(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/7/11
Image Reference:0001
THIS DOCUMENT IS T H E PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
May 1940.
SECRET.
Copy N o .
W.M. (40)
119th Conclusions.
TO
BE KEPT
UNDER
LOCK
AND KEY.
I t is requested t h a t special c a r e m a y be t a k e n to
e n s u r e t h e secrecy of this document.
WAR
CONCLUSIONS
CABINET
119 ( 4 0 ) .
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing
S.W. 1, on Friday, May 10, 1940, at 4 - 3 0 P . M .
Street.
Present:
T h e R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E C H A M B E R L A I N , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the Chair).
The R i g h t H o n . S i r J O H N S I M O N , K . C . , The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T H A L I F A X ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n
M . P . , Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r .
Affairs.
The R i g h t H o n . S i r K I N G S L E Y W O O D ,
M . P . , L o r d P r i v y Seal.
The
Right
Hon. WINSTON
C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of
S.
the
Admiralty.
The R i g h t H o n . O L I V E R S T A N L E Y , M . P . , I T h e R i g h t H o n . S i r S A M U E L H O A R E ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r W a r .
I B t . , M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for A i r .
The
Right
Hon. LORD
HANKEY,
Minister without Portfolio.
T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t
The R i g h t H o n . S i r J O H N A N D E R S O N ,
M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r t h e
H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of
Home Security
The R i g h t Hon. ANTHONY E D E N , M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for D o m i n i o n
Affairs.
Sir
The
HORACE
J.
WILSON,
Permanent
Secretary t o t h e Treasury.
Hon.
Sir
ALEXANDER
CADOGAN,
P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for F o r e i g n Affairs.
A i r Chief M a r s h a l S i r C Y R I L L . N .
N E W A L L , C h i e f of t h e A i r Staff.
A d m i r a l of t h e Fleet S i r D U D L E Y
P O U N D , F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d Chief of
N a v a l Staff.
General S i r W. EDMUND IRONSIDE,
Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff.
Air
Marshal
R.
E.
C. P E I R S E ,
Chief of t h e A i r Staff.
Secretariat
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Major-General H . L. ISMAY.
Group Captain W . ELLIOT.
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l E . I . C. J A C O B , R . E .
[21278j
B
Vice-
WAR
CABINET
119
(40).
CONTENTS.
Minute
No.
Page
Subject.
1
T h e Netherlands and Belgium
German air action.
Communication with the French High Command.
E.A.F. operations.
Military situation.
Employment of the British heavy bomber force.
91
2
The Netherlands
Interview between t h e Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and
the Dutch Foreign Minister.
Protection of oil refineries in Aruba and Curacao.
93
3
Belgium ...
...
...
...
Progress of German invasion.
...
...
...
94
4 ....
I n v a s i o n of G r e a t B r i t a i n
...
...
...
Action to be taken against German parachutists.
Move of Pioneer Corps: German refugee unit.
...
...
94
5
The W a r Cabinet
Resignation of the Prime Minister.
...
94
The
Netherlands and
Belgium.
German air
action.
(Previous
Beference:
W.M. (40) 118th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
1. T h e W a r C a b i n e t c o n s i d e r e d a R e p o r t by t h e J o i n t
Intelligence S u b - C o m m i t t e e , g i v i n g t h e names of a l a r g e n u m b e r of
places in H o l l a n d , Belgium, F r a n c e a n d S w i t z e r l a n d i n w h i c h
G e r m a n bombs were r e p o r t e d t o have fallen. F i v e i n c e n d i a r y bombs
h a d d r o p p e d in K e n t .
Communication
with the French
High Command.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 102nd
Conclusions^
Minute 1.)
General Ismay said t h a t , on t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e F i r s t L o r d
of the A d m i r a l t y , h e h a d sent a message to G e n e r a l G a m e l i n , by h i s
staff officer in P a r i s . T h e l a t t e r h a d s a i d to G e n e r a l G a m e l i n t h a t
h a v i n g r e g a r d to t h e conclusion r e a c h e d a t the 8 t h M e e t i n g of t h e
S u p r e m e W a r Council, a n d i n t h e l i g h t of t h a t d a y ' s events, H i s
M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t w e r e inclined t o p u t into o p e r a t i o n t h e p l a n
w h i c h h a d been e x p l a i n e d a t t h e S u p r e m e W a r C o u n c i l for bombing
t a r g e t s i n t h e R u h r , i n c l u d i n g m a r s h a l l i n g y a r d s a n d oil refineries.
H e had then asked General Gamelin whether he agreed that this
should be done.
