MACRO DETERMINANTS OF THE FUTURE OF THE STUDY OF
NEGOTIATIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS
Thomas A. Kochan
Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
August, 1985
Max Bazerman
Northwestern University
WP #1695-85
To appear in R.J. Lewicki, B.H. Sheppard, and M.H. Bazerman
(Eds.), Research in Negotiation in Oranizations, JAI Press,
Inc., Volume 1, 1986.
Macro Determinants of the Future of
The Study of Negotiations in Organizations
Thomas A. Kochan
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
lMa,, H. E-Bazerman
Northwestern University
The authors thank EBob McKersie for comments on a previous draft
paper.
This paper was written while the second author
of this
was on the faculty at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
A recent analysis of the state of negotiation research
through
1982
(Kochan and
erma,
1983) presented the following
rather pessimistic assessment:
... the rejection of the "management principles"
organization theory
1963).
(March and Simon,
along with the social
turmoil
1958;
approach to
Cyert
of the
and March,
1960's,
helped
organizational
theorists to begin to bring conflict out of
the closet and
to recognize that conflict may not only be a
phenomenon but that
naturally occurring organizational
would have positive as well
different organzational
Little
progress
point..
.sttdying
of
r-efreshing,
but all
of paradi gm
development
us far enough
guiding
(Coser, 1956;
down
of
the
organizational
interested
organizations
is
and
of
and the di
ladder
that
i nfl uenc:ing
of
for
can be used by
or
changing
within
within them... In
and between
(among) organizations have yet to be developed...
-1-
and
to suggest
individuals
negotiation
scussion
None of them take
design and principles
activities
in
elementary
focus on the level
articulation.
onceptual
Pondy, 1967).
:insightful
these wor::s still
or the behavior
-usefultheories
systems,
negotiations,,
for organizational
individuals
short,
actors
was made in going beyond this
power- and
strategies
as negative consequences for
organizational
conflict,
it
This statement articulated both the importance of the topic of
(a central
negotiations in organizations
this volume),
premise of
and its limited state of development three years ago.
In the three years since Kochan and Verma's paper, research
negotiation in organizations has
and teaching on the topic of
e.xpanded considerably.
Evidence of this increased interest
includes the creation of elective courses on negotiation at a
large number of management schools, a significant increase in the
frequency of dispute-related publications in organizational
journals, the commonality of symposia and conferences on
behavior
negotiation
community to the importance of
(Lewicki and
lives
negotiation
research three years
that
Our
to
designed
In
several
intellectual
material
during
paper we will
theory and research
reviewing
cover-ed
being
different
writings
prescriptive
negotiations.
,
the field
intell.ectual
has
period.
of the cu!..rrent
in
on negotiations
suggest
basic intellectual
however
the preceding
take sto:
nf
ri..gorously tested within
into
negotiat. on researc:h,
movement
little
this
of
will
of organi zatt ional
improve the practice
I-n other area.s
exerted
are now
of
from the state
current ass.essment
and translated
settings
organizational
their- professional
the state
in some domains of negotiation research,
aruiments and propositions
or
Thus,
in
very different
today is
ago.
negotiation
1984).
Eazerman,
research
of the management
and attention
topics,
related
organizations
tracks.
state
of
by brieFly
The four tracks
traditions we draw on closely reflect the
in
this
vol.ume and its
-2-
predecessor
(Bazerman
and
Lewicki
1983),
as some issues that we believe are
as well
relevant to negotiation research in organizations, but have not
received much attention.
review of
literature.
We do not seekl
to provide a general
Nor do we assert that all
advanced here are well-documented empirical
attempt to comment on the state of major
which
we see as being central
to the study of negotiations in
we will
inquiry.
The
(1) behavioral
and
(2) third party
analytic models of the negotiation process;
political
Rather we
domains of research
four domains examined in this paper include:
(.3 coalitions;
the arguments
findings.
organizations, and to thereby stimulate further
intervention;
of
(4) macro economic and/or
and
First, however,
models of conflict and :its resolution.
note the developments in the broader environment which
are stimulating the rising interest in thrse subjects.
Envi ronmental
Influences on Resear,-h Development
Some argue that academia stays ahead of changes in
environment.
Others argue that academia
to the environment..
researchers will
ex ists
that environmental
negotiation.
In
this
learns from and responds
While we certainly hope that negotiation
influence managerial
research outputs that
behavior,
ample evidence
changes preceded the recent increase in
we hve
section,
witnessed in
we outline
the field
mu.ltiple
we believe have affected the recent surge in
negotiation related materials.
environmental
the
.. ,._
factors which
the popularity of
We will use this
changes as we discuss the four
of
analysis of
substantive areas.
First,
1970's led organizational
the 1960's and
muLltiple forms of organizational
design for horizontal
These
1977).
(Galbraith,
organizations, etc.)
hierarchy, matrix
theorists to identify
product teams in a functional
(task forces,
communication
forms were primarily created because of the
organizational
failure of
and societal changes of
the accelerating technological
hierarchical organizations to respond
traditional
quickly, to deal
markets,
with rapidly changing technologies,
and
demands, and to efficiently involve relevant people
environmental
These organizational
across the hierarchy in decisions.
forms
delivered speed and flexibility of responsiveness at the expense
of clear
mechanisms
for reac(hing
and down
opposed to up
(Irett
.and Rognes,
organizational
The designers
forms thought
in
terms of
hw decisions
of
structur-al
implicitly
changes
.ommunication. channels
decision
making.
creation
of
new interest
would
the organization's
affect
would
in
assumed
that
and
(Shull,
apolitical
In
reality,
units
increased
the
also created
the potential
for
intraorganizational
for effective
Delbecq
thtese
the creation of
organizational
confiurrations
the
Thus,
organizations.
lead to rational,
new inter-dependent
group
of these new
'This has not been the case.
confi.ict and the need
negotiations
are made
as
ad to be negotiated
the organization,
186).
the
units,
decisions among organizational
ignoring how these structures
structure,
politics
However,
lines of authority and responsibility.
and Cummings,
-4,-.
19C69).
Managers felt
a need to negotiate that they had not perceived in hierarchical
organizations.
Thus, the expanded use of
task forces and other organizational
matrix organizations,
designs which attempt to
increase horizontal coordination has increased the need and
desire of
managers to be equipped with skills in negotiation.
