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Catalogue Reference:cab/66/25/45
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O ^ ^ V M Z K ^
THIS
DOCLi,^
"2-3
Wet.
THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed
MOST S E C R E T .
for the War Cabinet.
June
1942.
-
Copy No.
W.P- (42) 265.
June 22, 1942.
TO B E K E P T
UNDER
LOCK
AND
KEY.
I t is requested t h a t special care may be t a k e n to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR
THE
Joint
Memorandum
CABINET.
SHIPPING
SITUATION.
by the First Lord of the Admiralty
Minister of War
Transport.
and
the
T H E S h i p p i n g Committee's review of the S h i p p i n g S i t u a t i o n (S.C. (42) 20)
and the s u m m a r y of their conclusions gives a general p i c t u r e of the s i t u a t i o n as
regards non-tanker tonnage a n d import.
Summary of Merchant Ship
Building.
2. T h i s r e p o r t w a s concerned only w i t h non-tanker tonnage and we a p p e n d
a summary of the m e r c h a n t ship b u i l d i n g situation, as f a r as it is known a t
present, which includes t a n k e r tonnage :—
(a) Estimated
completions
of ocean-going
vessels in
1942—
B r i t i s h (including Dominions)
U n i t e d S t a t e s (on B r i t i s h account)
[Million
Non-tankers.
1-40
- 40
T o t a l s (British)
1-80
-30
3-55
- 80
U n i t e d S t a t e s (ex B r i t i s h account) ...
...
gross
5-35
Grand total
tons)
Tankers.
- 30
110
6-45
(b) Estimated
completions of ocean-going tonnage in 1943 are largely based
on tentative estimates, but may be assessed approximately as follows :—
B r i t i s h (including Dominions)
United States
...
...
(Million gross
Non-tankers.
...
1-60
8-50
10-10
Grand total
tons.)
Tankers.
-25
1-65
1-90
12-0
3. Since the foregoing estimates were p r e p a r e d information nas been
received from W a s h i n g t o n that, realising the vital importance of anti-submarine
escort vessels, the U n i t e d States now propose to t u r n over one m e r c h a n t shipyard
entirely to b u i l d i n g these craft. I t is impossible to estimate w h a t will be the
effect of this on the U n i t e d S t a t e s b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m m e because the U n i t e d States
y a r d s vary considerably in size, but an e n q u i r y has been addressed to Washington.
W e assume t h a t this proposal is not expected t o result in any reduction in output
of merchant ships in 1942. The resulting reduction in the 1943 o u t p u t may be
substantial, but in our opinion the reduction would probably be more t h a n made
good by a saving in sinkings.
Losses of Merchant Ship
Tonnage.
4. The figures given in p a r a g r a p h 3 (b) of the S h i p p i n g Committee's report
for t h e ocean-going non-tanker tonnage o p e r a t i n g in B r i t i s h interests a n d those in
p a r a g r a p h s 22-24 for the U n i t e d States are derived from the estimate agreed
between the A d m i r a l t y a n d the M i n i s t r y of W a r T r a n s p o r t in A p r i l last. This
p u t s the total losses (including tankers) from all causes for the calendar year
1942 in the neighbourhood of 6-5 million gross tons.
5. Tables are attached in A p p e n d i x I showing the actual losses incurred
by enemy action by areas, cause, &c. The U-boat c a m p a i g n off the east coast of
America began on the 12th J a n u a r y , 1942, a n d d u r i n g the five months, J a n u a r y
to May, sinkings in the western half of the N o r t h A t l a n t i c , including the
approaches to Newfoundland and C a n a d i a n w a t e r s (Table B), have been 63 per
cent, of t h e total losses. Losses by mine d u r i n g this period a m o u n t only to
2 - 5 per cent, of the total, and those by a i r c r a f t to about 10 per cent., of which the
majority were incurred in the F a r East. Surface a t t a c k h a s accounted for about
2 - 5 per cent., more t h a n half of which resulted from the J a p a n e s e incursion into
the Bay of Bengal in A p r i l . T h e r e h a s recently been a recrudescence of raider
activity both in the South A t l a n t i c and Southern I n d i a n Ocean.
T a n k e r losses have been heavy, a m o u n t i n g to 1,142,000 g.r.t., i.e., r a t h e r more
t h a n one-third of the total losses, though the steps taken to restrict a n d control
sailings and the introduction of convoy in A m e r i c a n coastal w a t e r s have consider­
ably reduced the r a t e of loss in J u n e .