G e n e r a l G a m e l i n h a d clearly s t a t e d t h a t it h a d been decided a t
t h e S u p r e m e W a r Council t h a t w e w e r e free to c a r r y o u t this p l a n ,
a n d t h a t h e agreed now t h a t w e should do it.
B.A.P.
operations.
The Chief of the Air Staff t h e n gave t h e W a r C a b i n e t such
i n f o r m a t i o n as w a s k n o w n a b o u t the a i r o p e r a t i o n s w h i c h were i n
progress.
T h e bombers of t h e A d v a n c e d A i r S t r i k i n g Force w e r e
o p e r a t i n g on m i l i t a r y objectives in accordance w i t h t h e M i l i t a r y
plan.
T h e fighters h a d been heavily engaged d u r i n g t h e m o r n i n g , a n d
according to t h e latest r e p o r t s they h a d shot down a b o u t 20 enemy
a i r c r a f t , b u t w e r e believed to have lost 8 H u r r i c a n e s .
I t h a d been l e a r n e d t h a t R o t t e r d a m a e r o d r o m e h a d been seized
by the G e r m a n s , who w e r e l a n d i n g t r o o p - c a r r y i n g a i r c r a f t on it.
F i g h t e r s a n d bombers h a d a c c o r d i n g l y been sent over to engage t h e
enemy. T h e bombers w e r e n o t yet back. S i x B l e n h e i m fighters h a d
been sent, of w h i c h one h a d so f a r r e t u r n e d . T h e p i l o t of t h i s
a i r c r a f t r e p o r t e d t h a t he h a d found t r o o p - c a r r i e r s l a n d i n g , a n d h a d
shot d o w n t w o .
H e h a d t h e n e n c o u n t e r e d a s q u a d r o n of
M e s s e r s c h m i t t s 110, b u t h a d m a d e h i s escape. I t w a s feared t h a t
the other 5 Blenheims m i g h t h a v e been shot d o w n by t h e
M e s s e r s c h m i t t s , t h o u g h they would probably h a v e done considerable
d a m a g e to t h e t r o o p - c a r r y i n g a i r c r a f t .
Military
situation.
The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff s a i d t h a t , u p to t h e
present, t h e a d v a n c e of o u r t r o o p s w e r e going a c c o r d i n g to p l a n . A s
to the e n e m y ' s progress, it a p p e a r e d t h a t a l t h o u g h p a r a c h u t i s t s h a d
been d r o p p e d a t a l a r g e n u m b e r of places in B e l g i u m , t h e r e w a s a s
yet no r u s h of a r m o u r e d Divisions across t h e f r o n t i e r ; a n d , i n fact,
i t w a s d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r a n invasion of B e l g i u m in s t r e n g t h w a s
actually t a k i n g place. I t m i g h t be t h a t t h e G e r m a n advance w o u l d
t a k e place t h a t n i g h t , b u t it m i g h t also be t h a t t h e y h a d m i s c a l c u l a t e d
our r e a c t i o n to t h e i r a d v a n c e on H o l l a n d a n d Belgium, a n d h a d n o t
expected us to a d v a n c e r a p i d l y i n t o B e l g i u m . I n a n y case, i t
a p p e a r e d t h a t we h a d got a good s t a r t , a n d our l e a d i n g troops should
by now be on t h e line of the Dyle. I t would t a k e some 48 h o u r s for
the m a i n bodies to reach t h a t line.
[21278]
B 2
The Chief of the Air Staff said t h a t he had j u s t been s p e a k i n g
to t h e C h i e f of Staff to t h e A i r Officer C o m m a n d i n g - i n - C h i e f ,
B r i t i s h A i r Forces i n France, w h o h a d said t h a t i t w a s very difficult
to get a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n , b u t t h e r e w a s no definite i n d i c a t i o n
t h a t the G e r m a n s h a d d e p a r t e d from t h e i r policy of bombing
m i l i t a r y objectives, though, of course, t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the l a t t e r
t e r m w a s w i d e , a n d civilian c a s u a l t i e s h a d been caused.
There
a p p e a r e d t o be no d e l i b e r a t e a t t a c k on the c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n .
T h e r e were r e p o r t s of a few bombs being d r o p p e d a t factories a t
Clermont Ferrand.
Employment of
the British
heavy bomber
force.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 113th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
Discussion t h e n ensued a s to t h e e m p l o y m e n t of the heavy
bomber force d u r i n g the coming n i g h t .
