(c) crown copyright Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/7/24 Image Reference:0001 THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1 9 4 0 . Copy N o . SECRET. W.M. (40) 129th Conclusions. TO B E K E P T UNDER LOCK AND KEY. It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document. WAR CONCLUSIONS CABINET 129 ( 4 0 ) . of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 1 0 Downing S.W. 1 , on Sunday, May 1 9 , 1 9 4 0 , at 1 0 A.M. Street, Present : The R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S. C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the Chair). T h e R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E C H A M B E R L A I N , I T h e R i g h t H o n . C. R . A T T L E E , M . P . , M . P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council. L o r d P r i v y Seal. The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T H A L I F A X , T h e R i g h t H o n . A . G R E E N W O O D , M . P . , Secretary of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Minister without Portfolio. I Affairs. T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t : The R i g h t H o n . A . V . A L E X A N D E R , T h e R i g h t H o n . A N T H O N Y E D E N , M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r W a r . M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y . The Right H o n . S i r ARCHIBALD The R i g h t H o n . S i r J O H N ANDERSON, S I N C L A I R , Bt., M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of S t a t e for A i r . H o m e S e c u r i t y (Items 1 - 5 ) . The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T C A L D E C O T E , T h e R i g h t H o n . L O R D L L O Y D , S e c r e t a r y S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r D o m i n i o n of S t a t e for t h e Colonies (Item 9 ) . Affairs. The R i g h t Secretary Secretary (Item 4 ) . The Hon. Hon. L. S. A M E R Y , M.P., T h e R i g h t H o n . A . D U F F COOPER, M . P . . of S t a t e f o r I n d i a a n d of S t a t e for Burma Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN, P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs. A d m i r a l of t h e Fleet S i r D U D L E Y P O U N D , F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d Chief of N a v a l Staff. M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n . A i r Chief M a r s h a l Sir C Y R I L L. N . N E W A L L , C h i e f of t h e A i r Staff. General S i r W. EDMUND IRONSIDE, Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff. Secretariat. Sir EDWARD BRIDGES. M a j o r - G e n e r a l H . L. I S M A Y . Captain A . D. NICHOLL, R . N . M r . W . D. W I L K I N S O N . Group Captain W . ELLIOT. L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l E . I . C. J A C O B , R E . M r . G. N . F L E M M I N G . [21307A] WAR CABINET 129 (40). CONTENTS. MinuteNo. 1 Subject. Page Military, A i r and Naval Progress of operations on Air operations. Recrudescence of U-boat Antwerp demolitions. Blockships for Zeebrugge Situation ... ... the Western Front. ... ... 181 and Ostend. 2 Operations in Norway ... ... ... ... 182 3 Norway Proposal that hostilities should cease north of a given line. 183 4 India Replacement of regular battalions by territorial battalions from the United Kingdom. 183 5 Italy Possible intentions. The Mediterranean: diversion of shipping. 184 6 Italy Contraband control. 7 TJ.S.S.R. activity. ... ... ,. 184 185 Suggested despatch of a special envoy to Moscow. 8 9 U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a Purchase of aircraft. Gibraltar Evacuation of civilians. ... ... ... ... ... 186 186 181 W . M . 129 ( 4 0 ) . The Military, Air and Naval Situation. 1. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff gave t h e W a r C a b i n e t a n a c c o u n t of t h e g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n on t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t . I n t h e n o r t h t h e B e l g i a n s were r e t i r i n g to the river line from G h e n t to t h e Scheldt. T h e B . E . F . w e r e on t h e i r r i g h t between Progress of G h e n t a n d T o u r n a i . To the r i g h t of t h e B . E . F . t h e F r e n c h were operations on h o l d i n g a l i n e t h r o u g h St. A m a n d , Valenciennes, M a u b e u g e , L a the Western Fere, M a r i e , M o n c o r n n e t , B e t h e l . Front. G e n e r a l H e a d q u a r t e r s of the B . E . F . h a d e v a c u a t e d A r r a s a n d (Previous t h e L i n e s of C o m m u n i c a t i o n h a d been moved back to A b b e v i l l e Eef erenee: W.M. (40) 127th A r r a s . T h e l a t e s t i n d i c a t i o n s were t h a t t h e G e r m a n s were c o n t i n u i n g Conclusions, t h e i r t h r u s t n o r t h - w e s t from L a n d r e c i e s a n d L e C a t e a u , a n d Minute 1.) advanced elements w e r e s a i d to h a v e r e a c h e d A l b e r t . A t P e r o n n e a n enemy r e c o n n a i s s a n c e g r o u p of a r m o u r e d fighting vehicles h a d forced back l i g h t B r i t i s h d e t a c h m e n t s on t h e p r e v i o u s a f t e r n o o n , b u t no enemy movement w a s r e p o r t e d between P e r o n n e a n d A r r a s other t h a n a few enemy a r m o u r e d fighting vehicles. T h e i m m e d i a t e d a n g e r w a s t h e r i s k t h a t t h e G e r m a n s w o u l d succeed i n e s t a b l i s h i n g themselves across t h e B r i t i s h lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n between A m i e n s a n d Abbeville. I f t h i s h a p p e n e d the B . E . F . could only be supplied t h r o u g h Boulogne, C a l a i s a n d D u n k i r k , all of w h i c h h a d been a t t a c k e d from t h e a i r on t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t . I t w a s of t h e utmost i m p o r t a n c e to p r e v e n t t h e B . E . F . a n d t h e B e l g i a n A r m y on its left being cut off from the m a i n F r e n c h a r m i e s . T h e B e l g i a n s showed a c e r t a i n r e l u c t a n c e to w i t h d r a w , as they were not b e i n g a t t a c k e d a n d were n a t u r a l l y l o a t h to give u p more of their territory. I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r , G e n e r a l D i l l h a d n o w gone to F r a n c e to spend t h e n e x t four or five days w i t h G e n e r a l Georges. A n Officer would be r e t u r n i n g t h a t evening w i t h a r e p o r t from G e n e r a l D i l l as to t h e position. T h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff s a i d t h a t he h a d also telephoned t o L o r d G o r t a n d h a d a s k e d h i m to consider w h e t h e r he could c o n c e n t r a t e some p a r t of t h e B r i t i s h E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e in the A r r a s a r e a . The Prime Minister s a i d t h a t he felt sure the W a r C a b i n e t would a p p r o v e t h e a c t i o n t a k e n by the Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff. W h i l e t h e B r i t i s h A r m y w a s u n d e r t h e o r d e r s of G e n e r a l Georges, i t w a s r i g h t t h a t t h e Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff a n d L o r d G o r t should concert as to t h e p l a n s w h i c h should be t a k e n i n v a r i o u s e v e n t u a l i t i e s to s a f e g u a r d t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e B r i t i s h E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force, a n d t h a t these p l a n s should be c o m m u n i c a t e d to G e n e r a l Georges, w h o would t a k e them i n t o account i n g i v i n g his o r d e r s for t h e c o n d u c t of t h e b a t t l e . Air operations. The Chief of the Air Staff gave t h e following account of a i r (Previous o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e p r e v i o u s 24 h o u r s . Eef erence: W.M. (40) 127th Bomber Command. Conclusions, Minute 1.) T h i r t y - n i n e B l e n h e i m s h a d been sent to o p e r a t e in F r a n c e from t h i s country. Of these only 11 h a d been able to c a r r y o u t their tasks, a t t a c k i n g successfully troops a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s i n the a r e a Landrecies-Avesnes. T h e others, on a c c o u n t of t h e confusion caused by b r e a k d o w n s in communications, a n d for o t h e r reasons, h a d been u n a b l e to operate, a n d h a d r e t u r n e d to E n g l a n d . Three Blenheims h a d been lost. D u r i n g t h e n i g h t heavy bombers h a d been d e s p a t c h e d as follows : — Area Givet-Dinant Area Gembleux-Namur [21307A] 11 12 These r e p o r t e d h a v i n g successfully bombed bridges, r a i l w a y s , and i n f a n t r y on t h e r o a d s . Oil i n s t a l l a t i o n s a t M i s b u r g in H a n o v e r 23 R a i l w a y objectives in t h e R u h r . 