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THIS DOCUMENT IS T H E PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY S GOVERNMENT
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
June
1940.
SECRET.
Copy N o .
W . M . (40)
170th Conclusions.
TO
BE KEFT
UNDER
LOCK
AND KEY.
I t is r e q u e s t e d t h a t special care m a y be t a k e n t o
e n s u r e t h e secrecy of this d o c u m e n t .
WAR
CONCLUSIONS
C A B I N E T 170 ( 4 0 ) .
of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 1 0 Downing
S.W. 1 , on Monday, June 1 7 , 1 9 4 0 , at 1 1 A.M.
Street,
Present:
T h e R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S. C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the
Chair).
The R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E CHAMBERLAIN,
M . P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council.
The Right Hon.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HALIFAX,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n
Affairs.
The R i g h t Hon. A. GREENWOOD, M.P.,
C . R. ATTLEE, M.P.,
L o r d P r i v y Seal.
M i n i s t e r Avithout P o r t f o l i o .
T h e following w e r e also p r e s e n t :
The Right H o n . A . V . ALEXANDER, The R i g h t Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r W a r .
M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y .
The
Right
Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD The R i g h t H o n . Sir J O H N ANDERSON,
M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e
S I N C L A I R , B t . , M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of
H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of
S t a t e for A i r .
Home Security.
T h e R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T CALDECOTE, T h e R i g h t H o n . A . D U F F C O O P E R , M . P . ,
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r D o m i n i o n
M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n .
Affairs.
The
Right
Hon. LORD
HANKEY,
The R i g h t Hon. LORD LLOYD, Secretary
Chancellor of t h e D u c h y of L a n c a s t e r
of S t a t e f o r t h e Colonies (Item 1 0 ) .
(Item 1 0 ) .
The R i g h t Hon. H U G H DALTON, M . P . ,
Minister
of
(Item 1 0 ) .
The
Hon.
Sir
Economic
ALEXANDER
M r . G. H . S H A K E S P E A R E , M . P . , P a r l i a -
Warfare
m e n t a r y U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e ,
D o m i n i o n s Office (Item 1 1 ) .
CADOGAN,
A i r Chief M a r s h a l S i r C Y R I L L. N .
N E W A L L , C h i e f of t h e A i r Staff.
P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for F o r e i g n Affairs.
A d m i r a l of t h e F l e e t S i r D U D L E Y
P O U N D , F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d Chief of
N a v a l Staff.
General Sir
J O H N D I L L , Chief
I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff.
Secretariat.
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Major-General H . L. ISMAY.
C a p t a i n A . D . NICHOLL, R . N .
Mr. W . D . WILKINSON.
Lieutenant-Colonel V . DYKES, R . E .
M r . E . P . DONALDSON.
M r . G. N . F L E M M I N G .
[21425]
of
the
43
WAR
CABINET
170
(40).
CONTENTS.
Minute
No.
Subject.
.
Page
I
The Air Situation
Middle East.
British air force in France.
493
2
The Military Situation
The Western Front.
493
3
The Naval Situation
Arrival of Australian and New Zealand convoy.
Attacks on trade.
Enemy mining activities.
494
4
France
...
...
...
...
...
...
Formation of new Government.
British consent to the French seeking an armistice.
...
...
494
5
E v a c u a t i o n of B e l g i a n m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l . . .
...
...
495
6
U.S.S.R.
Action in the Baltic States.
...
...
496
...
Rumours of concentration against Roumania.
7
Egypt
496
8
Japan
Relations with the U.S.A.
Defence a g a i n s t i n v a s i o n
...
...
...
...
...
State of readiness of the army and the Local Defence Volunteers.
Strength of the army.
The Local Defence Volunteers.
Rifles from the United States of America.
The press.
496
10
F r e n c h r e q u e s t for a n a r m i s t i c e
...
...
Our requirements from the French.
French Colonial Empire and mandated territories.
...
499
II
E v a c u a t i o n of c h i l d r e n f r o m G r e a t B r i t a i n overseas
...
