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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'3 GOVERNMENT Printed
for
the War
Cabinet.
April
1943.
SECRET. /Copy
No.
W . P . (43) 152.
April
.13, 1943.
WAR
CABINET.
POST-WAR AGRICULTURAL
M E M O R A N D U M BY T H E H O M E
POLICY.
SECRETARY.
C O N S I D E R A T I O N of the M i n i s t e r w i t h o u t P o r t f o l i o ' s M e m o r a n d u m
( W . P . (43) 103) a t the p r e s e n t t i m e b r i n g s f o r w a r d c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n t issues of
procedure as well as issues of substance which a r e i n h e r e n t in the proposals.
2. T h e Reconstruction P r o b l e m s Committee has proposed t h a t the g e n e r a l
policy be accepted by the W a r Cabinet as a basis for discussion, first w i t h
a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t s a t home and then w i t h t h e Dominions a n d I n d i a , w i t h o u t
any commitment in e i t h e r policy or finance, either express or implied. To me,
this a p p e a r s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n , if not in terms then c e r t a i n l y in substance. T h e
discussion w i t h f a r m e r s in this country of a Government-sponsored scheme
g u a r a n t e e i n g the m a i n t e n a n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r a g r i c u l t u r a l p a t t e r n which some
sections of t h e m would find highly acceptable from t h e i r sectional p o i n t of view,
would involve e i t h e r a moral commitment or a subsequent a n d very serious
political e m b a r r a s s m e n t — o n e or the other. Discussions w i t h t h e D o m i n i o n s would,
simply b r i n g down upon us a forcible expression of the s t r o n g objections they
would obviously feel to some aspects of the policy, a n d a demand, to k n o w w h e t h e r
it w a s or w a s not our policy, a n d w h e t h e r the discussions w i t h o u r own f a r m e r s
meant a n y t h i n g or not.
3. B o t h sets of discussions, if they were not i n t e n d e d to be public, would
very soon become so. a n d t h e Government would have to make u p its m i n d , n o t
quietly a n d upon m e r i t s , b u t in the m i d s t of m u l t i l a t e r a l action by a complex of
pressure-groups.
4. I a m firmly of o p i n i o n t h a t government o u g h t not to be c a r r i e d on in t h i s
way if we can possibly avoid it, a n d I u r g e t h a t the C a b i n e t should not decide
to i n i t i a t e discussions except on t h e basis of a policy whose general lines a r e
broadly agreed.
5. I t h e r e f o r e a d d r e s s myself to the question w h e t h e r w e o u g h t a t this stage
to accept t h e broad policy now before us.
6. These issues of procedure then arise :— .
(a,) I s i t necessary to accept a commitment of some £ 5 0 million in r e l a t i o n
to a p a r t i c u l a r field of policy w h e n the Government has recently
refused to accept financial c o m m i t m e n t s in respect of the Bevericlge
P l a n u n t i l i t is possible to make some g e n e r a l forecast of the financial
i m p l i c a t i o n s of p o s t - w a r policy as a whole ?
(b) A p a r t from this political difficulty, is i t necessary to e n t e r into a large
i m p l i e d c o m m i t m e n t in relation to one p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y w i t h o u t
being able to forecast t h e effect of t h a t c o m m i t m e n t u p o n the Govern­
m e n t ' s ability to meet the claims a n d needs of o t h e r s not yet fully
considered ?
(c) W e are on the eve of the Food Conference in the U n i t e d States, w h i c h
will meet a g a i n s t the b a c k g r o u n d of. a n d may well lead on to
subsequent discussion of, w i d e issues of i n t e r n a t i o n a l commercial
[25305]
policy. W o u l d it be a p p r o p r i a t e for B r i t a i n j u s t at t h i s s t a g e to show
signs of a d o p t i n g a policy involving special protective measures for
the B r i t i s h food-producing i n d u s t r y ? I s t h i s u n i l a t e r a l action a good
opening for the Conference, or a good lead to o t h e r Governments w h o
may feel t h a t t h e i r case for such measures is a t least as s t r o n g as
our own ?