6. It will be seen that the average monthly loss of tanker and non-tanker
tonnage from enemy action for the first five months of the year has amounted to
approximately 600,000 g.r.t., equivalent to an annual rate of 7£ million g.r.t.
It is evident that a considerable reduction in this rate of loss must be achieved
if the estimate of 6-5 million tons from all causes for the year is not to be exceeded.
The i n s t i t u t i o n of the convoy system on the A m e r i c a n seaboard in the middle
of M a y a n d between T r i n i d a d a n d A r u b a a few days later h a s much reduced the
losses on those routes and it is reasonable to expect t h a t t h e trans-Caribbean
convoy, which is due to s t a r t on the 1st J u l y , will have similar results.
On the other hand, experience shows t h a t this is likely to increase the weight
of attack in other areas. A reversion to the heavy scale of a t t a c k on our Atlantic
convoys m i g h t well result in a h i g h r a t e of loss, since our escort g r o u p s have had
to be weakened to meet our various other commitments.
W h i l e the effectiveness of the American a n t i - s u b m a r i n e measures is
increasing, the situation is a cause of g r a v e anxiety a n d is being watched with
great care.
North A tlantic, United States Coast, and Gulf and Caribbean.—Extension
of
Convoy
System.
7. W h e n U-boat a t t a c k s began off the E a s t coast of t h e U n i t e d States, the
A m e r i c a n s were completely u n p r e p a r e d to -deal w i t h this form of attack. A t
t h a t time our homeward-bound convoys were receiving escort t h r o u g h o u t their
voyage, but our outward-bound convoys were dispersing about 500 miles short
of H a l i f a x . The new attacks created an u r g e n t need for all-through escort and
for anti-submarine forces on the U n i t e d States seaboard, a n d U n i t e d States
agreement to the necessary reorganisation w a s achieved early in F e b r u a r y . The
desirability of a convoy system on the U n i t e d States coast w a s also represented
to the U n i t e d States authorities, but on the 10th F e b r u a r y t h e A d m i r a l t y Delega­
tion in W a s h i n g t o n reported t h a t anti-submarine forces on the A m e r i c a n coast
were quite i n a d e q u a t e for this purpose. It was therefore decided to lend 24 large
anti-submarine trawlers to the United States. Arrangements had previously
been made to hand over 10 corvettes, under construction or repair, to the United
States.
8. Owing t o U-boat attacks in the Caribbean in the middle of F e b r u a r y
it then became necessary, since the U n i t e d States were unable to afford a d e q u a t e
protection, to cut down t a n k e r sailings. T h e r o u t e i n g of the r e m a i n d e r w a s m a d e
the subject of continuous study by the A d m i r a l t y a n d M i n i s t r y of W a r T r a n s p o r t .
9. W e continued to press for the i n s t i t u t i o n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s coastal
convoy, a n d offered to open out the cycle of the A t l a n t i c convoy so as to make two
escort groups, as well as other reinforcements possible, to assist them. T h i s
entailed accepting a loss of i m p o r t s estimated a t 30,000 tons a month, a n d was
implemented as soon as the U n i t e d States plans were ready. The coastal convoys
started on the 14th May.
10. E a r l y in M a y the advent of fine weather made it possible to w i t h d r a w
one more g r o u p from the t r a n s - A t l a n t i c convoy escorts in order to s t a r t a t a n k e r
convoy between the D u t c h W e s t I n d i e s a n d T r i n i d a d .
11. On the 21st M a y Commander-in-Chief, U n i t e d S t a t e s Fleet, requested
the loan of a f u r t h e r 15-20 corvettes to deal w i t h the serious s i t u a t i o n which
had arisen in t h e Gulf of Mexico a n d the Caribbean. T h e proposals we m a d e
in reply were not acceptable to the U n i t e d States, a n d C a n a d i a n s a n d the U n i t e d
States a u t h o r i t i e s finally decided to s t a r t a convoy between H a l i f a x a n d A r u b a
as soon as possible, a n d a further convoy between Key W e s t a n d T r i n i d a d on the
1st J u l y .
12. T h i s is how the m a t t e r s t a n d s a t present, b u t certain modifications will
be made later. A l t h o u g h convoy a r r a n g e m e n t s and protective measures in the
Western A t l a n t i c a r e the responsibility of the U n i t e d States, the m a t t e r is
constantly studied on this side w i t h a view to securing the most advantageous
employment of available forces to meet s h i p p i n g needs a n d m a k i n g recommenda­
tions to this end.