500
12
F r e n c h p r o p o s a l s for a n a r m i s t i c e
...
...
...
500
13
P r i m e M i n i s t e r s statement in P a r l i a m e n t ...
Suggested broadcasting.
...
...
501
9
...
...
496
The Air
Situation.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 168th
Conclusions,
Minute 7.)
1. The Chief of the Air Staff s a i d t h a t , o w i n g t o b a d w e a t h e r ,
t h e r e h a d been very l i t t l e a i r a c t i v i t y on e i t h e r side. A n e n e m y
a i r c r a f t h a d been p l o t t e d p r o c e e d i n g t o w a r d s I r e l a n d .
This
b r o u g h t t h e t o t a l of G e r m a n a i r c r a f t believed to have been flown
to I r e l a n d t o six. The Secretary
of State for Dominion
Affairs
s a i d t h a t M r . de V a l e r a w a s k e p t fully i n f o r m e d of these G e r m a n
activities.
Some f u r t h e r I t a l i a n p e t r o l d u m p s h a d been destroyed i n a i r
o p e r a t i o n s in t h e M i d d l e E a s t .
M o r e r a i d s h a d been c a r r i e d o u t on M a l t a , b u t no c a s u a l t i e s or
d a m a g e h a d been r e p o r t e d .
T h e B r i t i s h A i r Forces in t h e S o u t h of F r a n c e h a d been
British Air
T h e a i r c r a f t could be flown back to t h i s
"Force in France, o r d e r e d to evacuate.
c o u n t r y . T h e m o r e f o r m i d a b l e question w a s the evacuation of some
1,500 m a i n t e n a n c e personnel w i t h a n u m b e r of A . A . g u n s .
Air
M a r s h a l B a r r a t t h a d been i n s t r u c t e d to concert t h e best m e a n s of
e v a c u a t i o n w i t h t h e S e n i o r N a v a l Officer.
The alternatives were
from Toulon to N o r t h A f r i c a or from B o r d e a u x .
Middle East.
The Chief of Naval Staff s a i d t h a t e v a c u a t i o n from T o u l o n
w o u l d r e q u i r e six destroyers to escort t h e t r a n s p o r t s . T h e only
s h i p s available w e r e p a t r o l l i n g the S t r a i t s of G i b r a l t a r .
The Prime Minister
w a s r e l u c t a n t to see t h e p l a n s for con­
t i n u i n g a i r a t t a c k on N o r t h I t a l y a b a n d o n e d a n d t h o u g h t t h a t
o r d e r s for e v a c u a t i n g t h e A i r F o r c e from t h e S o u t h of F r a n c e
should be held u p u n t i l t h e m a t t e r h a d been i n v e s t i g a t e d f u r t h e r .
T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above s t a t e m e n t s .
N O T E . — L a t e r i n t h e m e e t i n g , w h e n t h e n e w s w a s received t h a t
t h e F r e n c h A r m i e s h a d ceased fire, t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e
for A i r w a s a u t h o r i s e d to proceed w i t h the e v a c u a t i o n of
t h e B r i t i s h A i r Forces from the S o u t h of F r a n c e .
The Military
Situation.
2. The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff s a i d t h a t G e n e r a l
Brooke w a s n o w a t R e d o n . E v a c u a t i o n h a d been s t a r t e d from
N a n t e s a n d C h e r b o u r g . 51,000 m e n h a d been w i t h d r a w n from t h e
The Western
lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d 6,500 from C h e r b o u r g . Some 50,000
Front.
r e m a i n e d to be w i t h d r a w n .
(Previous
G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l - C o r n w a l l h a d been o r d e r e d to h o l d on w i t h
Reference:
the
F
r e n c h 10th A r m y a t all costs. H i s force n o w c o m p r i s e d t h e
W.M. (40) 168th
B e a u m a n force, one i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e of 5 2 n d Division, one
Conclusions,
a r m o u r e d b r i g a d e ( s t r e n g t h r e d u c e d to about one r e g i m e n t ) , a t o t a l
Minute 9.)
of a b o u t 5,000 men. H e w a s f a l l i n g back on h i s lines of c o m m u n i ­
c a t i o n to C h e r b o u r g . T h e W a r Office were n o t in c o m m u n i c a t i o n
w i t h G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l - C o r n w a l l , b u t G e n e r a l Brooke h a d r e p o r t e d
t h a t t h e F r e n c h 10th A r m y were d i s i n t e g r a t i n g .
