, p. 4
52
existing public company the responsibility of operating their water networks. This public company,
the Energie Electrique de C6te d'Ivoire, was created in 1952 to run the country's electric sector. The
municipalities felt that this company would have the management skills and administrative
infrastructure necessary to run the water sector as well.
Three years later, in 1959, C6te d'Ivoire issued an international tender for a private company to enter
the sector. The government had decided that EECI should have a private sector partner who was more
experienced in running a water network to focus on Abidjan's system and improve the sector's overall
performance. A French private operator, the Societ6 d'Am6nagement Urbain et Rural (SAUR), won
the bid and became that partner.
The next year, in 1960, C6te d'Ivoire obtained its independence from France.
Several African
countries became independent around the same time, beginning with Ghana in 1957, and in all of them
there was a noticeable push for nationalization of organizations and enterprises formerly run by
colonial powers. In the water sector in particular, rapid urbanization, the development of second-tier
cities, and increasing political pressure to provide water to disadvantaged populations all created
conditions that were incompatible with the dominance of foreign enterprises with differing interests.55
Most newly independent African countries, therefore, made significant changes to their water sectors
in the 1960s. These changes, however, varied significantly from country to country.
In C6te d'Ivoire, a certain amount of continuity prevailed, in that a private entity remained at the head
of the water sector. However, in keeping with the trend toward nationalization, SAUR created a
private Ivorian subsidiary, SODECI, in 1960 to construct production facilities and operate Abidjan's
water supply system under a concession contract. At that time, SAUR held all of SODECI's shares. 6
For the next 14 years, SODECI and EECI operated the water sector jointly; during that time water
supply services were extended beyond Abidjan to some of the country's other urban areas.
Bi, op. cit., p. 6
Zadi Kessy, Marcel, Culture Africaine et Gestion de l'Entreprise Moderne, Editions CEDA, Abidjan, 1998, p.
163
5 Montano, Iraida and Henri Coing, Le service d'eau potable dans les villes du Tiers-Monde: Modes de gestion
et d'organisation, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussdes, Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherches Techniques
et Sociales, September 1985, p. 16
56 Triche, Thelma, "Private Participation in Water Supply in Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea," World Bank, Water and
Sanitation Note No. WS-2, October 1990, p. 1
53
5
The management of the water sector by two entities, however, one private and one public, created
inefficiencies of service. Each entity had different management styles and levels of competence, and
by 1973 the Ivorian state decided that the entire sector should be restructured. The head of state gave
the Ministry of Planning the responsibility to develop a national water plan, and handed over the entire
water system to SODECI under the supervision and control of this same Ministry. 57 The legal
arrangement between the government and SODECI also changed. This arrangement was expanded to
include 1) a lease contract for urban and rural water supply services outside the capital; 2) a
concession contract for the Abidjan water supply system; and 3) a maintenance contract for the
Abidjan sewerage and drainage system. For the next few years, SODECI collected the approved tariff
from consumers and, after subtracting its fees, transferred the remaining revenue to the National Water
Works Fund, responsible for the sector's debt service, and the National Sanitation Fund, responsible
for financing the sanitation sector. The Direction d'Eau, or Water Directorate, of the Ministry of Public
Works and Transportation was responsible for water supply planning and decisions on investment. 58
In 1987, the government again restructured the sector, and negotiated a twenty year concession
contract with SODECI for all urban water supply in C6te d'Ivoire.
In addition, the government
awarded SODECI a separate operation and maintenance contract for the Abidjan sewerage system,
until then sadly neglected. The lease contract for rural water supply operations was canceled, and in
its stead a decentralized system is being created under the aegis of the Water Directorate."
b)
The National Potable Water Program
Before proceeding with a description of the current structure of C6te d'Ivoire's water sector, it is
important to note that this sector is highly influenced by a Programme National de l'Hydraulique, or
National Potable Water Program, designed by the Ministry of Planning. At the end of the first decade
of independence, the authorities of C6te d'Ivoire realized that their efforts had been heavily
concentrated on electrification programs to the detriment of the water sector. In 1973, while almost all
the country's main urban centers had electricity, only one third of these centers had water supply
systems. This disparity in water distribution, coupled with a severe drought, prompted the government
to formulate and implement a national water program. From 1973 to 1988, the plan aimed to supply
5
58
5
Zadi Kessy, op. cit., p. 163
Triche, October 1990, op. cit., p. 2
Ibid., p. 2
potable water to all urban centers with more than 4,000 inhabitants, and to equip villages with more
than 100 people with water.o
The national water program is based on five principles.
The first of these principles is price
equalization. Because Abidjan is located on a large and deep aquifer, the average cost per cubic meter
of water produced in the capital is about half of that in the provincial cities. As a result, in 1973 the
Water Directorate established a single tariff system and applied it nationwide; the revenue from
consumers in Abidjan helps to subsidize production in the rest of the country.
61
The second principle of the national water program is that the water sector should be financially selfsufficient, i.e., that the receipts from water sales should be sufficient to cover sector costs. In order to
reach this self-sufficiency goal, the government created a National Water Fund used to finance the
sector's debt service. The tariff structure, discussed in detail in a later section of this report, includes a
tax earmarked for this water fund.
The third principle is that the sector should have a social component and include special measures for
supplying low-income populations with clean water. A concern for the poor is apparent in the creation
of a Development Fund, also funded by a tax on the water tariff, used to subsidize private connections
for households under a certain income level.62 In addition, the increasing block tariff includes a low
tariff for household consumption below 6 cubic meters per month, known as the tariff's "social
block."
The fourth principle is that the state should be in control of all planning for the water sector. As a
result, the state makes all decisions pertaining to the development of the sector. For instance, the state
decides on the tariff structure, as well as when and where to invest in network expansion.
Finally, the state decided that a single, private entity should be in charge of the production,
transportation and distribution of water in all the urban areas of the country. This arrangement, the
Bidmi, Jean, "Water Crises and Constraints in West and Central Africa: The Case of Cote D'Ivoire,"
http://www.idrc.ca/books/focus/804/chap6.html, 1998.
61 Menindez, op. cit., p. 29
62 The effectiveness of this subsidization system is, however, subject to debate given that according to SODECI,
94 percent of the households that obtained a connection in 1997 qualified for the subsidy.
60
state felt, would ensure the proper management of the program's other principles. It is in accordance
with this principle that SODECI became the sole water company in C6te d'Ivoire.6 3
c) The water sector structure
SODECI, as the concessionaire, has very specific responsibilities. It is responsible for ensuring that
adequate drinking water supplies, in terms of both quantity and quality, are provided around-the-clock
to all urban centers served by the water supply system. It manages the operation of the entire urban
water supply network, and bears full commercial risk. 4 In addition, it is in charge of customer
management, as well as management of the aforementioned Development Fund.
responsible for all operating, maintenance and management expenses.
It is, therefore,
SODECI installs all
connections, conducts network expansion construction, and manages the billing and collection system.
Finally, it collects and forwards receipts from water sales to the National Water Fund, and is
responsible for all urban water supply investments.6 5
The National Water Fund is the central agency responsible for managing the sector's public debt. The
physical infrastructure that SODECI uses belongs to the government, which borrowed heavily for the
country's water projects. One of the surcharges added to the consumers' bills is devoted to this loan
repayment. While this fund was managed by SODECI on behalf of the state until 1992, it is now
managed by the Ministry of Finance and Economy.66
In addition to the Ministry of Finance and Economy, other state organizations are involved in the
water sector. Their relationships to each other are illustrated in Figure 1. The Water Directorate of the
Ministry of Public Works plans, implements and monitors the national water program and SODECI's
operation. It serves as the representative of the State, owner of the land and infrastructure, and as such
is in charge of planning and locating financing for all new construction, monitoring the execution of
the concession contract with SODECI, and setting water tariffs and prices with the goal of ensuring
quality service.
It receives technical assistance and financial advice from the Bureau National
d'Etudes Techniques et de Developpement (BNEDT), or National Technical and Development
Office.67 The Water Directorate also acts as a liaison between SODECI and the municipalities served
Men6ndez, op. cit., p. 29
6 Commercial risk here refers to the risk of cost exceeding revenues.
65 Zadi Kessy, op. cit. p. 166
66 Bidmi, op. cit., p.
5
67 Water Utilities Partnership, op. cit., p. 24
63
by its network.
Any significant request for SODECI's sewerage services, for example, must be
relayed through the Water Directorate, which then issues a notification to the concessionaire
68
constituting a work order covered by the operation and maintenance contract.
Figure 1
Water Sector Structure
Assistance
Money for NWF
Contract
Assistance
Authority
Funds
Source: Adapted from SODECI, 1996.
Serageldin, Mona, The Impact of Investments in Urban Infrastructure on Municipal Revenues and the
Integration of Informal Sector Activities-The Abidjan Experience, Harvard University Graduate School of
Design, September 1990, p. 42
68
3.
SECTOR PERFORMANCE IN C6TE D'IVOIRE
a) Overall performance
C6te d'Ivoire's water sector is considered a success among development professionals and water
experts worldwide. The various institutional and contractual reforms that have taken place since the
1960s have given the sector a remarkable profile. The number of communities equipped with a piped
network rose from just 38 in 1974 to 139 in 1980 and 438 in 1997. During this time, the total length
of the network increased from 922 kilometers to 10,000 kilometers.6 9 With 8 staff per 1,000
connections, the company's productivity, while not as high as that of water utilities in Western Europe
where there are two to three staff per 1.000 connections, is twice as high as that of any other water
utility in West Africa.7 4'
As required by the principles of the national water program, the water sector is entirely self-financed.
The state fixed an initial water price at the original date of contract signature, as well as a method of
calculating adjustments in the price according to economic forecasts. The price and the calculation
method are regularly reviewed in accordance with conditions written into the contract. The tariff
structure is revised every five years.72
SODECI implements an increasing block tariff, discussed later in this thesis. While the tariff ranges
from 184 Fcfa/m 3 (US$ 0.33) to 532 Fcfa/m 3 (US$ 0.95), in 1996 the average price of one cubic meter
of water was 325.5 Fcfa (US$ 0.58).7
SODECI retains just over half of this amount to cover its
operating expenses with 5 percent of turnover as a profit margin, fixed by the contract. The state
receives another 6 percent in the form of a value added tax. The rest, 37 percent, is earmarked as a
special water tax. Three quarters of it goes to the Development Fund for subsidized connections and
new construction, while one quarter goes to the National Water Fund to cover the sector's debt
service.74 This flow of funds is illustrated in Figure 2.
Zadi Kessy, op. cit., p. 169
Triche, October 1990, op. cit., p. 2
71 World Bank 1992, op. cit., p. 110
12 Bi, op. cit., p. 10
73 The CFA Franc is fixed to the French Franc at a rate of 100 to 1. At the time this report was written, the
exchange rate from French Francs to US Dollars was 5.6 FF to US$ 1. Therefore, US$ 1=560 Fcfa.