A second set of environmental
forces that are driving the
in negotiations research are the
increased interest
transformations in markets, technologies and industrial
organization structures.
These developments produce pressures to
renegotiate a variety of contractual
relationships and in many
cases blur or redefine the boundaries across organizations.
The most visible indication of this transformation is the growth
of the service sector in more highly developed Western
a ser-vice based economy requires buyers
economies.
For example,
and sellers
sly
to agree on more ambiguou
mining,
often
or
provide
services
to put certain
information
with considerable
is consumated.)
outputs of
'The "goods"
sectors.
agricultural
personal
commitment
the physical
of
are characteristic
defined
(such as a consulting
"products"
that
the manufacturing.
transacted
are
contract),
a
expertise to work on a problem or to
(whose ultimate value can only be estimated
uncertainty
What
is
at the time a contract or agreement
the nature and
scope of the negot at e
services-
Is the buyer purchasing consulting time or an agreed-
upon final
product?
party?
the parties
Are the parties
What is the time horizon relevant to each
engaged
hope to develop
in
a one-time transaction
a future
-5-
ongoing
relationship,
or do
and thereby bargain as if the quality of the future relationship
matters?
The answers to those questions are far less defined in
a service-based economy than in a manufacturing-based economy.
Note that these service transactions can occur within
organizations,
or parties can negotiate with external
organizations to perform these tasks or supply these services.
Thus, one of
the most
important implications of the
transformation to a service economy is the blurring of
organizational
boundaries and the creation of greater choice
about whether to integrate diverse functions into an existing
organization
or to go into the exter-nal market and purchase the
services as long
or negotiating
multiply
as they are needed.
interactions
as the shift
service-based
within and across organizations
continues
the
of total
declining
those su.r-viving
however,
manufacturing
in
world.
A great deal. of
the turmoil
system throughout
in
in
markets of
for
managing
labor
order
conflict
to
the modern
the U.S. industrial
has arisen out
and the renegotiations
The American
as a
the increased
industrial
of
relations
has been affected so severely because the institutional
mechanisms
to a
basic business strategies
the past decade
activities
contracts.
is
manufacturing
organizations,
the more highly competitive
these restructuring
employment
importance of
and reconsider
compete
relations
from a manufacturing-based
employment,
pressure to restructure
in
transactions
economy.
Accompanying
percentage
The number of
have
t
the
sstem
historically depended heavily on collective bargaining.
contrast, the changes underway call
In
for an expansion of the
interactions among workers and employers both above the reach of
the bargaining table
(the changes in business strategy employers
must make to remain competitive)
at the level
critical
the workplace.
These changes
table
are particularly
as employers struggle to overcome traditional
adversarial
and
of
and below the bargaining
relations
flexibility
into
-that we are moving
are renegotiating
the organization
through a period
the basic structure
relationships.
environment
and introduce greater employee commitment
It
calls
negotiations,
is
of work.
The result
where management
and scope of
not surprising,
is
and labor
their
that this
therefore,
for renewed attention to effective
conflict resolution, and integrative bargaining.
A closely related force supporting rnewed interest
in
identifying more efficient forms of conflict resolution is the
growinng
importance of individual
generation),
bargaining
as opposed to traditional
duLe pro(ess mechanisms
in
boundaries are blurr-ing,
are breaking down.
professional,
(part
collective
organizations.
traditional
of the "me"
bargaining and
As organizational
nion-management
relations
The labor force includes more mobile,
white collar and managerial
work-ers.
As a result,
we can expect an epansion of individualized negotiations between
organizational
members and their employers,
individuals who have -some form of
or with other
(-ontractual relationship
with
the organization.
A final
set
of
environmental
forces affecting
the importance
of negotiation in the workplace is the increased competitiveness
of
The slowdowns and fluctuations in
the environment.
national
and world economics have created the need for cutbacks in
Conflict is rare when resources are ample.
organizations.
However, when resources are scarce, conflict intensifies and the
Increased competition
need for conflict management increases.
has also resulted from the dramatic increase in foreign suppliers
and the deregulation of important sectors of the U.S. economy.
The impact of foreign competition is obvious.
In addition,
legislative changes in the U.S. have created a system of
negotiated compliance rather than the dictation of compliance
Entire industries (e.g,.
(Drayton, 1981).
have been deregulated,
industry)
travel
competitive
In
and
rates
government-set
behavior
summary,
allowing
all
parts of the
eliminating
market with
a free
full
to prtvail.
we have recently
a
witnessed
number of changes
that encourage organizations to negotiate their eistence in a
These chanrges are partially responsible
more competitive world.
for the increased
(1)
More specifically,
transformation
by neqot:ication
activity
technological
of mark:ets,
growing importance of the
competition
technologies
(3) the restructuring
structures,
environmental
in
of
organizations.
increase
changes,
ocietal
and
(4)
the
(5) increased
the importance
However,
(2)
industrial
manufacturing,
individual, and
have combined to
negotiations
and
scholars to the area.
the
influences has not been equally
of
impact of
felt
these
across
various subareas of the field negotiation research.
The sections
that follow examine recent developments in four different
substantive areas of negotiation research
Models of
identified earlier.
the Negotiations Process
The body of research that has the deepest roots and has had
the greatest
impact on recent empirical work and popular essays
on negotiations in organizations are the behavioral
analytical
theories of
behavioral
theory and empirical
bilateral
heavily on the conceptual
Wa'lton and McPKersie
bargaining.
and
Much modern
research on negotiations draws
terms and propositions presented
(1965) and Thibaut and K::elley
(1959)
in
while
much of the analytical research draws on the game theoretic
models of Von Neuman
(1957), and Raiffa
model
the
(1982).
(1948),
Luce and Raiffa
The Walton and McKersie descriptive
has received mcre attention from organizational
researchers.
in
and Morgenstern
The game theoretic models have become more popular
managerial
economics area as their concepts have been and
applied to a wider variety of managerial
problems.
behavior
and organizational
This section selectivity eamines each with the
intention to integrate the future of the two approaches.
Behavioral
Models
The two most important contributions of
McK::ersie model
are
the Walton and
that have been applied in organizational
research
(1) the mixed-motive nature of negotiating relationships
(including the multiple dimensionality of the negotiation
process) and
(2) the bargaining zone concept.
