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(THIS D0GUZ1ENT IS T H E P R O P E R T Y OF H I S BRITAIN! 1 0 H A - J E S T Y ^ GOVERNMENT )
COPY NO
0 A B I IT E T.
.p. 8 3 2 (38) .
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE,
Memorandum b y the Secretary of State fo r F o r e i g n
Affairs.
I circulate for the information of m y
colleagues
(1) a summary initialled b y the H o m e Secretary, the Secretary
of State for A i r , and m y s e l f , and d r a w n up b y the
first-named,
giving an account of the "private conversations" which h a v e b e e n con­
ducted b e t w e e n F r e n c h , A m e r i c a n and B r i t i s h representatives at G e n e v a
this w e e k .
It will b e seen that the method followed has b e e n to take
a selected topic and to find out what
ground.
is the largest area of c o m m o n
T h i s m e t h o d has h a d considerable s u c c e s s , and I d i r e c t
p a r t i c u l a r attention to the provisional agreement in respect of air
bombing.
The c o n v e r s a t i o n s are being continued on other s u b j e c t s , and
b y the end of the w e e k we shall a t . a n y rate know something of the
measure of common agreement
over the w h o l e field G O far as those
three delegations are concerned.
Of c o u r s e , everything
upon the whole b e i n g found satisfactory.
that P r e s i d e n t H o o v e r a
r
i s provisional
The Cabinet w i l l
understand
sudden m a n i f e s t o , couched in very m u c h
b r o a d e r t e r m s , was distinctly disturbing to these private a n d
detailed discussions.
'
But it is intended they should.go on.
(2) The statement of President Hoover's p r o p o s a l s r e a d to
the General C o m m i s s i o n o f the Conference b y M r . Gib SOB. on
W e d n e s d a y afternoon.
The Cabinet may be interested to k n o w how
much notice the P r i m e M i n i s t e r a n d I h a d of this proceeding.
A
vague hint was given on Sunday night that President H o o v e r h a d some
large proposals in his mind and an outline
verbally under terms
of them was
sketched
of p r o f o u n d secrecy and, as the Prime M i n i s t e r
4
C)
1 0
hi
and I understood, w i t h the intention of getting our views u p o n
them.
A similar and equally secret communication w a s made h y
the American delegation to the F r e n c h at a wayside
Lausanne and G e n e v a late at night on M o n d a y ;
I understand
Monsieur P a u l - B o n c o u r that it w a s equally v a g u e .
morning at l l
s
M r . Gibson hurried
w a s out, suggesting
inn between
On Tuesday
to inform m e that the
that the F r e n c h had "leaked".
President H o o v e r had determined
from
secret
Consequently
to make h i s announcement
immediately, and it w a s at that moment coming across in cypher
from Washington.
I pointed out
that if it w a s desired to have
due consideration from us w i t h a vie?/ to our support, this gave
no time.
M r . G i b s o n came over to Lausanne
at my request and
the Prime M i n i s t e r , b u t the A m e r i c a n s maintained
impossible.
that delay was
Consequently, P r e s i d e n t Hoover made h i s
in Washington on Wednesday at 1 0 . 3 0 , and
w a s summoned for 4.30 p.m.
saw
announcement
the G e n e r a l Commission
(the corresponding
Swiss time) in
order that a communication m i g h t be made simultaneously at G e n e v a .
(3)
I thought it best
to follow M r . G i b s o n in the discussion
at once so as to make plain that the p r o p o s a l s
\7ere
no part of an
A n g l o - A m e r i c a n arrangement, but had b e e n sprung on u s all alike,
while at the same time I spoke w a r m l y of their scope and b o l d n e s s ,
mailing certain reservations
misrepresentation h e r e a f t e r .
in order that there should be no
I append
the substance of what I
said, on the chance that my colleagues may care to look through it.
It seems to me that in considering this matter we have to
keep three large matters in m i n d .
(i)
the necessity of b r i n g i n g to the front our own B r i t i s h
Plan on bold and practical l i n e s ;
America in zeal for D i s a r m a m e n t .