74 Zadi Kessy, op., cit., p. 167
69
70
Figure 2
Flow of Funds
44 Fcfa
Source: Adapted from SODECI, 1996.
In 1997, SODECI produced 124 million cubic meters of water for 370,000 connections.
Of this
volume, 85 million cubic meters (or 68 percent) went to Abidjan alone for its 191,000 connections.
Just over 12 percent was lost as unaccounted-for-water (UfW), a figure that is remarkably low when
compared to the common UfW rates of 40-60 percent found in many developing countries and,
indeed, in some industrialized ones as well. In general, UfW for efficiently managed utilities ranges
from 10 to 12 percent.76 The collection rate on the 88 percent billed was 86 percent overall, and 97
percent if one considers only private consumers, as many public agencies neglect to pay their water
bills.77
This strong performance has enabled SODECI to turn a profit for several years, and the company's
8
shares, traded on the Abidjan Stock Market since 1978, have been consistently increasing in value.
SODECI's assets represent 4 billion Fcfa (US$ 7.1 million). SAUR holds 46 percent of the shares,
and private Ivorians hold another 45 percent. SODECI employees, of whom there are 1,300, own 5
7
SODECI, Rapport Annuel 1997, Abidjan, 1998, p.22
76 Haarmeyer, op. cit., p. 2
77 Bi, op. cit., p. 15
78 Triche, October 1990, op. cit., p. 1
percent of the shares, the Ivorian state owns another 3 percent, and French private individuals own the
remaining 1 percent. The company's annual turnover is 30.6 billion Fcfa. 79
b) Access to water in Abidjan's low income areas
In 1997, SODECI served approximately 2 million people in Abidjan through 190,729 connections.8 0
Given that current estimates of the city's total population hover around 3 million, these figures
indicate that close to one third of the city's residents live without private water connections. Many of
these people live in the unplanned neighborhoods at the periphery of the city. In 1990, 377,000 people
lived in these neighborhoods; given the 3.8 percent annual growth rate of the urban population, it is
safe to assume that, today, this number has surpassed 500,000. The remaining 500,000 are spread
throughout the city. Some may live in households that share a single tap located in a central yard, and
therefore do have access to a water connection even if it is not their own. Due to the lack of an up-todate population census, however, it is unclear where exactly they are located.
The primary reason for the lack of private connections in these neighborhoods is simple: The state
does not allow SODECI to extend the physical network into unplanned neighborhoods. While there
are multiple reasons for this law, the two principal ones are: 1) the investment in infrastructure
necessary to extend the network into these areas would far outweigh the payments that the often very
poor residents of these neighborhoods would be able to make; and 2) as these neighborhoods are often
illegal settlements, there is no guarantee that a resident will remain in one place long enough to pay
regular water bills. Even if it were legal for SODECI to extend the network, the incentive for the
utility to provide full and continual service to neighborhoods that may be razed any day would be
minimal. The resulting lack of water connections in unplanned neighborhoods, coupled with the fact
that many poor households in areas that are served by the network cannot afford the initial payment
for a private connection, means that a vast number of urban poor have no direct access to clean water
at home.
To their credit, the state and SODECI acknowledge that service is inadequate in low-income and
unplanned areas and have taken several steps to provide water to these neighborhoods. In those lowincome areas that SODECI's water mains do serve, SODECI is allowed to provide subsidized
connections to low income households. The connection fee for these subsidized connections is 19,000
79
80
Zadi Kessy, op. cit., p. 163
Bi, op. cit., p. 15
Fcfa (US $34) rather than the regular 169,000 Fcfa (US $300). In addition, the tariff for the first 0 to
18 cubic meters of water consumed per trimester (or 6 cubic meters per month) by any household,
considered "lifeline" consumption, does not include the surcharge for the National Water Fund or the
Development Fund. In unplanned neighborhoods that are not connected to the water mains, the Water
Directorate authorizes SODECI to extend the network up to the limit of the neighborhood and then to
install public, coin-operated standpipes across the neighborhood, at a rate of one per 1,000 inhabitants.
8
Each standpipe is managed by a standpipe operator, hired by SODECI. '
For a variety of reasons discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, these efforts have failed to
resolve the lack of access to clean water in the city's poorest neighborhoods. In those areas where
private connections are technically feasible, many households cannot afford the initial payment
necessary to obtain a subsidized connection, and cannot save enough to pay the bills that come only
once every three months. In those areas where private connections are not possible, public standpipes
have not offered an adequate solution. The standpipes are few and far between and break down easily.
Many quickly fall into disrepair as they are poorly maintained. The system for drawing water is slow,
and people do not have the time to wait in line for hours daily. In addition, the standpipes only take 10
Fcfa coins, which people do not always have readily on hand. Finally, obtaining water from a
standpipe requires lifting the heavy and full basins from a ledge onto one's head, an effort that is
physically challenging for the people who fetch water, predominantly women and children.
In certain planned areas in which households are grouped around a shared yard, some yards are
equipped with shallow wells that SODECI dug. Anyone is free to obtain water from these wells at no
cost, but the water is heavily polluted and unfit for consumption. At most some families use this water
to wash clothes but, as interviews with households indicated, many do not use it at all. The water that
SODECI provides through connections and standpipes is of very good quality, and the poor seem well
aware of the hazards of using well-water.
The amount of money that households spend on water on a daily or monthly basis, therefore, varies on
the sources they use. Table 2 summarizes the options that may be available to them, and the related
costs for a household of 7.82 While the minimum amount of water necessary to sustain life is often
held to be 5 liters per capita per day (lcd), 30-40 lcd are usually considered enough for a reasonable
81Interview with SODECI managers, January 1999.
82 Based on the interviews I conducted, the average household size appeared to be about 7, although it was often
difficult to get a clear sense of who belonged to which household.
level of personal and community health. Table 2 therefore assumes a daily per capita consumption of
40 liters.83 The data are further based on the assumption that a household obtains all its water from a
single source. While the case study reveals that this is often the case, it is not always so.
Table 2
Sources and prices of water in Abidjan
Well
None
Public standpipe
None
None
Household connection
19,000 Fcfa ($34)
vg. daily cost*
None
112 Fcfa ($0.20)
238 Fcfa ($0.42)
52 Fcfa ($0.09)
'or 280 liters)
.vg. monthly cost*
dvantages
None
a) Access in
3360 Fcfa ($6.00)
a) Cheaper than vendors
7,140 Fcfa ($12.75)
a) Convenient if there is
1,560 Fcfa ($2.76)
a) Access at home
shared yard
b) Free
b) Good quality water
b) Relatively cheap
c) Good quality water
a) Polluted
and unfit for
consumption
a) Very slow process and
long waiting time
b) Need exact change
c) Involves carrying
water
no connection at home
b) Credit option
c) Good quality water
a) Very expensive
b) Involves carrying
water
iial household
Vendor
ivestment
isadvantages
a) Large initial
investment
b) Requires ability to
save to pay bills
*Note: These costs do not include the cost of time spent collecting water.
In order to fill the resulting service gap, people with household connections have been reselling water
to their less fortunate neighbors for years. Water vending, therefore, has become a common practice
in both planned and unplanned low income neighborhoods in Abidjan.
Current estimates of the
number of vendors in the city range from 1,500 to 2,000.84 This water vending is for the most part
illegal. In planned neighborhoods with access to the network, vendors use their subsidized household
connections to sell water from a tap located either inside or close to their homes, or in a shared yard.
In illegal settlements, vendors have subsidized connections and meters installed at the periphery of the
neighborhood where the city's water mains come to an end and draw water into the heart of the
neighborhood by means of flexible plastic pipes strung together to cover as much as 300 yards. In
both cases, the vendors run fixed water points to which neighborhood residents come daily with
various containers to fetch water. None of the vendors deliver water to homes themselves, although it
Richards, P.J and A.M. Thomson (eds.), Basic Needs and the Urban Poor: The Provision of Communal
Services, Croom Helm, London, 1984, p. 125
84 Interviews with SODECI employees.
83
is possible for households adjacent to a vendor to install a flexible pipe from the vendor's tap to their
containers.
Given the proliferation of this informal water vending sector, SODECI decided to institutionalize the
activity through a system of "registered" water vending. Recognizing that the water vendors provide
an essential service to low income households, and hoping to reduce what it thought to be significant
financial losses resulting from these activities, SODECI decided in the early 1960s to allow people
who declared their vending activities and registered with the utility to resell water legally. However,
SODECI was never quite comfortable with the high prices that the vendors felt they could charge
given their virtual monopoly of the market, and in 1988 the utility placed a ban on all water vending.
In the meantime, SODECI focused on installing public standpipes in the city's low income
neighborhoods. Unfortunately, this effort was far from sufficient to provide all households with water,
and vending, now completely illegal, was still a common practice. Resigned to the need for water
vendors, SODECI lifted the ban on vending in 1994, and once again tried to establish a link with some
of the vendors by allowing them to register with the utility as vendors. According to some of the
utility's employees, there are currently approximately 300 registered vendors in Abidjan (and
countless unregistered, and hence illegal, ones). The next chapter presents the results of my case study
on the relationship between these registered vendors, illegal vendors, SODECI and consumers in
Abidjan, carried out in January, 1999.
4.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
I gathered information for this study through a series of interviews and surveys. Over the course of
three weeks, I spoke with close to 60 households, 15 vendors, and 5 SODECI managers. The surveys
and questionnaires on which all interviews were based are included in Appendices A-C. What began
as a structured interview often turned into a general conversation during which the survey respondent
discussed his or her views on access to water in the neighborhood.
Each survey of vendors and
households lasted on average 20 minutes, while each interview with SODECI managers lasted 45
minutes to one hour. For each of the households and vendors I met with, I completed a survey,
whereas I recorded the interviews with SODECI managers through field notes.
The household survey and vendor interviews took place in two separate zones of the city: the
neighborhoods of Sicobois in Yopougon, and Divo in Koumassi. Yopougon is a vast zone, nearly a
city in itself, located at the western periphery of Abidjan, and it is the second most rapidly growing
area of the city. 85 It comprises several different neighborhoods, themselves quite large, some of which
are low-income, illegal settlements and others of which are clearly well-to-do.
Sicobois is one of the
former, an amalgamation of spontaneous dwellings housing over 28,000 people. Surveyed households
were located in Sicobois-Yaossehi, a sub-neighborhood without water connections, in which 3-4
public standpipes serve thousands of people.
Koumassi is located at the eastern edge of the city. The neighborhood of Divo has approximately
17,000 inhabitants. Certain parts of the neighborhood are planned, with dwellings on numbered plots
gathered in clusters of 6-8 around a shared courtyard. These courtyards are often equipped with a tap
or well, while other areas depend on a single functioning public standpipe. Living conditions in Divo
are more unsanitary than in Sicobois, and proximity to the lagoon means frequent floods that increase
the spread of pollution in the area. In 1985, the date of the last electoral census, Yopougon, Koumassi
6
and a third area known as Abobo together accounted for 52.8 percent of Abidjan's population.
