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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
May 1 9 4 0 .
Copy N o .
SECRET.
W.M. (40)
129th Conclusions.
TO B E K E P T
UNDER
LOCK
AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR
CONCLUSIONS
CABINET
129 ( 4 0 ) .
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 1 0 Downing
S.W. 1 , on Sunday, May 1 9 , 1 9 4 0 , at 1 0 A.M.
Street,
Present : The R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S. C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the Chair). T h e R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E C H A M B E R L A I N , I T h e R i g h t H o n . C. R . A T T L E E , M . P . , M . P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
L o r d P r i v y Seal.
The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T H A L I F A X , T h e R i g h t H o n . A . G R E E N W O O D , M . P . ,
Secretary of S t a t e for F o r e i g n
Minister without Portfolio.
I
Affairs.
T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t :
The R i g h t H o n . A . V . A L E X A N D E R , T h e R i g h t H o n . A N T H O N Y E D E N , M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r W a r .
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
The
Right
H o n . S i r ARCHIBALD The R i g h t H o n . S i r J O H N ANDERSON,
S I N C L A I R , Bt., M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of
M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e
H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of
S t a t e for A i r .
H o m e S e c u r i t y (Items 1 - 5 ) .
The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T C A L D E C O T E , T h e R i g h t H o n . L O R D L L O Y D , S e c r e t a r y
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r D o m i n i o n
of S t a t e for t h e Colonies (Item 9 ) .
Affairs.
The R i g h t
Secretary
Secretary
(Item 4 ) .
The
Hon.
Hon.
L.
S. A M E R Y ,
M.P.,
T h e R i g h t H o n . A . D U F F COOPER, M . P . .
of S t a t e f o r I n d i a a n d
of S t a t e
for
Burma
Sir
ALEXANDER
CADOGAN,
P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for F o r e i g n Affairs.
A d m i r a l of t h e Fleet S i r D U D L E Y
P O U N D , F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d Chief of
N a v a l Staff.
M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n .
A i r Chief M a r s h a l Sir C Y R I L L. N .
N E W A L L , C h i e f of t h e A i r Staff.
General S i r W. EDMUND IRONSIDE,
Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff.
Secretariat.
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
M a j o r - G e n e r a l H . L. I S M A Y .
Captain A . D. NICHOLL, R . N .
M r . W . D. W I L K I N S O N .
Group Captain W . ELLIOT.
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l E . I . C. J A C O B , R E .
M r . G. N . F L E M M I N G .
[21307A]
WAR
CABINET
129
(40).
CONTENTS.
MinuteNo.
1
Subject.
Page
Military, A i r and Naval
Progress of operations on
Air operations.
Recrudescence of U-boat
Antwerp demolitions.
Blockships for Zeebrugge
Situation ...
...
the Western Front.
...
...
181
and Ostend.
2
Operations in Norway ...
...
...
...
182
3
Norway
Proposal that hostilities should cease north of a given line.
183
4
India
Replacement of regular battalions by territorial battalions from
the United Kingdom.
183
5
Italy
Possible intentions.
The Mediterranean: diversion of shipping.
184
6
Italy
Contraband control.
7
TJ.S.S.R.
activity.
...
...
,.
184
185
Suggested despatch of a special envoy to Moscow.
8
9
U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a
Purchase of aircraft.
Gibraltar
Evacuation of civilians.
...
...
...
...
...
186
186
181
W . M . 129 ( 4 0 ) .
The Military,
Air and Naval
Situation.
1. The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff gave t h e W a r
C a b i n e t a n a c c o u n t of t h e g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n on t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t .
I n t h e n o r t h t h e B e l g i a n s were r e t i r i n g to the river line from
G h e n t to t h e Scheldt. T h e B . E . F . w e r e on t h e i r r i g h t between
Progress of
G h e n t a n d T o u r n a i . To the r i g h t of t h e B . E . F . t h e F r e n c h were
operations on
h o l d i n g a l i n e t h r o u g h St. A m a n d , Valenciennes, M a u b e u g e , L a
the Western
Fere, M a r i e , M o n c o r n n e t , B e t h e l .
Front.
G e n e r a l H e a d q u a r t e r s of the B . E . F . h a d e v a c u a t e d A r r a s a n d
(Previous
t h e L i n e s of C o m m u n i c a t i o n h a d been moved back to A b b e v i l l e Eef erenee:
W.M. (40) 127th A r r a s .
