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THIS DOCUMENT IS T H E PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
May 1940.
SECRET.
Copy N o .
W.M. (40)
126th Conclusions.
TO B E K E P T
UNDER
LOCK
AND KEY.
It is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
W A R
CONCLUSIONS
CABINET
126(40).
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing
S.W. 1, on Friday, May 17, 1940, at 10 A.M.
Street,
Present:
T h e R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S . C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the
Chair).
T h e R i g h t Hon. N E V I L L E CHAMBERLAIN,
M . P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
The Right Hon.
The Right H o n . VISCOUNT HALIFAX,
Secretary of S t a t e for F o r e i g n
Affairs.
The R i g h t Hon. A . GREENWOOD, M.P.,
C. R . A T T L E E , M . P . ,
L o r d P r i v y Seal.
Minister without Portfolio.
T h e following were also p r e s e n t :
The R i g h t H o n . A . V . ALEXANDER,
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
The Right H o n . ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.,
Secretary of S t a t e for W a r .
The
ARCHIBALD
S e c r e t a r y of
The Right Hon. S i r J O H N ANDERSON,
M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e
H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of
Home Security.
T h e R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T CALDECOTE,
Secretary of S t a t e for D o m i n i o n
Affairs.
The R i g h t H o n . A . D U F F COOPER, M . P . ,
The
A i r Chief M a r s h a l S i r C Y R I L L .
N E W A L L , C h i e f of t h e A i r Staff.
Right
SINCLAIR,
Hon.
Bt.,
Sir
M.P.,
S t a t e for A i r .
Hon.
Sir
ALEXANDER
CADOGAN,
P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for F o r e i g n Affairs.
A d m i r a l of t h e Fleet S i r D U D L E Y
P O U N D , F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d Chief of
N a v a l Staff.
General
Sir
JOHN
M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n .
General S i r W . EDMUND IRONSIDE,
Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff.
DILL,
Vice-Chief
of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff.
Secretariat.
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
C a p t a i n A . D . NICHOLL, R . N .
Group Captain W. ELLIOT.
M r . G. N . F L E M M I N G .
[21297]
N.
WAR
CABINET
126
(40).
CONTENTS.
Minute
No.
Page
Subject.
1
The Western Front
The Prime Ministers visit to Paris.
157
2
T h e W e s t e r n F r o n t (continued)
...
Despatch of fighter aircraft to France.
Projected bomber operations.
Air operations on night of 16th/17th May.
British Expeditionary Force.
Extent of German advance.
Information for press and general public.
...
....
...
158
3
Aircraft Supplies
...
...
Replacement of casualties.
Purchase of aircraft from U . S A .
...
...
...
159
4
The Naval Situation
160
5
Norway
Progress of operations at Narvik.
Bearing of situation on Western Front.
160
6
I n v a s i o n of G r e a t B r i t a i n
...
Troops available in this country.
Local Defence Volunteers.
7
Italy
...
Passible intentions.
Crete.
161
8
Italy
Possible attack on Yugoslavia.
161
9
...
...
U n i t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a
...
...
...
Personal message to the Prime Minister from President Roosevelt.
161
...
...
...
...
...
160
The Western
Front.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 125th
-Conclusions.)
The Prime
Minister's visit
to Paris.
;
'
...
1. The Prime Minister
gave t h e W a r Cabinet a n account of h i s visit to F r a n c e on t h e previous d a y . H e h a d found M . D a l a d i e r a n d G e n e r a l G a m e l i n depressed, b u t M. R e y n a u d in r a t h e r better h e a r t . T h e r e w a s no doubt t h a t t h e
9 t h F r e n c h A r m y h a d sustained a h e a v y defeat. T h e i r smaller
a n t i - t a n k g u n s w e r e unable to stop the G e r m a n t a n k s a n d the
G e r m a n t a n k s ' flame-throwing g u n w a s effective to a r a n g e of about
300 y a r d s , even a g a i n s t block houses. Some of the F r e n c h troops,
however, h a d r e t r e a t e d w i t h o u t sufficient cause.
T h e G e r m a n s b a d some 30 to 40 divisions massed b e h i n d the g a p .
I t w a s now plain w h y the Allied t r o o p s h a d not been bombed in t h e i r
a d v a n c e i n t o B e l g i u m ; the G e r m a n s h a d w a n t e d to get us into
f o r w a r d positions i n order to effect a break t h r o u g h a n d t u r n o u r
flanks.
