(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:cab/66/26/23
Image Reference:0001
1 0 BE KEPT U N D E R LOCK A N D KE\
Itis requested that special cars may be taken t
anaure tha 8ecrecy of this documont.
jH
I S
Z
//a
y
11
Jr
D O O U M T ^ I S ^ T ^ ^ P R O P E R T Y OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT)
S E G R E T WjP-^ ) ?
2
2
3
22nd JUNE
19U2 COPY NO.
WAR CABINET
S H I P P I N G COMMITTEE
F I R S T REPORT
^
DOCUMENT IS T H E P R O P E R T Y OF H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T .
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
June
1942.
Copy No.
SECRET. S.C. (42) 20.
June 22,
(Final.)
1942.
TO B E K E P T
UNDER
LOCK
AND
KEY.
I t is requested t h a t special care m a y be t a k e n to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR CABINET.
Shipp
mittee.
FIRST REPORT.
P a r t 1 . — S U M M A R Y OF C O N C L U S I O N S .
We summarise our conclusions as follows:—
(a) On the assumptions set out in paragraph 3 below (with regard to ship­
building, losses, service requirements, civil requirements other than United
Kingdom imports, and American assistance), total non-tanker ocean-borne
imports may be estimated for the year 1942 at some 25£ million tons and may
be provisionally placed for the iirst six months of 1943 at 9£ million tons, giving
a total of 35 million tons for the eighteen-month period. Of this figure imports
of food and materials amount to 33 million tons. (Paragraphs 3 and 4.)
(b) The net consumption of importable food and materials for the same
period, assuming the continuance of our present consumption policy, would
amount to 4 1 - 4 million tons, leaving a deficiency of 8 - 4 million tons. (Para­
graphs 5 to 8.)
(c) If stocks were reduced to the minimum by the 30th June, 1943, a saving
of import requirements could be obtained of 6 -15 million tons. It would,
however, in any case, be hazardous to run down stocks to this extent, and it
would be out of the question to do so unless we could rely on obtaining, during
the second half of 1943, sufficient assistance from the United States to enable
us to import on a scale which would cover our consumption. This is likely to be
not less than 15 million tons (as compared with an expected import of 9£ million
tons in the first half of the year). This level of imports would be barely sufficient
to meet current requirements and would leave no margin for building up stocks
to meet- unforeseen emergencies. (Paragraphs 10, 11 and 24.)
(d) We have examined a number of possible methods by which the
consumption of imports might be reduced, as follows :—
(i) Obtaining additional supplies of food from home production. (This is
in large part dependent on factors, e.g., the weather, which are
outside our control.)
(ii) A further raising of the milling ratio.
(iii) Dilution of bread with rye, oats and barley. The use of the latter as
a diluent would involve a serious reduction in the output of beer.
(iv) Drawing upon the reserve of meat on the hoof.
(v) Reduction in consumption of fertilisers.
(vi) Reduction in consumption of materials (including steel) for purposes
other than direct war production. (Paragraphs 12 to 16.)
B
[23962] j i g
(e) We have also examined the possibilities of economising shipping used for
purposes other than bringing imports to the United Kingdom. A large part of
our total tonnage is employed in the interest of the fighting services, and anv
economy here would bring substantial relief to the United Kingdom import
position. For example, it is estimated that, if 100,000 tons of cargo shipping­
were transferred from combined military and importing use to purely importing
work on the North Atlantic for a period of twelve months, there would be a net
gain of imports into the United Kingdom of 375,000 tons.
(Paragraphs
17 to 19.)
s
v
(f) The extent to which it will be necessary to modify our present consump­
tion policy in order to reduce import requirements will depend not only on the
demands of the fighting services but also on the scale on which we obtain
assistance from the United States, both during the eighteen months ending
30th June, 1 9 4 3 , and during the ensuing period. (See Conclusion (c) above.)
For example, without additional assistance before mid-194i3, we should be
obliged to run down stocks to minimum levels, and, in addition, to effect
drastic consumption economies of the type listed at (d) above. If, on the
other hand, we were to obtain from the United States sufficient tonnage to
bring in an additional 2 million tons of imports in the first half of 1943, the
gap could be bridged either by running down stocks to the full extent shown at
(c) above (less any windfall supplies which might accrue from a good harvest) or
by a combination of destocking and consumption economies.
(Paragraphs
20 to 24.)
5
(g) It would, in our view, be unwise to await a precise intimation from
the United States Government of the amount of tonnage they propose to make
available for our assistance before taking action to reduce import requirements.
We are of the opinion that steps should be taken at once to consider such
economies as will on any prudent view of the future be necessary to safeguard the
position. (Paragraphs 25 and 28.)
. Part 2 . — R E P O R T .
Introductory.
