(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:CAB/23/96
Image Reference:0005
( T H I S DOCUMENT I S THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY*S GOVERNMENT)
S E C R E T .
COPY NO.
C A B I N E T
55
(58)
M e e t i n g o f t h e C a b i n e t t o be h e l d a t N o . 10 D o w n i n g
S t r e e t , S . W . I . , on MONDAY, 7 t h NOVEMBER, 1 9 5 8 ,
a t 5 . 0 p.in.
AGENDUM
DEFENCE PROGRAMMES AND ACCELERATION.
(Reference
C a b i n e t 52 ( 5 8 )
Conclusion
15)
R e p o r t by C a b i n e t Committee.
C P . 247 ( 5 8 ) - c i r c u l a t e d
herewith.
Memorandum b y t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
C P . 218 ( 5 8 ) - c i r c u l a t e d
for Air.
herewith.
Memorandum b y t h e M i n i s t e r f o r C o - o r d i n a t i o n o f D e f e n c e
c o v e r i n g e x t r a c t from Minutes o f the 555rd M e e t i n g o f
t h e C o m m i t t e e o f I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e , t o g e t h e r v/ith
Memorandum p r e p a r e d i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n betv/een t h e A i r
M i n i s t r y and t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f O v e r s e a s T r a d e .
C P . 222 ( 5 8 ) - c i r c u l a t e d h e r e w i t h .
(Signed)
E.E.
Secretary
Richmond T e r r a c e ,
4 t h November,
S.V7.1.
1958.
BRIDGES
to
the
Cabinet.
8 E 0 R E T.
COPY NO.
C A B I N E T
53(38).
CONCLUSIONS o f a M e e t i n g o f t h e C a b i n e t h e l d
a t 1 0 , Downing S t r e e t , S . W . I . , on MONDAY,
7TH NOVEMBER, 1 9 3 8 , a t 3 . 0 p . m .
PRESENT:
The R i g h t Hon. N e v i
Prime M i n i s t e r .
e Chamberlain, LLP.,
( I n the C h a i r ) .
The R i g h t H o n .
S i r John S i m o n , G . C . S . I . ,
G.C.V.O., O.B.E., K.C., M.P.,
C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer.
The R i g h t H o n .
The V i s c o u n t Runciman,
L o r d P r e s i d e n t o f the C o u n c i l .
The R i g h t H o n .
L o r d Maugham,
Lord Chancellor.
The R i g h t H o n .
S i r bamuel H o a r e , B t . , G . C . S . I . ,
G . B . E . , C.M.G. , M . P . , S e c r e t a r y
o f S t a t e f o r Home A f f a i r s .
The R i g h t H o n .
The V i s c o u n t H a l i f a x , K . G . ,
G.C.S.I., G.CI.E.,
Secretary
of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s .
The R i g h t K o n ,
S i r John A n d e r s o n ,
G.C.S.I.,G.C.I.E.,
Lord Privy Seal.
The R i g h t H o n .
Malcolm MacDonald, M.P..
Secretary of State f o r
D o m i n i o n A f f a i r s and S e c r e t a r y
o f S t a t e f o r the C o l o n i e s ,
The Most Hon.
The M a r q u e s s o f Z e t l a n d ,
C C S . I . , G.C.I.E.,
Secretary
of State f o r I n d i a .
The R i g h t H o n .
S i r Thomas I n s k i p , C . B . E . ,
K . C . , M.P., M i n i s t e r f o r
Co-ordination of Defence.
The R i g h t H o n .
The E a r l S t a n h o p e , K . G . , D . S . O . ,
M.C. , F i r s t L o r d o f t h e Admiralty.
The R i g h t H o n .
L . H o r e - B e l i s h a , M.P., S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r War.
The R i g h t H o n .
S i r K i n g s l e y Wood, L . P . ,
Secretary of State f o r A i r .
G.C.B.,
M.P.,
The R i g h t H o n .
John C o l v i l l e , M . P . ,
Secretary of State f o r
Scotland.
The R i g h t Hon.
O l i v e r o t a n l e y , M . C . , M.P. ,
P r e s i d e n t o f the Board o f T r a d e .
The R i g h t H o n .
W.S.Morrison, M.C., K.C.,
M.P., Minister of Agriculture
and F i s h e r i e s .
The R i g h t H o n .
The E a r l De L a W a r r , P r e s i d e n t
of the Board o f Education.
The R i g h t Hon,
Walter E l l i o t , M.C.,
Minister of Health.
The R i g h t Hon.
E r n e s t Brown, M . C , M.P. ,
M i n i s t e r of Labour.
The R i g h t H o n .
E.L. Burgin, M.P.,
of Transport. Mr. E . E .
Bridges,
M.C
IA.P. ,
Minister
The' R i g h t H o n .
The E a r l w i n t e r t o n , M . P . ,
C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Duchy o f
Lancaster.
Secretary.
ANGLO-AMERICAN
TRADE
AGRERvCENT.
1.
THE PRILIE MINISTER s a i d t h a t
(Previous
reference:
Cabinet 4 9 ( 5 8 ) ,
Conclusion 9.)
States
He t h o u g h t
c o l l e a g u e s w o u l d b e g l a d t o know t h a t
Government had a g r e e d t o
w h i c h we h a d s u b m i t t e d f o r
l i e was s u r e h i s
congratulate
the President
outco:.:e o f
the
was p r o b a b l e
until
t h e end o f
week.
this
for
It
that
the
of
Trade
the Board of Trade
yet been signed.
week o r
was t h e r e f o r e
-present.
proposals
colleagu.es would wish
s i g n a t u r e would not
this
news s h o u l d b e
latest
to
on
negotiations.
The T r e a t y h a d n o t
it
United
an A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
Agreement.
this
the
the
his
of
Indeed,
take
the beginning o f
t h e utmost
place
next
importance
r e g a r d e d as s t r i c t l y
that
confidential
DEFENCE P R O -
GRAMMES AND ACCELERATION.
Report of Cabinet Committee. (Previous
Reference:
C a b i n e t 52
(38),
Con­
clusion 13.
FT?.
Go
2.
The C a b i n e t
Secret
documents
had b e f o r e
on t h e
then t h e f o l l o w i n g
subject
of
Most
D e f e n c e Programmes
and
A c c e l e r a t i o n : -­
( a ) T h e R e p o r t o f t h e C a b i n e t C o m m i t t e e ( C P . - 2 4 7
( 3 8 ) ) a - p o i n t e d on 2 6 t h O c t o b e r - ; 1 9 3 8 , i n w h i c h
t h e y s e t out p r o p o s a l s put f o r w a r d by the S e r v i c e
together with
D e p a r t m e n t s and t h e Home O f f i c e
t h e i r recommendations t h e r e o n :
s
( b ) A Memorandum b y t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r A i r
( C P . - 2 1 8 ( 3 8 ) ) on R e l a t i v e A i r S t r e n g t h and
P r o p o s a l s f o r t h e Improvement o f t h i s C o u n t r y ' s
P o s i t i o n ^ f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f which by t h e
Cobineb Committee had b e e n a d j o u r n e d p e n d i n g
c o n v e r s a t i o n s between the C h a n c e l l o r o f the
E x c h e q u e r and t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r A i r :
)
(5%)
(c)
A Note by the M i n i s t e r f o r C o - o r d i n a t i o n of
D e f e n c e ( C P , - - 2 2 2 ( 3 8 ) ) c o v e r i n g a Memorandum
7, on t h e German A i r c r a f t I n d u s t r y p r e p a r e d i n
' ' c o l l a b o r a t i o n between the A i r M i n i s t r y
( i n t e l l i g e n c e ) a n d t h e Deportment o f Overseas
Trade ( i n d u s t r i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Centre) ( C . I . D .
P a p e r N o . 1472--B);
together with the relevant
e x t r a c t from the Minutes o f the 353rd M e e t i n g
o f the Committee o f I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e (Minute 9 ) .
Ft?.J-U(3q\
5
THE PRIME MINISTER
convenient
of
if
the
the Services
Cabinet
in
stated
dealt
(CP.
247 ( 3 8 ) )
were
where
stated
these
recommendations
are
ADMIRALTY
PROGRAMME.
ff£.z(3o)7
set
out
with
he
thought
the p o s i t i o n
in the Committee's
accepted without
a number o f
Report
Conclusions.
The
Committee's
in the
Cabinet
below.
the
(i.e.
the proposals
c o u l d b e met w i t h i n
allocated
the
the Admiralty f o r
put f o r w a r d
in the
sum w h i c h h a d
Committed'
been
three
years
quinquennium c o v e r e d by t h e D e f e n c e
Loans
Act
three years
April
the
explained
last
the
to
each
except
THE MINISTER FOR CO-ORDINATION OF DEFENCE
that
of
w o u l d be
Report
alteration
a s amended i n d i s c u s s i o n
in f u l l
it
turn.
The r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
in
that
1939 t o M a r c h
1942).
of
The.sura s o
a l l o c a t e d was £ 4 1 0 m i l l i o n s ,
a compromise
for
of
by
between the f i g u r e
the F i r s t
Lord of
aragrsph 2;
scort V e s s e l s .
allocation
With r e g a r d
a first
batch
explained
of
that
to
and the
o f £355
during
been impressed w i t h
the
the
to
crisis
lay
the
shortage
of
vessels
that
s h o u l d be t a k e n t o remedy t h i s
steps
c o u l d not
be l a i d
convoy
anxious
deficiency.
down u n t i l May,
to
start
1939,
any c h a n g e
be n e c e s s a r y
we p r o p o s e d
to
to
late.
Germany e a r l y
to
give
lay
vessels
was t o b e
inform
RQCOJB&,
notice
down t h e
b e f o r e May,
consideration
this
the calendar
1940.
He t h e r e f o r e
in
all
done, i t
year
must
second batch of
thought
of
that
notify
the
first
it
would
1939,
10
further
this latter
to
to
would p r o b a b l y be
nece'ssary
the
Christmas
the n o t i f i c a t i o n
our w h o l e programme
of
date
notify'
l a y down 20
i n t h e ensuing t w e l v e months.
the beginning
if
escort
asked f o r a u t h o r i t y
the proposal
He e x p l a i n e d t h a t
include
effect,
i n tgsmsEBgB,
t h e House o f Commons b e f o r e
was made t o Germany a t
(.