City of Abidjan, Cbte d'Ivoire
Source: Villes et Industries en Cte d'Ivoire, by Alain Dubresson, Editions Karthala, Paris 1989
85
86
Serageldin, op. cit., p. 13
Dubresson, Alain, Villes et Industries en Cte d'Ivoire, Editions Karthala, Paris 1989, p. 425
I chose these neighborhoods for two main reasons. The first was to encounter a greater variety of
concerns and variety of situations than would have been present in a single neighborhood. None of
Sicobois is planned, and all vending takes place through meters installed at the edge of the
neighborhood.
While few and far between, there are some functioning standpipes that offer
neighborhood inhabitants an alternative to the vendors. In Divo, half of the settlement is planned, and
in this area many households have access to a courtyard tap. While there is only one standpipe, some
of these yards also have shallow wells that supply the households with water which, while unfit for
consumption, can be used for washing.
The second reason for choosing these two neighborhoods was more practical. Knowing that I would
not be able to find my way alone in these neighborhoods, and that people might be suspicious of a
complete stranger, I asked a local NGO called ASAPSU (Association de soutient a 1'auto-promotion
sanitaire et urbaine, or Association for the Support and Promotion of Urban and Community Health) if
any of its staff could accompany me as I conducted the surveys. ASAPSU is an Ivorian NGO devoted
to the promotion of community health and active in several of Abidjan's sectors, including Yopougon
and Koumassi, where it runs community health centers and conducts frequent workshops. The head of
ASAPSU and I chose Yopougon and Koumassi based on my research criteria and the availability of
the NGO staff to accompany me.
I conducted most of the household surveys with women, as it is primarily they who fetch water for the
households. About 12 percent of the respondents were men. The first section of my questionnaires for
households was geared toward obtaining general information about the households and their water
consumption patterns. In particular I wanted to know the size of the household; the sources, amounts
and cost of water consumed per day; and the level of satisfaction with access to water. The second
part of my questionnaire pertained to water vending: perception of water vendors and water vending as
a practice, level of satisfaction with service, payment habits, etc.
I chose the respondents by walking through the neighborhoods and approaching people who were
sitting outside their homes, either alone or in groups, conducting various household chores (washing
clothes, cooking, etc.) or simply resting. Most were very welcoming and glad to see someone take an
interest in their concerns. For the most part, therefore, they were willing to interrupt their activities to
talk for a few minutes. However, some women, especially in Divo, were more hesitant. They were
unwilling to complain too loudly and refused to single out specific vendors in the neighborhood for
fear of causing their operations to be shut down and thus losing their sole source of water.
I met with even greater reluctance among the vendors. As all the vendors I encountered while walking
through the neighborhoods were illegal, they were unwilling to divulge too much information
regarding their operations. In order to put them at ease and allay their fears that I would turn them in
to SODECI, I presented myself as a student attempting to improve living conditions and access to
water in their neighborhood. While this approach did convince some vendors to speak more freely,
many were still very hesitant and most likely were not entirely truthful.
It is, however, virtually
impossible to verify the quantitative information I gathered regarding their expenses and revenues and
number of taps they have throughout the neighborhoods.
The vendor surveys began with general questions regarding vending habits (number of taps, prices
charged, types of employees). I also tried to gauge the vendors' level of familiarity with the registered
vendor system and their level of satisfaction with their relationship with SODECI. Finally I attempted
to elicit opinions regarding the relative profitability of vending and regarding competition from other
vendors and from public standpipes.
Finally, interviews with SODECI managers were geared toward obtaining factual information
regarding, for example, the tariff the utility charges, the process by which a vendor can become
registered, and SODECI's attempts to control illegal vending. I also elicited opinions regarding the
relative success of the registered vendor system and the relationship between the utility and the
vendors, both registered and illegal.
CHAPTER 3
ABIDJAN'S REGISTERED AND ILLEGAL VENDORS
This chapter, divided into two sections, presents the results of the surveys and interviews conducted in
Abidjan. The first section provides a description of findings, and of the perspectives of the various
stakeholders on water vending as it affects them. The second section comprises an analysis of the
obstacles to the success of water vending in Abidjan. A successful water vending sector is defined as
one that provides adequate and affordable access to clean water to all urban residents, including the
poor, gives vendors a legal opportunity to make a reasonable profit, and does not present a hindrance,
real or perceived, to SODECI's strong financial performance.
1.
THE UTILITY'S PERSPECTIVE
The following information was obtained from a series of interviews with managers at four of
SODECI's local offices as well as the company's headquarters.
a) Process and fees
Water vending takes place from individual household connections. Vendors who are not registered,
and therefore resell water illegally, use their private, subsidized connection, for which they pay a onetime connection fee of 19,000 Fcfa (US$34).
As the State prohibits household connections in
unplanned neighborhoods, vendors in these areas have their connection and meter installed in a
planned neighborhood, often at the edge of a road, and draw water into their neighborhood through
flexible pipes that they install themselves between the meter and the tap(s).
Registered vendors follow the same approach, but they are required to put down a deposit of 200,000
Fcfa (US$357), fully refundable if they choose to have their connection shut off and have paid all their
bills in full. In addition, they must pay SODECI 169,000 Fcfa (US$300) for a regular, unsubsidized
connection. They are bound to SODECI in the same way as any other customer but they appear as
registered vendors in the company's logs.
According to SODECI employees, the utility uses the
deposit to cover unpaid bills in the event that the customer disappears or does not pay the bills, and the
account is closed. The advantage to being registered is that vending is then legal; illegal or clandestine
-
El
-
-
-
-
_____
vendors run the constant risk of being discovered and fined, and of having their connection shut off as
well.
In order to become registered, an applicant must go to the utility's local office with jurisdiction over
the neighborhood in which he or she wants the connection to be installed. The applicant must specify
the location for the connection, and must present some form of identity card, proof of ownership of the
site or a building permit from the landlord, and some unlikely documents such as a topographical map
of the site. Upon receipt of these documents, SODECI opens an account for the applicant. As long as
the site is not within 400 meters of a standpipe, the company sends an agent out to take measurements
of the site and to choose the exact location of the meter. The applicant pays the deposit and, once
SODECI has inspected the site, the company sends the vendor a bill for the connection. As soon as
the vendor pays this bill, SODECI puts in the connection and the meter. According to the utility, the
entire process rarely takes longer than 48 hours, although some vendors say it took several days for
SODECI to install the connection and meter, and one even had to bribe one of the utility's agents to
come at all. If site work requires the company to place any pipes underneath a paved road, or if the
distance from the closest water main to the meter is greater than 12 meters, the vendor must pay an
extra charge. All site work required beyond the meter, such as pipe-laying from the meter into the
heart of the neighborhood, is the vendor's responsibility. If a vendor wishes to hire a plumber to lay
the pipes, he must find one himself.
b) Tariffs and prices
The utility bills the registered vendors according to its regular tariff structure, but does so monthly
rather than every three months as for regular customers. SODECI implemented this shortened billing
cycle in order to monitor the vendors' activities more closely. The increasing block tariff is structured
as follows:
0 m~
7 to 30 m3
31 to 100 m 3
U to
>101 m,
any
U to 16 m~
m3
19 to 90
91 to 300 m3
>301 m3
any
184 cta/m" ( USU.33)
286
464
532
390
cfa/m 3
cfa/m 3
cfa/m3
cfa/m 3
(US$0.51)
(US$0.83)
(US$0.95)
(US$0.69)
The social block allows a lifeline consumption of up to 6 cubic meters per month priced at a low tariff,
and designed to benefit the poor. The domestic and normal blocks apply primarily to private
households, while the industrial block applies to commercial and industrial entities.
Finally, the
administrative tariff applies to all government and public offices, who in reality rarely pay their bills in
full or on time.
This tariff structure, fixed by the state, is designed to cover:
>
SODECI's operating expenses;
a 5 percent (of turnover) margin for the utility;
>
debt recovery for the water sector;
>
the development fund used to finance network extensions and new water centers throughout the
country; and
>
taxes.
All vendors, whether registered or illegal, are free to choose the prices they charge to customers as the
utility has no means of controlling them. Most vendors set their prices by the container, which
neighbors bring to the vendor to be filled up. The prices the vendors ask vary from vendor to vendor,
but tend to hover around the same amounts. The most widely used containers are:
>
>
20- to 25-liter buckets
>
50-liter basins
>
200-liter barrels
30-liter basins
c) SODECI and the vendors
Although they have no means of verifying the prices that each vendor charges, the SODECI
employees interviewed believe that vendors sell water for roughly ten times what it costs them.
According to SODECI, therefore, even taking into account labor and other costs, all vendors, be they
registered or not, make a significant profit from reselling water. A later section of this chapter will
demonstrate that this is often not the case.
Unregistered vendors who take advantage of subsidized connections, do not make any deposit, and
often steal water by tapping directly into the water mains make their profit at the utility's expense.
SODECI, therefore, is currently attempting to eradicate all illegal vending. The only feasible method
of controlling the activities of the utility's customers is to observe their consumption trends and
monitor their bills. A special SODECI department, the Direction des Contr6les de Procedures (DCP),
undertakes all monitoring and controlling activities.
If a given household's consumption is
significantly higher than average, the chances are high that the customer is reselling water. When
SODECI suspects someone of being an illegal vendor, the utility sends an agent out to observe the
meter for a few minutes. As vendors usually have a steady stream of customers, their meters are
almost constantly turning and an agent can ascertain within half an hour of observation if the person is,
indeed, a vendor. If the utility's suspicions are confirmed, SODECI calls the customer to the local
office and asks that the illegal vendor pay 300,000 Fcfa (US$536), an amount that the utility deems
equivalent to one month of a vendor's water consumption. The utility set this amount as the fine to
compensate for what it believes it may be owed by the vendor, who is likely to have tampered with the
meter or bribed a SODECI agent to falsify the bill. As SODECI does not want to lose a customer who
represents a source of revenue, the company offers the vendor the opportunity to pay the deposit as
well as the difference between a subsidized connection and a regular one in order to become a
registered vendor. Not wanting to lose his or her water connection, the vendor usually agrees.
SODECI recognizes that water vending is necessary insofar as the utility itself cannot provide private
water connections in these low-income neighborhoods, but from a financial standpoint the company
would rather that water vending not take place at all. As we shall see in the next section of this
chapter, both registered and illegal vendors take many steps to reduce the amount that they pay the
utility.
As a result, the existence of so many water vendors affects the company's profitability.
Vendors are often foreigners from neighboring countries who sell water for a few months, accumulate
a few bills, and then disappear without paying. As illegal vendors only receive one bill every three
months, they need only delay payment on one bill for a few weeks to get away with selling water for
"free" for 5-6 months. In addition, many vendors tamper with the meters and succeed, through
devious tactics, in altering their bills to reflect a rate of consumption far lower than their actual
consumption.
As a result, SODECI does not encourage water vending and does not advertise legalized vending.