One b a t t a l i o n
w i t h a n t i - t a n k g u n s w a s covering t h e C h e r b o u r g P e n i n s u l a .
There was general agreement that, now t h a t the French
G o v e r n m e n t u n d e r M a r s h a l P e t a i n were s u i n g for a n a r m i s t i c e ,
we w o u l d be sacrificing o u r m e n to n o p u r p o s e if we told t h e m to
fight on. T h e F r e n c h w o u l d n o d o u b t r e p r o a c h us for e v a c u a t i n g
our t r o o p s while fighting w a s still in p r o g r e s s , b u t f u r t h e r sacrifice
w o u l d serve n o useful p u r p o s e a n d w o u l d n o t p r e v e n t t h e F r e n c h
from b l a m i n g us i n a n y case.
T h e r e w a s some discussion w h e t h e r G e n e r a l Brooke should
r e m a i n in F r a n c e , e i t h e r a t N a n t e s or C h e r b o u r g , or r e t u r n t o t h i s
country.
T h e Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff, felt t h a t n o u s e f u l
p u r p o s e w o u l d be served by G e n e r a l Brooke 's r e m a i n i n g i n F r a n c e .
The Prime Minister h o p e d t h a t t h e W a r Office w o u l d not r e c a l l
G e n e r a l Brooke so long as his presence in F r a n c e could be of v a l u e
to t h e difficult w i t h d r a w a l w i t h w h i c h o u r t r o o p s w e r e faced.
[21425]
B 2
The W a r Cabinet—
(1) A g r e e d t h a t G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l - C o r n w a l l should be told
f o r t h w i t h to w i t h d r a w his force to the coast.
(2) I n v i t e d the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for W a r to give f u r t h e r
c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the question w h e t h e r G e n e r a l Brooke
should n o w be recalled, in t h e l i g h t of the views
expressed by the P r i m e M i n i s t e r .
The Naval
Situation.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 168th
Conclusions,
Minute 8.)
Arrival of
Australian and
New Zealand
convoy.
Attacks on
trade.
3. The First Lord of the Admiralty
s a i d t h a t he h a d met the
A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d troop convoy on its a r r i v a l in the
Clyde on the previous afternoon a n d h a d found the troops i n very
good h e a r t . H e h a d also h a d some t a l k w i t h t h e p a r t y of n a v a l
r a t i n g s who h a d a r r i v e d w i t h the convoy, i n c l u d i n g a considerable
N e w Z e a l a n d c o n t i n g e n t , a n d h a d met the officers of t h e C a n a d i a n
destroyers who h a d formed p a r t of the escort on t h e l a s t s t a g e s of
t h e voyage.
The Chief of Naval Staff said t h a t the Empress of
Australia
h a d a r r i v e d a t R e y k j a v i k w i t h 1,000 C a n a d i a n troops.
T h e P r e n c h a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r Beam a n d t h e cruiser Jeanne
d'Arc
h a d sailed from H a l i f a x e a r l y on the previous day. So f a r as w a s
known, they w e r e i n t e n d i n g to make for N o r t h A f r i c a n p o r t s or
for Marseilles.
T h e following losses by enemy s u b m a r i n e a t t a c k s h a d occurred
on the previous d a y : —
S.S. Wellington
Star
(11,400 tons) torpedoed about
500 miles west of V i g o ;
N o r w e g i a n T a n k e r James Stove (8,215 t o n s ) ; a n d
(9,608 tons) s u n k by s u b m a r i n e
N o r w e g i a n s h i p Bralanta
off A d e n .
Enemy mining
activities.
