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Printed
for
the War Cabinet.
March
1917,
SECRET.
W A R CABINET,
Minutes
107.
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing
Wednesday,
March 28, 1917, at 1 T 3 0 A . M .
Street,
S.W., on
Present :
The
The R i g h t
Hon. the
EARL
CURZON
of
Right
Hon. the
VISCOUNT
T
MILNER,
Chair).
The Right Hon. A.
KEDLESTON, K G . , G.C.S.I., G . C . I . E .
The
(in the
PRIME MINISTER
H
E
R
[
G
U
R
Q
U
A
B
M.P.
HENDERSON,
Q
N
A
R
^
M
P
G.C.B., G.O.M.G. The following were also present-—
The R i g h t Hon. A . J . B A L F O U R , O.M.,
M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (for Minutes 1 to 9).
Vice-Admiral S I R . R. H . P E I R S E , K.C.B.,
M.V.O., Committee of Invention and
Research (for Minutes 5 and 6 ) .
The R i g h t Hon. the
Rear-Admiral A. L. D U F F , C.B., A d m i r a l t y
(for Minutes 5 and 6).
PENSHURST,
G.C.M.G.,
LORD HARDINGE
OF
G.C.B.,
G.C.S.I.,
G.O.T.E., G . C . V . O . , I.S.O.,
KG.,
Permanent Under Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs (for Minutes 1 to 3).
The R i g h t Hon. S I R E . C A R S O N , K . C . ,
M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty (for
Minutes 4 to 6 ) .
A d m i r a l S I R J . R. J E L L I C O E , G . C . B . ,
O.M., G.C.V.O., First Sea Lord of the
Admiralty (for Minutes 1 to 7).
Admiral
of the Fleet
K[LVERSTONE,
LORD
G.C.B.,
(for Minutes 4 to 6).
FISHER
O.M.,
Lieutenant-Colonel
OF
G.C.V.O.
SIR M.
P. A .
The Right Hon. the E A R L O F D E R B Y , K G . ,
. G.C.V.O., C.B., Secretary of State for
W a r (for whole Meeting).
General S I R W . R . R O B E R T S O N , G.C.B.,
K.C.V.O., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial
General Staff (for Minutes 1 to 9).
Field-Marshal V I S C O U N T F R E N C H , G.C.B.,
O.M. G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G. (for Minutes
4 to 6 ) .
;
Major-General S I R F. C.
(for Minutes 4 to 6).
HANK-EY,
K.C.B.,
Fleet Paymaster P. H . Row, R.N., Assistant
Captain
Destroyer
Casualties.
CLEMENT JONES,
had
Assistant
SHAW,
K.O.B.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Secretary.
1. T H E First Sea Lord reported that t h e destroyer " Tempest "
e n damaged in a collision with a submarine.
D e
2. The First Sea Lord reported that the loss of the destroyer
" M y r m i d o n " was due to a collision with a collier.
Submarines.
3. The First Sea Lord reported an action with a n enemy
submarine, and g a v e his usual statement of mercantile casualties. ^
4. I n continuation of the discussion on the 26th March ( W a r
Cabinet, 104, M i n u t e 1 4 ) , Admiral of t h e Fleet Lord Fisher of
Kilverstone gave his views on the question of invasion. After
recalling that he had formerly been a strong disbeliever in the
practicability of invasion, Lord Fisher gave the following reasons
for believing t h a t invasion was now feasible :—
(a.) His diminished confidence, owing to the withdrawal from,
the command of t h e Grand Fleet of Admiral Sir J o h n
Jellicoe, whom, without disparaging A d m i r a l Sir David
Beatty, he had a l w a y s regarded as the best m a n a n d
exceptionally qualified for the post, and whom h e
himself, when i n office, had for m a n y years designated
as Admiralissimo in time of war.
(6.) The increasing German submarine menace ; the numbers
of enemy submarines, he pointed out, were now very
large, and their sea-keeping qualities were increased.