In
As a r e s u l t
the A d m i r a l t y
i n 1939 o f
year.
early
under
we w e r e b o u n d t o
i n o u r p r o g r a m m e t o Germany d u r i n g
f o u r months o f
escort
the
material.
the Anglo-German N a v a l Agreement
was t o o
but
collecting
THE F I R S T LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY s a i d t h a t
vessels
once
had
for
S e a L o r d was most
could be taken f o r t h w i t h
necessary
down a t
the A d m i r a l t y
work.
The s h i p s
basis
Minister
and e s c o r t
steps
asked
millions.
vessels,
The F i r s t
on t h e
being.
Minister's
the proposal
10 e s c o r t
figure
o f £443 m i l l i o n s
the A d m i r a l t y ,
t h e New S t a n d a r d F l e e t ,
provisional
this
the
for
which
calendar
the
year.
If
THE PRESIDENT OP THE BOARD OP -TRADE - B ^ e a s e d .
t h e importance which h i s Department a t t a c h e d
being
a sufficiency
age of
vessels
for
of
these v e s s e l s .
might
result
control
of
i n convoys having
or ten days b e f o r e
they could
'th
short­
convoy would s e r i o u s l y
t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s made f o r
It
A
to
upset
shipping.
to wait
eight
sail.
THE SECRET.-.RY OP STATE POR FOREIGN A F F A I R S ,
asked by the Prime M i n i s t e r as
Germany o f
lay
an armouncement
down 20 o f
cial
year,
that
these v e s s e l s
said i t
to
the
effect
we p r o p o s e d
i n the next
was n e c e s s a r y
of
to hold
I t was i m p e r a t i v e
no
justification
preparing
account,
for
for
our d e f e n c e p l a n s
that
for
the
given
t h a t we w e r e
war a g a i n s t h e r
denouncing
defence
on Germany.
Germany s h o u l d b e
saying
to
finan­
b a l a n c e e v e n l y b e t w e e n what we n e e d e d f o r
and t h e e f f e c t
on
and,
on
that
the Anglo-German
Naval
-agreement.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
said
t h a t he d i d n o t
the proposal
Looking at
wider
point
to
lay
feel
view
the S e c r e t a r y
that
the near
to prevent
steps
setting
too hard b e f o r e
further
action
of
appeasement.
about
vessels.
w i t h Germany f r o m a
t h a t he thought
future
strongly
down, t h e s e 20 e s c o r t
our r e l a t i o n s
of
very
of
State
said
should be
taken
in
t h e Munich wax
we h a d talcen some
towards implementing
He was n o t ,
at
the
our
policy
moment,
in
a position
t o make a d e f i n i t e
but he thought
t h a t we m i g h t
t h a t we s h o u l d l i k e
any s u g g e s t i o n s
matters
tell
Germany
t o know w h e t h e r
a s t o how t h e
should be
suggestion,
she had
outstanding
discussed.
THE PRIME LIIITISTER s a i d t h a t h e v/as n o t
altogether
happy about
the proposal
our programme by l a y i n g
vesselSc.
that
proposal,
the
be h i g h l y
to i t s
the year
if
desirable
Secretary
This
c o u r s e was t o
subject
end o f
the
down t h e s e 20
He had come t o t h e
the r i g h t
increase
escovt
conclusion,
agree
to
before
should appear
from the p o i n t
for
however,
this
reconsideration
this
of State
to
Foreign
c o u r s e was a g r e e d
of
to
view
of
Affairs.
to.
THE MINISTER FOR CO-ORDINATION OF DEFENCE
then e x p l a i n e d b r i e f l y
the Cabinet
Admiralty
It
was a g r e e d
that
to bear
some s h a r e o f
to
relating
to
in
the
programme,.
the
that
other proposals
Committee's Report
whether
Harbour.
the
it
should be
Southern Railway
considered
should be
the cost
of
The v i e w was e x p r e s s e d ,
invited
dredging
Dover
however,
t h e d r e d g i n g w o u l d n o t b e o f much v a l u e
the Railway
Company,,
1 a3
THE MINISTER FOR CO-OiUINATION
WAR OFFICE PROGRAMME. explained
A n t i - A i r oral" t
Equipment.
(Paragraph 16)
that
t h e main p r o p o s a l s
Army d e a l t w i t h A . A .
"Ideal
Scheme" f o r
had p r o v i d e d
present
for
defences.
authorised
The
scheme v/as f o r
3 " guns r e l i n e d .
observed that
was a m i s t a k e
as
to
the
so-called
of
Great
Britain
modern t j f p e s .
320 w o u l l he t h e
it
relating
the A i r Defence
1264 g u n s o f
OF DEFENCE
The
928 g u n s ,
of
which
In passing,
to regard
the
he
3"
guns
ineffective.
The p r e s e n t p r o p o s a l
was t h a t
Ac e q u i p m e n t s a u t h o r i s e d f o r
Great B r i t a i n
In addition,
should be p r o v i d e d
of
the A i r Defence
should be i n c r e a s e d
modern t y p e s .
686 a d d i t i o n a l
for ports
guns o f
new
t h e number
to
1264,
all
another
50 o r
so
abroad,
making a
to
obtain the
would be n e c e s s a r y
to
c r e a t e new c a p a c i t y ,
to place
the necessary
additional
an o r d e r now f o r
additional
capacity
the present
the p r o v i s i o n
present
was,
of
however,
A.A.
guns t o
capacity
the
still
gunso
A.A.
t o be b u i l t
up.
guns.
out t h a t ,
guns.
to
At
of
on the p r o d u c t i o n
field
guns.
in order
guns t o b e p r o d u c e d
that
was
enable
field
required
f u r t h e r postponement
He t h o u g h t
it
and i t
t o employ our c a p a c i t y
indefinitely
was t h e r e f o r e
meet most o f
A?A"
for
the e x c l u s i o n
additional
guns,
the
guns had a b s o l u t e p r i o r i t y .
impossible
gun m a n u f a c t u r e
total
p r o p o s a l was l i n k e d up. w i t h
capacity
time, A.A.
guns
300 guns t o
The M i n i s t e r a l s o p o i n t e d
some e x t e n t ,
of
types.
In order
desired
of
of
for
of
The new
to
enable
without
the p r o v i s i o n
of
the present proposal
the c r i t i c i s m
It
t h a t we h a d n o t
field
would
got
enough
.1 £ 4
A. K -t In reply
was p r o p o s e d t o
of
an e x i s t i n g
to
create
Possible
the
who t h o u g h t
fact
to provide
that,
these
Broadly
Empire,
not
a thicker
at the present
calibre
by the
from o t h e r
time,
to
extension
the
to protect
find
additional
additional
It
was a
we h a d demands f o r
guns
w i t h i n and w i t h o u t
the
the
increase
His o n l y doubt was w h e t h e r
He s u g g e s t e d
that
Staff
might be d e s i r a b l e
should a g a i n c o n s i d e r
Defence
f r o m "the p o i n t
of
of
a d v i s i n g whether
the
was a g r e e d
o r d i n a t i o n o f Defence
the
a further
that
review of
take
It
gun s h e l l )
p r o p o s e d was n o t
although
it
that
on
Secretary.
ae to
A.A.
and t h a t
in exoess
discussion,
paragraph were
the o r d e r s d e a l t
to shell
of
different
the a d d i t i o n a l
o f u l t i m a t e Army
was i n e x c e s s o f
After
to
approved.
was e x p l a i n e d
field
Co­
the necessary s t e p s
recommendations
p a r a g r a p h 20 r e l a t e d m a i n l y
(mainly
for
t h e Home D e f e n c e p i c t u r e
l i n e s p r o p o s e d b y t h e Home
equipments were
this
the M i n i s t e r
should
The C o m m i t t e e ^
Jing
tion F i r m s
Eduction,
agraph 2 0 )
was
balanced.
It
secure
of
Home
programme a s a l t e r e d b y t h e a d d i t i o n s now p r o p o s e d
properly
with
that the C h i e f s
the whole q u e s t i o n o f
view
the
when
t h e p r o p o s a l s now u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n h a d b e e n d e a l t
it
of
meet.
p r o p o s e d was a d e q u a t e .
by the Cabinet,
had
Vickers
concentration.
THE HOME SECRETARY t h o u g h t t h a t
p r o p o s e d was i n e v i t a b l e .
it
labour d i f f i c u l t i e s
speaking,
sources,
w h i c h we w e r e u n a b l e
increase
that
t h a t t h e y would be a b l e t o
guns o r d e r e d w e r e r e q u i r e d ,
but
was e x p l a i n e d
firm concerned (Messrs.
the necessary labour.
areas,
it
t h e new c a p a c i t y
factory.
been discussed w i t h
Armstrong),
questions,
with.in
types
order
requirements,
what had a l r e a d y
been authorised
:
the Committee's proposals
accepted.
now;
in
I
loiopensation­
ln c o n n e c t i o n
[ith P r i o r i t i e s ,
[paragraph 2 3 4
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER s a i d
d i d n o t deny t h a t
cases
such a s
t h i s paragraph might a r i s e
would be n e c e s s a r y .
t h e r e was a g r e a t
prooedure
acting
individual
procedure
civil
He t h o u g h t ,
now p r o p o s e d
on the l i n e s
cases.
be included
exceptional
that
t h e r e might be
if
the
the
He t h o u g h t
the procedure
former
cases where a
would share
Clause,
in
that
and
the P e n a l t y
that
however,
as a standard formula,
He was a f r a i d
he
concession
the
c u s t o m e r and c o n t r a c t o r
most u n d e s i r a b l e
to
betv/een a d o p t i n g
suggested in
was a d o p t e d ,
proceeds o f
those r e f e r r e d
i n w h i c h some
difference
that
it
suggested
in the authorised p r a c t i c e
of
was
should
Government
Departments.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR s u g g e s t e d
be p o s s i b l e
provided
to deal
that i f
was i s s u e d ,
require
loss
that
it
w i t h the m a t t e r by a B i l l
a certificate
of
particular
t h e Government would have
absolute p r i o r i t y ,
s u s t a i n e d by the
and. t h a t
the
in
f i r m should be
might
which
urgency
right
to
such c a s e s
recouped.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE
thought
handling
that
this matter
required very
and h e s u g g e s t e d t h a t
-had a r i s e n
the
few
s h o u l d b e d e a l t w i t h ad Jboc-o
careful
cases
which
any
It
v/as a g r e e d
to
accept
the
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n made b y t h e C o m m i t t e e ,
the
addition of
case i s
dealt
subject
the words"on the b a s i s
w i t h on i t s
With regard
to
that
to
each
merits"*
the R d l e o f
the
Army,
t h e MINISTER FOR CO-ORDINATION OP DEFENCE
said
that
making
a l o n g memorandum had b e e n
proposals
Army.,
to
increase
the
effectiveness
The C o m m i t t e e h a d f e l t
question of
policy
within their
memorandum,
should be
submitted
that,
was i n v o l v e d ,
Terms o f
and t h e y
remitted
Reference
thought
to
it
of
as a
the
major
would not
to deal with
that
the
be
this
matter
the Committee o f
Imperial
Defence .