Russian
Convoys.
13. A s t h e Cabinet are aware, the enemy has concentrated powerful surface,
submarine a n d a i r forces in N o r t h e r n Norway. This has made the passage of
each convoy a fleet operation, besides forcing us to provide close a n t i - a i r c r a f t a n d
anti-submarine escort for the convoy on a greatly increased scale. I t has also
meant greatly enhanced risk of losses.
Indian
Ocean.
14. U p to d a t e the enemy h a s only made two serious a t t e m p t s to interfere
with our t r a d e in t h e I n d i a n Ocean.
T h e first occurred early in. A p r i l when
Japanese forces r a i d e d s h i p p i n g in the Bay of Bengal.
E a r l y t h i s month
Japanese submarines and r a i d e r s made their appearance in the N o r t h e r n and
Southern A p p r o a c h e s to the Mozambique Channel. Our requirements for escorts
in the A t l a n t i c and, N o r t h R u s s i a prevents us sending any considerable
reinforcements of a n t i - s u b m a r i n e vessels to t h i s area, a n d as long as the t h r e a t
continues on a comparatively small scale, we consider t h a t it can be met by
evasive r o u t e i n g and such air cover as can be provided in c e r t a i n focal areas.
Allocation
of Escort
Forces.
15. A p p e n d i x I I , Table E, shows the allocation of a n t i - s u b m a r i n e vessels
employed as A t l a n t i c ocean escorts on the 21st J u n e , 1942 (excluding U n i t e d
States ships). Table F shows the allocation of corvettes to the various commands.
As the tables show, the g r e a t m a j o r i t y of our available escort vessels are
concentrated in the N o r t h A t l a n t i c and very few are available for other areas.
16. I n F e b r u a r y 54 U n i t e d States destroyers were employed to assist w i t h
the escort of our t r a n s - A t l a n t i c convoys. As a result, however, of the r e a r r a n g e ­
ment of escort d u t i e s since then t h e U n i t e d States now provide only 3 destroyers
for the escort of t r a n s - A t l a n t i c t r a d e convoys, 5 on the Iceland shuttle service,
and 16 for the escort of troop convoys, m a k i n g a total of 24.
17. Table G shows the number of a n t i - s u b m a r i n e escort vessels expected to
be completed for the B r i t i s h E m p i r e from J u n e 1942 to the end of 1943. Fleet
destroyers are not generally available for t r a d e protection duties. I t will thus
be seen t h a t the number of escorts may be expected to increase by only 20 by the
end of t h e year 1942. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o g r a m m e was not scheduled to
produce any convoy escorts before the end of the year, but as mentioned above
the U n i t e d States authorities have at last realised the v i t a l necessity of producing
these vessels in a d e q u a t e numbers as r a p i d l y as possible. Two h u n d r e d and fifty
have already been ordered, the p r o g r a m m e which now totals some 700, has been,
given the highest priority. T h e r e is as yet no i n f o r m a t i o n as to the acceleration
t h a t will be achieved, but some vessels will probably be completed by the end of
the year. The U n i t e d S t a t e s a r e also b u i l d i n g numbers of fast motor boats,
which are employed on a n t i - s u b m a r i n e escort work in more sheltered waters. At
the present time the escort forces in t h e A t l a n t i c have had to be reduced in
strength to the barest m i n i m u m to meet the ever-increasing commitments
elsewhere. M a k i n g due allowance for losses, and t a k i n g into account the rate
of U-boat construction, which is believed to be about 20 p e r month, it is
evident t h a t u n t i l the U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o g r a m m e becomes effective the present acute
shortage of escort vessels will continue.
So f a r as t h e A d m i r a l t y p r o g r a m m e is concerned it is clearly of t h e greatest
importance t h a t the high p r i o r i t y accorded to escort vessels should be made
effective.
Additional
Measures
for
the Protection
of
Convoys.
