o
E.R.
MR. CHURCHILL'S ADMINISTRATION
1952
C . 0 . ( 5 2 ) 23rd, 24th and
25th C o n c l u s i o n s
Economic S i t u a t i o n :
B a l a n c e o f Payments
(N.C.R.)
C . C . ( 5 2 ) 66th C o n c l u s i o n s ,
Minute 3
Economic S i t u a t i o n :
B a l a n c e o f Payments
(C.A.)
C . C . ( 5 2 ) 76th C o n c l u s i o n s ,
Minute 1
Persia
(C.A.)
C.C.(52)
83rd Conclusions
The Duke o f
CO.(52)
85th C o n c l u s i o n s
The Duke o f E d i n b u r g h
(W.C.R.)
C O . ( 5 2 ) 98th and 99th
Conclusions
The Duke o f W i n d s o r
(N.C.R.)
C.C.(53) 1st
The Duke of
Edinburgh
(N.C.R.)
C-.C.(53) 28th C o n c l u s i o n s
The Duke of
Edinburgh
(N.C.R.)
C.C.(53) 50th C o n c l u s i o n s
The Duke ,of W i n d s o r .
(N.C.R.)
C.C.(53) 80th C o n c l u s i o n s
A l a n Nunn May
(N.C.R.)
*
C . C . ( 5 4 ) 22nd C o n c l u s i o n s
Equal Pay
(N.C.R.)
*
G . C . ( 5 4 ) 22nd C o n c l u s i o n s
L e v y on F l o u r
(N.C.R.)
*
C . C . ( 5 4 ) 24th C o n c l u s i o n s
Equal Pay
Edinburgh
(N.C.R.)
12a
*
Conclusions
1954
The Duke o f W i n d s o r
(N.C.R.)
C . C . ( 5 4 ) 47th C o n c l u s i o n s ,
Minute 4
Washington
Talks
(C.A.)
C . C . ( 5 4 ) 48th C o n c l u s i o n s ,
Minute 3
Washington
Talks
(C.A.)
Conclusions,
Washington
Talks
(C.A.)
C C . ( 5 4 ) 50th C o n c l u s i o n s ,
Minute 2
Washington
Talks
(C.A.)
C . C . ( 5 4 ) 52nd C o n c l u s i o n s ,
Minute 3
Washington
Talks
(C.A.)
C C . ( 5 4 ) 53rd C o n c l u s i o n s
Minute 2
Washington
Talks
(C.A.)
C . C . ( 5 4 ) 84th C o n c l u s i o n s
The Duke o f
C.C.(54)
C.C.(54)
Minute 1
sins in
aoor&s.
24th C o n c l u s i o n s
(N.C.R.)
49th
Windsor
(N;C.R.)
MR. CHURCHILL'S ADMINISTRATION - Contd.
m
9 t h Conclusions
The Duke o f
Edinhurgh
(M.C.R.).
C . C . ( 5 5 ) 1 0 t h Conclusions
The Duke of
Edinburgh
(M.C.R.)
1 9 t h Conclusions
The Duke o f
Edinhurgh
(M.C.R.)
CC.(55)
CG.(55)
MR. EDEN 'S ADMINISTRATION
1955 -
Contd.
C M . ( 5 5 ) 18th
Conclusions
The Duke of
Edinburgh
(M.C.R.)
CM.(55)
25th
Conclusions
The Duke cf
Edinburgh
(M.C.R.)
CM.(56)
25th
Conclusions
The Duke of
Edinburgh
( I C R . )
CM.(56)
39th
Conclusions
M i n i s t e r s of the Crown:
Superannuation R i g h t s
CM.(5b)
97th
Conclusions
MR. ?,(ACMILLAN'S
Conclusions
(M.C.R.)
ADMINISTRATION
Iron
and S t e e l
Industry-
(M.C.R.)
CC.(57)
llth
CC.(57)
1 9 t h Conclusions
Israel
CC.(57)
5 1 s t Conclusions
The Duke of
CC.(57)
6lfth
Conclusions
Syria
(M.C.R.)
C C . ( 5 7 ) 65th
Conclusions
Syria
(M.C.R.)
CC.(57)
^ 3 t h Conclusions
Syria
(M.C.R.)
C.C.(58)
21st Conclusions
Political
CC.(59)
54 th Conclusions
The Duke of
(M.C.R.)
Windsor
(M.C.R.)
1958
Situation
(M.C.R.)
Mm
Edinburgh
(M.C.R.)
MR. MACMTLLAN'S ADMINISTRATION
-,Cont'd
-I960
C . C . ( 6 0 ) 4th
C . C . ( 6 o ) 11th
C.C.(60)
Conclusions
Conclusions
52nd C o n c l u s i o n s
C . C . ( 6 3 ) 39th C o n c l u s i o n s .
0.0.(63)
40th C o n c l u s i o n s
The Name o f t h e
Family
Royal
(M.C.R.)
Royal. Marraiges
H.R.H.' P r i n c e s s
A c t , 1772:
Margaret
(M.C-R.')
The Duke and D u c h e s s
Gloucester
of
(M.C.R.)
R e s i g n a t i o n of the S e c r e t a r y .
o f S t a t e f o r War
(M.C.R.)
'
R e s i g n a t i o n of t h e S e c r e t a r y
o f S t a t e f o r War
(M.C.R.)
...
S I R ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME S
1
ADMINISTRATION
1964
C.M.(64)
5th
Conclusions
Mr. I a i n M a c l e o d ' s A r t i c l e
in the " S p e c t a t o r " '
(M.C . R . )
TJ3E.£ECK52
HO-CIRCULATION KECORD
.
g.
C * C . ( 5 2 ) 2 3 r d . - 24th"-and 2 5 t h C o n c l u s i o n s
( 2 3 r d a n d 2 9 t h F e b r u a r y , 19321'
IfCONOMIC SITUATION
fALANCE OF P A R E N T S
-Irrevious
. illference
% C . ( 5 2 ) 22nd
ifcmclusions,
limit e 1 ) .
A t t h r e e m e e t i n g s on 2 8 t h a n d 2 9 t h F e b r u a r y
t h e Cabinet discussed proposals by the Chancellor of t h e
E x c h e q u e r f o r a r r e s t i n g t h e d r a i n o n t h e g o l d and d o l l a r
reserves of the sterling area.
For t h e purpose o f t h e s e
d i s c u s s i o n s t h e y h a d b e f o r e t h e m a d r a f t memorandum
by the C h a n c e l l o r of t h e Exchequer o u t l i n i n g h i s plan
and s u m m a r i s i n g i t s - m a i n a d v a n t a g e s and d i s a d v a n t a g e s , a ­
memorandum b y t h e P a y m a s t e r G e n e r a l d e v e l o p i n g h i s o b j e c t i o n s
t o t h i s p l a n , and a s e c o n d memorandum b y t h e C h a n c e l l o r
o u t l i n i n g t h e a l t e r n a t i v e courses which would have t o
be f o l l o w e d i f h i s o r i g i n a l p l a n were not a d o p t e d .