1. By our terms of reference we are directed to p r e p a r e periodical reviews
of the s h i p p i n g situation.
2. I n this report we have attempted to survey the outlook for some distance
ahead and to consider whether, on the evidence available, our present rate ot
consumption of imported food and r a w materials can be justified or whether there
is a danger that, i n the early months of 1943, a situation m i g h t arise in which
we should have to choose between the requirements of our m i l i t a r y plans and the
essential needs of civilian consumption.
Importing
Capacity of Available
Shipping.
3. Excluding any further A m e r i c a n assistance, the a m o u n t of ocean-borne
non-tanker imports into the U n i t e d K i n g d o m may amount to about 25^ million
tons in 1942 (based upon an estimate by the M i n i s t r y of W a r T r a n s p o r t of imports
falling w i t h i n the range of 24-27 million tons), and to about 9^ million tons in
the first six months of 1943. This estimate, which is necessarily provisional ana
subject to relatively wide deviations, is conditioned by the following
assumptions :—
(a) t h a t the output of ocean-going non-tanker tonnage in the United
Kingdom, C a n a d a and A u s t r a l i a will be a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 - 4 million
gross tons in 1942 and -8 million gross tons in the first half of 1943;
,(&) t h a t losses, from all causes, of ocean-going non-tanker tonnage operating
in B r i t i s h interests will be about 3-3 million gross tons in 1942 and
somewhat less t h a n half t h a t figure in the first half of 1943;
(c) that, a s now foreshadowed by the W a r Office, the requirements of the
fighting services for military purposes, including B r i t i s h comnnt­
ments for shipments to N o r t h R u s s i a a n d the Bolero movement, will call
for an effective increase of not more t h a n 1 million gross tons of ocean­
going non-tanker tonnage d u r i n g the period M a y to the end of 19*-'
and a further -5 million gross tons in the first half of 1943, exclusive
in each case of vessels u n d e r r e p a i r . (The M i n i s t r y of W a r Transport,
however, in framing their estimate of i m p o r t s into the U n i t e d
K i n g d o m have made allowance for the fact t h a t it is unlikely t h a t all
the a d d i t i o n a l demands would materialise simultaneously a n d t h a t
c e r t a i n of them would continue for limited periods only.)
(d) that there will be no m a t e r i a l a l t e r a t i o n in t h e t o n n a g e specifically
required for civil i m p o r t s into areas other t h a n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m ;
(e) that, a p a r t from tonnage a c c r u i n g to this country u n d e r the T o d d
A g r e e m e n t (-4 million gross tons, all of w h i c h is expected to become
available d u r i n g 1942), the existing measure of U n i t e d S t a t e s
assistance will be m a i n t a i n e d but n o t increased.
4. S u p p o r t is given to the above estimate of U n i t e d K i n g d o m i m p o r t s
by an estimate for the first eight months of this year, based on achieved i m p o r t s
and on recent and prospective loadings. T h i s indicates a n i m p o r t from J a n u a r y
to August of between 16-j a n d 17 million tons.
Imports.
Consumption of
5. The following table shows t h e estimated net consumption of importable
food and materials as expected to result from present p l a n s a n d policies, excluding
any consumption of food and m a t e r i a l s consequent on new operations such a s
Bolero. (It is assumed t h a t these r e q u i r e m e n t s will bs met from imports n o t
included in the 2 5 ^ million tons mentioned in p a r a g r a p h 3.) N e t consumption
in this context means consumption less home production less any i m p o r t s from
Eire not included in " home p r o d u c t i o n , " and can only be met from i m p o r t s
plus stock reductions.
- Food
...
Materials
1942.
F i r s t half,
1943.
(Million tons.)
J a n . 1, 1 9 4 2 ­
J u n e 30, 1943.
12-4
15-1
6-1
7-8
18-5
22-9
27-5
13-9
41-4
6. The prospective import of " M u n i t i o n s a n d Miscellaneous " (the former
Board of T r a d e p r o g r a m m e ) cannot be closely e s t i m a t e d b u t m a y be pwt a t
1 1 million tons i n 1942 and -9 million tons in the first half of 1943. Of t h i s
tobacco and other non-Government i m p o r t s account for -22 in 1942 a n d -12
in the first half of 1943.
Imports and Consumption
of
Imports.
7. The i m p o r t s i t u a t i o n may therefore be set f o r t h thus :
1942.
Ocean-borne i m p o r t s
...
Less munitions. & c
...
Import
of
food
and
m a t e r i a l s
Net
consumption
of
importable food a n d
materials
Deficiency
Import Situation
F i r s t half,
1943.
(Million tons.)
J a n . 1, 1 9 4 2 ­
J u n e 30, 1943.
25 - 5
1-1
—i—
24-4
9-5
-9
35-0
2-0
8-6
33 0
27-5
13-9
41-4
3-1
5-3
8-4
in 1942.
