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Printed
for the War Cabinet.
March
1917.
SECRET WAR
Minutes
of a Meeting
of the War Cabinet held at 1 0 , Downing
Monday, March 2 6 , 1 9 1 7 , at 1 P 3 0 A . M .
The
The R i g h t Hon. t h e
EARL
KEDLESTON, K . G . , G.C.S.I.,
The R i g h t Hon. the
G.C.B.,
CABINET, 1 0 4 .
Present:
(in the
PRIME MINISTER
Street,
S.W., on
Chair).
CTJRZON O F
The R i g h t Hon. A.
HENDERSON,
G.C.I.E.
The R i g h t Hon. A.
BONAR L A W ,
VISCOUNT
M.P.
M.P.
MILNER,
G.C.M.G.
The following were also present :The R i g h t Hon. A. J . B A U F O U R , O.M., A d m i r a l S I R J . R. J E L L I C O E , G.C.B.
M.P., Secretary of State for F o r e i g n
O.M., G . C . V . O . , First S e a Lord of the
Affairs.
A d m i r a l t y (for Minutes 1 to 1 6 . )
The R i g h t Hon. the L O R D H A R D I N G E O F The R i g h t Hon. S I R J . M A C L A Y , Bart.,
PENSHURST,
K.G., G.C.B.,
G.C.S.I.,
S h i p p i n g Controller (for Minutes 1 6
G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., I.S.O.,
to 2 0 ) .
Permanent Under Secretary of State for S I R W . G U Y G R A N E T , Deputy-Director
Foreign Affairs.
of Military R a i l w a y s (for Minutes 1 6
to 2 0 ) .
The R i g h t Hon. the E A R L O F D E R B Y , K.G.,
G.C.V.O., C . B . , Secretary of State for Mr. G U Y C A L T H R O P , Board of Trade (for
War.
Minutes 1 6 to 2 0 ) .
Major-General F. B . M A U R I C E , C . B . , The R i g h t H o n . ; S I R A. H . S T A N L E Y , M . P . ,
Director of Military Operations (for
President of the Board of T r a d e (for
Minutes 1 to 2 0 ) .
Minutes 1 6 to 2 0 ) .
Field-Marshal the V I S C O U N T F R E N C H O F The R i g h t Hon. the L O R D D E V O N P O R T ,
Y P R E S , G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.,K.C.M.G.,
Food Controller (for Minutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .
Commander - in - Chief, Home Forces S I R R. H. R E W , K.C.B., Permanent Secre­
(for Minutes 1 4 a n d 1 5 ) .
tary to the Food ControRer (for Minutes
Major-General F. C. S H A W , C . B . , Chief of
2 1 and 2 2 ) .
General Staff, Home Forces (for Minutes The R i g h t Hon. R. M U N R O , K G . , M . P . ,
1 4 and 1 5 ) .
Secretary for Scotland (for Minutes 2 1
and 2 2 ) .
The R i g h t Hon. C. A D D I S O N , M.D., M.P.,
Minister of Munitions (for Minutes 1 5 S I R J A M E S M. D O D D S , K.C.B., UnderSecretary for Scotland (for Minutes 2 1
to 2 0 ) .
and 2 2 ) .
T h e R i g h t Hon. H. E . D U K E , K.C., M.P., Mr. J . H A R L I N G T U R N E R , Director of
Chief Secretary for Ireland (for Minutes
A g r i c u l t u r a l Section, National Service
2 1 and. 2 2 ) .
Department (for Alinutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .
The R i g h t Hon. J O H N H O D G E , M.P., The R i g h t Hon. R. E. P R O T H E R O , M.V.O.,
M.P., President of the Board of A g r i ­
Minister for Labour (for Minute 2 3 ) .
culture and Fisheries (for Minutes 2 1
Professor W . G. A D A M S (for Minutes 2 1
and
22).
and 2 2 ) .
Mr. A. D. H A L L , F.R.S., Board of
Major D A V I D D A V I E S , M.P. (for Minutes 1 6
A g r i c u l t u r e a n d Fisheries (for Minutes
to 2 0 ) .
2 1 and 2 2 ) .
The R i g h t Hon. S I R E . C A R S O N , K G , M.P., Mr. J . R. C A M P B E L L , Assistant Secretary,
First Lord of the A d m i r a l t y (for Minutes
Department of Agriculture for Ireland
1 to 1 5 ) .