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR s a i d
the General
views
Staff
were
on t h i s m a t t e r
record.
unable
In
their
to f u l f i l
should be
view,
of
State)
attached considerable
increase
take
these
Imperial
that
This
their
formal
its
present
obligationso
added t h a t
to
he
the
proposals
the T e r r i t o r i a l
the b e s t p l a n would be
two m a t t e r s up a t
Defence
s e t on
importance
the equipment o f
and h e t h o u g h t
that
t h e Army was a t
certain of
He ( t h e S e c r e t a r y
to
very anxious
the
Committee
to
of
c
c o u r s e was a g r e e d
that
to.
(The F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty
meeting at t h i s p o i n t . )
left
the
Army
THE MINISTER FOR COORDINATION CP DE7E2TCE
said that
the Chancellor
Secretary
of
State for
Air
m a t t e r w h i c h had v e r y
The A p p e n d i x t o
the Exchequer
serious
R e p o r t had b e e n
at
on
financial
in the discussions
tv/o M i n i s t e r s
and
had c o n f e r r e d
paper,
out
between
Committee s
t h e t i n e when t h e
1
submitted.
necessary
to
circulate
as h e was a n x i o u s t h a t
should have b e f o r e
He w i s h e d t o
the Chancellor
of
He t h o u g h t
that
it
of
weakness
very special
in the a i r
in this
sphere o f
and a n x i e t y which e x i s t e d
from t h e p o i n t
o u r own w e a k n e s s
handicap to
would a l s o
in his
assist
t o make t o o b t a i n
give
it
thanks
attitude
country­
importance.
and
the
the
other
causing the
view o f
world
If
appeasement,
our- a i r
would g i v e
further
limitation
the h e l p which i t
to
the
peace.
w h i c h we h o p e d
armaments.
position
serious
strength
efforts for
of
a
strength
us i n t h e e f f o r t s
unrest
to-day.
was o b v i o u s l y
s t r e n g t h e n i n g our a i r
our diplomacy
the
the world
our diplomacy.
Prime M i n i s t e r
only by
in
i n the a i r
could be i n c r e a s e d ,
It
of
his
generally
this
P o w e r s w h i c h was t h e m a i n f a c t o r
Again,
for
would be
v/as G e r m a n y ' s s t r e n g t h
relative
express
discussions.
t h e a i r defences o f
occupied a position
It
lengthy
colleagues
the Exchequer
t h a t he had a d o p t e d i n t h e i r
agreed that
this
a
that
them t h e p o s i t i o n a s s e e n b y
the A i r Ministry.
to
this
set
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR A I R s a i d
he had found i t
the
implications.
the Committee's Report
the stage reached
those
of
that
It
we
required.
was
could
Prom t h e d o m e s t i c
our weakness
great
the
in the
anxiety
to
Government
air
the
in
point
of
was t h e
view,
cause
country.
of
The p o s i t i o n
t h i s m a t t e r was
of
further
c o m p l i c a t e d b y t h e p l e d g e s w h i c h had b e e n
given
were
in regard to
air
aggressor
the course
the
end o f
of
strength
of
h i s P a p e r was i n t e n d e d
that
the paper
affairs.
He was s u r e ,
German s t r e n g t h
If
have been v e r y
and so f a r
so f a r
State
that
for
of
perhaps
which
of
it
certainly
German
it
under-estimated
the c a p a c i t y
engage
grave.
i n war i n
of
c o n t i n u e d an e f f e c t i v e
Our f i r s t
line
We c o u l d o n l y
fight
September,
a i r was c o n c e r n e d ,
as r e s e r v e s w e r e c o n c e r n e d ,
period.
air
thought
state
and was
as the
was h i g h l y p r e c a r i o u s .
short
the
the
industry.
v/e h a d h a d t o
our p o s i t i o n ,
of
a serious
and i n p a r t i c u l a r
t h e German a i r c r a f t
contained
of
He
however,
anything,
Labour
in the p o s i t i o n
n o t b a s e d on any o v e r - e s t i m a t e
If
The
countries.
to meet.
disclosed
to
o b t a i n e d from
Secretary
c o n t a i n e d no e x a g g e r a t i o n ,
strength.
uifficult
an e s t i m a t e
w e r e t h e main f a c t o r s
any
us.
submitted by the
information
the
attack
rebate.
and o t h e r
said
with
Summer S e s s i o n
including
this
These,
Air,
the
appeared to be
Air Ministry,
to
w h i c h was v e r y
Memorandum w h i c h h a d b e e n
Party at
equality
who was i n a p o s i t i o n
with in
These
as m e a n i n g t h a t v/e
some m e a s u r e o f
T h i s was a m a t t e r
what
strength.
i n t e r p r e t e d by p e o p l e
should a t t a i n
deal
our
in the
air
would
was w e a k ,
the
position
have
for
a very
His colleagues
- s t a t e o f
affairs
might
would not he
programme a u t h o r i s e a
implemented.
of
State
Germany.
of
Rather
giving
aircraft
when
it
orders
for
had
however,
equality
was b a s e d on t h e
sufficient
industry
of
fully
to occupy
a given period.
a very
the d i r e c t i o n
of
in
He i n v i t e d
the a i r .
connection
action
action.
our r e s e r v e
force
called
should be
strength
with the
and t h e
latest
to b r i n g
strength of
add d e p t h a s w e l l
as
this
for
that
further
a considerable
the development
Secondly,
b u i l d i n g up o u r
say t h a t
dissent
of
of
to
the
from t h e s e
two
of
increase
in
We s h o u l d
continue
and t h i s
to
involved
en.
He was g l a d
the Exchequer d i d
proposals.
The
capacity.
we must c o n c e n t r a t e
the Chancellor
of
organisation.
period,
strengths
in
machines.
Force.
our p r o d u c t i v e
fighter
further"
equipment
We s h o u l d b u i l d up a F o r c e w h i c h c o u l d
operate over
the
increase
about a g r e a t
length
some
f o u n d e d on two
types
the A i r
in
218(38j.
f i r s t l y , a considerable
r e s u l t would be
the r e a l
clearly
CP.
we
strength
in
He was c o n f i d e n t
to be taken
principles:
our
attention
the
Indeed,
advance
German
t o p a r a g r a p h 35 o f
The p o s i t i o n
further
limited
approaching
with
principle
when t h e p r e s e n t programme was c o m p l e t e d ,
s h o u l d h a v e made b u t
the
Lord
for Air,
That programme,
was n o t b a s e d on any m e a s u r e s
this
r e m e d i e d when
i n May l a s t ,
S w i n t o n was S e c r e t a r y
been
ask whether
not
to
The S e c r e t a r y
bomber s t r e n g t h ,
of
State then d e a l t
which he r e g a r d e d
Bombers w e r e a v e r y
consideration
of
expensive
of his
with
our
counter-d^fensive.
as our
item indeed,
and any
programme f r o m t h e f i n a n c i a l
v i e w would n a t u r a l l y
be l a r g e l y
point
concerned with
this
item.
The S e c r e t a r y
and t h a t
that
of
the Air
of
State
Ministry,
necessary
force
to
if
that
our r e a l
was t h a t
other
ensure
while
that
any c o u n t r y
the
Further,
b e s t means o f
country
Germany's p o l i c y
make a l t e r a t i o n s
for
a substantial
was p o s s i b l e
this
to concentrate
was
bomber
us
deterrent
get
on l e v e l
In
to
g i v e u s some
types,
degree
of
terms
types:
i n h e r programme
of
the
concentrate
number o f
measure
on h e a v i e r
until
strength.
the
It
field
which were
damage and
also
capable
which
advantage.
From t h e f i n a n c i a l
if
right
it
attack
c o u n t r y , w h i c h came i n t o
a much g r e a t e r
a bomber f o r c e
to
a limited
she had a t t a i n e d
obtain
war,
had b e e n t o
Germany d i d n o t
for
was
a h e a v y bomber programme a f f o r d e d
orders
would t h e r e b y
it
v/orth t h e c a n d l e .
was t h e b e s t
on g i v i n g l a r g e
inflicting
own v i e w ,
fighters,
wishing to
game was n o t
enabling this
w i t h Germany.
later,
of
aim was t o p r e v e n t
w o r d s , t h e bomber f o r c e
a v o i d war.
his
we s h o u l d a l s o h a v e a s u f f i c i e n t
would r e a l i s e t h a t
cost
that
we s h o u l d b u i l d up a s t r o n g f o r c e
nevertheless
of
said
point
of v i e w ,
w i t h a g i v e n bomb l i f t
we c o n s t r u c t e d h e a v y
bombers
than i f
we
at
could
less
we
c o n s t r u c t e d medium b o m b e r s .
A considerable
industry
was e n g a g e d
proportion
of t h e
in manufacturing
aircraft
h e a v y bomber
types,
and i t
the
was i m p o s s i b l e
industry
at
the present
There
were
was t h e
it
was n e c e s s a r y
the p l a c e
of
the
attached
a special
p a r a g r a p h 34 o f
further
jigs
under t h i s
of
Memorandum,
e.g.,
the worst,
Reserve
Chancellor
of
it
discussed
the
of
their
situation.
in
Exchequer
v/ith b y
and h i m s e l f
for
that
proposed
to
a
his
the Royal A i r
could be d e a l t
Force,
He t h o u g h t
the
in
consultation,
them t o
be
Cabinet.
of
of
importance,
repercussions
secondly from the p o i n t
at
in
of
action
and t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s .
with the p r e s e n t a t i o n
of
in
He t h o u g h t
the
State
for Air
then
these proposals,
first
w h i c h was
from t h e p o i n t
on I t a l y
of
and Germany,
of view of
dealt
As r e g a r d s t h e f o r m e r
and
Parliamentary
of
aspect,
he g a v e
a c o n v e r s a t i o n which had t a k e n
b e t w e e n t h e German A i r
Attache
and t h e
Chief
of
view
upinion
home.
particulars
to
t h a t he­
the purchase
contained
increase
The S e c r e t a r y
t h e utmost
said
then the
we
out.
the p r o p o s a l
would n o t be n e c e s s a r y
in the
orders
State then referred
proposals
the
these matters
and t h a t
to
Air
h e a d w o u l d e n a b l e us t o meet
ancillary
Volunteer
for
if
productive
follow-on
and m a t e r i a l s .
