(c) crown copyright Catalogue Reference:CAB/129/92 Image Reference:0027

advertisement
(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:CAB/129/92
Image Reference:0027
Printed for the Cabinet.
April 1958
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued
for the personal use of
T O P S E C R E T
Copy
No.
C. (58) 77
10th April. 1958
CABINET
ANGLO-AMERICAN
RELATIONS
N O T E BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
I c i r c u l a t e a p a p e r o n t h e effects of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e
l o n g - t e r m i n t e r e s t s of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , t o g e t h e r w i t h a s u m m a r i s e d v e r s i o n
(Annex), which has been p r e p a r e d in m y D e p a r t m e n t .
2. I n view of t h e d e t a i l e d r e f e r e n c e s in t h e p a p e r t o t h e J o i n t W o r k i n g
- G r o u p m a c h i n e r y e s t a b l i s h e d at t h e t i m e of t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r s visit t o W a s h i n g t o n
in O c t o b e r 1957, I w o u l d a s k t h a t t h i s p a p e r b e h a n d l e d w i t h t h e u t m o s t d i s c r e t i o n
a n d t h a t its c i r c u l a t i o n b e s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d .
3. I w o u l d n o t s u g g e s t t h a t this p a p e r s h o u l d b e p l a c e d o n t h e C a b i n e t
a g e n d a o r b e t h e s u b j e c t of a n y f o r m a l d i s c u s s i o n b y M i n i s t e r s . If, h o w e v e r , a n y
of m y c o l l e a g u e s h a v e a n y c o m m e n t s t o m a k e o n thfc p a p e r I s h o u l d b e very g l a d
t o r e c e i v e t h e m fairly s o o n , i n o r d e r t h a t I m a y t a k e t h e m i n t o a c c o u n t in c o n s i d e r i n g
t h e a c t i o n t o b e t a k e n t o i m p l e m e n t t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s in p a r a g r a p h 38 (a)
a n d (c) of t h e p a p e r .
Foreign Office, S.W.1,
9th April, 1958. THE
EFFECTS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN INTERDEPENDENCE ON
LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
THE
A.—DEFINITION
I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is b o t h a fact a n d a policy.
It is a fact n o t o n l y in
A n g l o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s b u t in t h e m u t u a l r e l a t i o n s of all n o n - C o m m u n i s t
c o u n t r i e s . T h e r e a r e t w o sides t o t h i s . T h e first is t h a t all s o v e r e i g n S t a t e s h a v e
a l w a y s b e e n to s o m e e x t e n t i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , e.g., in t r a d e , a n d t h a t t h e g r o w i n g
c o m p l e x i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l life is r a p i d l y d i m i n i s h i n g the e x t e n t t o w h i c h they c a n
act w i t h o u t affecting a n d b e i n g affected b y t h e a c t i o n s of o t h e r P o w e r s . T h e s e c o n d
is t h a t t h e p r e s e n t C o m m u n i s t t h r e a t is s u c h t h a t all n o n - C o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s a r e
d e p e n d e n t u p o n e a c h o t h e r ' s military, political a n d e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h in o r d e r t o
resist it. T h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e s e c o n d p o i n t is r e c o g n i s e d varies f r o m c o u n t r y
to c o u n t r y , a n d , w i t h it, t h e w i l l i n g n e s s of e a c h G o v e r n m e n t t o a d o p t
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a policy.
T h e r e a r e also, e.g., in E u r o p e , c o n s c i o u s a n d
d e l i b e r a t e m o v e m e n t s t o w a r d s u n i t y w h i c h a r e to s o m e e x t e n t i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e s e
two factors.
2. T o a d o p t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a policy is t o r e c o g n i s e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as
a fact a n d t o d e c i d e t o p r o m o t e it as t h e o n l y m e a n s of p r o g r e s s a n d safety.
It
involves t a k i n g a p r o c e s s w h i c h is h a p p e n i n g a n y w a y a n d t u r n i n g it t o a d v a n t a g e
b y e x t e n d i n g , a c c e l e r a t i n g a n d p r o c l a i m i n g it. It w a s this d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e U n i t e d
States a n d t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t s t o o k at t h e W a s h i n g t o n t a l k s in
O c t o b e r 1957.
B.-SCOPE
3. T h e P r e s i d e n t a n d t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r i n t e n d e d this p o l i c y t o b e e x t e n d e d
to t h e i r f r i e n d s a n d allies a n d c o n t e m p l a t e d its u l t i m a t e e x t e n s i o n t o t h e e n t i r e
free w o r l d . ("'" T h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e F r e e W o r l d a r e i n t e r d e p e n d e n t a n d o n l y in
genuine p a r t n e r s h i p can progress a n d safety be found
F o r our part we have
a g r e e d t h a t o u r t w o c o u n t r i e s will h e n c e f o r t h act in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h this
principle
W e believe t h a t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s w e h a v e r e a c h e d will b e
i n c r e a s i n g l y effective as t h e y b e c o m e m o r e w i d e s p r e a d b e t w e e n t h e free n a t i o n s . "
D e c l a r a t i o n of C o m m o n P u r p o s e . ) B u t t h e s c o p e of this p a p e r is c o n f i n e d t o t h e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . T h e r e a r e t h r e e r e a s o n s for
this: ­
(a) A l t h o u g h t h e c o m m u n i q u e issued a t t h e end of t h e N A T O m e e t i n g in
D e c e m b e r e n d o r s e d the p r i n c i p l e of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , t h e U n i t e d
K i n g d o m h a s n o t yet u n d e r t a k e n a n y n e w c o m m i t m e n t s t o N A T O in
p u r s u a n c e of this p r i n c i p l e . S o m e m a y e m e r g e later, e.g., in t h e p o o l i n g
of scientific a n d t e c h n i c a l r e s o u r c e s for d e f e n c e p u r p o s e s , in t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e of b a l a n c e d collective forces a n d t h e
i n t r o d u c t i o n of a single A i r D e f e n c e for E u r o p e , b u t it is n o t y e t p o s s i b l e
to foresee t h e i r f o r m a n d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s for U n i t e d K i n g d o m i n t e r e s t s
w h i c h t h e y will c a r r y . T h e s a m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a p p l i e s w i t h e v e n g r e a t e r
force t o o u r o t h e r alliances a n d c o n n e c t i o n s .
(b) W h e r e a s t h e policy of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e w a s i m m e d i a t e l y
p u t i n t o effect w i t h t h e s e t t i n g u p of W o r k i n g P a r t i e s in W a s h i n g t o n ,
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e in t h e N A T O s p h e r e is still a p r i n c i p l e r a t h e r t h a n
a programme.
B e c a u s e of this a n d b e c a u s e the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
d e c l a r a t i o n c a m e first, t h e r e is a n i m p r e s s i o n in s o m e q u a r t e r s in
E u r o p e t h a t A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c o - o p e r a t i o n is m o r e i m p o r t a n t t o t h e
United Kingdom than N A T O co-operation and that we are detaching
o u r s e l v e s f r o m t h e c o n t i n e n t in o r d e r t o b e c o m e e x c l u s i v e l y t h e first
l i e u t e n a n t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t p r e s e n t s p r o b l e m s
for U n i t e d K i n g d o m p o l i c y w h i c h a r e a d i r e c t result of A n g l o A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a n d n e e d e x a m i n a t i o n in t h a t c o n t e x t .
(c) A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is likely t o h a v e m o r e f a r - r e a c h i n g
effects o n U n i t e d K i n g d o m i n t e r e s t s t h a n a n y m o r e g e n e r a l l i n k - u p
for a t least t w o r e a s o n s . F i r s t , w h e r e t w o p a r t i e s a l o n e a r e c o n c e r n e d ,
d e c i s i o n s c a n b e t a k e n s e c r e t l y a n d q u i c k l y , a n d t h e p r o c e s s of
interlocking can go ahead more rapidly and thoroughly t h a n where a
d o z e n o r m o r e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s h a v e t o be p e r s u a d e d o r c a j o l e d
i n t o a g r e e m e n t . S e c o n d l y , t h e r e a l r e a d y exists a l o n g e r t r a d i t i o n o-.
a s s o c i a t i o n a n d a g r e a t e r f u n d of m u t u a l t r u s t b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s a n d t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m t h a n b e t w e e n a n y o t h e r c o l l e c t i o n of
S t a t e s . I n t h e intelligence" field, in p a r t i c u l a r , t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n
o u r r e s p e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n s h a v e b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y close.