T h e l a t e s t i n d i c a t i o n s were t h a t t h e G e r m a n s were c o n t i n u i n g
Conclusions,
t h e i r t h r u s t n o r t h - w e s t from L a n d r e c i e s a n d L e C a t e a u , a n d
Minute 1.)
advanced elements w e r e s a i d to h a v e r e a c h e d A l b e r t . A t P e r o n n e
a n enemy r e c o n n a i s s a n c e g r o u p of a r m o u r e d fighting vehicles h a d
forced back l i g h t B r i t i s h d e t a c h m e n t s on t h e p r e v i o u s a f t e r n o o n ,
b u t no enemy movement w a s r e p o r t e d between P e r o n n e a n d A r r a s
other t h a n a few enemy a r m o u r e d fighting vehicles. T h e i m m e d i a t e
d a n g e r w a s t h e r i s k t h a t t h e G e r m a n s w o u l d succeed i n e s t a b l i s h i n g
themselves across t h e B r i t i s h lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n between
A m i e n s a n d Abbeville. I f t h i s h a p p e n e d the B . E . F . could only be
supplied t h r o u g h Boulogne, C a l a i s a n d D u n k i r k , all of w h i c h h a d
been a t t a c k e d from t h e a i r on t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t . I t w a s of t h e
utmost i m p o r t a n c e to p r e v e n t t h e B . E . F . a n d t h e B e l g i a n A r m y on
its left being cut off from the m a i n F r e n c h a r m i e s .
T h e B e l g i a n s showed a c e r t a i n r e l u c t a n c e to w i t h d r a w , as they
were not b e i n g a t t a c k e d a n d were n a t u r a l l y l o a t h to give u p more of
their territory.
I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r ,
G e n e r a l D i l l h a d n o w gone to F r a n c e to spend t h e n e x t four or
five days w i t h G e n e r a l Georges. A n Officer would be r e t u r n i n g
t h a t evening w i t h a r e p o r t from G e n e r a l D i l l as to t h e position.
T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff s a i d t h a t he h a d also
telephoned t o L o r d G o r t a n d h a d a s k e d h i m to consider w h e t h e r
he could c o n c e n t r a t e some p a r t of t h e B r i t i s h E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e
in the A r r a s a r e a .
The Prime Minister
s a i d t h a t he felt sure the W a r C a b i n e t
would a p p r o v e t h e a c t i o n t a k e n by the Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l
Staff. W h i l e t h e B r i t i s h A r m y w a s u n d e r t h e o r d e r s of G e n e r a l
Georges, i t w a s r i g h t t h a t t h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff
a n d L o r d G o r t should concert as to t h e p l a n s w h i c h should be t a k e n
i n v a r i o u s e v e n t u a l i t i e s to s a f e g u a r d t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e B r i t i s h
E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force, a n d t h a t these p l a n s should be c o m m u n i c a t e d
to G e n e r a l Georges, w h o would t a k e them i n t o account i n g i v i n g
his o r d e r s for t h e c o n d u c t of t h e b a t t l e .
Air operations.
The Chief of the Air Staff gave t h e following account of a i r
(Previous
o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e p r e v i o u s 24 h o u r s .
Eef erence:
W.M. (40) 127th
Bomber
Command.
Conclusions,
Minute 1.)
T h i r t y - n i n e B l e n h e i m s h a d been sent to o p e r a t e in F r a n c e from
t h i s country. Of these only 11 h a d been able to c a r r y o u t their tasks,
a t t a c k i n g successfully troops a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s i n the a r e a
Landrecies-Avesnes.
T h e others, on a c c o u n t of t h e confusion
caused by b r e a k d o w n s in communications, a n d for o t h e r reasons,
h a d been u n a b l e to operate, a n d h a d r e t u r n e d to E n g l a n d .
Three
Blenheims h a d been lost.
D u r i n g t h e n i g h t heavy bombers h a d been d e s p a t c h e d as
follows : —
Area Givet-Dinant
Area Gembleux-Namur
[21307A]
11
12
These r e p o r t e d h a v i n g successfully bombed bridges, r a i l w a y s , and
i n f a n t r y on t h e r o a d s .