(for Minutes 2 1 and 2 2 ) .
Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M. P . A . H A N K E Y , K.C.B.,
Secretary.
Colonel E. D. S W I N T O N , C.B., D.S.O., Assistant
Secretary.
Fleet P a y m a s t e r P. H . R o w , R.N., Assistant
Secretary.
Captain C L E M E N T J O N E S , Assistant
Secretary.
Mr. T . J O N E S , Assistant
Secretary.
Western Eront:
The German
Withdrawal.
1 . T H E Director of Military Operations reported a slowing down
in the advance of the British troops, who had now approximately
reached the Hindenburg line. Southwards, however, where the
Hindenburg line was further in i*ear of the original German defensive
line, the French continued to m a k e progress. He stated that the
Germans m i g h t possibly withdraw their front to the northward of
Arras, but there were no immediate indications that this was going
to happen. He read a letter from General Headquarters, France,
dated 23rd March, describing the situation on t h e W e s t e r n Front.
Mesopotamia.
2. The Director of M i l i t a r y Operations reported t h a t General
Sir Stanley M a u d e had reinforced his Diala column, and had sent
his c a v a l r y to join it. W i t h a view to combined action, he was
endeavouring, by aeroplane and other means, to get into touch with
the R u s s i a n s from K e r m a n s h a h , but had not so far, been successful.
There were indications that the Turks had, withdrawn a division
from Salonica, and that its destination was" probably the Mosul
district.
Telegram No. 2 5 1 , of the 24th March, from the British Minister
at Berne, relative to the withdrawal of further Turkish divisions oh
the B u l g a r i a n front, was read, the Secretary of State for W a r stating
that similar reports had been received by the W a r Office.
r
Russia.
The Military
Command.
3. I n reference to W a r Cabinet, 99, M i n u t e 9, the Director of
M i l i t a r y Operations reported that our M i l i t a r y A t t a c h e in Petrograd
had reported t h a t General R u s s k y had been appointed Commander­
in-Chief of the R u s s i a n armies, and that the Grand Duke Nicholas
had placed Ids resignation in the hands of the Government.
Possibility of a
German Concentra­
tion on the Riga
Eront.
4s. R e p l y i n g to a question from the P r i m e Minister as to the
veracity or otherwise of the reports emanating from Russia relative
to a German concentration on the R i g a front, the Director of
Military Operations stated that there was no evidence of this, that it
w a s the worst season of the y e a r for such an operation, and that h e
did not think the rumours were correct. He expressed the opinion
that they were being circulated by the Russian Provisional Govern­
ment with a view to strengthening the moral of the Russian troops
"during the existing crisis.
Telegrams relative to Russia, Nos. 397 and 393 of the 25th
M a r c h , from the British Ambassador were read by the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.
Deputation of
Labour Members
to. Russia.
5. Mr. Henderson stated that he had received a communication
to the effect that representatives of the French Socialist party, who
stood for war a outrance,
were, with the authority and consent of
the F r e n c h Committee of Foreign Affairs, shortly arriving in
England en route to Petrograd, where they were going on a Mission
to the Russian Socialist party, their object being to persuade that
p a r t y to do a l l in its power to bring the war to a satisfactory
conclusion. ' .
The W a r Cabinet decided that—
Mr. Henderson should use his influence to secure t h a t a
suitably composed British Labour Deputation should
accompany the F r e n c h party with the same object.
Arabia:
The Hedjaz
Railway.
6. The Director of M i l i t a r y Operations reported further
destruction by the Arabs of the Hedjaz R a i l w a y and t h a t our
aeroplane flight had been moved from R a b e g h to W e j .
Air Raid.
7 . The First Sea Lord reported the execution of an air raid
upon the Berbecke blast furnaces on the 23rd M a r c h , and that a l l
our machines had returned safely.
The Baltic Fleet.
8. The First Sea Lord reported that the R u s s i a n men-of-war a t
R e v a l were in the hands of Committees of Seamen, and t h a t
arrangements had been made, with the permission of the R u s s i a n
Minister of Marine, for the t a k i n g over of the submarine depdt
ship at Reval.
The Sinking of the
Destroyer
" Laforey."