Britain m u s t not lag behind
W e have in fact now
assembled
O
a "better set of p r o p o s a l s , and a far more practical
set.
But
o w i n g to the delay in getting clear d e c i s i o n s , the effect has
b e e n largely lost by producing items p i e c e - m e a l .
(ii)
W e must
firmly maintain our stand for w h a t
is
n e c e s s a r y for the special purposes o f the British C o m m o n w e a l t h .
I w a s careful to say in my speech that it seemed to me
the H o o v e r Plan did n o t allow sufficiently for the
responsibilities of different n a v a l P o w e r s .
a well-judged,
that
varied
(At the
same time
all-round reduction would be an immense
relief
to e v e r y b o d y ) .
(iii)
The relation between G e n e v a and Lausanne is immensely
important.
No-one would
dream of sacrificing the
of B r i t i s h and I m p e r i a l defence to any other
but the fact
Is that if we can shew ourselves
and sympathetic
necessities
consideration
forthcoming
to the A m e r i c a n p r o p o s a l s , we shall create
m u c h b e t t e r atmosphere for the discussions of A m e r i c a n debt
than if we do n o t .
(Intd.) J.S.
greign O f f i c e ,
I
23rd J u n e , 1 9 3 2 .
a
A N N E X I.
SUMMARY OF C O W E R SATTQNS CONDUCTED B E T W E E N FRENCH,
AMERICA!? A N D BRITISH R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S A T GENEVA.
It may be advisable to summarise the results of the first
meetings w i t h the F r e n c h and A m e r i c a n D e l e g a t e s at G e n e v a .
We have sat so far m o r n i n g and afternoon on M o n d a y and
T u e s d a y and have covered about half of our agenda.
ings have b e e n most friendly;
The meet­
there have b e e n no serious d i s ­
agreements and definite conclusions have b e e n reached on several
points.
T h e F r e n c h have made it clear t h a t , while adhering to
their general p o s i t i o n as to the extent of disarmament
depend­
ing upon adequate measures to ensure further security, they are
w i l l i n g to leave that question in abeyance for the p u r p o s e of
these conversations and to discuss what measures can b e
agreed
on the b a s i s that provisions for security remain as they now a r e .
We t o o k first the question of the prohibition of c h e m i c a l
and b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l warfare as that was the one matter on which.,.,
a Commission of E x p e r t s had agreed.
W e endorsed the r e c o m m e n ­
dations of that c o m m i t t e e , but emphasis was
upon the g e n e r a l measures
laid b y the F r e n c h
of control to b e embodied in t h e T r e a t y
b e i n g adequate to ensure the observance of prohibition of this
form of w a r f a r e .
T h e y w e r e also anxious that there should b e
special penalties for i n f r a c t i o n , but were unable at this
stage
to suggest what they should b e .
W e next
turned to the question of air a r m a m e n t s , as the
F r e n c h D e l e g a t e s w e r e anxious to have this matter discussed b e ­
cause one of them - M. de J o u v e n e l - was to speak on the subject
on Wednesday at the meeting of the A i r Commission of the D i s a r m a ­
ment Conference.
T h e B r i t i s h D e l e g a t i o n stated that if it were possible to
propose an effective scheme for the entire abolition of military
and naval aviation and if there were any likelihood of its general
acceptance b y the C o n f e r e n c e , wo should not have opposed such a
scheme in p r i n c i p l e , h u t it appeared that these two
could not h e fulfilled.
conditions
T h e dangers to which the civil p o p u l a ­
tion might h e exposed in time of w a r , even if the prohibition
of the use of gas was
effective, w e r e emphasised b y all p a r t i e s
to the discussion and there was very complete agreement
definite steps should b e taken for their
that
protection.