Auxiliary
Aircraft
Carriers:
18. Measures a r e in h a n d to provide a u x i l i a r y a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s to work
w i t h the "convoys. Three have been completed a n d a r e now w o r k i n g u p and a
further 13 a r e expected to complete this year. I n 1943 it is hoped a further
12 of these ships building in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s will be allocated to us. Arrange­
ments have also been made for 2 m e r c h a n t ship g r a i n c a r r i e r s b u i l d i n g in the
U n i t e d K i n g d o m to be fitted w i t h a flush deck to enable them to operate a few
anti-submarine a i r c r a f t . These ships will c a r r y t h e i r usual cargo. I t is under
consideration to fit a d d i t i o n a l ships.
A utogyros and
Helicopters.
19. E x p e r i m e n t s are proceeding w i t h t h e A u t o g y r o and Helicopter, which,
i t is hoped, will be able to operate from a p l a t f o r m built on a m e r c h a n t ship.
C.A .M. Ships.
20.^ Thirty-five ships have been fitted w i t h a Sea H u r r i c a n e on a catapult.
These ships were designed a s a quick answer to t h e attacks on our convoys by
Focke-Wulf a i r c r a f t . Since they only c a r r y a one-shot fighter a i r c r a f t , the later
developments mentioned above a r e considered to be a more profitable line to
pursue.
Disguise of
Tankers.
21. T a n k e r s have been singled out for a t t a c k by enemy U-boats a n d a
scheme is in h a n d to disguise 10 Diesel-engined t a n k e r s now b u i l d i n g to resemble
o r d i n a r y cargo vessels.
Armament
of Escort
Vessels.
22. A new weapon, known as the " H e d g e h o g , " is being fitted in a large
number of escort vessels. T h i s weapon, which fires a salvo of 24 projectiles ahead
of the a t t a c k i n g vessel, will, it is expected, greatly increase the chances of the
destruction of U-boats. G r e a t progress has also been made in the fitting of radio­
locaters for the detection of U-boats on the surface a t night. Radio-telephony is
installed in the m a j o r i t y of escort vessels for use in co-ordinating attacks on
U-boats.
Armament
of Merchant
Vessels.
23. C o n t i n u a l progress is being m a d e w i t h the a r m a m e n t of merchant ships.
Ships are now being equipped w i t h H i g h Frequency Direction F i n d e r s to assist
with the location of U-boats i n the vicinity of a convoy. F a s t m e r c h a n t vessels
are e q u i p p e d w i t h d e p t h charges.
T h e a n t i - a i r c r a f t e q u i p m e n t of m e r c h a n t
vessels is being increased as f a s t as the m a t e r i a l a n d labour available will allow.
A type of n e t defence, which is designed for use a t sea by m e r c h a n t ships (of
certain speeds) to afford some measure of protection a g a i n s t torpedo attack, is
being fitted to a p p r o p r i a t e ships u n d e r construction. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s have
also a d o p t e d the system.
Review of the Anti-U-boat
Campaign
and Air
Offensive.
24. I t is believed we a r e a p p r o a c h i n g another of the t u r n i n g points in t h e
German U-boat c a m p a i g n .
Since J a n u a r y t h e m a i n w e i g h t of a t t a c k h a s been in t h e W e s t e r n A t l a n t i c
and u n t i l recently a t t a c k s on our other convoys have more o r less been abandoned,
with t h e exception of the a t t e m p t to i n t e r r u p t the flow of supplies to Russia.
T h e slowly increasing potency of the a n t i - s u b m a r i n e effort on the A t l a n t i c
seaboard* has led. to a n increased scale of a t t a c k i n the Caribbean a n d to t h e
south a n d east of the A n t i l l e s a n d to t h e development of the U-boat t h r e a t in
the Gulf of Mexico. Convoy a n d escort should s t a r t in t h e Caribbean on the
1st J u l y and should t h e r e a f t e r increase : in t h i s connection we have d r a w n the
attention of the U n i t e d S t a t e s to the i m p o r t a n c e of p r o v i d i n g a s t r o n g a i r effort
to the e a s t w a r d of T r i n i d a d .
T h e above measures may be expected to encourage t h e dispersal for t h e
concentrated, U-boat effort i n t h e W e s t e r n A t l a n t i c .
T h e r e are already signs of a renewed t h r e a t to our n o r t h - s o u t h convoys
in the E a s t e r n A t l a n t i c , a n d i t may be t h a t t h e easing of t h e s i t u a t i o n in the
Western A t l a n t i c will be followed by a renewed onslaught on our cross-Atlantic
convoys. T h e f u r t h e r extension of U-boat efforts i n . t h e South A t l a n t i c must
also be expected.