-9-
The mixed-motive
concept recognizes that very few intra- or
interorganizational
relationships are either totally competitive or cooperative.
Instead, latent
conflictual
in most relationships are both cooperative and
incentives, motives, and potential
mixed-motive model
outcomes. The
assumes that the essence of successful
negotiations is the effective choice of strategies to reflect
individual
and
joint outcomes.
To further
explore how parties
select these strategies, Walton and McKersie introduce four
models of
the negotiations process:
(1) distributive
bargaining--the processes used to accommodate conflicting goals;
(2) integrative bargaining--the processes used to pursue joint
gains given
issues of common interest;
(3) attitudinal
structuring--the processes by which the attitudes of the parties
or the affective aspects of
maintained, and;
their relationship
(4) intraorganizational
of accommodating among
are formed and
bargaining--the process
different interests within a party to a
negotiations process.
The bargaining zone concept suggested
has a resistance point,
be.ow which he/she would prefer to not
reach agreement rather than to settle.
the two parties--that
that each negotiator
is,
If a gap exists between
there are no points that both parties
find acceptable--a negative contract zone exists,
agreement is; the predicted outcome.
and no
When resistance points
overlap, a positive bargaining zone exists,
and an agreement is
-the likely outcome.
These concepts
developed to link
and the propositions
that Walton and
them, have been a rich source of
-1
-
IMcK::ersie
insight for
many behavioral researchers working on the boundary of
labor-management relations and organizational behavior over the
past twenty years
(see R.ochan,
198C0;
Strauss,
Hammer, 1982 for reviews of this work).
of multilateral
Brett and
For example, the models
collective bargaining in the public sector that
were developed in the
197.3)
1979; or
197)0s
(Kochan, 1973;
Juris and Feuille,
were based on the proposition that the differences in goals
built into the structure of management of public agencies made
intraorganizational
bargaining especially complex.
Goals were so
disparate that the distributive bargaining process often failed
to coalesce around two distinct bilateral
parties.
The parties themselves
members, agency administrators,
sets of interests or
(e.g. managers, city council
civil
service officials, etc)
differed greatly in their perception of the substantive positions
or priorit:ies to pursue in negotiations,
power to decide on priorities.
and over who had the
As a result,
the persistance of
intraorqanizational conflicts transformed what was epected to be
a two party or bilateral
gcovernment
negotiations between a union and a city
into a n-party or multilateral
process as each
management group attempted to directly assert its interests.
This made finding an acceptable contract zone more complex
and in
many cases prolonged and escalated the conflicts.
More recently,
drawn
azerman
heavily on behavioral
and Neale
(1983;
decision making
Eazerman, 1983) have
research to
demonstrate the existence of systematic cognitive barriers to
achieving
integrative outcomes.
Their work identifies
explanations for inefficient agreements
-11-
cognitive
(distributive agreements
and the fact that
when integrative agreements were possible)
negotiators often fail
to reach agreement despite the appearance
Others have taken many of Walton
of a positive bargaining zone.
and McK.ersie's propositions into the laboratory and refined them
based on their experimental
results
others such as Pruitt, Carnevale,
Still
and their colleagues
Carnevale, Pruitt and Seilheimer, 1981)
1983;
(e.g., Pruitt,
975).
(cf. Rbin and Brown,
expanded on the theor-etical. propositions in
the model
have
to develop
testable hypotheses on how negotiators can achieve integrative
bargains.
The common element in
the theoretical
and empirical
work that
draws on behavioral. negotiation models is that social
interactions and outcomes can be improved by increasing the
.lEkil.lsof
shoulc
negotiators
help the negcltiator by training
him/her to view the
negoti ating problem through the conceptual
well
i 's
suitedc
a mi:ed-motive
lens of
and t.o adopt empirical ly-verified
framework,
These
(organizational participants).
strategies that are
ive mix
to the speci ficC di stribu.ti ve-integrat.
of
es.
Analytic or Game Theoretic Models
Until
(1975)
recently,
the summary evaluation offfered
by Young
accurately portrayed the limited irnsight that formal
theory models of negotiations had achieved:
conception of
bargaining has yielded
but it abstracts away al..
severely
limits the
a number
"The game theoretic
of elegant
the dynamic aspects; of
applicability
of
the concept.
I2-
models
bargaining and
.
.
these models produces good predictions or satisfactory
-
game
. None of
explanations concerning bargaining in the great majority of real
world cases"
(Young 1975:
304;
391).
The recent worki
(1982) and his colleagues Lax and Sebenius
of Raiffa
(forthcoming) have
gone a long way to rendering Young's assessment obsolete.
Raiffa's career transformation from a theoretical
mathematician
to a policy advisor and management educator has led him to
identify ways of improving the achievement of more efficient
negotiated outcomes by improving the analytical understanding and
skills of negotiators and third party intervenors.
recent example of
His most
a strategy for applying the tools of
game
theory is illustrated by his proposal for experimentation with
"post settlement settlement" intervention
1985).
strategies
(Raiffa,
Lax, and Sebenius take the game theory framework further
into the realm of practice and prescription by exploring a wide
array of
tactics for- moving the otcomes of mixed motive
interactions closer to the efficiency frontier.
Ne-slin
(1983)
further
Greenhalgh and
etend these models by developing
heuristics
for identifying outcomes that lie on the efficient
fr ont ier.
All of
the intellectual
this research provides encouraging signs that
foundations of both the behavioral
and the game-
theoretic models have begun to move into the mainstream of
organizational
prescription
outcomes.
research,
for
Thus,
and are being
translated into tangible
improving organizational
this
general
stream of
made a significant theoretical,
interactions and
negotiations
empirical,
research
has
and normative impact
on the study and practice of negotiations within organizations.
-13--
The environmental
influences identified earlier
have had their greatest
impact on the models of the negotiation
process identified in this section.
models for understanding bilateral
Much of
in this paper
the success in
These models are the core
negotiations.
the diffusion of
to the emergence of these environmental
these models is due
influences.
But, we also
believe that this success is due to a blurring of the distinction
between the behavior-al
history,
and analytical
the behavioral
descriptive model.
In
model
behavior of: negotiators.
the analytica:
the analytical models were
Both had cdeficiencies.
into useful
models offered
ussming that you were describing a
with highly questionable validity
I-:ahne(nman and Tversky,
10979).
these deficiencies.