C.—THE
RESULTS
OF
THE
WASHINGTON
TALKS
4. In the present world situation, the United States and the United K i n g d o m
h a v e in a n y c a s e b e e n d e p e n d e n t u p o n e a c h o t h e r for s o m e t i m e . T o s o m e e x t e n t
t h i s d e p e n d e n c e h a s b e e n o n e - s i d e d , for a t b o t t o m w e h a v e n e e d e d t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s m o r e t h a n t h e y u s , b u t t h e b a l a n c e h a s b e e n at least p a r t i a l l y r e s t o r e d by
R u s s i a n t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s w h i c h h a v e m a d e A m e r i c a n b a s e s in B r i t a i n ( a n d
e l s e w h e r e ) e s s e n t i a l t o t h e h o m e d e f e n c e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d h a v e p e r h a p s
a l s o u n d e r m i n e d A m e r i c a n c o n f i d e n c e in t h e i r t e c h n o l o g i c a l self-sufficiency.
Since
interdependence was already so far advanced, w h a t changes h a v e the W a s h i n g t o n
t a l k s in fact b r o u g h t a b o u t ?
5 . T h e a n s w e r is. at least superficially, a g r e a t e r r e c o g n i t i o n b y t h e
A m e r i c a n s of t h e fact of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a n d a g r e a t e r w i l l i n g n e s s t o a d o p t it as
a policy. T h e practical results h a v e b e e n : —
(a) T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e W o r k i n g G r o u p s , c o v e r i n g d e f e n c e , p o l i t i c a l ,
e c o n o m i c a n d i n f o r m a t i o n p r o b l e m s . T h e r e n o w exists, for t h e first
t i m e s i n c e t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , m a c h i n e r y for t h e c o n t i n u o u s j o i n t
e x a m i n a t i o n of c e r t a i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s , w h i c h c a n b e e x t e n d e d
t o d e a l w i t h n e w p r o b l e m s as t h e y a r i s e (as h a s a l r e a d y b e e n d o n s i n
t h e c a s e of I n d o n e s i a ) . T h r o u g h it w e s h o u l d b e a b l e t o e n s u r e —
(i) in g e n e r a l , t h a t w e h a v e a g r e a t e r k n o w l e d g e of w h a t A m e r i c a n
policy o n a n y m a j o r p r o b l e m is, t h o u g h t h e F a r E a s t a n d m i l i t a r y
s t r a t e g y a r e likely t o b e e x c e p t i o n s a n d w e c a n n o t e x p e c t t h e
A m e r i c a n s to b e o v e r - c o n s c i e n t i o u s a b o u t k e e p i n g u s i n f o r m e d ;
(ii) t h a t o u r views a r e k n o w n t o t h e m ;
(iii) t h a t w e h a v e a c h a n c e of influencing A m e r i c a n policy at its
formative stages.
(b) T h e d r a w i n g u p of p l a n s f o r t h e p o o l i n g of b r a i n s a n d r e s o u r c e s in t h e field
of d e f e n c e a n d for t h e a l l o c a t i o n of r e s e a r c h a n d p r o d u c t i o n t a s k s .
(c) T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s u n d e r t a k i n g t o seek c e r t a i n a m e n d m e n t s t o t h e A t o m i c
Energy Act.
(d) T h e e n g a g e m e n t of U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r e s t in t h e d e f e n c e of H o n g K o n g .
6. T h e a b o v e list s h o w s t h a t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is b y n o m e a n s c o m p r e h e n s i v e
as yet, e i t h e r as a n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o r e v e n a n o b j e c t i v e . M o s t of it is still a h o p e
f o r t h e f u t u r e , a n d t h e r e h a s b e e n n o p o o l i n g of d e f e n c e r e s o u r c e s yet. O n t h e
e c o n o m i c s i d e w e shall c e r t a i n l y w a n t t o a i m a t a g r e a t e r d e g r e e of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e
in future.
W h i l e o u r e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a r e in m a n y
respects intimate and constructive, recent contacts with the present United States
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a v e s h o w n t h a t t h e r e is a c o n s i d e r a b l e g a p b e w e e n t h e t h i n k i n g
of t h o s e r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e d i r e c t i o n of U n i t e d S t a t e s e c o n o m i c policy a n d t h e
w e l f a r e of t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a .
7. T h e r e is a t p r e s e n t n o r e a s o n t o d o u b t t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t
a r e s i n c e r e i n t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o m a k e a success of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .
Provided
t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e m o m e n t u m is m a i n t a i n e d ( p a r a g r a p h 10 b e l o w ) w e m a y e x p e c t
c o n s u l t a t i o n a n d c o - o r d i n a t i o n of policy t o g o o n o v e r a n e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g r a n g e of
s u b j e c t s , a n d o u r effort, p a r t i c u l a r l y a s r e g a r d s d e f e n c e , t o b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y
i n t e r l o c k e d w i t h t h a t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
D.-THE
IMPLICATIONS
OF
INTERDEPENDENCE
(a) T h e Advantages
8. T h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t in t h e m a i n t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m s t a n d s t o g a i n
g r e a t l y f r o m this p r o c e s s : —
(i) T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is so m u c h t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l n a t i o n in t h e W e s t e r n
c a m p t h a t o u r ability t o h a v e o u r w a y in t h e w o r l d d e p e n d s m o r e t h a n
a n y t h i n g else u p o n o u r influence u p o n h e r to act in c o n f o r m i t y w i t h o u r
i n t e r e s t s . A g a i n s t h e r o p p o s i t i o n w e c a n d o v e r y little (e.g., Suez) a n d
o u r n e e d for A m e r i c a n s u p p o r t is a fact w h i c h w e c a n n o t i g n o r e . It
follows t h a t o u r p o l i c y s h o u l d c e r t a i n l y be to p u t o u r s e l v e s in t h e
p o s i t i o n in w h i c h w e c a n elicit f r o m h e r the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t .
T h e policy of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is well d e s i g n e d t o
a c h i e v e this a i m .
(ii) O u r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p l a y s a g r e a t p a r t in o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p
w i t h t h i r d c o u n t r i e s . W e s t a n d t o lose if we a p p e a r , t o t h i r d c o u n t r i e s ,
e i t h e r t o b e a satellite o r t o b e o u t of t o u c h w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
C o n s e q u e n t l y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , w i t h a g r e e m e n t o n b o t h s i d e s t o differ o n
i n d i v i d u a l p o i n t s , gives us t h e best p o s i t i o n w e c a n h o p e t o h a v e .
(iii) It is o n l y t o t h e g o o d t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e a n a g r e e d A n g l o - A m e r i c a n policy
i n , e.g., t h e M i d d l e E a s t , i n s t e a d of t w o policies p u l l i n g in different
d i r e c t i o n s . T h i s is t r u e e v e n if c o - o r d i n a t i o n m e a n s s u b o r d i n a t i n g o u r
o w n i n t e r e s t s a t least in n o n - e s s e n t i a l m a t t e r s ; t h e f o r c e for s t a b i l i t y
a n d s e c u r i t y w h i c h s u c h a p o l i c y will p r o v i d e is well w o r t h m i n o r
sacrifices, t h o u g h if a n a g r e e d policy is t o h a v e r e a l i t y t h e r e will h a v e t o
be American concessions too.
(iv) O n t h e d e f e n c e s i d e , w e s t a n d t o g a i n c o n s i d e r a b l y f r o m A m e r i c a n t e c h n i c a l
information and resources.
(v) I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e i n m a n y cases m e a n s t h a t the m o n e y w e s p e n d a n d t h e
effort w e m a k e p r o d u c e v e r y m u c h m o r e v a l u a b l e r e s u l t s . If we a c t
a l o n e o u r efforts a n d r e s o u r c e s m a y n o t b r i n g c o m m e n s u r a t e benefits.
A c t i n g w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w e far m o r e o f t e n get full v a l u e o r e v e n
m o r e for o u r efforts.
(h) P o s s i b l e D i s a d v a n t a g e s
9. T h e r e a r e h o w e v e r a n u m b e r of p o s s i b l e a n d a c t u a l difficulties t o b e
overcome. They m a y be divided into t w o classes: —
T h e difficulties of k e e p i n g u p t h e m o m e n t u m of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a n d t h e d a n g e r s of
its a b a n d o n m e n t b y e i t h e r s i d e ;
T h e d a n g e r s of b e c o m i n g or s e e m i n g t o b e c o m e a n A m e r i c a n s a t e l l i t e .
