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Catalogue Reference:CAB/24/227
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[This document is the Property o£ His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
Printed
jor the Cabinet.
January
1932.
SECRET.
C P . 3 (32).
Copy No
.
CABINET.
MEMORANDUM
BY
THE
SECRETARY
OF
STATE
FOR
INDIA.
I circulate for the consideration of m y colleagues a draft of the s t a t e m e n t to b e
m a d e on behalf of the G o v e r n m e n t a t the close of the B u r m a R o u n d T a b l e Conference.
,
S. H .
n
I N D I A OFFICE,
8 t h J a n u a r y 1932.
Draft Statement of His Majesty's Governments Policy.
1. His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t are p r e p a r e d , if a n d w h e n they are satisfied t h a t
t h e desire of t h e people of B u r m a is t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t of their c o u n t r y should
b e s e p a r a t e d from t h a t of India, to t a k e steps, subject to the approval of P a r l i a m e n t , to
e n t r u s t responsibility for t h e g o v e r n m e n t of B u r m a to a Legislature r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
of t h e people of B u r m a a n d a Ministry responsible to it, w i t h t h e conditions a n d
qualifications w h i c h I am a b o u t to specify. T h i s responsibility would extend not
only to Provincial s u b j e c t s — r e s e r v e d as well a s t r a n s f e r r e d — b u t also to subjects
w h i c h h a v e h i t h e r t o b e e n t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a .
2. His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t consider t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t u r e should consist of two
Houses. T h e U p p e r House should be composed p a r t l y of elected m e m b e r s a n d p a r t l y
of m e m b e r s n o m i n a t e d b y t h e Goveimor. I n size it should be about one-third of t h e
Lower House.
T h e Lower House should be composed of m e m b e r s directly elected, a n d provision
should be m a d e to e n s u r e a d e q u a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of minoi ity c o m m u n i t i e s a n d
special interests, e.g. commerce ( E u r o p e a n , Chinese a n d I n d i a n as well as B u r m a n ) .
I will refer to t h i s point a g a i n later.
His Majestj^s G o v e r n m e n t consider t h a t at t h e outset a Lower House of 1 2 0 - 3 0
will constitute as large a L e g i s l a t u r e as is at p r e s e n t p r a c t i c a b l e a n d compatible w i t h
efficiency. T h e two Houses will contain almost double t h e n u m b e r of elected
m e m b e r s in t h e p r e s e n t L e g i s l a t u r e .
T h e p o w e r s of t h e two Houses should b e equal in respect of all legislative­
m e a s u r e s , i n c l u d i n g Money Bills, b u t Supply should vest in the Lower House.
Provision should be m a d e for t h e resolution of differences of opinion b e t w e e n t h e
two Houses b y m e a n s of joint sessions.
-
3. T h e Ministry should consist of a b o u t six, b u t n o t more than eight, Ministers,
w h o should be appointed by the Governor, should hold office d u r i n g h i s pleasure,
and should be collectively responsible to the Legislature. I n a p p o i n t i n g Ministers
t h e Governor should normally seek t h e advice of t h e leader of t h e p a r t y c o m m a n d i n g
t h e largest following in the Lower House. T h e Governor should h a v e t h e r i g h t to
p r e s i d e over m e e t i n g s of t h e Ministry.
4. I n existing conditions certain of the subjects h i t h e r t o classed as Central a n d
excluded from t h e p u r v i e w of any Provincial L e g i s l a t u r e should be reserved for the
personal a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e Governor.
A p a r t from m a t t e r s s u c h as the bestowal of titles and the regulation of ceremonial
a n d ecclesiastical a d m i n i s t r a t i o n — t o which special considerations a p p l y — t h e Governor
should administer, in responsibility to P a r l i a m e n t , the subjects of Defence "and
E x t e r n a l Affairs.
T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the F e d e r a t e d S h a n States and of the other areas now
described as " B a c k w a r d T r a c t s , " b u t in future proposed to be k n o w n as " E x c l u d e d
Areas," should be vested in the Governor. T h e relations between the Shan S t a t e s
F e d e r a t i o n and the rest of B u r m a will r e q u i r e consideration.
I t is clear t h a t t h e G o v e r n o r should not be d e p e n d e n t upon the Legislature for t h e
s u p p l y r e q u i r e d for the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of reserved subjects, a n d t h a t h e should b e
563
60
1.32
empowered to take such steps jn t h e l a s t resort as may be necessary to ensure t h a t
the necessary funds (including emergency supply) are forthcoming. He should also
b e given power to secure the e n a c t m e n t of such legislative measures as may b e
essential for t h e discharge of his responsibility for these subjects.