FRai-fa's
pr;-esriptive/descricptive
its
little consideration for the actual
approach was not transformed
contrast,
Early in
was viewed almost exclusively as a
contrast,
e.xclu sivel y normative, with
models.
The behavioral
recommendations.
the best prescription,
rational actor--an
(March and Simon,
Recent
In
efforts
assumption
1958;
have responded to
(1932) asymmetrically
framework suggests that decision
analysis should prescribe the optimal
action, given the best
available description of+ the opposing negotiator.
Bazerman and
Neale attempt to describe cognitive deficiencies in negotiation
with the explicit goal
of
moving toward a prescriptiv
improving negotiator
e course of
action.
judgment and
In both cases,
the boundary between description and prescription has been
-14-
spanned,
reducing the limitations imposed by disciplinary
barriers in the initial
process models of
bilateral
negotiation.
The interaction between approaches is also evident in recent
work that prescibes the tactics necessary for dealing with the
mixed-motive problem.
Decision analysts Lax and Sebenius
(forthcoming) move from a approach toward a descriptive approach
by offering tactical
advice consistent with Raiffa's
asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive model.
Social
psychologists Pruitt and Rubin extend their descriptive framework
and also offer precriptive advice.
behaviorists Lewicki
Similarly, organization
and Litterer
(1985) offer theoretical
strategic prescriptions based on the empirical
determinants of effective negotiations.
arrived at a fruitful
and
literature on the
Thus, researchers have
middle ground between description and
prescription that did not exist a decade earlier.
In addition to the empirical
by the early bilateral
outpouring of popular
and theoretical
research
spawned
theories, there has been a recent
books that use
(implicitly or explicitly,
the earlier conceptual
frameworks.
propositions developed
and diffused to a popular, practitioner
audience by Fisher and Ury
derivatives of
(1981)
For example,
and Nierenberg
the earlier behavioral
many of
the
(1973) are
models.
The prospects for continued progress within this research
tradition are good given the number of individuals now using
these concepts as part of
their own research paradigms.
addition, the environmental
influences identified
-15-
In
earlier provide the impetus for further diffusion.
funding agencies
National
(e.g.,
the American Arbitration Association, the
Institutue for Dispute IResolution,
Foundation)
Finally,
are taking an unprecedented
the Hewlett
interest in the
cross-disciplinary development of the models identified in
section.
In summary, the foundation
negotiations
this
for research on bilateral
is poised for further development and diffusion over
the next decade.
Third Parties in Organizations
One special feature of
that the existence of
most organizations)
a hierarchical
mak es
the parties in conflict.
conflict.
he/she
have adverse
common,
that
(which exists in
third parties naturally available to
The third party may not know of
the conflict
consequences
hi erarchy,
and that
eists.
Using
to the parties.
any pair of
boss may choose
mandate and decide how to deal
strctural
structure
The third party may not choose to get involved
knows
traditional
negotiations within organizations is
the third
However,
individuals
to eercise
in
the
-f
even
party
may
a
has some boss in
the structural
with the conflict.
This
perspective., combined with the inherent eistence ot
conflict in organizations, suggests that the role of third pa-t,,
decisions and the impact of
potential
third parties on
negotiatiated outcomes should be a central
organizational
concern of
researchers.
The study of third parties is not new to organizational
research.
However, much of this research has studied third
parties who are not acting in a line mangement capacity.
-16-
For
example, the organizational development area has extensively
discussed the role of
a "process consultant"
(Walton,
1969).
Process consultants attempt to defuse tension and improve the
communication process between the parties, without explicit
attending to their substantive differences.
relations field,
In the labor
extensive theoretical and empirical analysis has
been accumulated on mediation and alternative forms of
arbitration
Katz,
(ochan,
198SC).
Other
research
(e.g., Farber and
1979) has given considerable attention to the interaction
between alternative third party procedures and negotiated
outcomes.
However, only recently have organizational
researchers
noted that the manager with conflicting subordinates is faced
with many of the same choices as
"independent"
With this realization, research has begun
that are centr-al to the choices of
i1ssues
third parties.
to identify generic
managers as third
pa r-ti es.
Two major questions have been raised for consideration.
Firt.,
what third party procedure shoutld be adopted?
manager
altern
stay out of
ative--yet
to the sections
justice.
-this volume on mediation
and
(198)
managerial
are central
procedural
the conflict,
differences in the third party, and a host of other
moderating variables that ar-e specific
Sheppard
These questions
The answer- may depend on the natu.re of
individual
the
the conflict, mediate, arbitrate, or use some
Unnamed--pr- ciced ur e'
in
Should
has provided
intervention
a
to the managerial
domain.
taxonomy of alternative forms of
and suggested
when they might be used,
However, the systematic examination of the third party procedures
--17-
chosen by managers and their
beginning
(e.g.,
Second,
decisions?
Lewicki
of
an 5
Sheppard,
1995).
how do third parties in organizations make
The question of
been the subject
Bazerman,
comparative effectiveness is only
how they shout:Ld make decisions has
of debate among philosophers for centuries
1985 for one review).
However, descriptive examination
these decisions has been minimal.
concern issues of
what outcomes,
(cf.
These decisions usually
distributive justice - i.e., who will
and by what decision rule.
Bazerman
receive
(1985) found
that experienced labor management arbitrators tend to make
decisions that maintain the status quo.
Tversky and K::ahneman's
(1974) anchoring heuristic can be used to predict that managers
and organizations will
how similar
tend to make these decisions by examining
decisions were made in the past, and make
insufficient adjustments for present circumstances.
task of distri.buting a
manager's conflictual.t
insufficient amount of
zero--based
al:L
limited and
pay to ten subordinates.
bdgeting approach
employees each year.
Consider the
One could use a
and totally reconsider the value of
In contrast, most organizations make
adjustments from the employee's past salary, and typically within
a very narrow band of percentage adjustments determined by
organizational
central
policy.
determinant
upcoming year-.
these kinds of
in
This process makes
how salaries will
last year"s anchor the
be distributed for the
Inequities are unlikely to be remedied under
dec:ision rules.
-18 -
These two questions outline a set of concerns that important
to all
managers;
yet the organization's procedures and the
manager's third party "style" are often taken for granted.