Oil i n s t a l l a t i o n s a t M i s b u r g in H a n o v e r
23
R a i l w a y objectives in t h e R u h r . 12
Oil i n s t a l l a t i o n s , H a m b u r g a n d B r e m e n
28
M i n e - l a y i n g oh' the D u t c h coast 6
F o u r of the above a i r c r a f t h a d been lost, b u t the crew of one h a d
been picked u p from the sea.
Fighter
Command.
T h e r e h a d been some a c t i v i t y off D u n k i r k , a n d d u r i n g the n i g h t
enemy a i r c r a f t h a d been active off o u r coast from H a r w i c h to Beachy
Head—probably mine-laying.
One enemy a i r c r a f t w a s r e p o r t e d to h a v e been shot down by
a n t i - a i r c r a f t fire from Dover.
T h e six fighter s q u a d r o n s o p e r a t i n g over F r a n c e from E n g l a n d
h a d r e p o r t e d h a v i n g shot down 20 enemy a i r c r a f t d u r i n g the day.
They h a d themselves lost 10 or 12, of w h i c h five or seven h a d been
d a m a g e d w h i l e on t h e g r o u n d a t V i t r y aerodrome.
A p a t r o l of t h r e e fighters off Z e e b r u g g e h a d shot down 2
Me. 110's.
Advanced
Air Striking
Force.
T h e s q u a d r o n s of the A d v a n c e d A i r S t r i k i n g F o r c e h a d been
re-forming in the Troyes a r e a , a n d h a d r e p o r t e d no combats. They
were going to co-operate t h a t d a y w i t h a F r e n c h c o u n t e r - a t t a c k
which i t w a s believed w a s developing from t h e S o u t h .
Air
Component
of the
B.E.F.
F u l l r e p o r t s h a d n o t been received, as t h e i r s q u a d r o n s were
probably on the move. T h e r e h a d been considerable fighter activity,
however, a n d i t w a s k n o w n t h a t t h e enemy losses h a d been heavy,
a n d o u r own few.
Recrudescence
of U-boat
activity.
Coastal
Command.
T h e r e seemed to be a n increase i n enemy s u b m a r i n e activity,
and several h a d been s i g h t e d a t v a r i o u s places r o u n d the coast.
The Chief of Naval Staff s a i d t h a t the r e p o r t of demolitions
a t A n t w e r p showed t h a t all d r y docks a n d heavy c r a n e s a n d 150,000
tons of petrol a n d oil h a d been d e s t r o y e d ; also t h a t one lock h a d
been blocked.
Blockships for Z e e b r u g g e a n d O s t e n d would be r e a d y to sail
Blocksbips for
for
B
e l g i u m at 1330 h o u r s t h a t day. T h e Chief of N a v a l Staff
Zeebrugge and
suggested t h a t t h e s h i p s should sail, as a r r a n g e d , a s t h e r e w o u l d be
Ostend.
no difficulty in r e c a l l i n g t h e m d u r i n g t h e afternoon, if necessary.
(Previous
L a t e r in the m e e t i n g i t w a s decided t h a t , i n view of t h e m i l i t a r y
Reference:
W.M. (40) 127th s i t u a t i o n , t h e s a i l i n g of the blockships should be p o s t p o n e d u n t i l
the following day.
Conclusions,
Antwerp
demolitions.
Minute 1.)
The W a r C a b i n e t ­
(i) Took note of these s t a t e m e n t s .
(ii) Decided t h a t t h e s a i l i n g of t h e blockships for Zeebrugge
a n d Ostend should be p o s t p o n e d u n t i l t h e e n s u i n g day.
2. T h e W a r C a b i n e t were i n f o r m e d t h a t heavy G e r m a n a i r
a t t a c k s c o n t i n u e d in t h e N a r v i k a r e a . T h e two a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s
were w a i t i n g 100 miles off t h e L o f o t e n I s l a n d s to fly off t h e i r
(Previous
fighter
a i r c r a f t a s soon as t h e l a n d i n g g r o u n d s w e r e r e a d y .
It
Reference:
h
a
d
been
hoped
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
l
a
n
d
i
n
g
g
r
o
u
n
d
s
would
be
r
e
a
d
y
t
h
a
t
d
a
y
W.M. (40) 127th
the
19th
M
a
y
.
Conclusions,
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above i n f o r m a t i o n .
Minute 3.)
Operations in
Norway.
Norway.
