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Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/5/27
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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC M A J E S T V S GOVERNMENT
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
January
1940.
SECRET.
,
Copy N o .
W.M. ( 4 0 )
2 7 t h Conclusions.
TO
B E
K E P T
U N D E R
LOCK
A N DK E Y .
It is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure t h e secrecy of this document.
WAR
CABINET
27 ( 4 0 ) .
CONCLUSIONS
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing
S.W. 1, on Tuesday, January 30, 1940, at 1 1 - 3 0 A.M.
Street,
Present:
T h e R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E C H A M B E R L A I N , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the
The R i g h t Hon. S i r J O H N SIMON, K . C ,
M . P , Chancellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r .
The R i g h t H o n . S i r SAMUEL HOARE,
B t , M . P , L o r d P r i v y Seal.
Chair).
The Right H o n . VISCOUNT HALIFAX,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n
Affairs.
A d m i r a l of t h e Fleet t h e R i g h t H o n .
LORD
CHATFIELD,
Minister
for
Co­
Hon. WINSTON
S.
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e
o r d i n a t i o n of Defence.
T h e R i g h t H o n . O L I V E R STANLEY, M R ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r .
Admiralty.
The R i g h t H o n . S i r KINGSLEY WOOD,
M . P , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for A i r .
The
Right
H o n . LORD
HANKEY,
Minister without Portfolio.
The
Right
CHURCHILL,
T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t
The R i g h t H o n . Sir JOHN ANDERSON,
M . P , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r t h e
H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of
H o m e Security.
The Right Hon. Sir J O H N GILMOUR,
B t , M . P , M i n i s t e r of S h i p p i n g
(Item 1).
The R i g h t Hon. Sir JOHN REITH,
M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n (Items
2
and 3).
Sir
HORACE
J.
The R i g h t Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M . P ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for D o m i n i o n
Affairs (Items 4 - 9 ) .
The R i g h t Hon. MALCOLM MACDONALD,
M . P , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e
Colonies (Item 2).
M r . R. H .
CROSS, M.P., Minister
Economic W a r f a r e (Item 4).
WILSON,
Permanent
S e c r e t a r y t o t h e T r e a s u r y (Items 1-4).
Secretariat.
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Captain A . D . NICHOLL, R . N .
Mr. F . H E M M I N G .
Mr. W . D . WILKINSON.
Mr. G . N . FLEMMING.
Mr. P . DEBENHAM.
[20747]
for
WAR
CABINET
27
(40).
- CONTENTS.
Minute
No.
Subject.
Page
1
Shipbuilding
Transfer from the Ministry of Shipping to t h e Admiralty of the
responsibility for Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs.
205
2
West Indies
Publication of Report of Royal Commission.
205'
3
Propaganda
...
...
...
...
...
...
Principles and objectives of British wartime propaganda.
4
Contraband Control
The case of t h e Soviet ship
...
208
209
Seletiga.
5
The Air Situation
6
The Naval Situation
210
7
The Military Situation
Western Front.
Finland.
211
8
Finland
Intercession service in St. P a u l ' s Cathedral.
211
9
The Far East
Relations with J a p a n : ease of the Asama
212
10
U.S.S.R.
...
...
Issue of warning to Soviet merchant ships.
...
210
Maru.
...
214
Shipbuilding.
1.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d before t h e m a M e m o r a n d u m by t h e
F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y ( W . P . (G.) (40) 28).
Transfer from
the Ministry of
The First Lord of the Admiralty
said t h a t h i s a r r a n g e m e n t s
Shipping to the for t a k i n g over t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for m e r c h a n t s h i p b u i l d i n g a n d
Admiralty of
r e p a i r s h a d been m a d e in consultation w i t h the D e p a r t m e n t s
the responsi­
concerned a n d m i g h t be r e g a r d e d as a g r e e d measures. H e h a d been
bility for
f o r t u n a t e in securing the assistance of S i r J a m e s L i t h g o w as
merchant ship­ Controller of M e r c h a n t S h i p b u i l d i n g , a n d of S i r A m o s A y r e as
building and
D i r e c t o r of M e r c h a n t S h i p b u i l d i n g a n d R e p a i r s .
repairs.
I n discussion, it w a s e x p l a i n e d t h a t the only p o i n t a t issue w a s
(Previous
t h e w o r d i n g of the f o u r t h p a r a g r a p h of t h e d r a f t announcement.
Eef erenee:
W.M. (40) 18th T h i s p a r a g r a p h r e a d a s follows :—
Conclusions,
" T h e M i n i s t e r of S h i p p i n g will c o n t i n u e t o be responsible
Minute 15.)
for a d v i s i n g , a f t e r consultation w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of S h i p ­
owners, u p o n the types of m e r c h a n t vessels to be built, while t h e
A d m i r a l t y will assume the responsibility for e n s u r i n g t h e
necessary p r o d u c t i o n of M e r c a n t i l e S h i p p i n g , as well as t h a t
of m e e t i n g the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the N a v y . "
N e i t h e r the F i r s t L o r d nor the M i n i s t e r of S h i p p i n g
a n t i c i p a t e d a n y difficulty in r e g a r d to the p o i n t of substance
mentioned. B u t the l a t t e r feared t h a t t h e s h i p p i n g world, w h o
would r e a d the a n n o u n c e m e n t closely, m i g h t resent the implication
t h a t the decisions as to the types of vessels to be b u i l t would be t a k e n
by the A d m i r a l t y .