9. The First Sea Lord reported the sinking of the destroyer
" Laforey," as the result of striking a mine.
The W a r Cabinet discussed with the First Sea Lord the general
question of mine-sweeping and the provision of mine-sweepers, i n
view of the enemy's great activity in mine-laying in the vicinity of
the South Coast of Ireland and the English Channel.
Mine-sweeping.
Bombardment of
Dunkirk.
10. The First Sea Lord reported a slight and ineffective
bombardment of D u n k i r k on the n i g h t of the 25th M a r c h .
Enemy Naval
Concentration at
Zeebrug^e.
11. The W a r Cabinet took note t h a t the enemy h a d
concentrated some thirty destroyers at Zeebrugge.
The First S e a
Lord pointed out that such a concentration m u s t be for the purpose
of covering a landing on the B e l g i a n coast, or raids i n the Channel,
or to a t t a c k the Dutch convoys and their escorts. H e stated that
w e had not at present in those waters sufficient forces to counter
such a t h r e a t decisively, and reported the dispositions he had made
to strengthen our forces in these waters.
Possible Attack by
Sea in Rear of
Allied Lines.
12. The Director of M i l i t a r y Operations, i n reference to W a r
Cabinet, 99, Minute 2, read a communication from the FieldM a r s h a l Commanding the British Expeditionary Force to the effect­
that General Nivelle did not consider, in view of the intelligence a t
his disposal, t h a t an a t t a c k in roar of the Allied Lines i n Flanders was
probable i n the near future, and t h a t after visiting this region he
considered the coast defences, for which the French were
responsible, to be adequate.
The First Sea Lord stated t h a t he was not in accord with t h e
v i e w expressed as to the a d e q u a c y of the coast defences, and
informed the W a r Cabinet that it would take at least six hours' before
a British Naval Force could be on the spot to interfersVwith a n y
attempt at landing,- and t h a t even then it would be inferior in
strength to t h e covering force.
Increase of
Portuguese
Contingent.
13. I n reference to W a r Cabinet,, 99, M i n u t e 16, the W a r
Cabinet approved the Report of Lord Derby's Committee (Paper
G.T.-210) recommending that, i n view of the shipping situation
and the reports on the Portuguese Contingent already landed i n
be transported should not he agreed to, and t h a t the Portuguese
Government should be approached with a view to the R a i l w a y
Construction and Labour Battalions already arranged for having
priority of shipping.
I n view of the sensitiveness "of the Portuguese, the W a r
Cabinet invited the Secretary of State for W a r to word his refusal
so as to avoid giving a n y cause of offence to the Portuguese
Government and nation.
Invasion.
\
14. The W a r Cabinet had under consideration the Report of
a Joint Admiralty and W a r Office Conference on t h e question of
Invasion, dated the 17th March, 1917 ( W a r Cabinet, 97, M i n u t e 3).
(Paper G.T.-217. Appendix I ) .
The Field-Marshal Comnaanding-in-Chief the Home Forces,
explained that the main line of defence was on the coast, and that,,
i n the event of the enemy reaching the coast, their first task would
be to force this line, and t h a t 5 divisions, 2 of which were new
divisions in a very backward condition, were distributed as reserves
to meet such a contingency. He further stated that, in spite of
v e r y carefully worked-out r a i l w a y arrangements, further reinforce­
ments could not be collected on the East Coast within less than
3 6 - 4 5 hours.
The general view of the experts present at the W a r Cabinet
was that, whilst an attempt at invasion could not be ruled out as
absolutely impossible, it was extremely u n l i k e l y that the enemy
would carry it to a successful conclusion.
Whilst concurring generally in the J o i n t Committee's Report,
the W a r Cabinet decided that—
I n view of the fact that the Committee had not heard the views
of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, a
formal invitation should be sent to Lord Fisher to attend
a Meeting of the W a r Cabinet, to give them the benefit of
his views.
The Secretary was instructed to t a k e action accordingly.
I n regard to the point raised in the last paragraph of the Joint
Committee's Report, as to the advisability of the despatch abroad
of the one division at Home which could be sent, the Director of
M i l i t a r y Operations stated that the Chief of the I m p e r i a l General
Staff would bring the subject forward for the decision of the W a r
Cabinet early in April.
Evacuation of the
Isle of Thanet.