(c.) The demonstration a t Gallipoli of the practicability, not
only of landing in t h e face of fire, but of maintaining
the expedition on beaches which were under continuous
fire.
(d.) The fact t h a t the German F l e e t is under the higher
command of a "military officer, namely, Field-Marshal
Hindenburg. He pointed out that a military officer
m i g h t order the Fleet to t a k e risks which no naval
officer would contemplate, and instanced the case of
Villeneuve being ordered to sea by Napoleon.
(e.) The risks to the Grand Fleet from mines and submarines in its passage to the vicinity of t h e landing-places. (/.) The recent increase in the size of the German A r m y , which rendered t h e requisite number of troops available. (g.) The fact that ample transport is available, 4 5 per cent, of
the German mercantile m a r i n e being a t H a m b u r g and
Bremen, as well as small craft a t Emden, suitable for
disembarkation purposes.
I n view of the above circumstances, Lord F i s h e r stated that
he bad felt bound t o l a y before t h e P r i m e Minister his views,
namely, that invasion was now feasible.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, while not denying the
feasibility of an actual landing, stated that the J o i n t Conference
h a d been m u c h influenced by t h e consideration that the enemy
would not be able to maintain his communications, and that he
would l i k e to hear Lord F i s h e r s opinion on this point.
Lord Fisher considered that t h e danger of invasion was under­
stated by the following summary of the views of experts, contained
in W a r Cabinet, 104, M i n u t e 1 4 : —
" The general view of the exjjerts present at the W a r Cabinet
w a s that, whilst an attempt a t invasion could not be ruled
out as absolutely impossible, i t was extremely u n l i k e l y
that t h e enemy would attempt it, or carry it to a successful
conclusion."
He pointed out that t h e impossibility of maintaining surface
craft in particular localities for a n y length of t i m e under modern
conditions increased the difficulty of a n y permanent interruption of
t h e lines of communications. Apart from the return of Admiral
Sir J o h n J e l l i c o e to the command of the Grand Fleet, Lord Fisher
stated that without full information of the A d m i r a l t y ' s existing
dispositions he could offer no suggestion for dealing with this
menace.
The W a r Cabinet thanked Lord Fisher for the statement of his
views, and undertook to give t h e m careful consideration i n their
examination of the problem of Home Defence.
5. The W a r Cabinet pressed Lord Fisher more particularly i n
regard to a statement in his letter to the First Lord, dated the
1st February, 1917, to the effect that he had given A d m i r a l Jellicoe
" a plan for dealing effectively with the German submarine
menace."
Lord Fisher stated that these words referred to his
having offered to serve under Sir J o h n Jellicoe as Controller of the
Navy, in order to provide more effectually than at present all the
apparatus requisite to subdue the German submarine menace.
H e referred to a very secret device, which the A d m i r a l t y have
already mentioned to the W a r Cabinet, and on which four separate
and independent investigators are at work.
Lord Fisher suggested that the number of these instruments
ordered was insufficient.
The First Sea Lord stated that 750 sets of one type had been
ordered, but Lord Fisher suggested that sufficient sets of the best
t y p e had not been ordered.
The representatives of the A d m i r a l t y stated that the Board of
Invention and Research had not recommended the adoption for
general use of the type referred to by Lord Fisher, but that 100 sets
had been ordered for experimental purposes on the recommendation
of the Board of Invention and Research.
Vice-Admiral Sir Richard Peirse, the Vice-Chairman of the
Board of Invention and Research, stated, however, that the Board of
Invention and Research had not considered that recommendations
for the adoption of any particular apparatus for general use came
within their functions. This came rather within the province of
the Admiralty Representatives on the Board of Invention and
Research.
Rear-Admiral Duff, the Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare,
gave a full resume of the orders given for anti-submarine devices of
the nature referred to. It transpired that 750 sets of one t y p e of
the device had been ordered, and that 2,400 of a different type
were already in use afloat.