8. The m i n i m u m i m p o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s for 1942 were fixed in J a n u a r y
at 26 million tons, b u t since then the milling r a t i o h a s been increased, estimates
of home food p r o d u c t i o n have been revised u p w a r d , c e r t a i n reductions have
been made in t h e consumption of m a t e r i a l s a n d food, m i n i m u m stock
requirements of m a t e r i a l s have been revised downward, and supplies of m u n i t i o n s
to be imported have not reached the level expected. I t now a p p e a r s t h a t w i t h
an importation in 1942 of 2 5 ^ million tons, or even 24 million tons (the lowest
level envisaged by t h e M i n i s t r y of W a r T r a n s p o r t ) , stocks would not be reduced
[23962]
B 2
below minimum working levels by the end of the year. I t would be dangerous
however, to allow stocks to fall so far d u r i n g 1942 t h a t they would be inadequate
to tide us over the subsequent half-year. I t is, therefore, necessary to consider
the eighteen-month period to the middle of 1943 as a whole, and to see what steps
have to be taken to bridge t h e g a p of 8-4 million tons between-net consumption
and imports.
Import Situation tip to mid-1943: Means of Bridging the Gap.
9. There a r e five p r i n c i p a l courses of action which might be adopted
severally o r in combination to bring available imports and import requirements in
the eighteen months ending the 30th J u n e , 1943, into e q u a l i t y : —
(a) destocking;
(b) reduction in consumption of imports (United K i n g d o m ) ;
(c) economising in the use of s h i p p i n g for civilian purposes other than
U n i t e d Kingdom i m p o r t s ; id) economising in the use of s h i p p i n g by the armed forces; and (e) obtaining assistance i n s h i p p i n g from the U n i t e d States.
(In view of the recent decisions, taken by the Defence Committee (D.C. (S.)
(42) 3rd Meeting) r e g a r d i n g the p r i o r i t y status of shipbuilding, the transfer of
labour to shipyards and m a r i n e engineering establishments, and the order of
priority w i t h i n the A d m i r a l t y programme, we have not so f a r enquired into the
possibilities of relieving the s h i p p i n g situation through increased merchant ship­
building.)
Destocking.
10. I t is estimated by the M i n i s t r y of Food t h a t stocks could be reduced
over the eighteen-month period by 1-05 million tons a n d by the Office of the
Minister of P r o d u c t i o n t h a t materials stocks could be reduced by 5-1 million
tons, without c u t t i n g below t h e minimum working stocks set out in Tables I and
I I respectively of A p p e n d i x A .
11. Destocking of this order could, however, be safely embarked upon only
if it were morally certain t h a t the s h i p p i n g situation of the U n i t e d Nations in
the second half of 1943 and thereafter would be such as to p e r m i t us to import
on a scale sufficient to cover our reasonable requirements w i t h o u t further drawing
upon stocks. To ensure this our need of A m e r i c a n assistance will be even greater
in the second half t h a n in the first half of 1943.
Reduction in Consumption
of Imports:
Food.
12.—(a) 840,000 tons of wheat equivalent m i g h t on certain assumptions be
obtained for h u m a n consumption from the 1942 harvest, additional to the quantity
assumed in p a r a g r a p h 5 above when e s t i m a t i n g net consumption of imported
foods. The make-up of the increase, which is contingent upon target acreages
being attained, crop yields being average, and a smaller proportion of production
being retained on farms, is analysed in A p p e n d i x B. P e r h a p s two-thirds of the
increase is dependent upon factors, such as weather, which are beyond human
control, and only one-third on measures of policy. A s p a r t i a l offsets to this
increase, some 60,000 a d d i t i o n a l tons of wheat equivalent may be required for seed
purposes, and some 25,000 a d d i t i o n a l tons of i m p o r t s of concentrated foods may
be required to compensate for the reduction in home o u t p u t of livestock products
resulting from the fall in the q u a n t i t y of crops retained on farms.
(b) If the milling ratio were increased to 95 per cent, now, a net import
economy of some 265,000 tons might be achieved w i t h i n the period, allowance
being made for the import of concentrated foodstuffs to replace the consequential
falling off in home o u t p u t of livestock products and for e x t r a consumption o.
foods due to inability of the body to digest the full n u t r i t i o n a l value of 95 per
cent, flour. If the milling ratio were raised to 90 per cent, some 150,000 tons
of imports might be saved.
(c) Dilution of bread of 95 per cent, extraction by rye, barley and oats might
yield a net import economy of 530,000 tons in a full year. W i t h a n extraction
ratio of 90 per cent, the economy secured by dilution would be some 30,000 tons
more. Dehusking machinery for the milling of oats m i g h t not be installed tor
six months, but a s t a r t could be made before then in building u p a stock of home­
grown oats. T h e use of barley as a diluent (which accounts for some 250,000 tons
of the total import saving) would have the effect of c u t t i n g the beer output in halt.