The Prime Minister t h o u g h t t h a t t h i s difficulty could be met if
t h e p a r a g r a p h were r e w o r d e d as follows, to follow more closely the
C a b i n e t decision of t h e 19th J a n u a r y :—
" T h e A d m i r a l t y will assume the responsibility for
e n s u r i n g the necessary p r o d u c t i o n of M e r c a n t i l e S h i p p i n g , as
well as t h a t of m e e t i n g the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the Navy, it b e i n g
u n d e r s t o o d t h a t , as r e g a r d s the types of m e r c h a n t ship to be
built, t h e A d m i r a l t y will meet the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the M i n i s t r y
of S n i p p i n g , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of s h i p ­
owners."
The W a r Cabinet—
(1) G a v e a g e n e r a l a p p r o v a l to the a r r a n g e m e n t s proposed in
W . P . (G.) (40) 28.
(2) A p p r o v e d the d r a f t announcement, subject to the substitu­
t i o n for p a r a g r a p h 4 of t h e new p a r a g r a p h proposed by
the P r i m e Minister.
West Indies.
Publication of
report of Eoyal
Commission.
2. The Secretary of State for the Colonies said t h a t he w i s h e d
to consult t h e W a r C a b i n e t as to w h e t h e r the R e p o r t of the R o y a l
Commission on the W e s t I n d i e s should be published. The investi­
g a t i o n s of t h a t Commission h a d revealed deplorable s t a n d a r d s of
h e a l t h a n d housing, a n d in social conditions generally, among the
w o r k i n g p o p u l a t i o n i n the W e s t I n d i e s . T h e w o r k i n g p o p u l a t i o n
themselves were now very conscious of t h i s . Serious disturbances
would p r o b a b l y have t a k e n place in the I s l a n d s if the R o y a l
Commission h a d not been a p p o i n t e d , a n d were liable to break out
if the R e p o r t Avere now w i t h h e l d . T h e R e p o r t contained some very
s t r o n g p a s s a g e s on t h i s subject. T h e R e p o r t w a s unanimous, b u t
there w o u l d have been a m i n o r i t y r e p o r t if the C h a i r m a n (Lord
Moyne) h a d a t t e m p t e d to secure t h e deletion of the p a r a g r a p h s
c o n d e m n i n g p r e s e n t conditions.
T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e h a n d e d r o u n d copies of two sample
passages.
*" [20747]
B 2
I n peace t h e r e w o u l d have been no q u e s t i o n of w i t h h o l d i n g
p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e R e p o r t , however severe i t s c r i t i c i s m s of B r i t i s h
administration.
B u t i t w a s obvious t h a t p u b l i c a t i o n of such a
R e p o r t in w a r t i m e w o u l d be fastened on by o u r enemies, w h o w o u l d
m a k e the fullest use of t h e s t r o n g c r i t i c i s m s , w h i l e i g n o r i n g p a s s a g e s
w h i c h dealt w i t h t h e f a v o u r a b l e side of t h e question.
Notwith­
s t a n d i n g these developments, h e h a d r e a c h e d t h e conclusion t h a t
publication was better than suppression.
T h e chief a r g u m e n t s w h i c h w e i g h e d w i t h h i m w e r e as
follows : —
(1) T h e a d v i c e he h a d received from t h e W e s t I n d i a n
G o v e r n o r s . O p i n i o n in t h e i s l a n d s , w h e r e m u c h of t h e
evidence before t h e Commission h a d a l r e a d y been
p u b l i s h e d , w a s in a s t a t e of f e r m e n t a n d w o u l d become
i n t e n s e l y suspicious if t h e r e p o r t w e r e suppressed. R i o t s
m i g h t ensue.
(2) T h e p r e s s u r e on behalf of p u b l i c a t i o n w h i c h m i g h t be
e x p e c t e d from some m e m b e r s of t h e R o y a l Commission
itself, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y from S i r W a l t e r C i t r i n e .
An
a d d e d difficulty w a s the f a c t t h a t S i r W a l t e r w a s n o w on
a, v i s i t to F i n l a n d .
( 3 ) T h e p r o b a b l e a t t i t u d e of t h e O p p o s i t i o n P a r t i e s a n d of t h e
Press.
T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e apologised for h a v i n g b r o u g h t t h i s
question before t h e W a r C a b i n e t a t such s h o r t notice. H e h a d been
e n g a g e d in p r e p a r i n g a p a p e r , w h e n h i s h a n d s h a d been forced by
a l e a k a g e in t h e P r e s s . T h e n e w s p a p e r s i n q u e s t i o n h a d i n s i n u a t e d
t h a t the G o v e r n m e n t w e r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e norr-publication of t h e
R e p o r t . W o u l d t h e W a r C a b i n e t a u t h o r i s e a dementi b e i n g issued ?
The Prime Minister
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e consequences of t h e
p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e R e p o r t m i g h t be m u c h more serious t h a n t h e
consequences of p u b l i s h i n g t h e evidence. T h e R e p o r t w o u l d be
r e g a r d e d as q u a s i - j u d i c i a l .
The Secretary of State for the Colonies e x p l a i n e d t h a t he h a d
i n m i n d t h e p u b l i c a t i o n , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e R e p o r t , of a W h i t e
P a p e r c o n t a i n i n g a s t a t e m e n t of policy by H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n ­
m e n t . T h e W h i t e P a p e r , indeed, m i g h t cover a w i d e r field t h a n the
W e s t I n d i a n Colonies, a n d m i g h t lay d o w n a p r o g r a m m e of
development covering t h e Colonial E m p i r e as a whole. I t w o u l d
h a v e t o be m a d e clear, however, t h a t , in g e n e r a l , the r e c o m m e n d a ­
tions of the W e s t I n d i a n Commission w o u l d be accepted by t h e
G o v e r n m e n t a n d would be i m p l e m e n t e d .