I n the view of His j\'lajesty's G o v e r n m e n t it is not practicable to divide in any
m a n n e r the responsibility for any reserved subject between the Legislature a n d
P a r l i a m e n t . Nevertheless, they recognise t h a t these subjects m u s t be a m a t t e r of
increasing concern to t h e Legislature ; a n d they consider t h a t opportune ty should be
provided at t h e G o v e r n o r s discretion for the Legislature to be informed of a n d to
discuss t h e m .
5. As r e g a r d s F i n a n c e , the separation of B u r m a from I n d i a would involve t h e
d i s c h a r g e of functions of w h i c h the Provincial Government a n d the Legislature have
necessarily h a d no o p p o r t u n i t y to a c q u i r e experience. It is no exaggeration to say
t h a t the success of the new Constitution no less t h a n the general prosperity of the
country will d e p e n d on B u r m a ' s ability to build u p h e r credit in the money m a r k e t s
of the world, a n d t h a t it is therefore essential in the interests of B u r m a that confidence
should b e established from the s t a r t in t h e soundness of h e r financial policy a n d in
the m a n a g e m e n t of credit a n d currency questions.
I n these circumstances His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t are of opinion t h a t of the wide
field covered by the t e r m F i n a n c e , t h a t portion which comprises t h e direction of
m o n e t a r y policy, i n c l u d i n g e x c h a n g e , currency a n d coinage, should be reserved to the
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Governor.
His i\lajesty's G o v e r n m e n t consider t h a t the Statute should contain provisions to
e n s u r e t h a t t h e Governor should be enabled to intervene t o p r e v e n t the adoption of
m e a s u r e s w h i c h would, in h i s opinion, seriously prejudice the financial stability a n d
the credit of B u r m a , and t h a t it should be laid down in the Statute t h a t the requisite
funds for t h e r e g u l a r p a y m e n t of B u r m a ' s p u b l i c debt obligations a n d the service of
future loans (including a d e q u a t e provision for redemption) should not b e d e p e n d e n t
on the vote of t h e Legislature. T h e b u i l d i n g u p of credit d e p e n d s mainly on t h e
d u e fulfilment o£ obligations a n d t h e p u r s u i t of sound b u d g e t a r y policy.
I t would also be necessary to provide that, like the supply r e q u i r e d for the reserved
d e p a r t m e n t s , the salaries a n d pensions (including Family Pensions and P r o v i d e n t
F u n d s ) of officers a p p o i n t e d u n d e r g u a r a n t e e s given by the Secretary of State should
not be d e p e n d e n t on t h e vote of the Legislature.
Subject to the foregoing limitations a n d provisions, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of financial
questions, i n c l u d i n g t h e power of taxation and raising r e v e n u e , fiscal policy a n d
e x p e n d i t u r e on objects outside t h e sphere of t h e G o v e r n o r s personal responsibility,
would b e e n t r u s t e d to the Ministry responsible to the Legislature.
I n view of the w i d e r r a n g e of finance which would devolve on the G o v e r n m e n t of
B u r m a as the result of separation, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that t h e
S t a t u t e should provide for the a p p o i n t m e n t b y the Secretary of State of a Financial
Adviser to the Government, i n respect of m a t t e r s reserved to the personal
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Governor, t h e F i n a n c i a l Adviser would be t h e Governor's
Adviser. Outside this field, all proposals h a v i n g an i m p o r t a n t financial significance
should be referred to him a n d provision should be m a d e to ensure t h a t any objections
t h a t h e m a y h a v e to m e a s u r e s proposed should be m a d e k n o w n to the Ministry a n d
t h e Governor.
6. T h e efficiency of the p u b l i c service is essential to the success of responsible
g o v e r n m e n t ; a n d His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t are anxious to secure in B u r m a ' s interests
t h a t t h e r e is no d i m i n u t i o n of t h e efficiency of the administrative m a c h i n e . T h e y
consider that provision should b e m a d e in t h e Statute for the establishment of a
P u b l i c Services Commission exercising like functions to those discharged by such
"Commissions in I n d i a .
T h e S t a t u t e m u s t also contain provision for t h e protection of all r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e d
to p e r s o n s r e c r u i t e d b y the Crown or t h e Secretary of State before t h e establishment
of t h e n e w Constitution, a n d to s u c h persons as may be recruited by the Crown or
t h e " Secretary of State u n d e r the new Constitution for service in B u r m a .