(i) Keeping up the
momentum
10. T h e p o l i c y of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e t o s o m e e x t e n t g o e s
a g a i n s t t h e g r a i n for b o t h sides. C o n s u l t a t i o n is i r k s o m e a n d c o - o p e r a t i o n o f t e n
i n c o n v e n i e n t . T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a c h i n e in W a s h i n g t o n is u n u s e d a n d i l l - a d a p t e d
i n m a n y r e s p e c t s to c o - o p e r a t i o n of a n y k i n d . W e m u s t m o r e o v e r a l w a y s b e
p r e p a r e d for s h o c k s a n d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s i n h e r e n t in t h e h i g h l y p e r s o n a l n a t u r e
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; w e c a n n e v e r a s s u m e t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n
m a c h i n e will w o r k w i t h a well-oiled c o h e s i o n a n d t h e o p e r a t i o n of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e ,
t h e r e f o r e , m a y b e s u b j e c t e d t o a n n o y i n g a n d a p p a r e n t l y c a p r i c i o u s i n t e r r u p t i o n s for
w h i c h s o m e t i m e s t h e r e will b e n o i m m e d i a t e r e m e d i e s . T h e n a t u r a l t e n d e n c y of all
n e w initiatives, w h i c h i n v o l v e e x t r a w o r k , t o flag a n d t h e n d i e will t h e r e f o r e b e
a g g r a v a t e d . It will b e of t h e g r e a t e s t i m p o r t a n c e to p r e v e n t this h a p p e n i n g , b e c a u s e
if it d o e s w e shall c o n t i n u e t o i n c u r t h e u n p o p u l a r i t y w h i c h is b o u n d t o r e s u l t in
s o m e q u a r t e r s f r o m t h e belief t h a t w e a r e in a special r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s , w h i l e c e a s i n g t o enjoy t h e benefits. W e shall t h u s get t h e w o r s t of b o t h
worlds.
11. H o w is this t e n d e n c y t o b e o v e r c o m e ?
T h e first w a y is t o k e e p t h e
m a c h i n e r y of c o n s u l t a t i o n c o n t i n u o u s l y fed w i t h a c o n s t a n t flow of s u b j e c t s for
d i s c u s s i o n a n d t o m a k e t h e fullest u s e of t h e n o r m a l c h a n n e l s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n —
i.e., F o r e i g n Office, U n i t e d S t a t e s E m b a s s y a n d British E m b a s s y - S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t .
W h e n , f o r a n y r e a s o n , it is d e s i r e d to b r i n g i n a w i d e r circle of D e p a r t m e n t s o n t h e
B r i t i s h o r A m e r i c a n side, or w h e n , f o r a n y o t h e r r e a s o n , t h e s e c h a n n e l s a r e n o t
a p p r o p r i a t e , t h e n full u s e s h o u l d b e m a d e of t h e W o r k i n g G r o u p m a c h i n e r y . It is
n o t h o w e v e r n e c e s s a r y o r d e s i r a b l e t o refer e v e r y p r o b l e m t o a W o r k i n g G r o u p .
T h e y a r e chiefly useful w h e r e W a s h i n g t o n D e p a r t m e n t s o t h e r t h a n t h e S t a t e
D e p a r t m e n t (e.g., C . I . A . a n d P e n t a g o n ) a r e i n v o l v e d . O t h e r w i s e n o r m a l E m b a s s y
c o n t a c t s a r e a d e q u a t e a n d i n d e e d q u i c k e r . It is also t h e c a s e t h a t , as s o o n as a c t i o n
is n e e d e d , a n y i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n h a s t o b e t a k e n u p a n d o u t of t h e W o r k i n g G r o u p
level. But, since t h e c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e of this p a r t i c u l a r m a c h i n e r y is for us a n
i m p o r t a n t e n d in itself, it will b e d e s i r a b l e t o let it d e a l w i t h as m a n y of t h e real
crises as p o s s i b l e , a n d , w h e r e o t h e r t r e a t m e n t is n e c e s s a r y , t o r e t u r n t h e h a n d l i n g
of t h e p r o b l e m t o it at t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e m o m e n t . T h i s i n v o l v e s foresight a n d
planning.
12. T h e s e c o n d w a y is t o e x t e n d t h e m a c h i n e r y so as t o m a k e c o n s u l t a t i o n a
h a b i t u a l r e a c t i o n t o a n y p r o b l e m in t h e widest possible circle w i t h i n b o t h
g o v e r n m e n t a l m a c h i n e s . In p a r t i c u l a r it w o u l d be useful t o d o this in t h e c a s e of
F a r E a s t e r n q u e s t i o n s , w h e r e t h e conflict b e t w e e n t h e t w o foreign policies t o w a r d s
C h i n a r e d u c e s effective c o - o p e r a t i o n (see p a r a g r a p h 23 belo\v)7 I t will t h e r e f o r e
b e v a l u a b l e t o i n t r o d u c e n e w s u b j e c t s for d i s c u s s i o n , n o t o n l y in o r d e r t o c o - o r d i n a t e
policy u p o n t h e m but also to i n t r o d u c e new people to consultation. In addition
t o civilian c o n s u l t a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e E m b a s s y a n d t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , it m i g h t
b e f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n w h e t h e r w e s h o u l d seek to i n t r o d u c e a m e a s u r e of m i l i t a r y
c o n s u l t a t i o n , w h i c h m i g h t in d u e c o u r s e lead t o i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e c o - o r d i n a t i o n
of m i l i t a r y p l a n s . T h i s is a s u b j e c t o n w h i c h t h e r e a r e g a p s in o u r k n o w l e d g e of
U n i t e d States thinking.
13. It will a l s o b e d e s i r a b l e t o w i n d u p w o r k i n g g r o u p s a s s o o n as t h e y s t o p
b e i n g useful. W e s h o u l d e n s u r e t h a t t h e p a t t e r n of o u r c o n s u l t a t i o n c h a n g e s w i t h
the world situation.
14. W e m u s t , h o w e v e r , r e c o g n i s e t h a t h o w e v e r h a r d w e w o r k t o k e e p u p t h e
m o m e n t u m , i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e h a s c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s . In t h e last a n a l y s i s , t h e policies
of H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e p e n d o n the
s u p p o r t of p u b l i c a n d p a r l i a m e n t a r y ( o r c o n g r e s s i o n a l ) o p i n i o n . T h i s m a y limit the
a b i l i t y of t h e t w o G o v e r n m e n t s to f o r m u l a t e a n d p u r s u e j o i n t policies. It will be
v e r y difficult for t h e S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t t o o v e r r i d e o b j e c t i o n s in C o n g r e s s in o r d e r
t o align t h e i r p o l i c y w i t h o u r s . N o r w o u l d it b e e a s y for H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t
to be ready to defend a policy which r a n counter to public opinion on the grounds
t h a t it w a s t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n s e q u e n c e of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .
15. T h e r e is t h e r e l a t e d q u e s t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d legislative l i m i t a t i o n s .
I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is p r e s u m a b l y l i m i t e d t o s o m e e x t e n t b y t h e U n i t e d States
C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d b y p o s s i b l e difficulties b o t h h e r e a n d in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of
e n a c t i n g n e w l e g i s l a t i o n a n d r e p e a l i n g or m o d i f y i n g e x i s t i n g legislation (e.g., the
M a c M a h o n Act) w h e r e this is n e c e s s a r y t o give p r a c t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n to
interdependence.
(ii) The Dangers of
Abandonment
16. H o w e v e r firmly t h e p r e s e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d
t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m a r e c o m m i t t e d t o t h e policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , t h e r e is
a l w a y s a risk t h a t t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s m a y wish t o a b a n d o n it. It is n o t n e c e s s a r y h e r e
t o c o n s i d e r t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m if s u c h a d e c i s i o n c a m e f r o m this
s i d e , for it w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y o n l y b e t a k e n if it w e r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e n a t i o n a l
i n t e r e s t in t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e t i m e . B u t it is p o s s i b l e t h a t a U n i t e d S t a t e s
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h o s t i l e o r indifferent t o this c o u n t r y m i g h t a t s o m e t i m e c o m e to
p o w e r , o r t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of i n t e r - c o n t i n e n t a l missiles m i g h t c o n c e i v a b l y lead
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o a d o p t a p o l i c y of " F o r t r e s s A m e r i c a , " o r t h a t a c h a n g e of
G o v e r n m e n t in this c o u n t r y m i g h t h a v e a f u n d a m e n t a l a n d d a n g e r o u s r e s u l t for t h e
A n g l o - A m e r i c a n partnership. A U n i t e d States w i t h d r a w a l from A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
c o - o p e r a t i o n w o u l d h a v e s e r i o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s for this c o u n t r y .
17. T h e y w o u l d b e p a r t i c u l a r l y s e r i o u s in t h e field of n u c l e a r c o - o p e r a t i o n ,
if, for e x a m p l e , t h e A m e r i c a n s w i t h d r e w f r o m t h e i r p r e s e n t p o l i c y of c o l l a b o r a t i n g
o n q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e n u c l e a r side of d i s a r m a m e n t a n d n u c l e a r tests. It is
h i g h l y i m p o r t a n t t o us t h a t t h e A m e r i c a n s , w h o a r e far a h e a d o n w e a p o n
d e v e l o p m e n t , s h o u l d n o t a g r e e to t h e c e s s a t i o n of tests unless t h e y h a v e m e a n w h i l e
s o revised t h e A t o m i c E n e r g y A c t t h a t t h e y c a n a n d will give us t h e fruits of all
t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t w o r k s o far.
