(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:CAB/24/263
Image Reference:0005
2
Printed for the Cabinet. July 1936.
SECRET.
C P .
Copy N o .
206
(36).
CABINET.
PROPOSED
TO
REQUEST
SECURE
NATIONAL
TO
THE
GERMAN
SOCIALIST
ESTABLISHED
Joint Memorandum
IN
AND
LIQUIDATION
THE
AND
FASCIST
UNITED
by the Home
ITALIAN
OF
GOVERNMENTS
BRANCHES
PARTY
OF
THE
ORGANISATIONS
KINGDOM.
Secretary and the. Foreign Secretary.
T H E branch o f the f o r e i g n section o f the N a t i o n a l Socialist P a r t y
established i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m is k n o w n as a L a n d e s g r u p p e and is
under
the
direction
of
a
Landesgruppenleiter,
Herr
Otto
Bene
(an
application f o r whose a p p o i n t m e n t as G e r m a n C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in L o n d o n
we recently
succeeded
in
forestalling
without
any
protest
from
the
German G o v e r n m e n t ) .
U n d e r h i m there are t w o local branches, k n o w n as
Ortsgruppe, i n L o n d o n and Dalston, and smaller branches, k n o w n as S t u t z p u n k t e ,
at B r a d f o r d , B i r m i n g h a m , H u l l and M a n c h e s t e r - L i v e r p o o l and N e w p o r t - C a r d i f f .
There is also, a p p a r e n t l y , a S t u t z p u n k t at D u b l i n .
I t is believed that at the
moment there are some 288 members o f the N a t i o n a l Socialist P a r t y i n G r e a t
Britain, o f w h o m some 67 f o r m the staff o f the B r i t i s h Isles branch o f the
Auslands O r g a n i s a t i o n .
P r i n c e B i s m a r c k h i m s e l f is one of these : he is the
liaison officer between the Embassy and the L a n d e s g r u p p e . T h e h e a d q u a r t e r s in
London are understood to be in touch w i t h some 1,500 people, some being B r i t i s h
subjects o f G e r m a n e x t r a c t i o n .
Since the N a z i P a r t y i n G e r m a n y has
unprecedented p o w e r over the i n d i v i d u a l , i t can direct the energies o f every
member of the p a r t y in any desired direction.
A n u n d e r l y i n g object o f the
Auslands o r g a n i s a t i o n is t o w e l d together a l l G e r m a n s abroad w h o are to be
regarded as an indissoluble p a r t o f the R e i c h , and w h o are e x p e c t e d by. t h e i r oath
to give active co-operation in the p u r s u i t of the F i i h r e r ' s aims.
2. Considerably less i n f o r m a t i o n is available r e g a r d i n g the I t a l i a n Fascist
P a r t y O r g a n i s a t i o n i n this country since enquiries i n t o their a c t i v i t i e s h a v e only
recently been set on f o o t ; but as in the case of the G e r m a n N a t i o n a l Socialist
Party, a branch of the Fascist P a r t y is k n o w n t o be i n existence here w i t h its
complement o f p a r t y officials and machinery. I t has its h e a d q u a r t e r s i n L o n d o n
and a number o f p r o v i n c i a l branches. I t is based on the f o r e i g n section o f the
Italian Fascist P a r t y i n R o m e . D u r i n g the recent crisis v e r y definite instructions
were issued f r o m H . Q . that i n the event of an outbreak o f hostilities certain acts
of sabotage w e r e t o be c a r r i e d out by members o f the Fascist P a r t y attached to
British A i r F o r c e units i n the N e a r and M i d d l e E a s t .
3. T h e r e is no objection on the p a r t o f our authorities t o G e r m a n and
Italian citizens in this country being affiliated as i n d i v i d u a l s t o their n a t i o n a l
party o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n G e r m a n y or I t a l y as the case m a y be. W h a t is considered
objectionable is the establishment o f branches of these o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n this
country. T h e s e o r g a n i s a t i o n s p r o v i d e a r e a d y - m a d e machine w h i c h can be used
for any end desired or decided upon by the p a r t y h e a d q u a r t e r s (a branch o f the
totalitarian S t a t e ) i n G e r m a n y or I t a l y .
T h e y m i g h t also be used i n an
8735
[13574]
emergency; t o the detriment of the v i t a l interests and safety-, o f this country. This
p a r t y machinery, is, i n fact, an excellent instrument n o t only f o r . p r o p a g a n d a and
intelligence, but also f o r espionage and, i n an emergency, f o r sabotage;- - I t cannot
...be, over-emphasised that every member o f the p a r t y is an a g e n t of his Government,
r a n d is o b l i g e d t o act according to their orders.
;:'
- .
:
;
4. I t is true that there is in existence in this, country an o r g a n i s a t i o n known
as the Russian Communist P a r t y cell, w h i c h consists of members o f the Russian
Communist P a r t y employed in S o v i e t institutions i n this country. T h i s organisa­
tion works underground and has no open contact w i t h the Communist P a r t y of
G r e a t B r i t a i n . I t can, however, be differentiated f r o m the Fascist and Nazi
organisations in that f o r the moment its a c t i v i t i e s and influence are so negligible
that our authorities do not consider i t necessary t o r e v i e w its activities in this
connexion.