T h e entrances to the L o i r e a n d St. N a z a i r e w e r e open to
demagnetised ships. Caen w a s closed a n d the G i r o n d e , P o r t l a n d ,
W e y m o u t h a n d B r e s t w e r e t e m p o r a r i l y closed. W e h a d to p r o v i d e
t h e ships a n d g e a r for the sweeping u p of m a g n e t i c mines in F r e n c h
ports.
The W a r C a b i n e t took note of these s t a t e m e n t s .
France.
Formation
of new
Government.
4. The Secretary
of State for Foreign
Affairs
d r e w the
a t t e n t i o n of t h e W a r C a b i n e t to t e l e g r a m No. 434 from H i s
M a j e s t y ' s A m b a s s a d o r a t B o r d e a u x , w h i c h h a d been received a t
3-50 A.M. t h a t m o r n i n g , r e p o r t i n g t h a t the chief members of the
new F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t . / ' following on the r e s i g n a t i o n of
M. R e y n a u d , were a s follows : —
M. C h a u t e m p s : V i c e - P r e s i d e n t of the Council. General W e y g a n d : M i n i s t e r of N a t i o n a l Defence. General Colsom : M i n i s t e r for W a r . A d m i r a l D a r l a n : M i n i s t e r of M a r i n e . G e n e r a l P u j o t : M i n i s t e r for A i r . M. Bauclouin : M i n i s t e r for F o r e i g n Affairs. M. B o u t h i l l i e r : M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e . M. P o m a r e t : M i n i s t e r of I n t e r i o r . M. F r o s s a r d : M i n i s t e r of P u b l i c W o r k s . I t would be noticed t h a t M . F l a n d i n , M. Laval, a n d M. Bonne^
were not included.
495
W . M . 170 ( 4 0 ) .
H e also r e f e r r e d to t e l e g r a m No. 435 D I P P r e p o r t i n g a con­
v e r s a t i o n between S i r R. Campbell a n d A d m i r a l D a r l a n i n r e g a r d
to the F r e n c h fleet, d u r i n g w h i c h t h e l a t t e r h a d said : " S o long a s
I can issue o r d e r s to i t you have n o t h i n g to f e a r . "
H e h a d t e l e g r a p h e d to our A m b a s s a d o r s at W a s h i n g t o n a n d
M a d r i d i n o r d e r to keep t h e m in touch w i t h the s i t u a t i o n .
The Prime Minister s a i d t h a t he h a d h a d a telephone conversa­
tion w i t h G e n e r a l S p e a r s , w h o w a s r e t u r n i n g to E n g l a n d , as he d i d
not t h i n k he could p e r f o r m a n y useful service i n the p r e s e n t
s i t u a t i o n . G e n e r a l de Gaulle w a s also coming back w i t h him, as h e
h a d a p p a r e n t l y been w a r n e d t h a t , a s t h i n g s were developing, i t
m i g h t be as well for h i m to leave F r a n c e .
C o n t i n u i n g , the Foreign Secretary
s a i d t h a t , according to a n
A m e r i c a n b r o a d c a s t service from Berlin, t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t
would n o t m a k e a n y a r m i s t i c e w i t h the F r e n c h Government, b u t
would proceed to destroy or p u t o u t of a c t i o n all t h e i r a r m e d forces.
I n f u r t h e r discussion, it w a s p o i n t e d out t h a t , so f a r a s
S i r R. C a m p b e l l s t e l e g r a m s showed, o u r only communication w i t h
t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t h a d been S i r R. C a m p b e l l s i n t e r v i e w w i t h
M . B a u d o u i n (reported i n t e l e g r a m No. 433).
British consent
to the French
seeking an
armistice.