1 5 . I n reference to letters received by the P r i m e Minister from
Lord North cliff e and from the Secretary to the Archbishop of
Canterbury on the subject of the recent withdrawal of school
children from the Isle of Thanet, the Field-Marshal Commanding­
in-Chief t h e Home Forces reported that he had, on the previous
F r i d a y , in consequence of information received as to enemy action,
ordered a state " V i g i l a n c e , " which state carried with it the
assembling at their W a r Stations of certain of the M i l i t a r y Forces
in Great Britain. H e stated that orders had been given that day
for the troops to revert to their normal duties.
Overland Route to
Salonica.
1 6 . I n reference to its previous decision ( W a r Cabinet, 1 0 2 ,
M i n u t e 4), the W a r Cabinet discussed, in the presence of the
R a i l w a y and Shipping experts, the question of the development of
the Overland Route through I t a l y to Salonica.
Sir Guy Granet stated t h a t the development of the route
presented no difficulty from a technical and constructional point of
view.
The Secretary of State for W a r explained, however, t h a t the
difficulties arose m a i n l y from the shortage of rolling-stock for the
paramount and indispensable needs of the Allied A r m i e s on the
W e s t e r n Front, which had been accentuated by the increased strain
produced by following up the recent German withdrawal, and that
the supply of this necessary material depended mainly on shipping.
The Shipping Controller said that he expected that considerable
assistance might be obtained for the shipping position if A m e r i c a
joined the Allies, and that there Avas a l w a y s the possibility of (
n e u t r a l shipping (some 2 5 0 Dutch, Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian
vessels) in British ports being requisitioned, which w o u l d he more
practicable if the United States entered the war.
The First Sea Lord indicated the hope that some 2,000 trucks,
at present employed in the conveyance of coal for the Fleet,
might, i n the near future, by means of re-organisation of the coaling
a r r a n g e m e n t s , be released.
Sir Guy Granet reported that four goods trains and one
passenger train per day would carry overland the same amount of
supplies as was being shipped from the United Kingdom to Salonica.
H e outlined two schemes—one for the transport of 1,200 tons a
day and another for the transport of 2,000 tons ^ e x p l a i n i n g t h a t
in the former case three months' preparatory work would be
required for the provision of sidings, & c , before transport could
begin, whilst in the latter case a longer time would be necessary.
Sidings, Rest
Camps, and Sheds.
The W a r Cabinet approved t h e instructions already given by
the W a r Office for the immediate development of t h e
necessary sidings, rest camps, and sheds on the new route,
in order that immediate a d v a n t a g e might be taken of
the first moment when the necessary rolling-stock could
be set free, either from the W e s t e r n Front or from this
country.
In view of the serious outlook for shipping in the Mediterranean,
the W a r Cabinet decided that the W a r Office, in m a k i n g
their preliminary arrangements, should envisage the
largest possible development of this route, w i t h a view
to the transportation of supplies to Egypt as well as to
Salonica.
The W a r Cabinet took note that the development of the smaller
scheme provides for the conveyance as f a r ' a s Taranto of a n a m o u n t
equal to all the material now despatched from this country to
Salonica, and more.
Provision of
Workmen by
M. Venizelos.
17. The W a r Cabinet took note of a letter, dated 19th M a r c h ,
1917, from M . Gennadius to the Private Secretary to the P r i m e
Minister (Paper G.T.-247, Appendix I I ) , on the subject of the
provision by him of labour for road construction.
Congestion in
Ports.
18. The Shipping Controller indicated his intention of pre­
senting to the Secretary of State for W a r at a n early date a scheme
for night and day work in the ports, involving special labour
arrangements, with a view to a more rapid turning round of t h e
ships.
The Shipping
Situation.
19. The Minister of Munitions called attention to the amount
of r a i l w a y material awaiting shipping at ports or works, as reported
in a Statement submitted b y him (Appendix I I I ) .
I n view of the accumulating evidence that the s u b m a r i n e
blockade and the increasing demands made upon tonnage b y our­
selves and our Allies were exercising a most serious influence on
our shipping position, the Shipping Controller was asked again to
review the whole situation. The Shipping Controller explained that
he had already done this in his Statement on the Mercantile M a r i n e
and Shipping Programme, which he had j u s t submitted for t h e
Meeting of the Imperial W a r Cabinet (Paper G.T.-284).