The S e c r e t a r y
number o f
State
Memorandum f o r
came t o
that
o r d e r s now b e i n g c a r r i e d
and t o o l s
t h e worst
that
consideration
to place
importance
his
from
time.
further
The S e c r e t a r y
if
discharges
t o s u c c e e d i n b u i l d i n g up a r e a s o n a b l e
capacity,
take
to contemplate
some
place
of
the
Air
Staff
that morning,
i n t h e Sunday p r e s s
out
of
an i m m e d i a t e
character
any s t a t e m e n t
give
reserves.
of
of
So f a r
large
to
clear
of
as t o
defensive
the
of
we
the
of
the r e s e r v e s
make p r o v i s i o n
aircraft
of
Governments
of
our
counter­
pax^ticularly
special
State
emphasised t h a t
types
N o r d i d he p r o p o s e
our
intention
to
he
in regard
to
did
to
make
concentrate
to
indicate
that there
s t r e n g t h would be i n c r e a s e d ,
Force
intended
strengthening
our o v e r s e a s r e q u i r e m e n t s ,
*ho the n e c e s s i t y
that
on
type.
in the l i g h t
Royal Air
the
training.
He a l s o p r o p o s e d
sary,
thought,
he
strength.
t h e h e a v y bomber
overseas
he
as "bombers w e r e c o n c e r n e d ,
and t o
for
any s t a t e m e n t
our
carry
strength
that
n o t p r o p o s e t o make any announcement
be a r e v i e w
to
to
The S e c r e t a r y
reserve
statement
in regard
numbers o f
indispensable
our
a
Air proposed
s a y no more t h a n t h a t
defensive f o r c e
the
for
and p a r t i c u l a r l y
i n t e n t i o n v/as to i n c r e a s e
for
emphasising
State
priority
force
proposed to
in the
conversation,
s h o u l d make i t
highest
our f i g h t e r
of
o u r programme.
The S e c r e t a r y
to
increase
This
importance
of
result
t h a t we w e r e p r o p o s i n g
large
the A i r F o r c e .
showed t h e
as t h e
of
for
that
review.
and o f
t.h
and
if
that
neces­
He w o u l d a l s o
accelerating
reserve
would
the t r a i n i n g
Q
Royal
M.v
of
refer
the
fbroi i t s e l f
The S e c r e t a r y
of
State
it
s h o u l d b e made c l e a r
of
our p r e v i o u s
strength,
it
objective,
adequate
declarations
our weakness,
this
to
point,
necessary to
of
reassure
very
to
line
that
were
to
say
could be
the
the
taking,
The f i g u r e
to
provoke undesirable
give
reasonable
ooncerned.
on t h i s
in
of
that
so f a r
consultation.
it
mainly
of
was
in
effort
our
the
rest,
be expressed
proposed,
the
in
steps
terms o f
i n Germany,
as
this
but
country
in
order
such a n a t u r e
the p u b l i c
the Exchequer,
us.
concerned.
For
the p o s i t i o n
repercussions
by
continued,
r. r e a l
some r e a l m e a s u r e o f
should be s e t t l e d
the Chancellor
attack
had b e e n
wc w e r e i n c r e a s i n g
assurance
Force
State
as t h e A i r was
He p r o p o s e d t h a t
point
and h i m s e l f ,
country
s h o u l d n o t be
our
Germany.
He t h e r e f o r e
express
stated
of
saiu. w o u l d n e c e s s a r i l y
country
any
Air
an A i r
to presentation
s t r e n g t h "rw 3 0 &
terms.
oixr
t h e p i c t u r e was t h a t
that
Fighter
general
give
to
would be tempted to
w^s now b e i n g made s o f a r
He p r o p o s e d
whilst
so t h a t no c o u n t r y ,
the p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s
side
that,
t h a t we s h o u l d now s t a t e
the Secretary
in regard
The o t h e r
all
regard
o u r own n e c e s s i t i e s
his proposals
first
in
n a m e l y t h a t we must p o s s e s s
Up t o
directed
thought
t h a t v;e d i d n o t w i t h d r a w
was i m p o r t a n t
for
r e a s o n of
also
we
money.
as
to
should
was
announcement
by t h e P r i m e
Minister,
the Foreign
Secretary
(lie
he
gave
difficulty
the f i g u r e
in
of
w o u l d he
for
the
comparatively
programme now p u t f o r w a r d
the
real
a t t e m p t by
that
although
represented
a
very
of
the A i r .
the present p r o p o s a l s
When t h e
Cabinet
t h e i r
deliberations
would
deal with particular
decisions
in
regard
to
to
proposals
to
give
could be
it
with
country's
Committee had
-chat,
started
while
they
individually,
those proposals
o h e time f a c t o r
Committee
on t h e
t h e y had d e c i d e d
r e v i e w when t h e p i c t u r e
Owing
the
small,
from
only,
first
financeSo
to
year
THE CHANCELLOR OP THE EXCIU'juIi.R d e a l t
in
country
first
resulting
our
effect
this
cost
if
t o make up for
deficiencies
the
cojoue.c_t.ion wa-a^that
additional
the "present p r o p o s a l s
figure
this
s h o u l d be
their
subject
seen as a w h o l e .
had n o t b e e n p o s s i b l e
any c o n s p e c t u s
of
their
for
proposals
as a w h o l e .
The C h a n c e l l o r
and a h a l f
years'
years
ago,
programme
programmes
of
t o b e met b y
of
for
country
the
total
£1,500 m i l l i o n s ,
second
Defence.
stage
out by
in
of
the
the
the M i n i s t e r
the A d m i r a l t y
such a l l o c a t i o n
and f o r
substantially.
had b e e n f i x e d f o r
It
was
certain
P r o g r a m m e s a s now p r e s e n t e d
and i t
might
the
programme
over f i v e
years.
the
Co-ordination
fixed
Office,^-u£-yfb
the A i r
The p r e s e n t p r o p o s a l s now a l t e r e d
q u i ncjuenni urn.
of
o r r a t i o n had b e e n
t h e War
the
programme
cost
for
that
would be
the
the
over
five
at
t h e programme h a d b e e n
An a l l o c a t i o n
two
The amount o f
t a x a t i o n was £ 1 , 1 0 0 m i l l i o n s
carried
millions,
that,
had e m b a r k e d upon a
re-armament.
Since
was then p u t a t
review
the
colleagues
t o b e met b y b o r r o w i n g h a d b e e n f i x e d
5400 m i l l i o n s .
The
reminded h i s
Ministry.
position
cost
of
tike
£2,000
w e l l be £2,100 m i l l i o n s
for
the
In
1957 we h a d s p e n t £ 2 6 2 m i l l i o n s
including Air
Raid Precautions.
on
1958 t h e
w a s £369 m i l l i o n s ,
making a t o t a l
for
o f £631 m i l l i o n s o
If
the t o t a l
the
cost
was now o v e r £ 2 , 0 0 0 m i l l i o n s
something
like
The T r e a s u r y
rates
of
taxation
e.g ,
This
estimate
the s o c i a l
on t h e b a s i s
expenditure
interest
0
at
the present
On t h e b a s i s
of
this
from t a x a t i o n
on t h e
in that
of £1,400 m i l l i o n s
an i n c r e a s e
t o any
of
borrowed
in the
£725 m i l l i o n s
to
years,
as
in A p r i l
within
Act
years
find
during
expenditure
therefore,
from b o r r o w i n g and/or
this
great
any s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t
the
total
defence
plus
:
0
a
in paragraph 5 of
CP.-247
(38),
which,
moderate
statement
authorised
in
D
He i n v i t e d
attention
the Appendix
he t h o u g h t , w a s
of the
results
of
a
task
to
of
millions
1937 a n d 1938 -
was w h e t h e r t h i s
from
sum was
1939 t o M a r c h 1942,- i . e *
question
our powers,,
statement
increase.
T h e r e was,
Assuming t h a t
raise
on
to be borrowed over the p e r i o d of
Loans
The r e a l
b*"t n o
defence
c o m p a r e d w i t h £400 m i l l i o n s
the Defence
expenditure.
quinquennium would b e £178
financial
o f £903 m i l l i o n s
other
existing basis
v a s t sum b y i n c r e a s e d t a x a t i o n ) ,
the
millions
expenditure
rate,
0
years.
present
( a n d he l o o k e d f o r w a r d w i t h
efforts
borrowing over
three
f i n d £225
a total
t o b e met e i t h e r
found by borrowing
anxiety
t o meet
in taxation.
find
c a l c u l a t i o n we c o u l d
years
£725 m i l l i o n s
of
on d e b t a n d c i v i l
assumed a c o n t i n u a n c e
period
years
programme
a f t e r meeting
the next three
this
to
services
£675 m i l l i o n s
two
over the next
we m i g h t manage
a year f o r Defence
charges,
of
the
figure
we s h o u l d h a v e t o
£1,400 m i l l i o n s
estimated that
defence,
was
the
to
very
excessive
total
five
borrowing.
It
was q u i t e
certain
that
sum c o u l d n o t h e p r o v i d e d o u t o f
this
country.
At
have
considerations
defence
tolerable.
needs.
It
we s h o u l d n o t
a very large
carrying
financial
It
was c l e a r
ordinarily
of
vital
of
to
justification
importance
do
especially
the
of
the Defence
to estimate
of
forces.
He t h o u g h t
which i t
a large
that
was
in order
of
this
factor
essential
contemplate
expenditure
the A i r
to previous
of
to bear
figure
a year.,
which
estimates.
maintenance
i n mind.