18. T h e r e a r e t w o sides t o this q u e s t i o n . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e f u r t h e r the
p r o c e s s of i n t e r l o c k i n g h a d g o n e , p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e fields of defence a n d the
p r o t e c t i o n of o u r essential interests o v e r s e a s , t h e m o r e A m e r i c a n w i t h d r a w a l w o u l d
l e a v e us helpless. It m u s t b e recognised t h a t in a p a r t n e r s h i p b e t w e e n t w o P o w e r s
of v e r y u n e q u a l s t r e n g t h , it is far m o r e s e r i o u s for t h e w e a k e r t h a n for the s t r o n g e r
if t h e p a r t n e r s h i p conies t o an e n d . A l t h o u g h t h e A m e r i c a n s as well as w e s t a n d
t o g a i n a g o o d deal from i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e in t e c h n i c a l a n d o t h e r fields, t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s c a n , so t o s p e a k , u n d e r w r i t e t h e c o m m i t m e n t which c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h u s
r e p r e s e n t s for t h e m , while the U n i t e d K i n g d o m c a n n o t . F u r t h e r , it a p p e a r s a t
p r e s e n t t h a t the U n i t e d States will n o t in fact, t o a n y significant d e g r e e , c a r r y
t h r o u g h t h e j o i n t a l l o t m e n t of t a s k s t o t h e p o i n t at which a n y i m p o r t a n t task is
o u r sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; t h e y a r e likely t o m a i n t a i n t h e full a p p a r a t u s r e q u i r e d b y
a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n t r y . T h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m in all p r o b a b i l i t y c a n n o t afford t o
d o t h i s — i n d e e d o n e of t h e p r i n c i p a l a d v a n t a g e s of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e from o u r p o i n t
of v i e w is t h a t w e shall n o t h a v e t o . B u t this m e a n s t h a t t h e a b a n d o n m e n t of t h e
p r e s e n t policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e w o u l d h a v e far m o r e s e r i o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s for
u s t h a n for the A m e r i c a n s .
19. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e f u r t h e r t h e p r o c e s s of i n t e r l o c k i n g g o e s , t h e less
p r o b a b l e A m e r i c a n w i t h d r a w a l will b e c o m e .
If i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is t o b e c o m e
r e a l , t h e risk is o n e w e m u s t a c c e p t , b u t t h e m o r e real it b e c o m e s , the m o r e t h e
risk will d i m i n i s h . In t h e first p i a c e t h e A m e r i c a n s , given their g e n e r a l l y d e c e n t
w a y of t h i n k i n g , w o u l d b e less likely t o w i t h d r a w if they realised t h a t b y d o i n g s o
t h e y w o u l d p u t us in a hopelessly d a n g e r o u s p o s i t i o n . S e c o n d l y , as l o n g a s t h e
w o r l d s i t u a t i o n r e m a i n s m o r e o r less as it is at p r e s e n t , it w o u l d clearly b e a g a i n s t
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' o w n interest t o let u s b e seriously w e a k e n e d . T h i r d l y , in spite
of t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o u t l i n e d in the last p a r a g r a p h it s h o u l d be p o s s i b l e for us t o
e n g a g e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s so d e e p l y in i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e t h a t w i t h d r a w a l w o u l d b e
seriously i n c o n v e n i e n t for t h e m , a n d t h e m o r e this is d o n e , t h e s m a l l e r t h e d a n g e r
will b e . If on t h e o t h e r h a n d w e t r y t o g u a r d a g a i n s t it by m a k i n g r e s e r v a t i o n s to
o u r p o l i c y of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a n d b y s e e k i n g not to c o m p r o m i s e o u r essential
i n t e r e s t s , w e shall e n d a n g e r t h e policy itself.
20. T h e c o n c l u s i o n t o b e d r a w n f r o m this is t h a t t h e r e is n o h a l f - w a y h o u s e
b e t w e e n a d e g r e e of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e s o slight as n o t to b e r e a l l y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e
at all, a n d i n v o l v i n g o u r s e l v e s s o closely w i t h t h e A m e r i c a n s t h a t w i t h d r a w a l o n
e i t h e r s i d e will in fact cease t o b e p r a c t i c a l policy. W h i l e b o t h c o u r s e s h a v e t h e i r
d a n g e r s , t h e l a t t e r s e e m s t o b e the o n l y p o s s i b l e o n e t o c h o o s e .
(iii) The clangers
of becoming
an American
Satellite
2 1 . T h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , in its relatively w e a k p o s i t i o n , is a l r e a d y g r e a t l y
d e p e n d e n t u p o n U n i t e d S t a t e s s u p p o r t . It w o u l d b e s u r p r i s i n g if t h e U n i t e d States
d i d n o t e x a c t a price for this s u p p o r t , a n d to s o m e e x t e n t s h e d o e s so. T h e policy
of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e will necessarily i n c r e a s e t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h the U n i t e d S t a t e s
c a n m a k e us p a y for this s u p p o r t , for t h e m o r e w e rely u p o n t h e m , t h e m o r e w e
shall b e h u r t if t h e y w i t h h o l d it.
22. T o o m u c h need n o t b e m a d e of this since it d o e s n o t s e e m at p r e s e n t t h a t
t h e r e a r e m a n y i m p o r t a n t fields in w h i c h A m e r i c a n a n d British policies conflict a n d
i n w h i c h we m i g h t b e forced t o give w a y . I n d e e d , if t h e r e h a d b e e n m a n y s u c h c a s e s ,
t h e D e c l a r a t i o n of C o m m o n P u r p o s e c o u l d h a r d l y h a v e b e e n i s s u e d , b u t t h e
q u e s t i o n m a y arise, e.g., o v e r B u r a i m i .
2 3 . T h e r e is a l s o the conflict of British a n d A m e r i c a n policies o v e r C h i n a .
W h i i e w e c o u l d b r i n g o u r policy i n t o line w i t h t h a t of the A m e r i c a n s , t o d o s o w o u l d
c a u s e political difficulties at h o m e , p r o l o n g t h e s t a l e m a t e o v e r C h i n a a n d d i m i n i s h
U n i t e d S t a t e s r e s p e c t b y m a k i n g it a p p e a r t h a t w e w e r e willing to sacrifice o u r
firmly-held
views in o r d e r t o o b t a i n t h e i r f a v o u r . W e m u s t t h e r e f o r e face t h e fact
t h a t w h i l e w e s h o u l d c o n s u l t fully o v e r C h i n a , a g r e e m e n t c a n n o t a t p r e s e n t b e
r e a c h e d a n d t h a t this m u s t limit t h e e x t e n t of t h e c o - o p e r a t i o n in t h e F a r E a s t .
24. T h i s a s p e c t of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s will r e q u i r e careful w a t c h i n g .
B u t t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to d o u b t t h a t w e s h o u l d b e a b l e to h o l d o u r o w n w h e n
A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r e s t s d i v e r g e , p r o v i d e d t h a t w e m a k e clear t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
w h e n n e c e s s a r y , t h a t a l t h o u g h i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of o u r policy, w e
c a n n o t b e e x p e c t e d t o sacrifice all o u r o t h e r i n t e r e s t s t o it.
(iv) The danger of exclusive Anglo-American
interdependence
2 5 . Since o u r i n t e r e s t s a n d t h o s e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d o not in fact m u c h
d i v e r g e , t h e r e is r e l a t i v e l y little d a n g e r of a s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g in w h i c h w e h a v e t o
c h o o s e b e t w e e n b r e a k i n g a w a y a n d b e c o m i n g a n A m e r i c a n s a t e l l i t e . But t h e d a n g e r
of (i) s e e m i n g t o b e c o m e o n e , a n d (ii) s e e m i n g t o t r y to set u p a n e x c l u s i v e A n g l o A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s h i p , is g r e a t e r .
If we give t h i s i m p r e s s i o n w e shall suffer o n
two counts:
(a) w e shall d a m a g e o u r r e l a t i o n s w i t h o u r o t h e r f r i e n d s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e
Europeans;
(b) w e shall lose influence w i t h t h e A m e r i c a n s t h e m s e l v e s , b e c a u s e this d e p e n d s
u p o n t h e e x t e n t of o u r influence e l s e w h e r e .
T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M AND H E R O T H E R F R I E N D S
26.