T h e C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e E x c h e q u e r i n h i s f i r s t memorandum
s a i d t h a t t h e r e w e r e s t i l l no s i g n s o f a n y s l a c k e n i n g i n t h e r a t e
a t w h i c h t h e g o l d and d o l l a r r e s e r v e s o f t h e s t e r l i n g " a r e a w e r e ,
being d e p l e t e d .
I n t h e p a s t e i g h t w e e k s t h e r e s e r v e s had
d r o p p e d b y $ 5 2 1 m i l l i o n s , and had now f a l l e n t o a f i g u r e o f
$ 1 , 8 0 0 m i l l i o n s , w h i c h r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y t h r e e and a h a l f w e e k s '
turnover of the s t e r l i n g area's transactions with the rest of
the world.
The r a t e of l o s s should f a l l i n t h e next few
m o n t h s , a s t h e v a r i o u s m e a s u r e s t a k e n t o a r r e s t i t came
f u l l y into operation;
and, i f e v e r y element i n t h e plan
a p p r o v e d b y t h e Commonwealth F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s a t t h e i r
m e e t i n g i n J a n u a r y w o r k e d f a v o u r a b l y , t h e d r a i n on t h e
r e s e r v e s m i g h t be c h e c k e d i n r e s p e c t o f t h e s e c o n d h a l f o f
1952.
I t w a s , h o w e v e r , b y no means c l e a r t h a t we c o u l d
scrape through u n t i l then;
a n d , e v e n I f we d i d , t h e
r e m a i n i n g r e 3 e r v e s w o u l d b y t h e n be s o i n a d e q u a t e t h a t t h e
s t e r l i n g a r e a w o u l d c o l l a p s e a t t h e f i r s t a d v e r s e t u r n of.
events.
I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s he c o n s i d e r e d t h a t d r a s t i c
a c t i o n s h o u l d be t a k e n now t o p r o t e c t t h e c u r r e n c y .
After
c o n s i d e r i n g v a r i o u s a l t e r n a t i v e s h e recommended t h e a d o p t i o n
of a f i v e - p o i n t plan, as f o l l o w s : ­
-
( i )
( i i )
te
TThile p r e s e r v i n g t h e n o m i n a l o f f i c i a l p a r i t y o f
$ 2 . 8 0 t o t h e £ s t e r l i n g , 7/e s h o u l d abandon t h e
e x i s t i n g m a r g i n ( ^ 2 . 7 3 - $ 2 . 3 2 ) and u s e t h e
Exchange E q u a l i s a t i o n Account t o s e c u r e t h e
maximum s t a b i l i t y i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l v a l u e o f
sterling.
T h i s w o u l d mean t h a t we s h o u l d
p u b l i c l y accept the p r i n c i p l e of a v a r i a b l e
r a t e of exchange.
P r i v a t e l y , we s h o u l d r e s o l v e
t o use t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a r e s e r v e s f o r t h e p u r p o s e
of keepinr the rate i n i t i a l l y within l i m i t s of
a b o u t f i f t e e n p e r c e n t on e i t h e r s i d e o f t h e o f f i c i a l
p a r i t y o f $ 2 . 8 0 , i . e . w i t h i n a r a n g e o f $2.AO - $ 3 . 2 0 .
Commonwealth G o v e r n m e n t s and Banks c o u l d b e I n f o r m e d
p r i v a t e l y t h a t t h i s was o u r o b j e c t i v e , but o u r
i n t e n t i o n w o u l d not be made p u b l i c o r c o m m u n i c a t e d
t o any o t h e r Government o r monetary a u t h o r i t y
within or without t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a .
A l l f o r e i g n e r s ' s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s w o u l d be
b l o c k e d , e x c e p t f o r A m e r i c a n and C a n a d i a n a c c o u n t s
already convertible into dollars.
Ten p e r c e n t of
t h e s e b a l a n c e s w o u l d be c l a s s i f i e d a s " e x t e r n a l "
s t e r l i n g w h i c h , t o g e t h e r w i t h any s t e r l i n g
e a r n e d s u b s e q u e n t l y , w o u l d be c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o g o l d ,
d o l l a r s , or o t h e r c u r r e n c i e s at t h e current r a t e .
(ill)
The p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e of t h e s t e r l i n g area would be m a i n t a i n e d .
The, U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d o t h e r s t e r l i n g a r e a c o u n t r i e s would r e t a i n f u l l exchange c o n t r o l , and c i t i z e n s who w e r e a l l o w e d t o a c q u i r e f o r e i g n exchange would buy i t i n t h e m a r k e t . ( i v ) N o t l e s s t h a n e i g h t y p e r c e n t o f t h e s t e r l i n g
b a l a n c e s h e l d by o t h e r s t e r l i n g a r e a c o u n t r i e s would
be h e l d i n f u n d e d f o r m , so t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t be
used f o r c u r r e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s . .
( v ) T h e L o n d o n g o l d m a r k e t w o u l d be r e - o p e n e d s o a s t o
p r o v i d e a f r e e market a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l s t e r l i n g .
T h e p r i c e o f g o l d w o u l d n o t be r e l a t e d t o t h e
o f f i c i a l d o l l a r p r i c e , but would f l u c t u a t e
freely.
Residents of s t e r l i n g area c o u n t r i e s , except gold
p r o d u c e r s , w o u l d n o t be a l l o w e d t o o p e r a t e i n t h e
g o l d market.
The f o l l o w i n g advantages were claimed f o r t h i s p l a n .
The
d r a i n on t h e g o l d and d o l l a r r e s e r v e s w o u l d c e a s e a u t o m a t i c a l l y :
we s h o u l d l o s e g o l d and d o l l a r s o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t we
i n t e r v e n e d i n t h e market t o p r e v e n t t h e exchange r a t e from
falling too far.
"Cheap s t e r l i n g " o p e r a t i o n s w o u l d be v i r t u a l l y
eliminated.
Payment f o r our e x p o r t s t o c o u n t r i e s o u t s i d e t h e
s t e r l i n g a r e a w o u l d be made o n l y i n e x t e r n a l s t e r l i n g , g o l d o r
f o r e i g n exchange which could be s o l d i n t h e London m a r k e t .
The
s t r a i n o f t h e b a l a n c e o f p a y m e n t s d e f i c i t w o u l d f a l l , n o t on t h e
r e s e r v e s , but on t h e e x c h a n g e r a t e .
I t was t r u e t h a t d e p r e c i a t i o n
o f t h e r a t e w o u l d h a v e an i m m e d i a t e and d i r e c t e f f e c t on t h e
i n t e r n a l e c o n o m y , i n t h e f o r m o f r i s i n g p r i c e s o f f o o d and raw
materials;
but t h i s p r o c e s s would i t s e l f b r i n g i n t o p l a y f o r c e s
w h i c h i n t h e I o n . : run w o u l d t e n d t o b r i n ; - t h e e c o n o m y i n t o
^
balance.
