8
THirDOCIJMBKT I S T H E P R O P E R T Y O P H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y S G O Y E B M M E N T :
Printed
$EGRET.
for the War Cabinet.
.
January
1942.
:
Copy N^.
W.PV(*2) 43.
January
28, 1942.
WAR CABINET.
THE INDIAN POLITICAL
SITUATION.
I N connection with my m e m o r a n d u m on t h e above subject ( W . P . (42) 42)
I circulate t h e following: telegram from t h e Viceroy.
.
L. S . A .
India Office, Jamiary 28, 1942.
:
Telegram
from
the Viceroy
to the Secretary of State
January 2 1 . 1942. for India,
dated
(MostImmediate.) 104. S. H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government will wish for a n a p p r e c i a t i o n of political
position here in t h e light of recent developments, p a r t i c u l a r l y B a r d o l i Resolution,
and for my suggestions a s to policy which we should wisely a d o p t in t h e p r e s e n t
circumstances. T e x t of J i n n a h ' s Resolution a t N a g p u r a n d of B a r d o l i Resolution
and gist of discussions on t h e l a t t e r in A l l - I n d i a Congress C o m m i t t e e will" be
available t o you a n d need n o t be repeated here.
';
. 2 . Cabinet will h a v e noted i n B a r d o l i Resolution insistent d e m a n d for
full
freedom ' ' ; reference to our system as " a r r o g a n t I m p e r i a l i s m w h i c h is i r i d i s
tinguishabie from Fascist a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m " ; a n d deliberate m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
of our a t t i t u d e . Discussion of Resolution i n A l l - I n d i a Congress Committee o n
13th J a n u a r y w a s i m p o r t a n t a s b r i n g i n g o u t t h e real reluctance of s u b s t a n t i a l
elements t o co-operate wholeheartedly whatever h a p p e n s ; f a c t t h a t t h e Resolution
was gotJ;hrough after all on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i t committed nobody t o a n y t h i n g
unless H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government conceded Congress demand, when t h e position
could be reconsidered; a n d e x t e n t to w h i c h elements in Congress w e r e a f r a i d to
antagonise possible victors by h e l p i n g or coming to terms w i t h u s . R a j a g o p a l a ­
chari a d d e d t h a t B a r d o l i Resolution " does n o t say w h a t w e w a n t . T h e B r i t i s h
Government know w h a t we w a n t . Therefore we need n o t r e i t e r a t e i t , " a n d a s
usual w i t h Congress pronouncements, t h e r e h a s been a number of competing
public statements by p r o m i n e n t Congressmen a s to w h a t exactly i t means.
r
3. I n effect B a r d o l i Resolution taken w i t h discussion i n A . I . C . C . represents
reiteration of Congress d e m a n d for s u r r e n d e r by H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government t o
congress claims, i g n o r i n g other p a r t i e s a n d interests a n d t h e i r o w n obligations
in the hope t h a t they will get Congress s u p p o r t in fighting t h e w a r . I t s m a i n
importance is t h a t i t places u s a t some tactical d i s a d v a n t a g e because of t h e ease
with which i t c a n be misrepresented to o u r d i s a d v a n t a g e here a n d elsewhere,
while i t h a s helped Congress machine by r e s p o n d i n g to s t r o n g feeling i n t h e
I country t h a t non-violence is a n impossible p r o p o s i t i o n in p r e s e n t conditions w i t h
Japanese n e x t door. I t is i m p o r t a n t n o t to let ourselves be h y p n o t i s e d by
Rajagopalachari a n d h i s a p p e a r a n c e of reasonableness a n d plausibility. H e is
endeavouring t o concentrate spotlight o n himself a n d t o obscure t h e very
significant dissident s t r a i n s t h a t have emerged i n discussions a t A . I . C . C . ; while
Congress publicity will continue to over-simplify t h e resolution a n d endeavour t o
present i t to t h e public quietly a s offer t o co-operate on reasonable terms.
4. T h e Moslem L e a g u e a t t i t u d e , so f a r a s I am aware, r e m a i n s u n c h a n g e d ,
with J i n n a h apprehensive t h a t H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government w i l l allow themselves
to be stampeded by H i n d u s a n d Congress. J i n n a h h a s j u s t i n f o r m e d L u m l e y
[23382-2]
t h a t he s t a n d s firm on P a k i s t a n , a n d thinks t h a t H i n d u s are out to get us to
make a n e n g a g e m e n t which would p r e j u d g e a n d rule out P a k i s t a n , and, having
obtained t h a t , use i t as weapon w i t h which to i n t i m i d a t e Moslems. I n all
minority provinces the Moslems h a d sampled Congress rule, a n d were determined
not to submit to any constitution which would install Congress domination over
whole of country. H e does not t h i n k t h a t Congress resolutions have materially
altered t h e i r position, and thinks t h a t Secretary of State, in reply to a recent
question in P a r l i a m e n t , has made only possible answer. H e accepts without
question t h a t we genuinely w a n t to arrive a t a settlement which m u s t m e a n a
transfer of power, but is afraid t h a t we may succumb to pressure, though he
seemed, to Lumley, well satisfied w i t h present a t t i t u d e of H i s Majesty's
Government.