Without m a k i n g any observations on the attitude of the
A d m i r a l t y towards this particular device, the W a r Cabinet took
particular note of the agreement among the experts t h a t at present
the particular device referred to by Lord Fisher, though promising,
did not provide a n y immediate solution of the submarine problem,
and could not be looked upoa as other than a. part of -the system
employed for the destruction of submarines. Lord Fisher referred
to a Memorandum by his scientific colleagues which, as they felt
strongly on the subject, he stated he would forward to the Prime
Minister.
6. W i t h reference to W a r Cabinet, 9 1 , M i n u t e 7, the First Sea
Lord informed t h e W a r Cabinet t h a t he now had received further
information in regard to Mr. Edison's reported submarine detector,
and had ascertained that it was a signalling apparatus with the
capabilities of which the A d m i r a l t y were fully acquainted, and
which had been in use in the Navy for some years.
7. The First Sea Lord read a telegram from Russia in regard
to the state of the R u s s i a n B a l t i c Fleet, containing particulars of
very serious disorders, and indicating that, whilst the situation at
Helsingfors was fairly normal, the state of affairs at Kronstad was
unsatisfactory, though improving, and, generally speaking, the
discipline in the Baltic Fleet had Aveakened considerably.
Russian Offensive,
Postponement of.
8. The W a r Cabinet had a preliminary discussion on the
subject of a M e m o r a n d u m by General Alexeieff, forwarded by
General H a n b u r y - W i l l i a m s (Appendix I ) .
The Chief of the I m p e r i a l General Staff stated t h a t he had
only j u s t received this communication, and, before giving his
considered view in regard to it, he would like to c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h
Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Hais: and General Niveile. I n the
meantime, as a preliminary expression of opinion, he considered
t h a t we should m a k e no material alterations i n our plans as
regards the Western Front.
He had, however, already com­
municated with General Alexnieff in regard to the great importance
of avoiding any delay i n the Russian operations in the Caucasus, as
such delay might react seriously on our position in Mesopotamia.
W h i l e , therefore, deferring further consideration of this
question, the W a r Cabinet note that the decisions of the Petrograd
Conference are completely upset.
The Labour
Deputation.
9. W i t h reference to W a r Cabinet, 1 0 4 , M i n u t e 5, M r .
Henderson reported t h a t Mr. Thomas would not be able to go to
Russia, He believed that M r . T h o m e and M r . 0 ' G r a d y would be
willing to accompany t h e deputation, and he hoped that Lieutenant
Sanders might also be available, which the Secretary of State for
W a r stated would be practicable.
The general view of the W a r Cabinet was in favour of a reliable
Russian Socialist being attached to the Mission as an interpreter,
and of the addition of a more academic Socialist of the t y p e of Mr.
Hyndman.
Prisoners of War.
1 0 . The W a r Cabinet had under consideration the Report of
Lord Derby's Committee (G.T.-266, Appendix I I ) on the Exchange
of Prisoners of W a r , prepared in accordance with W a r Cabinet, 9 5 ,
M i n u t e 1, and decided that—
(a.) A general e x c h a n g e of interned civilians was impracticable
and not in the interests of the State.
(6.) The Secretary of State for W a r should take the necessary
steps, in conjunction with the Foreign Office, to ascertain
the views of the French Government on the proposal
that officers and men who had been i n captivity for two
years or more should be interned in Switzerland or some
other neutral State.
(c.) The Secretary of State for W a r , the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, and the A d m i r a l t y should t a k e t h e
requisite action to give effect to the proposals of Lord
Derby's Committee with regard to the question of
effecting a n exchange of British and Indian prisoners of
war for Turkish.
(d.) The question of the employment of prisoners of w a r and
the publication of the facts relating to the imprisonment
of two German Officers should be deferred for con­
sideration at a later date.
(Initialled)
2, Whitehall
March
Gardens,
S.W.,
28, 1 9 1 7 .
D. LI. G .
A P P E N D I X I.
0
From General Hanbury Williams
to G.I G.S., March 26, 1917.