T h e F r e n c h p r o p o s a l , w h i c h had b e e n m a d e in a memorandum
to the D i s a r m a m e n t Conference dated A p r i l 14th, was the m a i n sub­
ject for discussion, and it was unanimously accepted as the best
p r o p o s i t i o n that had b e e n m a d e and as likely to prove
for this p u r p o s e .
adequate
T h i s p r o p o s a l , which the B r i t i s h D e l e g a t e s
hope m a y b e acceptable to the C a b i n e t , w i t h the additions m a d e to
it as the result of cur d i s c u s s i o n s , is the following:A e r i a l b o m b i n g shall b e p r o h i b i t e d
except:
1. I n the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of a c t u a l m i l i t a r y operations,
that is to say w i t h i n a certain distance to b e fixed,
of a line w h e r e two military forces are in contact
in time of war.
T h e actual distance is reserved for
joint expert examination w i t h the indication that
the three delegations desire that it should b e fixed
"at the lowest p o s s i b l e figure consistent w i t h t e c h n i ­
cal r e a l i t i e s " .
2. I n the case of air bases and long-range gun emplacements.
3. In a zone to b e fixed a l o n g the sea coast w h e r e b o m b i n g
would b e p e r m i t t e d w i t h i n a distance which should
and in
b e a r a relation to the range of naval guns;
respect of o b j e c t i v e s , the n a v a l bombardment of w h i c h
was permitted under the Hague Convention.,
I n other
w o r d s , the action of aeroplanes in the coastal area
w i l l b e subject to precisely the same limitations as
now extend to n a v a l action,,
It w a s made clear that the restriction of bombarding was not
to apply to measures taken for the p r e v e n t i o n or stopping of
raids or other disturbances in I m p e r i a l or Colonial
-J
p o s s e s s i o n s fyr Mandated. T e r r i t o r i e s .
00
B o t h the French and
American Belegatiens fully recognised the necessity for this
exception w h i c h the B r i t i s h Delegation had u r g e d .
After
considering possible formulae for effecting this object,
M. Faul-Boncour suggested that it m i g h t b e m o s t simply
done
if the restrictions on b o m b i n g as specified w e r e to apply, like
the rest of the t r e a t y , as b e t w e e n the High Contracting
By this very
Parties
simple procedure no restrictions would b e p l a c e d
u p o n any measures w h i c h a P c w e r w i t h colonial possessions
might find it necessary to u s e in order to assert
authority w i t h i n those p o s s e s s i o n s .
its
(it is possible that
difficulty might arise on the North-Western Frontier of India
if A f g h a n i s t a n should b e c o m e a party to the Convention and if
aggressive action w e r e taken b y some of the tribes living
b e y o n d car
border".
consideration).
eminently
This aspect m a y require
special
T h i s solution of the question appears to u s
satisfactory if it can secure the assent of the
C o n f e r e n c e as a w h o l e ;
it w i l l b e an immense relief to the
civil p o p u l a t i o n throughout E u r o p e .
It avoids all difficulties
w i t h regard t o the d e f i n i t i o n of distant military o b j e c t i v e s ;
such problems as w h e t h e r the presence of an arsenal or a
b a r r a c k s or a munition factory
in a p a r t i c u l a r town w o u l d
render legitimate the dropping of b o m b s on that town will
no
longer a r i s e .
W i t h regard to restrictions on the size of b o m b i n g
a e r o p l a n e s , here again we have reached a provisional
agreement.
It is proposed that the maximum u n l a d e n weight should be 3
tons
(not 5 tons as previously
suggested).
The British D e l e g a ­
tion pointed out/the n e c e s s i t y , h o w e v e r , of not preventing
the
u s e of large planes for carrying troops or stores in oversea
territories and this was at once recognised b y the other two
delegations.
It w a s agreed, h o w e v e r , that the number of such
p l a n e s should be limited and
that
the
tentative suggestion w a s made
the n u m b e r should b e fixed in relation to the size
the g a r r i s o n s where
of
the troops were stationed.
The A m e r i c a n s aslced that flying-boats should also be the
subject of special exemption.
Agreement w a s reached on t h e
lorinciple that there should be exceptions in these and p o s s i b l y
some other c a s e s , and the formulation o f the conditions of s u c h
e x c e p t i o n s w a s referred to a joint Committee of the experts of
each delegation.