R e f e r e n c e w a s m a d e to the t e l e g r a m w h i c h h a d been d e s p a t c h e d
to M. R e y n a u d on t h e p r e v i o u s d a y (No. 368 D I P P ) , in w h i c h i t
w a s s t a t e d t h a t the sailing of the F r e n c h Fleet for B r i t i s h h a r b o u r s
w a s a c o n d i t i o n of our a s s e n t i n g to the F r e n c h e n q u i r i n g a s to t h e
t e r m s of a n a r m i s t i c e for F r a n c e . T h i s t e l e g r a m h a d been delivered
to M . R e y n a u d , b u t he h a d t h e n been asked to suspend action on it,
a n d i t w a s n o t c e r t a i n w h e t h e r he h a d shown it to t h e other m e m b e r s
of t h e F r e n c h Government. S i r R. Campbell h a d therefore been
i n s t r u c t e d to deliver the t e l e g r a m to M a r s h a l P e t a i n .
The Prime Minister s u g g e s t e d t h a t a f u r t h e r telegram should
be sent, p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t , if t h e F r e n c h Government s o u g h t a n
a r m i s t i c e w i t h o u t fulfilling t h i s condition, o u r consent would not be
forthcoming.
The Secretary of State
t e l e g r a m in t h i s sense.
for Foreign
Affairs
undertook to send a
Evacuation of
5. The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs said t h a t t h e
Belgian Military B e l g i a n M i n i s t e r for F o r e i g n Affairs h a d told our C h a r g e d'Affaires
Personnel.
t h a t the B e l g i a n Government w i s h e d to be e n t i r e l y associated w i t h
H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government. H e h a d asked if facilities could be
given for t h e e v a c u a t i o n of some 900 B e l g i a n Officers a n d 30 to 35
t h o u s a n d troops, i n c l u d i n g 7,000 a t B r e s t .
The Prime Minister
suggested t h a t a reply should be sent to
the B e l g i a n s as follows :—
(1) T h e i r troops should be told to proceed to the p o r t s , a n d
w e would do o u r best to c o n t i n u e evacuation a s long a s
possible.
(2) T h e y should be i n f o r m e d a s to the p o r t s from w h i c h they
could m o s t conveniently be t a k e n off.
(The A d m i r a l t y w o u l d advise the F o r e i g n Office on
t h i s point.)
(3) T h e B e l g i a n s should be asked to inform us as e a r l y a s
possible a s to the n u m b e r of t h e i r troops likely to reach
each port.
T h e W a r C a b i n e t i n v i t e d t h e F o r e i g n Secretary t o r e p l y to
the B e l g i a n Government on the above lines.
U.S.S.R.
Action in the
Baltic States.
(Previous
lief erence:
W.M. (39) 31st
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)
Rumours of
concentration
6. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he
had no information of importance about the Russian designs in
the Baltic States. It was clear that there had been a considerable
extension of the Russian sphere of influence in Lithuania, and they
seemed to have similar designs with regard to Estonia. He had
no information of the rumours that Russia was concentrating forces
for an attack on Bessarabia.
There could be little doubt that the intention behind Russia's moves was to strengthen her position against Germany, whose military successes were not to her liking. The War Cabinet took note of the above statement. Eoumania.
Egypt.
7. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that his
(Previous
colleagues would now have seen his telegram of the previous evening
Reference:
(No. 468 DIPP to Cairo) in which he had authorised Sir Miles
W.M. (40) 166th Lampson to tell King Parouk that in time of war the worst policy
Conclusions,
$ uncertainty, and that the vacillation of Ali Maher was nQ
Minute 9.) '
fi n
accordance with the spirit of the Treaty, nor representative w
a
s
o
n
e
0
of the feelings of the Egyptian people, nor conducive to Egypt's ultimate interests. It was, therefore, necessary for another Govern­
ment to be formed, under another Prime Minister. He regretted that there had not been time to consult the War Cabinet before this telegram was despatched, but he had had no alternative but to take action quickly. He had received reports which had convinced him that the general situation in that country had been going from bad to worse. It remained to be seen how King Farouk would receive this message. On the whole he thought that the King might be expected to come into line, although he might at first give a certain amount of trouble. One satisfactory feature in the situation was the improved attitude of Nahas Pasha and the Wafd. No serious difficulties were expected with them. The War Cabinet took note with approval of the above statement. Japan.
Relations with
the U.S.A.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 38th
Conclusions,
Minute 7.)