12 Oil i n s t a l l a t i o n s , H a m b u r g a n d B r e m e n 28 M i n e - l a y i n g oh' the D u t c h coast 6 F o u r of the above a i r c r a f t h a d been lost, b u t the crew of one h a d been picked u p from the sea. Fighter Command. T h e r e h a d been some a c t i v i t y off D u n k i r k , a n d d u r i n g the n i g h t enemy a i r c r a f t h a d been active off o u r coast from H a r w i c h to Beachy Head—probably mine-laying. One enemy a i r c r a f t w a s r e p o r t e d to h a v e been shot down by a n t i - a i r c r a f t fire from Dover. T h e six fighter s q u a d r o n s o p e r a t i n g over F r a n c e from E n g l a n d h a d r e p o r t e d h a v i n g shot down 20 enemy a i r c r a f t d u r i n g the day. They h a d themselves lost 10 or 12, of w h i c h five or seven h a d been d a m a g e d w h i l e on t h e g r o u n d a t V i t r y aerodrome. A p a t r o l of t h r e e fighters off Z e e b r u g g e h a d shot down 2 Me. 110's. Advanced Air Striking Force. T h e s q u a d r o n s of the A d v a n c e d A i r S t r i k i n g F o r c e h a d been re-forming in the Troyes a r e a , a n d h a d r e p o r t e d no combats. They were going to co-operate t h a t d a y w i t h a F r e n c h c o u n t e r - a t t a c k which i t w a s believed w a s developing from t h e S o u t h . Air Component of the B.E.F. F u l l r e p o r t s h a d n o t been received, as t h e i r s q u a d r o n s were probably on the move. T h e r e h a d been considerable fighter activity, however, a n d i t w a s k n o w n t h a t t h e enemy losses h a d been heavy, a n d o u r own few. Recrudescence of U-boat activity. Coastal Command. T h e r e seemed to be a n increase i n enemy s u b m a r i n e activity, and several h a d been s i g h t e d a t v a r i o u s places r o u n d the coast. The Chief of Naval Staff s a i d t h a t the r e p o r t of demolitions a t A n t w e r p showed t h a t all d r y docks a n d heavy c r a n e s a n d 150,000 tons of petrol a n d oil h a d been d e s t r o y e d ; also t h a t one lock h a d been blocked. Blockships for Z e e b r u g g e a n d O s t e n d would be r e a d y to sail Blocksbips for for B e l g i u m at 1330 h o u r s t h a t day. T h e Chief of N a v a l Staff Zeebrugge and suggested t h a t t h e s h i p s should sail, as a r r a n g e d , a s t h e r e w o u l d be Ostend. no difficulty in r e c a l l i n g t h e m d u r i n g t h e afternoon, if necessary. (Previous L a t e r in the m e e t i n g i t w a s decided t h a t , i n view of t h e m i l i t a r y Reference: W.M. (40) 127th s i t u a t i o n , t h e s a i l i n g of the blockships should be p o s t p o n e d u n t i l the following day. Conclusions, Antwerp demolitions. Minute 1.) The W a r C a b i n e t ­ (i) Took note of these s t a t e m e n t s . (ii) Decided t h a t t h e s a i l i n g of t h e blockships for Zeebrugge a n d Ostend should be p o s t p o n e d u n t i l t h e e n s u i n g day. 2. T h e W a r C a b i n e t were i n f o r m e d t h a t heavy G e r m a n a i r a t t a c k s c o n t i n u e d in t h e N a r v i k a r e a . T h e two a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s were w a i t i n g 100 miles off t h e L o f o t e n I s l a n d s to fly off t h e i r (Previous fighter a i r c r a f t a s soon as t h e l a n d i n g g r o u n d s w e r e r e a d y . It Reference: h a d been hoped t h a t t h e l a n d i n g g r o u n d s would be r e a d y t h a t d a y W.M. (40) 127th the 19th M a y . Conclusions, T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above i n f o r m a t i o n . Minute 3.) Operations in Norway. Norway. 