Ministry
Force
The
p u t a t £110 m i l l i o n s
addition
to
endure
He h a d a s k e d t h e A i r
cost
to
Force.
to
the maintenance
the r e v i s e d Programme.
had b e e n t e n t a t i v e l y
represented
referred
b u t he t h o u g h t n o - o n e w o u l d
the maintenance
on t h e b a s i s
for
articles
p r o v i d e d f r o m b o r r o w e d money w e r e l i k e l y
we s h o u l d b o r r o w f o r
undertook
so.
borrowing
if
that
intention
enlarged A i r
for
over
as
the Exchequer a l s o
the
purely
should
and t h e n f o u n d t h a t
maintenance o f
b u i l d up o u r f o r c e s ,
that
arrangements
contemplate
r e a s o n s we w e r e u n a b l e
some t i m e ;
we
a n d a n n o u n c e d our
through,
The C h a n c e l l o r
for
that
i n t o a p o s i t i o n w h e r e b y we
programme,
There might be
that
financial
was, however,
get
it
of
of
should have p r i o r i t y
to he p r e p a r e d t o f a c e
the cost
the savings
w h i c h we s h o u l d n o t
of
enormous
t h e same t i m e he d i d n o t s u g g e s t
financial
vital
this
c o s t s was
one
The C h a n c e l l o r
also
referred
w h i c h he had e x p e r i e n c e d i n
large figures
and w h i c h i t
of
programme, w i t h
strength.
explanation
lay mainly
rate,
to order
of
difficulty
the
already
the f i g u r e s
and r e s e r v e
the
reconciling
aeroplanes
was p r o p o s e d
to
very
ordered
u n d e r t h e new
our
first-line
He u n d e r s t o o d t h a t
in the very high
and i n t h e number o f m a c h i n e s
the
v/astage
required
for
training.
Turning
Chancellor
of
to paragraph
30 o f
the Exchequer
C.P.-218
said that
cost
t h e new F i g h t e r programme
there
millions,
t h e Bomber programme
and t h e c o s t
£175 m i l l i o n s .
of
These f i g u r e s
the machines
maintenance
only
construction
the Chancellor
single
of
cost
for
the v e r y
were important
had r e i n f o r c e d
the types
these very big
his view that
special
and t h a t
it
emphasis
This
there
favour
consideration
was d e s i r a b l e
on p r i o r i t y
on t h e F i g h t e r
orders
flown.
that
and i n
proposed that
that
for
the
manifestly
special
part
should be placed
the t o t a l f i g h t e r
no
machines
he f e l t
Such a programme was
emphasis s h o u l d b e l a i d
of
on
type,
now p r o p o s e d h a d
nevertheless
He t h e r e f o r e
one-half
l a r g e bomber
on h e a v y b o m b e r s .
F i g h t e r programme.
defensive.
concentrate
arguments b o t h a g a i n s t
concentrating
we s h o u l d l a y
to
the Exchequer p o i n t e d out that
would c a r r y armour,
for
covered the
the p r o p o s a l
of
specimen of
programme,
of
o u t was £45
and made n o p r o v i s i o n
W h i l e he a p p r e c i a t e d t h a t
of
the
charges.
In regard to
the
of
set
the
(38),
programme.
of
the
forthwith
A S r e g a r d s Bombers
sufficient
orders
dismissals
in
the C h a n c e l l o r
should be p l a c e d
the a i r c r a f t
s e c u r e an a d e q u a t e
flow
to
factories
thought
avoid
substantial
concerned,
of p r o d u c t i o n .
to
volume o f
secure r a p i d
Some o f
production,
completion
t h e r e was a n o r m a l
For
should p r o c e e d
selves
to
of
orders,
complement
of
time being,
on t h i s b a s i s ,
the v a s t
to
difficult
to
yet
in
ensure
thought
and s h o u l d n o t
that
those
that
we
commit
oxitlay i n v o l v e d by the whole
find
full
it
of
our­
the
very
meet,
As r e g a r d s
p a r a g r a p h 52 o f
h e was n o t
a
employment i n
he
to
orders.
h e a v y Bomber p r o g r a m m e , w h i c h we m i g h t
difficult
of
was
were not
would be n e c e s s a r y
the
it
existing
t h e shadow f a c t o r i e s
and i t
factorieso
follow-on
and
Experience
showed t h a t u n l e s s c o n t r a c t o r s w e r e a s s u r e d
sufficient
that"­
clear
t h e 2,4-00 " o t h e r
CP.
218(58),
types"
the
referred
Chancellor
why p r o p o r t i o n a l
to
said
i n c r e a s e s were
in
that
required
i n Army c o - o p e r a t i o n m a c h i n e s and i n t h e F l e e t - a i r Arm.
He thought
Secretary
that
of
this
State
As r e g a r d s
demand m i g h t b e
for
Air
and h i m s e l f
the proposed
r o n s , he a g r e e d w i t h
the
examined by
increase
Secretary
of
in
in
the
consultation.
Overseas
State
for
Squad­
air
t h i s matter might be r e m i t t e d t o t h e Committee o f
that
Imperial
Defence.
He t h o u g h t
right
that
in the great
provision
of
jigs,
the Secretary
ence
tools
and m a t e r i a l s ,
capacity.
t o b e made i n
t o the f a c t
f o r Air
importance which he a t t a c h e d
increasing potential
statement
of State
that
t h e House s h o u l d i n c l u d e
talcen i n
he thought
Secretary
could
of
dealt
v/ith i n C P .
e a s i l y be adjusted between
a
State f o r
Air
-21­
and h i m s e l f .
refer­
this
218(58)
the
to
the
direction.
The o t h e r p r o p o s a l s
the
with a view
He a g r e e d t h a t
steps were being
to
was
T o sum u p ,
h i s main p o i n t
the Chancellor' o f
was t h a t we s h o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e
Fighter
programme.
propose
that
involved
necessary
As regards
the Cabinet
definite
the p l a c i n g
of
orders
if
rises
but
strength,
which
in f ull
work.
inflation.
clear
T h i s w o u l d mean
and i n i n t e r e s t
some r e a l
injury
rates,
t o our
which c o n s t i t u t e d a f o u r t h
and
financial
arm o f
defence.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOME AFFAIRS s a i d
that
h e was much i m p r e s s e d w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t made b y
the
Chancellor
con­
of
the Exchequer.
He s u g g e s t e d
s i d e r a t i o n might be g i v e n i n the near
q u e s t i o n whether
Government's
Continuing,
that
it
an e x a m p l e ,
that
our
for
of
first
figure
for
This
the
outside
far
of
the f i r s t - l i n e
in refraining
shop window.
of
for
Air
State
he
thought
but
To
give
proposed to
increased
t o a n y b o d y an
would not
for Air
to
give
strength.
a l s o wondered whether
AJ.r was n o t
all,
years
which everybody
woxxld b e
convey
from p v i t t i n g h i s
After
the
t h e House o f Commons
He a s k e d w h e t h e r i t
Secretary
State
for
strength,
would not
T h e Home S e c r e t a r y
Secretary
State
30 o r 4 0 S q u a d r o n s ,
3,700 F i g h t e r s .
possible
explain to
of
line Fighter
cent.
the
Germany,
t h e programme now p r o p o s e d .
the Secretary
was now a b o u t
30 p e r
said that
could e a s i l y be explained to
extent
to
War.
t h e Home S e c r e t a r y
would not b e easy t o
the r e a l
future
a s had b e e n d o n e i n t h e
immediately p r e c e d i n g the Great
t h e programme
that
the Opposition should be taken i n t o
confidence,
be
t h e programme now p r o p o s e d we
i n wages,
involve
not
authorise
s i d e he w a s b y no means
through without
might w e l l
t h e Bombers h e d i d
f r o m Bombers a s q u i c k l y a s m i g h t
we w e r e t o a d o p t
in prices,
that
on t h e
t h a t we s h o u l d
to keep the f a c t o r i e s
should get
said
should reach a conclusion
figures,
On t h e f i n a n c i a l
that
the Exchequer
going rather
goods i n
the
too
the
one main p u r p o s e o f
the
say
knew
by
order
be
some
Royal A i r
F o r c e was t o
was t h e r e f o r e
the
act
as a d e t e r r e n t ,
much t o be s a i d f o r
impressive
size
Finally,
laying
and s t r e n g t h o f
by the A i r
Defence Research Committee.
perhaps
of
the
of
of
air
warfare.
the utmost
e v e n more
to
the
Much h a d b e e n
Air
importance,
a t t e n t i o n might
scientific
his Paper,
and he t h o u g h t
be p a i d
to
i n which r e f e r e n c e
research.
in his
had a l r e a d y
this
to
strengthen
of p r e s e n t a t i o n ,
his
finger
from e x p r e s s i n g
that
Co:nmons
He
the
staff
he thought
that
there
was a n y
way,
our r e a l F i g h t e r
strength
would
to
disclose
validity
relation
t o Bombers.
this
any f i g u r e
argument
of
add t o
proposed.
was p e r h a p s
alternative
the f i r s t - l i n e
money,
reserves,
in regard to Fighters
Another
the
diffi­
of
less
to
concerned
in terms
somewhat
c o u r s e , be
0
t h e programme
a l t h o u g h he a g r e e d t h a t
of
to
this
b e i n c r e a s e d many t i m e s b y t h e programme now
He was r e l u c t a n t
para­
to
on t h e r e a l
He h a d c o n s i d e r e d w h e t h e r
indicating
to
research.
Home S e c r e t a r y h a d p u t
culty.
i n t h e House o f
taken steps
On t h e p o i n t
of
that
aspect
was made
He s a i d he w o u l d r e f e r
statement
scientific
apart
was
matter.
g r a p h 38 o f
with
done
defence
THE SECRETARY OF STATS FOR A I R r e f e r r e d
matter
on
Force.
t h e Rome S e c r e t a r y r e f e r r e d
aspect
there
emphasis
our A i r
scientific
now a m a t t e r
and
of
than
in
would,
strength
of
Fighters.
matter
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR A I R t h o u g h t
t h a t i t was a
for
should be
consideration
whether
explained
in
somewhat m o r e
detail
leaders of
the O p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s
the p o s i t i o n
confidentially
and a l s o
to Mr.
to
the
Churchill.
In regard
the Secretary
feel
that
the A i r
it
of
w o u l d he
of
that
the
increase
s t a t e how much o f
s a i d t h a t he d i d
say t h a t
not
whereas
current year wore
of
to
£80 m i l l i o n s
£120
that
next y e a r ' 3
t h e new p r o g r a m m e ,
o n l y £25
millions
t h e p r o p o s a l s now u n d e r
He t h o u g h t
0
presentation
t h e y w o u l d h e £200 m i l l i o n s ,
attributable
discuss ion
Air
enough t o
for
next year
would he
to
t h e manner o f
State for
Estimates
niillions,
since
to
if
h e was a s k e d
e x p e n d i t u r e was
h e was bound t o
answer
to
due
that
question.
THE CHANCELLOR OP THE EXCHEQUER s a i d t h a t
would f i n d
difficulty
t h e programme
further
if
in
i n terms
agreeing
of
money
ahead than 1939-40.
we a n n o u n c e d t h a t
to
to
would be
we i n t e n d e d t o
l a r g e programme and l a t e r
a statement
related
It
he
a
of
period
disastrous
carry
out a
had t o c a n c e l p a r t
very
of
the
programme.