For r i s i n g i n r o r t p r i c e s would raduce t h e consumption
of imports,
and a f a l l i n t h e e x c h a n g e r a t e w o u l d i n c r e a s e t h e
c o m p e t i t i v e p o w e r o f o u r e x p o r t s and e n c o u r a g e i n d u s t r y t o
c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e m a n u f a c t u r e o f e x p o r t s .
At t h e r e c e n t m e e t i n g
o f C o m m o n w e a l t h F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s i t had c l e a r l y e m e r g e d t h a t
s t e r l i n g c o u l d n o t s u r v i v e on an i n c o n v e r t i b l e b a s i s , and t h i s
p l a n w o u l d be r e g a r d e d as a m a j o r s t e p on t h e r o a d t o c o n v e r t i b i l i t
T h e f u n d i n g o f s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s , t h o u g h i t m i g h t i n i t i a l l y be
a shock f o r t h e h o l d e r s , would remove t h e g r e a t e s t p o t e n t i a l
d a n g e r t o t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a r e s e r v e s and w o u l d s t r e n g t h e n
confidence in s t e r l i n g .
A f t e r t h e i n i t i a l s t e r s had b e e n t a k e n
i t w o u l d be e a s i e r t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e r e s e r v e s b y b o r r o r d - n g , and
t h e C h a n c e l l o r p r o p o s e d t o seek l o a n s from Canada, from t h e
I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y Fund and b y p l e d g i n g t h e d o l l a r s e c u r i t i e s
h e l d b y t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t i n t h e New Y o r k m a r k e t .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e p l a n w o u l d mean a l a r g e new d e p a r t u r e
i n p o l i c y and w o u l d i n v o l v e s e r i o u s r i s k s .
I t would
mean
a b r o g a t i n g our m o n e t a r y and payments a g r e e m e n t s w i t h n o n - s t e r l i n g
countries.
I t w o u l d b e a s h o c k t o t h e Commonwealth members o f t h e
s t e r l i n g a r e a , and m i g h t b r i n g o n e o r t w o o f t h e m t o t h e p o i n t
of deciding t o leave the s t e r l i n g area a l t o g e t h e r .
I t would
d i s r u p t t h e E u r o p e a n P a y m e n t s U n i o n , and w o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e
v i e w e d with' mixed f e e l i n g s by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t .
F i n a l l y , so f a r a s c o n c e r n e d t h e i n t e r n a l economy o f t h e U n i t e d
K i n g d o m , i t w o u l d mean a b a n d o n i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e o f s t a b i l i t y i n
I n t e r n a l p r i c e s and -/rages;
t h e r e would i n the i n i t i a l
stages
be seme r i s e I n t h e c o s t o f l i v i n g and some m e a s u r e o f
unemployment;
and t h e r e w o u l d "be a c o n t i n u o u s p r o c e s s o f c h a n g e
Nevertheless,
.. and r e - a d j u s t m e n t , much o f w h i c h w o u l d b e p a i n f u l .
/ t h e p l a n o f f e r e d an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t
t o take a c o n s t r u c t i v e and powerful i n i t i a t i v e i n the world,
e c o n o n y ; \ and a l l t h e . i n d i c a t i o n s , w e r e t h a t , i f t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y
$ijipJMci-r/r i: was - n o t t a k e n i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e , we s h o u l d b e f o r c e d a t a l a t e r
$&f^&fW '
s t a g e , when t h e g o l d a n d d o l l a r r e s e r v e s o f t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a h a d
3p!o;-%vv - - " f a l l e n t o a much l o w e r l e v e l , t o t a k e a c t i o n w h i c h had a l l t h e
u n f a v o u r a b l e f e a t u r e s o f t h e p l a n now p r o p o s e d w i t h o u t a n y o f i t s
favourable p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
The C h a n c e l l o r t h e r e f o r e r e c o m m e n d e d
";
t h a t a c t i o n an t h e s e l i n e s s h o u l d b e t a k e n a s q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e
. a n d a n n o u n c e d a t t h e same t i m e a s t h e B u d g e t .
::
T h e P a y m a s t e r - G e n e r a l i n h i s memorandum a r g u e d t h a t
t h e r e w e r e no s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r t h e v i o l e n t r e v e r s a l o f
p o l i c y proposed by the C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer.
The
Government had a l w a y s b e e n g i v e n t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t the d r a i n
en t h e r e s e r v e s w o u l d c o n t i n u e d u r i n g t h e e a r l y months o f . 1 9 5 2 .
T h e r e m e d i a l m e a s u r e s w h i c h t h e y had t a k e n i n N o v e m b e r h a d
n e v e r been e x p e c t e d t o produce t h e i r e f f e c t u n t i l the e n d o f
February;
and t h e Commonwealth F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s h a d n o t y e t
had time t o arrange f o r t h e i r Governments t o put i n t o o p e r a t i o n
t h e f u r t h e r measures upon w h i c h t h e y had a g r e e d a t t h e i r m e e t i n g
i n January.
The o n l y n e w f a c t s w e r e t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t t o p r o v i d e us w i t h t h e J^JOO m i l l i o n s o f a i d
on w h i c h we had b e e n r e l y i n g and t h e d o u b t w h e t h e r t h e E u r o p e a n
P a y m e n t s Union, w o u l d b e a b l e t o h o n o u r i t s o b l i g a t i o n s i f we
achieved a credit balance.
Fundamentally our d i f f i c u l t i e s were
due t o f a i l u r e t o b a l a n c e o u r t r a d e .
The C h a n c e l l o r ' s p r o p o s a l s
were n o t addressed t o t h a t problem.
T h e y w o u l d n o t make i t
e a s i e r f o r us t o a c h i e v e a t r a d e b a l a n c e :
i n d e e d , the v a r i a b l e
r a t e of exchange would have the o p p o s i t e e f f e c t .
I f the rate
f e l l b y 20-0, ve s h o u l d h a v e t o e x p o r t 2$?£ more i n o r d e r t o p a y
f o r t h e same q u a n t i t y o f i m p o r t s .
And t h e f a c t t h a t our e x p o r t
p r i c e s would
b e more c o m p e t i t i v e w o u l d n o b h e l p u s i f , a s w a s
l a r g e l y t h e c a s e , t h e v o l u m e o f o u r e x p o r t t r a d e was l i m i t e d
b y d i f f i c u l t i e s o f s u p p l y r a t h e r than o f p r i c e .
So f a r a s
c o n c e r n e d o u r i n t e r n a l economy t h e r e w e r e g r a v e p o l i t i c a l
o b j e c t i o n s to the C h a n c e l l o r ' s plan.
I f i t helped t o improve
the b a l a n c e o f our t r a d e a c c o u n t s , i t would do s o o n l y b y
i n c r e a s i n g the p r i c e s of i m p o r t e d f o o d and m a t e r i a l s t o an e x t e n t
which compelled p e o p l e t o r e s t r i c t t h e i r consumption.