T h e G e r m a n a d v a n c e h a d now slowed down, probably to re-form
a n d re-fuel. F r e n c h divisions were b e i n g brought u p from Alsace,
a n d down from t h e N o r t h .
G e n e r a l G i r a u d h a d been p u t in
c o m m a n d of the 9 t h A r m y , the c o m m a n d e r of w h i c h h a d been
superseded.
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r h a d also seen General S w a y n e who h a d
r e p o r t e d t h a t G e n e r a l Georges w a s dealing calmly w i t h the
situation.
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t he h a d m a d e it clear to the
F r e n c h t h a t , unless they m a d e a s u p r e m e effort, we would not feel
justified i n a c c e p t i n g the g r a v e r i s k to the safety of t h i s country
w h i c h would be e n t a i l e d by t h e d e s p a t c h of more fighters to F r a n c e .
I f the F r e n c h would fight t h e i r h a r d e s t , we would do e v e r y t h i n g
possible to help them.
H e h a d also seen A i r V i c e - M a r s h a l Evill, who h a d g lven a
most e n c o u r a g i n g account of the a i r fighting, in w h i c h the G e r m a n
losses h a d been four or five times a s g r e a t as our own. T h e total
G e r m a n losses h a d been so heavy t h a t there w a s l i t t l e doubt t h a t the
d i s p a r i t y between the Allied a n d G e r m a n a i r s t r e n g t h h a d now been
a p p r e c i a b l y lessened.
T h e G e r m a n s , however, escorted their
bombing a t t a c k s w i t h such heavy fighter protection t h a t it w a s
difficult for our fighters to get a t t h e G e r m a n bombers.
H e felt t h a t t h e W a r Cabinet h a d been faced w i t h t h e gravest
decision t h a t a B r i t i s h Cabinet h a d e v e r h a d to take. On receiving
t h e i r decision (telegram No. 159) he h a d at once visited M . R e y n a u d
a n d G e n e r a l Gamelin. H e h a d first of all shown them' t h e telegram
(No. 206 D I P P ) , w h i c h h a d been before the W a r C a b i n e t a t their
M e e t i n g t h e previous evening. H e h a d then shown t h e m the' W a r
C a b i n e f s reply w h i c h h a d h e a r t e n e d them to a very considerable
degree.
H e h a d told A i r M a r s h a l J o u b e r t de la F e r t e to r e m a i n w i t h
A i r M a r s h a l B a r r a t t , who w a s very t i r e d a n d m u s t o b t a i n some rest.
B o t h A i r M a r s h a l s were a t G e n e r a l Georges' h e a d q u a r t e r s . H e
h a d told them t h a t they m u s t m a k e supreme efforts to settle ' ' The
B a t t l e of t h e B u l g e " — " la Poche " — o n which t h e fate of E u r o p e
depended. W i t h the a r r a n g e m e n t s which h a d now been made, he
t h o u g h t t h a t we should be able to d o m i n a t e the a i r over the Bulge.
T h e r e w a s a reasonable hope that, w i t h a four or five d a y s ' respite
from a i r attack, the F r e n c h A r m y would be able to rally a n d
re-establish the position.
The s i t u a t i o n on the rest of the front seemed f a i r l y satisfactory.
A p l a n h a d been p r e p a r e d for the w i t h d r a w a l of t h e B r i t i s h A r m y
in stages, if necessary, but he felt t h a t we o u g h t n o t to yield a n inch
of g r o u n d without- fighting.
H e h a d been told t h a t the F r e n c h h a d sustained Very heavy
losses in fighter a i r c r a f t a n d t h a t only o n e - q u a r t e r of the force
w i t h w h i c h they h a d s t a r t e d the c a m p a i g n remained serviceable.
1
The Vice-Chief
of the Imperial
General Staff said t h a t the
F r e n c h h a d been s u r p r i s e d by t h e direction a n d w e i g h t of the
[21297]
B 2
G e r m a n a t t a c k , by t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e new G e r m a n tank, a n d by the
d e v a s t a t i n g combination of a i r a t t a c k a n d a r m o u r e d vehicles. There
w a s no doubt, however, t h a t some of t h e F r e n c h troops h a d not
f o u g h t well. T h e F r e n c h w e r e depressed a t t h e lack of success
of t h e i r l i g h t t a n k s of which they h a d lost t w o - t h i r d s . T h e i r heavy
t a n k s h a d h a d a g r e a t success to s t a r t w i t h , b u t they h a d lost half
of them. They w e r e now faced w i t h the possibility of a t t a c k by
n i n e G e r m a n a r m o u r e d divisions a g a i n s t which they could only
m u s t e r t h r e e . Moreover, t h e G e r m a n a r m o u r e d divisions were
stronger t h a n their French equivalents.