25. A s r e g a r d s our readiness to meet t h i s renewal of the a t t a c k on the
convoys for w h i c h B r i t i s h escorts are, in the main, responsible, we cannot r e g a r d
the p r e s e n t average s t r e n g t h of t h e convoy escorts w i t h any equanimity. O u r
aid to the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d the greatly increased scale of protection given to
our convoys to a n d from R u s s i a have d r a w n heavily on our general s t r e n g t h w i t h
the A t l a n t i c convoys. B u t we a r e to t h i s extent better off t h a n we were a year
ago. T h e r e is much more confidence among t h e m a j o r i t y of our escort vessels
that they can compete w i t h the U-boat a t t a c k i n g a t n i g h t . Moreover, many
of our groups have now worked together for some t i m e a n d have acquired a t e a m
spirit a n d m u t u a l confidence. Several instances have recently occurred of convoys
with a comparatively weak escort being able to drive off t h e a t t a c k of a c e r t a i n
number of U-boats w i t h only slight loss. I n these encounters the U-boats have,
on m a n y occasions, a t least received a r o u g h h a n d l i n g .
T h u s , if w e have to face a really heavy scale of " p a c k " U-boat a t t a c k on
our cross-Atlantic convoys, w e may a t least hope to give t h e U-boats a very much
more difficult t a s k t h a n we should have done a year ago, a n d although we shall
undoubtedly suffer losses, p e r h a p s heavy losses, to our s h i p p i n g , we should also
be able to inflict considerable d a m a g e on the enemy.
26. Finally, in reviewing the situation, the r i s i n g scale of a i r operations
against U-boats w o r k i n g from Biscayan ports m u s t be borne in mind, together
with our recent success in h a r r y i n g newly-commissioned U-boats o u t w a r d bound
from the B a l t i c d u r i n g t h e i r passage round Scotland.
W i t h the advent into
service of squadrons lent from Bomber Command and of the searchlight-fitted
Wellington a i r c r a f t for n i g h t work, a n d w i t h the production of Torpex-filled
depth-charges, there is no doubt t h a t we have, d u r i n g the p a s t month, achieved
very successful results in the inner B a y area. One U-boat is believed to have
been sunk, two have been driven to seek shelter i n S p a n i s h ports, w i t h severe
damage, and a t least two have been forced to t u r n back t o h a r b o u r .
Despite these highly satisfactory results, however, it m u s t be emphasised
that the A d m i r a l t y r e q u i r e m e n t s for m e d i u m - r a n g e a i r c r a f t to m a i n t a i n the
patrol of the " inner " a r e a in the B a y of Biscay have n o t yet, in the A d m i r a l t y
* N O T E . — I n addition to t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t s of e s c o r t vessels m a d e available t o t h e U n i t e d
States, it was agreed to forgo t h e delivery of 100 floatplanes in order t h a t t h e y s h o u l d be
available for a n t i - s u b m a r i n e work on t h e e a s t coast of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
view, been met in full. One squadron, capable of n i g h t operations, h a s yet to be
provided. Moreover, there is the " outer " a r e a of the B a y of Biscay, in which
p a s t experience h a s led us to hope we should find a fruitful field for A / S work.
To m a i n t a i n daylight jDatrols in this a r e a the A d m i r a l t y demanded 4 long-range
squadrons, each of 9 a i r c r a f t . None of these have yet been provided and, in
the result, o u r operations have been, in t h e m a i n , limited t o the ' ' inner ' ' area.
T h e very success of our recent operations in the " inner " area will inevitably
enhance the importance of m a i n t a i n i n g a n a n t i - s u b m a r i n e effort in the " outer "
area, since by diving in the " inner " a r e a in daylight hours, U-boats can evade
our a i r a t t a c k by day a t the cost of a small reduction of their time on patrol.
27. It has already been pointed out that the general shortage of anti­
submarine vessels is acute and will remain so for some time to come. Immense
importance, therefore, is attached to developing the maximum attack on
U-boats on passage in the Bay of Biscay. This will not only assist the United
States, but will materially contribute to the safety of shipping in all parts of the
Atlantic. W e realise there are conflicting requirements, but in view of the
urgency and vital importance of the matter we feel bound to reiterate our view
that, until such time as replacement \ong-range aircraft are available, this
Admiralty requirement should be met by exploiting still further the flexibility
between Bomber and Coastal Commands in order to provide the latter with the
requisite additional aircraft on loan.
