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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT Printed
for the War Cabinet.
May 1942.
SECRET. Copy No.
W.P. (42) 226.
May 28, 1942.
TO B E K E P T U N D E R
LOCK A N D
KEY.
I t is requested t h a t special care may be t a k e n to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR
COAL
PRODUCTION
Memorandum
CABINET.
PROGRAMME,
by the Lord President
of the
1942-43.
Council.
WHEN
the W a r
Cabinet
considered
the
Committee's
proposals
( W . P . (42) 148) for c a r r y i n g t h r o u g h the coal p r o d u c t i o n p r o g r a m m e for the year
1942-43, the P r i m e M i n i s t e r undertook to p u t in w r i t i n g certain suggestions for
reducing the d e m a n d for coal, or for s u s t a i n i n g o u t p u t , which m i g h t make it
unnecessary to w i t h d r a w ex-miners from Field Force u n i t s in the A r m y a t home
(W.M. (42) 46th Conclusions, M i n u t e 1).
The suggestions communicated to me by the P r i m e M i n i s t e r a r e reproduced
in the A p p e n d i x to this M e m o r a n d u m .
2. I n the light of these suggestions a n d of the discussion a t t h e W a r Cabinet,
the Lord P r e s i d e n t s Committee have a g a i n reviewed the p r o d u c t i o n programme,
in consultation w i t h the M i n i s t e r s concerned.
I n t h i s review we have taken
account of new circumstances w h i c h modify to some e x t e n t the a p p r e c i a t i o n given
in W . P . (42) 148, viz. : ­
(a) T h e previous e s t i m a t e tended to mask the recent decline i n o u t p u t of cOal
per man shift worked.
On this account we have f r a m e d our new
estimate on the basis, not of the a d d i t i o n a l o u t p u t of t h e face workers
to be r e t u r n e d to the p i t s , but of the probable o u t p u t of the total labour
force employed in the i n d u s t r y .
(The discussion in the W a r Cabinet proceeded on the a s s u m p t i o n
t h a t 7,000 miners, whose release from the Field A r m y was then
suggested, would produce only 2 million tons of coal in a year and
t h a t there would be no need to w i t h d r a w these men from the A r m y if
means could be found of r e d u c i n g consumption by t h i s amount.
In
fact, if the 7,000 men were face-workers, a n d could all be re-employed
at the coal-face, t h e i r production would be nearer 5 million t h a n 2
million tons. But, if the e s t i m a t e were framed on t h e basis of t h e
additional coal likely to be obtained by face workers r e t u r n e d to t h e
industry, we should also have to assume a correspondingly h i g h e r figure
for tonnage lost t h r o u g h w a s t a g e from the industry.)
[b) The W a r Cabinet are r e l u c t a n t to authorise the release of ex-miners from
Field Force u n i t s , a n d a r e p r e p a r e d to r u n some risk of a shortage of
coal r a t h e r t h a n risk i m p a i r i n g the efficiency of the F i e l d A r m y a t
home.
[23880] (c) The numbers of ex-miners to be released from non-Field Force u n i t s in
the Army, from R . A . F . ground staff and from i n d u s t r y , will be larger
t h a n we h a d assumed when our previous estimate was submitted.
3. On the basis t h a t a higher degree of risk is to be accepted, we could
make the following cuts in the estimate of production required to meet essential
needs :—
(a) Stocks.—On
further consideration, the Mines D e p a r t m e n t are p r e p a r e d
to assume a reduction of stocks to the extent of 2f million tons.
This will involve a substantial reduction in colliery stocks, and
much of this coal will be of poor quality. I t will be necessary for the
W a r Cabinet to support the Mines D e p a r t m e n t in compelling
consumers, e.g., Supply Departments, to accept this low quality coal.
(b) Fuel economy in industry.—The
savings to be secured by this means
might amount to 1 million tons.
(c) Exports and foreign bunkers.—It
is agreed t h a t the estimate for bunkers
could be c u t by 200,000 tons. I n addition, I believe t h a t some reduc­
tion could be made in the estimates of (i) 630,000 tons for contingencies,
and (ii) 660,000 tons for minor exports to miscellaneous destinations.