T h i s method
o f r a t i o n i n g i m p o r t s b y t h e purse w o u l d be d i f f i c u l t t o d e f e n d ,
and i n a n y e v e n t w o u l d n o t p r o d u c e r e s u l t s i n , t i m e t o s o l v e o u r
problem.
R a t h e r t h a n r u n t h e r i s k s i n v o l v e d i n t h e C h a n c e l l o r *s
p l a n , the Paymasber-General s u g g e s t e d t h a t the immediate c r i s i s
s h o u l d b e met b y s t i l l f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n i n i m p o r t s , b y a f u r t h e r
e x p a n s i o n o f e x p o r t s , b y b o r r o w i n g s from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y Fund, by B u d g e t a r y . a c t i o n t o p r e v e n t a
f u r t h e r f a l l i n c o n f i d e n c e i n s t e r l i n g , a n d , above a l l , b y s t r o n g
p r e s s u r e on o t h e r s t e r l i n g a r e a c o u n t r i e s t o r e d u c e t h e i r i m p o r t s
from hard-currency sources.
!
r
D i s c u s s i o n showed t h a t o p i n i o n w i t h i n t h e C a b i n e t was
d i v i d e d , on t h e . e x p e d i e n c y o f p r o c e e d i n g a t o n c e w i t h - t h e p l a n
proposed b y t h e C h a n c e l l o r of the-Exchequer.
J^'V
The f o l l o w i n g i s a summary o f t h e main a r g u m e n t s
in support o f the C h a n c e l l o r ' 3 p r o p o s a l s : ­
advanced
(a)
I t was n o t c l a i m e d f o r t h i s p l a n t h a t i t w o u l d
I t was
ill i t s e l f r e d r e s s the t r a d e balance o f t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a .
e s s e n t i a l l y a plan t o p r o t e c t s t e r l i n g .
T h e C h a n c e l l o r '3
f i n a n c i a l a d v i s e r s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e w a s bound t o b e an e x c h a n g e
c r i s i s b e f o r e m i d - s u m m e r , and t h e y t h o u g h t t h a t t h i s was l i k e l y
t o d e v e l o p s h o r t l y a f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the f i g u r e s showing
­ t h e s t a t e o f t h e r e s e r v e s a t t h e e n d of t h e f i r s t q u a r t e r .
I t
was o r t h i s r e a s o n t h a t t h e C h a n c e l l o r v / i s h e d t o i n t r o d u c e h i s
Budget.
A f u r t h e r r e a s o n f o r t h i s was
1
ipV/'.'--,
tt%j . ;.;-\'­
£$;V.-V'
(it:­ .^­ -;.
: :
:
r
;
f
p
IV. -j
'
l
a
n
a
t
t
h
e
t
i
m
e
t
h
e
t h a t , t o g a i n f u l l e f f e c t , measures f o r ' r e m e d y i n g ' , t h e economic
s i t u a t i o n . s h o u l d be a n n o u n c e d , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , s o t h a t t h e y c o u l d
be s e e n a s p a r t o f a c o m p r e h e n s i v e p o l i c y .
The Government had
'
a l r e a d y b e e n p l a c e d a t a d i s a d v a n t a g e t h r o u g h . h a v i n g t o announce
'
t h e i r economic p r o p o s a l s p i e c e m e a l ;
and t h e C h a n c e l l o r had
-. ://'..
i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e f i n a l i n s t a l m e n t o f t h e s e m e a s u r e s w o u l d be
, ,.'
announced a t t h e t i m e o f t h e B u d g e t .
(b)
The a r g u m e n t s a d v a n c e d b y t h e P a y m a s t e r - G - e n e r a l a g a i n s t
a v a r i a b l e r a t e o f e x c h a n g e seemed t o be b a s e d on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o u r t r a d e w o u l d n o t ' be b a l a n c e d .
But h i s a r g u m e n t s i n f a v o u r
o f m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p r e s e n t f i x e d r a t e o f e x c h a n g e s e e m e d t o be b a s e d on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o u r t r a d e w o u l d be b a l a n c e d i n t h e second h a l f o f 1952.
He assumed t h a t , w i t h a v a r i a b l e r a t e o f e x c h a n g e , we m i g h t e x p e n d o u r r e s e r v e s i n s e e k i n g t o p r e v e n t t h e r a t e from f a l l i n g b e l o w $2.40.
But i f , i n f a c t , o u r t r a d i n g balance improved in t h e second h a l f of the
y e a r , the r a t e would a u t o m a t i c a l l y r i s e w e l l above $ 2 , 4 0 . (c)
I t was a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e C h a n c e l l o r s
' p l a n w o u l d i n v o l v e a r i s k o f h i g h p r i c e s and unemployment i n
this country.
B u t , i f t h e d r a i n on o u r r e s e r v e s c o n t i n u e d t o
' t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h we c o u l d no l o n g e r c o n t r o l t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r o u r i n t e r n a l economy w o u l d be e v e n more s e r i o u s . I f we c o u l d
no l o n g e r p a y f o r o u r i m p o r t s , a c u t e s h o r t a g e s and w i d e s p r e a d unemployment w o u l d b e i n e v i t a b l e ;
and t h e w h o l e economy w o u l d t h e n be t h r e a t e n e d w i t h i m m e d i a t e c o l l a p s e . (d)
A moderate r i s e i n t h e p r i c e o f i m p o r t s w o u l d have a
s a l u t a r y e f f e c t i n b r i n g i n g home t o t h e p e o p l e o f t h i s c o u n t r y
the r e a l i t y of the economic s i t u a t i o n in which t h e y were l i v i n g .
Under t h e p l a n n e d economy t h e G o v e r n m e n t t h e m s e l v e s assumed
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f a r v a r y i n g t h e p a t t e r n o f c o n s u m p t i o n b y making
a d j u s t m e n t s i n iim. ; r t p r o g r a m m e s .
T h e r e w a s s o m e t h i n g t o be
s a i d , p o l i t i c a l l y , f o r moving towards t h e s y s t e m b y which
i n d i v i d u a l s were i n f l u e n c e d , by the o p e r a t i o n o f the p r i c e
m e c h a n i s m , t o make t h e i r own a d j u s t m e n t s t o c h a n g i n g e c o n o m i c
circumstances.
T h i s l a t t e r s y s t e m had the f u r t h e r a d v a n t a g e t h a t
i t e n a b l e d p e o p l e t o a d j u s t t h e m s e l v e s more g r a d u a l l y t o c h a n g i n g
c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d a v o i d e d t h e v i o l e n t u p h e a v a l s w h i c h seemed
i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m Government p l a n n i n g .