A. V. A.
L.
June
22, 1942.
L O S S E S BY E N E M Y ACTION OF MERCHANT S H I P S OF ALL TONNAGES.
Following the last publication of M e r c a n t i l e loss figures u p to end of
June 1941, there followed a period of five months (July-November) when t h e losses
were exceptionally low a n d averaged only 168,000 gross tons p e r month. T h e n
came the e n t r y of t h e U n i t e d States a n d J a p a n i n t o t h e w a r on the 7th December,
the i m m e d i a t e result of w h i c h was a s h a r p u p w a r d tendency in the losses w h i c h
for December a g g r e g a t e d some 415,000 gross tons. T h i s t o t a l included a good
proportion of tonnage w r i t t e n off i n t h e F a r E a s t as c a p t u r e d or sunk by t h e
Japanese.
T h e U-boat c a m p a i g n in the W e s t e r n A t l a n t i c opened on the 12th J a n u a r y
by the s i n k i n g of the B r i t i s h s.s. Cyclops and the N o r w e g i a n Frisco off the E a s t e r n
Seaboard of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , which w a s followed u p by the s i n k i n g of a f u r t h e r
33 vessels in this a r e a by the end of the month.
Tn F e b r u a r y t h e losses rose steeply to 608,000 gross tons a n d t h e a r e a of t h e
U-boats' o p e r a t i o n s w a s f u r t h e r extended to the Caribbean a n d t a n k e r tonnage
appeared to be the p r i n c i p a l target.
M a r c h saw a f u r t h e r rise in the t o n n a g e lost to t h e p e a k figure of
769,000 gross tons, b u t t h i s total contained a c e r t a i n a m o u n t of t o n n a g e lost
in the M a l a y a n a n d D u t c h E a s t I n d i e s a r e a s where a number of vessels h a d to
be scuttled a n d abandoned.
I n A p r i l the losses, t h o u g h still high, showed a d r o p to 607,000 gross tons,
which included r a t h e r more t h a n 100,000 tons sunk in the I n d i a n Ocean a s a
result of t h e a t t a c k by J a p a n e s e w a r s h i p s i n the B a y of B e n g a l a n d Ceylon area.
The o p e r a t i o n s of U-boats in t h e W e s t e r n A t l a n t i c were extended i n t o the Mexican
Gulf.
I n M a y the total of losses reached t h e second highest t o t a l of the w a r a t
681,000 gross tons. T h e bulk of these losses occurred in t h e W e s t e r n N o r t h
Atlantic, i n c l u d i n g the Caribbean a n d Gulf of Mexico, where the U-boats were
particularly active. A b o u t 62,000 gross tons w a s lost in t h e A r c t i c Sea a n d
Murmansk *areas as the result of a t t a c k s by submarines a n d a i r c r a f t on the ships
in convoy t a k i n g supplies to Russia.
T h e losses for J u n e (recorded u p to t h e 18th) t o t a l 396,000 gross tons, and
at this r a t e i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e total for the m o n t h will probably be heavy. T h e r e
are so f a r only nine t a n k e r losses, w h i c h indicates a n improvement in the losses
of these vessels r e s u l t i n g from p u t t i n g them into convoys in the W e s t e r n N o r t h
Atlantic i n c l u d i n g W e s t I n d i e s area.
U-boat activity h a s also shifted f u r t h e r South in the C a r i b b e a n to t h e P a n a m a
Canal a r e a in the vicinity of Colon, where several valuable ships were recently
sunk.
British,
Allied and Neutral Losses of Merchant
according to A rea.*
Ships by Enemy
Action
(Occurrence basis.)
Total.
N.-W.
Approaches.
1941—January ...
F e b r u a r y ...
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December...
327.
376
535
638
501
420
122
130
278
205
104
415
122
223
178
191
153
179
6
2
117
86
33
19
1942—January
F e b r u a r y ...
March
April
May
368
608
769
607
681
122
104
25
58
Western
Atlantic.
69
8
6
7
6
129
307
418
342
498
North Sea
(including
B a r e n t s Sea).
Thousand gross tons.
Channel, Irish
Sea, S.-W.
Freetown and
Approaches,
South
Atlantic. ­
Biscay and
Azores.
18
8
46
29
32
69f
5
12
32
38
28
54
88
118
125
73
49
100
93
77
77
42
12
18
23
11
44
84i
62'
7
3
7
Mediterranean
(including
Suez Canal
and Black
Sea.
