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Catalogue Reference:CAB/128/41
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THIS
DOCUMENT
HER
IS
THE PROPERTY
BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
Printed for the Cabinet.
OF GOVERNMENT September
1966
CC (66)
Copy N o . 3 7
41st Conclusions
CABINET
of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at CONCLUSIONS
JO Downing Street, S.W.1, on Tuesday, 2nd August, 1966, at 10 a.m. Present:
The Right Hon. HAROLD WILSON, M P, Prime Minister
The
Right
Hon.
HERBERT
BOWDEN,
M p, Lord President of the Council The
Right
Hon.
JAMES
CALLAGHAN,
M P , Chancellor of the Exchequer The
Right
Hon.
DENIS
HEALEY, M P,
Secretary of State for Defence
The
Right
Right
Hon.
LORD
GARDINER,
MICHAEL
STEWART,
Lord Chancellor
The
Right
Hon.
M P, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs
The Right Hon. ARTHUR BOTTOMLEY,
M P, Secretary of State for Common­
wealth Affairs
H o n . R O Y JENKINS, M P ,
Secretary of State
Department
The
for the Home
The Right H o n . DOUGLAS HOUGHTON,
M P, Minister without Portfolio
The Right
Hon. WILLIAM R O S S , M P,
Secretary of State for Scotland
The
Right
Hon. DOUGLAS JAY, M P ,
President of the Board of Trade
The Right H o n . ANTHONY GREENWOOD,
T h e Right H o n . ANTHONY CROSLAND,
M p, Minister of Overseas Develop­
ment
M p, Secretary of State for Education
and Science
The
Right H o n .
RICHARD GROSSMAN,
M P , Minister of Housing and Local
Government (Items 1-5)
The Right H o n . R. J. GUNTER, M P ,
The
Right
Hon.
The
Right
Hon.
Minister of
and Food
Minister of Labour
The Right H o n . BARBARA CASTLE, M P,
Minister of Transport
T H E EARL
OF
LONGFORD, Lord Privy Seal
FRED
PEART, M P ,
Agriculture,
Fisheries
The Right H o n . RICHARD MARSH, M P ,
Minister of Power
T h e Right H o n . ANTHONY WEDGWOOD BENN, M P, Minister of Technology T h e following were also present:
The
Right
Hon.
FREDERICK
MULLEY,
M p, Minister of Aviation (Item 6)
Mr.
AUSTEN
ALBU,
M P , Minister
State,
Department
of
Affairs (Items 5 and 6)
Chief Secretary, Treasury (Item 5)
of
Economic
The Right Hon. Sir ELWYN JONES, Q C,
M p, Attorney-General (Item 7)
The Right Hon. JOHN DIAMOND, M P ,
Mrs.
JUDITH
State for
(Item 5)
The
Right
HART, M P , Minister
Commonwealth
Hon.
JOHN
of
Affairs
SILKIN, M P ,
Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury
Secretariat:
Sir
BURKE TREND
Mr.
P . ROGERS
Mr.
W . A . NIELD
Miss J. J. N U N N
Mr.
D . S. LASKEY
Mr.
R . T . ARMSTRONG
CONTENTS
Item
Subject
Page
1
PARLIAMENT
3
2
ECONOMIC SITUATION
3
Prices and Incomes Bill
3
OVERSEA AFFAIRS
4
South Arabia Nigeria 4
PRIME MINISTER'S V I S I T TO WASHINGTON
5
5
ZAMBIA
5
Intensification
Zambia
of
Sanctions
Against
Rhodesia
by
Effects on the United Kingdom of an Interruption in
Zambian Copper Supplies
6
T H E AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
9
Re-equipment of British European Airways
Proposed Merger of Rolls-Royce, Limited, and Bristol
Siddeley Engines, Limited
7
ROYAL COMMISSION ON A S S I Z E S AND QUARTER
OUTSIDE LONDON
SESSIONS
11
CONFIDENTIAL
3
CC 41 (66)
CONFIDENTIAL
1. The Lord President reported that the Opposition had
decided to substitute for the Supply Debate arranged for Wednesday,
8th August, a Motion to transfer consideration of the Prices and
Incomes Bill from Standing Committee B to a Committee of the
whole House. This change was devised to permit a Second Reading
Debate on the new clauses of the Bill providing powers to enforce
the standstill on wages and prices; and the Debate should be
conducted on that basis. It would not necessarily be to the
Governments disadvantage.
Parliament
Economic
Situation
Prices and
Incomes Bill
(Previous
Reference:
CC (66) 40th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)
!
CONFIDENTIAL
2. The Minister of Housing and Local Government said that
it would be important, both in the debate on the Bill and
subsequently, to try to ensure that the standstill on wages and prices
should become effective by means of voluntary co-operation. It was
open to question how far the standstill could in fact be enforced
by the statutory means provided in the Bill; and contingency plans
should be prepared for the action to be taken if the voluntary
standstill proved abortive, in order that the Cabinet might be able
to consider the implications in advance.
In discussion there was some support for this view. The
Governmenfs intention had been to try to ensure the success of the
standstill by voluntary methods and not to resort to compulsion until
these had been seen to fail. Moreover, if, as seemed likely, the
Trades Union Congress decided on the following day to support
the standstill, this would be an additional reason for preferring the
course of voluntary co-operation.
On the other hand it would be wrong to exaggerate the prospect
that a standstill could be achieved by voluntary means. The
Government, as employer, would be able to enforce a standstill in
the very large public sector; but this would be liable to provoke
considerable resentment if the standstill were seen to be only partially
effective in the private sector. It would be unfortunate, therefore,
to give employees in the public sector any reason to suppose that in
the private sector voluntary methods would be attempted in the
initial period and that only if these failed would compulsion be
invoked. From this point of view it might be preferable to be ready
to implement the compulsory powers in Part IV of the Bill at an
early stage in order to demonstrate the Governmenfs determination
to hold the balance evenly as between the public and the private
sectors and to deter any attempts by the latter to frustrate the
standstill. Indeed, some private employers might need the protection
of Part IV of the Bill to indemnify them in relation to contracts
made before 20th July.
The Prime Minister recalled that at their previous discussion
on the standstill of wages and prices the Cabinet had agreed that
the procedure envisaged by Part IV of the Bill, whereby its provisions
would become operative only on the introduction of an Affirmative
Order lapsing unless confirmed by both Houses within 28 calendar
days, would demonstrate the Government^ preference for
proceeding by voluntary means but also their determination to
enforce the standstill by statutory powers if voluntary means broke
down. The Cabinet would need to adhere closely to this collective
decision; and it might be advisable for a form of words, based upon
it, to be agreed for use in the debate. Thereafter, however, it would
be necessary to see how the situation developed before further
decisions were taken. If, as now appeared possible, there was a
general and voluntary acceptance of the standstill, pressures by one
or two recalcitrant groups could be dealt with ad hoc, if necessary,
by use of the reversion powers over wages and prices in Part IV of
the Bill. But, if the standstill were infringed more widely, other
action would be required; and it might be advisable for the Cabinet
to give some thought, in advance, to its implications. In any event
the Affirmative Order giving effect to the powers in Part IV of the
Bill would not be introduced without prior discussion and decision
by the Cabinet.
The Cabinet—
( 1 ) Took note, with approval, of the Prime Ministers summing
up of their discussion.
(2) Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for the
Cabinet to consider the implications of the action which
might be required if it became necessary to enforce a
statutory standstill of prices and wages.
Oversea
Affairs
South Arabia
(Previous
Reference:
C C (66) 33rd
Conclusions,
Minute 3)
SECRET
3. The Foreign Secretary said that a village in Beihan had
been raided the previous day by two aircraft from the Yemen
which were almost certainly Egyptian. 75 houses had been hit and
three children wounded. The raid had been widely interpreted as
action designed both to discredit our ability to defend South Arabia
and to destroy the cohesion of the Federal Government. The latter
had asked that we should both make a formal protest to the
Government of the United Arab Republic (UAR) and also retaliate
on Egyptian targets in the Yemen. The Canadian and United
States Governments, which were the protecting powers in the U A R
and the Yemen respectively during the period in which we did not
maintain diplomatic relations with either country, had been asked to
make strong protests to the two Governments: we were in addition
seeking to call a meeting of the Security Council. While such
diplomatic action was being taken we could not simultaneously
retaliate, but if that action failed to produce any result we might
have to consider retaliation. Alternatively, it might be possible to
obtain agreement to a United Nations investigation of the incident
on the spot.
In discussion it was pointed out that, since the Yemeni side of
the border in question was occupied by the royalists, the raid could
C C 41 (66)
not plausibly have been made in retaliation for raids from Beihan
on areas under the control of the Yemeni Government. We were
taking such military precautions as were possible to deal with
further raids of this nature.