O u r r e l a t i o n s w i t h o u r friends m a y b e c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r t h r e e h e a d s : —
The
Commonwealth
27. H e r e t h e p r o b l e m is n o t a c u t e . S o l o n g as w e c o n t i n u e full c o n s u l t a t i o n
a n d c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e m , t h e C a n a d i a n s a r e n o t likely t o t h i n k of us in this
light o r w o r r y o v e r m u c h a b o u t this p o s s i b i l i t y . T h e i r a n x i e t y is t h e r e v e r s e — t h a t
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m m i g h t o n e d a y d i v e r g e s o far t h a t
C a n a d a h a d t o c h o o s e b e t w e e n t h e m . T h e s a m e a p p l i e s to A u s t r a l i a a n d N e w
Z e a l a n d . In g e n e r a l for all t h r e e t h e c l o s e r t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m is t o t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s , t h e b e t t e r . S o u t h A f r i c a is p r o b a b l y n o t i n t e r e s t e d . P a k i s t a n w e l c o m e s
A n g l o - A m e r i c a n solidarity.
W i t h India, C e y l o n and p r o b a b l y also G h a n a and
M a l a y a , t h e p o s i t i o n is r a t h e r different. P a r t of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m ^ s t r e n g t h in
S o u t h a n d S o u t h - E a s t A s i a d e r i v e s f r o m t h e fact t h a t w e a r e n o t r e g a r d e d t h e r e as
identified w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a r e w i d e l y r e g a r d e d as b r a s h ,
b e l l i c o s e a n d d o m i n e e r i n g , a n d t h e r e is a t e n d e n c y ( m a r k e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e
I n d o - C h i n a crisis in 1954) t o r e s p e c t t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m for not s h a r i n g these
q u a l i t i e s . I n d i a a n d C e y l o n at least a r e likely t o r e s e r v e j u d g m e n t o v e r A n g l o A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , t o like it if it s e e m s t h a t w e a r e i n c r e a s i n g o u r influence
o v e r t h e A m e r i c a n s a n d t o dislike it if it s e e m s t h a t t h e y a r e i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r
i n f l u e n c e o v e r us.
Western Europe
2 8 . H e r e t h e p r o b l e m is m u c h m o r e s e r i o u s , in t h a t t h e r e is a l r e a d y a
w i d e s p r e a d feeling in E u r o p e t h a t t h e r e a r e t w o a l t e r n a t i v e policies for t h e U n i t e d
K i n g d o m , t o e n t e r E u r o p e a n d to s t a n d o u t s i d e it in a n " A n g l o - S a x o n " c l i q u e , a n d
t h a t , b y a d o p t i n g t h e policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , w e h a v e p l u m p e d for t h e s e c o n d .
It is n o t so m u c h t h a t w e a r e r e g a r d e d as h a v i n g o p t e d t o b e c o m e a n A m e r i c a n
s a t e l l i t e ; t h e E u r o p e a n s c o u l d a c c e p t t h i s e v e n if t h e y r e g r e t t e d it. W h a t t h e y
r e s e n t is t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t w e a r e t r y i n g t o s t a n d a p a r t f r o m b o t h A m e r i c a a n d
E u r o p e a n d t o profit at t h e e x p e n s e of b o t h b y a r r o g a t i n g t o o u r s e l v e s a special
p o s i t i o n in A m e r i c a n eyes by v i r t u e of o u r w o r l d p o s i t i o n .
T h i s is a
m i s c o n c e p t i o n of " i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e " w h i c h v/as i n v e n t e d as a n e x p a n d i n g r a t h e r
t h a n as a n e x c l u s i v e i d e a , b u t t h e r e a r e g o o d r e a s o n s for its a p p e a r a n c e .
The
s u s p i c i o n t h a t B r i t a i n is s t a n d i n g aloof f r o m E u r o p e a n d is indifferent o r e v e n
h o s t i l e t o E u r o p e a n u n i t y is a n o l d o n e . T h e fact t h a t w e , a l o n e of t h e W e s t e r n
E u r o p e a n Powers, have m a d e the hydrogen b o m b , joined the American nuclear
directorate and are n o w seeking to prevent any " fourth country " from possessing
it, i m p l i e s to m a n y E u r o p e a n s , especially t h e F r e n c h , t h a t w e a r e s e e k i n g t o e s t a b l i s h
a n d m a i n t a i n a two-level P o w e r s y s t e m in t h e free w o r l d , w i t h B r i t a i n a n d A m e r i c a
in c o m m a n d a n d t h e rest in t h e r a n k s . T h e r e is also t h e s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e U n i t e d
K i n g d o m is t r y i n g t o e d g e o u t of h e r c o m m i t m e n t t o m a i n t a i n t r o o p s o n t h e
C o n t i n e n t . F i n a l l y , t h e first m a j o r act of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c o - o p e r a t i o n after t h e
W a s h i n g t o n t a l k s w a s to s u p p l y a r m s t o T u n i s i a , a n a c t i o n in w h i c h w e a p p e a r e d
t o b e o v e r - r i d i n g t h e w i s h e s a n d u n d e r m i n i n g t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e F r e n c h . T h e s e ,
a n d o t h e r f a c t o r s , h a v e u n f o r t u n a t e l y a d d e d u p t o c r e a t e t h e i m p r e s s i o n at t h e
p r e s e n t t i m e in m a n y influential q u a r t e r s in E u r o p e t h a t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is a
e u p h e m i s m for a n e x c l u s i v e A n g l o - A m e r i c a n l i n e - u p i n v e n t e d for o u r o w n p r i v a t e
c o n v e n i e n c e , a n d t h a t t a l k of its e x p a n s i o n is h y p o c r i s y .
IAS
H 29. A l t h o u g h s u s p i c i o n s of t o o close A n g l o - U n i t e d S t a t e s s o l i d a r i t y will
p r o b a b l y a l w a y s exist, especially in F r a n c e , the p r e s e n t e x t r e m e m a n i f e s t a t i o n of
t h i s feeling m a y p r o v e t o b e c o m p a r a t i v e l y s h o r t l i v e d , p r o v i d e d w e r e c o g n i s e its
d a n g e r s a n d act a c c o r d i n g l y . F o r it w o u l d i n d e e d b e d a n g e r o u s for t h e U n i t e d
K i n g d o m a n d for t h e W e s t e r n w o r l d as a w h o l e if this i m p r e s s i o n w e r e a l l o w e d t o
g r o w a n d t o persist. A s far as t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m is c o n c e r n e d , w e c a n n o t afford
t o b u i l d u p a p o s i t i o n as t h e First L i e u t e n a n t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s in a w a y w h i c h
s e v e r e l y d a m a g e s o u r p o s i t i o n in E u r o p e .
T h e e m e r g e n c e of t h e S i x - P o w e r
c o m m u n i t y m a k e s t h i s d a n g e r m o r e a c u t e . P l a y i n g o u r p r o p e r p a r t in E u r o p e , w e
s h o u l d b e a n i n v a l u a b l e ally t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Isolated from E u r o p e , o u r v a l u e ,
a n d t h e r e f o r e o u r influence, w o u l d fall a w a y very g r e a t l y . U n l e s s w e a r e c a r e f u l , it
is p o s s i b l e t h a t a s i t u a t i o n m i g h t arise in w h i c h , if Britain w e r e isolated f r o m t h e
political l e a d e r s h i p of E u r o p e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m i g h t , in spite of i n t e r - d e p e n d e n c e ,
d e a l d i r e c t with E u r o p e o v e r o u r h e a d s .
The
Rest
30. Slightly different c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a p p l y to o u r o t h e r f r i e n d s , e.g., t h e m e m b e r s
of t h e B a g h d a d P a c t , s i n c e h e r e t h e d a n g e r is t h e m o r e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d o n e of
s e e m i n g to b e an A m e r i c a n satellite. W h i l e they a r e g l a d t o see t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m
a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p u l l i n g t o g e t h e r they w o u l d b e s o r r y t o see t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
in c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l . B u t in such a s i t u a t i o n t h e y w o u l d c e r t a i n l y t r a n s f e r t h e i r
a l l e g i a n c e w h o l l y t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d in a n y c o n s e q u e n t a r r a n g e m e n t s b e t w e e n
them and the A m e r i c a n s , U n i t e d K i n g d o m interests might be ignored.
T H E U N I T E D KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES
3 1 . It follows f r o m this t h a t o u r influence w i t h t h e A m e r i c a n s will a m o n g
o t h e r t h i n g s d e p e n d u p o n t h e e x t e n t of o u r influence e l s e w h e r e a n d t h a t w e shall
e s c a p e a p p e a r i n g t o b e c o m e a satellite o n l y by p u t t i n g o u r s e l v e s in a p o s i t i o n t o
i n c r e a s e it. S u c h a p o s i t i o n o n o u r p a r t , m o r e o v e r , w o u l d s u r e l y b e w e l c o m e t o t h e
United
States.