Most of the registered vendors in Abidjan are former illegal vendors whose activities were discovered,
and who subsequently registered with SODECI so as to continue to sell water. Rarely do people
present themselves of their own accord to become registered vendors. A manager at the utility's office
in Yopougon, the city's most populated sector, said that, on average, one person comes in every two
months or so asking to be registered.
Of the sector's 37,000 customers, only 31 are registered
vendors. Similarly, in Koumassi there are only 21 registered vendors, yet estimates put the number of
illegal vendors in that sector at 1,500 to 2,000.
SODECI believes that, little by little, registered
vendors, who must face competition from illegal vendors whose expenses are lower, will denounce the
illegal vendors they know. According to managers at the Yopougon and Koumassi offices, several
illegal vendors have been discovered thanks to registered ones. In no case, however, has a "tattler"
been offered any reward.
According to some SODECI managers, the only way to reduce the number of vendors is to increase
the number of public standpipes in these low-income neighborhoods.
They feel that, as it is
impossible to control the prices that vendors charge to customers, the only way to lower these prices
and to eliminate water vending is to increase the number of water sources at which the price is not
only controlled, but significantly lower than the vendors' prices.87
The idea is to create such
competition that water vendors will no longer find it worth their while to resell water. As a later
section will discuss, water vendors and consumers have differing opinions on the subject.
SODECI has never explicitly studied the impact of water vending, legalized or not, on the company
itself, and as a result opinions regarding the effect of vending on the company are varied.
Some
employees feel that legal water vending has improved the company's image in the eyes of the
government and the international institutions that see it making a significant effort to provide water to
unplanned areas despite legal restrictions on network extensions. In addition, these employees feel
that registered water vending has increased the company's revenues because vendors sell enough to be
billed according to a high tariff block. Others do not feel that vending has had any significant effect
on the utility. Others still feel that vending, legal and illegal, has a negative impact on the company's
profitability because of the number of unpaid bills and the rampant corruption discussed later in the
chapter.
2.
ILLEGAL VENDORS' PERSPECTIVE
a) Vending methods
In the planned neighborhoods of Divo, many residents have access to a water faucet in the shared yard.
The "owner" of the connection, i.e. the person who paid for it, sells water to the households with
At a standpipe, 25 liters of water cost 10 Fcfa (US$0.02); at a vendor, the same volume of water is likely to
cost over 21 Fcfa.
87
whom he or she shares the yard, as well as to neighboring households whose yards do not have a
connection. In the illegal settlements of both Divo and Sicobois, vendors sell water from their homes
or from a tap located in one of the alleyways that crisscross the neighborhood. Water vending points
usually open around 5 or 6 am and close, for security reasons, around 9 or 10 p.m. Some vendors,
whose taps are located within their homes and who, therefore, do not need to leave the house to sell
water, offer around-the-clock service.
Of the 15 interviewed vendors, only two knew at the time of the survey that it is possible to be a
registered vendor. All the others had never heard of registered vending, and thus did not know that
they might be able to sell water legally. Among them, 10 are "owners" of the taps they operate, while
5 manage the sale of water for someone else, often a relative. For twelve of them, water vending
represents the main source of income. Half operate several taps (anywhere from 2 to 5) by hiring
attendants and 8 of the "owners" have handed over the management of one or several of their taps to
neighborhood women or teenagers, usually neighbors or family members. If they are the latter, they
are usually not paid. If they are not relatives, the owners pay them from 500 Fcfa (US$0.89) to 2,500
Fcfa (US$4.5) per week.
Illegal vendors operate in one of two ways: some resell water from one or several taps connected to a
single meter in the hopes that SODECI will not notice their high levels of consumption and absence of
a deposit. Others take specific steps, at times elaborate, to ensure that SODECI cannot identify them
as vendors. It is especially amongst the latter that corruption is rampant.
One vendor explained the steps he took, aided by some of the utility's employees, to set up his illegal
service: instead of paying the 200,000 Fcfa (US$357) deposit to become a registered vendor, he
distributed bribes of 10,000 Fcfa (US$17.8) to 50,000 Fcfa (US$89.3) to three SODECI employees in
exchange for a meter and connection installed in a friend's yard. His only direct payment to the utility
itself was the 19,000 Fcfa (US$33.9) required to get a subsidized, private connection. The SODECI
employee who explained to the vendor how to sidestep the requirements then came to "control" the
site and "choose" the location for the meter. Currently, when a SODECI agent comes by to read the
meter every three months, the vendor has only to slip him a 10,000 Fcfa (US$18) bribe to see his bill
fall by more than half. This system is made all the easier by the fact that each meter reader is assigned
to a specific neighborhood, and thus returns regularly to see the same customers. Such bribery is
common among vendors, whose "consumption" then appears in the utility's database as that of a
regular household.
Vendors also frequently set up their illegal activities without the help of SODECI employees. Some,
for example, tap directly into the utility's water mains and divert water into a series of flexible pipes
without the use of a meter. Others who do have a meter, registered or not, manage to dismantle it and
either block it or re-install it upside down so that it measures a decreasing volume of water. As the
vendors know when the meter readers will come by, they have only to right the meter a few days
beforehand to give the appearance of normalcy. With this rampant corruption and complex web of
steps taken to conceal illegal activities, it is almost impossible for SODECI as a company to realize the
extent to which illegal vending, even among registered vendors, is a thriving industry, let alone try to
eliminate it.
b) Revenue and expenses
i.
Revenue
The survey results show that the prices vendors charge vary from one vendor to another within a
certain range. The price of a 20-25 liter bucket varies from 10 Fcfa to 15 Fcfa (about US$0.02).
Basins containing 30 liters are sold for 20-30 Fcfa (US$0.04-0.05), while 50 liter basins cost anywhere
between 30 and 50 Fcfa (US$0.05 to US$0.09). The price per liter thus varies from 0.5 Fcfa to 1.15
Fcfa, with an average of 0.85 Fcfa per liter, or 850 Fcfa (US$1.52) per cubic meter. Even when
consumption is high enough to place the vendor in the upper tariff bracket, this average price
represents close to 160 percent of the tariff that the vendor must pay to SODECI.
ii.
Expenses
The profit that illegal vendors make varies depending on the steps they take to avoid detection, as well
as the amount of their initial investment.
Some incur significant expenses to link their water
connection and meter, often located in an adjacent neighborhood, to their taps. If a vendor operates
several taps, this can be an expensive endeavor. However, as the pressure at each tap decreases the
more taps are linked to a single meter, a vendor is unlikely to operate more than three taps. These
vendors with multiple taps also, at times, hire neighbors or relatives to operate some of them; hiring
these employees can add to their expenses.
Vendors tend to lose some of their potential revenue by selling water for credit. Indeed, about 60
percent of the surveyed households said that they sometimes take water without paying, and most of
them are forced by circumstances to do so often. Although none of these people would admit it to me,
the vendors pointed out that many never actually pay them back. However, the vendors feel that they
cannot refuse their friends and neighbors water; they view this loss of income as a consequence of
their providing a social service.
iii.
Example
What follows is an example of two vendors' expenses and revenues.
Some of the numbers come
directly from an interview with an illegal vendor, while others are assumed based on information
obtained from vendors, SODECI and households in Sicobois and Divo.
>
Illegal vendor who has not made any bribes, and sells water in the hopes that SODECI will not
notice.
This vendor operates two faucets. In the course of a three month period, he receives 163,840 Fcfa
(US$293) from customers for the water he sells. At an average price of 0.85 Fcfa per cubic meter, this
represents the sale of 193 cubic meters during this time. Assuming that the vendor loses 10 percent of
his potential revenue due to leaks between the meter and the faucets and due to unpaid credits, he
actually has "consumed" 214 cubic meters.
According to SODECI's tariff structure, this vendor's bill for the trimester should read:
0 to 18 m"
m3
19 to 90
91 to 214 m3
184 Fcfa/m"
286 Fcfa/m 3
464 Fcfa/m 3
3,312 Fcfa
20,592 Fcfa
57,536 Fcfa
81,440 Fcfa
After paying his 81,440 Fcfa (US$145) bill, the vendor is left with 82,400 Fcfa (US$147.)
The vendor's initial investment consisted of 19,000 Fcfa (US$34) for the subsidized connection, and
80,000 Fcfa for 400 meters of flexible pipe that he installed himself in between the meter and the
taps. 8 Given the vendor's revenue of 82,400 Fcfa (US$147) in one trimester, it takes him more than
three months to recover his initial investment. Once this investment has been repaid, the vendor can
count the 82,400 Fcfa as profit. This amount represents 27,147 Fcfa (US$48) per month. If, as is
88 Each of the two faucets is located 200 meters from the metered connection. Each flexible 6 meter pipe costs
1,200 Fcfa.
frequently the case, this vendor pays a local teenager 1,400 Fcfa (US$2.5) per week to operate one of
the taps, the vendor is left with 21,547 Fcfa (US$38) per month, or 718 Fcfa (US$1.3) per day. This
net revenue is significantly lower than Cote d'Ivoire's minimum wage for urban areas, currently at
36,000 Fcfa (US$64) per month.
>
Illegal vendor who has bribed SODECI employees in order to hide his activities from the utility.
Let us consider now the case of an illegal vendor who is somewhat more determined to conceal his
activities, who sells the same volume of water, and therefore also should receive a bill for 81,440 Fcfa.
This vendor's initial investment differs from that of the previous vendor. In addition to the 19,000
Fcfa required for a subsidized connection and the 80,000 Fcfa for the flexible pipes, this vendor has
paid out 140,000 Fcfa (US$250) in bribes to a SODECI employee to "control" the site and install the
meter, and to a plumber to install the pipes. His total initial investment is, therefore, 239,000 Fcfa
(US$427).
Because this vendor has paid to have the flexible pipes installed by a plumber instead of doing it
himself, he loses 8 percent of his potential revenue (compared to 10 percent in the previous case) due
to leaks and unpaid credits. He therefore receives, over the course of the three months, 167,117 Fcfa
(instead of 163,840 Fcfa.) His bill should be, as in the previous case, for 81,440 Fcfa. However, this
vendor has given the meter reader 10,000 Fcfa (US$18) to "read" a much lower consumption level.
As a result, the bill is only for 46,000 Fcfa (US$82). The vendor therefore pays a total of 56,000 Fcfa
(US$100) for the water he has sold, and is left with just over 111,000 Fcfa (US$198) at the end of the
three months. It takes this vendor over 6 months to recover his initial investment. Once he has done
so, he keeps the 111,117 Fcfa. This amount represents a profit of 37,039 Fcfa per month. If he pays a
local teenager 1,400 Fcfa per week to operate one of the taps, he is left with 31,439 Fcfa (US$56) per
month, or 1,047 Fcfa (US$1.9) per day. Once again, this amount falls below the minimum monthly
wage of 36,000 Fcfa (US$64).
c) Competition
The vendors feel that they face a fair amount of competition. However, half of them do not feel that
this competition impinges on their activities or profitability, as virtually all households in these areas
patronize them. In addition, there is among the vendors a certain solidarity which prevents them from
feeling too resentful of other vendors around them. Even those who were willing to participate in the
survey were unwilling to point out who else was a water vendor, or to discuss the activities of other
vendors. As for competition from the public standpipes, the vendors feel that it is almost non-existent.