Defence against
Invasion.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 164th
Conclusions,
Minute 12.)
State of readi­
ness of the
Army and t h e
Local Defence
Volunteers.
8. The Secretary
of State
for Foreign
A fairs
drew the
attention of the War Cabinet to Tokyo telegram No. 996, dated the
13th June. This telegram showed that the United States
Ambassador in Tokyo had been urging on his Government the
desirability of not allowing American and Japanese relations to
crystallise into a state of deadlock. Mr. Grew had recently had an
interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister and it appeared that
a measure of improvement in the relations between the two Govern­
ments had resulted.
The War Cabinet took note of the above statement. 9. In view of the probability that within the next few weeks this country would be faced with an attempted German invasion, whether on a larger or a smaller scale, a discussion took place on the state of readiness of the British Army and of the Local Defence
Volunteers. The principal points which were raised were as follows :— Strength
Army.
of the
(1) The strength of the Army was much greater than was
commonly realised. W e now had approximately
1-1 million men under arms in this country. There were
deficiencies in their offensive equipment, but all of them
had rifles. It was desirable to give publicity to this
fact, which ought both to hearten our own people and
to give the Germans food for reflection.
The Secretary of State for War undertook to check these facts
andfiguresin order that the Prime Minister might include some reference to them in his speech in the House of Commons on the following day. (2) Our forces in the United Kingdom would shortly be
strengthened by the return of the remainder of the
B.E.P., and by the arrival of our Regular battalions
from India, and of reinforcements from Canada and
Australia.
(3) Voluntary enlistment into the Army was continuing on a considerable scale, above the age groups which were liable for compulsory military service. There was nothing to prevent afitman between the ages of 30 and 50 from volunteering, and about 1,000 a day were doing so. Thus, of the intake into the Army during the last month, which had been about 165,000, about 30,000 had been volunteers. (4) Our forces at home were being organised, drilled, trained and equipped as rapidly as possible; and from now onwards they would be permeated with a leaven of men who had seen active service. Nevertheless, some serious defects in the Army had now come to light. (a) There was a shortage of good officers. Many of the Territorial officers who had joined in peace-time were not really suitable men. The Prime
Minister
strongly urged the
selection and rapid promotion of men who had made their mark in action. (&) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that the
retreats and withdrawals which we had recently
been compelled to carry out must necessarily have
left their mark on the psychology of our troops.
W e must once and for all cast behind us the spirit
of "looking over one shoulder," and of looking
for a position to fall back on.
(c) W e had always in the past aimed at training our
whole Army to reach a uniformly high level. This
method had on occasions resulted in a certain lack
of enterprise among the rank andfile.This was
rather marked at the present time. The Germans,
on the other hand, had even in the last war made
a distinction between the Storm Troops who led
the way and the dull solid mass who consolidated
the position after the Storm Troopers had won
it. In the present war this differentiation had
been much more marked in the German Army.
The young Nazi hot-heads whofilledthe armoured
divisions had suffered very heavy losses, but had
been responsible for a shattering series of German
victories. W e should have to take a leaf out of
the Germans' book and to organise special
squadrons of Storm Troopers (see also at (7)
below).
The Local
Defence
Volunteers.
Rifles from the
United States of
America.
The Press.
(5) There had been a good deal of criticism both in the press and among Members of Parliament of the lack of organisation and discipline among the L.D.V's. It was no doubt difficult to reach a very high standard with men who gave part-time service only, on an unpaid basis. On the other hand, the L.D.V's. were now some 500,000 strong and most of them were very keen. There was also a very widespread demand from men of all ages to be allowed to serve in the armed forces or at least to be given weapons in order to defend their homes. This demand could not be ignored. The Secretary
of State for War described certain steps which
he was taking to meet this situation. The organisation of the
L.D.V's. had now become too heavy a task to impose on the existing
staffs of the Home Defence Forces. It was proposed to reorganise
them under separate Central and Local Commanders of their own.