5. Minorities, such as scheduled castes, a n d large body of opinion which
is anxious to assist but knows t h a t i t can in no circumstances hope to exercise
real control itself over political future, is w a t c h i n g line we shall take with
uneasiness a n d uncertainty.
6. Issue is clearly of great importance, and we m u s t consider it dispassion­
ately. I am quite ready to accept t h a t it may be necessary for us to alter genera]
line of our policy towards' I n d i a after and as a consequence of t h e w a r . But I
am clear in any event t h a t policy as it stands (ultimate dominion s t a t u s and
transfer of real power to I n d i a n s a t centre, & c , a n d u l t i m a t e implementing of
a r r a n g e m e n t s covered by Declaration of A u g u s t 1940) is one which can only be
succesfully implemented from a strong position. O u r present position I would
not r e g a r d as a strong one, a n d our prestige is u n d e r g o i n g some deterioration.
I have to bear in m i n d further fact t h a t we are u n d e r w a r n i n g t h a t we may lose
Singapore, a n d that, as I have frequently informed Secretary of State, I am
advised t h a t I n d i a is a t present wholly insufficiently protected a g a i n s t attack, and
t h a t direct a t t a c k on any considerable scale might produce an exceedingly difficult
situation to hold in terms of security in this country. I would not j u d g e that
there could wisely be any question allowing ourselves to be stampeded into
implementing either wholly or p a r t i a l l y our long-term policy in such circum­
stances a n d a t present time. A n d if I a m r i g h t in t h i n k i n g t h a t these are not
circumstances in which implementation of our long-term policy is practicable,
I am of opinion equally t h a t there is very little if a n y t h i n g further t h a t we can
do w i t h i n our tether.
7. I develop this position f u r t h e r below. I n doing so I concentrate on issue
as affecting Centre. The P r o v i n c i a l aspects, though i m p o r t a n t , a r e less so and
not decisive in present argument.
8. M a i n propositions p u t f o r w a r d for our consideration are e i t h e r —
(a) I n effect, implementation of our long-term policy e i t h e r completely or to
a degree which would m a k e i t impossible for us after the w a r to
r e g a i n any ground given now, a n d which we t h o u g h t it desirable to
retrace, e.g., the Congress demand for acceptance of complete
independence for I n d i a , to be accompanied by positive immediate
steps in evidence, and t h e i r demand (Bardoli Resolution) for a " Free
independent I n d i a which only can be in a position to u n d e r t a k e the
defence of the country on a n a t i o n a l basis and be of help to the
furtherance of larger causes t h a t are emerging from the storm of
w a r " ; or
(b) The S a p r u type of proposal—elimination of P a r l i a m e n t a r y control,
Viceroy to have autocratic powers w i t h wholly non-official executive
responsible to him, &c.
9. To t a k e second category first. Cabinet will be fully alive to the objections
to the severance of P a r l i a m e n t a r y control, a n d will a p p r e c i a t e t h a t the acceptance
of S a p r u ' s propositions would compromise the post-war position beyond any
question, while I do not myself believe t h a t it would secure us the support of
the major political parties. They represent a leap in the d a r k from the solid
platform of the A c t of 1935 and w i t h no g u a r a n t e e of any r e w a r d . ' ' Home
Rule for the Viceroy," which I have been disturbed to see t h a t The Times has
tended to support, ignores the impossibility of a n y Governor-General reconciling
his diverse obligations, or disposing on a n autocratic basis of all the resources
of this immense country, without P a r l i a m e n t a r y sanction a n d control. W e have
already made a r r a n g e m e n t s to meet the contingency, of a breakdown ,of all
communications between London and Delhi. I n d e e d in any emergency i t m a v
well be unavoidable t h a t the Governor-General should t a k e i m m e d i a t e responsi­
bility for much about w h i c h he would p r e f e r to have secured t h e p r i o r consent
of H i s Majesty's Government. B u t all this is very different from a proposal to
release the Governor-General and the Government of I n d i a from all s t a t u t o r y
control by H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government a n d P a r l i a m e n t . Nor do I believe t h a t a n y
entirely non-official Council t h a t I could p u t together, unless it h a d the full
support of m a j o r i t y p a r t i e s (who have r e f r a i n e d from s u p p o r t i n g S a p r u ) , would
be better t h a n I have got a t the moment. S a p r u and h i s friends c a r r y n o real
weight here. T h e inclusion of all or any of them would a d d n o t h i n g to effectiveness
of our prosecution of w a r ; a n d I t h i n k it q u i t e likely t h a t we should be u n d e r
strong pressure from t h e m for concessions in t h i s direction or t h a t designed to
show I n d i a n public opinion t h a t they really counted for something. I n a wholly
Indianised Council I should be much concerned, too, lest t h e moment t h e w a r
drew nearer to I n d i a we found ourselves u n d e r pressure t o recall I n d i a n forma-'
tions overseas for I n d i a 's local defence, a n d t o close down despatch of w a r l i k e
supplies outside I n d i a in interests of conserving them for I n d i a herself. I would
take t h a t risk very seriously if I h a d s t r o n g Congress element in C e n t r a l
Government, b u t it c a n n o t be ignored even w i t h a C e n t r a l Government of
moderates of S a p r u type.