3. The Secretary
of State
for Foreign
Affairs
drew the
Proposal that
a t t e n t i o n of the W a r C a b i n e t to a n u n n u m b e r e d telegram, d a t e d
hostilities
t h e 17th M a y , 1940, from M r . Lascelles (the B r i t i s h R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
should cease
w i t h t h e N o r w e g i a n G o v e r n m e n t in N o r w a y ) s e t t i n g o u t a r a t h e r
north of a
obscure p r o p o s a l , a p p a r e n t l y of G e r m a n origin, u n d e r w h i c h
given line.
fighting
w a s to cease n o r t h of a line to be d r a w n a t some unspecified
d i s t a n c e n o r t h of T r o n d h j e m . A s i m i l a r p r o p o s a l h a d also been
m e n t i o n e d in e a r l i e r t e l e g r a m s from t h e B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r a t
Stockholm.
T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t it w a s clear t h a t a n y such
p r o p o s a l would be q u i t e u n a c c e p t a b l e , a n d i t w a s only i n t e r e s t i n g
a s i n d i c a t i n g the s t r a i n w h i c h t h e c o n t i n u a n c e of o p e r a t i o n s i n
N o r w a y w a s i m p o s i n g on the G e r m a n resources.
He thought,
however, t h a t i t would be a s well t h a t w e should i n f o r m both t h e
S w e d i s h a n d N o r w e g i a n G o v e r n m e n t s t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l seemed to
us entirely impracticable.
The W a r Cabinet agreed t h a t the Swedish and Norwegian
G o v e r n m e n t s should be i n f o r m e d accordingly.
India.
Replacement of
Regular
battalions by
Territorial
battalions from
the United
Kingdom.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 108th
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
4. The Secretary
of State for India s a i d t h a t he h a d given
c o n s i d e r a t i o n to t h e p r o p o s a l t h a t e i g h t R e g u l a r B r i t i s h b a t t a l i o n s
should r e t u r n from I n d i a to the U n i t e d Kingdom, being r e p l a c e d
by T e r r i t o r i a l b a t t a l i o n s .
T h e s t a t e m e n t m a d e by t h e S e c r e t a i y of S t a t e covered t h e
f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s :—
(1) T h e r e w e r e now 42,000 B r i t i s h t r o o p s in I n d i a as c o m p a r e d
w i t h 77,000 i n 1914.
Of t h e 34 R e g u l a r i n f a n t r y
b a t t a l i o n s included in the p r e s e n t g a r r i s o n , 13 w e r e
allocated to the defence of t h e N o r t h - W e s t F r o n t i e r a n d
21 to i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y d u t i e s .
(2) T h e i n t e r n a l security b a t t a l i o n s h a d , since the b e g i n n i n g
of the w a r , been d r a i n e d of t h e i r best W a r r a n t Officers,
Non-commissioned Officers a n d men.
(3) Nevertheless, he w a s so i m p r e s s e d w i t h the need for
i n c r e a s i n g t h e s t r e n g t h of o u r a r m e d forces in t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m t h a t he w a s p r e p a r e d to ask t h e Viceroy to
consent to t h e r e t u r n home of the e i g h t R e g u l a r
b a t t a l i o n s . T h i s r e q u e s t w o u l d place t h e Viceroy i n a
difficult p o s i t i o n w h i c h m i g h t be eased—
(a) I f
t h e relief t r o o p s left the U n i t e d K i n g d o m
simultaneously
with
the d e p a r t u r e of
the
R e g u l a r s from I n d i a .
(b) I f t h e relief consisted of m o r e t h a n 8 b a t t a l i o n s of
territorials.
I n d i a w o u l d be a n a d m i r a b l e
t r a i n i n g g r o u n d for these t e r r i t o r i a l s , w h i l e
troops t r a i n e d in I n d i a would be available for
service i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t .
(4) T h e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n I n d i a w a s n o t such as to m a k e t h e
exchange imprudent.
I n discussion, it w a s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e were serious
difficulties in t h e w a y of a r r a n g i n g for t h e relief to leave t h i s
c o u n t r y a t the same time a s the R e g u l a r b a t t a l i o n s left I n d i a . T h e
m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n did n o t j u s t i f y as m a n y a s 16 B r i t i s h b a t t a l i o n s
b e i n g on t h e h i g h seas a t t h e same time. F u r t h e r , i t w a s u n l i k e l y
t h a t s h i p p i n g would be available a t t h e same t i m e to c a r r y b o t h
contingents.