Indeed
the
Americans
have
always
welcomed
moves
d e s i g n e d t o d r a w t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m c l o s e r t o E u r o p e , a n d w o u l d h a v e iiked t h e m
to have been m o r e n u m e r o u s and far-reaching than has been possible hitherto.
T h e d a n g e r s of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n e x c l u s i v e n e s s i n d e e d d o n o t d e r i v e from t h e
A m e r i c a n a t t i t u d e t o i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e at all. P r o v i d e d t h e y a r e c o n v i n c e d t h a t o u r
d e s i r e is g e n u i n e l y t o b r i n g t h e free w o r l d t o g e t h e r a l o n g a g r e e d A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
lines, a n d n o t t o i m p r o v e o u r o w n p o s i t i o n by p l a y i n g off o u r v a r i o u s friends a g a i n s t
e a c h o t h e r , t h e y a r e likely t o w e l c o m e a n y m o v e s w h i c h will e n h a n c e o u r g e n e r a l
p r e s t i g e a n d influence a n d t h u s e n a b l e us "to m a k e a d i s t i n c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e
u n i t y of t h e free w o r l d .
(c) C o n c l u s i o n
32. If t h e a b o v e a n a l y s i s is b r o a d l y a c c e p t e d , it a p p e a r s t h a t o n e of t h e U n i t e d
K i n g d o m ' s p r i n c i p a l p r o b l e m s in t h e c o n t e x t of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , b o t h in t h e l o n g
a n d in t h e s h o r t t e r m , is t o a v o i d t h e a p p e a r a n c e of s e e k i n g t o set u p a n e x c l u s i v e
A n g l o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s h i p o r of b e c o m i n g a n A m e r i c a n s a t e l l i t e , a n d t o
s t r e n g t h e n r a t h e r t h a n w e a k e n o u r ties w i t h o u r o t h e r f r i e n d s — i . e . , to p l a y a n a c t i v e
p a r t in t h e w i d e n i n g of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .
H o w is this t o b e d o n e ?
33. T h e i m m e d i a t e a n d p e r h a p s t h e m a i n p r o b l e m is in E u r o p e . W e h a v e
t o convince the E u r o p e a n s , and particularly the F r e n c h , that we are not tiptoeing
o u t of E u r o p e , a n d t h a t w e a r e n o t p r o p o s i n g t o d e s e r t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s in o r d e r t o
c o n s o l i d a t e o u r p o s i t i o n as A m e r i c a s exclusive p a r t n e r . T h e t w o p r i n c i p a l b o n e s
of c o n t e n t i o n at p r e s e n t a r e t h e w i t h d r a w a l of forces f r o m G e r m a n y a n d t h e F r e e
T r a d e A r e a . It is difficult t o assess t h e i r c o m p a r a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e in E u r o p e a n e y e s ,
b u t it s e e m s c l e a r t h a t it is n e c e s s a r y t o e x a m i n e w h a t c o n c e s s i o n s t h e U n i t e d
K i n g d o m c a n afford t o m a k e in o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n a p o s i t i o n in E u r o p e w h i c h
h a s d e t e r i o r a t e d b a d l y o v e r t h e last few m o n t h s . It is fair t o say t h a t t h e m a i n ­
t e n a n c e of B r i t i s h forces o n t h e C o n t i n e n t a n d a firm a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s R u s s i a n
p r o p o s a l s for t h e n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of E u r o p e , t o g e t h e r w i t h o u r w i l l i n g n e s s to m e e t
t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e Six in t h e F r e e T r a d e A r e a n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e t h e t o u c h s t o n e b y
w h i c h o u r a t t i t u d e t o E u r o p e will b e tested in E u r o p e a n e y e s d u r i n g t h e n e x t few
m o n t h s . In t h e i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e , h o w e v e r , w e shall h a v e t o press o n w i t h t h e
F r e e T r a d e A r e a n e g o t i a t i o n s , d e s p i t e F r e n c h desires for d e l a y — a n d c o n c e s s i o n s
will h a v e t o b e m a d e o n b o t h sides b e f o r e w e c a n e s t a b l i s h a right r e l a t i o n w i t h
E u r o p e in t h e l o n g t e r m .
34. T h e q u e s t i o n also a r i s e s : is it a l w a y s in the best interests of the U n i t e d
S t a t e s a n d t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m t o g e t h e r t h a t w e s h o u l d s p e a k a n d a c t in c o n c e r t ?
C a s e s m a y arise in t h e f u t u r e in w h i c h o u r j o i n t i n t e r e s t s m a y be b e t t e r s e r v e d by
o n e o r t h e o t h e r a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l l y . If, for e x a m p l e , t h e c o h e s i o n of the A t l a n t i c
C o m m u n i t y is in q u e s t i o n , t h e r e m a y well b e o c c a s i o n s o n w h i c h it will b e b e t t e r
p r e s e r v e d if t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m b e h a v e s as a E u r o p e a n r a t h e r t h a n a s a n " A n g l o S a x o n " m e m b e r . S i m i l a r l y , in S o u t h a n d S o u t h - E a s t Asia t h e W e s t as a w h o l e
m a y g a i n if t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , as c i r c u m s t a n c e s d i c t a t e ,
a d o p t a d i v e r g e n t t o n e . P r o v i d e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s
r e m a i n f u n d a m e n t a l l y in p a r t n e r s h i p , it m a y b e b e t t e r t h a t s i n c e r e d i s a g r e e m e n t
s h o u l d b e p u b l i c l y reflected t h a n t h a t o n e s i d e s h o u l d d r o p its o w n view in the
c a u s e of u n b r o k e n u n i t y .
35. S u c h d i v e r g e n c e s h o u l d o n l y b e a l l o w e d t o h a p p e n after c o n s u l t a t i o n ,
a n d , if possible, by a g r e e m e n t . It m a y s e e m difficult t o a l l o w for it w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g
full c o - o p e r a t i o n o v e r t h e long t e r m . But it m a y b e o b s e r v e d t h a t b o t h sides a r e i n
a n y c a s e a l r e a d y p l a y i n g this g a m e . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a b s t a i n e d from v o t i n g in
t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s d e b a t e o v e r C y p r u s , p r e s u m a b l y in o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r
p o s i t i o n in t h e eyes of G r e e c e a n d of t h e a n t i - C o l o n i a l P o w e r s ; t h e d e b a t e t o o k
p l a c e after t h e W a s h i n g t o n t a l k s . S i m i l a r l y w e a d o p t a d i v e r g e n t line o v e r C h i n a
a n d s t r a t e g i c c o n t r o l s , it is highly d e s i r a b l e , b o t h in o u r o w n p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s , a n d
in t h o s e of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o g e t h e r , t h a t w e s h o u l d
c o n t i n u e t o r e s e r v e t h e right to s p e a k a n d act i n d e p e n d e n t l y o n o c c a s i o n . By d o i n g
so we m a y be able to d o m u c h t o w a r d s preserving a n d p r o m o t i n g o u r prestige as
a P o w e r in o u r o w n right.
36. I n c o n c l u s i o n , it must be s t a t e d t h a t t h e policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e
p r o b a b l y c a n n o t , if t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m ^ essential i n t e r e s t s a r e t o b e p r e s e r v e d ,
p r o d u c e g r e a t s a v i n g s in m o n e y . W h i l e w e h o p e in t h e long t e r m t h a t t h e c o n c e p t
of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e will b r i n g us c e r t a i n e c o n o m i e s t h r o u g h t h e s h a r i n g of b u r d e n s
w h i c h a r e t o o h e a v y for us to c a r r y a l o n e , it will necessarily i n v o l v e us in m a k i n g
c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o w a r d s t h e e x e c u t i o n of a g r e e d policies if w e a r e t o m a i n t a i n a n y
s u b s t a n t i a l influence o v e r t h e A m e r i c a n s a n d o u r o t h e r friends in a r e a s w h e r e w e
h a v e i m p o r t a n t interests.
37. T h i s is n o t t o say t h a t t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m c a n n o t afford i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .
O n t h e c o n t r a r y , it is p e r h a p s t h e only policy t o hold o u t h o p e s of t h e s t a b i l i t y a n d
s e c u r i t y w i t h o u t w h i c h w e c a n n o t p r o s p e r . It is a n e c e s s a r y i n v e s t m e n t a n d t h o u g h
it will n o t b e c h e a p o r e a s y to m a k e , it c o u l d if w e p l a y it right b r i n g u s g r e a t benefits.
E.-RECOMMENDATIONS
38.