T h e W a r C a b i n e t were i n f o r m e d t h a t it h a d i n a n y case been
a r r a n g e d for those bottle-necks W e s t of t h e R h i n e , t h r o u g h w h i c h
t h e m a i n G e r m a n forces m u s t pass, to be a t t a c k e d by a p r o p o r t i o n of
t h e heavy bombers d u r i n g the n i g h t . I t r e m a i n e d to d e c i d e w h e t h e r
o t h e r s q u a d r o n s of the heavy bomber force s h o u l d be l a u n c h e d
a g a i n s t the m a r s h a l l i n g y a r d s a n d oil refineries i n t h e R u h r , or
w h e t h e r they should be held back for t h e present, u n t i l t h e s i t u a t i o n
w a s more clearly defined.
T h e a r g u m e n t s in favour of a n i m m e d i a t e a t t a c k o n m i l i t a r y
objectives i n the R u h r w e r e s t a t e d by the Chief of the Air
Staff
as follows :—
(a) T h e psychological effect of a n i m m e d i a t e blow at t h e
e n e m y ' s most v u l n e r a b l e spot w o u l d be very g r e a t
t h r o u g h o u t t h e world.
(b) E v e r y d a y w h i c h passed m a d e it more difficult for us to
e n g a g e these t a r g e t s , since t h e G e r m a n s w o u l d g a i n
d e p t h to t h e i r defence.
(c) I n view of our i n f e r i o r i t y i n n u m b e r s , i t h a d n o t been
t o o u r a d v a n t a g e to open u p t h e a i r w a r so long a s t h e
G e r m a n s h a d not gone i n t o H o l l a n d . If, however, t h e
G e r m a n s were allowed to establish themselves in H o l l a n d
before we s t r u c k a t t h e i r vitals, t h e y w o u l d be able t o
open t h e a i r w a r w h e n t h e y were r e a d y , a n d in the most
favourable situation.
On t h e other h a n d , the risk a t t a c h i n g to a decision to a t t a c k
t h e R u h r w a s t h a t , if a c r i t i c a l p h a s e shortly developed in the l a n d
b a t t l e , we m i g h t have to d i v e r t our effort in o r d e r to t h r o w t h e
whole s t r e n g t h of our bomber force i n t o the fight, before we h a d
achieved a n y decisive result i n t h e R u h r .
The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff s a i d t h a t t h e A l l i e d
a r m i e s were now a d v a n c i n g i n t o B e l g i u m . T h e G e r m a n s would h a v e
to a n s w e r by a similar advance. T h e B e l g i a n s would t h u s a c t a s
a n a d v a n c e d g u a r d for the A l l i e d a r m i e s . T h e l a t t e r would be i n
a very d a n g e r o u s position u n t i l they h a d established themselves on
t h e A n t w e r p - N a m u r line. T h e G e r m a n s w o u l d do all in t h e i r
p o w e r to delay our advance, a n d to o v e r t h r o w t h e B e l g i a n A r m y .
H e n c e m u c h would depend u p o n o u r power to hold u p t h e G e r m a n
advance.
The C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f w a s strongly of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t
a t t a c k s on t a r g e t s E a s t of the R h i n e w o u l d have no effect on the l a n d
b a t t l e . F u r t h e r m o r e , there w a s a d a n g e r t h a t , if we s t a r t e d
a t t a c k i n g t h e R u h r , a n d then h a d to s w i t c h to a t t a c k i n g t h e G e r m a n
a r m y , we m i g h t end by a c h i e v i n g n o t h i n g decisive a g a i n s t e i t h e r
objective. Fie was, therefore, in favour of h o l d i n g back the a t t a c k
on the R u h r , for a short time, u n t i l i t w a s seen h o w t h e l a n d b a t t l e
would develop. I f we succeeded i n e s t a b l i s h i n g ourselves on the
Dyle, we should have shortened t h e line, a n d saved t h e B e l g i a n
army.
The First Lord of the Admiralty
suggested t h a t it w o u l d be
wise to w a i t for 24 hours before a t t a c k i n g t h e t a r g e t s in the R u h r .
T h e r e w a s no doubt t h a t we should shortly have to a t t a c k t h e oil
refineries, a n d we h a d full justification for d o i n g so. Nevertheless,
the effect of a 24-hour delay could n o t m a k e a n y a p p r e c i a b l e
difference to t h e difficulty or d a n g e r of t h e a t t a c k , b u t it m i g h t
enable a clearer view to be o b t a i n e d of t h e s i t u a t i o n o n land.
The Secretary
of Slate for Air said he w a s m u c h impressed
w i t h the psychological a r g u m e n t t h a t if we d i d n o t s t r i k e G e r m a n y
h a r d a n d immediately, world o p i n i o n would be very c r i t i c a l of us.