The W a r C a b i n e t ­
(1) I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a to ask the Viceroy,
as a m a t t e r of urgency, to a g r e e to t h e r e t u r n of 8
R e g u l a r b a t t a l i o n s from I n d i a ; these b a t t a l i o n s would be
relieved by t e r r i t o r i a l b a t t a l i o n s from the U n i t e d
K i n g d o m , w h i c h would p r o b a b l y sail back i n t h e ships
w h i c h b r o u g h t the b a t t a l i o n s home from I n d i a .
(2) I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a to d r a f t his
t e l e g r a m to the Viceroy in c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r .
Italy.
5.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t were given t h e following
information
w h i c h h a d a b e a r i n g on I t a l y ' s possible i n t e n t i o n s :—
Possible
intentions.
(i) The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
r e a d to the
(Previous
W a r C a b i n e t the reply to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s message
Reference:
to S i g n o r Mussolini.
W.M. (40) 127th
(ii) The Chief of the Naval Staff s a i d t h a t a s e a p l a n e - c a r r i e r
Conclusions,
Minute 9.)
w a s d u e to sail from T r i p o l i on the 22nd M a y , bound for
M a s s a w a . T h i s ship would n o t be clear of t h e Suez
C a n a l u n t i l the 2 5 t h May, a n d w o u l d n o t reach M a s s a w a
until the 27th May.
(iii) T h e Chief of the N a v a l Staff also r e a d o u t a s i g n a l from
the F l a g Officer in c h a r g e a t M a l t a , g i v i n g a r e p o r t
i n d i c a t i n g probable o p e r a t i o n s by G e r m a n a n d I t a l i a n
forces a c t i n g in co-operation in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
(iv) The Prime Minister
r e a d out a f u r t h e r s i g n a l from t h e
same source, f o r w a r d i n g a r e p o r t t h a t g e n e r a l A r m y a n d
A i r F o r c e mobilisation w a s to t a k e place in I t a l i a n E a s t
Africa immediately.
Information
Mediterranean.
was
given
as
to
Naval
dispositions
in
the
The
Mediterranean.
Diversion of
shipping.
(Previous
' Reference:
W.M. (40) 124th
Conclusions,
Minute 9.)
The Chief
of the Naval Staff
s a i d t h a t s h i p p i n g in t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n w a s being t h i n n e d o u t g r a d u a l l y . T h e t r a n s p o r t s
w h i c h h a d b r o u g h t t h e A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d troops to Suez
were, however, u r g e n t l y r e q u i r e d to t r a n s p o r t F r e n c h t r o o p s from
Casablanca, a n d he suggested t h a t t h e y should be told to s a i l
i n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d chance g e t t i n g t h r o u g h the M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
Italy.
Contraband
control.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 127th
Conclusions,
Minute 10.)
6. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said t h a t , since
Signoi M u s s o l i n i ' s reactions to the p r o p o s a l seemed likely to be
favourable, he h a d explored f u r t h e r t h e possibility of e n t e r i n g i n t o
n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e I t a l i a n G o v e r n m e n t w i t h the object of
m i n i m i s i n g the annoyances caused to t h a t G o v e r n m e n t by t h e
p r e s e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of our c o n t r a b a n d control. On the p r e v i o u s
d a y he h a d been in consultation w i t h the M i n i s t e r of Economic
W a r f a r e a n d h i s e x p e r t s , a n d w i t h t h e M a s t e r of t h e Rolls. T h e
M e e t i n g h a d r e a c h e d the conclusion t h a t i t w a s practicable, even
i n p r e s e n t conditions, to open discussions w i t h I t a l y on t h e lines
suggested. P u t briefly, the p l a n w o u l d be t h a t a s f a r as possible
all cargoes consigned to I t a l y from other countries should be covered
by navicerts. T h e a t t i t u d e of some e x p o r t i n g countries, for example,
the U n i t e d S t a t e s , m i g h t m a k e i t impossible to a p p l y t h e p l a n
universally, b u t t h e control by m e a n s of n a v i c e r t s would be m a d e as
complete as w a s reasonably possible. T h e line w h i c h we m i g h t t a k e
i n p u b l i c w o u l d be to say t h a t we could n o t tell in a d v a n c e h o w
t h e new system w o u l d woi'k i n p r a c t i c e b u t t h a t we intended, in
order to meet t h e I t a l i a n grievances, to t r y i t on a n e x p e r i m e n t a l
basis.