I t is r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t : —
(a) A s t u d y s h o u l d b e m a d e of w a y s a n d m e a n s of e x t e n d i n g A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
i n t e r l o c k i n g in t h e field of policy p l a n n i n g , w i t h special r e f e r e n c e to t h e
possibility of e x t e n d i n g political c o n s u l t a t i o n t o F a r E a s t e r n p r o b l e m s ,
t h o u g h full a g r e e m e n t c a n n o t b e r e a c h e d o v e r C h i n a ( p a r a g r a p h s 11, 12
a n d 23).
(/;) T h e possibility m i g h t a l s o b e c o n s i d e r e d of i n t r o d u c i n g a m e a s u r e of
m i l i t a r y c o n s u l t a t i o n ( p a r a g r a p h 12).
(c) A s t u d y s h o u l d b e m a d e of p o s s i b l e initiatives w h i c h t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m
c o u l d t a k e in o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n h e r p o s i t i o n in t h e r e s t of t h e w o r l d
a n d t o i n c r e a s e h e r influence a s a n " i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , " w i t h s p e c i a l
r e f e r e n c e t o E u r o p e ( p a r a g r a p h s 32 a n d 33).
ANNEX
THE EFFECTS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN INTERDEPENDENCE ON THE
LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM : SUMMARY
A.—Definition
T o a d o p t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a policy is t o r e c o g n i s e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a
fact a n d t o d e c i d e t o p r o m o t e it as t h e o n l y m e a n s of p r o g r e s s a n d s a i e t y .
It
involves t a k i n g a p r o c e s s w h i c h is h a p o e n i n a a n y w a y a n d t u r n i n g it t o a d v a n t a g e
b y e x t e n d i n g , a c c e l e r a t i n g a n d p r o c l a i m i n g it. It w a s this d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s a n d U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t s t o o k at t h e W a s h i n g t o n t a l k s in O c t o b e r ,
1957.
B.—Scope
2. T h e P r e s i d e n t a n d t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r c o n c e i v e d i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as
e x t e n d i n g t o t h e e n t i r e free w o r l d . But t h e s c o p e of this p a p e r is c o n f i n e d to A n g l o American interdependence b e c a u s e : ­
(a) vve h a v e s o far u n d e r t a k e n n o n e w c o m m i t m e n t s as p a r t of the policy of
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , e x c e p t w i t h the A m e r i c a n s ;
(b) A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e h a s a l r e a d y c r e a t e d p r o b l e m s for U n i t e d
K i n g d o m p o l i c y in r e l a t i o n t o E u r o p e :
(c) A n g l o - A m e r i c a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is likely t o affect t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m
more t h a n any more general link-up.
C . - T h e R e s u l t s of t h e W a s h i n g t o n T a l k s
3. T h e W a s h i n g t o n t a l k s h a v e a p p a r e n t l y b r o u g h t a b o u t a g r e a t e r r e c o g n i t i o n
b y t h e A m e r i c a n s of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e as a fact a n d a g r e a t e r willingness t o a d o p t
it as a policy. T h e p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s h a v e b e e n : —
(a) T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e W o r k i n g G r o u p s . T h e r e n o w exists, for the
first t i m e s i n c e t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r , m a c h i n e r y for t h e c o n t i n u o u s
j o i n t e x a m i n a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s .
(b) T h e d r a w i n g u p of p l a n s for t h e p o o l i n g of b r a i n s a n d r e s o u r c e s for
defence.
(c) T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s u n d e r t a k i n g t o seek c e r t a i n a m e n d m e n t s to t h e A t o m i c
Energy Act.
(d) T h e e n g a g e m e n t of U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e r e s t in t h e d e f e n c e of H o n g K o n g .
4. A l t h o u g h m o s t of the a b o v e is still a h o p e for t h e f u t u r e , a n d e c o n o m i c
c o - o p e r a t i o n falls far s h o r t of t h e ideal, t h e r e s e e m s n o r e a s o n t o d o u b t U n i t e d
States sincerity. P r o v i d e d t h e m o m e n t u m is m a i n t a i n e d ( p a r a g r a p h 10 b e l o w )
w e m a y e x p e c t c o n s u l t a t i o n a n d c o - o r d i n a t i o n of p o l i c y t o g r o w a n d o u r effort,
p a r t i c u l a r l y as r e g a r d s d e f e n c e , t o b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t e r l o c k e d w i t h t h a t of
the United States.
D . — T h e A d v a n t a g e s of
Interdependence
5. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o c c u p i e s a p o s i t i o n of s u c h p o w e r , t h a t w e n e e d t o
p u t o u r s e l v e s in a p o s i t i o n t o elicit f r o m h e r t h e g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t .
The
p o l i c y of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is well d e s i g n e d t o a c h i e v e this a i m .
6. Visible A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c o - o p e r a t i o n e n h a n c e s o u r i n f l u e n c e ,
t h a t we c o n t i n u e t o u p h o l d o u r o w n d i v e r g e n t v i e w o n o c c a s i o n .
provided
7. I t is o n l y to t h e g o o d t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e a j o i n t A n g l o - A m e r i c a n policy,
e.g., in t h e M i d d l e E a s t , r a t h e r t h a n t w o policies p u l l i n g in different d i r e c t i o n s !
E v e n from a p u r e l y n a t i o n a l p o i n t of v i e w u n i t y is w o r t h m i n o r sacrifices.
8. O n the d e f e n c e side w e s t a n d t o g a i n f r o m A m e r i c a n
resources.
9.
J o i n t efforts will p r o d u c e g r e a t e r v a l u e for m o n e y .
knowledge
and
2 ( 3 Jc E.—Possible
Disadvantages
(a) The difficulty of keeping up the momentum
10. C o n s u l t a t i o n is i r k s o m e a n d c o - o p e r a t i o n often i n c o n v e n i e n t . T h e
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a c h i n e in W a s h i n g t o n is i l l - a d a p t e d t o i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y
b e c a u s e of its highly p e r s o n a l n a t u r e . T h e r e is t h u s a d a n g e r t h a t this n e w i n i t i a t i v e
will Hag. If it d o e s w e shall c e a s e t o g e t t h e benefits of close c o - o p e r a t i o n while
still i n c u r r i n g o d i u m , e.g., in E u r o p e , b e c a u s e of t h e belief t h a t it exists (see
p a r a g r a p h 17 b e l o w ) .
11.
T o p r e v e n t this w e m u s t d o t h r e e t h i n g s : —
(i) K e e p t h e m a c h i n e r y of c o n s u l t a t i o n c o n s t a n t l y fed w i t h a flow of s u b j e c t s
for d i s c u s s i o n m a k i n g full u s e of n o r m a l E m b a s s y c o n t a c t s , a n d , w h e r e
a p p r o p r i a t e , of t h e W o r k i n g G r o u p s ;
(ii) E x t e n d t h e m a c h i n e r y s o as t o m a k e c o n s u l t a t i o n a h a b i t u a l p r a c t i c e in
t h e w i d e s t p o s s i b l e circles in W a s h i n g t o n (in p a r t i c u l a r it w o u l d b e useful
t o d o this o v e r F a r E a s t e r n p r o b l e m s a n d p e r h a p s m i l i t a r y c o n s u l t a t i o n ) ;
(iii) W i n d u p W o r k i n g G r o u p s as s o o n as t h e y s t o p b e i n g useful.
12. B u t w e m u s t r e c o g n i s e t h a t t h e r e a r e limits t o t h e p o s s i b l e e x t e n t of policy
c o - o r d i n a t i o n . P u b l i c o p i n i o n o n b o t h sides a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l difficulties in t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s a r e limiting f a c t o r s .
I t w o u l d n o t b e e a s y for H e r M a j e s t y ' s
G o v e r n m e n t t o d e f e n d a n u n p o p u l a r policy as a n e c e s s a r y c o n s e q u e n c e of
interdependence.
(b) The clangers of abandonment
13. T h e r e is a l w a y s a risk t h a t a f u t u r e U n i t e d S t a t e s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n m a y
wish t o withdraw from interdependence.
This would have far more serious
c o n s e q u e n c e s for t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e n u c l e a r field, t h a n f o r t h e
United States.
14. B u t t h e f u r t h e r i n t e r l o c k i n g g o e s , t h e iess likely s u c h a w i t h d r a w a l will
b e c o m e . T h e A m e r i c a n s w o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t willingly p u t u s in a h o p e l e s s l y
d a n g e r o u s s i t u a t i o n b y a b a n d o n i n g u s ; it w o u l d n o t b e in t h e i r o w n interest t o d o
s o ; a n d , in s p i t e of t h e d i s p a r i t y of o u r r e s o u r c e s , w e s h o u l d b e a b l e t o e n g a g e t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s s o d e e p l y i n i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e that w i t h d r a w a l w o u l d b e at least
s e r i o u s l y i n c o n v e n i e n t for t h e m .