T h e r e w e r e a g r e a t n u m b e r of instances in h i s t o r y of the p o s t p o n e ­
m e n t of a decision l e a d i n g to i t s never being t a k e n . H e w a s most
a n x i o u s t h a t we should get our blow in before t h e G e r m a n s got i n t o
t h e i r s t r i d e . A g a i n , the effect of a p o s t p o n e m e n t f r o m day to d a y
of a h a z a r d o u s o p e r a t i o n o n t h e crews of the bomber a i r c r a f t , w h o
were c o n s t a n t l y being b r o u g h t u p to t h e p i t c h of e n t e r p r i s e , only
to find t h e i r o r d e r s c o u n t e r m a n d e d , should be fully realised.
He
t h e r e f o r e s u p p o r t e d t h e Chief of t h e A i r Staff i n h i s contention t h a t
the t a r g e t s i n t h e R u h r should be e n g a g e d f o r t h w i t h .
The First Sea Lord also expressed t h e view t h a t t h e i m m e d i a t e
o p p o r t u n i t y to s t r i k e should not be missed.
I n r e p l y to a n e n q u i r y by the F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y , the
Chief of the Air Staff s a i d t h a t if a decision w e r e t a k e n to a t t a c k
the R u h r , a b o u t 40 heavy bombers would t a k e p a r t i n the a t t a c k
on the first n i g h t . T h e a t t a c k w o u l d be s u s t a i n e d each n i g h t by
a s i m i l a r n u m b e r u n t i l r e s u l t s w e r e achieved.
The First Lord of the Admiralty
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t if we delayed
our a t t a c k a n d the Germans bombed o u r bomber aerodromes t h a t
n i g h t , t h e y w o u l d n o t h a v e a m u c h better t a r g e t t h a n they w o u l d
have if these 40 bombers h a d been despatched. H e therefore felt
t h a t t h i s w a s a r i s k w h i c h would be p r e s e n t each n i g h t , a n d m u s t
be accepted.
The Prime Minister s a i d t h a t a f t e r h e a r i n g t h e a r g u m e n t s , h e
w a s i n f a v o u r of p o s t p o n i n g a n a t t a c k on objectives E a s t of t h e
R h i n e , a t a n y r a t e for 24 h o u r s .
I t was agreed—
T h a t no a i r a t t a c k should be m a d e on t h e n i g h t
^ l O t h - l l t h M a y o n objectives E a s t of t h e R h i n e , b u t t h a t
the m a t t e r should be f u r t h e r considered t h e following d a y
in the l i g h t of t h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n .
2. The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
said t h a t he
h a d t h a t afternoon seen t h e D u t c h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , who, w i t h t h e
D u t c h M i n i s t e r for the Colonies h a d come to t h i s c o u n t r y i n o r d e r
Interview
to p r o v i d e the nucleus of a D u t c h G o v e r n m e n t in the event of
between t h e
H o l l a n d being completely over-run.
If, however, conditions
Secretary of
p
e
r
m
i
t
t
e
d
,
they
i
n
t
e
n
d
e
d
t
o
r
e
t
u
r
n
to
H
o
l
l
a
nd. The Dutch Foreign
State for
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
h
a
d
said
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
D
u
t
c
h
now
r
e
g
a r d e d themselves as one
Foreign Affairs
of t h e A l l i e s . H i s l a t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n before leaving H o l l a n d h a d
and the Dutch
been t h a t t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t w a s holding. T h e a e r o d r o m e a t T h e
Foreign
H a g u e h a d c h a n g e d h a n d s twice, w h i l e the aerodome a t A m s t e r d a m
Minister.
h a d been destroyed. No decision h a d been reached as t o w h e t h e r t h e
(Previous
Queen of t h e N e t h e r l a n d s should come to t h i s country.
Reference:
O t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n given by t h e D u t c h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r
W.M. (40) 118th
concerned t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s , t h e s o w i n g of m a g n e t i c mines, t r a d i n g
Conclusions,
w i t h t h e enemy, a n d the D u t c h stock of gold. T h i s l a s t i n f o r m a t i o n
Minute 3.)
h a d been p a s s e d on to t h e A d m i r a l t y .
Protection of
T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs h a d broached t h e
oil refineries in subject of o u r proposed a c t i o n a t C u r a c a o a n d A r u b a . T h e D u t c h
Aruba and
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r h a d t a k e n a f a v o u r a b l e view, t h o u g h he h a d shown
Curacao.
some concern as to how t h e m a t t e r would be p r e s e n t e d to the world.