;
11. So much for w h a t I m i g h t call a policy of nibbling, a n d of endeavouring
to buy off opposition by concessions of g r e a t e r or lesser importance, w h i c h would
not, however, take us all t h e w a y to. o u r final objective. I h o w t u r n to w i d e r
suggestion t h a t we should, in effect, go t h e whole w a y a t once, accept demand for
full independence a n d give tangible proof of r e a l i t y of our d o i n g so. I t seems
to me to be out of the question to consider a n y t h i n g of t h e sort. A n d I i m a g i n e
that t h a t will be feeling of Cabinet also. On t h a t assumption we m a y take it t h a t
there is no possibility of giving satisfaction to Congress or securing their real
and whole-hearted s u p p o r t .
I n my experience they a r e e n t i r e l y ruthless
politicians; will t a k e all they can get; will do their utmost t o manoeuvre us into
a position in w h i c h we m a k e sacrifices t h a t a r e s u b s t a n t i a l a n d t h a t will increase
the prestige a n d power of Congress in t h i s country. B u t short of acceptance of
their full demand no sacrifices however g r e a t can be relied on to keep them quiet,
12. I need not develop the u n f o r t u n a t e effect on those who genuinely
sympathise w i t h us in t h i s country, or on those to whom we have given under­
takihgs, such as Moslem League, o r on t h e P r i n c e s , of allowing ourselves to be
stampeded into n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Congress or acceptance of Congress demand.
Nor (while possibility of u n d e r g r o u n d n e g o t i a t i o n s can never be wholly r u l e d out)
do I see a n y t h i n g to suggest t h a t Congress a n d Moslem League a r e a t t h i s stage
likely to u n i t e a n d get together in an e x p a n d e d Council. J i n n a h h a d m a d e clear
to the E d i t o r of the Times of India t h a t he would r e g a r d as essential, firstly,
50 : "SO in any such Council; secondly, t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of m i n o r i t i e s should
be secured t h r o u g h h i m a n d be u n d e r h i s control, since otherwise m i n o r i t y r e p r e ­
sentatives would be absorbed by H i n d u element. (I need not e l a b o r a t e difficulties
which a n y such a r r a n g e m e n t would produce.)
13. My general conclusion, viewing t h i s difficult m a t t e r w i t h g r e a t e s t
detachment t h a t I can, a n d w i t h full sense of i t s importance, is in these circum­
stances t h a t we should s t a n d firm and m a k e n o f u r t h e r move. I do not believe
that any f u r t h e r move a t t h i s stage will be likely to improve I n d i a 's c o n t r i b u t i o n
to the war. A s mentioned above, I t h i n k i t q u i t e possible t h a t f u r t h e r t r a n s f e r
of power m i g h t mean p r e s s u r e on us for w i t h d r a w a l of I n d i a n troops a n d I n d i a n
, supply. I d o not believe t h a t we could rely on a u n i t e d I n d i a (even a u n i t e d
^ British I n d i a , for P r i n c e s t e n d to be ignored to a dangerous degree in discussions
in press, &c.) solid behind us in fighting the w a r . I n d i a is hopelessly, a n d I
. suspect irremediably, split by racial a n d religious divisions w h i c h we cannot
bridge, a n d which become more acute as any real t r a n s f e r of power by us d r a w s
nearer.
/­
14. I t a k e very seriously, too, in r e a c h i n g my conclusions possibility t h a t
further t r a n s f e r would give m a r k e d encouragement to Quisling activity. Recent
report from m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s in E a s t e r n I n d i a is to the effect t h a t t h e r e is a
large and dangerous p o t e n t i a l fifth column in Bengal, Assam a n d B i h a r a n d
Orissa, and that, indeed, potentiality of pro-enemy-: sympathy a n d activity in
E a s t e r n I n d i a is enormous. S a r a t Bose h a s been a lesson. T h e activities of
U Saw and T i n T u t (senior Civil Servant occupying a very responsible position)
are another a n d a grave one. I know t h a t we are frequently u r g e d to do something
to " t o u c h the heart of I n d i a " a n d our sympathies n a t u r a l l y lean in t h a t direction.