'A" The W a r C a b i n e t Took note of the above s t a t e m e n t s , a n d a g r e e d to the course
proposed as r e g a r d s s h i p p i n g i n the M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
T h e I n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l M e e t i n g h a d a g r e e d on t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s
w h i c h should govern t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of o u r c o n t r a b a n d control
vis-a-vis- I t a l y from t h e d a t e of t h e n e w a g r e e m e n t , if one were
concluded, u n t i l f u r t h e r notice :—
(i) T h e object of t h e p r o p o s e d r e l a x a t i o n of our c o n t r a b a n d
control w a s to a v o i d or a t least to p o s t p o n e w a r w i t h
Italy.
(ii) A n y r e l a x a t i o n s of o u r c o n t r a b a n d control w e r e of a
t e m p o r a r y n a t u r e (the use of t h e f o r m u l a a t " A " above
w o u l d be one m e t h o d of s a f e g u a r d i n g our p o s i t i o n in
t h i s respect). W e should t h u s be able to reimpose o u r
. control in i t s f o r m e r severity if w e t h o u g h t fit.
(iii) O u r r e l a x a t i o n s vis-a-vis
I t a l y should n o t be such a s to
d e s t r o y o u r g r o u n d s of a c t i o n vis-a-vis
other neutral
countries.
I t m i g h t be t h o u g h t t h a t these p r o p o s a l s w e n t very f a r in the
d i r e c t i o n of w e a k e n i n g our control. B u t i t w a s no use m a k i n g t h i s
n e w a p p r o a c h to the I t a l i a n s unless we m e t t h e m w i t h a n offer on
generous lines. I f we could hold t h e p o s i t i o n vis-a-vis I t a l y d u r i n g
t h e n e x t c r i t i c a l weeks, i t w o u l d be well w o r t h w h i l e .
S i r W i l f r i d Greene w a s l e a v i n g for R o m e on t h e 21st May,
a c c o m p a n i e d b) a d v i s e r s from the M i n i s t r y of E c o n o m i c W a r f a r e .
H e asked t h a t S i r W i l f r i d should be given full p o w e r s to r e a c h a
settlement on t h e lines w h i c h he h a d i n d i c a t e d generally.
Sir
W i l f r i d should be e m p o w e r e d to a g r e e t h a t no f u r t h e r I t a l i a n ships
should be d e t a i n e d w h i l e t h e n e w system w a s u n d e r t r i a l .
r
The W a r C a b i n e t G a v e a g e n e r a l a p p r o v a l to t h e
p r o p o s a l s a s s u m m a r i s e d above.
U.S.S.R.
Suggested despatch of a
special envoy to
Moscow.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 127th
Conclusions,
Minute 13.)
Foreign
Secretary's
7
xhe Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs s a i d t h a t , as a
r e s u l t of t h e decision of t h e W a r C a b i n e t a t t h e M e e t i n g r e f e r r e d
to i n t h e m a r g i n , he h a d discussed f u r t h e r w i t h t h e M i n i s t e r for
Economic W a r f a r e t h e p r o p o s a l to send S i r Stafford C r i p p s on
a n e x p l o r a t o r y mission to Moscow. T h e y h a d r e a c h e d t h e conclusion
t h a t i t w o u l d be best to give him, as a n experienced adviser a n d
technical a s s i s t a n t , M r . A s h t o n G w a t k i n of t h e M i n i s t r y of
Economic W a r f a r e , w h o h a d j u s t r e t u r n e d f r o m t h e U . S . A .
He
a n d the M i n i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e p r o p o s e d to see S i r Stafford
C r i p p s on the following d a y a n d to e x p l a i n to h i m t h e n a t u r e of
t h e mission w h i c h he w a s b e i n g a s k e d to u n d e r t a k e a n d the g e n e r a l
p o l i t i c a l b a c k g r o u n d , a n d the M i n i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e would
also a r r a n g e to give h i m d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e issues w i t h
w h i c h he w a s directly concerned.
I f S i r Stafford C r i p p s accepted the i n v i t a t i o n he (the F o r e i g n
S e c r e t a r y ) would t h e n p u t the s u g g e s t i o n to M.. M a i s k y , w i t h o u t
s a y i n g a n y t h i n g a s t o t h e possibility of o u r s e n d i n g a n A m b a s s a d o r
t o Moscow. I f the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t agreed, S i r Stafford C r i p p s
a n d M r . A s h t o n G w a t k i n w o u l d set off on t h e i r mission a s soon a s
possible.