Little consideration is given to the fact that research which
suggests different procedures may lead to very different levels
of personal
and organizational effectiveness.
environmental
However,
changes are forcing researchers and practitioners
to seriously examine these issues.
Overloaded courts are now
forcing organizations to consider alternative dispute resolution
procedures.
Problems which used to be resolved in court cases
are now negotiated resolutions worked out by anti-litigation
oriented attorneys, brought before a mini-trial,
or handled by a
low cost, contractually agreed upon arbitration procedure.
reduction
of unioniza
The
tion has dramatized the importance of third
party procedures for handling non-union
grievances,
mai.king
organizational roles such as ombudsman central to many
organizations
(Rotiwe and Bak.:er,
par-allel
for
C3
cal
unit, has created
interdivisional
1984).
profit ma>ximization by the strategic business
the need for
corporate mechanisms for handling
disputes.
The literature ori
third party intervention has produced a
wealth of information that will
of
negotiation in
be useful
organizations.
of third party intervention,
jutstice are all central
organizational
Decentralization, and the
for the developing area
The issues of alternative forms
procedural
justice,
to organizational
and distributive
functioning.
However,
researchers are only beginning to incorporate
these issues into research and teaching.
-19-
This area has a bright
The
is headed in the appropriate directions.
future and
challenge is to develop these models over the next five years so
research and
that they have a significant impact on the empirical
the development of
teachable principles about negotiation and
dispute management.
Coalitions
The argument that coalition behavior constitutes an important
set of
organizational actions at the broad
theory is well
organizational
(e.g.,
has been minimal.
as a topic of
The seeds of the study of coalition behavior
organizational scholars can be found in the work of
March
The author
(1963).
to define organizational
the goals of
of
coalition.
Other uses of the coalition
the theoretical
work of
and Mintzberg
Thompson
as the
effectiveness
dominant
concept
(1967),
(1977)
Ffeffer
are evident in
and Salancik
(198:5).
While organizational
importance of
and Goodman
the organization's
fulfillment
an
by the goals of the
Pennings
organization's dominant coalition.
framework
suggested that
best be described
goals can
organization's
researchers have discussed the
coalitions in organizations, empirical
been limited to three disciplines:
psychology,
Pearce, Stevenson,
behavior, theory, research, and application
micro organizational
(1978),
Cobb;
In contrast, the incorporation of this topic into
and Porter).
used this
of
accepted and has been documented in
earlier chapters in this volume
Cyert and
level
and political
science
work has
game theory, social
(Murnighan, 1978).
has adopted a different philosophical. approach, used a
-2
0-
Each area
different methodology,
set of questions.
and most importantly, asked a different
Game theoretic approaches have focused on the
development of sophisticated mathematical representations of the
coalition-oriented behavior of maximally rational
Rapoport, 1960).
impact of
(cf.
Social psychological models have focused on the
the amount and kind of resources that each actor brings
to a potential
political
actors
coalition task
(Komorita, 1974).
models focus on the ability of
Finally,
a coalition to its
implement the goals following its formation
(e.g.,
DeSwann,
1977;
River, 1962).
Each of
these three disciplines has generated very high
quality work.
A thorough review of the literature, however,
suggests that little overlap or infiltration has occurred among
disciplines
(Murnighan,
1978),
and that this research has had
virtually no impact on the study of coalitions in organizational
behavior.
Given the lack of infiltration,
aski:: whether the study of
coalitions is
useful
decision-making entities in organizations.
research suggests
that the answer
appears to be-"yes".
identify
organizations,
executive
for understanding
While the lac
of
"no", the intuitive answer
Both theorists and practitioners can
the relevance of
various organizational
is
it is appropriate to
coalition behavior for understanding
issues:
how power is derived in
how key decision making groups such as an
committee or a task
force will
how corporate networks form and operate.
act, or understanding
Given this anecdotal
evidence, and the rich disciplinary research, why has so little
infiltration occurred and what changes are necessary to advance
-21-
coalition behavior as an organization topic?
To begin to answer this question, we return to examining the
Consider the following paragraph from
impact of the environment.
14):
a recent Boston Globe article (3/4/85, pg.
to close for three
With its only convention center de
years and
1500 new rooms opening at the same time, Boston has
been facing the financial. nightmare every tourism official
dreads.
But in a unique, hard-won agreement,
(within a half mile radius of the center)
three hotels
that were once
fiercely competitive have joined forces to keep
conventioneers
coming to Boston by marketing their space as a
package::
ae
These short
paragraphs illustrate the importance of environmental
changes on the cr-eation of new coalitions, and new agreements
This same theme is replayed in a
within defined coalitions.
of the
statement often made by the President
and Tetile
over a
Workers Union
(ACTWU), the national
decade against the J.P. Steve.,ns
represent Stevens' employees.
at
least
twice in
the past year
that
Congress
jointly
company and others
for
in
issues,
I.S.
tetil.e
it
f:ights with
works cooperatively
industry in
the te::tile
The union
lobbying
also work:s
indtustry on new technologies
designed to keep the industry compet itive
in
to
ACTWU has noted
while his union
favorable trade policies.
with the
union that fouqht
company fo- the right
The President of
Stevens over union representation
with this
malgamated Cl.othing
world markets.
Thus,
fierce competitors
protagonists
(the union and the employers) formed coalitions when
environmental
changes made their
gains possible.
interests compatible and
joint
However, note that these are temporary or
partial coalitions,
scope
(different U.S. textile firms) and
limited to specific issues within the wider
f the parties'
interactions,
and hence likely to be
unst ab 1 e.
Social
psychologists have long recognized the importance of
a common enemy for creating bonds.
firms by increased international
The threats posed to many
and domestic competition provide
the incentives for new partnerships.
recent
increase in
(<::ochan,
of
cooperative mer-gers
partner
of
as an
(1) the
cooperation between unions and some employers
Mc::ersie, and
coalition
Two examples are
atz,
19e5;
K:atz,
1985) and
that we witness today.
forces that previously viewed
(2) the number
Both call
their
for
the
coalition
opposing force.