T h e R e p o r t a n d t h e W h i t e P a p e r m i g h t be published, say, on
t h e 2 0 t h F e b r u a r y . T h i s w o u l d g i v e t i m e :—
(a) for h i s p r o p o s a l s for r e m e d i a l a c t i o n to be p u t i n t o final
s h a p e ; he w a s a l r e a d y in c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e C h a n ­
cellor of t h e E x c h e q u e r :
(b) for t h e M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n to c r e a t e in t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s a n d other n e u t r a l c o u n t r i e s a n a t m o s p h e r e f a v o u r ­
able to t h e reception of t h e t w o documents.
Every
e n d e a v o u r w o u l d be m a d e t o place t h e m a i n e m p h a s i s
on t h e W h i t e P a p e r , r a t h e r t h a n on t h e R e p o r t .
The Minister
of Information
said t h a t he a n d his D e j j a r t ­
m e n t a l a d v i s e r s h a d seen a d v a n c e copies of t h e R e p o r t . T h e g e n e r a l
view of h i s a d v i s e r s f a v o u r e d p u b l i c a t i o n , subject to t h e a n n o u n c e ­
m e n t of definite a n d i m m e d i a t e r e m e d i a l action, a n d subject also
to t i m e b e i n g allowed for t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of o p i n i o n i n n e u t r a l
countries. T h e assessment of t h e possible d a n g e r s r e s u l t i n g from
p u b l i c a t i o n w a s a m a t t e r w h i c h w a s more for t h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y
a n d the Colonial S e c r e t a r y t h a n for himself.
he w a s p r e p a r e d to s u p p o r t p u b l i c a t i o n .
S u b j e c t to t h e i r views,
I n discussion, i t became clear t h a t the g e n e r a l view of t h e
C a b i n e t w a s s t r o n g l y opposed to p u b l i c a t i o n d u r i n g the w a r .
The Prime Minister
said t h a t , w h e n he h a d discussed t h e
m a t t e r previously w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e Colonies, h e
h a d not seen t h e e x t r a c t s w h i c h w e r e now before t h e W a r C a b i n e t .
T h e s e convinced h i m t h a t it w o u l d inflict serious d a m a g e on o u r
w a r effort to p u b l i s h such a R e p o r t a t a t i m e w h e n the G e r m a n
M i n i s t r y of P r o p a g a n d a w a s r e a d y to t a k e a d v a n t a g e of a n y
m a t e r i a l m a d e available for it. I n n e u t r a l c o u n t r i e s p u b l i c a t i o n
of the R e p o r t m i g h t well have t h e effect of l e a d i n g to a g e n e r a l
revision of o p i n i o n a m o n g those w h o h a d h i t h e r t o t h o u g h t of G r e a t
B r i t a i n as a l e a d i n g Colonial P o w e r t h a t p a i d d u e r e g a r d to i t s
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as t r u s t e e for the w e l f a r e of t h e natives. O p i n i o n
i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e very much on t h e
look-out for items of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t were d a m a g i n g to the B r i t i s h
case, a n d p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e R e p o r t would have a very b a d effect i n
t h a t country.
Discussion t h e n t u r n e d on t h e v a r i o u s p o i n t s which m u s t be
d e a l t w i t h if p u b l i c a t i o n of the R e p o r t w e r e w i t h h e l d .
(1) The Members of the Royal
Commission.
I t w a s n a t u r a l t h a t they should w i s h for publication, b u t n o
g r e a t difficulty w a s a n t i c i p a t e d i n p e r s u a d i n g them to agree to t h e
o p p o s i t e course, if it w e r e p u t to t h e m clearly t h a t this w a s t h e
decision reached by t h e W a r C a b i n e t a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the p r o b a b l e
effects of p u b l i c a t i o n on t h e course of the W a r . The Prime
Minister
s u g g e s t e d t h a t the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for the Colonies should convey
t h e view of t h e W a r C a b i n e t a t once to L o r d Moyne, b u t should
stave off the a n s w e r s to a n y questions in r e g a r d to p u b l i c a t i o n u n t i l
he h a d been able to see S i r W a l t e r C i t r i n e on h i s r e t u r n from
Finland.
(2) The Ovposition
in the House of Commons.
I t should be possible to p e r s u a d e members of P a r l i a m e n t n o t
to m a k e trouble by r e p r e s e n t i n g t o t h e m the d i s a s t r o u s consequences
of p u b l i c a t i o n from t h e p o i n t of view of t h e w a r . T h i s w a s n o
party matter.
(3) Opinion in the West
Indies.
T h e p o s i t i o n h e r e w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y difficult, b u t the real a n x i e t y
about t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e R e p o r t arose from t h e fear t h a t non­
p u b l i c a t i o n w o u l d m e a n the p o s t p o n e m e n t of r e m e d i a l action. I f
we could m a k e it clear t h a t such a c t i o n would be t a k e n quickly,
t h e a g i t a t i o n a b o u t p u b l i c a t i o n of the R e p o r t w o u l d probably die
down. I n h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h t h e Governors, the S e c r e t a r y of
S t a t e would m a k e i t clear t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t i n t e n d e d to m a k e
a s t a t e m e n t i n about t h r e e weeks' t i m e of t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s to set
on foot r e m e d i a l m e a s u r e s .
T h e W a r C a b i n e t : ­
(i) Decided to w i t h h o l d a p p r o v a l to the p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e
R e p o r t of the R o y a l Commission on t h e W e s t I n d i e s .
A s a t p r e s e n t advised, it w a s not c o n t e m p l a t e d t h a t
H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t would be able to s a n c t i o n
p u b l i c a t i o n u n t i l a f t e r t h e end of t h e w a r .