The
Governor m u s t have full control over officials serving in the field directly administered
by h i m ; h e should further have a special responsibility a n d the necessary powers to
e n a b l e h i m to protect the r i g h t s a n d interests of officers recruited by the Crown or
the Secretary of State and s e r v i n g in the field administered by Ministers.
' 7. W i t h r e g a r d to subjects in the administration of which t h e Governor ordinarily
would act on t h e . advice of Ministers, His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t consider t h a t
-arrangements m u s t be m a d e whereby in the last resort t h e peace a n d t r a n q u i l l i t y of
.any p a r t of B u r m a m a y be secured, serious p r e j u d i c e to t h e interests of any section of
t h e population m a y be avoided a n d I m p e r i a l interests protected. F o r these p u r p o s e s
-the Governor m u s t be empowered to act in responsibility to P a r l i a m e n t a n d to
i m p l e m e n t his decisions, if necessary, by legislative enactment, administrative action,
or a p p r o p r i a t i o n of revenue.
A d e q u a t e powers m u s t be vested in the Governor for the p u r p o s e of e n a b l i n g the
K i n g ' s g o v e r n m e n t to be carried on in the event of a b r e a k d o w n of t h e Constitution.
8. His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t r e g r e t t h a t t h e Conference h a s not been able to
r e a c h a g r e e m e n t on t h e question of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of minority communities a n d
special interests in the Legislature. T h e y hope t h a t a g r e e m e n t may still be achieved,
for settlement by consent m u s t be far more satisfactory t h a n a decision imposed b y
any outside authority. F a i l i n g a g r e e m e n t His Majesty's Government would find it
very difficult to enforce a n y scheme which did not recognise the claims of m i n o r i t i e s
-and special interests to representation by s e p a r a t e electorates.
Apart from this question of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n the Constitution m u s t contain provisions
d e a l i n g w i t h t h e difficult question of commercial discrimination.
T h e precise
a r r a n g e m e n t s to b e m a d e will r e q u i r e careful examination, b u t it is clear t h a t t h e
m a i n p r i n c i p l e t o . b e followed lnust be t h a t of equal r i g h t s a n d opportunities for
B r i t i s h subjects ordinarily r e s i d e n t or c a r r y i n g on t r a d e or business in B u r m a ;
a n d t h e Governor should have power to secure t h a t this principle is observed b o t h i n
legislation a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
9. The Governor would necessariby c o n t i n u e to have discretion, on behalf of t h e
Crown, to refuse his assent to legislative m e a s u r e s a n d to r e t u r n Bills for r e ­
-consideration, a n d , subject to any i n s t r u c t i o n s issued to him, t h e existing p o w e r s of
reservation a n d disallowance would r e m a i n .
10. To s u m u p , H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t s intention is that in the event of
B u r m a electing to p u r s u e h e r political development a p a r t from India, responsibility
should be devolved u p o n her Legislature for t h e administration not only of the
subjects which Avill fall w i t h i n the r a n g e of Provincial G o v e r n m e n t s in India, b u t also
of subjects w h i c h will be a d m i n i s t e r e d in I n d i a by t h e Central Authority. B u t in.
o r d e r that the stability of the realm may be m a i n t a i n e d a n d financial stability secured,
t h e Governor m u s t have the powers a l r e a d y set forth. I t will be t h e endeavour of
H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t to e n s u r e t h a t these powers shall not be allowed to p r e j u d i c e
t h e a d v a n c e of B u r m a to full self-government.
1 1 . T h e Governor would obviously consider h i s relations with h i s Ministers a n d
t h e Legislature, before m a k i n g use of these powers ; he would stay h i s h a n d as l o n g
.as possible and b e slow to use his own powers in s u c h a way as to enable h i s
Ministers to cast u p o n h i m a responsibility w h i c h p r o p e r l y is theirs. If Ministers are
to develop responsible g o v e r n m e n t they on their side m u s t refrain from s h e l t e r i n g
b e h i n d the G o v e r n o r s special powers, and leaving to h i m the o d i u m of an u n p o p u l a r
decision for w h i c h they, if they are to d i s c h a r g e their responsibilities, o u g h t to be
-answerable. T h e s e p o w e r s are i n t e n d e d to lie i n reserve a n d to b e k e p t in t h e
background.
Given goodwill in w o r k i n g the n e w Constitution t h e occasions on
w h i c h they would be called into effect should be r a r e .