But Cabinet will, I think, agree w i t h me t h a t I n d i a a n d B u r m a have no natural
association w i t h E m p i r e , from which they a r e alien by race, history and religion,
and for which neither of them h a s any n a t u r a l affection, a n d both are in
E m p i r e because they are conquered countries which had been brought there by
force, k e p t there by our control, a n d w h i c h h i t h e r t o it h a s suited to remain
under our protection'. I suspect t h a t t h e moment they t h i n k t h a t we may lose the
w a r or take a bad knock, their leaders would be much more concerned to make
terms w i t h victor a t our expense t h a n to fight for ideals to which so much
lip-service is given, a n d I have been impressed by prominence given by
R a j a g o p a l a c h a r i to doubts felt in A.I.O.C. a s t o wisdom of a n t a g o n i s i n g possible
victors. '.
'
' *
,
;
15. W h a t we have to decide, however, is Avhether in such circumstances,
whatever feeling of I n d i a , we intend to stay in this country for our own reasons,
a n d whether I n d i a ' s place in I m p e r i a l communications is not so i m p o r t a n t , a t any
r a t e in w a r time, t h a t we must hold on and must not relinquish power beyond a
c e r t a i n point. If we accept t h a t I n d i a is too i m p o r t a n t at t h i s stage for us to
t a k e any chances, then I would r a t h e r face such trouble as w e may have to face
here as a result of m a k i n g no concessions now in political field t h a n make con­
cessions which are ill-advised and dangerous, and on which we m i g h t have to go
back for reasons of I m p e r i a l security a t a later stage in the w a r .
16. I recognise to the full t h a t Cabinet have to deal w i t h much left wing
pressure a n d pressure from academic theorists or sentimentalists, reflected even
in p a p e r s so i m p o r t a n t as The Times.
T h i s battle, if it is lost, will, however, be
lost a t home and not in I n d i a , a n d if my suggestion t h a t we make no move is
accepted by yourself and by Cabinet it will be necessary to consider the best line
to take to t r y to d a m p down activities of this order. You alone can judge how
much significance is to be attached to criticism in the press a n d from left wing
and liberal element i n P a r l i a m e n t . I would have j u d g e d i t myself to be largely
a reflection of uneasiness at the t u r n things have taken in the F a r E a s t , and to be
based on the assumption, which I do not r e g a r d a s correct, t h a t by a generous
gesture now we can u n i t e I n d i a behind us and get her solid moral support for
t h e prosecution of the W a r ; -—;—-—- —
17. H i s Majesty's Government will n a t u r a l l y wish t o a p p e a r as constructive
a s possible in any debate. I suggest, however, that the general line of any debate
could properly be t h a t we have responsibilities to discharge a n d pledges to
honour, t o h a r p again on the d e p t h a n d reality of the I n d i a n differences; to insist
t h a t in no circumstances shall we go back on our pledges to Moslems; to bring out
incompatibility of Moslem League demands w i t h those of Congress; to show the
public how little the Bardoli Resolution really m e a n s ; to lay particular
emphasis on discussion in A l l - I n d i a Congress Committee; to r e p e a t (it does not
m a t t e r if i t bores people here) the merits of A u g u s t offer a n d reluctance of
Congress to face up to i t ; to r e p e a t t h a t it was I n d i a n s themselves alone that
made impossible in October 1940 something a p p r o x i m a t i n g p r e t t y closely to what
Congress a r e now asking for; to stress t h a t we have got in p r a c t i c e as national a
Government a n d a s good a n a t i o n a l Government as we can get in present circum­
stances, in expanded Council; and, as a possible constructive alternative, to refer
to the possibility of t h e federal scheme (which to my p o i n t of view secures defence,
secures a degree (corrupt group) control, b r i n g s in conservative (corrupt group) ly
element to which our u n d e r t a k i n g s are so i m p o r t a n t , a n d would be practicable
consistently w i t h maintenance of w a r effort). On these lines I should hope that
we could g a i n any ground which Congress have t a k e n from us by appearance of
readiness to co-operate on reasonable terms which attaches to B a r d o l i Resolution.
18. Above represents my own considered view.
I have not yet consulted
Governors, t h o u g h I would expect general s u p p o r t from t h e m for policy of
s t a n d i n g firm. I f there is any further information which you o r Cabinet require
t o enable you to reach decision you will, I am sure, let me know.
^