89
-
90
60
203
53
3
6
15
22
12
6
"'8
20
263
60
11
9
5
22
17
19
38
57
29
21
7
19
20
12
16
Indian Ocean
(including
Bed Sea).
Elsewhere.
10
19
7
14
4
8
21
4
5
280
29
26
29
140
7
51
141
173
12
* Total losses by enemy action of m e r c h a n t vessels of all tonnages, including tankers but excluding m e r c h a n t vessels commissioned for Naval service and Royal
Fleet Auxiliary Tankers. The figures include losses reported up to the 18th J u n e , 1942. The areas are defined in C.A.F.Os. 2299/41 and 794/42. " N.-W. Approaches "
extends roughly from Nova Scotia to Shetlands and " W e s t e r n Atlantic " extends westward from 3 5 W. between latitudes 0 and 4 3 N.
f Including 25,000 tons seized in German Baltic ports. X Including 27,000 tons lost in Baltic Sea while a t t e m p t i n g to escape from Sweden. 0
o
D
Summary
of Merchant
Ships
sunk by U-boat in Atlantic
and West of 3 5 W.
North
of the
Equator
G
British.
—1
Tankers.
Others.
American.
Tankers.
Non-Tankers.
No.
Gross
Tons.
No.
Gross
Tons.
No.
Gross
Tons.
No.
Gross
Tons.
No.
Gross
Tons.
6
47,620
6
35,659
3
20,567
2
13,286
7
58,826
Februar
Februaryy
12
77,713
15
86,632
9
71,214
7
36,778
8
59,570
March
Marc h
10
90,631
7
38,376
12
95,554
18
76,701
8
64,209
April
Apri l
3
24,151
10
66,452
10
67,910
14
67,232
7
61,505
May
May
5
42,101
27
106,697
14
98,951
27
113,021
10
69,442
11
65,791
4
28,122
17
77,360
3
35,707
76
399,610
52
382,318
85
384,378
43
349,259
1942
1942-Jan
Jan.. 12-Jan
12-Jan.. 3 1 . . .
Gross
Tons.
No.
I
June
Jun e (a
(ass reporte
reported
d
t o 0900
0900,, J u n e 19)..
19)....
Total
Totalss
Non-Tankers.
Tankers.
Non-Tankers.
36
282,216
*
Y
No.
112
j 44,279
14
56,106
18
72,702
11
; 39,101
26
89,556
15
j 57,492
95
359,236
Y
No.
137
Gross Tons.
681,826
11
Gross Tons.
766,696
No.
138
Gross Tons.
708,495
TABLE C .
Causes of Merchant
Shipping
Losses.*
(British,
Allied
(Occurrence Basis.)
and Neutral
Combined.)
(Thousand Gross Tons.)
E n e m y Action.
Total.
1942January
February
March
Marc h
Apri
Aprill
May
Ma y
...
Total, 5 m o n t h s
. ....
Submarine.
Mine.
Surface
Craft.
Other
C a u s e s or
Aircraft.
Cause
Unknown.
Marine
Risk.
368
608
769
607
681
305
424
530
413
601
10
19
17
15
14
3
12
4
54
-7
35
114
39
93
59
15
39
179
32
128
70
62
67
23
3,033
2,278
75
80
340
265
350
* T o t a l losses by e n e m y a c t i o n a n d m a r i n e risk of m e r c h a n t v e s s e l s , i n c l u d i n g t a n k e r s b u t
excluding m e r c h a n t v e s s e l s c o m m i s s i o n e d for n a v a l s e r v i c e a n d R o y a l F l e e t A u x i l i a r y T a n k e r s .
Vessels of all t o n n a g e s lost by e n e m y a c t i o n a n d v e s s e l s of 100 gross t o n s a n d over lost b y
marine risk.
Losses of British,
A Hied and Neutral
Tankers
and Non-Tankers
by Enemy A ction.
(Oceurence Basis).
Tankers.
Non-Tankers.
Total.
Month.
No. of
Ships.
Gross T o n s
(Thousands).
No. of
Ships.
Gross Tons
(Thousands).
No. of
Ships.
Gross Tons
(Thousands).
245
314
364
516
439
380
105
118
243
151
98
369
62
95
134
150
118
103
43
40
81
47
34
150
327
376
535
638
501
420
122
130
278
205
104
415
233
349
473
370
466
79
113
192
112
143
368
608
769
607
681
1941J a n u a r y ...