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR A I R , w h i l e
this
difficulty,
questions:
r e p e a t e d t h a t he would be asked
first,
how f a r
the Government s
w i t h Germany;
v/as t h e
t h e new p r o g r a m m e .
w o u l d be v e r y
of
difficxilt
question by saying
After
terms
of
further
to
the Foreign Secretary
in
him t o
consultation.
He t h m i g h t
answer
he was u n a b l e
it
what
to
the
cost
give
figures.
was a g r e e d t h a t
of
Secretary
the
of
the
of
i n v o l v e d s h o u l d be
the Chancellor
and t h e
it
second
t o b e made i n t h e House
the
the Prime M i n i s t e r ,
Air,
and, s e c o n d l y ,
discussion
the statement
Commons r e l a t i n g
by
that
for
two
proposals
1
achieved p a r i t y
cost
appreciating
settled
Exchequer,
State
for
THE CHANCELLOR OP THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER observed that
of
State
his experience
f o r A i r had s a i d .
possession of
challenge
information
any s t a t e m e n t
w h i c h was n o t put
c o n f i r m e d what t h e
Secretary
The O p p o s i t i o n w e r e
in
w h i c h w o u l d e n a b l e them
of the
Government's
forward with
to
programme
a considerable
degree
of
frankness.
THE MINISTER OF HEALTH r e f e r r e d
particulars
given
in C P .
t h e German a i r c r a f t
industry.
figures
were v e r y
sort
"White War".
of
easy t o defend.
figures
the
of
as t o
that
-We w e r e now,
He d i d n o t
think that
with production
of
the e f f o r t
we w e r e u n a b l e t o
of
a long period
of
which t h i s
our h i s t o r y .
this
It
we s h o u l d make a s u p r e m e e f f o r t
even
if
in fact,
the
out that
we w e r e now i n a p e r i o d
Further,
we had one and a h a l f
a potential
labour source
however,
done without
a supreme
in this
source
of
that
it
represented
to
falling
He
pointed
prices.
m i l l i o n unemployed,
which
of
if
untapped revenue
applied.
He
and p e r h a p s w i t h o u t
o r g a n i s a t i o n of
a s he u n d e r s t o o d t h e m a t t e r ,
her
this
seme r a d i c a l
Germany was g r e a t l y
imports
of
raw
exchange
materials.
so
far
helped
armament programme b y h e r e x p o r t
her
this
country.
i n arms w h i c h h a d g i v e n h e r t h e f o r e i g n
which she paid f o r
end
direction
would be hard t o g e t
effort
make.
necessary
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR A I & s a i d t h a t
in paying f o r
a
would
would be t h e
might be
c o u l d be p r o p e r l y
appreciated,
i n the
in
figures
ought
meant b o r r o w i n g £ 1 , 0 0 0 m i l l i o n s .
represented
these
i n Germany
country
obtain parity,
that
it
of
He w o n d e r e d e v e n now w h e t h e r , t h e
If
change
growth
our own p r o p o s e d p r o d u c t i o n r e a l l y
extent
this
the
the
He t h o u g h t
disquieting.
comparing our p r o d u c t i o n
be
222 ( 3 8 )
to
trade
with
He enquired whether we ourselves could not again build up
an export trade in armaments?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that he had paid great
attention to the proposals put forward and the arguments
used in discussion, and he was in agreement with the
views stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
He
thought that we should take steps to obtain the necessary
material, jigs and tools, etc., so as to be in a position
to carry out the f u l l programme i f need be.
I t might
be that Germany would be able to continue to increase
her productive capacity, but he rather doubted whether
this would prove the case.
He thought that we should
be most i l l - a d v i s e d to take the risks referred to by
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, until i t was absolutely
necessary that we should do so.
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR AIR said that he
agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer that i f
we were involved in war, we must have sufficient
financial strength to maintain ourselves.
We no longer
possessed the same financial assets as we had before the
Great War.
He thought that this consideration f u l l y
justified the adoption of the course proposed by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The new programme represented a very considerable
effort on our part.
He thought that the programme
need give rise to no awkward repercussions in Germany;
at the same time, i f i t could be properly presented,
it
should and would satisfy public opinion in this country.
m
THE PRIME MINISTER a g r e e d
about
the question
v/e w e r e d o i n g
ciliation
these
it
to drive
and r e a r m a m e n t .
in
step.
over
that
industrial
that
o u r bomber
difficult
this
strength,
to represent
side
t h a t he f e l t
of
very
proposed.
the
strength
the
first
It
our f o r c e
that
as
we
s a i d t h a t he
t h o u g h t l i e must
say
the proposal
type
of
reasons i n favour
extremely
however,
the
of
had s t a r t e d
we
of State
of
satisfaction
"Dreadnoughts
for
Air
this
The P r i m e
w h i c h had
by
this
starting
this
new
an a d v a n t a g e
over
all
that by
Before
now
starting
formidable.
v/e w e r e g a i n i n g
o t h e r m a r i t i m e Powers,,
that
v e r y h e a v y bomber
the S e c r e t a r y
had b e e n thought
then been f o r c e d
was
to
building
of b a t t l e s h i p
of
it
was u n d e s i r a b l e
He a g r e e d w i t h
recalled,
countries
the
it
on t h e
new t y p e w h i c h w o u l d b e
type
the
the programme.
t h e r e v/ere w e i g h t y
country.
and
cordially
he thought
this part
uneasy about
should concentrate
greeted
he
Everyone would a g r e e
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r
Minister
that
Germany
capacity
our f i g h t e r
must h a v e b o m b e r s , b u t he t h o u g h t
that
keep
a
Germany had
the p r o p o s a l g e n e r a l l y ,
i n a n y way d e f e n s i v e .
stress
we c o u l d b e a t
was n o t m e r e l y
respect
to
increased.
As r e g a r d s
rather
the l a t t e r
with the suggestion
should be
of
art
us.
As r e g a r d s
agreed
con­
was w o r t h r e m e m b e r i n g
also
advantage
abreast,
It
question of
in
policy
was a v e r y n i c e
Such a r a c e
force;
I n our f o r e i g n
two h o r s e s
i n an armament r a c e .
money, b u t
difficulties
It
was n o t b y a n y means c e r t a i n
labour
t h e r e were
of presentation.
our b e s t
two s t e e d s
that
long,
1
however,
to b u i l d Dreadnoughts,
other
and v/e h a d
t o r e b u i l d t h e whole o f our B a t t l e F l e e t .
The
r e s u l t had b e e n t h a t
and o f
their
on t h e b u i l d i n g
the proposal
of
i n Germany p r o d u c i n g
matter which c o u l d be
a super
concentrate
would
not
Halifax..
that
t h i s was n o t
a
of
in regard
to i t ,
b t a t e would g i v e
and h e
further
d e c i d i n g w h i c h was
bound
hoped
consideration'
the r i g h t
course
adopt.
The P r i m e
Minister
said
that he noted
h e a v y "bombers c o s t
a s much a s f o u r
that
on the. h e a v y
concentration
c r e w s and s o f o r t h .
than t h e l o s s
feeling
covey
that
of
of
it
He
the l o s s
a far
of
to grass
i n the l i g h t
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY p o i n t e d
limitation
out
o f armaments was o b t a i n e d ,
p r o b a b l y b e made b y b a n n i n g t h e s e v e r y
of
to
they a l l
the M i n i s t e r
Surely,
policy
however,
for
think i t
this
felt
was t h e r i g h t
the
whole
birdo
re­
qualitative
a start
would
large
bombers.
said
referred
in
was what was t h e
For h i s p a r t ,
policy
help
that i f
o f H e a l t h as t o p r e s e n t a t i o n
country?
blow
discussion.
the d i f f i c u l t y
the r e a l point
of
the
THE MINISTER FOR CO-ORDINATION OF DEFENCE
t h a t no doubt
one
t h a n t o b r i n g down o n e l a r g e
the problem a f r e s h
in
He c o u l d n o t
w o u l d b e more d i f f i c u l t
these
agreed
more f o r m i d a b l e
THE SECRETARY - OP STATE FOR A I R u n d e r t o o k
examine
one o f
t y p e meant economy
a s m a l l e r machine.,
small b i r d s
that
fighters.
Nevertheless,
t h e s e machines would r e p r e s e n t
by
help
s e t t l e d by laymen, but he f e l t
to t h e p r o b l e m " b e f o r e
to
He c o u l d n o t
and H a l i f a x e s
agreed
to e x p r e s s h i s u n e a s i n e s s
the S e c r e t a r y
armaments
t h a t we s h o u l d
Manchesters
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r
that
of naval
c o s t had been r a i s e d , .
wondering whether
result
the whole l e v e l
he d i d
t h a t we s h o u l d
try
to
Parliament.
right
not
to
match
Germany m a c h i n e b y m a c h i n e .
statement
He i n v i t e d
i n p a r a g r a p h 15 o f
v/as s t a t e d
that
u
to
achieve
CP.
capable
of delivering
at
the required r a n g e " .
said
we v/ere i n a p o s i t i o n
in
sufficient
strength
that
least
this
if
follow
our
in air
striking
an e q u a l
to deliver
to create
any i n c r e a s e
of
also
the proposal
force
emphasised
in regard
to
must b e
o f bombs
the
an a t t a c k
a deterrent
at
Minister
He t h o u g h t
that
on Germany
effect,
it
i n German s t r e n g t h must
n e c e s s a r i l y b e f o l l o w e d b y an i n c r e a s e
The M i n i s t e r
it
striking
load
statement.
^
i n which
speaking as a layman,
t h a t he d i s p u t e d
did not
218(38),
equality
p o w e r w i t h Germany means t h a t
attention
in
our
the importance
jigs,
tools
own
strength.
in his
and
view
materials.
T h i s was a p o i n t w h i c h had b e e n e m p h a s i s e d b y a l l
the
experts.
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR A I R
Staff
reply
ordination
v/ould
to
of Defence
be
strength;
the p o i n t
made b y
was, h e
said
that
the
Air
the Minister
for
Co­
thought, that
argument
s o u n d , p r o v i d e d we h a d s u f f i c i e n t
but at
t h e moment t h i s v/as n o t
hoped the C a b i n e t would reach agreement
the present
discussion.
it
open t o t h e
would be
the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y
and s a y t h a t
of
this
to
It
was c l e a r l y
Chancellor
come t o
of
fighter
the case.
He
as the r e s u l t
of
understood
the Exchequer
the Cabinet
at
t h e programme must b e r e v i e v / e d i n
the f i n a n c i a l
situation
necessary by reason
or that
it
of the betterment
that
or
any" t i m e
the
light
was no
longer
of
International
the
situation.