(Previous
A g r e e m e n t h a d been r e a c h e d t h a t t h i s should t a k e t h e form of a n
Reference:
e x c h a n g e of Notes, the t e x t of w h i c h w a s being d r a f t e d a t t h e
W.M. (40) 117th F o r e i g n Office.
The
Netherlands.
Conclusions.)
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above s t a t e m e n t .
Belgium.
Progress of
German
invasion.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 118th
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)
3. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff r e a d a r e p o r t which
h a d j u s t been received a t t h e W a r Office from the M i l i t a r y A t t a c h e ,
B r u s s e l s . T h i s s t a t e d t h a t general mass a i r a t t a c k s h a d begun on
B e l g i a n a e r o d r o m e s i n the early h o u r s of t h a t m o r n i n g , a n d t h a t
G e r m a n p a r a c h u t i s t s h a d l a n d e d a t v a r i o u s p o i n t s b e h i n d the
B e l g i a n defences. Some of these p a r a c h u t i s t s h a d c a r r i e d dummies
dressed in k h a k i , a n d one such h a d been b r o u g h t to G.H.Q.
T h e advance elements of t h e G e r m a n A r m y , i n c l u d i n g i n f a n t r y and
t a n k s , h a d , a t 1100 hours, been across t h e B e l g i a n f r o n t i e r E a s t
of L i e g e , b u t h a d not y e t reached the B e l g i a n line of defences.
Demolitions h a d been c a r r i e d o u t on the M a a s a n d all bridges
h a d been destroyed except the m a i n r a i l w a y b r i d g e .
The W a r Cabinet took note of t h e above s t a t e m e n t .
Invasion of
Great Britain.
4.
War
On a p o i n t r a i s e d by the Secretary
Cabinet­
of State
for
War,
the
(Previous
(a) Took n o t e t h a t t h e Connnander-in-Chief, H o m e Forces,
Reference:
w o u l d issue a w a r n i n g g i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s to troops
W.M. (40) 117th
a b o u t the action w h i c h they should t a k e a g a i n s t
Conclusions.)
p a r a c h u t i s t s a t t e m p t i n g to l a n d i n t h i s country.
Action to be
(b) I n v i t e d t h e M i n i s t e r for H o m e S e c u r i t y t o issue comple­
taken against
m e n t a r y i n s t r u c t i o n s to t h e Civil Defence a u t h o r i t i e s .
German
parachutists.
Move of Pioneer
On a p o i n t r a i s e d by the Minister for Home Security,
the W a r
Corps: German C a b i n e t —
refugee unit.
I n v i t e d the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r t o move t h e U n i t
of t h e P i o n e e r Corps n o w i n the D p v e r - R i c h b o r o u g h area,
a n d w h i c h comprised G e r m a n refugees i n B r i t i s h u n i f o r m ,
to a m o r e suitable a r e a .
The War
Cabinet.
Resignation of
the Prime
Minister.
5. The Prime Minister said t h a t , as his colleagues were a w a r e ,
t h e L a b o u r P a r t y h a d been asked w h e t h e r they w o u l d consider in
p r i n c i p l e c o - o p e r a t i n g in the Government (a) u n d e r the p r e s e n t
P r i m e M i n i s t e r , or (b) u n d e r some other P r i m e M i n i s t e r .
The
L a b o u r P a r t y ' s a n s w e r h a d now been received. T h e i r r e p l y to the
first question w a s in t h e negative a n d to the second question w a s as
follows :—
" T h e L a b o u r P a r t y a r e p r e p a r e d to t a k e t h e i r s h a r e of
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as a full p a r t n e r in a new Government, u n d e r a
n e w P r i m e M i n i s t e r , w h i c h would command the confidence of
the nation."
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r said t h a t , in t h e l i g h t of t h i s answer, he
h a d reached t h e conclusion t h a t the r i g h t course w a s t h a t he should
a t once t e n d e r h i s r e s i g n a t i o n to T h e K i n g . H e p r o p o s e d to do so
t h a t evening. H e t h o u g h t it would be convenient t h a t t h e new
P r i m e M i n i s t e r should be a u t h o r i s e d to assume t h a t all members of
t h e W a r C a b i n e t placed t h e i r r e s i g n a t i o n s a t t h e disposal of the
n e w P r i m e M i n i s t e r , w h e n sent for by T h e K i n g , a n d t h a t there
w a s no necessity for t h i s t o be confirmed in w r i t i n g . I n t h e mean­
time, of course, M i n i s t e r s r e m a i n e d in office a n d w o u l d continue to
d i s c h a r g e t h e i r functions u n t i l a new A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d been
formed.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t agreed to t h e course suggested.
Richmond
Terrace, S. W. 1,
May 10, 1940.