15. W e s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e seek t o i n v o l v e o u r s e l v e s s o closely
A m e r i c a n s t h a t w i t h d r a w a l o n e i t h e r s i d e ceases to b e p r a c t i c a l policy.
(c) The danger of becoming an American
with t h e
Satellite
16. A l t h o u g h i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e will i n c r e a s e t h e effectiveness of t h e p r e s s u r e
A m e r i c a c a n e x e r t o n u s if s h e w i s h e s , t h e d a n g e r of h a v i n g t o sacrifice o u r i n t e r e s t s
t o h e r s is n o t g r e a t . T h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s d o n o t g r e a t l y d i v e r g e a n d
w e s h o u l d b e a b l e t o m a k e c l e a r t h a t , w h i l e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is i n d e e d f u n d a m e n t a l
t o o u r p o l i c y , w e c a n n o t b e e x p e c t e d t o sacrifice all o u r o t h e r i n t e r e s t s t o it.
(d) The danger of exclusive Anglo-American
interdependence
17. If w e give t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t w e a r e b e c o m i n g a n A m e r i c a n s a t e l l i t e
o r t r y i n g t o set u p a n e x c l u s i v e A n g l o - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s h i p , w e s h a l l d a m a g e
o u r r e l a t i o n s w i t h o u r o t h e r f r i e n d s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e E u r o p e a n s , a n d t h e r e f o r e lose
influence with t h e A m e r i c a n s themselves.
As far as o u r other friends a r e
concerned: —
(i) The "old"
Commonwealth w o u l d n o t b e u n d u l y w o r r i e d a b o u t t h i s ,
so l o n g a s w e c o n t i n u e d full c o n s u l t a t i o n a n d c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e m .
In t h e i r v i e w , t h e c l o s e r w e a r e t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e b e t t e r . O u r
r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e " n e w " C o m m o n w e a l t h h o w e v e r w o u l d suffer if
t h e y t h o u g h t t h a t A m e r i c a n influence o v e r u s h a d g r o w n m o r e t h a n
o u r influence o v e r t h e U n i t e d S l a t e s .
(ii) Western Europe w o u l d n o t o b j e c t s o m u c h t o o u r s e e m i n g t o b e c o m e a n
A m e r i c a n s a t e l l i t e a s to o u r c l a i m i n g a s p e c i a l p l a c e a s A m e r i c a ' s
p r i n c i p a l ally b y v i r t u e of o u r w o r l d p o s i t i o n . T h e r e is a l r e a d y a
w i d e s p r e a d s u s p i c i o n t h a t w e a r e " t i p - t o e i n g " o u t of E u r o p e i n o r d e r
t o d o t h i s ; o u r n u c l e a r p o l i c y , t h e w i t h d r a w a l of s o m e U n i t e d K i n g d o m
m
forces f r o m G e r m a n y a n d a r m s for T u n i s i a h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t o it.
T h i s is d a n g e r o u s , s i n c e , i s o l a t e d from E u r o p e , o u r v a l u e t o t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s w o u l d fall a w a y very g r e a t l y a n d w e m i g h t find t h e A m e r i c a n s ,
in spite of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , d e a l i n g direct w i t h E u r o p e o v e r o u r h e a d s ,
(iii) The rest of o u r f r i e n d s , e.g., t h e m e m b e r s of t h e B a g h d a d P a c t , a r e n o t
very sensitive a b o u t o u r c l a i m i n g a s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n .
But if t h e y
t h o u g h t t h e A m e r i c a n s t o b e in c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l , t h e y w o u l d t r a n s f e r
their allegiance wholly to the United States and our interests might
consequently be ignored.
18. It follows f r o m p a r a g r a p h 17 a b o v e t h a t o u r influence w i t h t h e
A m e r i c a n s largely d e p e n d s u p o n o u r influence e l s e w h e r e . O n t h e w h o l e , a n y
i n c r e a s e in t h e l a t t e r will b e w e l c o m e t o t h e A m e r i c a n s . T h e y h a v e a l w a y s u r g e d
u s t o d r a w c l o s e r t o E u r o p e . I n d e e d t h e d a n g e r s of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n e x c l u s i v e n e s s
clo n o t arise f r o m t h e A m e r i c a n a t t i t u d e at all, a n d t h e y w o u l d w e l c o m e a n y m o v e s
w h i c h will i m p r o v e o u r g e n e r a l p r e s t i g e a n d influence.
F.—Conclusions
19. O u r p r o b l e m s a r e : —
(a) t o m a i n t a i n a n d e x t e n d t h e m a c h i n e r y of c o n s u l t a t i o n ;
(b) t o e n g a g e t h e A m e r i c a n s so d e e p l y in i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e t h a t w i t h d r a w a l
ceases to be practical policy:
(c) t o a v o i d t h e a p p e a r a n c e of b e c o m i n g a n A m e r i c a n satellite a n d , m o r e
p a r t i c u l a r l y , of s e e k i n g t o e s t a b l i s h a n exclusive A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
relationship.
20. (c) a b o v e is p e r h a p s t h e m o s t i m m e d i a t e p r o b l e m .
It a m o u n t s t o
b a l a n c i n g o u r c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s b y a closer r e l a t i o n s h i p
w i t h o u r o t h e r friends, i.e., p l a y i n g a n a c t i v e p a r t in t h e w i d e n i n g of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .
I t a p p l i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y to E u r o p e w h e r e w e a r e at p r e s e n t u n d e r a c l o u d .
The
t w o p r i n c i p a l b o n e s of c o n t e n t i o n a r e t h e F r e e T r a d e A r e a a n d t h e w i t h d r a w a l of
forces f r o m G e r m a n y , a n d w e n e e d t o e x a m i n e w h a t c o n c e s s i o n s w e c a n afford t o
m a k e (while m a i n t a i n i n g o u r d r i v e t o get t h e F r e e T r a d e A r e a e s t a b l i s h e d as q u i c k l y
as p o s s i b l e ) in o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n o u r p o s i t i o n .
2 1 . W e s h o u l d a l s o c o n t i n u e t o m a i n t a i n o u r o w n v i e w p o i n t w h e r e British
a n d A m e r i c a n policies d i v e r g e o n i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s . W h i l e m i n o r sacrifices a r e
w o r t h w h i l e in t h e c a u s e of u n i t y ( p a r a g r a p h 7 a b o v e ) it is in o u r j o i n t i n t e r e s t t h a t
b o t h sides s h o u l d s p e a k a n d act i n d e p e n d e n t l y o n o c c a s i o n .
22. T h e policy of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is unlikely t o r e s u l t in large s a v i n g s
m o n e y . W h i l e w e h o p e t h a t it will b r i n g u s e c o n o m i e s t h r o u g h the s h a r i n g
b u r d e n s w h i c h a r e t o o h e a v y for us t o b e a r a l o n e , w e m u s t c o n t r i b u t e t o
e x e c u t i o n of j o i n t policies if w e a r e t o m a i n t a i n a n y s u b s t a n t i a l influence o v e r
A m e r i c a n s a n d o u r o t h e r friends in a r e a s w h e r e w e h a v e i m p o r t a n t i n t e r e s t s .
of
of
the
the
2 3 . I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e is p e r h a p s t h e o n l y p o l i c y to h o l d o u t h o p e s of t h e
s t a b i l i t y a n d p r o s p e r i t y w i t h o u t w h i c h w e c a n n o t p r o s p e r . It will n o t b e c h e a p
o r e a s y , b u t if w e p l a y it r i g h t , it c a n b r i n g u s g r e a t benefits.
G.—Recommendations
24. It is r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t : —
(a) A s t u d y s h o u l d b e m a d e of w a y s a n d m e a n s of e x t e n d i n g A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
i n t e r l o c k i n g i n t h e field of policy p l a n n i n g , w i t h special r e f e r e n c e t o t h e
possibility of e x t e n d i n g political c o n s u l t a t i o n t o F a r E a s t e r n p r o b l e m s .
(b) T h e p o s s i b i l i t y m i g h t also b e c o n s i d e r e d of i n t r o d u c i n g a m e a s u r e of
m i l i t a r y c o n s u l t a t i o n ( p a r a g r a p h 11).
(c) A s t u d y s h o u l d b e m a d e of p o s s i b l e initiatives w h i c h t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m
c o u l d t a k e i n o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n h e r p o s i t i o n in the rest of t h e w o r l d
a n d t o i n c r e a s e h e r influence a s a n " i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , " w i t h s p e c i a l
r e f e r e n c e t o E u r o p e ( p a r a g r a p h 20).
Download