The whole organisation would, however, remain under the orders of
General Ironside. In order to assist in training, full-time
permanent instructors would be taken on. Further assistance in
training would be given by drawing on the Officers' Emergency
Reserve. (This had originally consisted of 11,000 ex-Officers, of
whom some 3,000 had not yet been found posts.)
(6) The Secretary of State said that the L.D.V's. were at the moment largely a "broomstick" Army. Rifles were being provided for them as quickly as possible. "We had a supply of rifles which had been kept in store since the last war, and which were now being reconditioned. Another 500,000 rifles were ready to leave the United States. According to the original intention, these would have been divided equally between this country and France, but arrangements were now being made which would ensure that the whole consignment came to us. The Prime Minister emphasised the importance of getting these
rifles shipped at the earliest possible moment. Nothing must be
left undone to get these rifles as quickly as possible.
(7) Steps were also being taken to organise sections of Storm Troopers on a full-time basis, as part of the L.D.V's. Tough and determined characters would be selected. Some of these would be armed with " Tommy " guns. Some 2,000 of these weapons were on order, of which some 200 had already arrived. (8) The press were no doubt doing their best to keep up the public morale, and to a great extent they were succeeding.
The mass of our population remained remarkably cheerful under adversity. But the press could not refrain from indulging in one " stunt" after another. These stunts sometimes created a lack of confidence. Again, even the most reputable newspapers treated the guidance which they were given in a rather cavalier spirit. In tJhe last resort the only remedy in the hands of the Government was to order prosecutions, and it seemed undesirable to adopt this remedy at the present juncture. The War Cabinet :­
(1) Approved generally the steps proposed by the Secretary of
State for War for the re-organisation and training of
the L.D.V's.
(2) Invited the Secretary of State for War to take action on the following lines to improve the training and to instil an offensive spirit into the Army
whole : (a) The Storm Troop element should be introduced into
the Army.
(b) All leaders who should prove themselves lacking
in drive and initiation should be rutJhlessly
eliminated and replaced by others who had shown
themselves active and ardent spirits in battle.
(3) Invited the Secretary of State for War, in conjunction with
the Minister of Supply, to take all possible steps to
expedite the supply of rifles, automatic weapons and
ammunition from the United States, and to report the
position as soon as possible.
10. The War Cabinet had before them an Aide-Memoire prepared by the Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (C.O.S. (40) 466). The Chancellor
of the Duchy of Lancaster
pointed out that the
paper was a policy of perfection, but it was hoped that we might
be able to obtain some of our requirements. The difficulties were
(Previous
very considerable owing to the state of disorganisation in France.
Reference:
Nevertheless, consignments of machine tools and the German pilot
W.M. (40) 168th prisoners were arriving at the ports, and everything possible was
Conclusions,
being done to get them away. It was hoped to evacuate 250 tons
Minute 1.)
of Belgian gold now at Bordeaux. A somewhat disturbing piece
of news had just come in, to the effect that one of our demolition
parties at Dinard had been prevented by the French from carrying
out their task. If this was done on orders from above, it would be
symptomatic of the policy of the new French Government. If
France made terms with the enemy, we must expect that large
quantities of oil would fall into German hands.
Some discussion followed on what steps could be taken to implement the recommendations in the Aide-Memoire, which had been originally prepared with a view to its discussion by a British delegation with the French Government. It was recognised that the security of the French Fleet was the most important item. The inclusion of Admiral Darlan in the new Government was perhaps a hopeful sign. The War Cabinet then considered a further Report by the French Colonial
Chiefs of Staff relating to the French Colonial Empire and Empire and
Mandated Territories (W.P. (40) 207), and a Memorandum by the Mandated
Minister of Economic Warfare (W.P. (G.) (40) 156). Territories.
The Secretary
of State for the Colonies said that, if the French
collapsed altogether, there was the possibility that the Germans
would take over the French West African troops and employ them
to attack our West African Colonies by land.
The Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs
supported the view
expressed by the Minister of Economic Warfare in his Memo­
randum, that economic inducements might be offered to the French
administrative officers in the Colonies in order ' to obtain their
co-operation. Such co-operation was most important, and it would
be worth offering substantial amounts if necessary. W e could not
rely on the French Government sending a secret message to their
Colonial authorities urging them to continue the struggle. He
asked the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to consider this
possibility.