I t a p p e a r s to me t h a t these issues arise and must be faced irrespective of the
view t h a t may be taken of the m e r i t s of the proposals now before us.
7. T h e r e a r e issues of a n o t h e r kind affecting the substance of the R e p o r t ,
upon w h i c h I feel myself much in need of f u r t h e r e n l i g h t e n m e n t before I could
feel content to come to any conclusion, pro or con, on a m a t t e r so deeply affecting
the n a t i o n a l welfare a n d the position of the country in world t r a d e . They a r e as
follows : —
(a) W h a t would be the effect upon a g r i c u l t u r a l policy of a p p r o a c h i n g the
question p r i m a r i l y from the p o i n t of view of n a t i o n a l health a n d
n u t r i t i o n ? H o w far would a policy t h a t m i g h t a r i s e from t h i s
a p p r o a c h coincide w i t h the policy now p u t f o r w a r d ? If it differed
in any respect would it form an equally good basis of livelihood for a
healthy a g r i c u l t u r e of reasonable size? Would it m a k e less or more
demand upon the E x c h e q u e r ?
W o u l d it r e q u i r e less or more
protection ?
(b) A s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e will, in any event, be the need for some public s u p p o r t
of a g r i c u l t u r e , w h a t a r e the respective m e r i t s of the v a r i o u s possible
methods by which this s u p p o r t may be given—tariffs, bulk purchase
and the fixing of prices, or direct subsidies shown upon the B u d g e t ?
W h a t are t h e effects of these various m e t h o d s u p o n world t r a d e and the
expansionist economic policies which it is desired to p u r s u e after the
w a r ? W h a t are the possibilities'of each when i t comes to a d a p t i n g
financial h e l p to the differing n a t u r a l costs of a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s in
different c i r c u m s t a n c e s ?
(c) W h a t is to be the f u t u r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of food d i s t r i b u t i o n in B r i t a i n ?
A r e s u b s t a n t i a l economies envisaged? H o w f a r has this question a
bearing upon the f u t u r e of a g r i c u l t u r a l policy in its relation to
Exchequer costs a n d to the n a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g ?
8. I am strongly of opinion t h a t decisions upon a g r i c u l t u r a l policy, a s upon
other m a t t e r s , must be taken before the end of the w a r . a n d in time to enable
the necessary p r e p a r a t i o n s to be made. B u t I do not see t h a t the a p p l i c a t i o n
of t h i s p r i n c i p l e requires a n y i m m e d i a t e and b i n d i n g decision in the case of a n
i n d u s t r y whose present security is fully g u a r a n t e e d , whose prosperous f u t u r e
h a s already been announced as a p r i m e a i m of post-war policy, a n d whose a c t u a l
change-over from a w a r - t i m e to a peace-time basis of p r o d u c t i o n m u s t in any case
a w a i t the complete d e f e a t of the G e r m a n blockade.
9. Even if there w e r e a s t r o n g e r case for i m m e d i a t e decisions t h a n any t h a t
I can see, I would be much concerned by the difficult questions of procedure to
which this paper makes reference in p a r a g r a p h 6.
10. A n d finally, w i t h o u t d e p a r t i n g in a n y way from the general p r i n c i p l e
t h a t prosperous, stable a n d extensive post-war a g r i c u l t u r e m u s t be a p r i m e aim
of public policy. I feel t h a t there is more exploratory w o r k to be done into
questions of ways and means.
11. I suggest t h a t the consideration of the three p o i n t s of substance above
set out, as well as f u r t h e r consideration of the financial r e l a t i o n s h i p between
a g r i c u l t u r e and other post-war claims, should be r e m i t t e d to t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
Committee of the W a r Cabinet, which would a p p e a r to be the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n
P r i o r i t i e s Committee.
PI.
Home Office, April 13, 1943. M.