The question was adjourned for further consideration after
discussion at the Imperial W ar Cabinet.
T
Possible
Intervention of the
United States of
America.
20, H a v i n g regard to the great stress laid by the Shipping
Controller on the importance, from a shipping point of view, of the.
intervention of the United States of America in the w a r on the side
of t h e Allies, and also in view of the importance of such intervention
from a financial point of view, the W a r Cabinet decided that—
It was desirable that, in the event of the intervention in t h e
W a r by the United States of America, a special Mission
should proceed to the United States for the purpose of
notifying the relative importance of the various forms i n
which co-operation could he given. The W a r Cabinet
recognised, however, that it was essential for such a
Mission to have at its head some individual of the highest
consequence and authority, who would carry great weight
with the United States Government, and that the despatch
of this Mission was contingent on the selection of such a
leader.
Agriculture : Corn Production Bill. 21. The W a r Cabinet had under consideration the Corn
Production Bill, which had been drafted to give effect to the
decisions which had been reached by it on the 2 l s t F e b r u a r y ( W a r
Cabinet, 76, M i n u t e 8, 10). The discussion on this subject was
adjourned for further study.
22. The W a r Cabinet had before them the draft of " The Food
Pood: Hoarding
Order, 1917," proposed by the M i n i s t r y of Food ( W a r
The Food Hoarding Order. Cabinet, 99, M i n u t e 19) (Paper G.T.-257, Appendix I V ) . The
W a r Cabinet decided to approve the issue of the Order, subject to
the following changes :—
Clause 3. Reference to Police to be omitted, and " a n y person
specially authorised by the Food Controller," or words to
t h a t effect, to be substituted.
Clause 4 (6.). This clause to be re-drafted so as to exempt
persons in the habit of baking their own bread or c u r i n g
their own bacon, or otherwise conserving foodstuffs in
their own homes.
23, The Minister of Labour raised the question of the strike
engineers at Barrow, where the workmen alleged that
Messrs. Vickers have been cutting down the time-rates of the
p r e m i u m bonus system. The W a r Cabinet approved in principle a
draft announcement to be made in the House of Commons on the
afternoon of the 26th March, and left its exact terms to be arranged
by the Prime Minister, Mr. Bonar L a w , and Mr. Hodge.
Strike of Engineers at Barrow. of
2, Whitehall
March
Gardens,
S.W.,
26, 1917.
(Initialled)
D. LI. G.
APPENDIX
I.
G.T.-217.
Note by the
Secretary,
I N circulating this Report of a j o i n t A d m i r a l t y and W a r Office Conference on
Invasion, attention is drawn to the fact that the Conference do not appear to have
pressed " Lord Eisher to explain f u l l y the grounds on which his apprehensions were
based," as suggested by the W a r Cabinet ( W a r Cabinet, 97 ( 3 ) ) .
I t is for consideration whether the W a r Cabinet should not themselves hear what
Lord Fisher has to sav on the matter.
(Signed)
M . P. A . H A N K E R .
2, Whitehall
Gardens,
S.W.,
March 20, 1917.
A Conference was held in ,the Room of the Secretary of State for W a r , at
2-45 P . M . , on the 16th March, 1917.
Present :
- .
Secretary of-State for W a r . First Loi'd of the Admiralty. First Sea Lord of the A d m i r a l t y . Chief of the A d m i r a l t y W a r Staff. Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Director of M i l i t a r y Operations. Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Home Forces. Chief of the General Staff, Home Forces. 1. The Secretary of S t a t e for W a r stated that the conference was held at the
request of the W a r Cabinet, i n consequence of a communication on the subject of the
invasion of Great B r i t a i n which the Prime Minister had received from A d m i r a l of the
Fleet Lord Fisher.
2. The First Sea Lord stated that in view of n a v a l developments the A d m i r a l t y
desired to review the conclusion (ii) of the " Report of a Conference between
representatives of the A d m i r a l t y W a r Staff and the General Staff, held to consider the
possibility of an attack on the United Kingdom the 9th August, 1916," and to extend
the time within which the enemy's landing operations could be effectively interrupted
from the original estimate of from twenty-four to twenty-eight hours after the hostile
transports were sighted from t h e shore to from thirty-two to thirty-six hours after
the hostile transports had been sighted from the shore.