(It was also decided that w i t h regard to
this and other matters the m e e t i n g s of e x p e r t s should b e
attended b y p o l i t i c a l m e m b e r s of the delegations,)
T h e question of fixing a m a x i m u m u n i t volume
d i r i g i b l e s w a s also referred for expert
for
consideration.
There was a general desire that the n u m b e r s of m i l i t a r y
and n a v a l aeroplanes possessed b y e a c h country should be
l i m i t e d , b u t no progress w a s m a d e as to finding a principle
w h i c h the numbers should b e based.
on
The F r e n c h fully agreed
that it would not b e right to relate the numbers of
aeroplanes
to the s i z e of armies as this would put the countries without
c o n s c r i p t armies at a v e r y u n f a i r disadvantage.
It was
thought p o s s i b l e , h o w e v e r , that after further study some b a s i s
o f agreement might be reached as b e t w e e n the three delegations
s
t h o u g h w e are o u r s e l v e s inclined to doubt w h e t h e r any rule is
l i k e l y to be found w h i c h would b e acceptable
other P o w e r s .
to Italy and
T h e experts are also to consider whether therei
should b e a limit of total tonnage as well as a limit of
numbers.
W e next
turned to what has b e e n called the French P l a n for
the Inter-nationalisation of C i v i l A v i a t i o n , h u t w h i c h a s .
appeared from the explanations that were g i v e n is quite
w r o n g l y designated hy that name.
now
In the first p l a c e , the
F r e n c h do no "J/propose that whatever measures are
adopted
should apply to any "but the largest a e r o p l a n e s , that is those
over '5 t o n s , possession of which is to h e prohibited to
governments - except for a limited number of troop-carriers.
The question of any form of control of m a n u f a c t u r e , or of
licensing
the p o s s e s s i o n , of the
ordinary small p l a n e owned b y
p r i v a t e individuals does not therefore arise.
the French are not no?/ putting forward
Secondly,
their plan for placing
large planes at the disposal of the League of N a t i o n s .
The
a c t u a l project now b e f o r e us is f o r a measure of international
control o v e r the big air l i n e r s , the object being to prevent
the formation, w i t h the help of s u b s i d i e s , of powerful fleets of
large p l a n e s , w h i c h a country which w a s prepared to b r e a k the
lav/- might use most d e s t r u c t i v e l y for bombing.
T h e French
laid great emphasis u p o n the n e c e s s i t y for t h i s , and
indeed
declared definitely that they would not agree to the
abolition
of the large bombing machine unless effective m e a n s w e r e taken to
prevent planes o f similar size, ostensibly provided f o r
civilian p u r p o s e s , b e i n g available as substitutes.
present p l a n , which h a s b e e n worked
Their
out in great d e t a i l , is
in effect the creation of an international organisation
on
lines more or less resembling the W a g o n - L i t C o m p a n y , which is to
run t h e long-distance
trains are run.
air services m u c h as the sleeping-car
S p e c i a l provision
that countries which desire
should be made to ensure
to see established
long-distance
lines to their colonial or other possessions should be
to secure that this w o u l d be effected
company.
It is claimed
i
through the
able
international
that, apart from t h e first
consideration
that has h e e n m e n t i o n e d , this p l a n w o u l d he
desirable in itself as it v/ould prevent the unnecessary
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of competing
diminish
a i r lines and v/ould greatly
the amount of subsidies paid by the various
governments.
We feel some doubt whether such a scheme v/ould
w o r k efficiently and whether it is n o t more elaborate than the
conditions r e q u i r e ;
it might be possible to have a more
restricted f o r m of control u n d e r the supervision of the L e a g u e
of N a t i o n s w h i c h would effect the main purpose in view.
But
it is o b v i o u s l y important not to impose a direct negative u p o n
the French p r o p o s a l
and we readily agreed to the suggestion of
their delegation that the A i r Committee of the Conference
should appoint a smaller sub-committee to go into this
subject
more closely.
At our f o u r t h m e e t i n g we discussed questions of qualitative
land d i s a r m a m e n t , and first the proposal w i t h regard to h e a v y
artillery.