3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs drew the Proposal that a t t e n t i o n of the W a r C a b i n e t to a n u n n u m b e r e d telegram, d a t e d hostilities t h e 17th M a y , 1940, from M r . Lascelles (the B r i t i s h R e p r e s e n t a t i v e should cease w i t h t h e N o r w e g i a n G o v e r n m e n t in N o r w a y ) s e t t i n g o u t a r a t h e r north of a obscure p r o p o s a l , a p p a r e n t l y of G e r m a n origin, u n d e r w h i c h given line. fighting w a s to cease n o r t h of a line to be d r a w n a t some unspecified d i s t a n c e n o r t h of T r o n d h j e m . A s i m i l a r p r o p o s a l h a d also been m e n t i o n e d in e a r l i e r t e l e g r a m s from t h e B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r a t Stockholm. T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t it w a s clear t h a t a n y such p r o p o s a l would be q u i t e u n a c c e p t a b l e , a n d i t w a s only i n t e r e s t i n g a s i n d i c a t i n g the s t r a i n w h i c h t h e c o n t i n u a n c e of o p e r a t i o n s i n N o r w a y w a s i m p o s i n g on the G e r m a n resources. He thought, however, t h a t i t would be a s well t h a t w e should i n f o r m both t h e S w e d i s h a n d N o r w e g i a n G o v e r n m e n t s t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l seemed to us entirely impracticable. The W a r Cabinet agreed t h a t the Swedish and Norwegian G o v e r n m e n t s should be i n f o r m e d accordingly. India. Replacement of Regular battalions by Territorial battalions from the United Kingdom. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 108th Conclusions, Minute 4.) 4. The Secretary of State for India s a i d t h a t he h a d given c o n s i d e r a t i o n to t h e p r o p o s a l t h a t e i g h t R e g u l a r B r i t i s h b a t t a l i o n s should r e t u r n from I n d i a to the U n i t e d Kingdom, being r e p l a c e d by T e r r i t o r i a l b a t t a l i o n s . T h e s t a t e m e n t m a d e by t h e S e c r e t a i y of S t a t e covered t h e f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s :— (1) T h e r e w e r e now 42,000 B r i t i s h t r o o p s in I n d i a as c o m p a r e d w i t h 77,000 i n 1914. Of t h e 34 R e g u l a r i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s included in the p r e s e n t g a r r i s o n , 13 w e r e allocated to the defence of t h e N o r t h - W e s t F r o n t i e r a n d 21 to i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y d u t i e s . (2) T h e i n t e r n a l security b a t t a l i o n s h a d , since the b e g i n n i n g of the w a r , been d r a i n e d of t h e i r best W a r r a n t Officers, Non-commissioned Officers a n d men. (3) Nevertheless, he w a s so i m p r e s s e d w i t h the need for i n c r e a s i n g t h e s t r e n g t h of o u r a r m e d forces in t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m t h a t he w a s p r e p a r e d to ask t h e Viceroy to consent to t h e r e t u r n home of the e i g h t R e g u l a r b a t t a l i o n s . T h i s r e q u e s t w o u l d place t h e Viceroy i n a difficult p o s i t i o n w h i c h m i g h t be eased— (a) I f t h e relief t r o o p s left the U n i t e d K i n g d o m simultaneously with the d e p a r t u r e of the R e g u l a r s from I n d i a . (b) I f t h e relief consisted of m o r e t h a n 8 b a t t a l i o n s of territorials. I n d i a w o u l d be a n a d m i r a b l e t r a i n i n g g r o u n d for these t e r r i t o r i a l s , w h i l e troops t r a i n e d in I n d i a would be available for service i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t . (4) T h e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n I n d i a w a s n o t such as to m a k e t h e exchange imprudent. I n discussion, it w a s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e were serious difficulties in t h e w a y of a r r a n g i n g for t h e relief to leave t h i s c o u n t r y a t the same time a s the R e g u l a r b a t t a l i o n s left I n d i a . T h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n did n o t j u s t i f y as m a n y a s 16 B r i t i s h b a t t a l i o n s b e i n g on t h e h i g h seas a t t h e same time. F u r t h e r , i t w a s u n l i k e l y t h a t s h i p p i n g would be available a t t h e same t i m e to c a r r y b o t h contingents. The W a r C a b i n e t ­ (1) I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a to ask the Viceroy, as a m a t t e r of urgency, to a g r e e to t h e r e t u r n of 8 R e g u l a r b a t t a l i o n s from I n d i a ; these b a t t a l i o n s would be relieved by t e r r i t o r i a l b a t t a l i o n s from the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , w h i c h would p r o b a b l y sail back i n t h e ships w h i c h b r o u g h t the b a t t a l i o n s home from I n d i a . (2) I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a to d r a f t his t e l e g r a m to the Viceroy in c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r . Italy. 