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[This Document is the Property of His Britaanie Majesty's Government^
Printed
for
the War Cabinet.
March
1917,
SECRET.
W A R CABINET,
Minutes
100.
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street,
Wednesday,
March 2 1 , 1917, at 11-30 A.M. S.W., on Present :
The -PRIME MINISTER (in the
The Right
Hon. the E A R L
KEDLESTON, K G . , G . C . S . I . ,
The R i g h t
CTJRZON
G.C.I.E.
of
Hon. the VISCOUNT MILNER,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
Chair).
The Right Hon. A. HENDERSON, M.P.
The Right Hon. A. BONAR L A W , M.P.
.
The following were also presentThe
R i g h t Hon.
A. J . BALFOTJR,
M.P., Secretary of State for
Affairs.
O.M.,
Foreign
Admiral S I R J . R. JELLICOE, G.C.B.,
O.M., G.C.V.O., First Sea Lord of the
Admiralty (for Minutes 1 to 14).
Major - General F. B. MAURICE, C . B . , Lieutenant - Colonel S I R M A R K S Y K E S ,
Director of Military Operations (£or
Bart., M.P. (for Minutes 2 , J 1 1 , 12,
Minutes 1 to 1 4 ) .
and 13).
Lieutenant-Colonel S I R M. P . A. HANKEY, K.C.B.,
Colonel E. D- SWINTON, C.B., D . S . O . , Assistant
Western Front:
The German
Withdrawal.
Mesopotamia.
Secretary.
Secretary.
1. THE Director of Military Operations reported that the
Germans had withdrawn approximately to the H i n d e n b u r g Une,
with which the advanced troops of both British and French a r m i e s
were at certain places in touch. In the region of Arras our troops
had actually penetrated that line near its point of junction with the
old German line, while the French had penetrated what was believed
to be the Hindenburg line at a point south of St. Quentin ; but the
exact location of that line south of that town w a s uncertain.
The enemy had been burning St. Quentin, and, though t h e
situation was still obscure, there were indications that they, m i g h t
take up a position in some localities in rear of the Hindenburg line.
2. The Director of Military Operations informed the W a r
Cabinet of the occupation by the British of F a l l u j a h , on the
Euphrates, and explained that the occupation of this point, together
with that of Nasiriyah, gave us control of a good supply area, and
should have a favourable effect on the neighbouring A r a b tribes.
On the T i g r i s the situation remained unchanged, and the
remnant of the Turkish force was entrenching to the south of
Samara.
On the Diala River, General Maude's force had reached a point
one march beyond Bakuba and 70 miles from Khanikin, from which
place the Russians were 80 miles distant in the other direction.
Though both forces were approximately equidistant from this place
100]
B
51 3.
the Russians were farther off as r e g a r d s time, because
separated from it by a difficult and snowbound pass.
General Maude had reported that his situation
supplies was entirely satisfactory ; large quantities were
at Bakuba, and more particularly at B a g h d a d itself,
resources had been found to be much greater than
anticipated, the stores discovered including frozen
machines, soda-water factories, and live-stock.
they were
as r e g a r d
obtainable
where the
had been
meat, ice­
Medina.
3. The Director of Military Operations stated that the reports
of the Turkish withdrawal from Medina along the Hedjaz R a i l w a y
were g r a d u a l l y being confirmed, and that the Arabs were growing
correspondingly more active.
Eoumania:
Information as to
Eailway Service.
4. The Director of Military Operations stated that he had
received information from the British military attache in Roumania
to the effect that the Roumanian railway communications had
recently g r e a t l y improved, and that he hoped they would be normal
in ten days' time.
Submarines.
5. The First Sea Lord made his usual report r e g a r d i n g the
recent mercantile losses from submarines.
He also gave a detailed
account of the sinking by torpedo, to the north of the Shetlands, of
a German submarine by His Majesty's submarine G.-13, on the
10th March.
Mining of the
Hospital Ship
" Asturias."
6. The First Sea Lord reported that the hospital ship
" A s t u r i a s " h a d been mined off the Start, and had subsequently
been beached. The loss of life w a s small, no wounded being on
board.