Fundamental
internal
in
change
the definition
unit also creates the need for new coalitions.
of the business
With the economy
shifting fr-om a manufacturing--based economy to a service-based
economy, the creation of new partnerships is apparent.
have "full
service financial planning centers,"
We now
composed of
services that were represented in a half a dozen different
organizations
service
just
five
organizations
within the firm.
years ago.
workings of many
also create the need for new coalitions
i-or eample,
revolve around project
The internal
consulting
teams that
organizations
f orm as a new project
often
is
defined.
This form of organization suggests that the continual
formation and reformation of operating coalitions may partially
replace the hierarchy as the dominant organization structure of
many companies.
These examples attempt
fundamental
social
these changes
to illustrate that there are
changes occurring,
and that a byproduct of
is an increase in the importance of
formation and action.
the organizational
Coalitions are of
growing importance and
environment can be epected to be amenable to
research that focuses
on coalition behavior.
·favorable environment does not guarantee
coalition work.
coalition
However,
this
the diffusion of
Coalition research must offer something useful
to the organizational
behavior audience.
conclude that the field of
organizational
It
is not unfair to
behavior has not viewed
p ast coalition resear-ch as directly usefull.
However, a number of
barriers exist
that have inhibited the diffusion process.
Identification
of
the influence of
MuLArnighan
these barriers
c-oalition
the first
research in
step toward
the organizational
(this-, volume) attributes this lack
cross-fertilization of
improving
coalition research
arena.
of
to two causes. First,
the language of coalition theory and its highly formalized
models
(particularly those with a game theory base) may be less
tractable than most
Second,
imported research in organizational
previous empirical
e>xclusively in the
research has been done almost
laboratory.
In addition,
-24-
we argue
behavior.
that the literature's assumptions of the rational decision maker
inhibits the usefulness of
its advice, since one's coalition
partners may not exhibit this presumed rationality.
argue that coalition research has not
organizational
We also
infiltrated the
arena because the specific areas of coalition that
have received attention have not been optimally targeted from an
organizational behavior standpoint, the range has been narrow,
and important
issues have been unaddressed.
Many of
these
unaddressed issues need attention for coalition concepts to be
useful
to the organizational
behavior audience.
For example.
there has been virtually no discussion of norm formation of
coalitions
press),
of
(with the exception of Bettenhausen and Murnighan,
in
tactics for coalition formation, the decision processes
coalition actors, and environmental
coalitions.
influences on shifting
Each of these domains would be of interest to
organizational
behavior.
In addition, the bilateral
negotiation
that occurs between pairs of members in an emerging coalition
have not studied.
This limits the connection between coalition
research and models of negotiation.
dyadic perspective
Finally,
In this regard,
Murnighan's
(this volume) moves in the right directlcn.
in order to move coalition research under
negotiation research, we
the rubric
conceptualize coalition settings
s
individuals/organizations facing a mixed-motive task in which
they must reserve sufficient independence of action to assert
their
distributive interests, while simultaneously trying to
achieve the integrative opportunities of a viable coalition.
-25-
co
we have asserted that
In conclusion,
important to the study of
infiltration of
organizational
(1) coalitions are
behavior,
(2) the
disciplinary ideas has been minimal,
observable barriers must be overcome and
and
(.)
important topics must be
investigated for more effective dissemination to take place in
the fture.
We think
to see future work
that these barriers are manageable and hope
in this area.
Macro Conflict Models
The study of conflict and its resolution has a long and rich
tradition within several
science,
branches of economics and political
yet relatively few of the concepts or- their applications
have been integrated into the study of negotiations within
Within economics, the role of conflicting
organizations.
economic interests, transactions among collective units or
and competitive behavior are deeply embedded in
economic agents,
the models of
institutional
and theories of
i937)
(Edgeworth, 1881;
economics
Roulding,
society's
groups,
theories
but,
exist?",
conflicting
revolve
"why
does
be structured
Indeed, the major debates
not around
the question of
exist?"
"and how should
it
is
interests who share power
science.
capital,
(the state,
institutions
etc.)
Interactions among parties
1962).
also the essence of political
conflict
Coase,
imperfect competition and oligopoly
with separate and o:ten
among political
(Commons, 1928;
labor,
other
'des
nterest
to manage these different interests '
Given the complementary nature of these theories of econorit:
and institutional
relationships,
researchers or organizationai
negotiation might benefit from further examination of the
- 2.
6-
insights to be found
in this broad intellectual
domain.
While
these themes have surrounded research questions addressed in
this volume and its predecessor
(Bazerman and Lewicki,
1983),
little of this information has infiltrated directly the
organizational
arena.
highlight a few interesting,
We will
but
propositions of direct applicability that
highly controversial,
illustrate the potential benefits of deeper utilization and
empirical
testing of this work.
Institutional
economists and liberal pluralist political
theorists start from the proposition that society is composed of
multiple interest groups and that an effective society is one
that
is able to negotiate acceptable and efficient
or transactions between or among these groups.
accommodations
ut an equally
important proposition is that these transactions are not
costless,
nor- are all.
outcomes necessaril.y
efficient.
Instead,
the costs of transactions, as measured by the cost of
resources, or- lost opportunities,
any democratic
or political
can be
value gained
Thus, collective or organizational
are often
judged
the free market
time,
large enough to offset
from the relationship.
interactions and transactions
against the outcome that would be produced by
(Williamson,
outcomes are equally
1975;
"efficient"
Olson, 1982).
(i.e.,
If market
the outcomes
leave the
parties as well or better off than a negotiated or collective
transaction) and if the market produces these outcomes more
efficiently than negotiations
costs) then markets will
(i.e.,
prevail.
with fewer transactions
The formal
interest groups into interacting parties will
- 2
7 -
organization of
not occur or occur.
propositions have dominated the economics
While these general
been translated into more specific models of
negotiations through the work: of
Williamson
1982),
they have also
science literatures for decades,
and political
(1975),
Boulding
and Schelling
conflict and
(1962),
1978,
(1960,
(1962
Olson
What
1984).
follows is not presented as a comprehensive summary of the
implications of
these models for organizational
negotiations.
However, an overview of needed areas of organizational
may illustrate how central many of
these ideas are to
settings.
organizational
A central proposition
in the transaction cost models is that
markets serve as the alternative to organizational
and that organizations
only when they are more
efficient and effective than the market
Institutional
more democrat;.c
in producing valued
economists tend to state the problem in
or pl.uralistic terms--institutions will
when groups with conflicting interests interact
neither
(Commons,
occur
in
arise
in settings where
has the power to uni. ].aterally. determine the outcome
1928).