(e)
S t e r l i n g was a t p r e s e n t o v e r - v a l u e d , w i t h t h e r e s u l t
t h a t n o - o n e w o u l d h o l d s t e r l i n g i f he c o u l d a v o i d d o i n g s o . I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e l a r g e sums a t c a l l i n t h e s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s were a grave t h r e a t t o the s t a b i l i t y of the c u r r e n c y . I t was v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o m a i n t a i n s t a b i l i t y w i t h t h e s e v a s t l i a b i l i t i e s overhanging the market. (f)
I t was u n r e a s o n a b l e t h a t t h e o e o p l e o f t h i s c o u n t r y
s h o u l d be a s k e d t o a c c e p t i n c r e a s e d h a r d s h i p s and s a c r i f i c e s ,
in o r d e r t o r e d r e s s t h e U n i t e d Kinrdom b a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s , i f ­
a l l t h e i r e f f o r t s c o u l d be f r u s t r a t e d b y u n r e s t r i c t e d d r a w i n g s
on t h e s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s h e l d b y c o u n t r i e s l i k e A u s t r a l i a whose
-inroads on t h e r e s e r v e s w e r e n o t r e g u l a t e d b y . any f o r m a l a g r e e m e n t .
T h e r e was a 3trong c a s e f o r r e s t r i c t i n g A u s t r a l i a ' s r i g h t t o draw
down t h e c e n t r a l r e s e r v e s o f t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a .
(g)
The P a y m a s t e r - G e n e r a l s u g g e s t e d i n h i s memorandum t h a t
our f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n was t o o weak t o - / a r r a n t o u r t a k i n g t h e
r i s k s which the C h a n c e l l o r 's plan e n t a i l e d .
I f i t w e r e i n f a c t so
w e a k , and t h e C h a n c e l l o r ' s p l a n w e r e n o t a d o p t e d , i t w o u l d n o t be
l o n g b e f o r e the r e s e r v e s o f the s t e r l i n g a r e a were w h o l l y e x h a u s t e d
and we s h o u l d t h e n f a c e i m m i n e n t e c o n o ) n i c c o l l a p s e w i t h o u t a n y
p o l i c y for dealing with that situation.
'.
On t h e
urged against
other
side,
the
the. adoption o f : t h e
following
considerations
Chancellor's
were
plan:­
(h)
T h o u g h i t was - c e r t a i n , t h a t i t w o u l d i n v o l v e v e r y g r a v e
r i s k s , t h e r e v a s no c e r t a i n t y t h a t i t w o u l d succeed,
The r a t e
o f e x c h a n g e , o n c e f r e e d , w o u l d he b o u n d i n i t i a l l y t o f a l l - s h a r p l y ;
a n d , i f t h e E x c h a n g e E q u a l i s a t i o n F u n d -were u s e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e
of h o l d i n g i t a t $2.40,* a s u b s t a n t i a l - p o r t i o n o f the r e m a i n i n g
r e s e r v e s m i g h t be expended i n t h i s . o p e r a t i o n .
Some - M i n i s t e r s ­
f e a r e d t h a t t h e r e s e r v e s m i g h t be d e p l e t e d more r a p i d l y i n t h i s
way t h a n b y c o n t i n u i n g t o u s e t h e m t o m e e t t h e d e f i c i t
in.the
balance o f payments.
(i)
I t w o u l d b e a s e r i o u s b l o w t o o t h e r Commonwealth
Governments i f t h i s p l a n were announced s o soon a f t e r t h e M e e t i n g
o f Commonwealth F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s i n J a n u a r y , when i t h a d b e e n ­
a g r e e d t o make a v e r y d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h t o t h e s e . p r o b l e m s .
They
w o u l d n a t u r a l l y e x p e c t t h a t , i f a c t i o n on t h e s e l i n e s h a d b e e n ,
i n c o n t e m p l a t i o n , i t would have been m e n t i o n e d a t t h a t M e e t i n g .
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER s a i d " t h a t h e had i n f a c t g i v e n an
i n d i c a t i o n , a t the e n d o f t h e M e e t i n g , t h a t t h e m e a s u r e s t h e n
d i s c u s s e d m i g h t n o t be s u f f i c i e n t and t h a t , i f t h e s i t u a t i o n
c o n t i n u e d t o d e t e r i o r a t e , much more d r a s t i c a c t i o n m i g h t h a v e t o
be t a k e n b e f o r e t h e end o f t h e y e a r .
Since then, in a telegram ­
t o Commonwealth F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s w h i c h he h a d c i r c u l a t e d - t o
t h e C a b i n e t on 1 1 t h F e b r u a r y
t o the i n c r e a s i n g g r a v i t y o f
( C . ( 5 2 ) 33) , h e had drawn a t t e n t i o n
the s i t u a t i o n .
- ­
(j)
The E u r o p e a n P a y m e n t s U n i o n was u n l i k e l y t o r e m a i n e f f e c t i v e f o r v e r y l o n g , but the a d o p t i o n of t h i s p l a n would d e a l i t an i m m e d i a t e d e a t h - b l o w .
This would accord i l l with the
*.
G o v e r n m e n t ' s e f f o r t s t o make p l a i n t h e i r s y m p a t h y w i t h t h e movement t o w a r d s E u r o p e a n u n i t y .
I t m i g h t e v e n be r e g a r d e d a s i n i m i c a l t o the el f o r t s of t h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c C o u n c i l t o e s t a b l i s h a sound e c o n o m i c f o u n d a t i o n on w h i c h t o b u i l d up t h e d e f e n s i v e s t r e n g t h o f Western Europe,
T h i s a s p e c t of the p o l i c y w o u l d v c e r t a i n l y be d i s t a s t e f u l t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Government. (k)
T h i s p l a n w o u l d do l i t t l e t o e a s e our f u n d a m e n t a l
problem of b a l a n c i n g the trade of the s t e r l i n g area.
I t might,
h o w e v e r , s u g g e s t t h a t the Government were p r e p a r e d t o s e e t h i s
p r o b l e m s o l v e d by t h e e x p e d i e n t s cf t h e n i n e t e e n - t h i r t i e s .
Reliance
on m o n e t a r y m e a s u r e s w o u l d be t h o u g h t t o p o i n t t o l a r g e - s c a l e
unemployment;
and t h e G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d be e x p o s e d t o a l l t h e
w e l l - w o r n c r i t i c i s m s d i r e c t e d on t h a t a c c o u n t a g a i n s t t h e
Conservative Party.
(l)
Those o f the e c o n o m i s t s i n . Government s e r v i c e
b e e n c o n s u l t e d a b o u t t h e p l a n vrere o p u o s e d t o
it.
who had (m)
The a d o p t i o n o f t h e p l a n w o u l d h a v e t h e i m m e d i a t e r e s u l t of producing a general r e s t r i c t i o n of world trade.
Many
o f t h e c o u n t r i e s w h i c h now b o u g h t e x p o r t s f r o m us b e c a u s e t h e y c o u l d p a y f o r them i n a s o f t c u r r e n c y w o u l d be u n w i l l i n g t o go on b u y i n g i f s t e r l i n g became a h a r d c u r r e n c y .
Many o f t h o s e who now s p e n t s t e r l i n g i n o r d e r t o s a v e d o l l a r s w o u l d t u r n t o d o l l a r s o u r c e s of s u p p l y .