They are confident that households prefer them to the standpipes, despite the fact that they charge
more per liter of water, because they are invariably located nearby, sell water for credit, and provide
more rapid service than do the standpipes. Because they are so confident of the service they provide,
most vendors are not opposed to the idea of SODECI installing more standpipes.
In fact, a few
mentioned an interest in becoming standpipe operators so as to have a legal source of revenue should
the utility discover and shut down their illegal vending practice.
3.
REGISTERED VENDORS' PERSPECTIVE
a) The registered vendors' association
The registered vendors represent only 1-2 percent of all the water vendors in Abidjan. The three
registered vendors who agreed to be interviewed did so as members of a new organization, the
Association des Revendeurs d'Eau des Quartiers Pr6caires de C6te d'Ivoire, or AREQUAP-CI
(Association of Water Vendors of C6te dIvoire's Low-Income Neighborhoods). This association was
formed in November, 1998, as a result of a workshop organized by the World Bank and in which some
vendors participated. According to its president, Patrice Any, the goal of this association is to unite
the vendors and prompt SODECI to recognize them as providers of an essential service, and potential
partners in water distribution. The association would like to professionalize the water vending sector
so as to improve service to customers, and so as to be heard and respected by the utility.
The association is currently an overly complex and bureaucratic organization, especially given its
limited membership (roughly 40 at the time of this report).
It includes a general assembly, a
management committee, an oversight board, and several advisors.
The management committee is
made up of eight members, including a president, a vice president, a general secretary, an assistant
general secretary, a treasurer, and an assistant treasurer.
In order to become a member of the association, a vendor must be registered and pay an initial fee of
5,000 Fcfa as well as a monthly fee of 1,000 Fcfa. Currently, the association's few members appear to
be friends, and most of them have a primary occupation such as shopkeeper, accountant or teacher.
According to the group's president, the members of the association are attempting to spread the word
about AREQUAP-CI among the vendors in the city's low-income neighborhoods. However, neither
the illegal vendors interviewed in Sicobois and Divo nor the majority of the registered vendors knew
of the association's existence. The association's membership, therefore, is not a representative sample
of the vendor population, but rather appears to be a form of cartel, a tightly knit group of vendors
claiming to be protecting vendor's rights but mostly protecting their personal interests.
b) Registered vendors and SODECI
The association has very specific ideas regarding what it would like to see changed, and the president
Any, who speaks for the association, does not mince words on the subject. According to him, the
AREQUAP-CI would like all vendors to be subject to the same uniform tariff as the standpipe
operators, 390 Fcfa/m 3 (US$0.7) regardless of consumption, and would like help from a bank to create
a fund from which vendors could borrow to make the initial deposit and payment to become registered
vendors. The president of the association feels that SODECI's increasing block tariff is too high for
the vendors to make a decent living, and that it is difficult for many people to save up the money to
pay the deposit and the initial connection fee.
The registered vendors and the utility have diverging opinions regarding water vending, and disagree
on many counts. According to SODECI, registered vendors receive a bill on the
2 5th
of every month;
the association members say that the billing cycle is rarely longer than 3 weeks, which does not give
them enough time to collect payment from all their customers. The utility claims that only 0.5 percent
of the registered vendors' bills do not get paid, while Mr. Any says that many vendors have trouble
paying their bills. Finally, according to SODECI's calculation, a registered vendor can make a daily
profit of 3,000 Fcfa whereas the association members claim that their profits are barely sufficient to
feed and house their families. It is not entirely clear exactly where their calculations diverge, but it
seems that SODECI does not take into account the initial investment in the pipes, the cost of hiring
attendants for multiple taps, losing water through leaks, and taking a loss on unpaid credits.
c)
Competition
The registered vendors feel that there is a lot of competition from the illegal vendors. However,
according to Mr. Any, they are not often willing to turn in illegal vendors to the authorities as they
know that these vendors, like them, provide an essential service to the neighborhood households.
There have been instances of a registered vendor placing a call to the utility to draw its attention to an
illegal vendor whose business is drawing customers away from the registered vendor, but such cases
are rare. As for competition from public standpipes, the registered vendors, like the illegal ones, feel
that it is virtually non-existent.
4.
HOUSEHOLDS' PERSPECTIVE
All the households I surveyed in Sicobois and Divo obtain at least some of their water from vendors.
Each household knew of at least one vendor nearby, and 37 percent knew of at least five. None,
however, knew if the vendor they use is registered or not. In fact, the vast majority of people
interviewed (95 percent) did not know, at the time of the survey, that there is any difference between
registered and illegal vendors. As far as they knew, all water vending is illegal. Some respondents,
therefore, did not want to complain too loudly for fear of seeing their vendor's operation shut down.
Those residents of Sicobois and Divo surveyed are generally satisfied with the service that the vendors
provide. However, many qualified their response by explaining that they have no choice but to be
satisfied, and to be resigned to the current situation. Despite the fact that 77 percent of the respondents
claimed to prefer vendors to public standpipes, half of them said that their preference is due to the fact
that they have, or feel that they have, no choice in the matter. Either there is no standpipe close to
their home, or there is one that does not work, or they do not have the time to wait in line. Similarly,
while 60 percent of the respondents claimed to be satisfied with their access to water in general, half of
them pointed out that, because they cannot have a private connection, they make do with what is
available to them, and are resigned to having to use the vendors.
Whether they use vendors or
standpipes, they are satisfied with the quality of the water they get. Ultimately, most would prefer to
have a household connection, although most did not know exactly how much that would cost.
Because of this general attitude of resignation, many of the respondents did not have specific
criticisms. When asked how the water vending system could be improved, half could not think of a
single recommendation.
And while over 60 percent feel that the prices that vendors charge are too
high, only 11 percent said they are not satisfied with the vendors' service.
There were, however, a handful of complaints: 15 percent of the respondents prefer public standpipes
to vendors because water from the standpipes is cheaper and because they view the standpipes as
"modem." In addition, 26 percent feel that they waste a lot of time waiting in line at the vendors.
Finally, 18 percent said that they are not at all satisfied with their access to clean water, two thirds of
whom because the prices are too high and one third because they feel they have limited choices.
It is often the availability of credit that makes obtaining water from vendors appealing. Over 60
percent of the respondents admitted that they sometimes take water for credit when they do not have
the money on hand. Of these, one out of five said s/he pays at the end of the day, one the next day,
two within a couple of days, and one at the end of the month. (None admitted to not paying at all.)
Because the vendors cannot refuse their customers water, these customers are always guaranteed at
least some water every day. The women who fetch water always go to the same vendor, and develop
friendly relationships with the person who runs the tap. Some women have a running "tab" with a
vendor, and pay at the end of the week or month, while others still pay a fixed monthly amount for
unlimited water.
5.
LIMITS TO THE SUCCESS OF WATER VENDING
Given the laws prohibiting the extension of the physical infrastructure into the city's unplanned
neighborhoods and the poverty of many of the households in the low-income, planned neighborhoods,
water vending is an inevitable reality in Abidjan.
In order for water vending to be considered a
success, it must fulfill certain criteria for each of the stakeholders: for the utility, water vending must
not represent a financial drain; for the vendors, water vending must be a lucrative and legal
undertaking; and for the households, water vending must provide affordable water within easy access.
Currently, several obstacles stand in the way of success.
a) Lack of information
1.
The utility
The utility, the illegal vendors, the registered vendors and the households all have different views of
water vending. Because of a fundamental lack of information and communication between the groups
of stakeholders, no one has a complete understanding of all aspects of water vending as a sector.
SODECI, for example, is under the impression that water vending is a highly lucrative activity. While
some vendors, through various tactics, do succeed in making a decent living, most claim that they can
barely house and feed their families. Although there are no means to verify their earnings, observation
of their living conditions leads one to assume that their profits are minimal. The calculation carried
out in an earlier section shows that it is quite likely that the average vendor makes only 700 to 1,000
Fcfa (about US$1.2 to 1.8) per day.
The fact that SODECI has never carried out a study of the impact that vending has on it reinforces the
utility's lack of understanding regarding water vending. The reason is largely the fact that there are no
easy means of measuring the water losses to the utility that are due to vending. These losses cannot be
isolated from the losses due to other causes, such as leaks throughout the network.
In addition,
SODECI does not monitor the consumption of each of the 10 sectors in Abidjan: the utility only
knows the aggregate consumption and billing rate for the city as a whole. While all households and
businesses are metered, there are no bulk meters on the distribution system for each sector. As a
result, it is impossible to identify the areas of the city where water losses are the greatest, and thus to
pinpoint neighborhoods where vending may be concentrated. SODECI, therefore, has the impression
of bearing significant losses due to vending, but these are losses that, for the moment, cannot be
quantified.
SODECI, therefore, lacks adequate information regarding the vendors, including the registered
vendors.
Only one of the five SODECI employees who were interviewed knew that some of the
registered vendors have formed an association, despite the fact that this association was created
following a workshop that, among others, some SODECI managers attended. This lack of information
is all the more surprising when one considers that four of these five employees work in the utility's
local offices, including the Yopougon and Koumassi branches, rather than at the company's
headquarters, and thus should be in direct contact with vendors.
As a result of this general lack of information, SODECI, although it recognizes that the vendors
provide these neighborhoods with an essential social service, is of the opinion that the poor still prefer
public standpipes, and that if the utility installed a few more, the number of vendors would decrease.
However, the vast majority of the survey respondents definitely prefer the vendors to the standpipes,
even if their water is more expensive. They would rather pay a somewhat higher price to fetch water
at the tap of someone they know, and who will be willing to give it to them for a credit. In addition,
the time spent waiting in line is much shorter, on average, at the vendors than at the standpipes, which
are slow and often break down. Simply installing more standpipes is not, therefore, the ideal solution
to the water distribution problems of these low-income neighborhoods.
ii.
The vendors
SODECI is not the only stakeholder to lack information: the vendors, too, are unaware of some
important factors. Most of the illegal vendors that I interviewed, for example, were not aware of the
possibility of becoming registered and reselling water legally because the utility has never bothered to
publicize this arrangement. SODECI tells only those vendors whose illegal activities it discovers that
they can be registered.
These illegal vendors, therefore, are unaware of the existence of the very
association that claims to be protecting their rights. In fact, when told that some vendors have recently
formed such an association, several of the illegal vendors pointed out that they do not have any need
for it, and that they are content with the small solidarity groups that they form to handle any problems
they might encounter with SODECI or with customers.
iii.