(d) The reserve of meat on the hoof, i n c l u d i n g the b r e e d i n g stock of the
beef herds and their replacements is estimated a t not more t h a n 486,000 tons.
This estimate, however, is on the most favourable assumptions, a n d would
irobably not be realised in practice. Moreover, t h e bulk of the a d d i t i o n a l m e a t
would be of low grade, suitable only for m a n u f a c t u r e . T h e emergency s l a u g h t e r
of 10 per cent, of home-bred beef cattle, and 20 per cent, of ewes, all the wethers,
and all lambs not required for replacement purposes, would provide in the twelve
months to J u n e 1943 an a d d i t i o n of u p to 100,000 tons of home-produced m e a t
over normal supplies, a n d would save s h i p p i n g space for a corresponding volume
of imports. This, however, would be a t the expense of reductions in supplies of
home-produced meat in the following and subsequent y e a r s ; a n d would raise
o-rave issues of a g r i c u l t u r a l policy t h a t would need t h e most careful consideration.
13. The saving in i m p o r t s which would result from t h e full p r o g r a m m e of
consumption economies set forth under (b), (c) a n d (d) a m o u n t s to 895,000 tons.
If 500,000 tons is added as a mean probable figure for the a d d i t i o n a l s u p p l i e s of
food from home production, which m a y be expected u n d e r (a), the a g g r e g a t e
saving in imports would amount to a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1,400,000 tons. T h i s a g g r e g a t e
would be reduced by 85,000 tons if the milling r a t i o were raised to 90 per cent,
only instead of 95 per cent.; by 250,000 tons if barley were not used for the
dilution of b r e a d ; a n d by 100,000 tons if the slaughter policy were not applied.
14. I n e x a m i n i n g possible savings in the consumption of food i m p o r t s we
have not considered any measure which would result in a reduction of the energy
value of the people's diet below its present level w h i c h is r e g a r d e d by t h e M i n i s t r y
of Food as the m i n i m u m compatible w i t h health a n d efficiency.
Reduction in the Consumption
of Imports:
Materials.
15.—(a) If stocks of p h o s p h a t e rock were allowed to fall to zero by mid-1943
as a part of the reduction in stocks referred to in p a r a g r a p h 10 above (see also
Appendix A), imports of fertilisers from mid-1942 to mid-1943 would be about
400.000 tons. A n y reduction in i m p o r t s below t h i s figure would d i m i n i s h the
supplies of s u p e r p h o s p h a t e available for t h e 1942-43 season. A r e d u c t i o n of
400,000 tons of imports of fertilisers (i.e., no i m p o r t s a f t e r J u n e 1942) would
reduce the phosphates available for t h e 1942-43 season by about t w o - t h i r d s .
This would result in a loss in home food p r o d u c t i o n for the 1943 harvest Which
could only be made u p by the use in the following year of between 2 a n d 3
times the s h i p p i n g space originally saved. T h e M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e has j u s t
announced plans for a s u b s t a n t i a l increase i n food production i n 1943 in order
to save shipping, and a n y action t h a t would reduce supplies of fertilisers below
the present p r o g r a m m e m i g h t a p p e a r to be inconsistent w i t h t h i s policy.
(b) I t is unlikely t h a t i m p o r t s of steel and steel-making m a t e r i a l s could be
reduced by more t h a n 400,000 tons w i t h o u t c u t t i n g into direct w a r production.
This would involve a consumption r a t e of steel (including home production) of
11-4 million tons in 1942 a n d 5-75 in the first half of 1943, a n d would mean
that steel supplies would be restricted for purposes for w h i c h they are now
regarded as essential, e.g., t h e less vital needs of the Services P a s s i v e Defence,
maintenance of productive a n d of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n equipment. L o n g - t e r m construc­
tion programmes might also have to be postponed.
(c) The Office of t h e M i n i s t e r of P r o d u c t i o n considers t h a t a saving of
200.000 tons m i g h t be achieved by consumption economies in m a t e r i a l s other t h a n
steel. These economies would fall mainly on civilian consumption, w h i c h has
already been reduced nearly to the limit.
7
16. The economies mentioned u n d e r (a), (b) and (c) above amount,
aggregate, to about 1 million tons.
in
Economies in Shipping for Civil Purposes outside United
Kingdom.