The d e f i c i t i n ' o u r d o l l a r b a l a n c e o f p a y m e n t s w o u l d t h u s be i n c r e a s e d ;
the exchange r a t e would f a l l :
and t h i s i n t u r n w o u l d mean h i g h e r p r i c e s and more unemployment i n t h i s country. (n)
The c o m p u l s o r y f u n d i n g o f s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s h e l d b y
Commonwealth and f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s m i g h t be c o n s t r u e d as a m o u n t i n g
t o a b a n k e r ' s d e f a u l t a n d -would i m p a i r o u r i n t e r n a t i o n a l
credit.
(o)
The a d o p t i o n o f t h e p l a n w o u l d g i v e r i s e t o v e r y g r e a t
political difficulty.
p u b l i c o p i n i o n in t h i s c o u n t r y was w h o l l y
u n p r e p a r e d f o r such measures.
The s u d d e n r e v e r s a l o f t h e e c o n o m i c
p o l i c i e s w h i c h had b e e n p u r s u e d f o r t h e l a s t t w e l v e y e a r s , and i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e abandonment o f t h e o b j e c t i v e o f s e e k i n g s t a b i l i t y i n i n t e r n a l p r i c e s and w a g e s , w o u l d come a s a s e v e r e s h o c k t o public opinion.
Under d e m o c r a t i c government w i t h u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e such v i o l e n t r e v e r s a l s o f p o l i c y w e r e h a r d l y p r a c t i c a b l e . E v e n i f t h e c ^ a a f o r t h i s o h a n g e w e r e a b u n d a n t l y o l e a r on t h e m e r i t s , t h e r e w o u l d be v e r y g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y i n p e r s u a d i n g t h e public to.accept i t .
M o r e o v e r , t h e a d o p t i o n of t h i s p o l i c y w o u l d c r e a t e an u n b r i d g e a b l e , g a p b e t w e e n t h e G o v e r n m e n t and t h e /Opposition;
a n d , i f i t w e r e t h o u g h t p o s s i b l e t h a t an e v e n m o r e
g r a v e e c o n o m i c c r i s i s m i g h t d e v e l o p l a t e r i n the y e a r , i t w o u l d
be u n j u s t i f i a b l e t o t a k e a t t h i s s t a g e a s t e p w h i c h m i g h t e x c l u d e
a l l p o s s i b i l i t y o f f o r m i n g a N a t i o n a l Government t o handle t h a t
situation.
S p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n was g i v e n , i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n , t o t h e e f f e c t w h i c h t h e p r o p o s e d p o l i c y m i g h t h a v e on t h e G o v e r n m e n t s o f t h e o t h e r members o f t h e Commonwealth..
THE
COMMCNWEALTH SECRETARY s a i d t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l t o f r e e z e 80^ o f t h e i r s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s v o u l d come a s a g r e a t s h o c k t o t h e s e G o v e r n m e n t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a s no i n d i c a t i o n o f t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y had been g i v e n a t t h e r e c e n t M e e t i n g o f Commonwealth F i n a n c e Ministers.
I f , h o w e v e r , due n o t i c e was g i v e n i t was u n l i k e l y t h a t i t w o u l d c a u s e any g r e a t p o l i t i c a l u p h e a v a l i n t h e Commonwealth.
F o r P a k i s t a n and C e y l o n i t m i g h t w e l l p r o v e t o be t h e t u r n i n g - p o i n t a t w h i c h t h e y . d e c i d e d t o l e a v e the s t e r l i n g a r e a , t h o u g h t h e r e w o u l d be no q u e s t i o n o f t h e i r l e a v i n g t h e Conunbnwealth on t h i s a c c o u n t .
A u s t r a l i a v/ould be h a r d h i t by i t , b u t h e r G o v e r n m e n t must r e a l i s e t h a t she was o v e r - s p e n d i n g a n d c o u l d n o t e x p e c t t o go on d o i n g s o .
I t was c o n c e i v a b l e , though u n l i k e l y , t h a t she might seek independence o f the s t e r l i n g a r e a .
New Z e a l a n d w o u l d a c c e p t t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e U n i t e d K i n g d t .i G o v e r n m e n t .
South A f r i c a would n o t o b j e c t :
she w o u l d w e l c o m e t h e r e - o p e n i n g o f t h e L o n d o n g o l d m a r k e t .
I n d i a , i f the p r o p o s a l s were c a r e f u l l y p r e s e n t e d . t o h e r , might
w e l l a c c e p t t h e m i f she c o u l d b e a s s u r e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d n o t
p r e v e n t her from o b t a i n i n g s u f f i c i e n t c a p i t a l f o r t h e development
p l a n t o w h i c h she was c o m m i t t e d .
C a n a d a , t h o u g h n o t a member o f
the s t e r l i n g a r e a , would welcome the p l a n .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d . i t was p o i n t e d o u t . t h a t u n d e r t h e C h a n c e l l o r ' s p l a n t h e Commonwealth members o f t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a w o u l d b e l e f t f r e e t o s p e n d a t w i l l some 20;£ o f t h e i r
sterling b a l a n c e s and. t h a t some o f . them w o u l d n o t t h e r e f o r e be under a n y g r e a t e r r e s t r a i n t than t h a t a l r e a d y imposed b y t h e e x i s t i n g a g r e e m e n t s l i m i t i n g t h e i r d r a w i n g r i g h t s on t h o s e b a l a n c e s . From t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w t h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t g a i n v/ould be t h e r e s t r a i n t t o be i m p o s e d b y t h i s p l a n on A u s t r a l i a ' s use o f h e r sterling balances;
f o r h e r drawing r i g h t s were not a t p r e s e n t t h e s u b j e c t o f any a g r e e m e n t and h e r o v e r s e a s e x p e n d i t u r e c o n s t i t u t e d the g r e a t e s t c u r r e n t t h r e a t t o the s t a b i l i t y of the s t e r l i n g area. T o w a r d s t h e e n d o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n i t became c l e a r
t h a t many members o f t h e C a b i n e t e n t e r t a i n e d s e r i o u s d o u b t s a b o u t
t h e e x p e d i e n c y o f p r o c e e d i n g a t o n c e w i t h s o v i o l e n t a change o f
p o l i c y as t h a t proposed b y the C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer.
At
an e a r l i e r s t a g e i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n i t h a d b e e n s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e
C h a n c e l l o r ' s p l a n m i g h t be c a r r i e d o u t i n t w o s t a g e s - f i r s t a
e v e r e B u d g e t , i n c l u d i n g a s h a r p i n c r e a s e i n the Bank r a t e ' a n d
o r a s t i c r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e d e f e n c e and h o u s i n g p r o g r a m m e s ;
and,
s e c o n d l y , a t t h e end o f M a r c h , a f u r t h e r c o n f e r e n c e o f Common­
w e a l t h F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s t o p r o d u c e an a g r e e d p l a n f o r d e a l i n g w i t h
the problems o f t h e s t e r l i n g b a l a n c e s , the v a r i a b l e r a t e of exchang
and t r a d e a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a c o u n t r i e s
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER r e g a r d e d " t h i s p a r t i c u l a r " c o m p r o m i s e
as i m p r a c t i c a b l e ,
He d i d n o t t h i n k i t w o u l d be p o s s i b l e t o '
r e a c h a g r e e m e n t , i n a Commonwealth c o n f e r e n c e , on s o D r a c o n i a n
a plan as t h i s .