5. T h e proposal which it is now desired that the Cabinet should consider is
that i n f o r m a l and f r i e n d l y suggestions should be made to the G e r m a n and Italian
Governments through their Embassies in L o n d o n that they should t a k e steps to
secure the closing d o w n of their p a r t y organisations in this country, the presence
of w h i c h is considered unusual and undesirable here. A c t i o n of this kind has
already been taken, w i t h o u t any serious protest f r o m G e r m a n y , by the Swiss
Government against the N a t i o n a l Socialist P a r t y o r g a n i s a t i o n i n S w i t z e r l a n d . It
is not proposed t h a t detailed reasons f o r this request should be communicated to
the G e r m a n or I t a l i a n Embassies; but they w o u l d be g i v e n to understand that,
should the request not be acted upon, w e should probably be o b l i g e d to require the
leading organisers and p a r t y officials t o leave the country.
6. T h e decision to be taken by the Cabinet in this matter must depend
p r i m a r i l y on their v i e w of the effect o f the proposed action on the safety of the
country.
M.I.5, w h o are responsible f o r supervising the a c t i v i t i e s of any
organisation w h i c h may be a danger to the internal security of this country,
strongly u r g e that this action should be taken. T h e i r v i e w is t h a t to d e p r i v e these
organisations of their r i g h t to operate publicly and f r e e l y here w o u l d embarrass
them and l i m i t their activities. For instance, the pressure w h i c h they can bring
to bear on other individuals, o f G e r m a n and even of B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i t y , to aid
and abet their activities would, i n the v i e w of M.I.5, be d i m i n i s h e d ; and, more­
over, even i f the w o r k of the o r g a n i s a t i o n w a s continued i n secret and by under­
ground methods, i t w o u l d inevitably be hampered in m a n y directions. On the
other hand, it can be argued that i f d r i v e n u n d e r g r o u n d and compelled to work
in secret i t m i g h t become more difficult t o keep an effective w a t c h on these
organisations. On this v i e w the action suggested w o u l d not necessarily secure
the discontinuance of these organisations, but m i g h t a d d to the difficulties of
observation.
7. T w o other points w i l l have to be borne in m i n d i n coming to a decision on
this matter. T h e first is the fact that this action w i l l c e r t a i n l y be challenged in
P a r l i a m e n t and the P r e s s , and t h a t f o r obvious reasons it w o u l d not be in the
public interest to g i v e detailed arguments in its defence.
T h e ultimate sanction
is deportation of p a r t y officials i f the organisations continue, and g r e a t pressure
would be brought t o bear on the H o m e Secretary to e x p l a i n his reasons for
r e q u i r i n g the departure from this country o f G e r m a n or I t a l i a n subjects who
ostensibly have good reasons to r e m a i n in this country but are k n o w n to the
authorities to be e n g a g e d in secret p a r t y a c t i v i t i e s .
8. T h e r e is, finally, the question of the effect of the proposed action on
our relations w i t h I t a l y and G e r m a n y .
T h e r e can be n o question but
that the action proposed is l e g i t i m a t e f r o m our o w n p o i n t of
view;
and, however inconvenient i t m a y be to the G e r m a n or I t a l i a n Govern­
ments, it can scarcely be said that they w o u l d be entitled to resent
it. I f our people g o to Germany or I t a l y they have to c o n f o r m to German
or I t a l i a n practice : and there is no reason w h y G e r m a n or I t a l i a n citizens in this
country should seek to establish over here, in this unprecedented manner, their
o w n organisations. These, as agencies o f a t o t a l i t a r i a n S t a t e , are the tools of a
f o r e i g n Government o w i n g direct allegiance to its head. O n the other hand, it is,
of course, true that, f o r this reason, the t w o Governments concerned w i l l feel that
this action strikes at a very fundamental p a r t of their methods and programme.
9. I t w o u l d c e r t a i n l y be l e g i t i m a t e to refuse to g i v e d e t a i l e d reasons f o r
our action to either P o w e r o r to say more t h a n t h a t w e h a d d e c i d e d to t a k e the
action proposed on grounds o f public interest. A reason f o r t a k i n g i t soon,
which is of some importance, is that, the l o n g e r i t is delayed, the g r e a t e r becomes
the prescriptive r i g h t of these o r g a n i s a t i o n s t o c a r r y on t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s here.
B y p e r m i t t i n g t h e i r continuance w e , i n f a c t , condone t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s .
Were,
moreover, action to be delayed u n t i l a p e r i o d o f e m e r g e n c y arose, its i n i t i a t i o n ,
which m i g h t then be i m p e r a t i v e , m i g h t be e m b a r r a s s i n g ; and i n a n y case the
widened activities o f these o r g a n i s a t i o n s m i g h t be difficult to suppress at short
notice. T h e y are i n an e a r l y stage o f d e v e l o p m e n t h e r e : w e do n o t ' k n o w h o w
they w i l l evolve.
10. I f the Cabinet take the v i e w that some action to deal w i t h these f o r e i g n
political organisations is necessary, the only possible course seems to be. that
suggested in this memorandum, even i f w e cannot be sure t h a t i t w i l l be e n t i r e l y
effective.
T o g i v e f r e e d o m of action in this country to the o r g a n i s e d agencies
of a f o r e i g n P o w e r is a dangerous p r e c e d e n t ; and i t is f o r serious consideration
whether time has not come w h e n w e should d o our best to c u r t a i l the a c t i v i t i e s
of these f o r e i g n p o l i t i c a l organisations.
July 24, 1936.
.
J. S.
A . E.