3. The A d m i r a l t y representative stated that the enemy still had sufficient
shipping to transport 160,000 men to these shores, and the O.I.G.S. stated that the
enemy would still be able to find that number of troops for the purpose of invasion,
more especially as he is now increasing the number of his divisions in Belgium.
4. The A d m i r a l t y representatives further stated that while invasion was possible
they did not consider that, from a n a v a l point of view, it was probable, in view of the
grave risks which t h e enemy m u s t run.
The First Sea Lord stated that, in his opinion, the probability of a beach landing
was remote, as the risks involved were very great, and t h e C.I.G.S. added t h a t the
feasibility of landing a force of 160,000 men within thirty-six hours depended upon
the enemy being a b l e to use the beaches.
5. The Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces,'stated t h a t the m i l i t a r y
aspect of the question was t h a t the defences -on the coast were now in a far better
condition to meet invasion t h a n they were a y e a r ago, and t h a t in particular the
number of machine-guns available at home, which was a n important factor in the
question, was much g r e a t e r ; on the other hand, the number of mobile troops
immediately at the disposal of t h e Field-Marshal for Home Defence was, as a result of
the W a r Cabinet decision of the 22nd J a n u a r y last, about 60,000 below his estimated
requirements to meet an invasion by 160,000 men, and the quality of a considerable
portion of his Divisions w a s poor.
There was also t h e question of Ireland to be
considered.
6. The Conference, after hearing the above expression of opinion, decided that the
question of the number of troops to be maintained i n Great B r i t a i n to meet invasion
w a s one of balancing the advantages of strengthening our oversea forces as against
t h e risk of invasion, and could only he decided by the W a r Cabinet after periodical
review of the general situation. ,
At the present t i m e there is only one Division a t Home which could be sent
abroad. I t is now being prepared and w i l l be ready i n about a month's time. The
advisability of its despatch should then be considered by t h e W a r Cabinet.
(Initialled)
E. C.
D.
E.
J . R. J .
W . R. R.
March 17, 1917.
APPENDIX
II.
G.T.-247.
SALONICA.
Provision
Copy of a Letter
of Workmen
from
by M. Venizelos
M. J. Gennadius
for Road-building
to the Private
Secretary
Purposes.
to the Prime
Minister.
Dear Sir,
14, De Vere Gardens, March 19, 1917.
I H A V E received a telegram in which M . Venizelos desires me to convey to the
P r i m e Minister his w a r m thanks for the courteous manner i n which he was so good as
to receive M . Diomedes.
M . Venizelos g a v e his immediate attention to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s remarks in
regard to workmen for road-building. Although, in consequence of the occupation by
t h e I t a l i a n s of Northern Epirus and by t h e Erench of Koritsa, the road to Monastir
is not in territory under the control of the Provisional Government, M . Venizelos
offered to General Sarrail to recruit tbe number of men needed, but the General
replied t h a t for the present he was sufficiently supplied with workmen.
M . Venizelos made the same offer to the British Commander-in-Chief, who stated
t h a t he needed in his section some 5,000 men. The necessary measures have at once
been t a k e n b y the Administration under M . Venizelos to supply these workmen.
I request you, i n presenting m y regards to the P r i m e Minister, to add t h a t I am
at his disposal, should he desire to convey to M . Venizelos a n y further message.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed)
J . GENNADIUS.
J . T. Davies, Esq.
APPENDIX
Ministry
STATEMENT
of Munitions
III.
: Railway
Materials
Branch.
showing Promised Production compared with Actual Supplies available
as at March 10, 1917.
Description of Supply.
Total
Quantity
Shipped.
Total awaitGrand
ing Shipping
Total
at Ports or
Produced.
Works.
Miles.
140
1 . Rails
Rails—
—
20-lb.
20-lb . rail
railss
75-lb.
75-lb . an
and
d 80-lb
80-lb.. rails
rails—
—
Gues
Guestt Kee
Keen
n
India.
India...
Australia
Australi a
Canada
Canada (80-lb.
(80-lb.))
Britis
British
h railway
railwayss
Miles.
278
Miles.
418
"so
1U
114
48
50
107
86
149
116
50
137
200
247
405
652
375
37 5
1,222
336
No.
8,469
862
No.