The households
Some of the survey respondents who live in the planned areas of Divo do not appear to understand
completely that they may be in a position to get a private water connection. According to SODECI, a
number of households could probably save enough to pay for their own connection, but do not
necessarily realize this because they are not familiar with the cost or procedure that obtaining a private
connection entails.
b) Lack of organization among vendors
It is very difficult for anyone, including SODECI, to communicate with the water vendors as a single
group as there is no clear organization that represents them. Water vendors fall into many categories,
depending on:
>
their legal status: most are illegal while a handful are registered;
>
their mode of reselling: some sell illegally in the hopes that SODECI will not notice, while others
take many steps, including bribery, to conceal their activities;
>
the relative importance of reselling: for some, water reselling is the only source of income while
for others, it represents a secondary source;
>
the means used to operate the taps: some operate their tap themselves, while others hire neighbors
and relatives to do so;
>
their profit: a few succeed in making a significant profit, while many earn barely enough to house
and feed their families.
The recently formed association, AREQUAP-CI, cannot be considered a representative organization:
all its members are registered and most consider water vending as a secondary activity. On November
17, 1998, one third of the members were shopkeepers, while the others were accountants, students,
teachers, tailors, etc.
Only three people, all three housewives, considered water vending as their,
although not necessarily their household's, sole source of income.
c)
Divergence of motives
In the course of the interviews, the SODECI employees and the registered vendors all agreed on the
need for a partnership between the utility and this "informal" sector. However, the motives of the two
entities contradict each other: SODECI, considering the social aspect of water vending, wants to
ensure that low-income households have access to affordable water, whereas the vendors, while
claiming concern for their neighbors, want to ensure that they make a significant profit.
Now that some SODECI managers are aware of the registered vendors' association, they would like to
use it to strengthen the utility's relationship with the vendors by making association membership a
prerequisite for being registered. The association president, however, is firm in his desire to have
membership be optional. He would like the association to be entirely vendor-run and vendor-focused.
Trying to use the association for its own purposes may be counterproductive for the utility: SODECI
may only succeed in alienating the registered vendors.
d) Physical and technical constraints
1.
Meter tampering
The success of water vending is further limited by certain technical aspects of the system. The meters
that SODECI installs, for example, are easily tampered with. Vendors, registered as well as illegal,
often take them apart to change the numbers or to re-install them upside down. SODECI employees
are known to do the same. This meter-tampering can lead to significant water losses for the utility. In
addition, meters are sometimes stolen, in which case the utility shuts off water service to that
connection and thus interrupts water vending until a new meter is paid for by the vendor and installed.
ii.
Leaks
Frequent leaks at the connection point, at the tap and throughout the network aggravate the situation.
Because the vendors, both registered and illegal, must put in the flexible pipes themselves, they often
do a haphazard job connecting them. Although some vendors do hire plumbers, most do the work
themselves without any particular expertise in the matter. They run the pipes along hundreds of yards,
sometimes only one or two inches underground, from their meter to their taps.
Leaks frequently
develop at the connection points, and along the surface of exposed pipes that cross well-traveled paths.
Because these leaks occur beyond the meter, they increase the vendors' bills. These vendors must
then do one or several of three things: pay bills that do not reflect their actual consumption, thus
harming their profits; raise their prices, thus harming their customers; or tamper with the meter, thus
harming the utility.
Finally, the flexible pipes often criss-cross particularly unsanitary zones, raising the possibility of
water contamination. A worn or pierced pipe running through an open sewer is enough to contaminate
the water running through it. While survey respondents generally find the quality of their water to be
good, such contamination has been known to occur.
e) Corruption and fraud
Corruption and fraud are rampant in the entire water vending sector. Water vendors and SODECI
employees tamper with the meters. Some employees accept bribes in exchange for "help" in reducing
bills.
The entire sector is characterized by secrecy and clandestine activities, even among the
registered vendors.
The common reaction to corruption and fraud is that they must be eliminated at all costs. However, in
Abidjan's poor neighborhoods, one cannot deny the fact that the relative success of water vending is in
large part due to this corruption and fraud. For it is, ironically, thanks to this system that the city's
poorest residents have access to clean water at all. Without the vendors, these urban poor would have
even more difficult access to clean water. And without corruption, vendors would not be able to pay
their bills and earn a living without raising the prices even further.
In the water sector, long
considered around the world to be unprofitable, corruption and fraud are what enable the vendors to
survive. While the elimination of corruption and fraud may thus seem, at first glance, to be desirable,
it is not in itself a simple solution to the problems of water vending in these low-income
neighborhoods. It can be, at most, only a partial one.
CHAPTER FOUR
RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Chapter Three highlights some of the limitations to the success of water vending in Abidjan. It is
important to note that while several limitations exist, the situation is perhaps close to being optimal
given the current regulatory and legal constraints on the water sector. Researchers and professionals
familiar with the water sector in developing countries will note that SODECI is a relatively healthy
company, vendor prices are significantly lower than they are in other countries, and the urban poor are
clearly able and willing, even if grudgingly, to pay the prices that the vendors charge. In unplanned
areas that, by law, cannot be connected to the piped water network, there are few major steps that the
utility could take to improve access to water.
The recommendations to SODECI that follow, therefore, are aimed at better organizing and
strengthening a system that, despite stakeholders' dissatisfaction, is already relatively organized and
strong. These recommendations assume a status quo in the law prohibiting SODECI from extending
the network into unplanned areas. Indeed, if the law were changed to allow SODECI to do so, the
question of access to water in these neighborhoods would take on a new dimension.
However,
SODECI's contract is valid for at least another 8 years, and it is unlikely that the law will change
before then.
The recommendations to other utilities draw from SODECI's experience.
The circumstances of
Abidjan's water vending sector are, of course, particular to that place and its political, institutional,
social and economic environment, but the lessons learned can be applied to other utilities looking to
form a partnership with water vendors.
1.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SODECI
a) Promote organization and representation among vendors
i.
Promote legal vending
In order to reduce clandestine activity, SODECI should:
>
Crack down on unregistered vendors: While SODECI currently claims to conduct regular controls
in the field, these tend to occur only three or four times a year at most and are sometimes
conducted by agents with more incentive to accept a bribe from an illegal vendor that to turn one
in to the authorities.
SODECI should intensify its efforts to eliminate unregistered vendors,
perhaps even offering its field agents a "reward," financed by the fee levied on the illegal vendor,
for turning him or her in. A reward could also be offered to non-SODECI individuals who report
an illegal vendor. Such an effort to reduce unregistered vending would allow SODECI to collect
some of the money it is currently losing to illegal vendors.
>
Eliminate or reduce the amount of the deposit and provide all vendors with a subsidized
connection: It is quite possible that, currently, the utility registers greater losses due to meter
tampering and other tactics that vendors use to avoid these fees than it registers gains from those
who do pay them. It may therefore be wiser to eliminated these fees that only enhance a vendor's
incentive to cheat.
>
Give the vendors an incentive to declare themselves to the utility: Vendors should see some
advantage to being registered. Such a system would reduce the number of unregistered vendors
and thus reduce SODECI's expense of tracking them down. Any vendor who registers with the
utility could, for example, be reimbursed for the cost of his or her connection over the course of
six months. Every month, SODECI could give the vendor a credit equivalent to one sixth of the
connection fee, or approximately 2,000 Fcfa, on the vendor's bill. So as to be certain that only
vendors, and not regular households, benefit from this system, the utility could choose to give this
credit only if consumption reaches a certain, pre-determined, level that is significantly higher than
an average household's consumption.
>
Disseminate information throughout the neighborhoods: As discussed earlier, lack of information
is one of the barriers to a successful water vending sector. In order to avoid a similar situation,
and to ensure that all persons interested in reselling water are aware of how the system works,
SODECI should publicize legal water vending and spread information throughout the city's lowincome neighborhoods.
ii.
Promote a vendor association
If the vendors are to cooperate with the utility, they would no doubt benefit from an association that
would represent them and give them an official channel through which to communicate with SODECI.
For the moment, the vendors are not organized enough for the utility to listen to them and consider
them as a unified group. The AREQUAP-CI represents an effort on the part of some vendors to create
this association. However, AREQUAP-CI as it stands now cannot be the official vendor association;
its members are a tightly knit group of friends from the same neighborhood in Yopougon whose
president has a specific agenda (that includes obtaining cell phones for registered vendors) that he
wishes to impose on everyone. The AREQUAP-CI, therefore, cannot fairly and accurately represent
the views of all the vendors as a group.
For there to be a valid channel of communication between the utility and the vendors, the latter should
create a new association, perhaps even with SODECI's collaboration and support, that incorporates the
AREQUAP-CI.
The existing association has taken significant steps to become a legitimate
organization, with letterhead and a phone number, and a new vendor's association should capitalize on
these efforts. In addition, this association should be promoted throughout all neighborhoods in which
water vending takes place as well as within the utility, so that all vendors and SODECI employees
have full information.
Finally, there must be some link between the association and the utility.
Perhaps SODECI could designate one representative from each sector in which water vending is
common who would participate in association meetings.
In addition to serving as a communication channel, this association could serve several roles,
including:
>
"Policing" neighborhoods for signs of illegal vendors and encouraging them to register with
SODECI;
>
Promoting registered vending and disseminating information in neighborhoods where vending is
common;
>
Creating and managing a revolving loan fund that would enable vendors to borrow to pay the
initial connection fee or high bills.
b) Increase SODECI's control over water vending
The water utility currently has very little authority over water vendors, despite its efforts to introduce
legal vending. If SODECI wants to make water vending a viable and healthy sector and establish a
good working relationship with the vendors, the utility must first gain a greater understanding of and
accurate information regarding water vending in Abidjan. The following five steps should help the
utility to do so:
Conduct a study of the impacts of water vending on SODECI
i.
As mentioned earlier, SODECI has never conducted a study of the effects of water vending on the
It is important for the utility to analyze the impact of water vending on its financial
utility.
performance so as to make informed decisions.
The study should focus, among other things, on
locating high concentrations of vendors, assessing the prices they charge and the bills they pay, and
estimating the total number of vendors in the city, as well as the total volume of water they sell. The
World Bank could possibly contribute to and perhaps even take the lead on such a study.
ii.
Replace the meters
The meters that SODECI currently uses, shipped from a manufacturer in France, are too easily
tampered with, making it impossible for the utility to measure most of its water losses. Replacing
these meters with more tamper-proof ones would enable SODECI to better control water flows and
pinpoint areas of particularly high consumption. In order to avoid a massive, lump-sum investment,
the utility should begin by using new meters for all new connections, and gradually replace old ones as
they break down.
iii.
Alternate meter readers
Because each meter reader is assigned to a specific area, it is easy for a meter reader to develop a
relationship with certain water vendors and take regular bribes in exchange for falsifying records. In
order to reduce corruption at this level, the utility should develop a rolling system, and send out a
different meter reader to a given area at the end of each billing cycle.
iv.
Install individual sector meters
SODECI has divided the city, for administrative purposes, into ten sectors, with an average of 19,000
connections per zone. Each sector has a local SODECI office. Some of these sectors are vast, densely
populated, and include several sprawling low-income neighborhoods in which water vending is very
common. However, SODECI does not have any means of monitoring water consumption, billing rates
or volume of unaccounted-for-water by sector; only city-wide, aggregate numbers are available. It is,
therefore, impossible to pinpoint the sectors in which consumption is the highest, or in which the
billing rate is the lowest. Because such information is critical to the utility's ability to direct its efforts
toward specific neighborhoods, SODECI should install a separate trunk meter for each of the ten
sectors.
v.