I propose t h a t the estimate for exports should be cut by 750.000
tons.
(d) Outcrop deposits.—It
is now estimated t h a t the w o r k i n g of outcrop
deposits may yield about 2 million tons of usable coal d u r i n g the year.
(For convenience this is treated here as equivalent to a reduction
in consumption, for it reduces the demand for coal produced from
the mines.)
4. By these alterations in the estimates, the t a r g e t for the year's production
from the mines (making no allowance for the r a t i o n i n g of domestic fuel) is reduced
from 215 to 208^ million tons.
W h a t labour force is required to produce this o u t p u t ?
If efficiency in terms of o u t p u t per man were the same as d u r i n g 1941-42,
the reduced target could be reached by a n average labour force d u r i n g the year
of 708,500 men. Allowing a net wastage of 25,000 d u r i n g the year, this would
mean a labour force of 721,000 at 1st May, 1942.
But efficiency was falling d u r i n g 1941-42. O u t p u t per man shift worked
overall, which was 1 - 086 tons in the first q u a r t e r of 1941, h a d fallen to 1 -057 tons
in the corresponding period of this year, a fall of 2-6 per cent.
If o u t p u t per shift continues to fall at the same r a t e d u r i n g 1942-43, we
should need an average labour force of 726,000 to produce 208^ million tons in
the year. Allowing for wastage, this would mean a labour force of 738,500 at
the 1st May, 1942.
W e cannot afford to assume t h a t efficiency will continue to decline a t this
r a t e d u r i n g the coming year. Measures of reorganisation which a r e now being­
considered, though they may not become fully operative d u r i n g the year, should
at least arrest the d o w n w a r d trend of o u t p u t per shift. I therefore propose
that, for the purpose of the present estimate, we should assume t h a t the o u t p u t
per shift d u r i n g 1942-43 will, on the average, equal t h a t secured d u r i n g the
first q u a r t e r of 1942, though it is at present somewhat lower.
On this assumption, the reduced t a r g e t could be reached by a n average labour
force of 713.000 men. Allowing for wastage, this would m e a n a force of 725.500
at the 1st May, 1942.
,
5.
level ?
. i
W h a t progress have we made towards r a i s i n g the labour force to this
(a) A rmy.—As a result of the decision endorsed by the W a r Cabinet on the
10th A p r i l , 6,033 ex-miners had been released from the A r m y for
r e t u r n to the mines u p to the 23rd May.
The W a r Office estimate t h a t under the existing decision we
may obtain about 6,500 ex-miners from the A r m y .
(b) R.A.F.—The
A i r M i n i s t r y have furnished lists" of 2,700 ex-colliery
workers who m i g h t be released from the ground staffs of the R.A.F.
- I t is unlikely, however, t h a t more than" half this number will be
r e t u r n e d for u n d e r g r o u n d employment in the mines. F i r s t , these are
men who have indicated their willingness to r e t u r n to particular
collieries of their own choice. Secondly, the lists include a fairly high
p r o p o r t i o n of men who are not u n d e r g r o u n d workers, and i t is known
t h a t collieries Avill not be able to absorb many surface workers. For
these reasons it is unsafe to assume t h a t more t h a n 1,300 men will be
obtained from this source,
(c) Industry'.-The
M i n i s t e r of Labour, in consultation w i t h other M i n i s t e r s
concerned, has concluded a r r a n g e m e n t s for releases of coal-face
workers from i n d u s t r y and Civil Defence which could result in the
r e t u r n of a m a x i m u m number of 4,025 ex-miners to the pits. P r e v i o u s
experience suggests t h a t it will not be possible in p r a c t i c e to secure
the release of this m a x i m u m t o t a l ; b u t we may assume t h a t about
3,500 ex-miners will be obtained from this source.
6. If these special steps h a d not been taken to secure the r e t u r n of men to
the industry, t h e labour force would have fallen to 704,000 by-the 1st May, 1942.