(ii) I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for the Colonies t o com­
m u n i c a t e t h i s decision to L o r d Moyne a n d to t h e '
Governors of t h e W e s t I n d i a n Colonies.
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
Propaganda.
Principles and
objectives of
British wartime
propaganda.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 15th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (39) 45th
Conclusions,
Minute 7.)
E v e r y e n d e a v o u r should be m a d e to secure t h e
a d h e s i o n of L o r d M o y n e a n d h i s colleagues on t h e R o y a l
Commission a n d of t h e G o v e r n o r s to t h i s decision, b u t
no hope w a s to be held out t h a t i t could be reversed.
I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e Colonies, i n con­
s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r , to m a k e a s i m i l a r
c o m m u n i c a t i o n to t h e L e a d e r s of the O p p o s i t i o n P a r t i e s .
I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e Colonies t o c i r c u l a t e
to t h e W a r C a b i n e t t h e t e x t of t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
of t h e R o y a l Commission, w i t h a v i e w t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n
being given t o t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r these r e c o m m e n d a ­
tions should be published,
R e c o r d e d the view t h a t t h e real solution to t h e p r e s e n t
difficulties l a y i n t a k i n g r e m e d i a l m e a s u r e s a t t h e
earliest o p p o r t u n i t y , a n d i n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for the Colonies to c i r c u l a t e to t h e W a r C a b i n e t a d r a f t
of t h e proposed W h i t e P a p e r on t h e m e a s u r e s to be
taken.
S u g g e s t e d t h a t the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e Colonies
should give a n o n - c o m m i t t a l a n s w e r to a n y P a i i i a ­
m e n t a r y Questions u n t i l steps h a d been t a k e n to com­
m u n i c a t e t h e W a r C a b i n e t ' s decision, a n d t h e reasons
therefor, to t h e m e m b e r s of t h e R o y a l Commission a n d
to t h e L e a d e r s of t h e O p p o s i t i o n P a r t i e s .
3 . T h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d before t h e m a M e m o r a n d u m by t h e
M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n covering a d r a f t s t a t e m e n t on the
P r i n c i p l e s a n d Objectives of B r i t i s h w a r t i m e p r o p a g a n d a , for use
a s a g u i d e w i t h i n ' t h e M i n i s t r y ( W . P . (G.) (40) 20).
The Minister
of Information
e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h i s o u t l i n e did
n o t differ in substance from the M e m o r a n d u m d r a w n u p by h i s
predecessor ( W . P . (G.) ( 3 9 ) 162), b u t t h a t i t h a d been d r a f t e d in
a different style, so t h a t it could more easily be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o
action.
I f the o u t l i n e were a p p r o v e d in g e n e r a l by t h e W a r
C a b i n e t , i t would be a help for h i m to k n o w w i t h w h a t v i g o u r they
would like the objective, or p a r t i c u l a r p a r t s thereof, prosecuted.
T h e view generally expressed w a s t h a t t h e outline r e p r e s e n t e d
i n g e n e r a l a sound a n d useful s t a t e m e n t for D e p a r t m e n t a l g u i d a n c e ,
b u t t h a t i t should n o t receive publicity. I t w a s of t h e essence of
p r o p a g a n d a t h a t i t should n o t be recognised as such. A u t h o r i t a t i v e
s t a t e m e n t s of B r i t i s h policy h a d a l r e a d y been published, as, for
e x a m p l e , in t h e s t a t e m e n t m a d e by H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t i n
r e p l y to H i t l e r ' s speech in t h e R e i c h s t a g on t h e 6th October, 1 9 3 9 .
Discussion took p l a c e on t h e following p o i n t s i n t h e D r a f t
outline : —
" A compromise peace with an unbeaten Germany
in the long run."
(Section B (5).)
tvould
be
defeat
T h e view w a s expressed t h a t w h i l e t h i s w a s a t r u e s t a t e m e n t
i t w a s s o m e w h a t ' ' telescoped ' ' a n d w a s liable t o m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
I t w a s therefore a g r e e d t h a t t h i s sentence should be o m i t t e d a n d
t h a t t h e following sentence should be i n s e r t e d between (6) a n d (7),
Section B : " N o peace could be justified Avhich does n o t secure
these t h i n g s . "
" This is your war, the peopled
ivar."
(Section
A (1).)
The Minister for Co-ordination
of Defence suggested t h a t t h i s
m i g h t be i n t e r p r e t e d as d r a w i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n between " t h e
people ' ' as r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e m a s s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n a s d i s t i n c t
f r o m t h e g o v e r n i n g classes, w h e r e a s the i m p o r t a n t , p o i n t w a s t o
e m p h a s i s e t h e responsibility of t h e whole people for the w a r . T h e
M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n w a s i n v i t e d to a m e n d t h e s t a t e m e n t so
a s to a v o i d any r i s k of t h i s m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
The reference
to " sacrifice
" in Section
A (6).
The Chancellor of the Exchequer d r e w a t t e n t i o n to t h e savings
c a m p a i g n being c o n d u c t e d u n d e r S i r R o b e r t K i n d e r s l e y . I t w a s
very i m p o r t a n t to secure a w i d e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g a m o n g t h e intelli­
g e n t w a g e - e a r n e r s as to the r e l a t i o n between w a g e s a n d prices
a n d ' t h e vicious s p i r a l ' ' a n d so on, a n d he welcomed t h e co-opera­
tion of t h e M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n to t h i s end. Some of t h i s
g r o u n d w a s i n d i r e c t l y covered by t h e S a v i n g s C a m p a i g n , t h o u g h
i t w a s n o t i t s direct concern. I t w a s very i m p o r t a n t t o avoid a n y
i m p r e s s i o n of o v e r - l a p p i n g or i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h i s m a t t e r , a n d he
t h e r e f o r e suggested t h a t the M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n should discuss
t h e m a t t e r w i t h S i r R o b e r t K i n d e r s l e y w i t h t h i s e n d in view.