No.
5,23
5,2333
1,75
1,7533
298
109
407
245
24 5
10
40
50
50
85
68
2. Waggons
Waggons—
—
4-ft.
4-ft . 8^-in
8^-in.. gaug
gaugee
60-cm.. gaug
60-cm
gaugee
No.
No.
. 7,247
526
3 . Locomotives
Locomotives—
—
60-c.m.
60-c.m. gaug
gaugee
4-ft.
4-ft . 8^-in
8^-in.. gaug
gaugee ordere
ordered
d
b y Ministr
Ministryy
4-ft.
4-ft . 8^-in
8^-in.. gaug
gaugee switc
switch
h
typ
typee
Total
Promised.
Miles.
Miles.
35
3500
Remarks.
Promise
Promise mad
madee b y Ministr
Ministryy
in lette
letterr of 5t
5th
h Januar
Januaryy t o
Secretary
Secretary,, Wa
Warr Offic
Officee
A s arrangement
arrangementss wer
weree
made
made
at
meeting
meeting,,
- 20/12/1
20/12/166
wit
with
h
th
thee
Ministe
Ministerr an
and
d Si
Sirr E.
Geddes
Geddes..
Statemen
Statementt b y Si
Sirr B.
W . Moi
Moirr a t meetin
meeting
g
a t G.H.Q,
G.H.Q,,,
France
France,,
j
20/11/16
20/11/16..
Non
Nonee of thes
thesee ar
aree ye
yett due
due..
!
j
Based
Based on
liveries
liveries..
contrac
contractt
de
de-­
Figures in italics
quantities actually shipped. Figures in heavy type = quantities awaiting shipment at port or works. March
20, 1917.
APPENDIX
G-.T.-257.
IV.
STATUTORY
RULES
AND
Defence
ORDERS,
of the
1917,
No.
Realm.
The Pood Hoarding Order, 1 9 1 7 , dated tbe
M a r c h , 1 9 1 7 , made b y the Food
Controller under R e g u l a t i o n 2 E of the Defence of t h e R e a l m Regulations.
I N exercise of the powers conferred upon h i m by Regulation 2 E of the Defence
of the R e a l m Regulations, and of all other powers enabling h i m in that behalf, the
Food Controller hereby orders as follows :—
Supplies
for
14 days
only
to be
Held.
1 . Except under the authority of the Food Controller, no person shall b u y or
offer to b u y or after the
, 1 9 1 7 , have i n his possession or under his
control a n y article of food i n a greater quantity than is required for ordinary use and
consumption in his household or establishment during a period of fourteen days.
I n any proceedings for a breach of this Article, the burden of showing what
quantity of a n y article of food is so required shall rest upon the person charged.
Aiding
and
Abetting.
2. No person shall, as seller or otherwise, k n o w i n g l y aid or abet the commission
of a n y act forbidden by Article 1 of this Order.
Power
of
Entry.
3. A n y person authorised b y the Pood Controller and a n y officer of police m a y
enter upon a n y premises in which he has reason to believe t h a t any article of food is
being kept or secreted'in contravention of this Order, and carry out such inspection
and examination of the premises as he may t h i n k necessary.
Exceptions.
4. This Order shall not a p p l y t o —
(a.) A n y article of food required or held i n the ordinary course of business b y
a n y producer, dealer, or manufacturer.
(b.) Any home-produced or home-made article of food i n the possession of t h e
producer or maker.
(Interpretation.)
5. F o r the purposes of this Order, the expression " article of food" shall include
every article w h i c h is used for food b y man, or which ordinarily enters into the
composition or preparation of h u m a n food, except flavouring matters.
Penalty.
6. If a n y person acts in contravention of this Order, or aids or abets a n y other
person in doing a n y t h i n g in contravention of this Order, t h a t person is g u i l t y of a
s u m m a r y offence against the Defence of the R e a l m Regulations, a n d if such person
is a company, every director and officer of t h e company is also g u i l t y of a s u m m a r y
offence against those regulations, unless he proves t h a t t h e contravention took place
without his knowledge or consent.
Title and Commencement
of
Order.
7.—(a. This Order may be cited as " The Food Hoarding Order, 1917." (6.) This Order shall come into force on t h e
, 1917. Ministry
of Food, March
1917.
Food
Controller.