As a result of these measures, the labour force may be raised to a total of about
715.300 men.
Not all of these men, however, were a t work in the mines a t the beginning
of the production y e a r on the 1st May—indeed, the full numbers will not h a v e
returned to the p i t s for some weeks to come. If allowance is m a d e for this, and
for wastage, i t may be said t h a t the measures already taken for the r e t u r n of
ex-miners from the Services a n d i n d u s t r y will secure a n average labour force,
during the year, of 702,300 men.
On the a s s u m p t i o n suggested a t the end of p a r a g r a p h 4 above, this labour
force could produce d u r i n g the year a total of 2 0 5 - 3 million tons of coal—repre­
senting a deficit of 3 - 2 million tons on the reduced t a r g e t of 208 - 5 million tons.
7. Before considering how this deficit could best be met, we wish to d r a w
attention to some u n c e r t a i n factors a n d possible new commitments which may
have the effect of increasing the g a p between production a n d consumption :—
(a) T h e estimate is based on t h e assumption t h a t o u t p u t per shift d u r i n g the
year will, on the average, equal t h a t of ,the first q u a r t e r of 1942,
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t o u t p u t per m a n shift declined d u r i n g 1941-42
by 2 - 6 per cent, and t h a t the decline is still continuing.
(b) The programme, as now revised, provides no m a r g i n for contingencies. I n
the case of exports, i n p a r t i c u l a r , there can be no g u a r a n t e e t h a t events
will not force us to meet new demands for which no provision has
been made. For example, we may be compelled, on strategical grounds,
to increase our exports to E g y p t in order to m a k e good a loss of
supplies from I n d i a which could not be met from other sources. A n d
it h a s already been suggested t h a t We should export more coal in ships
sailing to N o r t h A m e r i c a in ballast, so as to set free A m e r i c a n ships
now engaged in the coastwise c a r r i a g e of coal, and so increase the pool
of t o n n a g e available for A n g l o - A m e r i c a n purposes.
(c) I n a d d i t i o n to these factors of uncertainty, there is a potential new
commitment of which no account has so far been taken. I f certain
m i l i t a r y projects which are now u n d e r consideration m a t u r e , heavy
a d d i t i o n a l demands for coal are likely to be made for various m i l i t a r y
purposes d u r i n g the w i n t e r of 1942-43. I need not specify the n a t u r e
of these demands in detail. The Committee will a p p r e c i a t e t h a t these
projects m i g h t involve a heavy increase in coal consumption for a
variety of reasons; and no provision has so far been made for t h i s in
the production p r o g r a m m e .
T h e r e is the further p o i n t t h a t these projects will involve the
t e m p o r a r y w i t h d r a w a l of a substantial number of vessels from the
coastwise t r a d e , most of which would o r d i n a r i l y be engaged in the
coal t r a d e . These ships would be w i t h d r a w n a t a time when an exeep­
tionally heavy s t r a i n w a s being placed on the r a i l w a y system; and, to:
meet this, steps will have to be taken in advance to build u p s u b s t a n t i a l
stocks in certain areas. T h i s must be done d u r i n g the summer of 1942,
but it can only be done if production d u r i n g t h e summer can be m a i n ­
t a i n e d a t a level sufficient to provide a s u r p l u s after meeting both
current consumption a n d the amounts required for m i n i m u m stocks i n
other p a r t s of the country.
[23880]
2
B
8. F o r the reasons indicated in the preceding p a r a g r a p h , the deficit a g a i n s t
w h i c h we have to provide may, in the result, be found to be substantially more
t h a n 3-2 million tons.