The Shipping
Situation.
7. The^ W a r Cabinet had a short discussion on the serious
shipping situation. The discussion arose from a consideration of
telegram No. 753 of the 20th March, 1917, from the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs to the British Minister at The Hague,
indicating the probable early necessity of requisitioning the Dutch
shipping at present in our ports.
Possible Develop­
ment of Scottish
and Irish Ports for
the Purpose of
receiving Imported
Supplies.
8. In connection with the preceding Minute, the W a r Cabinet
considered the possibility of developing additional ports in Scotland
and Ireland with the object of providing alternative points to which
supplies might be brought and landed without the necessity of the
vessels carrying them passing through the narrow approaches to the
Channel and North Sea.
The W a r Cabinet decided that— A Committee should be appointed, composed as follows : — A Chairman A Representative of the Admiralty, ,,
Shipping Controller, ,,
,,
R a i l w a y Executive Committee, ,,
Port and Transit Committee, -
A dock expert [to be appointed by the Port of London
Authority^
With Fleet-Paymaster P. H. Row and Captain Clement
Jones as Joint Secretaries^
To examine and report upon the possibility of developing
alternative ports in Scotland and Ireland into which
supplies could be brought.
/
;
*
Possible Secession
of Allies.
ftaly.
9. With, a view to possible investigation at a later date by a
Committee of the W a r Cabinet, the W a r Cabinet invited Lord
Curzon to confer with the various Departments concerned and to
prepare a report on the probable effect on our own prospects in the
W a r of the secession of one or more of our Allies.
10. The W a r Cabinet instructed the Director of Military
Operations to telegraph to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff
in the sense that the Italian Ambassador had communicated to the
Prime Minister a message from the Italian Prime Minister requesting
that Sir W i l l i a m Robertson might be instructed to use every
endeavour to arrange to provide assistance to the Italian A r m y
. should the necessity for it arise.
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
French Co-operation.
11. In reference to the definite decision of the French to attach
two battalions of A l g e r i a n Tirailleurs and one troop of Spahis to
the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, operating towards Palestine, the
Director of Military Operations raised the question as to the status
of this contingent. The W a r Cabinet decided that—
This small force ought to be definitely under the orders of the
British Commander-in-Chief, and that the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs should communicate with the
French Government to this effect-
Italian Co-operation.
12. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that the
Italian Government also desired to attach a nominal force to the
British troops in order to show the Italian flag in the area to be
traversed. In all probability this force would be of the m i n i m u m
strength possible and would possess no military value.
Having regard to the fact that, in virtue of the 9th Article of
the Treaty of the 26th April, 1915, by which the Italians undertook
to enter the war, they already possessed the right to a voice in the
disposal of such Turkish Possessions (including Palestine) as m i g h t
fall into the hands of the Allies, the W a r Cabinet, while recognising
the strength of the political objections to the admission of y e t
another A l l y to participation in this Expedition, felt that it would
be difficult and impolitic, by a blunt refusal to their request, further
to aggravate our diplomatic relations with the Italians, who were
already somewhat put out by the negotiations i n regard to Asia
Minor. The War Cabinet therefore decided that—
The proposal should be accepted on the distinct understanding
that there w a s .to be no political mission attached to the
force, and that Italian interests should not be looked upon
as being concerned beyond the " brown area " shown on
the coloured map attached to the Anglo-Franco-Russian
Exchange of Notes respecting Asia Minor of A p r i l 1916
(the Sykes-Picot Agreement).
13. The Director of Military Operations stated that t h e
Portuguese Government had expressed disappointment at the slow
rate at which their troops were being transported to France, and, to
remedy the situation, had put forward two alternative proposals :—
'i ' i
[1365-100]
-.
(1.) That the British Government should assume the respon­
sibility for the supply of all transport a n i m a l s ; or (2.) That the Portuguese troops should be conveyed from Lisbon to Bordeaux instead of from Lisbon to Brest, i n
order to shorten the passage.