(913.)
F O L L O W I N G is complete translation of memorandum referred to i n my 914 :—
" Presenting m y respects to the representative of British M i l i t a r y Mission at
Russian G.H.Q., I regard it as m y conscientious duty, in order to avoid the serious
consequences which m i g h t arise from the omission to express frankly m y opinion of
the possibility of fulfilling decisions arrived at in the course of the Petrograd
Conference:—
" F i r s t , letter j u s t received from the Minister of W a r points out that the interior,
political commotions have had a serious effect on the condition of our
reserve (dep6t) units throughout the entire country. They are in a state of
moral confusion, and cannot be employed as reinforcements for three or four
months, that is, earlier J u n e - J u l y .
" Second, the same causes and effects hear equal relation to the c a v a l r y of the
whole army.
" A b o v e situation necessitates looking facts straight in the eyes, and stating with
complete frankness that we cannot assume the offensive here at the commencement of
M a y (old style), and can count upon participation on a large scale only in J u n e - J u l y .
Position allows to the e n e m y the possibility of concentrating all his reserves on the
French front, or with greatly increased [? group omitted], to fall upon us, profiting
b y our temporary period of weakness. Circumstances should, I think, entail certain
alterations in consideration of operations in the near future, and influence decisions
arrived at at the Petrograd Conference.
" i n particular must be considered General Nivelle's communication, dated the
16th March, that he w i l l employ the whole strength of the French Armies for a n
offensive on the W e s t front, in order to obtain a definite result.
" Obligatory and unavoidable (for their preservation for the future) inactivity of
the Russian Armies in the n e x t few months, in m y opinion, calls for F r e n c h A r m y not
to be exhausted, and for its reserves to be kept until compatible with the time when,
with joint forces, we shall be in a position to attack enemy on all fronts.
" S i x t h , I think also that i t would be more expedient, under the circumstances
of our enforced inaction, that the British-French Armies at least should follow up
enemy's retreat slowly and prudently, and should also occupy new and strong lines of
defence. This does not refer to decisive a t t a c k by British-French Armies on e n e m y
i n retreat on strongly fortified lines, perhaps intending some large manoeuvre in open
warfare, where freedom of movement of reserves might give a favourable opportunity
to one side or the other.
" B u t in such an operation, enemy, who is based on prepared, strongly fortified
positions, would possess a n undoubted a d v a n t a g e . "
JO APPENDIX
II.
G.T.-266. PRISONERS
Minutes
of a Meeting
held
OF W A R
SUB-COMMITTEE.
at the War Office on Friday,
at 4*30 P.M.
March
16, 1917,
Present:
The R i g h t Hon. the Earl of Derby, K.G., G.O.V.O., C.B., Secretary of State
for W a r (in the Ohair).
The R i g h t Hon. Lord Newton, Director
of Prisoners Department.
M r . J . E. Hope, M.P., Chairman of the
Prisoners
of
War
Employment
Committee.
Lieutenant General Sir H . E. Belfield,
E . C . B . , D.S.O., Director of Prisoners of
W a r , W a r Office.
Brigadier-General C. K. Cockerill, C.B.,
Sub-Director of M i l i t a r y Intelligence,
W a r Office.
M a j o r C. L. Storr,
Secretary.
I N accordance with W a r Cabinet instructions ( W a r Cabinet, 95, M i n u t e 1), the
Committee assembled to consider the following questions : —
(a.) The exchange of British and German interned civilians,
(b.) The employment of prisoners of war.
1. The Committee had before t h e m a Memorandum by Lord Newton, dated the
3rd March, 1917 (G.T.-92 ( A n n x e u r e A ) ) , in which it was pointed out that there
were interned in Germany approximately 4,500 British civilians, whereas there
were in the British Empire about 36,000 Germans, 30,000 of whom were of m i l i t a r y
a g e ; that a formidable agitation was in progress in Great Britain to secure a general
exchange of these c i v i l i a n s ; that the only justification for an exchange of so
disproportionate a nature rested upon humanitarian g r o u n d s ; that there was reason to
believe that statements regarding conditions at Ruhleben were greatly exaggerated, and
that, even if the dispaiity in numbers were reduced by the addition of French
civilians, the difficulties of transporting the m a n y thousands of Germans by sea would
remain almost insuperable.