1
T h e W a r C a b i n e t a g r e e d :—
T o a p p r o v e t h e s t a t e m e n t of the p r i n c i p l e s a n d objectives
of B r i t i s h w a r t i m e p r o p a g a n d a set o u t in t h e M e m o r a n d u m
( W . P . (G.) (40) 20), for c i r c u l a t i o n a s a w o r k i n g g u i d e
w i t h i n t h e M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n b u t not for publica­
t i o n , subject to a m e n d m e n t a s i n d i c a t e d i n discussion.
Contraband
Control.
The case of the
Soviet ship
Selenga.
4. T h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d before them a M e m o r a n d u m by the
M i n i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e on the case of the Soviet ship
Selenga ( W . P . (G.) (40) 24).
The Minister for Economic Warfare said t h a t the a l t e r n a t i v e
courses of action open to us i n r e g a r d to t h i s s h i p , w h i c h h a d been
t a k e n i n t o H o n g K o n g for c o n t r a b a n d e x a m i n a t i o n a n d h a d been
f o u n d to be c a r r y i n g , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , 1,190 m e t r i c tons of
w o l f r a m ore, were set o u t in p a r a g r a p h 8 of h i s m e m o r a n d u m . W e
could d e t a i n the c a r g o indefinitely, b u t such a c t i o n could n o t be
justified a s a m e a s u r e of c o n t r a b a n d control. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , if we
decided t o release the cargo, w e could do so e i t h e r after some delay,
on r e c e i v i n g f u r t h e r p u b l i c a s s u r a n c e s from R u s s i a t h a t the goods
w e r e i n t e n d e d for i n t e r n a l c o n s u m p t i o n , or we could do so a t once
as a f r i e n d l y act t o t h e C h i n e s e Government. H i s own suggestion
w a s t h a t t h e s h i p should be released a t once, b u t t h a t w e should
a p p r o a c h t h e C h i n e s e G o v e r n m e n t w i t h a view to s e c u r i n g from
them, in r e t u r n for t h i s release, a n a r r a n g e m e n t u n d e r w h i c h —
(a) t h e y disclosed to u s t h e terms of the b a r t e r a g r e e m e n t
between themselves a n d R u s s i a , u n d e r w h i c h they
received m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s in r e t u r n for c e r t a i n r a w
m a t e r i a l s ( i n c l u d i n g the p r e s e n t c o n s i g n m e n t ) ; a n d
(&) t h e y u n d e r t o o k to r a t i o n supplies of w o l f r a m to R u s s i a a t
a level of, say, 350 to 400 tons a m o n t h .
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs s a i d t h a t he a g r e e d
w i t h the line of a c t i o n proposed by the M i n i s t e r for Economic
Warfare.
Pie w a s influenced by t h e position of C h i n a in t h i s
m a t t e r . H e w a s , however, r e l u c t a n t to base a n y action on a s s u r a n c e s
received f r o m R u s s i a . H e a g r e e d t h a t the cargo should be released
— e s p e c i a l l y as in all p r o b a b i l i t y i t w a s i n t e n d e d for c o n s u m p t i o n
in R u s s i a — a s a favour to C h i n a . For the f u t u r e , the M i n i s t e r for
E c o n o m i c W a r f a r e a n d himself should e x a m i n e t h e p r i n c i p l e s on
w h i c h o u r policy w i t h r e g a r d to Chinese e x p o r t s to R u s s i a should
be based. H e a g r e e d t h a t w e should a t t e m p t to secure a n a g r e e m e n t
w i t h C h i n a , based on i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d by h e r as to h e r b a r t e r
a g r e e m e n t w i t h R u s s i a , to r a t i o n her e x p o r t s of c e r t a i n r a w
m a t e r i a l s to R u s s i a .
Such a n a g r e e m e n t w o u l d have to be a
u n i l a t e r a l a g r e e m e n t between ourselves a n d C h i n a , to w h i c h R u s s i a
w o u l d n o t be p a r t y .
The W a r Cabinet agreed—
(a) To a u t h o r i s e the release of t h e Soviet s h i p Selenga as a n
a c t of favour to the Chinese G o v e r n m e n t .
(b) T h a t the Chinese G o v e r n m e n t should be i n f o r m e d t h a t , i n
a g r e e i n g to the release of t h i s cargo, we h a d in m i n d t h a t
they should come to a n a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h us to r e g u l a t e
Chinese e x p o r t s of c e r t a i n r a w m a t e r i a l s to R u s s i a .
(c) T o i n v i t e t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs and t h e
M i n i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e to e x a m i n e
the
p r i n c i p l e s on which the a r r a n g e m e n t r e f e r r e d to in (b)
should be based.
The Air
Situation.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 26th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
5. The Secretary
of State for Air said t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e
n u m b e r of a t t a c k s h a d been c a r r i e d o u t on E a s t Coast s h i p p i n g on
t h e p r e v i o u s day, in which a total of possibly 15 enemy a i r c r a f t h a d
been engaged. E n e m y a i r c r a f t h a d also o p e r a t e d in the S h e t l a n d s
area. Twelve enemy a i r c r a f t h a d a t t a c k e d a convoy w i t h o u t r e s u l t ;
a n d a total of 15 other m e r c h a n t vessels h a d been e n g a g e d by t h e
enemy, by bombs or m a c h i n e g u n s .