5. T h e W a r C a b i n e t were given t h e following information w h i c h h a d a b e a r i n g on I t a l y ' s possible i n t e n t i o n s :— Possible intentions. (i) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs r e a d to the (Previous W a r C a b i n e t the reply to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s message Reference: to S i g n o r Mussolini. W.M. (40) 127th (ii) The Chief of the Naval Staff s a i d t h a t a s e a p l a n e - c a r r i e r Conclusions, Minute 9.) w a s d u e to sail from T r i p o l i on the 22nd M a y , bound for M a s s a w a . T h i s ship would n o t be clear of t h e Suez C a n a l u n t i l the 2 5 t h May, a n d w o u l d n o t reach M a s s a w a until the 27th May. (iii) T h e Chief of the N a v a l Staff also r e a d o u t a s i g n a l from the F l a g Officer in c h a r g e a t M a l t a , g i v i n g a r e p o r t i n d i c a t i n g probable o p e r a t i o n s by G e r m a n a n d I t a l i a n forces a c t i n g in co-operation in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n . (iv) The Prime Minister r e a d out a f u r t h e r s i g n a l from t h e same source, f o r w a r d i n g a r e p o r t t h a t g e n e r a l A r m y a n d A i r F o r c e mobilisation w a s to t a k e place in I t a l i a n E a s t Africa immediately. Information Mediterranean. was given as to Naval dispositions in the The Mediterranean. Diversion of shipping. (Previous ' Reference: W.M. (40) 124th Conclusions, Minute 9.) The Chief of the Naval Staff s a i d t h a t s h i p p i n g in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n w a s being t h i n n e d o u t g r a d u a l l y . T h e t r a n s p o r t s w h i c h h a d b r o u g h t t h e A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d troops to Suez were, however, u r g e n t l y r e q u i r e d to t r a n s p o r t F r e n c h t r o o p s from Casablanca, a n d he suggested t h a t t h e y should be told to s a i l i n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d chance g e t t i n g t h r o u g h the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . Italy. Contraband control. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 127th Conclusions, Minute 10.) 6. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said t h a t , since Signoi M u s s o l i n i ' s reactions to the p r o p o s a l seemed likely to be favourable, he h a d explored f u r t h e r t h e possibility of e n t e r i n g i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e I t a l i a n G o v e r n m e n t w i t h the object of m i n i m i s i n g the annoyances caused to t h a t G o v e r n m e n t by t h e p r e s e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of our c o n t r a b a n d control. On the p r e v i o u s d a y he h a d been in consultation w i t h the M i n i s t e r of Economic W a r f a r e a n d h i s e x p e r t s , a n d w i t h t h e M a s t e r of t h e Rolls. T h e M e e t i n g h a d r e a c h e d the conclusion t h a t i t w a s practicable, even i n p r e s e n t conditions, to open discussions w i t h I t a l y on t h e lines suggested. P u t briefly, the p l a n w o u l d be t h a t a s f a r as possible all cargoes consigned to I t a l y from other countries should be covered by navicerts. T h e a t t i t u d e of some e x p o r t i n g countries, for example, the U n i t e d S t a t e s , m i g h t m a k e i t impossible to a p p l y t h e p l a n universally, b u t t h e control by m e a n s of n a v i c e r t s would be m a d e as complete as w a s reasonably possible. T h e line w h i c h we m i g h t t a k e i n p u b l i c w o u l d be to say t h a t we could n o t tell in a d v a n c e h o w t h e new system w o u l d woi'k i n p r a c t i c e b u t t h a t we intended, in order to meet t h e I t a l i a n grievances, to t r y i t on a n e x p e r i m e n t a l basis. 