The Committee were unanimously of the opinion t h a t ^ ­
1. A n y increase of the resources in man-power of the Central Powers must tend
to prolong the W a r , and t h a t as the W a r is to a great extent one of
attrition, the best and really most h u m a n e course to follow is to place and
keep out of action as many of the enemy a s possible.
2. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, and more especially in view
of the disparity of the numbers involved, t h e . proposal of a general
exchange of interned civilians should not, i n the interests of the State, be
entertained, and they should report to the War Cabinet accordingly.
2. The Committee further considered a suggestion that endeavours should be
made through diplomatic channels to effect a n a r r a n g e m e n t with the German
Government whereby officers and men who have been in captivity for over two years,
might he interned in Switzerland or in some other neutral country.
The Committee took into consideration the following points :—
(a.) That under existing conditions the Swiss Government would not be prepared
to accommodate more than a limited number of such prisoners of both
nationalities.
(b.) That we have undertaken to waive any c l a i m on Norway for such purposes
in favour of Russia.
The Committee recommended t h a t —
(1.) The W a r Office should designate w h a t neutral countries were open to least
objection for this purpose.
(2.) If the W a r Cabinet approve the suggestion in principle, the views of the
French Government should, in the first instance, be ascertained.
3. The Committee considered the question of effecting an exchange of British
and Indian Prisoners of W a r for Turkish.
The Committee recommended that—
(1.) The Turkish Government be invited through the proper channels to come
to a m u t u a l arrangement with His Majesty's Government for t h e
exchange of 600 prisoners on each side as a preliminary to a wider
exchange.
(2.) The selection of the men to be exchanged should he left to the captor
Government.
(3.) Officers and men, both of British and Indian nationality, in strict proportion
to their relative numbers, should be included under the terms of the
exchange.
(4.) The A d m i r a l t y be asked to report if, and when, shipping could be provided
for the conveyance of the prisoners.
(5.) The proposal should be for unconditional repatriation, and not for
internment.
(6.) If the W a r Cabinet approve the proposal, the Russian Government should be
informed of the action taken.
4. The Committee examined the question of the employment of Prisoners of W a r .
They had before them a letter (G.T.-81) (Annexure B) dated the 20th J a n u a r y , 1917,
from the Secretary to the Prisoners of W a r Employment Committee to the Secretary
to the W a r Cabinet, which stated that the number of such prisoners applied for by
Government Departments alone already far exceeds the available supply, and which
suggested that—
Prisoners of war, especially those skilled in a g r i c u l t u r e and engineering, should,
if possible, be released from France for work in the United Kingdom, their
places in France being taken by Turkish prisoners of war now in Egypt.
After due consideration, the Committee decided that there were m a n y difficulties
in the w a y of carrying into effect the above proposal, and that no material advantages
were likely to be gained by its adoption,
5. The Committee considered the suggestion that Schleswig-Holstein deserters
from the German A r m y , of whom there were about 7,000 in Denmark, might be
conveyed to and employed in the United Kingdom. I t was understood that the
Danish authorities favoured the proposal.
The Committee decided that—
Mr. Hope, M.P., Chairman of the Prisoners of W a r Employment Committee,
should t a k e up the question in consultation with the Home Department and
and Foreign Office.
6. The Committee also considered a suggestion that the facts relating to the
imprisonment of two German "officers in retaliation for the imprisonment of two
B r i t i s h officers—Lieutenant L a m b l e and L i e u t e n a n t Bate—should be published, and
Lord Derby undertook to bring the suggestion before the W a r Cabinet.
2, Whitehall
Gardens,
March 16, 1917.
) 8.W.,
(Initialled)
D.