Yet even when these negotiations occur,
the context
of markets
The more
discretion.
discretion
interactions
("hier-archies" in Williamsons
terminology) emerge and survive
outcomes.
research
which constrain
competitive the market,
they
the parties'
the narrower
the
and the less slack available for transaction costs.
For example, in the context
of
labor management negotiations,
these propositions imply that the greater the product market
competition a
firm and
its employees face,
they have in setting wages and other
-28-
the less discretion
contract terms and the
greater the loss in market share and employment that can be
expected from a strike.
A key implication for organizational
negotiating
negotiations is that the
processes and outcomes are implicitly or explicitly
subject to an
"efficiency" test.
negotiations processes will
Stated more precisely,
only survive within or among
organizations to the extent that they enhance the effectivness of
the organization(s) and the key interests within them.
Fisher and Ury
(1981)
Just as
argue that negotiators should constantly
consider their next best alternative to a negotiated settlement,
market forces exert pressures on organizational
participants to
consider their best alternative to the negotiation process
itself.
Thus, researchers and practitioners need to evaluate the
results of organizational
negotiations against their next best
alternative organizational
organiizational
or market process and outcome.
research should focus not only
Thus,
on the prediction
of_neqotiated outcomes _but also on the conditions under which
organizational
actors will
choose to negotiate.
Again an example from labor management relations may help
illustrate the importance of this point.
that a significant proportion of
recent study showed
the decline in unionization
in
the private sector of the U.S. economy since 1960 occurred
because previously unionized employers experienced increasing
incentives and opportunities to open,
plants on a nonunion basis.
efforts to negotiate
maintain, and expand new
Rather than intensifying their
hard with unions to bing about changes
needed to remain competitive in a changing economy, many of these
-29-
firms chose to escape from the bargaining relationship whenever
it was feasible to do so
Olson's
1985).
(Kochan, McKPersie and Chalykoff,
1982) theories of collective behavior take the
(1962,
above argument one step further by emphasizing that the structure
of interest group configuration, coalition formation, and
collective representation is critical
societal,
to producing efficient
and by implication, organizational,
outcomes.
A
similar argument has been made recently in analyzing the
strategic choices made by management and
labor in response to
changing markets,
technologies, and labor-management relations
(Piore and Sabel,
1984;
Piore and Sabel
IKochan,
argue that the growing specialization of markets
and the flexibility of
production required by new technology will
demand increased organizational
interdependence.
market niches,
out more specialized
adaptation of
forthcoming).
McKersie, and PKatz,
products,
As firms seek
and attempt quicker
production methods, and work
relationships to meet more specialized and varied market demands,
organizations will
be more constantly renegotiating their
relationships with
suppliers,
employees.
customers,
co-producers and
Negotiations within and among organizations will
therefore increase,
and the demand for integrative
or joint gain) outcomes will
intensify.
organizations within a given economy)
Economies
will
(cooperative
(or those
prosper if they
perform these negotiations and cooperative tasks efficiently and
effectively;
however-, if
they remain fix:ed in a world view of
mass production marketplace of
the past, or if they fail
transform what have traditionally been adversarial
-3-
into
to
the
cooperative relationships, they will decline.
Recent industrial relations theory and
complements Piore and Sabel's
thinking.
institutional practice
This research argues
that by responding to increasing competitive markets and changing
technologies,
managerial
as well
as the values and strategies of
key
decision-makers, corporate managers are forcing
-fundamental renegotiations of the structure of industrial
relations in at the workplace, in collective bargaining, and at
the strategic decision making level
organizations and governments
forthcoming).
(Kochan, Mcr::ersie,
and K::atz,
The ability of these groups to coherently
restructure their industrial
relations systems in relationship to
these three levels of activity will
industrial
within corporations, labor
determine the extent to which
relations contributes to or constrains organizational
effectiveness,
the welfare of
workers,
and the achievement of
society's economic and democratic goals.
Thus,
the crrent period is one of searching for more
efficient and effective structures for responding to important
changes in eternal
mark:ets and technologies, and ways to
accommodate individual
needs and interests.
negotiations, organizational
In analyzing these
theorists need to consider the
market, technological
and business strategy forces that drive the
restructuri'ng effort,
and
that emerge.
influence the negotiated relationships
In summary, the theoryand
of
neqotiations
iractice
lwithin organizations need to more seriously consider the external_
and internal
organizational
contexts in which they occur.
Olson's work on collective interactions is more pessimistic.
-31 -
In his early
and
(1962)
work, he used the concepts of
"public goods"
"free riders" to identify an important paradox
to all
negotiations involving collectivities
that applies
(coalitions of
individuals into groups or representative organizations).
parado.:
The
is that while the primary contribution of collective
representation in society is to further democracy by
enfranchising
otherwise powerless individuals, to do so requires
a degree of coercion by the collective to get individuals to join
and maintain membership.
when a set of
That
is, a free rider problem exists
individuals share a common interest
in organizing
but each has the incentive to not participate actively
(by
contributing dues or personal resources) as long as enough of the
others in the group do so.
The free rider problem has been
identified by a number of scholars from various disciplines and
is conceptuall
the
y
"problem of
the problem
therefore,
is
similar to the
the cornmons"
expected to
(Hardin,
problem"
19-s).
increase as group
large collective
groups
impose san(tions or require
benefiting
"social
size increases,
tend to
f or all
from t.he r-esults of4 the negotiations.
effective negotiations that further
and
The seriousness of
(unions or cartels)
group membership
1980)
(Dawes,
those
Thus,
democracy requires
achieving
coercion
of individuals.
In his more recent work., Olson
pessimistic tone.
structure
and
He argues;
interests
groups that
takes an even more
that it is very difficult to
maintain efficient
groups tend to proliferate
(19S82)
interest
groups.
over time and produce
seel::
to perpetuate
-_-
Interest
even
more narrow
themselves rather
than
broad societal
objectives.
growth of more special
Thus, that societies that allow the
interest group structures,
who exercise
power through negotiation rather than allowing market forces to
Translated to the
play freely, are doomed to economic decline.
organizational
level,
Olson's argument poses the ultimate
challenge to negotiation theorists and practitioners.