T h e s t e a m s h i p Manela, the R . A . F . flying-boat d e p o t s h i p in t h e
S h e t l a n d s , h a d been a t t a c k e d by 4 a i r c r a f t . Only s l i g h t d a m a g e by
concussion h a d been caused.
D e s p i t e the b a d a e r o d r o m e conditions, a t o t a l of 99 fighter­
a i r c r a f t h a d been sent u p . T h r e e of t h e enemy a i r c r a f t h a d been
e n g a g e d , b u t w i t h inconclusive results. C o n d i t i o n s for our fighters
h a d been extremely bad. A l l our a i r c r a f t h a d r e t u r n e d safely.
A n t i - a i r c r a f t g u n s h a d been in action in t h e N e w c a s t l e a n d
Blyth areas.
T h e r e was a n i n t e r e s t i n g r e p o r t of a duel between one of o u r
H u d s o n a i r c r a f t a n d a M e s s e r s c h m i t t 110 of the l a t e s t t y p e . T h e
H u d s o n a p p e a r e d to have h a d t h e better of t h e e n g a g e m e n t a n d h a d
o b t a i n e d some h i t s on the M e s s e r s c h m i t t .
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of t h e above s t a t e m e n t .
The Naval
Situation.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 26th
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)
Air attacks on
shipping.
6 . The First Lord of the A dmiralty
gave t h e W a r C a b i n e t
d e t a i l s of t h e a t t a c k s on m e r c h a n t s h i p p i n g r e f e r r e d to in t h e fore­
going Minute.
A s u m m a r y of the a t t a c k s is as follows :—­
(ft) T w o a t t a c k s on a convoy. N o d a m a g e .
(b) T w o l i g h t vessels a t t a c k e d .
One b a d l y
damaged—-crew
(c) H . M . S . Coventry a t t a c k e d a t Sollum Voe. N o d a m a g e .
(a) F o u r t e e n B r i t i s h m e r c h a n t vessels a t t a c k e d . O n e s l i g h t l y
d a m a g e d , t w o badly d a m a g e d .
One L a t v i a n s h i p set on fire and a b a n d o n e d .
(/) O n e F r e n c h s h i p attacked. No p a r t i c u l a r s of d a m a g e d .
F u t h e r a t t a c k s on t r a d e were as follows :January 27.
D a n i s h s.s. Fredensborg
(2,094 tons), S u n k south-east of
the O r k n e y s . C r e w — p r o b a b l y 20. N o news of s u r v i v o r s .
January 28.
S.S. FjSton (1,487 tons). M i s s i n g , p r e s u m e d s u n k a s one
of h e r boats a n d a body h a d been w a s h e d ashore.
January 29.
D u t c h sis. Nora (298 tons). D a m a g e d by m i n e w h i l e a t
a n c h o r off Deal. Beached.
Convoys on t h e E a s t Coast h a d been delayed o w i n g to the
weather.
T h e F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y s a i d t h a t a i r a t t a c k s of t h e
t y p e w h i c h t h e G e r m a n s h a d c a r r i e d out on t h e p r e v i o u s d a y would,
if c o n t i n u e d , affect the morale of our m e r c h a n t crews. W h i l e , t h e r e ­
fore, the w e a t h e r m a d e conditions so difficult for o u r fighters, i t
m i g h t be a d v i s a b l e to r e t u r n t o the convoy system on t h e E a s t Coast
in s p i t e of the delays w h i c h t h i s would i n e v i t a b l y cause.
The Minister
for Co-ordination
of Defence e m p h a s i s e d
feeling of s e c u r i t y w h i c h convoy gave to m e r c h a n t s h i p p i n g .
the
The Lord Privy Seal e m p h a s i s e d the d e s i r a b i l i t y of c o n s u l t i n g
t h e M i n i s t e r of S h i p p i n g in connection w i t h a n y decision t o
re-establish convoy.
Coal supplies.
T h e r e w a s some discussion as to w h e t h e r the r e i n t r o d u c t i o n
of convoys w o u l d have a serious effect on t h e a l r e a d y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y
position a s r e g a r d s coal s u p p l i e s in t h e S o u t h of E n g l a n d . I t w a s
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e s h o r t a g e of coal w a s due f u n d a m e n t a l l y to the
s h o r t a g e of a n d delays to s h i p p i n g , a c c e n t u a t e d by t h e long spell
of b a d w e a t h e r .
The W a r Cabinet : ­
(i) Took n o t e of t h e above s t a t e m e n t .
(ii) I n v i t e d t h e F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y a n d t h e S e c r e t a r y
of S t a t e for A i r , in c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e M i n i s t e r of
S h i p p i n g , t o e x a m i n e w h e t h e r convoys should be r e - i n t r o ­
duced for E a s t Coast s h i p p i n g w h i l e conditions con­
t i n u e d f a v o u r a b l e to enemy a i r a t t a c k .
The Military
Situation.
Western Front.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 26th
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
Finland.
7. The Secretary
of State for War s a i d t h a t one G e r m a n
division w a s r e p o r t e d to have a r r i v e d i n the W e s t from P o l a n d .
One division w a s believed to have moved from the A a c h e n a r e a
t o t h e E i f e l a r e a . A s a r e s u l t of these changes, t h e n u m b e r of
divisions i n t h e W e s t w a s increased by one to 100, a n d the n u m b e r
in t h e E a s t reduced by one to 38.
T h e R u s s i a n s h a d c o n t i n u e d t h e i r a t t a c k s N o r t h of L a k e
L a d o g a , b u t w i t h o u t success. A t t e m p t s on t h e 2 6 t h J a n u a r y t o
cross the ice S o u t h of K i t e l a h a d met w i t h heavy loss.
E l s e w h e r e t h e r e w a s n o t h i n g to r e p o r t .