Some comfort m i g h t be taken, however, from the f a c t t h a t the
flower of the F r e n c h A r m y w a s in t h e N o r t h a n d not in the p a r t of
t h e line w h e r e t h e blow h a d fallen.
The Lord President
of the Council said t h a t the W a r Cabinet,
a t t h e i r M e e t i n g on t h e previous evening, h a d been most disturbed
a t the s i t u a t i o n revealed in the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s telegram. They
h a d realised t h a t t h e b a t t l e m i g h t be decisive for F r a n c e .
They
h a d felt t h a t they m u s t r e s p o n d to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s courageous
l e a d e r s h i p a n d h a d decided t h a t e v e r y t h i n g possible m u s t be done
to give t h e F r e n c h a chance to rally.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of these s t a t e m e n t s .
The Western
Front (con­
tinued).
Despatch of
fighter aircraft
to France.
(Previous
Eef erenee:
W.M. (40) 125th
Conclusions.)
Projected
bomber
operations.
2. The Chief of the Air Staff s a i d t h a t six of t h e e i g h t fighter
flights, w h i c h it h a d previously been decided to send, h a d reached
F r a n c e a t d u s k on t h e p r e v i o u s d a y ; the o t h e r two w o u l d a r r i v e
t h a t m o r n i n g . A n u m b e r of fresh fighter pilots h a d also been sent.
T h e a r r a n g e m e n t s to enable six f u r t h e r s q u a d r o n s of H u r r i c a n e s to
o p e r a t e i n F r a n c e w o u l d be on the lines described to the W a r Cabinet
t h e previous n i g h t . T h r e e of the s q u a d r o n s were n o w o p e r a t i n g
in F r a n c e . The o t h e r t h r e e h a d been held u p by fog, b u t would
almost c e r t a i n l y be r e a d y t o o p e r a t e t h a t afternoon.
Air operations
on night of
16th/17th May.
T h e Chief of t h e A i r Staff s a i d t h a t a t t a c k s h a d been m a d e
by heavy bombers d u r i n g t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t , the 1 6 t h - l 7 t h May,
on—
(i) enemy r o a d a n d r a i l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a t M a a s t r i c h t ,
Aachen a n d Munchen-Gladbach;
(ii) the coking p l a n t a t H a m b o r n ;
(iii) docks a n d m a r s h a l l i n g y a r d s a t Dusseldorf;
(iv) the r a i l w a y s i d i n g s a t H a m b u r g ;
(v) the a e r o d r o m e a t D u i s b u r g .
T h e bomber force would be c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e B u l g e t h a t
night.
Successful a t t a c k s h a d also been m a d e on the h y d r o g e n a t i o n p l a n t s
a t Gelsenkirchen a n d a t C a s t r o p R a u x e l . Only one of t h e heavy
bombers sent out h a d failed to r e t u r n .
E a r l y t h a t m o r n i n g 12 B l e n h e i m s h a d t a k e n off a t 4 - 5 0 A.M.
to a t t a c k objectives a t Gembloux. T h e y h a d r u n i n t o 15 Messer­
s c h m i t t s before r e a c h i n g t h e t a r g e t . One of t h e Blenheims h a d been
shot down in flames a n d news of t h e r e m a i n d e r w a s u p to t h a t
m o m e n t lacking.
/British
Expeditionary
Force.
The Vice-Chief
of the Imperial
General Staff said t h a t the
B . E . F . h a d w i t h d r a w n to t h e line of the c a n a l r u n n i n g t h r o u g h
Brussels. T h e i r position w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y except on t h e r i g h t flank
w h e r e the G e r m a n a r m o u r e d vehicles h a d p e n e t r a t e d the line. A
s t r o n g c o u n t e r - a t t a c k w a s being m a d e . O u r troops w e r e d i s t r i b u t e d
i n g r e a t d e p t h . T h e d a n g e r spots w e r e the flanks. T h e B e l g i a n
A r m y on our left flank h a d not yet been a t t a c k e d .
Extent of
German
advance.