B 2
The Director of Military Operations explained that as r e g a r d s
(1) we were ourselves badly off for horses, and that, since the animals
we supplied to the Portuguese would have to be replaced from
America, there would be no gain in time.
The First Sea Lord explained that Bordeaux was a difficult port,
which w a s often mined, and that, as the distance from Lisbon to
Bordeaux was practically the same as from Lisbon to Brest, there
would be no saving of time in adopting the second alternative. He
also explained that, without jeopardising other transport, including
that of pur food supplies, it would be impossible to furnish more
destroyers for convoying Portuguese transports, and therefore impos­
sible to. do a n y t h i n g to expedite the conveyance of the troops.
Having regard to the above statements, the W a r Cabinet decided
that—
Neither of the alternatives suggested by the Portuguese could
be acceded to, and that the Portuguese Government should
be so informed by the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.
Restrictions as to
Women and
Children Leaving
the Country.
14. The First Sea Lord explained that, under the existing
restrictions for leaving the British Isles, it was being found impds­
sible to obtain licences to embark for a certain number of women
and children who wished to leave and not to come back, and for
whose presence in the country there was no necessity. The W a r
Cabinet decided that— The Secretary should ascertain the present regulations on this
subject.
Russia.
The Revolution.
Telegram from the
Prime Minister to
the President of
the Council.
Proposed Resolu­
tion to the Duma
15. The Prime Minister informed the W a r Cabinet that the Russian Charge d'Affaires had called upon him and pressed for the despatch of a telegram from the Prime Minister to the Russian President of the Council. . i After discussion of a preliminary draft, prepared by the
authority of the Prime Minister, the W a r Cabinet left the precise
terms of the telegram for the Prime M i n i s t e r s further consideration.
, '16. In reference to War Cabinet, 99, Minute 10, the W a r
Cabinet, after consideration of the comments of the British
Ambassador in Petrograd on the draft resolution prepared by the
Prime Minister (Foreign Office telegram No. 514, dated the
19th March, 1917, to the British Ambassador at Petrograd) and
the reply (telegram No. 514, dated the 20th March, 1917, from the
British Ambassador at Petrograd to the Foreign Office), decided on
a resolution to be passed by the House of Commons in the following
form :—
" That this House sends the Duma its fraternal greetings,
and, tenders to the Russian people its heartfelt congratulations
on the establishment, among them of free institutions, in full
confidence that they will lead not only to the rapid and happy
progress of the Russian nation, but to the prosecution, i n close
alliance with the constitutional Governments of Western
Europe, and with renewed steadfastness and vigour, of the war
against the stronghold of autocratic militarism which threatens
the liberty of Europe."
:
The Czar.
- 17. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs read a telegram Q)
from the British Ambassador in Petrograd raising the question of
the relations' of the British Ambassador and the Head of the British
Military" Mission with the members of the Russian Imperial F a m i l y
(telegram No. 359, dated the 20th March, 1917, from the B r i t i s h
Ambassador, Petrograd, to the Foreign Office). The W a r Cabinet
decided that—
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should send a reply
to the British Ambassador, Petrograd, based on the
following principles :—
(1.) That the Ambassador already had authority to
recognise the Provisional Government; but that
he must obtain guarantees that that Government
would carry out the engagements of its
predecessor.
(2.) That General H a n b u r y - W i l l i a m s should not go to
Tsarskoe Selo without definite instructions.
That in his relations with friends who were
members of the Grand Ducal Families, the
British Ambassador should take great care to
avoid g i v i n g cause for umbrage, as it was of
great importance that he should be able to retain
his authority with all parties, and particularly
with the Provisional Government, with which the
British Government desire to cultivate good
relations.
(3.) That no invitation had as yet been sent to the
Emperor to come to Great Britain ; that in h i s
own interest the British Government would be
glad if he could leave R u s s i a ; but that they were
in doubt as to whether Great Britain w a s the
right place for him to go to.
2 Whitehall
Gardens,
S.W.,
March 2 1 , 1917. 9
(Initialled)
D. LI. G.