The more a
structure encourages negotiation processes to proliferate within
or between organizations_
the more difficult
it will
be to
structure
andmanage the ngotiationsin_ways that achieve
efficient
and effective outcomes.
In addition, the more
participation is encouraged within organizations composed of
individuals or groups with diverse interests, the more difficult
the management task will
not) accept all of
and practical
central
While one need not
(indeed we do
Olsons arguments, he has thrown theoretical
down to those who see negotiations as becoming an
increasingly vital
An
be.
part of
rganizational
theoretical
organizational
level
life.
eample might help illustrate the
and practical relevance of
research on organizatinal
these ideas for
negotiations and conflict resolution.
Two recent studies documented the negative effects that poor
management of
workplace industrial
on organizational
performance.
relations conflicts can have
Specifically both studies
found
that the higher the number of unresolved grievances, the larger
the numbers of demands introduced
negotiations, the longer it
took
in plant
level
contract
to reach an agreement in
negotiations, and the more hostile the attitudes in the plant
between management and labor, the lower the labor efficiency and
33-.
Gobeille, 1984;
::ochan and Weber,
Katz,
fifty plants studied
::ochan
(atz,
the lower the product quality of the plant
and
Yet among the
1985).
in this research, some had developed
effective means of resolving their differences and thereby
enhanced organizational
conflict/low trust
effects.
Thus,
performance while others fell
into a high
pattern that produced negative performance
it is not the existence of conflict or the need
for negotiations per se that we see potentially leading to
negative organizational
or societal
performance, but the failure
to identify and achieve effective negotiations and conflict
The challenge for negotiations
resolution or management.
researchers, therefore, is not to encourage the suppression of
conflict and negotiations
for- the mangement
theoretical
of
in settings where they are essential
diverse
resolution.
of conflict
The point of reviewing
political
science
needed to improve the
skills
ideas and practical
effectiveness
but to provide the
interests
with an
models of conflict
or- industrial
relations
to draw
base is
attention to an important set of macro theoretical
organizational
address.
arguments that
negotiations theorists and researchers need to
Because these theoretical
arguments have largely been
couched in the language of economic or political
applied in the contex<t of industrial
management
economics,
relations,
have been largely
organization or labor
and foc:used on formal
structures and relationships
theory, been
institutional
(union-management relations),
they
inaccessable to the work of organizational
behavior researchers.
Given
the environmental
-. 4-
conditions
discussed at the outset of this paper, the issues addressed
in
these macro models are becoming increasingly important to
micro-level
negotiations within organizations.
This trend
presents a challenging opportunity for progress in the theory and
practice of negotiations.
In summary, we see the issues raised by these macro level
frameworks as offering new challenges to the development of
negotiations
literature in organizations.
a
However, this domain
of negotiation is far less developed than others we have
reviewed.
While the models of
developed, and
the third parties and coalitions literatures are
just being integrated
of
into the organizational
conflict are often not
turf.
the negotiation process are well
arena, macro models
identified as part of the negotiation
This section is meant to focus on the challenges offered
by this area to the negotiation research
ommunity.
Conclusions and_Implications
We started this analysis by noting that the contemporary
environment is challenging researchers to produce new insights
into effective negotiations within organizations.
there are a number of
In addition,
encouraging signs that the research
profession has been making considerable progress in recent
years.
All
indications are that
the environment and a community
of scholars interested in negotiations
continue to make theoretical
in organizations will
and empirical
research advances in
the coming years.
To effectively translate this research into organizational
practices, researchers will
need
to continue to test the
-35.-
implications of
their- models and to integrate more fully the
micro and macro perspective on models of coalitions and conflict
management.
The macro models of conflict appear to be the least well
integrated and utilized
in organizational
negotiations research,
and yet we believe that they pose the deepest intellectual
practical challenges to the field.
The intellectuial
challenqe
arises from our belief that while future organizational
wi.l
increase in the number and comple>ity of
and
relations
negotiations
processes, some macro theorists propose that societies are not
good at designing effective structures
processes for managing complex
optimism about the future
of
and conflict resolution
interest groups.
research
For the current
and practice
of
negotiation
in organizations to endure, we believe that this proposition will
have
to be shown to be incorrect.
The third
of
the answer
bu:ild
literature
to this
its
on theories
conflict
original
challenge,
of
resolution
with third
conflict
processes.
labor-management
have fertile
We are further
important
client
since
Given
legal
empirical
encouraged
and funding
Resolution,
Institute
in
the Nationa].
supporting
e
the
from which
by the growing
the Society
to
organizational
laboratories
organizations
is
eperimentaticn
and outside of
arenas,
Arbitration Association,
role
part
to design effectt.
increased
both within
and
may offer
central
and negotiation
party procedures
researchers
draw.
party dispute resolution
interest
tn
of
such as the American
for Frofessionals in
for Dispute Resolution,
and providing access; to ongoing
lp-,.
etc.
dispute resolution
te
processes and professionals.
Thus,
we have reason to epect
significant activity and progress in the near future from
researchers and practioners in this area.
The key to meeting
this expectation lies in demonstrating the contextual
of eisting models to different organizational
turn,
this requires organizational
relevance
settings.
In
researchers to deepen their
own understanding of the multiple contexts in which
organizational
negotiations occur.
the successful
diffusion and
mediation, arbitration,
This was one of the keys to
institutionalization of third party
and related conflict resolution
procedures in
the practice of labor-management relations.
same level of
understanding will be needed to have an equally
strong
negotiations and conflict
impact on organizational
resolution
The
systems.
The coalition literature faces the challenge of translating
the empirical
insights from laboratory experiments and micro
models of coalition behavior
coalitions found
in actual
into the more macro models of
organizations.
This area of research
may be a position similar to that held by formal
negotiations prior to their
tools.
conversion into practical
Work that demonstrates the relevance of formal
the real world of organizational
with equal
enthusiasm.
----
management
models to
coalitions would be received
-37-
llPl_____C____1_1_0·-----·I
models of
In
summary,
we have reason to be considerably more positive
about the state of negotiations in organizations research and its
applicability than the assessment made three years ago by K::ochan
and Verma
(1983).
Whether another positive assessment is
warranted three or four years hence will
of
depend on the ability of
researchers working in this area to address the challenges
posed by the papers in this volume.
-38-
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Urbana, IL: