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THIS DOCUMENT IS T H E PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC M A J E S T V S
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
November
GOVERNMENT
1941.
Copy No.
SECRET.
W.M. (41).
111th Conclusions.
TO' B E
KEPT U N D E R
LOCK
A N D KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to'
ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR CABINET 111 (41).
CONCLUSIONS
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 1 0 Downing
S.W. 1, on Tuesday, November 1 1 , 1 9 4 1 , at 5 P . M .
Street,
Present: The Right Hon. W I N S T O N S. C H U R C H I L L , M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair). The Right Hon. Sir J O H N A N D E R S O N , The Right Hon. A N T H O N Y E D E N , M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign
M.P., Lord President of the Council.
Affairs.
The Right Hon. A . G R E E N W O O D , M.P., The Right Hon. L O R D B E A V E R B R O O K ,
Minister of Supply (Items 5 - 8 ) .
Minister without Portfolio.
The Right Hon. E R N E S T B E V I N , M.P.,
The Right Hon. Sir K I N G S L E Y W O O D ,
Minister of Labour and National
M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Service. "
The following were also present
The Right Hon. H E R B E R T M O R R I S O N , The Right Hon. V I S C O U N T C R A N B O R N E ,
M.P., Secretary of State for the
Secretary of State for Dominion
Home Department and Minister of
Affairs (Items 1 - 6 ) .
Home Security (Items 1 - 6 ) .
The Right Hon. L. S. A M E R Y , M.P., The Right Hon. L O R D M O Y N E , SecreSecretary of State for India and
tary of State for the Colonies
(Items 1 - 6 ) .
Secretary of State for Burma
(Items 1 - 6 ) .
The Right Hon. A. V. A L E X A N D E R , Captain the Right Hon. H. D.
M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty
M A R G E S S O N , M.P., Secretary of State
(Items 1 - 6 ) .
for War (Items 1 - 6 ) .
The Right Hon. Sir A R C H I B A L D The Right Hon. B R E N D A N B R A C K E N ,
SINCLAIR,
Bt., M . P . , Secretary of
M.P., Minister
of
Information
State for Air (Items 1 - 6 ) .
(Items 1 - 6 ) .
The Right Hon. H U G H D A L T O N , M . P . , The Hon. Sir A L E X A N D E R C A D O G A N ,
Minister of Economic
Warfare
Permanent Under-Secretary of State
(Item 6 ) .
for Foreign Affairs (Items 1 - 6 ) .
Admiral of the Fleet Sir D U D L E Y General Sir J O H N D I L L , Chief of the
P O U N D , First Sea Lord and Chief of
Imperial General Staff (Items 1 - 6 ) .
Naval Staff (Items 1 - 6 ) .
Air Chief Marshal Sir C H A R L E S F. A . Major-General Sir P. M I T C H E L L , Chief
PORTAL,
Chief of the Air Staff
Political Officer, Occupied Terri­
(Items 1 - 6 ) .
tories, East Africa (Item 5 ) .
Lieut.-General Sir W. P L A T T , General
Officer Coinmanding-in-Chief, East
Africa (Item 5 ) ;
Secretariat.
Sir
EDWARD
BRIDGES.
Major-General Sir H A S T I N G S
[23142]
ISMAY.
Mr.
W.
Mr.
L.
D.
F.
WILKINSON.
BURGIS.
WAR CABINET 111 (41).
CONTENTS.
Minute No. 1.
Subject.
Page
141
Parliament
D e b a t e OH t h e A d d r e s s .
Naval, Military and Air Operations
141
Air Operations. Naval Operations: S h i p p i n g losses. Military Operations: U.S.S.R.
3.
Par E a s t
142.
Co-operation with the Netherlands Government.
4y
5.
6.
142
Air Policy
Ethiopia
Blockade
....
I n t e r c e p t i o n of F r e n c h c o n v o y en route
7.
War Cabinet Arrangements ....
81
UTSi&R.
142
....
145
from M a d a g a s c a r .
....
....
....
146
146,
Parliament.
Debate on the
Address.
1. The Prime Minister said that he thought the Debate on the
Address should be allowed to continue over Wednesday and
Thursday, the 12th and 13th November, and also Tuesday and
Wednesday, the 18th and 19th November, if so desired. There
should be the fullest opportunity for the expression of views, but
it would, of course, be necessary to move the House into Secret
Session at once if airy dangerous topic was touched on. He hoped
that Ministers generally, and in particular the Foreign Secretary
and First Lord of the Admiralty, would find it possible to be on the
Front Bench for a considerable time during the progress of the
Debate.
The Prime Minister indicated some of the topics he proposed
to refer to in his speech in the Debate on the Address. He did not
propose to be drawn into discussion of strategical matters.
The War Cabinet took note, with approval, of this
statement.
Naval, Military
2. The Chiefs of Staff gave the following information in
and Air
amplification of Cabinet War Room Records Nos. 795-800 :—*
Operations.
Summary of aircraft losses since the 5th November :—
(Previous
Home Theatre-— Reference:
W . M . (41) 1 0 9 t h
Enemy— Conclusions,
14 destroyed. M i n u t e 3.)
9 probable. Air O p e r a t i o n s .
13 damaged. Our Own—
24 fighters (3 pilots safe).
52 bombers.
7 Coastal Command aircraft.
Overseas Theatre— Enemy—­
10 destroyed. 4 probable. 4 damaged. Our Own—­
18 destroyed. 18 damaged. In the last six days we had made 690 bomber sorties,
compared with 237 sorties by the enemy against this country; of
which only 82 had penetrated inland.
On the night of the 7th/8th November 400 bombers had been
despatched, of which 37 had been lost, mainly on account of weather
conditions. The forecasts had been fairly good, although it had
been known that there was a strong wind. After the last forecast
had been received weather conditions had worsened. The wind had
shifted 35 degrees and had increased 10 m.p.h. in velocity. There
had been cloud up to 18,000 feet, with heavy icing. As a result,
fuel expenditure bad been heavy and many of our aircraft had gone
off their course on the return journey. It was possible that this
accounted for most of the 37 casualties.
Seventeen fighters had been lost in a sweep against a target at
extreme range on the 8th November. A number of fighters had got
off their course, and probably failed to return owing to a fuel
shortage.
,
[23142]
B 2
The Prime Minister said that instructions had several times
been given that attacks should not be pressed too hard if the weather
was unfavourable. In battle, heavy losses must be faced; but it was
undesirable to expose our aircraft to extreme hazards in the course
of routine operations. Clear instructions must be given to the
Commanders-in-Chief that in planning operations they should take
into account the need to build up our Air Force so as to have a
stronger force available in the Spring.
Naval
Operations.
Shipping Losses.
Military
Operations.
U.S.S.E. The Prime Minister congratulated the Admiralty on the
brilliant action by H.M. Ships A urora, Penelope, Lively and Lance
against an Italian convoy during the night of the 8th/9th November.
Aircraft from H.M. Auxiliary Aircraft-Carrier Audacity had
brought down two Focke Wulf aircraft while escorting a convoy to
Gibraltar. One of our aircraft had been shot down.
During the previous six days 22,000 tons of shipping had been
reported sunk. This figure included one belated report.
The Russians appeared to have carried out a successful counterattack on the Murmansk front, probably about six weeks ago. Two
German mountain divisions on this front had been relieved. The
Germans were negotiating for their withdrawal through Sweden.
The Germans yesterday claimed the capture of Tikvin on the
Leningrad-Vologda Railway (250 miles from Vologda). They were
attacking Tula heavily from the north-west with armoured forma­
tions. The Russians had concentrated reserves in this area and
considered the situation was in hand. Nearly the whole of the
Crimea had been overrun except for Sevastopol and the Kerch
Peninsula.
The general picture was heartening.
The situation had
stabilised on the greater part of the Russian front. There was no
indication of the Finnish forces ceasing to take part in active
operations. The near future would probably see a further German
attempt against Moscow and Rostov.
The War Cabinet took note of the above statements.
3. The War Cabinet had some discussion on the situation in
the Far East, a record of which is contained in the Secretary's
Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.
Far East.
Co-operation
with
Netherlands
Government.
(Previous
Reference:
W . M . (41) 1 0 8 t h
Conclusions,
M i n u t e 5.)
Air Policy.
(Previous
ReferenceW . M . (41) 1 0 4 t h
4. The War Cabinet agreed to defer for one month the con­
sideration of the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air
(W.P. (41) 260). The view taken was that action on the lines
proposed would be inopportune at the present time.
Conclusions,
M i n u t e 2.)
.
:
Ethiopia. '
!
5. The War Cabinet had before t h e m ­
(Previous
(1) A report of a Committee under the Chairmanship of the
Reference:
: "
Lord President of the. Council (W.P. (41) 261).
W . M . (41) 1 0 3 r d
(2) A memorandum by the Secretary of State forthe Dominions
C o n c l u s i o n s , . , - (.W.P, (41) 263) setting out.the special interests of Field;' - - " Marshal Smuts and ,the-Union* Government in regard to
Miwte &)
' "
-v. the administration of Ethiopia.
f
;
0
;
1
After a short preliminary discussion, Lieutenant-General
Sir William Platt and Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell entered
the meeting. Discussion ensued as to our military
interests.
Lieutenant-General Sir William Platt said that the War Office
wanted the road kept open through Ethiopia from Kenya to the Red
Sea, as an alternative to the sea route. The Air Ministry also
attached importance to the air facilities in the country and to the
maintenance of a meteorological station at Addis Ababa. The
position would, however, be greatly changed once the Italian force
at Gondar had been captured and all the Italian civilians had been
evacuated. If, at the same time, the British troops in Ethiopia were
to be removed, the maintenance of adequate communications with
the country would be a matter of relative indifference. Sir Philip
Mitchell said that it would probably be necessary to leave 300 or
400 Italians to run the railway. These would, however, stay of their
own accord, and would make their own terms with the Emperor.
Removal of Italian civilians.
Sir William Platt said that without the use of Jibuti the
Italian civilians could be removed at the rate of about 1,000 a week.
With the resources of Jibuti available a much higher rate could be
achieved.
The Prime Minister said that the present policy was to allow
the blockade of Jibuti to continue for another month.
Sir Philip Mitchell said that while the question was mainly a
matter of transport, at the present time, however, destinations had
only been found for some 14,000 of the Italian civilians.
Dealing with the question of internal security, Sir Philip
Mitchell said that the Emperor was now in a weak position. The
reason for this was that he was the only important leader in
Ethiopia who had not got an army of his own. It was necessary to
create one for him, and steps to this end had been set on foot. The
Emperor was anxious to put an end to the feudal system of govern­
ment, and to avoid undue reliance on the Rasses. He was still in
dispute with Ras Sayoum. Given reasonable time to establish
himself, the Emperor should be able to maintain his position,
provided that his local Governors did not commit atrocities on the
subject tribes, who were now armed.
The discussion then turned on the terms of the draft
A greement.
The Lord President explained that the Agreement was based on
the instructions given to Sir Philip Mitchell after the meeting of
the War Cabinet held on the 9th June last. The draft correctly
interpreted the instructions given by the Cabinet, subject to the
important qualification that in a number of respects Sir Philip
Mitchell had felt bound to defer to arguments put forward by the
Emperor that complete acceptance of the Cabinefs instructions
would make Ethiopia indistinguishable from a protectorate. The
draft Agreement had been reported to the Committee under his
Chairmanship as in the main an agreed document between the
Foreign Office and the War Office, subject to certain outstanding
points.
The first ten Articles were read to the War Cabinet. The conclusion generally expressed was that some provisions of the draft Agreement were more appropriate to a protectorate than to,^anv 7
independent native State.
.
f
' t'0^^^^0(ip^f^^^4^^j^i%
thought that our policy should
, be defined as follows
.^x-iihiwio^jm & J^aoi
vv:)-sm (1) An endeavour should be made; to remove the Italian:
1
JTTS&i)^^
as possible. Tt must
be assumed that the facilities of Jibuti would not be
available for a month. Thereafter endeavours should
be made to get them out of the country a t the rate of
five or six thousand a week.
(2) All military rights must be retained until the Italian force
in Gondar had been captured, and the prisoners captured
in this operation and the Italian civilians had been got
out of the country.
(3) In the meantime we should proceed to help the Emperor to
build up an army to enable him to maintain his position.
We would also provide him with advisers who would be
his servants.
(4) An agreement should be signed with the Emperor as quickly
as possible. This, however, should be on much simpler
lines than the draft agreement, the provisions of which
had been read to the War Cabinet.
(5) We should undertake to make payments to the Emperor to
enable him to maintain his position until the inter­
national settlement at the end of the war.
No doubt we should be able to use the power of the
purse to secure some of the objectives set out in the draft
agreement which it was undesirable to provide
explicitly in that agreement. Some part of the payment
could also be regarded as rent for, e.g., the air facilities
we required.
(6) We should make it clear that we did not propose to continue
paying a subsidy to Ethiopia after the international
settlement at the end of the war.
(7) Diplomatic relations should be resumed as soon as possible,
though it must be clearly understood that, while
military operations continued, those relations would have
to be subject to special limitations. For example, the
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief must have direct
access to the Emperor.
General agreement was expressed in the War Cabinet with this
general policy. The following points were made in regard to i t : —
(i) Sir Philip Mitchell said that he feared that it would take
longer than the Prime Minister contemplated to get the
Italians out of the country. The Foreign Secretary said
that he thought it was important that this period should
not be unduly delayed, as otherwise we should be faced
with trouble in Ethiopia.
(ii) On the question of resuming diplomatic relations,
Sir Philip Mitchell pointed out that the appointment
of a diplomatic representative at Addis Ababa at the
present moment would present certain difficulties, since
the problems with which he had been faced were mainly
administrative.
Considerable administrative work
remained to be done before the Emperor would have an
organisation which could stand on its own.
It was agreed that this was a matter which would
require special consideration.
, '
s
(Hi) The Chancellor of the Exchequer was anxious that it
,, should be provided.that the Exchequer assistance to the
/
Emperor should take the form of a fixed,sum.
The Lord President of the Council said that while
a fixed subvention might be appropriate for part of the
field, there were-certain services which he thought would
have to be dealt with on a different basis in the early
stages.
(iv) The Secretary of State for Dominion.Affairs
said that it
was important to advise Field-Marshal Smuts in advance
of whatever decision was taken, for his position in South
Africa on this question was a difficult one. This was
the more important, since the policy now decided upon
might appear at first sight to be somewhat inconsistent
with that announced on the 6th February.
The War Cabinet decided as follows :-—
I. General agreement was expressed with the policy outlined
by the Prime Minister under heads (l)-(7) above.
II. The Lord President of the Council was invited to arrange
for the draft agreement to be revised, as a matter of
urgency, on the lines indicated in discussion. A repre­
sentative of the Treasury should be associated for the
settlement of the financial articles.
III. The Secretary of State for War was invited to convene a
Technical. Committee of representatives of the Depart­
ments concerned: to- arrange a programme for the
reception in appropriate countries of the Italian
civilians still in Ethiopia, and to put forward a scheme
to enable them to be removed from the country as quickly
as possible.
IV. The Secretary for Dominion Affairs was invited to concert
with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the terms
of a telegram to Field-Marshal Smuts explaining the
position to him.
1
Blockade.
Interception of
French Convoy
en route from
Madagascar.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (41) 1 0 8 t h
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the
Foreign Secretary (W.P. (41) 264) proposing that no specific com­
munication should be made by His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom to the Vichy Government about these ships.
The Minister of Economic Warfare said that he concurred in
this course. We had three different grounds on which we could
justify the action taken; but if we made a statement at the present
time we might weaken our case.
The War Cabinet concurred in the course proposed by the
Foreign Secretary.
The Minister of Economic Warfare reminded the War Cabinet
that a ship with 7,000 tons of rubber on board had put in to
Casablanca.
The question arose as to what action it would be allowable to
take to intercept this cargo if an attempt was made to send part of
it to Metropolitan France by sea. Would it, for instance, be
allowable to enter Spanish territorial waters for this purpose ?
The Foreign Secretary thought that this course might expose
us to certain risks at the present time.
The -Prime Minister proposed, and the War Cabinet agreed,
that the matter was one which should be settled by discussion
between the Ministers concerned.
War Cabinet
Arrangements,
7. The Prime Minister said that he proposed that in future
the usual arrangement would be that the Meeting of the War
Cabinet on Monday would be attended, as at present, by War
Cabinet Ministers and the other Ministers who normally attended
Meetings, together with the three Chiefs of Staff; but the Meeting
on Thursday would be attended by War Cabinet Ministers only
unless some matter arose which made it necessary to invite other
Ministers to attend. These would continue to be the two regular
Meetings of the War Cabinet, but other Meetings would, of course,
be held as and when necessary. If the War Cabinet agreed, a
detailed note would be circulated as to the revised arrangements.
The War Cabinet approved the arrangements proposed.
U.S.S.R.
8. The War Cabinet were informed of certain communications
between the Prime Minister and M. Stalin.
A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary's
Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.
Great George Street, S. W. 1,
November 11, 1941.