Subdivide the city's ten sectors into smaller zones
In addition, the larger sectors should be subdivided into smaller zones so as to enhance the utility's
control over water vending activities. At the moment, some of the sectors are too vast for the small,
local offices to be able to monitor the activities of all the customers. Breaking the sectors into smaller
zones as well as increasing the staff at each of the local offices, thus increasing the company's total
staff, would increase the utility's ability monitor activities at the local level.
vi.
Install the pipes that link the meters to the taps
Leaks in the flexible pipes linking the meters to the taps cause significant water losses, resulting in
high bills which the vendors sometimes have trouble paying.
One possible means of reducing these
leaks would be for SODECI, instead of the vendors, to install these pipes. While the vendors could
still be responsible for purchasing the pipes, having them installed by experienced plumbers working
for the utility would no doubt reduce the chance of leaks. This system would serve the additional
purpose of reducing the chance of water contamination. The cost of installation could perhaps be
shared between the vendor and SODECI, depending on the distance the pipes were required to
traverse.
SODECI could, for example, finance the installation for the first 50 yards, while any
additional installation costs would be the responsibility of the vendor.
c) Improve the public standpipes
SODECI employees are virtually unanimous in their opinion that one of the best solutions to the
difficult access to clean water in poor neighborhoods that are not connected to the water network is to
increase the number of public standpipes located in these neighborhoods.
However, the survey
revealed that residents of these neighborhoods tend to prefer water vendors to standpipes. If SODECI
plans to install new standpipes, they must be an improvement over the old ones.
First, the pump should be designed to reduce the waiting time necessary to fill each container.
Currently, it can take up to 3 minutes to fill a single, 25 liter bucket. Second, the standpipes should be
equipped with a different type of coin-operated device. At the momefit, many customers complain
that they often do not have the requisite 10 Fcfa needed to operate the standpipe. This change problem
could be addressed through a token system. The standpipe operator could purchase these tokens from
SODECI and sell them to customers who could then buy one or several without needing exact change.
Standpipe users could insert the tokens to set the standpipe in motion, and, at the end of each month,
the standpipe operator would receive payment from SODECI in exchange for the contents of the token
machine.
d) Create a resale point/standpipe hybrid
SODECI should negotiate with the Water Directorate to be allowed to install in unplanned
neighborhoods a limited number of connections that would be designated as water vending points.
These connections could be made as offshoots of the water mains that have already been installed to
supply the standpipes. Each vending point would be run by a vendor, just as standpipes are run by
operators hired by SODECI. The vendor would sign a contract for a fixed period of time, and would
be responsible for the day-to-day operations of the reselling point. This contract could be likened to
the management contracts that some companies sign with utilities to manage the operation of a portion
of the system. The fact that SODECI cannot regulate the price that the vendors charge could serve as
the vendor's compensation: vendors would be, as they are now, free to set their own prices. However,
competition from other such vendors might lower prices.
e) Facilitate access to private connections in planned neighborhoods
Water vending occurs in planned neighborhoods that are connected to the network as well as illegally
settled ones that are not. In these planned neighborhoods, there are no physical or technical reasons
for which some households do not have private connections. What prevents low-income residents of
these neighborhoods from obtaining private connections is, at times, a series of administrative barriers.
They must, for example, go to the local SODECI office with a number of documents, including
topographical map of their plot, a document that is difficult (or impossible) to obtain. In addition, they
often are unable to save enough to pay the initial connection fee in one lump sum, and to pay for bills
that come only once every three months.
SODECI should, therefore, attempt to simplify the process by which one obtains a private connection,
and offer a more flexible means of payment for the service. Monthly billing, for example, would
enable some households to pay for their water in a manner more in keeping with their means, although
it would also increase administrative costs to the utility. In addition, spreading the initial connection
fee over the course of several months would also make private connections more accessible to low
income households.
f)
Conduct a pilot study for network extension
According to some of its managers, SODECI has in the past conducted a few studies to determine the
willingness and ability to pay for private connections among households in some low-income areas.
The utility should focus on one unplanned area in which demand appears to be high, assess this
demand and the households' ability to pay, and petition the Water Directorate to let it extend the
network into this area. SODECI's ability to demonstrate the financial viability of such an extension
might lead the Water Directorate to relax some of the rigid constraints it imposes on network
extensions.
The above recommendations are based on the assumption that vendors in Abidjan are not currently
earning excessive rents. While simple observation of their living conditions seems to indicate that this
is true, it is difficult to know for certain how much the vendors are actually retaining as profit. If, in
fact, vendors were earning excessive rents, the recommendations, while not changing drastically,
would shift in relative importance. Promoting legal vending through such measures as cracking down
on unregistered vendors, eliminating the deposit, offering a subsidized connection and promoting a
vendor association would then be given less importance as they would tend to increase the rents to
vendors. Instead, SODECI would need to emphasize the creation of competition, by improving the
standpipes, creating designated resale points, and facilitating access to private connections in planned
areas.
2.
SODECI AS A UNIQUE CASE
Before drawing lessons for other utilities from SODECI's experience with legalized vendors, it is
important to note that SODECI presents an unusual case, and that many of the characteristics of C6te
d'Ivoire's water sector are not present in other developing countries. The very fact, for example, that
the sector has been run by a private company for 39 years sets it apart from the water sectors of other
developing countries, whether in Africa or elsewhere.
Most systems currently under private
management were public as recently as ten years ago. SODECI is, therefore, a particularly wellestablished private utility, and an Ivorian one at that. In many countries such as Argentina, Indonesia
or Morocco, the water sector has been privatized with the participation of a foreign private company,
usually French or British. SODECI has, however, been Ivorian since its inception in 1960.
The company's management structure is also noteworthy. SODECI is headed by Marcel Zadi Kessy,
an Ivorian who has taken a bold initiative to structure the management of his company to take into
account not only elements of human nature, but specific elements of African culture and tradition. A
carefully orchestrated division of duties in each of Abidjan's local offices, for example, ensures a
system of checks and balances that minimizes the occurrence of "combines," best translated as
"schemes." SODECI managers are the first to admit that schemes designed to sidestep rules and
regulations are frequent not only in their company, but in many African organizations. These schemes
are often the result of social pressure on those who earn a salary to provide for extended families,
reinforced by overall economic hardship.
In each of Abidjan's ten local offices, four SODECI employees share management duties, according to
a specific breakdown of responsibilities. One person is in charge of commercial activities and is
responsible for maintaining the office accounts and dealing with customer relations. Anyone wanting
to lodge a complaint, pay a bill or request an extension for payment is directed to this person. A
second employee takes on the administrative duties. These include, but are not limited to, billing,
personnel management, office supply provision, monitoring of fraud, and database management as
well as occasional site visits. A third person plays a more technical role. He or she monitors the flow
of water through the network and supervises the plumbers or engineers who are sent to make repairs or
deal with malfunctions in the network.
Finally, a fourth manager is responsible for inventory
management. This person is the link between the local office and SODECI's central supply office,
and monitors the distribution of meters and other materials.
This management system was designed so that the person who initiates an action is never the person
who completes it, especially if it involves a financial transaction. If, for example, a customer demands
that his or her connection be shut off, the person who receives the request and meets with the customer
(the commercial representative) does not actually see the meter. Similarly, the technical representative
who removes the meter does not return it to storage, but hands it to the inventory representative. This
representative then alerts the administrative representative who logs in the closure of the connection
and informs the customer that it has taken place. In this manner, it is difficult for one person to abuse
the system (e.g., falsify a request for connection closure or log in an incorrect figure from the meter
counter) without someone else finding out. The division of responsibilities acts as a system of checks
and balances.8 9
Within this management system, all four representatives within a given local office are on equal
footing. Zadi Kessy has opted for limiting hierarchy within each office so as to limit community
89
Zadi Kessy, op. cit., p. 191
pressure. In his experience, the existence of a "chef " someone who is above other employees, often
leads to his or her succumbing to the pressures of family members or political authorities appealing to
him for favors (free connections, lower bills) that usually involve his side-stepping the company rules
to the detriment of the company itself. Having all managers on equal footing enables the company to
emphasize, instead, the culture of solidarity and teamwork that is prevalent in Africa. All managers of
each local office are in direct contact with the Abidjan regional director, rather than having to go
through layers of bureaucracy to communicate with an entity at the top of a pyramid. This lack of
hierarchical pyramid also reduces the likelihood of competitive behavior among employees trying to
attain a position of relative authority within the company.9
In part as a result of this management structure, SODECI has become somewhat of a success story in
the fields of water supply, privatization and urban development. Its low water losses (on the order of
12 percent) and high collection rate of 97 percent among private customers place it well above other
water utilities in the region and in the developing world as a whole. Its productivity is twice as high as
any other water utility in West Africa, in either physical terms (with 125 connections per employee) or
monetary terms (value added divided by personnel costs). 9' Its relative financial and service success
has been compounded with its history of trying to serve the poor through such mechanisms as
subsidized connections, a social block in the tariff structure and public standpipes to make it a model
among water utilities in Africa. It is therefore necessary to bear these characteristics in mind when
considering the lessons that SODECI's experience with vending, both legal and illegal, can provide to
other utilities.
3.
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER UTILITIES
Other situations in which a private utility is considering partnering with water vendors are likely to
differ considerably from the situation in Abidjan. The success of a partnership between a private
utility and water vendors will depend on many factors, including:
>
The laws that govern the sector:
The utility may be subject to specific laws dictating its
jurisdiction and its network expansion plans. In addition, private enterprises may be subject to
regulatory laws.
>
Land tenure status of the urban poor:
Those living under marginal conditions may be on
inalienable public land that authorities cannot give up, alienable public land that the city may sell,
90
Ibid., p. 187
92
rent, or grant as a concession, or various types of private land. The attributes of the land that the
urban poor occupy will affect the legality and feasibility of extending the water network or
encouraging vendors.
>
Level of water consumption: The amount of water consumed by the urban poor will vary from
case to case, and will depend on several factors, including quality and price of water as well as
income level.
>
Variety of sources available:
The relative success of water vending will depend on the
availability, accessibility and affordability of water from other sources of water such as private
connections, private wells, public standpipes and surface water.
>
Size of "informal sector": The prevalence of water vending will also depend on the size of the
"informal sector" and the level of entrepreneurship.
> The length and type of private sector participation: How long and how comprehensively the
private sector has been involved in the water sector will have some bearing on its ability to form a
working relationship with vendors. The longer and more comprehensively a private utility has
been involved in the sector, the more likely it is to have gained an understanding of the local
conditions and to include local staff who can develop a relationship with the vendors.
