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THIS D O C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y OF H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T V S G O V E R N M E N T
Printed for the Cabinet.
August 1959
C.C. (59)
Copy N o .
3 2
38th Conclusions
CONCLUSIONS
of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 30th June, 1959, at 11 a.m. Present: The Right Plon. H A R O L D MACMILLAN, M.P. Prime Minister. The Right H o n . VISCOUNT KILMUIR.
Secretary of State for the H o m e
Lord Chancellor.
Department and Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. SELWYN LLOYD, Q.C., The Right H o n . D. HEATHCOAT A M O R Y ,
M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign
M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Affairs (Items 1-2).
The Right H o n . T H E EARL OF H O M E ,
The Right H o n . A L A N LENNOX-BOYD,
Secretary of State for Commonwealth
M.P., Secretary of State for the
Relations.
Colonies.
The Right H o n . VISCOUNT HAILSHAM, The Right Hon. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P.,
Q.C., Lord President of the Council.
Minister of Defence.
The Right H o n . R. A. BUTLER, M.P.,
The Right H o n . Sir D A V I D E C C L E S ,
M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Right Hon. IAIN MACLEOD, M.P.,
The Right H o n . H E N R Y BROOKE, M.P.,
The Right H o n . LORD M I L L S , Minister
Minister of Housing and Local Gov­
ernment and Minister for Welsh
Affairs.
The Right H o n . FIAROLD WATKINSON,
M.P., Minister of Transport and Civil
-Aviation.
The
Right
Hon.
JOHN
HARE,
M.P.,
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries a n d
Food.
Minister
Service.
of Labour
and National
of Power.
The Right Hon. G E O F F R E Y LLOYD, M.P.,
Minister of Education.
Dr. The Right H o n . CHARLES H I L L .
M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster.
The Right Hon. REGINALD MAUDLING,
M . P . , Paymaster-General.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. D . O R M S E Y - G O R E ,
M.P., Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs.
The Right Hon. E D W A R D H E A T H , M.P.,
Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury.
Secretariat :
CONTENTS
Minute
No.
1
Subject
Germany
Foreign Ministers' Meeting
2
Parliament
3
European Economic Community
4
Civil Defence
Evacuation Policy
5
Industrial Disputes
Printing
6
Education
Teachers' Salaries
7
Commercial Policy
Butter
* 1 . The Cabinet were informed of the consultations which were
being held with the United States Administration on the line to be
taken by the Western Powers when the Foreign Ministers resumed
on 13th July their negotiations on the problem of Berlin. They had
before them copies of telegrams which had passed between London
and Washington (Foreign Office telegrams to Washington Nos. 2807,
C.C. (59) 37th 2808, 2811 and 2881, and Washington telegrams Nos. 1465, 1474
Germany.
^Foreign
Ministers'
Meeting.
(Previous
Reference:
Conclusions.
and
1485).
The Prime Minister said that, in pursuance of the Cabinet^
discussion on 23rd June, he and the Foreign Secretary had sought to
set before the United States Administration the advantages of seeking
an interim settlement of the Berlin question by which the existing
position would be maintained for a further period. If the Foreign
Ministers could provide the framework for such a settlement, they
could reserve for decision at a meeting of Heads of Governments such
questions as the duration of the moratorium, the level of Western
troops to be retained in Berlin and the form of the proposed
consultations between representatives of East and West Germany. The
United States Government had promised to send us their considered
views on these proposals later in the week. But their initial reaction
had not been unfavourable. They evidently recognised that the
tactical position of the Western Powers in respect of Berlin was weak,
and they seemed to be prepared to consider the possibility of seeking
an interim settlement on the basis of a moratorium. On the other
hand, public opinion in the United States would not welcome any
apparent concessions over Berlin and it would on that account be
more difficult for them to follow a realistic policy.
The Foreign Secretary said that in France and Germany also
there were circles in which a realistic approach to this problem would,
if it were advocated by the United Kingdom Government, be
represented as a policy of appeasement; and it was therefore
preferable that any compromise proposals should be put forward by
the United States Government.
The Cabinet—
Took note of these statements by the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Secretary.
Parliament.
2. The Cabinet were informed of the business to be taken in the
House of Commons in the following week.
European
Economic
Community.
3. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Foreign
Secretary (C. (59) 106) proposing that formal diplomatic relations
should be established between the United Kingdom and the European
Economic Community (E.E.C.).
The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said that, in view of the
economic impact on this country of the trade and economic policies of
the E.E.C., some formal relations between the United Kingdom and
the Community were inevitable.