The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff s a i d t h a t t h e l a t e s t
i n f o r m a t i o n received t h a t m o r n i n g w a s t h a t the G e r m a n advance
h a d reached t h e a r e a L a o n - S o i s s o n s on the direct road to P a r i s .
*
Information for
Press and
general public,
The Chief of the Air Staff also r e p o r t e d t h a t he h a d j u s t h e a r d
from A i r M a r s h a l Evill t h a t t h e situation w a s very serious. T h e
G e r m a n s h a d m a d e a considerable advance d u r i n g the n i g h t a n d h a d
reached the line L a o n - S o i s s o n s . The necessary w i t h d r a w a l of t h e
a i r component w a s considerably h a m p e r e d by lack of t r a n s p o r t , a n d
A i r M a r s h a l Evill h a d asked for troop-carriers to be provided. T h e
s i t u a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d to the a i r component in t h e N o r t h w a s more
satisfactory. T h e position of t h e A d v a n c e d A i r S t r i k i n g Force,
however, was p r e c a r i o u s . A s a result of the r a p i d G e r m a n advance,
the large n u m b e r of d a m a g e d a i r c r a f t , a n d the p a r t i a l b r e a k d o w n
of communications, the A d v a n c e d A i r S t r i k i n g F o r c e m u s t be con­
sidered virttially o u t of action u n t i l i t could be re-formed.
The Minister
of Information
suggested t h a t more should be
done to i n f o r m the general public of the seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n ,
about which most people were in complete ignorance.
The Prime Minister
agreed. T h e F r e n c h communiques
commentaries were framed w i t h this in view. T h e public in
country should likewise be m a d e to realise t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
F r e n c h A r m i e s w e r e engaged i n a most c r i t i c a l battle which
a p p r o a c h i n g i t s climax.
and
this
and
was
The Secretary of State for War said t h a t t h e Vice-Chief of t h e
I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff w a s seeing the M i l i t a r y correspondents t h a t
afternoon.
H e t h o u g h t t h a t General Dill, w i t h o u t t a k i n g a
despondent view, should give a frank account of the position.
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs said t h a t he h a d
sent a ' ' M o s t Secret a n d P e r s o n a l ' ' t e l e g r a m to the D o m i n i o n
P r e m i e r s on the previous evening, i n f o r m i n g t h e m of the seriousness
of the s i t u a t i o n a n d the steps w h i c h were being taken to meet it.
The W a r C a b i n e t I n v i t e d t h e M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n t o take the necessary
s t e p s to b r i n g home to the general public the seriousness of
the present situation.
Aircraft
Supplies.
Replacement of
casualties.
3. The Prime Minister d r e w a t t e n t i o n to the u r g e n t need for
r e p l a c i n g t h e heavy losses w h i c h the R o y a l A i r Force h a d sustained,
p a r t i c u l a r l y in respect of F i g h t e r a i r c r a f t .
Could a n o t h e r
12 S q u a d r o n s of F i g h t e r s be r a i s e d w i t h i n the next month ?
The Chief of the Air Staff explained t h a t special steps w e r e
being taken to b r i n g e x i s t i n g F i g h t e r s q u a d r o n s up to strength, a n d
t o form n e w s q u a d r o n s . These steps included the salvage of all
serviceable m a t e r i a l a n d i n s t r u m e n t s from crashed a n d d a m a g e d
a i r c r a f t . D e s p i t e this, he considered t h a t it would be impossible
to form as m a n y as 12 new s q u a d r o n s w i t h i n a month. H e would
p r e f e r t h a t the W a r Cabinet should not, a t the moment, t a k e a
decision to w i t h d r a w the F i g h t e r S q u a d r o n s covering Scapa.
Purchase of
aircraft from
United States.
(Previous '
Reference:
W.M. (40) 124th
Conclusions,
Minute 12.)
The Secretary of State for Air agreed t h a t our resources would
n o t allow of 12 new F i g h t e r S q u a d r o n s b e i n g formed w i t h i n a
month.
E n q u i r i e s were being made as to the possibility of
accelerating and increasing t h e supply of a i r c r a f t from the U n i t e d
S t a t e s of A m e r i c a . H e drew a t t e n t i o n . t o the e n c o u r a g i n g references
w h i c h h a d been m a d e on t h i s point by P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt in h i s
speech on t h e previous evening. If available, such a i r c r a f t m i g h t
p e r h a p s be b r o u g h t over in a n a i r c r a f t - c a r r i e r .