Nigeria
(Previous
Reference:
CC (66) 29th
Conclusions,
Minute 1)
The Commonwealth Secretary said that there had been a further
mutiny in Nigeria and that Major-General Ironsi, the Head of State,
had been kidnapped and possibly killed. A Lieutenant-Colonel
Yakubu Gowon, who was a Hausa from the Northern Region, had
assumed charge of the Government, with the support of the
Supreme Council. He had been strongly advised by both our own
High Commissioner and the United States Ambassador against
promoting the secession of the North from the Federation. So far
there had been no anti-European feeling, although two Europeans
had by accident been killed in cross fire between two bodies of
troops.
The Cabinet— Took note of these statements. Prime
Ministers
Visit to
Washington
SECRET
4. The Prime Minister informed the Cabinet of the outcome of
his recent discussions with the President of the United States,
President Johnson, in Washington.
The Cabinefs discussion and the conclusions reached are
recorded separately in the bound volume of Most Confidential Records
held by the Secretary of the Cabinet.
Zambia
(Previous
Reference:
CC (65) 9th
Conclusions,
Minute 4)
Intensification
of Sanctions
Against
Rhodesia by
Zambia
SECRET
5. The Cabinet considered a note by the Commonwealth
Secretary (C (66) 120) covering a memorandum by the Minister of
State for Commonwealth Affairs about the intensification of
sanctions against Rhodesia by Zambia; and a note by the President
of the Board of Trade (C (66) 121) on the effects on the United
Kingdom of an interruption in Zambian copper supplies.
The Minister of State for Commonwealth
Affairs said that our
policy required the intensification of sanctions against Rhodesia if
we were to secure a negotiated settlement on our terms within a
reasonable period. We also needed to keep up the momentum if
international support for sanctions were to be sustained. Apart
from the oil supplies reaching Rhodesia from South Africa and
Mozambique, which we were unable to prevent, Zambian trade with
Rhodesia now constituted the major gap in sanctions. Zambian
imports from Rhodesia had already been reduced by about 30 per
cent compared with the level before the illegal declaration of
independence (i.d.i.); if in co-operation with us the Zambian
Government were now to impose a phased cut-off, reducing their
imports by a total of 80 per cent from the level before i.d.L, this
would have a major effect on Rhodesian earnings of foreign exchange
and on employment in Rhodesia. An agreement on these lines
would also help to restore Zambian confidence in the United
Kingdom Government and might prevent a decision by Zambia at
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in September to leave
the Commonwealth or sever relations with us, either of which
courses could lead to a break-up of the Commonwealth. In her
negotiations with the Zambian Government she had been authorised
to offer a total of £6-85 million to be spent in the rest of 1966 on
approved projects for developing alternative supply routes and local
coal supplies, together with a review of the situation in December
1966 if the emergency had not ended by then. This offer had been
rejected by the Zambian Government, partly because of their lack
of confidence in the policy of the United Kingdom Government and
partly because they regarded it as an inadequate commitment by
the United Kingdom to carry through the projects which Zambia
wished to undertake. We could not give an unlimited commitment,
as the Zambians wished, but it might be possible to reach agreement
if we brought forward the review promised for the end of the year
and agreed now on the amount of continuing assistance which we
could offer for the first half of 1967. She therefore proposed that
we should maintain our offer of £6-85 million for expenditure on
agreed projects in 1966 and offer a further £7 million for the
continuation of agreed projects during the first half of 1967. Our
assistance would be discontinued if there were a return to
constitutional rule in Rhodesia or to normal communications
between Rhodesia and Zambia. Our offer would also be subject to
reconsideration if Zambia left the Commonwealth or broke off
relations with the United Kingdom.
j
President of the Board of Trade said that any substantial
Kin^omt)! reduction in copper exports from Zambia from the normal rate of
an Interruption 60,000 tons a month would increase the price of our copper imports
in Zambian
and add to the burden on our balance of payments. This was
Copper
illustrated by the recent movement in copper prices which had fallen
] y £loo a ton, to just under £500 a ton, owing to the
Supplies
Zambian Government^ decision to permit the resumption of copper
exports through Rhodesia provided that the freight charges in
Rhodesia were paid by the purchasers. If Zambian copper exports
were in the range of 20,000 to 38,000 tons a month this would
impose an additional burden on our balance of payments, owing to
higher copper prices, of £3-4 million to £7-4 million a month. If
the level of Zambian exports fell below 38,000 tons a month there
was likely to be a physical shortage of copper which would further
affect our manufacturing industry and hence our exports. There
was therefore a strong case for trying to reach an agreement with
Zambia which would increase the capacity of alternative routes for
the export of copper from the present level of 20,000 tons a month
to a potential level of 38,000 tons a month, and which might also
reduce the risk of unilateral action by Zambia to restrict copper
exports.
Effects on
n
b
y
n e a r
e
The Chancellor of the Exchequer
said that the Zambian
Government were seeking an unlimited commitment of support by
the United Kingdom: it therefore seemed doubtful whether they
would accept an offer of an additional £7 million since this still set
a limit to our aid, even if a higher one. It seemed even more
doubtful whether this offer would re-establish Zambian confidence in
the United Kingdom Government to such an extent as to alter their
whole attitude and induce them to adopt the policy we advocated
for Zambian trade with Rhodesia. Copper exports from Zambia
were now moving again through Rhodesia and United Kingdom
companies were able to purchase supplies through Swiss firms
without the need for any alteration in our exchange control
regulations against Rhodesia. The Zambian Government would
still be in a position to take unilateral action to restrict copper
exports and it seemed unilkely that increased aid from the United
Kingdom would seriously inhibit them from doing so if they so
wished. If the additional offer of £7 million could be found within
the ceiling for our economic aid, he would nevertheless not object
to it; but in our present economic situation there could be no
justification for any increase in the total aid expenditure.
In discussion it was agreed that three main aspects of the
problem required consideration; the effect in Rhodesia of more
stringent sanctions by Zambia; the degree to which an increased
offer of aid might influence Zambia's attitude at the forthcoming
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting; and the extent to which
agreement with Zambia would safeguard our supplies of Zambian
copper.
As regards the first point, sanctions were already having a
considerable economic effect in Rhodesia, and this would be
substantially increased if there were a phased reduction of Zambian
trade on the lines we had in mind. This would also help to sustain
international support for the policy of voluntary sanctions against
Rhodesia. On the other hand sanctions had so far had little political
effect in Rhodesia itself and even if their economic effects became
more severe it was arguable that this might only increase the
determination of the regime and of the hard core of the European
community not to surrender. Moreover there seemed little prospects
of any large scale liberal move against the regime. Nevertheless
sanctions could still bring about a change of policy on the part of
the regime, although it might well take a considerable time to
achieve this: the effective sanction on sales of tobacco was
particularly important in this context. The Government were
committed to bringing the rebellion to an end and must in honour
maintain the policy of sanctions even if this policy would still take
a considerable time to show its full effect and the ultimate result
could not be regarded as certain.
The Rhodesian situation had had serious political effects in
Zambia, but, although the Zambian economy had suffered certain
limited damage, Zambian foreign exchange reserves had increased
considerably, owing to the higher price of copper, and the revenues
of the Zambian Government had gained considerably and were
relatively substantial. Zambian distrust of the United Kingdom
Government was due to political rather than economic causes and
specifically to suspicion about the informal talks with the regime in
Salisbury. It was doubtful whether an increased offer of aid would
substantially affect Zambia's attitude at the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers' Meeting but the consequences of Zambia leaving the
Commonwealth, particularly if this led to a more extensive break-up
of the Commonwealth, would be so serious, both politically and
economically, that it would be worth paying the £7 million if this
avoided such an outcome. If the offer were rejected by Zambia we
should be no worse off and, the offer having been made, our position
with other Members at the Comonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting
would be stronger. If the offer were accepted it would be reasonable
to stipulate, as was proposed, that the position would be subject to
reconsideration should Zambia leave the Commonwealth. In fact,
however, we might wish even in this eventuality to maintain the
offer if it would help significantly to safeguard our copper supplies.
An agreement with Zambia would not of itself necessarily
prevent the Zambian Government from seeking to restrict copper
exports. We could however make it clear that our assistance would
be terminated if such action were taken and that this must be a
condition of our offer. Even if the total amount of our aid to
Zambia of some £14 million were regarded as an insurance for
continued copper supplies, the premium would not be unduly high
since a heavy reduction of supplies could cost us as much as an
additional £100 million a year on the balance of payments.
In further discussion it was pointed out that it had been agreed
that the £6-85 million which we had already offered should be
additional to the total agreed expenditure on aid. It was argued
that neither this amount nor the additional £7 million could
properly be regarded as aid or found within the aid budget. During
the current financial year our aid was fully committed up to the
agreed ceiling. In the year 1967-68 there would be a cut of
£20 million as a result of the announcement made on 20th July and
there would in practice have to be a further cut of £10 million to
provide for contingencies.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the
balance of opinion was in favour of making a further offer to
Zambia on the lines proposed by the Minister of State for
Commonwealth Affairs. In addition to the conditions suggested in
the memorandum it should be made clear that the offer was
conditional on the Zambian Government imposing no restrictions on
copper exports. We should in any case be under great pressure at
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting and subsequently at
the United Nations for the imposition of mandatory sanctions
against Rhodesia. It was doubtful whether these could be confined
to oil sanctions and they could well lead to an economic embargo
against the whole of Southern Africa, which would have disastrous
consequences for the United Kingdom economy. There would
also be strong pressure for military action against Rhodesia either
by the United Kingdom alone or by a United Nations force. It
might be suggested that, since we could not be certain that sanctions
would be effective, the question of using military force should be
reconsidered. This had however been studied in detail and the
difficulties of a military operation and the objections to the use of
force, not only in regard to Rhodesia itself but for the whole of
Central Africa and indeed for the economic and strategic position
of the United Kingdom, had been shown to be decisive. It was
arguable that the cost of. our aid to Zambia could be regarded as
part of a war operation rather than as part of our normal aid
programme but further consideration should be given to the manner
in which the cost should be borne. In view of the difficulty of
making provision for it within any existing departmental budget and
since it would be to some extent an insurance for maintaining the
supply of Zambian copper to the United Kingdom this consideration
should include the possibility of providing the money by means of a
levy on imports of copper.
The Cabinet—
(1) Approved C (66) 120, subject to the points made by the
Prime Minister in his summing up of their discussion.
(2) Invited the President of the Board of Trade, in consultation
with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of
State, Department of Economic Affairs, to consider the
possibility of recovering the cost of our aid to Zambia by
a means of a levy on imports of copper.
(3) Subject to Conclusion (2), invited the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, in consultation with the Secretary of State
for Defence, the Commonwealth Secretary and the
Minister of Overseas Development, to consider further
in the light of the discussion how the cost of aid to
Zambia should be met.
The Aircraft
Industry
Re-equipment
of British
European
Airways
(Previous
Reference:
CC (66) 40th
Conclusions,
Minute 4)
CONFIDENTIAL
6. The Cabinet resumed their consideration of a memorandum
by the First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs (C (66) 119) on the aircraft industry.
The Minister of State, Department
of Economic
Affairs,
recalled that at their previous meeting the Cabinet had invited the
Minister of Aviation to inform British European Airways (BEA)
of the Governmenfs decision that their fleet should be re-equipped
with United Kingdom aircraft, and had invited the First Secretary
of State, in consultation with the Minister of Aviation, to arrange
for a further study to be made of the means by which assistance
should be given to BEA to deal with the problems with which this
decision would present them, of the size, constitution and timing of
B E A orders and of the implications of postponing re-equipment for
CONFIDENTIAL
10
domestic
the study
which it
airframe
Proposed
Merger of
Rolls-Royce,
Limited, and
Bristol
Siddeley
Engines,
Limited
routes. The First Secretary of State took the view that
of these matters should be remitted to the Sub-Committee
was proposed should consider the reorganisation of the
industry.
The Cabinet were now invited to endorse the further conclusions
reached by the Ministerial Committee on Economic Development,
that Rolls-Royce, Limited, and Bristol Siddeley Engines, Limited,
should be told that the Government saw no objection in principle
to the proposed merger of their aero-engine interests, and that no
decision should be taken for the time being on the reorganisation
of the airframe industry, while the matter was further studied by a
Sub-Committee of Ministers.
The Minister of Aviation said that he had informed BE A of
the Governments decision that they should re-equip with United
Kingdom aircraft. BEA had taken this decision badly, and an
unfortunate speech by the Chairman of BEA at a lunch at which
the Press were represented had led to premature reports in the
Press. He would be making a statement in the House of Commons
later in the day on the Governments decision. It had been
suggested that he should not indicate in that statement that BEA
would themselves from a commercial point of view have preferred
to buy United States aircraft; but BEA had strongly urged that he
should do so and, if he did not, they would certainly make it
publicly known themselves.
He questioned whether it was
appropriate for further study of the questions arising on BEA
re-equipment to be undertaken by the Sub-Committee which would
be considering the future of the airframe industry, but he supported
the conclusions suggested by the First Secretary of State on the
aero-engine merger and on further study of the reorganisation of
the airframe industry.
In discussion the following points were m a d e :
(a) A key question for the proposed Sub-Committee on the
future of the airframe industry would be the future load on the
industry. The re-equipment of BEA was an integral part of this,
and questions arising on the size, make-up and timing of BEA orders
could appropriately be considered by the same Sub-Committee. It
might not be appropriate, however, to invite the Sub-Committee
to consider the wider question of the future of the Air Traffic
Licensing Board and its procedures.
(b) It was suggested that relationships between BEA and the
aircraft industry would be improved if BEA were represented on the
boards of directors of companies in the industry. On the other
hand it was pointed out that this relationship could make for
difficulties, and there was no evidence that it would have any
substantial practical value.
(c) While a Government statement on the future of the
airframe industry during the Recess need not be ruled out, it was
suggested that it would be better to defer a final decision until some
of the uncertainties about demand on the industry were resolved,
even though this might mean postponing an announcement until
the autumn.
CONFIDENTIAL 1 1
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the
Cabinet in general endorsed Conclusions (4) and (5) in paragraph 9
of (C(66) 119). H e would give further thought to the composition
and terms of reference of the proposed Sub-Committee.
The Cabinet—
(1) Agreed that Rolls-Royce and Bristol Siddeley should be told
that the Government saw n o objection in principle to
the proposed merger of their aero-engine interests.
(2) Agreed that no decision should be taken for the time being
on the reorganisation of the airframe industry, while the
matter was further studied by a Sub-Committee of
Ministers.
(3) Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for the
constitution of a Sub-Committee for this purpose, and
would consider how far it was appropriate to remit to
that Sub-Committee questions arising from the decision
to require B E A to re-equip with United Kingdom
aircraft.
Royal
Commission
on Assizes
and Quarter
Sessions
Outside
London
CONFIDENTIAL
7. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Lord
Chancellor (C (66) 123) proposing the appointment of a Royal
Commission on Assizes and Quarter Sessions outside London.
The Lord Chancellor said that there had long been criticism
of the wastefulness and inefficiency of the circuit system which
required Assize Judges to sit twice a year for hearing civil and
criminal cases in each of 61 Assize towns, many of which provided
inadequate business or were visited for too short a time to hear
the occasional long case, while large centres of population had no
Assize of their own. These arrangements resulted in serious delays
in hearing civil cases and in accused persons having to travel long
distances for trial. The system had not been examined since the
Royal Commission on the Dispatch of Business at Common Law
(the Peel Commission) of 1936, and there was a strong case for a
far-reaching inquiry by an authoritative Royal Commission which
could consider not only the reorganisation of the Assize system,
but the desirability of establishing district High Courts outside
London; the case for extending Crown Courts similar to those at
Liverpool and Manchester; the administration of criminal justice
at Quarter Sessions which were now so overloaded that it was
difficult to find suitable persons to serve as Recorder or Chairman
of Quarter Sessions; and the ownership and use of court
accommodation, the scarcity of which played a disproportionate
part in determining the pattern of the court system. There might
now be less local opposition to reform of the system than had been
the case in the past, because many local authorities were finding the
cost of supporting an Assize a heavy financial burden, and an early
255
12
CONFIDENTIAL
inquiry was likely to be welcome. The Home Affairs Committee
had approved in principle the proposal to recommend the
appointment of a Royal Commission. It was proposed, after
consultation with the other Ministers concerned, that the terms of
reference should b e : " T o enquire into the present arrangements
for the administration of justice at Assizes and at Quarter Sessions
outside Greater London, and to report what reforms should be
made for the more convenient,' economic and efficient disposal of
the civil and criminal business at present dealt with by those
courts ".
In discussion there was general agreement that an inquiry was
necessary and that it was of sufficient importance to be undertaken
by a Royal Commission. The chairman should be a layman with
wide administrative experience, and it would be important that the
financial aspects of the system of Assizes and Quarter Sessions and
the desirability of the State acquiring court premises outside
London should be carefully considered.
The Cabinet—
(1) Agreed that it was desirable that an inquiry should be
undertaken into the system of Assizes and Quarter
Sessions outside London on the lines proposed in
C (66) 123.
(2) Took note that the Prime Minister would submit to The
Queen proposals for the appointment of a Royal
Commission on Assizes and Quarter Sessions.
Cabinet Office,
2nd August,
S.W.1,
1966.