The W a r C a b i n e t I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs
proceed on these lines.
to
United States of
America.
Purchase of
aircraft.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 126th
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)
8. The Secretary of State for Foreign A ffairs r e a d to the W a r
C a b i n e t a telegram No. 759, w h i c h he h a d j u s t received, r e p o r t i n g
a conversation between L o r d L o t h i a n a n d P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt on
the p r e v i o u s evening. P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt h a d , of course, shown
himself very friendly a n d h a d e m p h a s i s e d the efforts w h i c h he was
m a k i n g to keep I t a l y from e n t e r i n g t h e w a r . H e h a d , however,
said n o t h i n g w h i c h showed t h a t he recognised o u r p r e s s i n g need for
i m m e d i a t e a i r c r a f t s u p p l i e s ; n o r h a d he m e n t i o n e d the suggestion
t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t should let us h a v e a i r c r a f t a t
once from t h e i r own s u p p l i e s , to be replaced l a t e r from orders
a l r e a d y placed in the U n i t e d S t a t e s .
The Prime
Minister
s a i d t h a t in these circumstances he
proposed to send a t e l e g r a m to P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt a t once m a k i n g
clear o u r i m m e d i a t e needs.
The W a r C a b i n e t I n v i t e d the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for A i r to f u r n i s h the
P r i m e M i n i s t e r before 5 P . M . t h a t d a y w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n
for inclusion in such a t e l e g r a m .
Gibraltar.
Evacuation of
civilians.
(Previous
References:
W.M. (40) 108th
Conclusions,
Minute 12,
and 124th
Conclusions,
Minute 10.)
9. The Secretary
of State for War recalled t h a t on the
16th M a y t h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d a g r e e d t h a t t h e scheme for
e v a c u a t i n g civilians from G i b r a l t a r should be c a r r i e d out.
The
scheme covered both B r i t i s h Service families a n d G i b r a l t a r i a n s .
A t e l e g r a m h a d n o w been received from t h e Governor of
G i b r a l t a r s t a t i n g t h a t he w a s u n w i l l i n g to c a r r y o u t the scheme.
H i s m a i n reason w a s t h a t t h e e v a c u a t i o n of civilians from G i b r a l t a r
would create a m o s t - u n f a v o u r a b l e impression on S p a n i s h opinion,
a n d t h a t i t should not, therefore, be c a r r i e d o u t unless we were
c e r t a i n t h a t S p a i n would be hostile.
T h e m a t t e r h a d been f u r t h e r discussed i n t e r - D e p a r t m e n t a l l y .
I t would be possible to c a r r y o u t the scheme a f t e r w a r h a d broken
out w i t h I t a l y , b u t t h i s would p u t a considerable s t r a i n on the
Navy. T h e F o r e i g n Office h a d t a k e n t h e view t h a t the effect of
evacuation on S p a n i s h o p i n i o n o u g h t n o t to be serious.
The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
s a i d t h a t , unless
t h e r e w a s a revolution, he s a w n o reason to t h i n k t h a t S p a i n would
come i n t o the w a r . H e d o u b t e d w h e t h e r t h e e v a c u a t i o n of c e r t a i n
civilians from G i b r a l t a r would alter S p a n i s h policy.
I n f u r t h e r discussion, the view w a s expressed t h a t the
evacuation of civilians from G i b r a l t a r could p r o p e r l y be r e p r e s e n t e d
as a p r e c a u t i o n a r y m e a s u r e , w h i c h w a s being t a k e n in view of t h e
d i s t u r b e d s i t u a t i o n i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n generally, a n d not as a
m e a s u r e m a d e necessary by a n x i e t y as to S p a i n ' s i n t e n t i o n s .
The W a r C a b i n e t A g r e e d t h a t t h e Governor of G i b r a l t a r should be i n s t r u c t e d
to p u t into effect t h e scheme for the e v a c u a t i o n of civilians.
C a r e should be t a k e n to e x p l a i n t h a t t h i s w a s a
p r e c a u t i o n a r y m e a s u r e t a k e n in view of the d i s t u r b e d
s i t u a t i o n in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n generally, a n d t h a t it w a s
not due to a n x i e t y a s to S p a i n ' s i n t e n t i o n s .
Richmond
Terrace, S.W.
May 19, 1940.
1,