, 1 7 . A limited amount of British-controlled tonnage is employed in c a r r y i n g
civil requirements to a number of areas other t h a n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m ,
wherever possible, however, such civil supplies are c a r r i e d either as p a r t cargoes
Hi vessels allocated for m i l i t a r y stores or in vessels which proceed to t h e a r e a for
purpose of loading back for the U n i t e d K i n g d o m i m p o r t p r o g r a m m e ,
programmes of essential civil requirements for the M i d d l e E a s t , P e r s i a n Gulf,
hidia and W e s t Africa are carefully examined both in the t e r r i t o r i e s concerned
id in London and are reduced to the bare m i n i m u m necessary for m a i n t a i n i n g
ai
the economic and political stability of the territories concerned.
Certain
Dominion requirements have to be met, a n d these also have been drastically cut
both as regards bulk cargo and general cargo. British-controlled tonnage is also
employed in carrying re-export n i t r a t e from Chile to the eastern seaboard of
N o r t h America a n d in meeting the coal requirements of the R e d Sea and Indian
Ocean areas. Some of the s h i p p i n g used for these purposes is not capable of
t r a d i n g to the U n i t e d Kingdom. W e intend to give fuller consideration to this
question in the near future, but a t first examination it does not appear probable
t h a t further material reductions can be effected in the use of shipping for these
purposes.
Service
Economies.
IS. A n i m p o r t a n t element in the total employment of shipping is the
tonnage used for service purposes. The amount of British-controlled merchant
shipping allocated to the fighting service at the end of M a r c h w a s 4-8 million
gross tons (exclusive of ships under repair), of which some -85 million was
engaged in the c a r r i a g e of m i l i t a r y stores on the o u t w a r d voyage and would be
available for carrying imports to the U n i t e d K i n g d o m on the inward voyage.
I n addition, some merchant tonnage allocated to the fighting services is engaged
on routes outside the U n i t e d Kingdom, although not all of this is suitable for
t r a d i n g to the U n i t e d K i n g d o m ; and substantial quantities of military supplies
are carried as p a r t cargo in liners not allocated to the fighting services. It is
evident t h a t any saving which could be m a d e in this sphere would have a
considerable effect on our importing capacity for the civil programme. For
example, it is estimated t h a t the transfer of 100,000 gross tons of merchant
s h i p p i n g from employment in carrying m i l i t a r y stores on o u t w a r d voyages from
the U n i t e d K i n g d o m and imports on homeward voyages to t h e U n i t e d Kingdom
to import service on the N o r t h A t l a n t i c route would, if the tonnage were retained
on the N o r t h A t l a n t i c service for .12 months, enable us to import in that period,
net, an additional 375,000 tons of food or r a w materials. The corresponding
reduction in m i l i t a r y shipments to the East, in terms of vehicles, which have in
general determined the shipping required, would be about 6,000 vehicles per
a n n u m w i t h present methods of packing. A c t u a l shipments to the Middle East,
P e r s i a n Gulf and I n d i a from the U n i t e d Kingdom and N o r t h America during
the first 4 months of this year have been a t the r a t e of 220,000 vehicles per annum.
I t should be noted t h a t the transfer of 100,000 gross tons in the manner
mentioned above would involve a reduction on average of only about one half
t h a t a m o u n t in the t o n n a g e ' ' Allocated to the F i g h t i n g Services '' shown in the
M i n i s t r y of W a r T r a n s p o r t Employment returns. T h e reason for this is that the
vessels are classified for the purpose of the r e t u r n s a s ' ' Allocated to the Fighting
Services " only whilst they a r e c a r r y i n g m i l i t a r y stores, & c , on the outward
voyage from the U n i t e d Kingdom.
19. W e have given some attention to possible economies in the use of
shipping by the Services. T h e issues raised are, however, either so wide in scope
(e.g. the size of our forces in overseas theatres, the scale of reserves and
maintenance, &c.) as to be beyond our competence, or, on the other hand, of such
a technical character (dismantling and p a c k i n g of vehicles, aircraft, &c.) that
we have not been able to examine them in any detail. Questions of this latter
k i n d are being examined by a departmental Committee recently set u p by the
M i n i s t r y of W a r T r a n s p o r t , on which the W a r Office a n d A i r Ministry are
represented. Already additional steps have been taken to improve the packing
of load-carrying vehicles shipped from this country including a new economical
pack of 15-cwt. lorries. Reports are awaited from the W a r Office and Air
M i n i s t r y on the breaking down and p a c k i n g of certain technical vehicles.
There is, however, scope for further economy in the use of s h i p p i n g by the
A r m e d Forces in such m a t t e r s as the source of supply and routeing of military
stores, the packing of vehicles, the c r a t i n g of a i r c r a f t and possibly some breaking'
down of landing craft. I t is not possible to assess the results in figures and it
seems desirable to treat any such economies as a p a r t i a l offset against the
possibility of additional military demands on s h i p p i n g due to unforeseen changes
in the strategical situation, to which any forecast of Service requirements must
be subject. W e propose to keep this matter under review a n d hope to submit a
further report a t a later date.
Situation in absence of further United States
aid.
20. I t is a p p r o p r i a t e to s u m m a r i s e the s i t u a t i o n a t t h i s point before
considering the r e m a i n i n g factor to be taken into account, viz., A m e r i c a n
assistance.
[million
tons)
Food
Materials
Total
Possible destocking
...
...
x-05
5-1
6-15
Possible
reduction
in
con­
sumption of imports
...
1-4
1-0
2-4
Possible reduction in i m p o r t
requirements
...
...
2-45
6-1
8-""
Original deficiency
...
...
8-4^
Balance
"""7
15
The effect of the destocking and consumption economies on i m p o r t i n g require­
ments is shown in the following t a b l e : —
Food
Materials
...
...
.
Requirements
before
adaptation
(-s-s n e t
consumption).
Requirements
after
adaptation.
18-5
22-9
16-0
16-8
41-4
32-8
33-0
Imports.
21. I t a p p e a r s , therefore, t h a t by the full application of the measures
described, the " g a p ' ' would be almost exactly filled. T h i s , however, would involve
alterations in diet a n d d r a s t i c restrictions i n other civilian consumption, serious
dislocation of a g r i c u l t u r a l and o t h e r production, a very close p a r i n g of steel
requirements, which in some circumstances would h a m p e r the execution of
programmes, a n d a r u n n i n g down of stocks to levels w h i c h would not be justified
save on the assurance of a d e q u a t e A m e r i c a n assistance from the second' half of
1943 onwards. Moreover, imports m i g h t well fall short of the t a r g e t figure for
the eighteen months by as much a s 2 million tons. T h i s serves to emphasise t h e
importance of securing U n i t e d S t a t e s assistance in the first half of 1943. though
it would be i m p r u d e n t to rely entirely upon such assistance for a solution.
United States
Assistance.
22. U n i t e d States new b u i l d i n g in 1942 (excluding vessels b u i l d i n g for us)
may amount, for non-tankers, to some 3-5 million gross tons. Losses of U n i t e d
States and of A l l i e d a n d n e u t r a l tonnage not t r a d i n g in B r i t i s h interests have
been estimated for 1942 a t 1 - 2 million gross tons. T h e n e t g a i n of U n i t e d S t a t e s
controlled tonnage over the year is h a r d l y likely to be much more t h a n
2-3 million gross tons a n d m i g h t be less if t h e recent r a t e of losses were to
continue. E x p a n d e d calls on United States shipping, in connexion with the new
Russian Protocol, the Bolero movement and other m i l i t a r y movements, may absorb
a large p a r t of the net g a i n s . I t is unlikely t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s will be able
to make available to us much, if any, n o n - t a n k e r tonnage a d d i t i o n a l to that which
has already been provided.
23. I n the first half of 1943 the outlook is more promising. U n i t e d S t a t e s
production of d r y - c a r g o ocean-going tonnage is p r o g r a m m e d to amount to
3'8 million gross tons over the six months. Losses m a y a m o u n t to more t h a n
'6 million gross tons, a n d net gain to r a t h e r less t h a n 3-2 million gross tons.
H one-third of this net g a i n could be devoted to our assistance, a n d were spread
gradually over the period, it would probably b r i n g in about 2 million tons of
additional imports.
24. In the second half of 1943, the excess of U n i t e d S t a t e s building over
losses in the category of vessel u n d e r consideration should a m o u n t to almost
4 million gross tons. T h i s gives grounds for hope that U n i t e d S t a t e s assistance
ill be sufficient, together w i t h our own resources, to enable us to import at least.
w
some 15 million tons in the second half of 1943. Only if we achieve this rate
of importation can we r u n down stocks to t h e levels envisaged in Appendix A by
mid-1943 w i t h o u t d a n g e r of a n i n t e r r u p t i o n of production in the subsequent
period. Even then we should be r u n n i n g a t a low level of consumption, without
any m a r g i n for the rehabilitation of stocks or for unforeseen emergencies.
Conclusion.
25. Our conclusion is that there is a considerable g a p between the consump­
tion of imported food a n d r a w m a t e r i a l s as a t present p l a n n e d d u r i n g the eighteen
months e n d i n g the 30th J u n e , 1943, and the imports which we may expect to
receive d u r i n g t h a t period. The g a p can t o some extent be bridged by running
down stocks; but some reduction in consumption of imports a p p e a r s on present
prospects to be inevitable. A n d a very early decision to enforce economies will
be needed if stocks a r e to be m a i n t a i n e d a t a level which will enable us to face
the comparatively low r a t e of i m p o r t s which on present information we are
entitled to expect in 1943. If we h a d to depend on our own resources alone, the
economies necessary would be of a most d r a s t i c kind. W e consider, therefore,
t h a t a strong case could, if necessary, be made to the U n i t e d States Government
for some further assistance in meeting our difficulties.