The W a r Cabinet—
(1) I n v i t e d the M i n i s t e r for A i r P r o d u c t i o n to a t t e n d a
m e e t i n g of t h e W a r C a b i n e t o n t h e following d a y to
e x p l a i n w h a t steps could be t a k e n to effect a n i m m e d i a t e
acceleration of a i r c r a f t p r o d u c t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y in
fighters.
(2) A g r e e d t h a t , if the e n q u i r i e s now being m a d e r e s u l t e d in
f u r t h e r a i r c r a f t being o b t a i n e d from the U . S . A . , the
A d m i r a l t y should be consulted as to the possibility of
s h i p p i n g such a i r c r a f t from N o r t h A m e r i c a in an
aircraft-carrier.
The Naval
4. The Chief of Naval Staff s a i d t h a t t h e r e w e r e two ships
Situation.
m i s s i n g i n the S o u t h A t l a n t i c , a n d t h a t m i n e s h a d been l a i d off C a p e
(Previous
A g u l h a s . I t looked, therefore, as t h o u g h t h e r e w a s a r a i d e r in the
Reference:
South Atlantic.
W.M. (40) 124th
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of t h i s statement.
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
Norway.
Progress of
operations at
Narvik.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 124th
Conclusions,
Minute 5.)
Bearing of
situation on
Western Front.
5. The Prime Minister
suggested t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n should
be given to the b e a r i n g of the n e w s i t u a t i o n in F r a n c e on our
o p e r a t i o n s a t N a r v i k . On the one h a n d , w e k n e w t h a t t h e G e r m a n s
h a d a complete Geschwader
in N o r w a y , w h i c h w a s a welcome
diversion. On the o t h e r h a n d , we should consider w h e t h e r N a r v i k
w a s e a t i n g u p w h a t w e needed for o u r o w n defence, p a r t i c u l a r l y in
destroyers, a n t i - a i r c r a f t g u n s a n d F i g h t e r s .
The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff s a i d t h a t the Chiefs
of Staff h a d a l r e a d y reviewed our o p e r a t i o n s a t N a r v i k i n the l a r g e r
s e t t i n g m e n t i o n e d by t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r . A s a result, a telegram
h a d been sent to L o r d Cork, i n f o r m i n g h i m t h a t he m u s t deal w i t h
the s i t u a t i o n w i t h t h e forces a t h i s disposal a n d t h a t he could
expect no more, a n d a s k i n g for his views. M e a n w h i l e , t h e s i t u a t i o n
in N o r t h e r n N o r w a y a p p e a r e d to be s a t i s f a c t o r y . A n u m b e r of
G e r m a n p r i s o n e r s h a d been taken, w i t h c o m p a r a t i v e l y few casualties
a m o n g the B r i t i s h forces, a n d it seemed likely t h a t N a r v i k would
be c a p t u r e d a t any moment.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of t h e above s t a t e m e n t s .
Invasion of Great Britain. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 123rd
Conclusions,
Minute 15.)
Troops available
'in this country.
6. T h e W a r C a b i n e t gave c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the need for m a i n ­
t a i n i n g sufficient t r o o p s in t h i s c o u n t r y to deal w i t h t h e possibility
of air-borne invasion.
;'
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said t h a t there w a s no
s h o r t a g e in numbers, b u t t h a t q u a l i t y w a s l a c k i n g in c e r t a i n cases.
H e h a d spoken to the C o m m a n d e r s - i n - C h i e f on t h i s p o i n t a n d h a d
given t h e m definite i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t they m u s t imbue the troops
w i t h the s p i r i t t h a t they m u s t a t all costs fight. A m o n g t h e good
m a t e r i a l in t h i s c o u n t r y w a s the L o n d o n Division, t h e 15th B r i g a d e
a n d the C a n a d i a n s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e R e g u l a r C a v a l r y were being
formed into a r m o u r e d u n i t s . T h e possession of mobile a r t i l l e r y
w a s a r e a s s u r i n g factor.
The Secretary of State for War said t h a t t h e r e h a d been a good
Local Defence response to the a p p e a l for volunteers to deal w i t h p a r a c h u t i s t s . A
volunteers. hitch, however, h a d occurred over t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e i r compensation
in t h e event of i n j u r y , the T r e a s u r y t a k i n g the view t h a t they should
be r e g a r d e d a s civilians, w h e r e a s he (the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r )
considered e m p h a t i c a l l y t h a t they should be t r e a t e d as soldiers, since
they would be in u n i f o r m .