The C a b i n e t ' s
are set
decisions in regard
out i n d e t a i l
at
t h e end o f
to the Air
this
Minute.
Programme
THE HOME SECRETARY,
p a r a g r a p h 24 o f
CP.
247 ( 3 8 ) , s a i d
questions were r e f e r r e d
legislation.
with
he thought
anything,
Bill
should a c c e p t
side
by the Lord P r i v y
For
erred,
of moderation,
the
subject
to
further
to
deal
Raid
the
the p r o p o s a l s
rest,
if
Cabinet
consideration
Sealo
THE LORD P R I V Y SEAL s a i d
agreement w i t h
involve
w o u l d he b e t t e r
had b e e n p r e p a r e d .
them,
certain
when t h e p r o p o s e d A i r
that while
on t h e
it
to
that
to which would
He t h o u g h t
these proposals
Precautions
referring
the proposals
t h a t he was
generally,
ox* two m i n o r m a t t e r s h e m i g h t d e s i r e
to
in
b u t on o n e
suggest
some
modification.
R e f e r e n c e w a s made t o
p a r a g r a p h 24 ( 4 )
shelters
as t o
the p r o v i s i o n
in existing buildings.
discussion
as to
the
extent
covered p r i v a t e houses.
matter
the p r o p o s a l
of
in
blast-proof
T h e r e was some
to which t h i s
I t was a g r e e d
s h o u l d b e e x a m i n e d when t h e
proposal
that
this
Bill
was
in
approve
the
proposals'
draft.
The C a b i n e t
i n p a r a g r a p h 24 o f
Raid Precautions,
the Lord P r i v y
desirable
agreed to
CP.
247 ( 3 8 )
subject
Seal might
to b r i n g before
relative
to
Air
t o any m o d i f i c a t i o n s
think necessary
the
Cabinet.
or
which
The C a M n e t
A . ADMIRALTY
PROGRAMME.
Escort
Vessels.
(1) T h a t t h e A d m i r a l t y s h o u l d h a v e
authority
f o r t h e i m m e d i a t e 3ray ing*
down o f t h e f i r s t b a t c h o f 10
E s c o r t V e s s e l s , subject to the
usual arrangements f o r o b t a i n i n g
Treasury sanction.
(il)
Minesweepers
and A n t i Submarine
Vessels.
New M i n e l a y e r .
Defence
Ports.
of
D o v e r and
Rosyth
Harbours.
Defensive
Arming o f
Large Liners
and M e r c h a n t
Ships.
agreed:-
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
That the Admiralty should be
p r o v i s i o n a l l y authorised to include
two b a t c h e s e a c h o f 10 E s c o r t
V e s s e l s i n the n o t i f i c a t i o n t o
b e made t o Germany i n J a n u a r y ,
1 9 3 9 , o f o u r s h i p b u i l a i n g programme
o v e r t h e n e x t 12 m o n t h s , s u b j e c t t o
the proviso that the inclusion in
t h i s n o t i f i c a t i o n o f the second
b a t c h shoula be subject to r e c o n ­
s i d e r a t i o n i f , i n t h e meantime, t h i s
c o u r s e should appear d e s i r a b l e from
the p o i n t o f v i e w o f the S e c r e t a r y
of State for Foreign A f f a i r s .
'
That the A d m i r a l t y should have
authority to obtain Treasury
a p p r o v a l i n t h e o r d i n a r y way f o r
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 12 s m a l l
s h a l l o w - d r a u g h t m i n e s w e e p e r s , and
f o r the expenditure of approximately
£ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 on i m m e d i a t e p u r c h a s e o f
corarae r c i a l t r a w l e r s .
To r e s t o r e t h e f o u r t h f a s t m i n e l a y e r
t o t h e 1938 New C o n s t r u c t i o n P r o g r a m m e ,
subject t o the usual r e f e r e n c e to the
T r e a s u r y I n t e r - S e r v i c e s Committee t ^ - ^ &
That the A d m i r a l t y should l a y t h e i r
p r o p o s a l s b e f o r e the Joint Oversea
and Home D e f e n c e C o m m i t t e e , w i t h a
view t o the matter b e i n g brought
b e f o r e t h e Committee o f I m p e r i a l
Defence.
That the A d m i r a l t y should have
a u t h o r i t y t o p u t i n hand f o r t h w i t h
t h e d r e d g i n g o f D o v e r and R o s y t h
Harbours.
The q u e s t i o n o f i n v i t i n g
a c o n t r i b u t i o n from the Southern
R a i l w a y i n r e s p e c t o f Dover Harbour
should be considered.
That approval should be obtained
i n t h e o r d i n a r y way f r o m t h e T r e a s u r y
I n t e r - S e r v i c e s Committee to the whole
scheme f o r s t i f f e n i n g m e r c h a n t s h i p s .
,
Passive
Defence,
O i l Fuel
S t o r a g e and
Ammunition
Storage.
Fleet Air
Arm.
F l e e t A i r Arm
Aerodrome a t
Scapa F l o w .
New Signal
School.
Armour P l a t e .
Recruitment
of Skilled '
Ratings.
(vilij
(ix)
(x)
(xi)
(xii)
(xiii)
(xiv)
That the A d m i r a l t y r e q u e s t f o r
t h e e x p e n d i t u r e o f an a d d i t i o n a l
B u m o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y £1% m i l l i o n s
on t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e p a s s i v e
defence o f Naval Establishments
s h o u l d b e t a k e n up d i r e c t v/ith t h e
Treasury.
In the event o f a
d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n between the
two D e p a r t m e n t s t h e m a t t e r s h o u l d
b e r e f e r r e d t o the Committee o f
Imperial Defence.
That the A d m i r a l t y ' s p r o p o s a l s
f o r a c c e l e r a t i n g t h e programmes
o f c o n s t r u c t i o n of underground
s t o r a g e f o r o i l f u e l and a m m u n i t i o n
s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d as e a r l y a s
p o s s i b l e b y t h e A d n i r a l t y and
Treasury in consultation.
T h a t t h e A d m i r a l t y and t h e A i r
M i n i s t r y should examine i n
c o n s u l t a t i o n the d e f i c i e n c y in
a i r c r a f t f o r t h e F l e e t A i r Arm
r e v e a l e d during the recent
emergency.
T h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n o f an a e r o d r o m e
a t S c a p a F l o w f o r t h e u s e o f the....
F l e e t A i r Arm i n w a r - t i m e s h o u l d
be approved in p r i n c i p l e , the
d e t a i l s b e i n g t a k e n up i n c o n s u l ­
t a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e T r e a s u r y and
the Admiralty.
That the A d m i r a l t y p r o p o s a l f o r
t h e p r o v i s i o n o f a new S i g n a l
School should be approved in
p r i n c i p l e , the d e t a i l s b e i n g
t a k e n up i n c o n s u l t a t i o n b e t w e e n
t h e T r e a s u r y and t h e A d m i r a l t y .
That the A d m i r a l t y be a u t h o r i s e d
t o p l a c e an o r d e r i n C z e c h o s l o v a k i a
f o r 2 , 2 0 0 t o n s o f armour p l a t e ,
subject to approval being obtained
i n t h e o r d i n a r y way f r o m t h e
Treasury I n t e r - S e r v i c e s Committee.
That the t h r e e Defence S e r v i c e s
should c o n s i d e r the Recruitment
of Skilled Ratings conjointly
in c o n s u l t a t i o n with the M i n i s t r y
o f Labouro
WAR OFFICE
PROGRAMME.
Anti-aircraft
Equipments. The C a b i n e t
agreed:'
( i ) T h a t t h e number o f
anti-aircraft
equipments a t p r e s e n t a u t h o r i s e d
s h o u l d b e i n c r e a s e d t o t h e number
s p e c i f i e d i n t h e " I d e a l Scheme" f o r
the A i r D e f e n c e o f G r e a t B r i t a i n , and
such a d d i t i o n a l numbers a s m i g h t b e
agreed are r e q u i r e d f o r p o r t s abroad
£ See Conclusion A ( v ) , ^ /
( i i ) T h a t t h e War O f f i c e s h o u l d b e a u t h o r i s e d
t o c r e a t e the c a p a c i t y r e q u i r e d f o r
c a r r y i n g out the i n c r e a s e d programme,
and t o p l a c e i m m e d i a t e o r d e r s f o r
a d d i t i o n a l e q u i p m e n t s i n so f a r a s
such o r d e r s w e r e e s s e n t i a l G O t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t o f new c a p a c i t y t o r e a c h
t h e s t a g e o f p r o d u c t i o n and d e l i v e r y .
Treasury a p p r o v a l f o r the proposals
should be o b t a i n e d i n the o r d i n a r y
way.
Light AntiAircraft
Equipments,
Searchlights.
Predictors,
Heightfinders,
Fuze S e t t e r s
and M e c h a n i c a l
Fuzes,
(iii) T o t a k e n o t e t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f o b t a i n i n g f r o m any
source, B r i t i s h or f o r e i g n ,
deliveries
o f 1,000 l i g h t a n t i - a i r c r a f t e q u i p ­
m e n t s o f any t y p e i s s t i l l u n d e r
e x a m i n a t i o n b y t h e War O f f i c e .
(iv) T h a t t h e War O f f i c e s h o u l d b e a u t h o r i s e d
t o p l a c e o r d e r s f o r such a d d i t i o n a l
s e a r c h l i g h t s a s a r e r e q u i r e d up t o a
t o t a l o f 600 ( i n c l u d i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y
5 0 w h i c h may b e r e q u i r e d a t p o r t s
a b r o a d - s e e C o n c l u s i o n A ( v ) ) on t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t b e f o r e such o r d e r s
are p l a c e d d e t a i l e d arrangements
a r e made w i t h t h e T r e a s u r y .
(v)
T o t a k e n o t e t h a t t h e War O f f i c e w i l l
g e t i n t o touch w i t h the Treasury i f
the need a r i s e s f o r i n c r e a s e d f i n a n c i a l
p r o v i s i o n f o r the purpose of p l a c i n g
orders f o r p r e d i c t o r s abroad.
( v i ) That orders f o r h e i g h t f i n d e r s , fuze
s e t t e r s and m e c h a n i c a l f u z e s , s h o u l d ,
i f n e c e s s a r y , be p l a c e d abroad,
subject to Treasury approval being
o b t a i n e d i n the o r d i n a r y way.