There are three possible ways of meeting such a deficit:—
(a) Some economies could be secured t h r o u g h a system of allocating coal to
i n d u s t r y analogous to t h a t for allocating r a w materials—cf. (b)-(d) in the
A p p e n d i x . The Mines D e p a r t m e n t are now w o r k i n g out a scheme for m a k i n g
definite allocations to the main coal-consuming industries. Such a scheme will
present substantial administrative difficulties, for coal supplies are not u n d e r the
direct control of the Mines D e p a r t m e n t to the extent t h a t r a w materials a r e
controlled by the M i n i s t r y of Supply. The only course open to the D e p a r t m e n t
is to work t o w a r d s such a system progressively by determining the m i n i m u m needs
of selected industries, one by one, a n d dealing first w i t h a few of the less essential
industries whose coal consumption a p p e a r s to be excessive.
The D e p a r t m e n t will need the full co-operation of the S u p p l y D e p a r t m e n t s ,
a n d other D e p a r t m e n t s concerned with p a r t i c u l a r industries, in d e t e r m i n i n g the
allocations to be m a d e ; and i t will be necessary for the W a r Cabinet to give specific
directions t h a t all D e p a r t m e n t s concerned shall collaborate in securing the
necessary economies in industrial consumption.
If this system can be b r o u g h t into effective operation d u r i n g the summer,
even over a limited p a r t of the field, there is a reasonable prospect t h a t substantial
economies may be secui'ed d u r i n g the course of the year. A t t h i s stage it is not
possible to frame any reliable estimate of the savings which m i g h t be obtained
by this means; but they m i g h t well amount to more t h a n 1 million tons d u r i n g
the year.
(b) Full account has not so far been taken of the increase in production
which m i g h t be expected to result from the proposals for the reorganisation of
the industry which have been outlined in W . P . (42) 224.
I t h a s been assumed ( p a r a g r a p h 4 above) t h a t these measures of
reorganisation will serA e to arrest the d o w n w a r d trend of o u t p u t per shift. If
the decline in o u t p u t per shift continued at its present rate d u r i n g the AAdiole of
1942/43, the effect would be a loss of 4 million tons on the y e a r ' s production
assumed in this memorandum. Thus, a substantial contribution has already been
assumed on account of reorganisation. If, however, these measures of reorgani­
sation are pressed forward speedily a n d vigorously, and if they secure the
Avhole-hearted s u p p o r t of both sides of the industry, the gain will not be limited
to t h a t directly resulting from the practical measures proposed, e.g., coneen­
t r a t i o n on the more productive p i t s and seams. T h e psychological effect of these
changes, on workers and managements alike, should also haA^e a considerable effect
on o u t p u t . I t is permissible, therefore, to assume that, d u r i n g the l a t t e r p a r t of
the year, Ave can look not merely to arresting the decline in o u t p u t per shift, b u t to
a further increase in production.
T
(c) F u r t h e r economies in consumption could be secured by the r a t i o n i n g
of domestic fuel.
The full scheme of " points " r a t i o n i n g outlined by the
P r e s i d e n t of the Board of T r a d e in his memorandum W . P . (42) 225 would save
about 6 million tons in the year, if introduced w i t h effect from the 1st J u l y .
9. I n these circumstances the Lord P r e s i d e n t s Committee do not wish
t o press their previous suggestion ( W . P . (42) 148) t h a t the labour force of the
i n d u s t r y should be increased by the w i t h d r a w a l of ex-miners from Field Force
u n i t s in the A r m y a t home.
10. The r e m a i n i n g question for decision by the W a r Cabinet is whether
i t is necessary to proceed With the scheme for r a t i o n i n g domestic fuel.
I n the view of my Committee, the position will be materially altered by the
adoption of the reorganisation scheme. I t is i m p o r t a n t to enlist not only good­
will, b u t even enthusiasm, for the successful operation of this' scheme; a n d we
t h i n k it preferable that, at this stage, we should place the emphasis on the
increased production which is likely to be secured through t h i s reorganisation,
r a t h e r t h a n on b r i d g i n g the g a p by economies to be enforced by a scheme of com­
pulsory r a t i o n i n g .