12. I t is on these g e n e r a l lines t h a t H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t will be p r e p a r e d to
frame, for the approval of P a r l i a m e n t , a Constitution for a B u r m a separated from
I n d i a . B u t t h e first step is to ascertain w h e t h e r the people of B u r m a endorse t h e
provisional decision t h a t separation should take place.
To enable them to take a
decision on this matter they should be aware, not only of the g e n e r a l n a t u r e of the
-Constitution proposed, b u t also of t h e financial consequences of separation.
13. T h e e x p e r t s ' r e p o r t on the financial p r o b l e m h a s already been published. His
Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t will take steps, in co-operation w i t h the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a
a n d G o v e r n m e n t of B u r m a , to press on the consideration of the question to a decision.
14. W i t h this material before t h e m t h e people of B u r m a will be in a position to
-decide w h e t h e r or not they are in favour of separation from India. His Majesty's
Government, consider t h a t t h e decision m i g h t best be t a k e n after a g e n e r a l election
a t w h i c h the broad issue h a d been placed before the electorate. T h e life of t h e
p r e s e n t Legislative Council has been extended for a year, b u t an election m u s t be
held before the e n d of t h e year.
T h a t decision will determine w h e t h e r on the one h a n d B u r m a should b e
i n d e p e n d e n t of I n d i a w i t h a Constitution on the lines set forth above or on the other­
h a n d should r e m a i n a Province of I n d i a w i t h the prospects indicated i n t h e
proceedings of the two sessions of the I n d i a n Round Table Conference—and i n this
connection it should be r e m e m b e r e d t h a t if an Indian Federation is established it
cannot be on the basis t h a t m e m b e r s can leave it as a n d w h e n they choose.
15. I t was m a d e plain in the course of t h e first session of the I n d i a n Conference
t h a t if it is shown t h a t t h e desire of t h e people oil Burma is t h a t their Government
should be separated from t h a t of India, I n d i a will not oppose her choice. But there
are m a n y m a t t e r s of joint concern to w h i c h r e g a r d m u s t be h a d by both parties. T h e
Consultative Committee of t h e I n d i a n Conference which is to be set u p may afford
a channel t h r o u g h w h i c h I n d i a n opinion could be expressed on such questions."
As was observed b y the B u r m a Sub-Committee of the first I n d i a n Conference, it is
i m p o r t a n t t h a t separation should cause a m i n i m u m disturbance of t h e close trade
relations between Burma a n d India, a n d a r r a n g e m e n t s will have to be m a d e in
r e g a r d to these relations before separation takes place.
16. A n o t h e r m a t t e r which r e q u i r e s close consideration before His Majesty's
Government can a n n o u n c e any final opinion on it is t h a t of the franchise,,
i n c l u d i n g t h e electoral a r r a n g e m e n t s to be established in B u r m a u n d e r the new
Constitution. Adult suffrage at the age of 2 1 has been advocated by some for both
sexes in view of t h e s t a t u s enjoyed b y women in B u r m a ; others consider t h a t t h e
present basis of franchise, wider as it is t h a n in India generally, is sufficiently
wide for some years to come. H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t are not satisfied that
t h e practical administrative difficulties involved b y any considerable extension of
t h e franchise could in p r e s e n t conditions b e overcome. T h e m e t h o d of election
for the elected portion of t h e U p p e r House, t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s to b e m a d e to increase
the n u m b e r of constituencies for t h e Lower House, and t h e ratio of women to men
voters are all m a t t e r s w h i c h require careful w e i g h i n g before provision to deal with
t h e m can b e included in a Constitution Bill. T h e r e is m u c h to be done before a
Constitution can b e finally framed, a n d H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t will lose n o time
in s e t t i n g in h a n d t h e necessary work.
17. His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t h a v e t h o u g h t it r i g h t and useful to set out as above­
in considerable detail t h e p l a n s which they have i n mind. I t is, of course, possible
t h a t on further consideration a n d in w o r k i n g out a n d drafting t h e new Constitution,
modifications in detail of w h a t has been indicated m a y p r o v e necessary ; b u t His
Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t believe that t h e s t a t e m e n t I have read p r e s e n t s a clear p i c t u r e
of the g e n e r a l constitutional scheme.
18. If this Conference had achieved n o t h i n g else it would yet have served a
g r e a t p u r p o s e in e s t a b l i s h i n g direct a n d personal contact between representatives of
t h e British P a r l i a m e n t a n d leaders of p u b l i c opinion in B u r m a .