In the present state of the
negotiations for a European Trade Association this was a suitable
time to establish those formal relations. The delegations of the other
countries in the Stockholm group had supported this course and, with
the exception of Denmark which already had formal relations with the
Community, were recommending their Governments to follow it. An
informal approach had been made to the Community and, if their
response was satisfactory, he recommended that diplomatic relations
should be formally established. In that event legislation would be
required in due course to provide for appropriate privileges and
immunities for the E.E.C. representatives in London.
The CabinetApproved the proposal to establish formal diplomatic
relations with the European Economic Community.
r
C i v i i
Defence
Evacuation
Policy.
4. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Home
Secretary (C. (59) 107) on evacuation policy.
m,
TT
r,
. ,
,
,
,.
The Home Secretary said that Members of Parliament were
showing a moderate amount of interest in the Governments
evacuation plans, and it might be difficult for him to avoid making a
public statement on any alteration of the existing plans, t h e scheme'
for the evacuation of 12 million people in the priority classes from the
larger centres of population, which had been put to the local
authorities in 1956, was no longer practicable. The reception areas in
the eastern half of England could n o longer be used because of the
airfields and missile sites which would be primary targets of attack.
There were, however, difficulties in planning for a more limited
scheme of evacuation. There would undoubtedly be complaint from
areas which had been heavily attacked in the last war but would not
be included in a new scheme. Moreover, if missile sites were
established in the west of the country, any scheme based on reception
areas there would have to be abandoned in a few years' time. On the
other hand, a planned evacuation scheme might well save many lives
in an emergency. Moreover, an admission that the Government were
abandoning planned evacuation would call into question the value of
all civil defence arrangements, would undermine the credibility of the
deterrent, and would weaken our position in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation. On balance, the best course might be to ask the
local authority associations to discuss a modified scheme for the
evacuation of about 6\ million people in the priority classes from
certain large centres of population to reception areas mainly in the west
country. These discussions would not take place until the autumn,
and details of the modified plan would not be disclosed before then.
But he would be glad to have authority to make a general statement
in Parliament, on the lines of the draft in Annex B to C. (59) 107, if
that became necessary. He also suggested that an interim evacuation
plan might be prepared, in secret and without consultation with the
local authority associations, for use if an emergency arose before the
modified plan had been worked out in detail.
In discussion it was argued that the modified scheme for the
evacuation of about 6\ million people would not in the event be any
more practicable than the existing scheme. It was doubtful,whether
a Government would be able to start such an evacuation scheme in
time for it to be effective; and, if it were started, it was likely
to encourage a general unorganised evacuation of the cities. The
G o v e r n m e n t s objective should rather be to educate people
to understand that their best course in an emergency would be to seek
the best protection they could get in the place where they lived. This,
however, would take time, and meanwhile it might be desirable, even
if only to maintain public morale, to prepare a modified scheme of
evacuation. But the preparation of a modified plan ought to take into
account the realities of the situation—that as many people as possible
would try to leave the large centres of population, with inevitable
chaos to the transport system.
The Prime Minister said that the Government should try to avoid
making any statement on evacuation policy in the near future. If a
statement had to be made it should be in very general terms, a n d ^
should say only that the Government proposed to review the question U
in consultation with the local authority associations later in the year.
It might well be that the Governments long-term aim should be to try­
to bring the public to realise that the best course in an emergency was
for as many people as possible to stay in the area where they lived.
But it would be premature to begin this process at the present time.
T h e Cabinet would need to consider again in due course how
the existing evacuation scheme could best be modified, having regard
to what was likely to happen in reality in an emergency.
0
The Cabinet—
(1) Agreed that a statement on evacuation policy should be
avoided lor as long as possible.
(2) Took note that, if a statement had to be made, the Home
Secretary would submit for the Prime Ministers approval
a revised version of the draft annexed to C (59) 107.
(3) Agreed to resume their consideration of evacuation policy on
a later occasion.
Industrial
Disputes.
Printing.
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (59) 37th
Conclusions,
Minute 5.)
5. The Minister of Labour informed the Cabinet that one of the
leaders of the trade unions concerned in the printing dispute had now
threatened to withdraw labour employed by the Stationery Office.
There was no issue in dispute with the Stationery Office, and this
threat was probably an attempt to force the Government to intervene
in the main dispute in the industry. If, however, the Stationery Office
now sought to transfer to their own printing establishments work
normally carried out by contractors or made temporary arrangements
for using duplicating in place of printing, there might be hostile
reactions from the unions. While the withdrawal of printing and
warehouse labour from the Stationery Office would not immediately
threaten the essential machinery of government, it could lead to
a difficult position within a relatively short time.