This does not mean t h a t We can afford to do without
economies in domestic fuel consumption. If we are to close the g a p and to provide
a g a i n s t the contingencies mentioned in p a r a g r a p h 7, we must aim a t securing, by
voluntary means, reductions in domestic consumption not substantially less t h a n
those which would be secured u n d e r the r a t i o n i n g scheme. T h e Mines D e p a r t ­
ment must also proceed w i t h the scheme for allocating coal to industry, w i t h a
view to securing the m a x i m u m possible reduction in the i n d u s t r i a l consumption
of coal.
11. My Committee do not, therefore, recommend t h a t the r a t i o n i n g scheme
should be introduced a t this stage. They t h i n k it essential, however, t h a t we
should be ready to ration domestic fuel consumption a t short notice; a n d they
therefore recommend t h a t all a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r e p a r a t i o n s should be made for the
introduction of the " p o i n t s " scheme of r a t i o n i n g outlined in W . P . (42) 225.
Moreover, they suggest t h a t these p r e p a r a t i o n s should be carried to the stage of
issuing the forms and m a k i n g the assessments. These steps should be associated
with an appeal to all members of the public to practise economy in the use of
all forms of fuel. There should be sustained publicity designed to p e r s u a d e
people to restrict their fuel consumption, voluntarily, as nearly as practicable
to the limits which would be imposed on them if a r a t i o n i n g scheme were
introduced.
Finally, the Committee recommend t h a t the position should continue to be
closely watched, in the light of t h e o u t p u t actually secured; a n d t h a t in a n y
event a special report should be made to the W a r Cabinet in September n e x t
on the result of t h e decisions now to be taken.
J. A. Great George Street, S.W.
May 28, 1942. 1, APPENDIX.
Minute
from
the Prime
Minister.
-LORD PRESIDENT.
1. There is general agreement about the proposals in your p a p e r about
coal, except for the transfer of 7,000 t r a i n e d soldiers from the Field A r m y to
the p i t s . These 7,000 men, if they produced the same as the average mine­
workers, m i g h t hew 2,000,000 tons of coal in a year.
T h e effect of such a
dislocation in the A r m y a t this critical time is so serious t h a t I hope all other
alternatives to find these 2,000,000 tons will be exhausted. There a r e many
alternatives, i t seems to me a t first sight, which are less i n j u r i o u s to our general
w a r effort :—
(a) D r a w i n g from the coal reserve of 12,000,000 tons.
(b) Economies m i g h t be effected by a system of allocating coal to various
users such as obtains in other r a w m a t e r i a l s .
(c) F u r t h e r economies in the W a r P r o d u c t i o n D e p a r t m e n t s
(d) Reduction in i n d u s t r i a l users other t h a n m u n i t i o n s .
(e) A possible reduction in the export programme.
(/) Monetary r e w a r d s to miners for surrender of a portion of their
customary coal allowance.
(g) Directing a large number of u n t r a i n e d youths of 18-19 years into the
pits.
(h) P e r s u a d i n g or allowing a proportion of a g e i n g men to w o r k for
another year.
(i) Possible expansion in outcrop working. ' (;) Get miners to work a n e x t r a 15 m i n u t e s a week. W i t h all these possibilities in view, each of which m i g h t m e a n nearly 1,000,000
tons a year, there should be no difficulty in finding t h e 2,000,000 tons, a n d thus
avoiding the i n j u r y to the A r m y .
2. F u r t h e r help will be given by all your long-term projects, including,
the financial point about r e l a t i n g E . P . T . to tons mined.
3. Meanwhile the W a r Office a r e to specify how m a n y miners they have
in the Metropolitan F i e l d Force, w h a t p r o p o r t i o n a r e face-workers, a n d how
many of them a r e w i t h the fighting f o r m a t i o n s ; t h a t is to say, excluding
T r a n s p o r t , R.A.S.C., R.A.O.C., a n d other ancillary services. T h e W a r Office
will of course find the 5,000 men out of the 12,000 asked for, which a r e to be
given from A . D . G . B . a n d other Field Force branches.
4. I hope all these possibilities will enable us to r o u n d the corner without
t a k i n g the very grave step at this j u n c t u r e which would derange the solidaritv
of the A r m y .
.
(Initialled)
W . S. C.
11.4.42.