T h e United States
Government have, however, hitherto been unwilling to commit themselves in
advance to afford us any definite measure of assistance, t h o u g h they have always
been ready to help us in meeting any u r g e n t and specific need.
26. W h a t e v e r the contribution to a solution of the problem which may be
obtained from American assistance and from economies i n civil consumption of
imports, it is essential t h a t the greatest possible economy of s h i p p i n g space should
be achieved i n meeting Service needs, p a r t i c u l a r l y since, in our view, we are
approaching the limit of possible economies in civilian consumption.
Signed on behalf of the Committee :
HARCOURT JOHNSTONE.
Chairman.
Great George Street,
June 22, 1942.
S.W.1,
Minimum
Stocks
of Importable
Goods as at June
SO, 1943.
TABLE I.—FOODSTUFFS.
Commodity
Wheat
Flour
Maize
Cereal products including soya
and flour
..... ­
Pulse
....
--...
Rice ...
Oilseeds a n d n u t s
"...
Vegetable oils
...
Whale a n d fish oils
Animal l a r d ...
Other animal fats ...
Bulk
Stocks
(000 tons)
... 960
600
... 126
beans
...
17
...
93
22
No. of
Weeks
Consumption
8-1 6-0 8-7(a) 2-9 30-0 13-6 ...
...
...
...
...
230
75
119
60
13
58-5
12-8
16-8
...
550
55
18-3
19 0
Carcase meat a n d offal (imported)
Canned corned m e a t s
Other canned meats
...
Bacon and h a m
...
Canned fish ...
...
...
...
...
...
115
194
114
42
73
4-0
21-1 5 1 26 1 Butter
...
Cheese
...
...
Processed m i l k
Egg products
Dried f r u i t ...
Canned a n d bottled f r u i t ...
Canned a n d bottled vegetables
Tea
Coffee
Cocoa
...
...
...
...
...
30
84
159 24
30
15 38
9-4 14-5 16-7 6-6 7-9 (b)
(b)
Sugar (as refined)
Starch
...
...
...
..
...
...
...
50 26
62
1
\ \
t 12 (in oil)
s
J
(P)
14-7 52-0 13-6 "(a) Excluding 100 000 tons of maize for milk production reserve ( a s s u m e d to be replenished
f December 31, 1942) and based on h u m a n and industrial utilisation
'
(o) Not applicable.
[23962] TABLE I I . — M A T E R I A L S
Stocks '
(000 tons)
Commodity
Iron and Steel—
I r o n ore—Home
Imported
Manganese are
P i g iron
Steel (b)
Chrome ore ...
Non-Ferrous
Metals—
Copper
Lead
Zinc
Zinc concentrates
Textiles—
Cotton (raw)
Timber—
Softwoods
Hardwoods
...
M i n i n g timber (c)
Paper and paper-making
Woodpulp
Newsprint
Sulphuric A cid and
P h o s p h a t e rock
Sulphur
Pyrites
(a).
No. of Weeks'
Consumption
. 2,470
. 730
.. 112
. 1,210
. 800
21
7
17
16
8
av. of 3
175
65
87
94
15
15
15
20
99
11
550
360
424
14
20
14
72
60
8
13
17 (d)
73
85
9 (d)
13
16
1 K
materials-
Fertilisers—
(a) The m i n i m u m stocks in this table (measured in t e r m s of weeks' consumption) are in
general substantially lower t h a n stocks h a v e been in the past. I n t h e absence of experience of
working with stocks a t these levels it is impossible to say exactly w h a t t h e degree of interference
with production would be. I t is thought, however, t h a t delay to direct war production would be
avoided.
(b) The figures in the table are for stocks at steel works a n d at Ministry of Supply yards.
Stocks with consumers might be approximately 2-J million tons.
(c) Assuming full achievement of the steel substitution p r o g r a m m e and of other economies.
(d) I t is assumed t h a t stocks of p h o s p h a t e rock for fertiliser have been cut down to nil and
t h e remaining stocks are for industrial purposes only. Such a s t e p would bring the production
of superphosphates to a stop for t h e t i m e being, b u t would not interfere with t h e consumption of
superphosphate in t h e 1942-43 fertiliser season. I n order to avoid interference with t h e supply
of superphosphate in the 1943-44 season, imports of p h o s p h a t e rock would have to be resumed
early in the second half of 1943, which would involve an additional burden on internal transporta­
tion in t h e second half of 1943. There is, moreover, a risk t h a t t h e r e might be some short fall,
which would be reflected in a reduction of home food production at t h e 1944 harvest. If this
expedient of a temporary cessation of superphosphates production were not resorted to, minimum
stocks of phosphate rock would have to be set 100,000 t o n s higher.