H e r e w e were hoping to secure an agreement
the p r o h i b i t i o n of m o b i l e land guns of a calibre above
6'
1
(155mm).
about
M. P a u l - B o n c o u r raised a p o i n t , h o w e v e r , w h i c h
is u n d o u b t e d l y of serious importance.
it was
for
He pointed out that
impossible to require coastal defences to be
v/ith g u n s of a smaller calibre than those of the
which might attack them.
provided
ships
T h e forts of M a r s e i l l e s could n o t
b e limited to 6" guns to meet an attack from battleships
armed v/ith 1 2 " guns.
But in the view of the F r e n c h D e l e g a t i o n
and their m i l i t a r y advisers it was not in f a c t possible to
prevent guns authorised f o r coastal defence from b e i n g u s e d
in land w a r f a r e .
If one country attacked another, having
broken the p a c t against g o i n g to w a r , it v/ould not scruple to
b r e a k a convention w h i c h prohibited it from u s i n g its coastal
defence guns in the c a m p a i g n , w h i l e the defending country could
not be
expected to refrain from doing so in resisting the
aggression.
A s a m a t t e r of fact, he said, many of these
coastal defence guns were not p h y s i c a l l y fixed; they were
already mounted
on rails in order that they"might be moved
fram one loop-hole
of a fort to another and to transfer
to the ordinary railways was a simple m a t t e r .
them
W i t h regard
to
o t h e r s , it was not the case that it would take very long ts
manufacture the mountings necessary to convert them from fixed
to mobile artillery.
Furthermore,
it is necessary that
convention should be easily enforceable and that
the
infractions
should be verifiable without too m u c h difficulty, but if guns
of heavy calibre wore still to be permissible
for
coastal
defences and for ships it would be impossible to say that any
such guns that were being manufactured w e r e really intended
for
land warfare.
In the course
of the discussion the F r e n c h
Delegation
agreed:­
1.
That w h a t e v e r figure was
agreed internationally,
either
by the Washington Convention or by the Convention now
u n d e r n e g o t i a t i o n , for the maximum calibre
of naval­
g u n s , they would agree also as the m a x i m u m for land
artillery.
£.
That a figure should be fixed w i t h expert
advice
w h i c h should be regarded as the maximum size of the
n o r m a l artillery required by a r m i e s .
3.
That h e a v y land artillery above that calibre
be limited
piece
should
in n u m b e r , that the allocation of each
should be registered w i t h the Commission
of
C o n t r o l and that the number of such guns at present
existing should not be e x c e e d e d , although there might
be replacements.
Turning to t a n k s , it was agreed that the complete
abolition
of tanks w a s wrcng in principle and could not be adopted,,
( vii)
W i t h regard to the maximum w e i g h t , the F r e n c h were
willing to fix a limit.
quite
They h a d a considerable n u m b e r of tanks
of 70 t o n s , and their experts hitherto h a d suggested that as the
appropriate maximum,
M, P a u l - B o n c o u r , h o w e v e r
9
understood
that
the British Gcverment favoured a figure o f about 25 tons and he
was w i l l i n g to approximate
to that.
The F r e n c h h a d , h o w e v e r ,
a number of tanks of a 25 ton p a t t e r n , the v/eight of which h a d
b e e n considerably
increased b y the attachment of much h e a v i e r
c a t e r p i l l a r s , b r i n g i n g them up to about 3 2 t o n s , and he w o u l d
suggest that as the l i m i t ,
v e r y considerably
W e asked -whether that might not b e
r e d u c e d , b u t were m e t b y
the argument that it
w a s a question of w h a t weight w a s adequate to give
sufficient
armour p r o t e c t i o n against ordinary artillery u s e d b y armies,
M. Paul -KB one our suggested
that it w a s a m a t t e r for joint
determination to decide hov/ that p r i n c i p l e
expert
should b e applied and
w h a t w e i g h t of tank should be agreed to a s the outcome.
We
suggested that existing tanks over the a g r e e d limit should b e
scrapped. - a p r o p o s a l w h i c h the F r e n c h d i d n o t reject, b u t
asked for an opportunity
to give it further
they
consideration.