F e b r u a r y ...
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October ...
November
December
8
8
22
17
9
5
2
2
5
7
2
10
82
62
171
122
62
40
17
12
35
54
6
' 46
54
87
112
133
109
98
41
38
76
40
32
140
1942J a n u a r y ...
F e b r u a r y ...
March
April
May
17
36
48
32
30
135
259
296
237
215
62
77
144
84
113
-
Vessels of all t o n n a g e s , e x c l u d i n g M e r c h a n t vessels c o m m i s s i o n e d for N a v a l Service and
R o y a l F l e e t Auxiliary T a n k e r s , as r e p o r t e d u p t o 15th J u n e , 1942.
TABLE E .
A,'S
Fitted
Vessels
employed as Atlantic
Ocean Escorts—(British,
Manned.)
and Allied except American
Destroyers.
Corvettes.
Western Approaches
Newfoundlan d
Newfoundland
Halifa
Halifax
x
..
....
..
....
....
North
Nort h A t l a n t i c ( G i b r a l t a r )
South
Sout h A t l a n t i c
Lent
Len t U.S.A
U.S.A.. ( T e m p o r a r y fo
forr C a r i b b e a n ) . . .
47
12
18
4
8
3
59
32
44
6
20
7
Totals
92
168
Canadian
Sloops
(including C u t t e r s ) .
32
^
32
G r a n d T o t a l ... 292
A v e r a g e p e r c e n t a g e available
60
70
70
196
N O T E . — I n a d d i t i o n t h e r e are 110 A/S t r a w l e r s e m p l o y e d as local e s c o r t s ; 70 p e r c e n t , of
these a r e n o r m a l l y a v a i l a b l e .
TABLE F .
Allocation
of
-
Corvettes.
(Mid-June, 1 9 4 2 . )
T o t a l : 200
H o m e Command...
...
...
...
...
N o r t h A t l a n t i c (Gibraltar)
...
...
...
South Atlantic
Mediterranean
...
...
...
...
...
Eastern Fleet
R.C.N. Pacific Coast
...
A t l a n t i c Coast ( i n c l u d e s 5 R . N . a n d
1 Free French)
L e n t t e m p o r a r i l y to TJ.S.A. for C a r i b b e a n
...
T r a n s f e r r e d to U . S . N a v y
59
6
20
7
8
7
\
7 f i
/
7
10
200
TABLE
Ocean-going
Anti-Submarine
G.
Craft
To British
Empire
Building
and
Projected.
Account.
1943.
1942.
B u i l d i n g i nn—
—
June. July.
F l e e t D e s t r o y e r s -t
-t-- Allied
Allied—
—
United Kingdom
C a n a d a ..
....
Australia
Total
..
....
..
....
3
Aug. S e p t .
3
3
4th
Qtr.
1st
Qtr.
11
4
. ..
....
Twin
Twi n Scre
Screw
w Corvettes—
United Kingdom
C a n a d a ..
....
Australia
Total 3rd
Qtr.
4th
Qtr.
6
3
7
3
7
3
11
5
6
Al 1 H u n t s
4
1
10
6
1
3
2
3
2
3
2
1
5
4
6
6
1
8
3
1
2
1
5
4
6
7
12
1
2
6
3
4
2
2
4
1
8
7
4
1
4
3
4
3
3
7
3
4
3
-f
Total 1
2
1
2
2
3
1
1
4
1
Sloopss + Allied
Sloop
Allied—
—
United Kingdom
H e b e , H a l c y o n an
andd Algerin
Algerinee
Classs M i n e s w e e p e rrss ( O c e a nn--­
Clas
going)—
United Kingdom
C a n a d a ..
....
Total "
1
1
3
5
1
1
3
5
10
3
7
4
27
41
72
2
8
8
11
3
36
37
69
76
108
British Destroyer Escorts—
U n i t e d S t a t e s ..
....
Fleet Minesweepers—
U n i t e d S t a t e s ..
....
Grand Total
2nd
Qtr.
1
E s c o r t D e s t r o y e r s , H u n t ClaB
ClaBSS
D e s t r o y e r s 4- Allied—
Allied —
Unite
United
d Kingdom
Singlee
Singl
S c r eew
w
Corvettes
Cutters—
United Kingdom
C a n a d a ..
....
Australia
2
j
10
8
10
5