'A" The W a r C a b i n e t Took note of the above s t a t e m e n t s , a n d a g r e e d to the course proposed as r e g a r d s s h i p p i n g i n the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . T h e I n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l M e e t i n g h a d a g r e e d on t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h should govern t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of o u r c o n t r a b a n d control vis-a-vis- I t a l y from t h e d a t e of t h e n e w a g r e e m e n t , if one were concluded, u n t i l f u r t h e r notice :— (i) T h e object of t h e p r o p o s e d r e l a x a t i o n of our c o n t r a b a n d control w a s to a v o i d or a t least to p o s t p o n e w a r w i t h Italy. (ii) A n y r e l a x a t i o n s of o u r c o n t r a b a n d control w e r e of a t e m p o r a r y n a t u r e (the use of t h e f o r m u l a a t " A " above w o u l d be one m e t h o d of s a f e g u a r d i n g our p o s i t i o n in t h i s respect). W e should t h u s be able to reimpose o u r . control in i t s f o r m e r severity if w e t h o u g h t fit. (iii) O u r r e l a x a t i o n s vis-a-vis I t a l y should n o t be such a s to d e s t r o y o u r g r o u n d s of a c t i o n vis-a-vis other neutral countries. I t m i g h t be t h o u g h t t h a t these p r o p o s a l s w e n t very f a r in the d i r e c t i o n of w e a k e n i n g our control. B u t i t w a s no use m a k i n g t h i s n e w a p p r o a c h to the I t a l i a n s unless we m e t t h e m w i t h a n offer on generous lines. I f we could hold t h e p o s i t i o n vis-a-vis I t a l y d u r i n g t h e n e x t c r i t i c a l weeks, i t w o u l d be well w o r t h w h i l e . S i r W i l f r i d Greene w a s l e a v i n g for R o m e on t h e 21st May, a c c o m p a n i e d b) a d v i s e r s from the M i n i s t r y of E c o n o m i c W a r f a r e . H e asked t h a t S i r W i l f r i d should be given full p o w e r s to r e a c h a settlement on t h e lines w h i c h he h a d i n d i c a t e d generally. Sir W i l f r i d should be e m p o w e r e d to a g r e e t h a t no f u r t h e r I t a l i a n ships should be d e t a i n e d w h i l e t h e n e w system w a s u n d e r t r i a l . r The W a r C a b i n e t G a v e a g e n e r a l a p p r o v a l to t h e p r o p o s a l s a s s u m m a r i s e d above. U.S.S.R. Suggested despatch of a special envoy to Moscow. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 127th Conclusions, Minute 13.) Foreign Secretary's 7 xhe Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs s a i d t h a t , as a r e s u l t of t h e decision of t h e W a r C a b i n e t a t t h e M e e t i n g r e f e r r e d to i n t h e m a r g i n , he h a d discussed f u r t h e r w i t h t h e M i n i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e t h e p r o p o s a l to send S i r Stafford C r i p p s on a n e x p l o r a t o r y mission to Moscow. T h e y h a d r e a c h e d t h e conclusion t h a t i t w o u l d be best to give him, as a n experienced adviser a n d technical a s s i s t a n t , M r . A s h t o n G w a t k i n of t h e M i n i s t r y of Economic W a r f a r e , w h o h a d j u s t r e t u r n e d f r o m t h e U . S . A . He a n d the M i n i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e p r o p o s e d to see S i r Stafford C r i p p s on the following d a y a n d to e x p l a i n to h i m t h e n a t u r e of t h e mission w h i c h he w a s b e i n g a s k e d to u n d e r t a k e a n d the g e n e r a l p o l i t i c a l b a c k g r o u n d , a n d the M i n i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e would also a r r a n g e to give h i m d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e issues w i t h w h i c h he w a s directly concerned. I f S i r Stafford C r i p p s accepted the i n v i t a t i o n he (the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y ) would t h e n p u t the s u g g e s t i o n to M.. M a i s k y , w i t h o u t s a y i n g a n y t h i n g a s t o t h e possibility of o u r s e n d i n g a n A m b a s s a d o r t o Moscow. I f the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t agreed, S i r Stafford C r i p p s a n d M r . A s h t o n G w a t k i n w o u l d set off on t h e i r mission a s soon a s possible. The W a r C a b i n e t I n v i t e d t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs proceed on these lines. to United States of America. Purchase of aircraft. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 126th Conclusions, Minute 3.) 8. The Secretary of State for Foreign A ffairs r e a d to the W a r C a b i n e t a telegram No. 759, w h i c h he h a d j u s t received, r e p o r t i n g a conversation between L o r d L o t h i a n a n d P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt on the p r e v i o u s evening. P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt h a d , of course, shown himself very friendly a n d h a d e m p h a s i s e d the efforts w h i c h he was m a k i n g to keep I t a l y from e n t e r i n g t h e w a r . H e h a d , however, said n o t h i n g w h i c h showed t h a t he recognised o u r p r e s s i n g need for i m m e d i a t e a i r c r a f t s u p p l i e s ; n o r h a d he m e n t i o n e d the suggestion t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t should let us h a v e a i r c r a f t a t once from t h e i r own s u p p l i e s , to be replaced l a t e r from orders a l r e a d y placed in the U n i t e d S t a t e s . The Prime Minister s a i d t h a t in these circumstances he proposed to send a t e l e g r a m to P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt a t once m a k i n g clear o u r i m m e d i a t e needs. The W a r C a b i n e t I n v i t e d the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for A i r to f u r n i s h the P r i m e M i n i s t e r before 5 P . M . t h a t d a y w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n for inclusion in such a t e l e g r a m . Gibraltar. Evacuation of civilians. (Previous References: W.M. (40) 108th Conclusions, Minute 12, and 124th Conclusions, Minute 10.) 9. The Secretary of State for War recalled t h a t on the 16th M a y t h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d a g r e e d t h a t t h e scheme for e v a c u a t i n g civilians from G i b r a l t a r should be c a r r i e d out. The scheme covered both B r i t i s h Service families a n d G i b r a l t a r i a n s . A t e l e g r a m h a d n o w been received from t h e Governor of G i b r a l t a r s t a t i n g t h a t he w a s u n w i l l i n g to c a r r y o u t the scheme. H i s m a i n reason w a s t h a t t h e e v a c u a t i o n of civilians from G i b r a l t a r would create a m o s t - u n f a v o u r a b l e impression on S p a n i s h opinion, a n d t h a t i t should not, therefore, be c a r r i e d o u t unless we were c e r t a i n t h a t S p a i n would be hostile. T h e m a t t e r h a d been f u r t h e r discussed i n t e r - D e p a r t m e n t a l l y . I t would be possible to c a r r y o u t the scheme a f t e r w a r h a d broken out w i t h I t a l y , b u t t h i s would p u t a considerable s t r a i n on the Navy. T h e F o r e i g n Office h a d t a k e n t h e view t h a t the effect of evacuation on S p a n i s h o p i n i o n o u g h t n o t to be serious. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs s a i d t h a t , unless t h e r e w a s a revolution, he s a w n o reason to t h i n k t h a t S p a i n would come i n t o the w a r . H e d o u b t e d w h e t h e r t h e e v a c u a t i o n of c e r t a i n civilians from G i b r a l t a r would alter S p a n i s h policy. I n f u r t h e r discussion, the view w a s expressed t h a t the evacuation of civilians from G i b r a l t a r could p r o p e r l y be r e p r e s e n t e d as a p r e c a u t i o n a r y m e a s u r e , w h i c h w a s being t a k e n in view of t h e d i s t u r b e d s i t u a t i o n i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n generally, a n d not as a m e a s u r e m a d e necessary by a n x i e t y as to S p a i n ' s i n t e n t i o n s . The W a r C a b i n e t A g r e e d t h a t t h e Governor of G i b r a l t a r should be i n s t r u c t e d to p u t into effect t h e scheme for the e v a c u a t i o n of civilians. C a r e should be t a k e n to e x p l a i n t h a t t h i s w a s a p r e c a u t i o n a r y m e a s u r e t a k e n in view of the d i s t u r b e d s i t u a t i o n in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n generally, a n d t h a t it w a s not due to a n x i e t y a s to S p a i n ' s i n t e n t i o n s . Richmond Terrace, S.W. May 19, 1940. 1,