The American D e l e g a t i o n indicated that their
Government
would h a v e b e e n glad to see the total abolition of tanks, b u t if
that were impossible
they would co-operate in finding a maximum
limit of size.
We have h a d informal
conservations w i t h Signor Grandi and
with H e r r N a d o l n y , the German D e l e g a t e , in order to keep them
informed of the course of e v e n t s ,
(Intd.)
' t
H.S.
J.S.
L.
June 21st, 1932,
GENEVA.
3
1
9.
Q
ANNEX
Statement of tne instructions issued
"by President Hoover to the A m e r i c a n
Delegation to the Conference for the
L i m i t a t i o n and S e d u c t i o n of A r m a m e n t s ,
read b y Ambassador G i b s o n b e f o r e the
General C o m m i s s i o n , June 2 2 , 1 9 3 2 ,
4,30 p.m.
The delegations at the W o r l d Conference on Disarmament at
Geneva are now engaged in discussions as to methods b y w h i c h more
comprehensive efforts can be made toward disarmament.
The following is the substance of instructions w h i c h have
b e e n g i v e n by the President to the A m e r i c a n Delegation f o r guidance
in the discussions which are now occupying them.
They are
p u b l i s h e d in order that the A m e r i c a n people may b e f u l l y a n d
a c cur a t e ly i nf o rme d.
"The time has come when we should cut t h r o u g h the b r u s h a n d
adopt some b r o a d and definite m e t h o d of reducing the overwhelming
b u r d e n of armament which now lies u p o n the toilers of the world.
This w o u l d be the most important w o r l d step that could be taken to
expedite economic recovery.
W e must make headway against the
m u t u a l fear and friction a r i s i n g out of war armament w h i c h kill
h u m a n confidence throughout the world.
We can still r e m a i n p r a c ­
tical in maintaining an adequate self-defence among all n a t i o n s .
We can add to the assurances ol peace and yet save the people of the
w o r l d f r o m ten to fifteen billions of w a s t e d dollars d u r i n g the
n e x t t e n years.
I propose that the following p r i n c i p l e s should b e our guide.
First:
The Kellogg-Briand Pact to w h i c h we are all signatories
can only m e a n that the nations of the world have agreed that they
w i l l u s e their arms solely for defence.
I
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S e c o n d ; This r e d u c t i o n should be carried out n o t only by b r o a d
g e n e r a l cuts in armaments but b y increasing the comparative p o w e r
of defence through decreases in the p o w e r o f the attack.
Third:
The a r m a m e n t s of the w o r l d have grown u p in m u t u a l
r e l a t i o n to each other, and speaking generally such relativity
should b e preserved in m a k i n g reductions.
F o u r t h ; The reductions must be real and p o s i t i v e .
effect economic relief,
They must
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Fifth;
There are three problems to deal with - land f o r c e s ,
air f o r c e s and naval forces.
They are all inter-connected.
No
p a r t of the proposals w h i c h I make can be dis-associated one from
the other.
B a s e d on these p r i n c i p l e s I propose that the arms of the world
should be reduced by nearly one-third.
L a n d forces.
In order to reduce the offensive character of a l l
land f o r c e s as distinguished from their defensive character I
p r o p o s e the adoption of the p r e s e n t a t i o n already made at the Geneva
Conference for the a b o l i t i o n of a l l t a n k s , all chemical warfare and
all large mobile guns.
This would not prevent the establishment or
increase of fixed fortifications of any character for the defence of
frontiers a n d seacoasts.
It would give a n increased relative
strength to such defence as compared with attack.
I p r o p o s e , f u r t h e r m o r e , that there should be a reduction
of one-third in s t r e n g t h of all land armies over a n d above the
s o - c a l l e d police component.
T h e land a r m a m e n t s of m a n y n a t i o n s are considered to h a v e
two functions.
One is the m a i n t e n a n c e of internal order in
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the regular peace forces of the country.
The
strength r e q u i r e d for this purpose h a s b e e n called the "police
component".