>
Organization among vendors: Water vendors will have different levels of organization; in some
areas they may have formed an association or informal solidarity groups, while in others they may
operate individually without any form of organization. If they are highly organized, they are
likely to communicate more effectively with the utility.
Despite the variety of factors that may influence the formation of a partnership, however, a strong case
can be made for encouraging cooperation between utilities and water vendors, and consequently
encouraging competition among vendors. The consultancy firm London Economics refers to retail
competition among entrants to the water market. It suggests that, while there are times when limits on
competition will be justified, competition may actually be efficient if entrants take a bulk supply of
water from the main network and then offer customers a choice of water suppliers. While London
Economics uses the term "entrants" to refer to private companies, the term could just as well refer to
private individuals such as vendors. These entrants could take the water from the existing system and
91
92
World Bank, June 1990, op. cit.
Lyonnaise des Eaux, op. cit., p. 15
either build a new distribution network (which is what occurs, on a very small scale, in Abidjan's
unplanned neighborhoods) or use the utility's network (which is what occurs in the city's planned
neighborhoods) to resell water to customers. 93
According to London Economics, this system can improve efficiency by providing supply to
customers who are willing to pay the full cost of supply, but are currently unserved. It also enables
resellers to offer tariff packages tailored to customer's demands.9 4 While the article is referring to the
tariff packages that telecommunications service resellers offer, the same holds true in the water sector:
Vendors and resellers provide the urban poor with a payment system tailored to their abilities by
enabling them to pay for small quantities of water on a daily basis and, at times, selling water for
credit. In 1989, after full privatization of the water system, the government in England and Wales
allowed for competitive entry into the water industry. "Inset appointments," defined as supply to a
specific area by a new entrant, licensed by the Office of Water Services, the central regulatory agency,
were permitted for sites which were not already connected, and were more than 30 meters from the
distribution main of the water utility. 95 The system of registered vendors, who are, in effect,
"licensed" by the utility, bears close resemblance to this arrangement, on a much smaller scale.
For such a system to work several conditions are necessary. These include, but are not limited to, the
following:
a) Availability of information
i.
Regarding the existing situation
In order to design a system that is advantageous to all parties involved, namely the utility, the vendors
and the customers, it will be necessary for the utility to have accurate and up-to-date information
regarding the state and prevalence of water vending in the area, as well as customer preferences.
Several surveys and field visits will be required for the utility to obtain date on vending practices, the
prevalence of vendors and their geographical distribution, the prices charged, and household demand,
needs and preferences, as well as satisfaction of vendors and customer satisfaction with existing
services.
93 London Economics, "Competition in Water", a paper presented for the Department for International
Development, April 1998, p. 14
94
Ibid., p. 16
9 Ibid., p. 18
ii.
Regarding the partnership
Once the utility and the vendor association have agreed on an arrangement, its success will depend
largely on the affected parties having access to complete information about it. Information regarding
the nature of the arrangement and its advantages or disadvantages, the process by which to become a
registered the vendor, the benefits to the customers and the entity to which to address complaints will
need to be disseminated among the vendors as well as among the water users.
b) Administrative capacity
A certain level of administrative capacity to orchestrate and monitor a partnership with vendors will be
required. However, among private utilities, this should not pose a significant constraint. The utility
will need to set up the structure of the partnership, in conjunction with vendors, and the mechanisms to
oversee it. This may include, but not be limited to, a system for "licensing" or registering vendors, a
separate billing system, and a means of tracking sales to and revenues from vendors.
c)
Vendor representation
The vendors, too, must have a certain amount of administrative capacity. As discussed in Chapter
Three, it is imperative that the vendors have some form of representative association around which
they can be organized and through which they can communicate with the utility and any other entity
engaged in the system. A single organization is the only means by which the vendors as a group can
be a partner with the utility.
d) Partnership
If the arrangement between the vendors and the utility is to be successful, it will need to be a
partnership in which there is a clear division and definition of roles and responsibilities, as well as
distribution of risk. The association, for example, can try to regulate the prices that the vendors charge,
and can take on the responsibility of tracking down illegal vendors and encouraging them to register
with the utility.
e) Bulk water price for vendors
A single, bulk tariff imposed on vendors would be more advantageous than the increasing block tariff
(IBT) that is common in many developing countries. An IBT implies that the more water is purchased
from a single connection, the higher the average price of each cubic meter. In vending situations,
96
where a single connection supplies dozens of families, the IBT in effect penalizes these families. In
Abidjan, where SODECI must charge tariffs dictated by the Water Directorate, vendors demand high
prices from customers so as to cover their own high bills. A bulk tariff would, therefore, be more
appropriate for these vendors, and might help lower costs to customers.
AREQUAP-CI in Abidjan, is requesting one such tariff.
Any Patrice, head of
In a situation in which the utility can
negotiate the tariffs it charges, it should set a bulk supply price that is not too high to keep out entrants
to the industry but not low enough to subsidize them.
f) Reduction of unregistered vending
While it would no doubt be impossible to eliminate all unregistered vending, the utility should make a
significant effort at least to reduce its occurrence. The existence of a parallel system of clandestine
vending can only hurt the chances of a partnership with vendors proceeding smoothly. All vendors
should have the same legal status, and none should have any incentive to sell water illegally.
Regardless of the conditions under which a partnership between vendors and a private utility occur, it
is important for both the utility and the government authorities regulating the industry to bear in mind
that such a partnership is at best an interim solution to the problems of access to water in low-income
urban neighborhoods. No matter how well the arrangement is designed and monitored, it will be
difficult, sometimes even impossible, for the utility to regulate the prices that the vendors charge to
customers. As a result, the urban poor patronizing water vendors will undoubtedly continue to pay
prices that restrict their consumption of water to a sub-optimal level. Integrating water vendors into
the "formal" water system, therefore, is not a panacea for the urban poor, but simply a way to improve
at least partially the accessibility and affordability of clean water.
4.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
SODECI has demonstrated a desire to address the needs of the urban poor in illegally occupied
squatter settlements, but feels that its hands are tied due to the limitations it faces on extending the
network. Such a situation is not uncommon in developing countries. As mentioned in Chapter 2,
authorities generally are loathe to permit the installation of infrastructure services in areas that are
illegally settled. In the course of my fieldwork in Abidjan, I was unable, due to time constraints, to
interview anyone in the government offices that oversee the legal rights of the utility.
It would,
however, have been important to discuss the options that such offices foresee for extending service to
these poor neighborhoods. In an era of unprecedented urban growth in developing countries, the
number of people living illegally in areas unserved by basic infrastructure is only going to increase.
The laws that prevent the extension of services to these areas with the aim of limiting the development
of squatter settlements are rapidly becoming obsolete, and the measures that can be taken in changing
them so as to reflect the current reality are worthy of future research.
96
Whittington, Dale, "Possible Adverse Effects of Increasing Block Water Tariffs in Developing Countries," in
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1992, p. 76
APPENDIX
1. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONS
a) General questions
How many people live in this household?
Who is in charge of fetching water?
How many sources of water do you use? Which ones?
What types of containers do you use for each source? How many?
Where are these water sources in relation to where you live? (neighbors' house, a few minutes away,
etc.)
Do you have different uses for water from different sources?
Which source(s) do you prefer? Why?
How much time do you spend per day, as a household, on obtaining water?
How much money do you spend per day on water?
Are you satisfied with your access to water? (not at all, somewhat, very) Why?
What changes in your access to water would you like to see?
b) Questions regarding water vending
Do you think that there are a lot of water vendors in this neighborhood? How many?
Do you know if any of them are "registered?"
Do you always go to the same vendor(s)?
When you get water from vendors, do you have to fetch it or does it come to your home?
When during the day do you go fetch water?
Do you feel that you have to wait in line for a long time?
How much do you spend at the water vendors' per day? For how much water?
Are you satisfied with the prices that the water vendors charge?
Do you sometimes have to take water for a credit?
How often? (never, rarely, often, always)
If you do sometimes get water for credit, when can you generally repay the vendor? (later the same
day, the next day, several days later, etc.)
Do you find the vendor's water points to be well managed? Why?
How do you find the quality of the water from the vendors? And the cleanliness of the site?
Are you satisfied with the service that the vendors provide? Why?
What would you like to change in the way that vendors provide you with water?
In your opinion, what are the advantages of getting water from a vendor rather than from other
sources?
And the disadvantages?
Do you have any other comments?
2.
VENDOR SURVEY QUESTIONS
Is this your primary source of income? If not, what is?
What are your hours of operation?
How many taps do you run?
Do you hire anyone to help you?
How did you choose them?
How are these people paid?
Did you know that SODECI accepts "registered" vendors?
Do you think consumers know if the vendor they use is illegal or registered?
How do you choose the prices you charge?
Did you know that there is a water vendors' association?
Are you a member?
Do you feel that there is competition from illegal vendors? How much?
How many vendors do you think there are in this neighborhood?
What about competition from standpipes?
Do you think it affects your business? How?
What advantage(s) is/are there to being a vendor rather than a standpipe operator?
How often do you receive a bill?
Do you ever have trouble paying your water bills?
Do you ever sell water for credit?
If yes, how long do you generally have to wait to be paid back?
Do you feel that you can earn a reasonable living by reselling water?
What is your relationship with SODECI?
(for registered vendors) Was it relatively easy to become registered?
In general are you satisfied with the water vending system in Abidjan?
Are there any changes you would like to see?
3.
SODECI INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Where are you allowed to install meters? What are the characteristics of these neighborhoods?
How do you inform people of the possibility of becoming a registered vendor?
What is the process to become registered? What are the requirements?
Do you take into account the proximity of standpipes to the site of a proposed vending operation?
When you inspect the site, what exactly are you looking for?
How much time does the process take from beginning (initial application) to end (beginning of
reselling?)
Is there any way to verify that the person asking for a meter actually lives where it is being placed?
What type of connection do registered vendors get?
What are the fees that a vendor must pay to become registered? And those that a regular customer with
a subsidized connection must pay?
What are the tariffs that the registered vendors must pay to SODECI? And regular customers?
What documents join the registered vendors to SODECI?
How do you monitor the activities of registered vendors? Who does this?
Do you think that it is possible to sidestep the requirements and become a vendor illegally without
being caught?
Do you think there is any corruption among any of your employees who might help illegal vendors?
Are there any mechanisms in place to control for corruption?
There are a lot of illegal vendors in most of the city's low-income neighborhoods. What do you think
of this situation? How does it affect SODECI?
How do you control for illegal vendors? Who does this?
What happens when you discover an illegal vendor?
How many illegal vendors do you think you have eliminated?
Do you have list of registered vendors in this sector?
What do you think of the new water vendors' Association?
How do you feel about the relationship between SODECI and the registered vendors?
What is the percentage of non-payment among registered vendors? And overall?
How has legalized water vending affected SODECI's image? And its finances?
What are the problems with this registered vending system?
How do you think it could be improved?
Do you think that SODECI's attitude toward water vending would be any different if the utility was
public?
What recommendations would you give to another utility that might be thinking of instituting a legal
vending system?
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