Any d r a s t i c a c t i o n t o save t h e c u r r e n c y w o u l d h a v e ­
t o he d e v i s e d i n s e c r e t ;
a n d , a l t h o u g h e v e r y e f f o r t s h o u l d he made
-to c a r r y o t h e r Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s w i t h a s , t h e p a r a m o u n t n e e d
f o r s e c r e c y w o u l d make i t i m p o s s i b l e t o g i v e t h e m m o r e t h a n a
f e w days in which t o c o n s i d e r such a plan.
A financial operation
o f t h i s k i n d n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d n a t i o n a l c r e d i t and c o n f i d e n c e
i n t h e f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n of t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m a s t h e b a n k e r f o r
the s t e r l i n g a r e a ;
and i t w o u l d become i m p o s s i b l e t o c a r r y out­
such an o p e r a t i o n ' i f c o n f i d e n c e w e r e w e a k e n e d i n a d v a n c e a s a
r e s u l t of l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e plans at a conference
a t t e n d e d b y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r o m a l l t h e Commonwealth members
of the s t e r l i n g area.
I n t h e C h a n c e l l o r ' s v i e w t h e d e c i s i o n was
one f o r w h i c h t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t must t a k e p r i m a r y
responsibility.He h i m s e l f s t i l l b e l i e v e d t h a t on b a l a n c e t h e w i s e r
c o u r s e w o u l d be t o t a k e t h i s a c t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y and announce i t
as p a r t o f t h e Budget p r o p o s a l s .
He r e c o g n i s e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t
o t h e r M i n i s t e r s w o u l d p r e f e r t o w a i t , i n t h e hope t h a t e i t h e r t h e
p o s i t i o n w o u l d i m p r o v e t o such an e x t e n t t h a t n o such a c t i o n was
n e c e s s a r y or t h a t , i f i t c o n t i n u e d t o d e t e r i o r a t e , they c o u l d a t
l e a s t c l a i m t h a t t h e y had been c o m p e l l e d t o take t h i s s t e p by
f o r c e m a j e u r e . - He a l s o a p p r e c i a t e d t h e p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s
of
m a k i n g s o v i o l e n t a r e v e r s a l i n e c o n o m i c p o l i c y and a c c e p t i n g t h e
r i s k s which i t e n t a i l e d o f r i s i n g p r i c e s and i n c r e a s i n g unemployment.
I f t h e C a b i n e t w e r e n o t p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t t h e s e r i s k s and
d i f f i c u l t i e s , ' t h e a d o p t i o n o f h i s p l a n must a t l e a s t b e d e f e r r e d ­
t h o u g h , f o r h i m s e l f , he b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d be f o r c e d i n t o some such a c t i o n b e f o r e t h e summer was o v e r and he would have p r e f e r r e d t o choose the c o n s t r u c t i v e course o f t a k i n g t h e a c t i o n a t a t i m e when t h e r e was s t i l l h o p e o f s e c u r i n g p o s i t i v e
a d v a n t a g e f r o m i t r a t h e r t h a n w a i t u n t i l a c t i o n was f o r c e d upon
him and t h e p r o s p e c t s o f w r i n g i n g p r a c t i c a l a d v a n t a g e f r o m i t
were c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y l e s s .
THE PRIME M I N I S T E R , summing up t h i s p a r t o f t h e '
d i s c u s s i o n , s a i d t h a t t h e r e was a c l e a r d i v i s i o n o f o p i n i o n w i t h i n ­
t h e C a b i n e t on t h e m e r i t s o f t h e C h a n c e l l o r ' s p r o p o s a l .
Many
M i n i s t e r s , w i t h e v e r y d e s i r e t o h e l p the C h a n c e l l o r i n h i s
d i f f i c u l t t a s k , remained unconvinced t h a t t h e advantages which
m i g h t be g a i n e d f r o m t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h i s " p l a n , i f a l l w e n t w e l l ,
o u t w e i g h e d i t s m a n i f e s t d i s a d v a n t a g e s and d a n g e r s .
So l o n g a s
t h e r e was s o l a r g e a d i v i s i o n o f o p i n i o n w i t h i n t h e C a b i n e t on
the m e r i t s o f t h e p l a n , i t w o u l d be h a z a r d o u s f o r the C h a n c e l l o r
to proceed with i t .
H i s own c o n c l u s i o n was t h a t , a t t h e p r e s e n t
t i m e , t h e r e was n o t w i t h i n t h e C a b i n e t a s u f f i c i e n t b o d y o f s u p p o r t
f o r t h i s plan t o enable the C h a n c e l l o r t o launch i t w i t h confidence
t h a t he had b e h i n d h i m t h e c o n v i c t i o n , as w e l l as t h e l o y a l t y ,
of his c o l l e a g u e s .
THE CHANCELLOR OP THE EXCHEQUER s a i d t h a t a t t h i s
s t a g e he o u g h t t o p u t p l a i n l y b e f o r e h i s c o l l e a g u e s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e
c o u r s e w h i c h he w o u l d f e e l bound t o f o l l o w i f he was u n a b l e t o
p r o c e e d w i t h h i s p l a n f o r p r o t e c t i n g the c u r r e n c y .
The C a b i n e t
s h o u l d r e a l i s e t h a t t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y v/ould i t s e l f
involve
a c t i o n w h i c h i n some r e s p e c t s m i g h t p r o v e q u i t e as u n p a l a t a b l e
t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n as t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s which might have f o l l o w e d
from the a d o p t i o n o f h i s o r i g i n a l p l a n .
Political
difficulties
c o u l d c e r t a i n l y n o t be e s c a p e d by p r e f e r r i n g . t h e
alternative
l i n e of p o l i c y ;
and t h e economic c o n s e q u e n c e s might p r o v e t o
be e q u a l l y u n p l e a s a n t .
I t w o u l d h a v e t o be a n n o u n c e d t h a t t h e
G o v e r n m e n t ' s f i r s t o b j e c t i v e was t o r e d r e s s t h e b a l a n c e o f
p a y m e n t s , a n d a l l G o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y v/ould h a v e t o be r e l a t e d t o
that primary o b j e c t i v e .
The main h e a d i n g s o f h i s a l t e r n a t i v e
p o l i c y v/ould be a s f o l l o w s .