Italy.
Possible
intentions.
7. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said t h a t on the
latest evidence he w a s inclined to t h i n k t h a t S i g n o r Mussolini h a d
very n e a r l y r e a c h e d the p o i n t of b r i n g i n g I t a l y into the w a r .
( TPrP V I O L I S
Reference ^he Chief
of Naval Staff
a n d the Chief
of the
Imperial
W M (40) 124th General Staff gave a short account of the action which it w a s
Conclusions
proposed t h a t our forces should take in t h a t event.
Minute 7.)
Crete.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 124th
Conclusions,
Minute 11.)
The Lord President
of the Council said t h a t the Meeting over
w h i c h he h a d p r e s i d e d o n the previous evening h a d a g r e e d u p o n
i n s t r u c t i o n s w h i c h should be sent to the three C o m m a n d e r s - i n - C h i e f
i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , g i v i n g t h e m a n a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e p o s i t i o n
a n d a u t h o r i s i n g them to consult w i t h G e n e r a l W e y g a n d a n d t h e
senior F r e n c h N a v a l Officer i n the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , in r e g a r d to the
position of C r e t e , a n d to concert p r e p a r a t o r y measures w i t h them.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above s t a t e m e n t s .
ItaI
V­
Possible attack
on Yugoslavia.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 124th
Conclusions, Minute 7.)
8. T h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d before them a M e m o r a n d u m by t h e
Secretary of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs ( W . P . (40) 157), s u g g e s t i n g
ii
f a c t i o n i n t e r m e d i a t e between a d e c l a r a t i o n of w a r a n d a
completely n e g a t i v e a t t i t u d e , w h i c h we m i g h t take if I t a l y were t o
a t t a c k Y u g o s l a v i a a n d i t w e r e decided on m i l i t a r y g r o u n d s to t r y
to avoid b e i n g involved in w a r w i t h I t a l y . a
n e
0
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs r e f e r r e d to t e l e g r a m No. 218 D I P P , d a t e d the 16th M a y , 1940, from t h e B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r
a t B e l g r a d e to S i r A l e x a n d e r C a d o g a n , r e p o r t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h
he h a d received from a confidential Yugoslav source. A c c o r d i n g to
t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , Count C i a n o h a d assured the Yugoslav M i n i s t e r
in Rome t h a t I t a l y h a d no i n t e n t i o n of a t t a c k i n g Yugoslavia, a n d
t h a t w h e n she did e n t e r t h e w a r she would do so " by the front
d o o r . " T h e Yugoslav G e n e r a l Staff were also now of the opinion
t h a t I t a l i a n action would not be directed in the n e a r f u t u r e a g a i n s t
Y u g o s l a v i a (telegram No. 2 1 1 , d a t e d the 1 5 t h M a y , 1940, from the
B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r at B e l g r a d e ) . I t seemed unlikely therefore, t h a t
the contingency r e f e r r e d t o in his P a p e r would actually a r i s e ; b u t
he h a d t r i e d in h i s M e m o r a n d u m to suggest a course of action w h i c h
we could t a k e if it did. I t w a s n o t a very satisfactory proposal,
b u t he w a s not able to s u g g e s t a n y t h i n g t h a t would suit the circum­
stances better. I t m u s t also be recognised t h a t a s t a t e m e n t on these
lines w o u l d have a p r o f o u n d l y depressing effect on the B a l k a n s .
T h e W a r Cabinet : I n v i t e d the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs to
consult w i t h t h e F r e n c h a n d T u r k i s h Governments, w i t h
a view to s e c u r i n g t h e i r agreement to t h e proposal t h a t , in
t h e event of a n I t a l i a n a t t a c k on Yugoslavia, the B r i t i s h
a n d F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t s should issue a s t a t e m e n t o n the
lines proposed in W . P . (40) 157.
9. The Prime Minister r e a d to his colleagues a communication
United States of
which he h a d received from P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt in reply to his
America.
Personal
personal message.
niessage to the
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the S t a t e m e n t by the P r i m e
Prime Minister
M
inister.
from President
Roosevelt.
(Previous
Richmond
Terrace, S.W. 1,
Reference:
May 17, 1940.
W.M. (40) 123rd
Conclusions,
Minute 9.)