Keeping Firms
i n Production. ( v i i ) That a u t h o r i t y s h o u l d be g i v e n f o r the
p l a c i n g of the a d d i t i o n a l orders
necessary t o keep i n p r o d u c t i o n u n t i l
3 1 s t March, 1940, f i r m s which have
been converted i n t o munition f i r m s ,
subject to approval being obtained in
t h e o r d i n a r y way f r o m t h e T r e a s u r y
I n t e r - S e r v i c e s Committee.
Payment o f
Compensation
i n connection
with P r i o r i t i e s .
Role
of
t h e Army.
(viii)
(ix)
That, with a view t o securing
the n e c e s s a r y p r i o r i t y f o r
munitions p r o d u c t i o n , the
Treasury should g i v e favourable
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o any p r o p o s a l s
f o r compensation t o f i r m s which
t h e S e r v i c e D e p a r t m e n t s may t h i n k
i t r i g h t t o p u t f o r w a r d t o them,
on t h e " b a s i s t h a t e a c h c a s e i s
d e a l t w i t h on i t s m e r i t s .
That the p r o p o s a l s of the
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r War,
contained i n h i s Paper e n t i t l e d
"The R o l e o f the A my i n the
light
of the Czechoslovakian
c r i s i s " s h o u l d he c o n s i d e r e d
by t h e Committee of I m p e r i a l
Defence.
r
R e v i e w o f Home
Be f e n c e A r r a n g e m e n t s
(x)
That the M i n i s t e r f o r C o - o r d i n a t i o n
of Defence, i n the l i g h t o f the
decisions recorded i n these
Conclusions, should arrange f o r
a comprehensive r e v i e w t o be
u n d e r t a k e n o f Home D e f e n c e
arrangements, with a view to
d e t e r m i n i n g what r e a d j u s t m e n t s
are necessary i n order to secure
a proper balance.
The C a b i n e t
oecretarv
of
C . i - . 218
(38)
reservation
( i )
( i i )
( i i i )
( i v )
( v )
( v i )
jtate
took note
for
and o f
as t o
its
Air
of
the i;aper by
on t h e
. . i r i rogra^une
the C h a n c e l l o r o f
financial
the
j
the
ixchequer'
feasibility,
and
That a p p r o v a l should be g i v e n
in p r i n c i p l e to the f u l l
prograiome o f 3 , 7 0 0 a d d i t i o n a l
f i g h t e r s and a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e
p l a c i n g o f o r d e r s as n e c e s s a r y
for one-half thereof.
T h a t e f f o r t s s h o u l d b e made t o
s e c u r e t h e maximum p r o d u c t i o n o f
f i g h t e r s w i t h i n the p e r i o d ending
March 1 9 4 0 .
That the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r
A i r should give further consideration
t o t h e p o l i c y o f c o n c e n t r a t i n g on
the development and c o n s t r u c t i o n
o f the l a r g e h i g h performance
bomber c a p a b l e o f c a r r y i n g a v e r y
h e a v y bomb l o a d , i n t h e l i g h t o f
the d i s c u s s i o n a t the C a b i n e t .
That, subject to
(iii),approval
should be g i v e n f o r the p l a c i n g
o f s u f f i c i e n t o r d e r s f o r bombers
to avoid substantial dismissals
in the a i r c r a f t f a c t o r i e s concerned
a n d t o m a i n t a i n an a d e q u a t e f l o w
o f p r o d u c t i o n , and, i n t h e c a s e o f
any n a t i o n a l f a c t o r i e s d e s i g n e d f o r
t h i s work h ut as y e t u n d e r - e m p l o y e d ,
to secure a r . \ : c o m p l e m e n t
of
employment.
That p r o p o s a l s f o r the i n c r e a s e
i n the o v e r s e a s squadrons s h o u l d
be r e v i e w e d by the Committee o f
I m p e r i a l Defence with a view to
making i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e
T r e a s u r y such a d d i t i o n s as may
be found n e c e s s a r y .
That the o t h e r requirements f o r
m i s c e l l a n e o u s a i r c r a f t should be
examined by the C h a n c e l l o r o f the
E x c h e q u e r and t h e S e c r e t a r y o f
S t a t e f o r A i r , who s h o u l d i f
p o s s i b l e a g r e e as t o t h e o r d e r s
t o be p l a c e d f o r t h e s e .
The
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e should be
a u t h o r i s e d t o s t a t e i n t h e House
o f Commons t h a t p r o p e r p r o v i s i o n
w o u l d b e made i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y as t o t r a i n i n g
machines.
( v i i )
( v i i i )
( i x )
( x )
( x i )
( x i i )
That in the p l a c i n g o f the orders r e f e r r e d to above the A i r M i n i s t r y s h o u l d consult w i t h the Treasury w i t h a v i e w t o k e e p i n g them a p p r i s e d o f the f l o w o f commitments. T h a t commitments b e y o n d 1 9 3 9 / 4 0 ,
so f a r as a u t h o r i s e d by the
above p a r a g r a p h s , s h o u l d be
capable o f t e r m i n a t i o n i n the
e v e n t o f n e c e s s i t y on t h e l e a s t
o n e r o u s terms t h a t c a n b e
arranged.
T h a t , i f and when o r d e r s p l a c e d
on t h e f o r e g o i n g p r i n c i p l e s
b e g i n t o i n v o l v e commitments
i n 1940/41 o r l a t e r y e a r s w h i c h
are prima f a c i e beyond our
r e s o u r c e s , the q u e s t i o n should
be brought to the Cabinet f o r
review.
That the q u e s t i o n o f o b t a i n i n g
j i g s , t o o l s and m a t e r i a l s w i t h
a view to increasing p o t e n t i a l
c a p a c i t y should be r e s e r v e d
pending f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n
between the S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e
f o r A i r and t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f
the Exchequer, but t h a t the
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e should be
a u t h o r i s e d to s t a t e i n the
Debate t h a t steps are to be
t a k e n i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n s o as
t o s e c u r e f u r t h e r and q u i c k e r
p r o v i s i o n of a i r c r a f t , should
i t b e deemed d e s i r a b l e .
T h a t a n c i l l a r y m a t t e r s such
as t h o s e a f f e c t i n g t h e R . A . F .
Volunteer Reserve should, i f
p o s s i b l e , be s e t t l e d w i t h the
Treasury but t h a t i t i s
recognised that further steps
w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y and t h a t a
g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t i n t h e House
can b e made i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n .
t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t t o t h e House
o f Commons r e l a t i n g t o t h e c o s t
i n v o l v e d should be s e t t l e d by
the Prime M i n i s t e r , C h a n c e l l o r
o f the Exchequer, the F o r e i g n
S e c r e t a r y and t h e S e c r e t a r y
of State for A i r in consultation.
T h e C a b i n e t
agreed:-
To approve t h e f o l l o w i n g recommendations
o f t h e C a b i n e t C o m m i t t e e on D e f e n c e P r o g r a m m e s
and A c c e l e r a t i o n , s u b j e c t t o any m o d i f i c a t i o n s
w h i c h t h e L o r d P r i v y S e a l may t h i n k i t
necessary or d e s i r a b l e to bring b e f o r e the
Cabinet.
( i ) T h a t t h e d u t y o f o r g a n i s i n g a i r r a i d
p r e c a u t i o n s s h o u l d be l e f t to t h e l o c a l
a u t h o r i t i e s , but t h a t p o w e r s s h o u l d b e
taken i n the forthcoming A i r Raid
P r e c a u t i o n s B i l l t o d e a l w i t h an
a u t h o r i t y which i s c l e a r l y n e g l e c t i n g
i t s d u t i e s , and a l s o t o s t r e n g t h e n , i n
q u a l i t y and n u m b e r s , t h e r e g i o n a l i n ­
s p e c t o r a t e o f t h e Home O f f i c e .
( i i )
( i i i )
That a s u b s t a n t i a l cadre o f t h e A i r
Raid Precautions S e r v i c e should be r e ­
c r u i t e d and t r a i n e d on t h e b a s i s t h a t ,
i n w a r t i m e , t h e members o f t h a t c a d r e
w i l l b e e m b o d i e d , w h o l e t i m e , as a p a i d
Home S e c u r i t y F o r c e .
Care should be
taken that the recruitment of t h i s
F o r c e d o e s n o t p r o c e e d on l i n e s i n c o n ­
s i s t e n t w i t h t h e Government's Man-Power
plans.
T h a t a s t a t u t o r y , d u t y s h o u l d be p u t on
e m p l o y e r s w i t h e s t a b l i s h m e n t s o f more
than a c e r t a i n s i z e t o t r a i n t h e i r
workpeople in f i r e - f i g h t i n g , f i r s t aid
and a n t i - g a s m e a s u r e s .
( i v ) T h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s h o u l d b e m a d e ,
through the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , of
blast-proof shelter in existing build­
i n g s , by a s u r v e y and by s t r e n g t h e n i n g
t h e r o o f o f r e f u g e rooms i n p e a c e - t i m e ,
and a s s e m b l i n g m a t e r i a l o f t h e r i g h t
d i m e n s i o n s f o r i m m e d i a t e a c t i o n i n an
emergency.
I t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y t o
empower a u t h o r i t i e s t o e n t e r b u i l d i n g s
f o r t h e p u r p o s e , and t o p a y c o m p e n s a ­
t i o n t o t h e owner f o r d i s t u r b a n c e o f
user,
( v ) T h a t t h e s u r v e y r e f e r r e d t o i n ( i v )
s h o u l d b e u n d e r t a k e n by t h e l o c a l
a u t h o r i t i e s , under the guidance o f
e x p e r t a d v i s e r s l e n t by t h e Home
Office.
( v i ) T h a t t h e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s s h o u l d b e
empowered t o make bye-Daws r e q u i r i n g new
*multiple' buildings to include A,R.P.
features.
( v i i ) T h a t e m p l o y e r s s h o u l d b e r e q u i r e d t o t a k e stich a c t i o n as i s reasonable to protect t h e i r workpeople. ( v i i i ) T h a t t h e t r e n c h s y s t e m b e g u n d u r i n g
t h e c r i s i s s h o u l d b e c o m p l e t e d and
extended g r a d u a l l y , b o t h i n open
s p a c e s and i n g a r d e n s .
( i x ) To t a k e n o t e t h a t t h e
in consultation with the
o f " t l i e ^ I i i x c h e q u e r , tSeT
Chancellor
the Minister of Labour and any other
Ministers concerned, would consider the
practicability of giving work on treneh
digging to men in receipt of Unemployment
Assistance.
Richmond T e r r a c e ,
7th November,
S.V/.1.
1938.