The other f u n c t i o n is defence against f o r e i g n
attack.
The a d d i t i o n a l s t r e n g t h required for this purpose
W h i l e it is not
has b e e n called the "defence component' .
s u g g e s t e d that these different components should be separated it
is necessary to consider this contention as to functions in p r o ­
p o s i n g a p r a c t i c a l p l a n of r e d u c t i o n in land f o r c e s .
U n d e r the
T r e a t y of Versailles a n d the other peace treaties the armies of
G e r m a n y , A u s t r i a , Hungary a n d B u l g a r i a were reduced to a size
deemed appropriate for the m a i n t e n a n c e of internal o r d e r , G e r m a n y
b e i n g a s s i g n e d one hundred t h o u s a n d troops for a p o p u l a t i o n o f
a p p r o x i m a t e l y sixty five m i l l i o n p e o p l e .
I p r o p o s e that we
s h o u l d accept for a l l nations a b a s i c police component of soldiers
p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the average w h i c h was thus a l l o w e d Germany a n d
these other states.
This formula w i t h necessary corrections for
P o w e r s having c o l o n i a l p o s s e s s i o n s should b e sufficient to provide
f o r the m a i n t e n a n c e of internal o r d e r b y the n a t i o n s of the world.
H a v i n g a n a l y s e d these two components in this f a s h i o n , I propose
as stated above that there should b e a reduction of one third in
the strength of a l l land armies over and above the police
component.
1
This
A i r Forces.
A l l b o m b i n g p l a n e s to b e abolished.
w i l l do away w i t h the"^mTTTtrarpy p o s s e s s T b n of types of p l a n e s
capable of a t t a c k s u p o n civil p o p u l a t i o n s a n d should be coupled
w i t h the^T6XaT^profal^xtl'on'''or^all b o m b a r d m e n t froni the air.
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N a v a l forces.
I propose that the treaty number a n d tonnage
of b a t t l e s h i p s shall b e reduced b y one third; that the treaty
tonnage "or" aircraft c a r r i e r s , cruisers and destroyers shall b e
r e d u c e d b y one"""fourth; that the treaty tonnage""iof submarines shall
b e reduced b y one t h i r d and that no n a t i o n shall r e t a i n a submarine
t o n n a g e greater t h a n 3 5 , 0 0 0 tons.
The relative strength of n a v a l arms in b a t t l e s h i p s and a i r ­
craft carriers as b e t w e e n the five leading naval p o w e r s was f i x e d
by the Treaty of W a s h i n g t o n .
The relative strength in c r u i s e r s , destroyers and submarines
w a s f i x e d as b e t w e e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Great B r i t a i n , a n d J a p a n
b y the Treaty of L o n d o n .
F o r the purpose of this p r o p o s a l it is
s u g g e s t e d that the F r e n c h and I t a l i a n strength in crxiisers a n d
destroyers b e c a l c u l a t e d as though they h a d joined in. the Treaty
of L o n d o n o n a basis a p o r o x i m a t i n g the so called a c c o r d of March .1,
1931.
5
There are v a r i o u s technical considerations connected w i t h
these naval reductions w h i c h w i l l be p r e s e n t e d by the Delegation
at Geneva.
General.
The effect of this p l a n would be to effect a n
enormous saving in cost of n e w construction a n d replacements of
n a v a l vessels.
It w o u l d also save large amounts in the operating
expense in a l l n a t i o n s of land, sea and a i r forces.
It w o u l d
greatly reduce offensive strength compared to defensive strength
in a l l nations.
These proposals are simple and direct.
They call u p o n
a l l nations to contribute something.
The contribution here
p r o p o s e d will be relative and m u t u a l .
I know of n o t h i n g that
w o u l d give more hope for humanity today than the acceptance
cf such a p r o g r a m v.ith such m i n o r changes as m i g h t be"
necessary.
It is folly for the world to go on b r e a k i n g its
b a c k over military expenditures and the U n i t e d States is
w i l l i n g to take its share cf responsibility b y m a k i n g definite
p r o p o s a l s that w i l l relieve the w o r l d , "