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of t h e above s t a t e m e n t .
Finland.
Intercession
service in
St. Paul's
Cathedral.
8. The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs said t h a t h e
h a d received a l e t t e r from L o r d P h i l l i m o r e , w r i t t e n on behalf of
L o r d P l y m o u t h a s C h a i r m a n of the F i n n i s h F u n d , i n q u i r i n g
w h e t h e r t h e W a r C a b i n e t w o u l d be r e p r e s e n t e d a t the special I n t e r ­
cession Service t o be held in St. P a u k s C a t h e d r a l on T h u r s d a y ,
the 1st F e b r u a r y , 1940, a t 2 P . M . T h e A r c h b i s h o p of C a n t e r b u r y
w o u l d t a k e p a r t in t h e service.
The W a r Cabinet : ­
(a) A g r e e d t h a t the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs
should i n f o r m L o r d P h i l l i m o r e t h a t the W a r C a b i n e t
w o u l d be r e p r e s e n t e d a t the I n t e r c e s s i o n Service for
F i n l a n d a t St. P a u k s C a t h e d r a l .
[20747]
c
(b) Took n o t e t h a t t h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y p r o p o s e d himself to
a t t e n d t h e service.
(c) I n v i t e d a n y o t h e r m e m b e r of t h e W a r C a b i n e t w h o proposed
to be p r e s e n t to i n f o r m t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e W a r C a b i n e t
accordingly.
The Far Bast.
Relations with
J a p a n : case of
the s.s.
Asama Maru.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 26th
Conclusions,
Minute 8.)
9. The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs d r e w a t t e n t i o n
t o the following f u r t h e r developments in r e g a r d to t h e case of the
s t e a m s h i p Asama
Maru:—
(i) T h e J a p a n e s e A m b a s s a d o r in L o n d o n (who d i d not s p e a k
E n g l i s h very well) h a d a p p a r e n t l y given t h e J a p a n e s e
G o v e r n m e n t the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t we m i g h t be p r e p a r e d
to h a n d back all the t w e n t y - o n e m e n w h o m w e h a d
removed from the s t e a m s h i p A sama Maru.
T h i s seemed
t o be clue to a, g e n u i n e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g on the p a r t of
t h e J a p a n e s e A m b a s s a d o r as to w h a t he (the F o r e i g n
S e c r e t a r y ) h a d s a i d a t t h e i r first i n t e r v i e w on the subject.
H e (the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ) proposed, therefore, to
see t h e J a p a n e s e A m b a s s a d o r t h a t afternoon a n d to
correct a n y m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H e p r o p o s e d also to take
t h e line t h a t a n y suggestion from t h e J a p a n e s e side t h a t
we should now r e t u r n all the t w e n t y - o n e men in question
w o u l d c r e a t e a p o s i t i o n of e x t r e m e difficulty. H e would
t e l e g r a p h to S i r R o b e r t C r a i g i e in t h e same sense.
(ii) I n t e l e g r a m Mo. .159, d a t e d t h e 2 9 t h J a n u a r y , 1940,
S i r R o b e r t C r a i g i e a r g u e d t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r in the
last r e s o r t we should be p r e p a r e d to r e t u r n all the
t w e n t y - o n e men. C o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h i s question could
be d e f e r r e d , since Sir R o b e r t C r a i g i e could for the
p r e s e n t hold the position on t h e b a s i s of his p r e s e n t
i n s t r u c t i o n s . I n the same t e l e g r a m S i r R o b e r t C r a i g i e
h a d expressed t h e view t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t
m i g h t be able to obtain from t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t
a n u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t , if these m e n w e r e allowed to r e t u r n
to G e r m a n y , they w o u l d n o t be used for any p u r p o s e
connected w i t h t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e w a r ; and, w h i l e
a d m i t t i n g t h a t l i t t l e reliance could be placed o n a n y
u n d e r t a k i n g by the G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t , Sir R o b e r t
asked w h a t a n s w e r he should m a k e if such a p r o p o s a l
w e r e p u t to h i m by the J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t .
The
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e t h o u g h t t h a t S i r R o b e r t C r a i g i e
should be told t h a t , if he f o u n d it impossible to secure
t h e a g r e e m e n t of the J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t to e i t h e r of
t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s set out in the i n s t r u c t i o n s already
conveyed to him, we should be p r e p a r e d , as a t h i r d best,
to r e t u r n all the twenty-one m e n to t h e J a p a n e s e Govern­
m e n t on r e c e i v i n g from the l a t t e r a n u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t
t h e y w o u l d be held i n J a p a n , or that, if they were
p e r m i t t e d to r e t u r n to G e r m a n y , t h e G e r m a n Govern­
m e n t should first give a n u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t they should
n o t be p e r m i t t e d to t a k e a n y p a r t i n t h e w a r .
The Prime Minister
t h o u g h t t h a t , if c o n s i d e r a t i o n w a s to be
g i v e n t o such a p r o p o s a l , we should t r y to m a k e the J a p a n e s e
G o v e r n m e n t accept responsibility for t h e d u e d i s c h a r g e by the
G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t of a n y u n d e r t a k i n g so given. T h i s w a s the
s u g g e s t i o n w h i c h h a d been m a d e by S i r R o b e r t C r a i g i e i n his
t e l e g r a m No. 163 of the 29th J a n u a r y , 1940.
P e r s o n a l l y , he
d o u b t e d w h e t h e r , i n d e a l i n g w i t h a n o r i e n t a l people like t h e
J a p a n e s e , it w a s necessary, or even wise, a t t h i s s t a g e to give our
A m b a s s a d o r p a r t i c u l a r s of t h i s t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e u n t i l the first two
h a d been fully explored.