The War Cabinet­
(1) Approved the Aide-Memoire of the Chiefs of Staff (C.O.S. (40) 466). (2) Invited the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to proceed, in collaboration with the other Ministers concerned, with his arrangements to oarry out, so far c [21425] French Request
for an
Armistice.
Our require­
ments from the
French.
as possible, the recommendations contained in the Aide-
Memoire, and to report what further action, if any, could be taken to obtain our requirements from the French. (3) Invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to communicate to Sir Ronald Campbell the more important points in the Chiefs of Staff Aide-Memoire. (4) Approved the Report of the Chiefs of Staff on the action
which should be taken in respect of the French Colonial
Empire and Mandated Territories (W.P. (40) 207).
Evacuation of
Children from
Great Britain
Overseas.
11. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the
Minister of Home Security covering the Report of an Interdepartmental Committee under the Chairmanship of the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State, Dominions Office, on the arrangements
for enabling children to be sent to places of greater safety overseas
(W.P. (G.) (40) 152). The Secretary
of Home Security
of State
for the Home Department
and
Minister
explained that the Report of the Committee, for
which he and his colleagues were greatly indebted to Mr. Shake­
speare, set out a plan for organising the evacuation of school children
to the Dominions and to the United States of America. Many offers
to take children for the duration of the war had been received from
the overseas Dominions with the approval of the Governments
concerned, and similar offers had been received from private
organisations in the United States of America. The action to be
taken was set out on pages 10 and 11 of the Report, which, if the
War Cabinet approved, should be brought into operation forthwith.
The Minister
without
Portfolio
said that, while it was no
doubt repugnant to wide sections of public opinion to break up
homes in this way, he recognised that, if this country were to
become an " island fortress," it would be desirable to have fewer
mouths to feed.
The Secretary
of State for Dominion
Affairs
supported the
proposals, the success of which would depend upon the work of the
proposed Children's Overseas Reception Board, who would be the
executive committee for the scheme.
The Parliamentary
Under-Secretary
of State,
Dominions
Office,
said that the Report had been drafted in a form suitable for publication. If the War Cabinet approved the proposals, it was intended to announce the scheme in Parliament in reply to a question on the following Wednesday. The War Cabinet— (a) Approved the recommendations of the Interdepartmental
Committee set out in the Report circulated with
W.P. (G.) (40) 152. (6) Agreed that the scheme should be announced in answer to
a Parliamentary question the following Wednesday, and
that thereafter the Report of the Committee should be
published.
French
Proposals for an
Armistice.
12. At this point in the Meeting a message was brought in
reporting that the French troops had ceasedfireat 12 - 40, and
giving an account of Marshal Petain's speech on the wireless at
12 Noon. The Marshal was reported as having said —
'' It is with a broken heart that I tell you to-day that fighting must cease. I addressed myself last night to the enemy
3c
3
to ask him if he is prepared to seek with me, as between soldiers after an honourablefight,the means of putting an end to hostilities." Prime Minister's
Statement in
Parliament.
Suggested
Broadcasting.
13. The Minister of Information
raised the question whether
the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on Tuesday,
the 18th June, should be broadcast.
Before this could be done, it would be necessary that a Resolution should be passed by the House agreeing to the course proposed. It was pointed out that the Speaker had been closely associated with the previous discussions which had taken place between the Leaders of the Political Parties in regard to the broadcasting of proceedings of the House, and it would clearly be necessary that the Speaker should be consulted before any arrangements were made for broadcasting the speech. If arrangements were made for the speech to be broadcast, it was suggested that the House of Lords should not meet until after the Prime Minister's speech had been delivered. The War Cabinet-
Authorised the Minister of Information to consult the Speaker in regard to the proposal that the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on the following day should be broadcast. NOTE.—It
was eventually decided not to adopt this suggestion.
Richmond
Terrace, S.W.
June 17, 1940. 1,