Meanwhile the effect of the main dispute on the production of
printing ink was becoming rapidly more serious and might prevent the
printing of the national newspapers before the end of the week. The
Minister had therefore sent an informal invitation to the unions and
the employers concerned with this part of the dispute to meet his
Chief industrial Commissioner, with a view to negotiating a
continuance of work until the main dispute had been settled. The
employers had accepted his invitation but the unions had declined it.
It would be inexpedient for him to meet the employers alone. He had,
however, renewed his invitation on a more formal basis; and, if the
unions maintained their refusal, he proposed to safeguard the
Governments position by a public statement of the facts.
The Home Secretary said that the Ministerial Committee on
Emergencies were keeping the situation under review. In view of
certain recent incidents it might be desirable at some stage to make a
statement on the law relating to peaceful picketing and the duty of the
police to enforce it, but the Committee did not consider that the time
for this had yet come.
The Cabinet—
(1) Took note, with approval, of these statements by the Home
Secretary and the Minister of Labour.
(2) Invited the H o m e Secretary and the Minister of Labour to
keep them informed of developments in the dispute in the
printing industry.
Education.
^Teachers'
Salaries.
(Previous
Reference:
C.C. (59) 36th
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)
6. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister
of Education (C. (59) 104) on teachers' salaries.
The Minister of Education
suggested that the provisional
agreement of the Burnham Committee that the proposed new basic
s a ^ r y scale of £520-£1,000 should operate for not less than 2\ years
f"-om October 1959, went a considerable way to meet the objection
that a minimum above £510 would have an inflationary effect and
constituted a new factor in the situation which would justify the
Government in reversing their earlier decision not to approve a scale
with a minimum above that figure. The Local Authorities Panel
of the Committee had, since the war, shown a reasonable willingness
to resist demands for pay increases during the currency of earlierO
settlements intended to last for three years. In the circumstances the
Minister proposed that, when the Burnham Committee submitted
their formal recommendation to him, he should notify his approval in
the terms of the draft letter annexed to his memorandum, laying
especial emphasis on the period for which it was to operate.
In discussion it was pointed out that the 2-J-year period of the
proposed settlement was in fact less than the period normally
adopted for Burnham awards and therefore did little to mitigate the
inflationary character of the proposal.
Nevertheless, while the
reversal of the Governments earlier decision might be considered a
sign of weakness, the objection to a prolonged controversy with the
teaching profession and their employers was such that it would be
preferable to regard the period of operation—which had been
proposed spontaneously by the Committee themselves and not, as on
the previous occasion, adopted by the Minister as the basis on which
he would approve the award—as a new factor justifying the
Government in withdrawing their objection to a minimum of £520. On
balance, therefore, it was agreed that a basic scale of £520-£ 1,000
should be approved if it was formally recommended by the
Committee. While the precise terms of the letter of approval should
not be settled until the recommendation was received, the Minister
might note that the Committee had met his concern that their
proposals should not be inflationary in their effect by recommending
that the new scale should remain in force for at least 1\ years from
October 1959 and say that on that basis he would not press his
objection to the proposed minimum.
The Cabinet—
(1) Agreed that a new basic salary scale for teachers of
£520-£ 1,000, to remain in force for not less than 2\ years
from October 1959, should be approved if it were formally
recommended by the Burnham Committee.
(2) Invited the Minister of Education, in consultation with
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to give further
consideration to the terms in which his approval should be
given.
7. The Chancellor of the Exchequer informed the Cabinet that
the Economic Policy Committee had approved a proposal to increase
(Previous
the quota for Polish butter by 5,000 tons and that for Hungarian and
Reference:
Bulgarian butter by 1,000 tons. Even with these increases butter
C.C. (59) 30th supplies this year were likely to be about 20,000 tons lower than last
Conclusions,
year, but these increases would help to moderate the rise in butter
Minute 6.)
prices. Since this was a once-for-all measure and without prejudice
Butter.
to the level of the normal quotas from these countries, and since
additional supplies of Danish butter were not available, the
negotiations for a European Trade Association would not be affected.
Nor would there be any ground for complaint from New Zealand,
since her butter exports were commanding a higher price than at any
time since September 1956. There might, however, be objections from
Canada, and it might be necessary to consider in due course some
relaxation of the restrictions on the import of Canadian butter.
Commercial
Policy.
The Cabinet—
0
Approved the proposal to increase the quotas for the import
of butter from Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.
el:TCT