A P P E N D I X
B.
C O N S U M P T I O N E C O N O M I E S : FOOD.
Calctdations
used in arriving at economies set out in paragraph
sub-paragraphs
(a), (b) and (c).
(a) Increased supplies
of home produce
A
1
J
.
I
in 1942.
.
I
N
C
R
e a t
Sugar
Potatoes
Other Vegetables
...
E
A
S
E
F
R
O
M
1
Additional
Acreage.
(000 tons.)
P
Additional
Sales off F a r m s .
(000 tons.)
T o t a l in T e r m s
of W h e a t
Equivalent.
(000 t o n s )
210
200
410
75
500
7 0 0
'O
*QX
o i .
^5
3 0
E s t i m a t e d gross s a v i n g in i m p o r t s
....
(000 tons.)
60
(000 tons.) 5 ^ as canned meat
17 = a s bacon
21 = a s dried egg
3
17
5
-
....
25
755
(b) Increase in Milling
Ratio.
E s t i m a t e d gross saving in w h e a t i m p o r t s if r a t i o increased
to 95 per c e n t
600
E s t i m a t e d n e t saving (say)
....
Less—
(i) Allowance for e x t r a c o n s u m p t i o n of foods due to inability
of body t o digest full n u t r i t i o n a l value of 95 per cent.
flour (say)
(ii) Allowance for i m p o r t of c o n c e n t r a t e d foods to replace
loss of livestock p r o d u c t s :—
(000 tons.)
Beef
....
Pigmeat
Eggs
....
300
(000 tons.)
6£ = a s c a n n e d m e a t
24 = a s bacon
29 = a s dried egg
E s t i m a t e d n e t saving
840
Less—
(i) Additional r e q u i r e m e n t s for seed p u r p o s e s in 1943
....
;ii) Allowance for i m p o r t of c o n c e n t r a t e d foods to replace
loss of livestock p r o d u c t s — a s s u m i n g loss falls on
beef c a t t l e , pigs a n d p o u l t r y in p r o p o r t i o n s 1 : 2 : 2 : —
Beef
Pigmeat ....
Eggs
12,
3J
24
11
....
....
....
[Some allowance w o u l d h a v e to be m a d e for flour of lower e x t r a c t i o n for invalids, & c , b u t t h i s would n o t be signifi­
cant.] 35
265
(c) Dilution of bread with rye, barley and oats.
( A s s u m i n g use of 25,000 t o n s of rye
375,000 t o n s of barley
500,000 t o n s of oats)
(000
E s t i m a t e d gross saving in w h e a t i m p o r t s (at 95 per c e n t . tons),
extraction)
....
.... . ....
....
---.... 575
Less—
Allowance for i m p o r t of c o n c e n t r a t e d foods to m a k e u p for
loss of livestock p r o d u c t s :—
(000 tons.)
Beef ....
Pigmeat
E g g s ....
....
..
....
(000 tons.)
8£ = a s c a n n e d m e a t
29 = as bacon
40 = a s dried egg
4i
29
10
44
E s t i m a t e d n e t saving (say)
....
....
530
[ A s s u m i n g t h e barley would be e n t i r e l y a t t h e expense of beer, t h e p r o d u c t i o n of beer w o u l d be halved.] Note.—The economies under p a r a g r a p h 12 (a), so f a r as increased output
from farms is concerned, 12 (b) a n d 12 (c), would have considerable repercussions
on farming operations. There would have to be reductions in the numbers of
certain kinds of livestock, mainly pigs a n d poultry, but also p a r t l y beef cattle,
a n d these would in t u r n have serious consequences on crop production. In
addition, the whole basis of the feeding stuffs r a t i o n i n g scheme would have to be
revised in order to keep to the m i n i m u m any loss in milk production.
xAliowances have been made in the calculations for the consequent loss of
livestock products, b u t on the assumption t h a t the livestock are feel entirely on
the feeding stuffs diverted to h u m a n consumption. I n practice the livestock
subsist p a r t l y on swill a n d roughages, a n d the actual loss would be greater than
the theoretical figures. On the other h a n d , no allowance h a s been made for any
gain in meat supplies due to the immediate slaughter of a d d i t i o n a l numbers of
beef cattle, p a r t l y because loss of feeding stuffs of this order would more probably
result in slaughter a t lower weights a n d / o r lengthening of the f a t t e n i n g period,
especially where the cattle are valued for the production of d u n g . (In the case
of poultry the increase of poultry meat due to e x t r a s l a u g h t e r would not be
significant. I n the case of pigs any immediate gain i n pigmeat from extra
slaughter would be more t h a n offset w i t h i n the ) ear.)
r