3) The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
said t h a t the
J a p a n e s e D i e t reassembled on the 1st F e b r u a r y , a n d t h a t i t w a s
desirable to m a k e some p r o g r e s s before the D i e t met. W h a t he h a d
in m i n d w a s merely to give S i r R o b e r t C r a i g i e a g e n e r a l i n d i c a t i o n
of the possible courses of action w h i c h in c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s the
W a r C a b i n e t m i g h t be p r e p a r e d t o consider.
The Prime Minister s a i d t h a t , in view of the m e e t i n g of t h e
J a p a n e s e Diet, he a g r e e d t h a t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n should be sent to
S i r R o b e r t C r a i g i e on the lines suggested.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d r e w a t t e n t i o n to
t h e suggestion c o n t a i n e d in the l a t t e r p a r t of t e l e g r a m No. 159 t h a t ,
a s p a r t of a n e v e n t u a l settlement. S i r R o b e r t C r a i g i e m i g h t be
a u t h o r i s e d to convey a g e n e r a l message of goodwill from the P r i m e
M i n i s t e r to A d m i r a l Y o n a i , t h e J a p a n e s e P r i m e M i n i s t e r .
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , p e r h a p s the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y m i g h t send
a s i m i l a r message to t h e J a p a n e s e M i n i s t e r of M a r i n e .
The Prime Minister t h o u g h t t h a t t h e question of sending such
a message did n o t a r i s e a t t h i s j u n c t u r e . H e e n q u i r e d w h e t h e r ,
h a v i n g r e g a r d to the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ' s i n t e n t i o n to inform the
J a p a n e s e A m b a s s a d o r t h a t he h a d been u n d u l y o p t i m i s t i c in the
r e p o r t w h i c h he h a d m a d e to the J a p a n e s e Government, i t w a s still
desired t h a t he (the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ) should include in t h e speech
w h i c h he w a s to m a k e on the following d a y a conciliatory reference
t o J a p a n on. t h e lines of t h e d r a f t w h i c h t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e h a d
c o m m u n i c a t e d t o him.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a g r e e d t h a t t h e r e
w a s no need to consider f u r t h e r t h e suggestion of t h e d e s p a t c h t o
J a p a n of a conciliatory message, b u t he hoped t h a t the P r i m e
Minister' would i n c l u d e in h i s speech a f r i e n d l y reference to J a p a n
o n the lines w h i c h he h a d suggested. I t would be very valuable if,
a s soon as the P r i m e M i n i s t e r h a d decided on the t e r m s of t h i s
reference, the exact text could be c o m m u n i c a t e d to h i m (the
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ) for t r a n s m i s s i o n to Sir R o b e r t C r a i g i e for h i s
information.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t agreed—­
(a) t h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs should
a d d r e s s a telegram t o H i s M a j e s t y ' s A m b a s s a d o r ,
Tokyo­
(i) i n f o r m i n g h i m of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h i c h he (the
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ) p r o p o s e d to m a k e to t h e
J a p a n e s e A m b a s s a d o r to correct the u n d u l y
o p t i m i s t i c r e p o r t w h i c h he (the A m b a s s a d o r ) h a d
sent to the J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t r e g a r d i n g the
eventual possibility of our h a n d i n g back to t h e m
all the twenty-one G e r m a n s - t a k e n from the
s t e a m s h i p Asama
Maru;
(ii) i n d i c a t i n g in g e n e r a l terms the possibility t h a t , a s
a l a s t resort, a n d in o r d e r n o t to lose a g e n e r a l
a g r e e m e n t w i t h the J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t con­
c e r n i n g the f u t u r e
t r e a t m e n t of
Germans
a p p l y i n g for passages in J a p a n e s e ships, the W a r
C a b i n e t m i g h t be p r e p a r e d to consider h a n d i n g
back the G e r m a n s in question in r e t u r n for an
u n d e r t a k i n g from the J a p a n e s e
Government
e i t h e r (i) to i n t e r n the men in question in J a p a n ,
or (ii) t h a t , if the men were allowed to r e t u r n t o
G e r m a n y , the J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t would first
o b t a i n from the G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t a n u n d e r ­
t a k i n g t h a t they would not be used for a n y
p u r p o s e connected w i t h the prosecution of the
w a r , a n d , secondly, t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e G o v e r n m e n t
w o u l d m a k e themselves responsible for e n s u r i n g
the d u e observance by t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t of
the u n d e r t a k i n g so g i v e n ;
(b) t h a t t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r should i n c l u d e i n a speech on t h e
31st J a n u a r y , 1940, a c o n c i l i a t o r y r e f e r e n c e t o J a p a n as
p r e v i o u s l y p r o p o s e d ; a n d t h a t , as soon as t h e P r i m e
M i n i s t e r h a d settled t h e t e x t of the s t a t e m e n t w h i c h he
p r o p o s e d to m a k e i n t h i s connection, t h e t e x t should be
t e l e g r a p h e d to S i r R o b e r t C r a i g i e for h i s i n f o r m a t i o n
and guidance.
U.S.S.R.
10. The First Lord of the Admiralty
said that, according to
Issue of warning a r e p o r t received from a confidential source, t h e Soviet G o v e r n m e n t
to Soviet
h a d issued o r d e r s to all m e r c h a n t s h i p s flying t h e Soviet flag to
merchant ships, r e t u r n h o m e or to t a k e r e f u g e in n e u t r a l p o r t s by a c e r t a i n d a t e .
If
confirmed, t h i s r e p o r t m i g h t not be w i t h o u t significance.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took n o t e of t h e above s t a t e m e n t .
Richmond
Terrace, S. W. 1,
January 30, 1940.