(i)
He v/ould h a v e t o i n t r o d u c e a s e v e r e B u d g e t
include a s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n in the food subsidies
of o t h e r unpopular measures.
which would
and a number
A : (ii)
T h e Bank r a t e w o u l d h a v e t o , b e r a i s e d t o U% - a n d t h i s w o u l d
c e r t a i n l y e v o k e t h e f a m i l i a r c r y t h a t t h e . C o n s e r v a t i v e , P a r t y h a d - p u t ,.; -.,
t h e m s e l v e s I n t h e hands- o f t h e B a n k e r s . "
'
,
( i i i ) . T h e r e would have t o be a f u r t h e r cut i n d e f e n c e p r o d u c t i o n ,
i n " o r d e r t o r e l i e v e t h e s t r a i n o n . t h e m e t a l - u s i n g I n d u s t r i e s and--enable,.
them t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r / e x p o r t s .
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , - o r i n a d d i t i o n , we v
:
s h o u l d h a v e t o - t r y . t o ' s e l l f o r d o l l a r s some o f t h e m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t - . .
w h i c h was now b e i n g . m a n u f a c t u r e d f o r o u r own u s e . . .
:
life
/;
(iv)
I f . t h e C a b i n e t w e r e u n w i l l i n g t o a l l o w - t h e p r i c e mechanism '
t o o p e r a t e - a u t o m a t i c a l l y t o reduce consumption, f u r t h e r use would have t o be
made o f
p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l s and the;mechanisms o f . e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g . I n p a r t i c u l a r , . a f u r t h e r e u t o f £200 m i l l i o n s w o u l d . h a v e t o b e made i n '
import programmes.
T h i s meant t h a t - wheat s t o c k s w o u l d p r o b a b l y h a v e t o
be r e d u c e d - t o a l e v e l r e p r e s e n t i n g t m w e e k s ' -consumption, t h a t s t o c k s
o f s u g a r w o u l d h a v e t o b e r u n d o w n , . a n d t h a t f u r t h e r c u t s must b e made,
i n i m p o r t s o f a n i m a l f e e d i n g s t u f f s and r a w m a t e r i a l s .
I m p o r t s o f s d f t - w d o d -.
would h a v e t o b e f u r t h e r r e d u c e d , and t h e h o u s i n g programme m i g h t have' t o
be cut back.
Open g e n e r a l l i c e n c e s t o i m p o r t w o u l d h a v e t o b e s u s p e n d e d .
T h e r e w o u l d h a v e t o be a c u t i n t o b a c c o i m p o r t s , a n d t h e ' S e r v i c e programmes
f o r a c c u m u l a t i n g r e s e r v e s o f o i l w o u l d h a v e t o be d e l a y e d .
--: ( v )
F u r t h e r l i m i t s w o u l d h a v e ' t o be p l a c e d o n t h e f r e e d o m o f p r i v a t e
t r a d e r s t o . i m p o r t goods from Europe.
T h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s would f a l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y o n i m p o r t s o f m a c h i n e r y , t e x t i l e s and - f o o d .
This further
r e v e r s a l o f t h e p o l i c y o f l i b e r a l i s i n g E u r o p e a n t r a d e w o u l d b r i n g us t o t h e
p o i n t a t w h i c h some o f t h e o t h e r E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s w o u l d t a k e r e t a l i a t o r y
T h e p o l i c y w h i c h we s h o u l d b e f o r c e d t o
a c t i o n a g a i n s t our e x p o r t s .
f o l l o w would h a s t e n t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h e European Payments U n i o n .
m
(vi)
O t h e r Commonwealth G o v e r n m e n t s w o u l d h a v e t o b e u r g e d t o t a k e
a c t i o n , e v e n m o r e d r a s t i c t h a n t h a t upon w h i c h t h e y had a g r e e d a t t h e .
r e c e n t M e e t i n g o f Commonwealth F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r s , t o r e d u c e t h e i r I m p o r t s
f r o m c o u n t r i e s o u t s i d e t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a and t o e x p a n d t h e i r e x p o r t s t o
those countries.
Soraa a l t e r n a t i v e method o f d e a l i n g w i t h t h e i r - s t e r l i n g
b a l a n c e s m i g h t a l s o h a v e t o be c o n s i d e r e d .
I t must be assumed t h a t t h e y
w o u l d be u n w i l l i n g t o fund t h e s e b a l a n c e s i f t h e b a l a n c e s h e l d b y f o r e i g n ­
c o u n t r i e s i n London remained f r e e o f r e s t r i c t i o n .
I t m i g h t , h o w e v e r , be
p o s s i b l e t o . s e c u r e some e x t e n s i o n o f p a y m e n t s a g r e e m e n t s l i m i t i n g t h e i r
drawing r i g h t s .
.
- .
'
- - ' . ' - ' .
. - ' : . ' - - ' - ­
(vii)
F u r t h e r c u t s i n - i n v e s t m e n t w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y . . T h e h o u s i n g
programme m i g h t h a v e t o be r e d u c e d .
And, i n o r d e r t o d i s c o u r a g e
,
i n v e s t m e n t i n new m a c h i n e r y , t h e d e p r e c i a t i o n a l l o w a n c e s f o r i n c o m e t a x
p u r p o s e s might h a v e t o be c a n c e l l e d .
A t t h e t h i r d o f t h e s e m e e t i n g s , on 29th F e b r u a r y , t h e C a b i n e t g a v e
p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c u t s w h i c h w o u l d h a v e t o b e made, u n d e r t h i s
a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y , i n t h e import programmes.
T h e y h a d b e f o r e them a.,
note by t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer s e t t i n g out a t e n t a t i v e l i s t
o f m e a s u r e s f o r r e d u c i n g i m p o r t s and e x p a n d i n g e x p o r t s w i t h a v i e w t o ' ,
c h e c k i n g t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom b a l a n c e o f p a y m e n t s .
I n ' a p r e l i m i n a r y d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s e measures t h e f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s . w e r e
made:The M i n i s t e r o f D e f e n c e would need t o s a t i s f y h i m s e l f t h a t h e c o u l d
o v e r c o m e t h e o b j e c t i o n s w h i c h t h e C h i e f s o f S t a f f had p r e v i o u s l y r a i s e d
t o t h e p r o p o s a l t h a t wheat s t o c k s should be r e d u c e d t o t h e l e v e l o f t e n
weeks' consumption.
Strong
objection
was
raised
t o the proposal
t o reduce t h e import
of
coarse -grains.
A s t h e r e was l o s s . p r o s p e c t o f i n c r e a s e d s u p p l i e s o f i m p o r t e d m e a t , i t was , t h e r a o r e ; i m p o r t a n t ' t o b u i l d up t h e " p i g . , population i n t h i s country.
. '.- '..
' i : ' i
:,
'v :j:v,'V- ".' P r o p o s a l s f o r r e d u c i n g . t h e i m p o r t o f s o f t w o o d s m u s t , b e , 1'-.
7 c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d i n r e l a t i o n t o . t h e n e e d s o f t h e houslng:i:'::^;i;::'-^:
programme.over t h e n e x t t h r e e years'. ^ M i n i s t e r s were most--reluct ant
! t o reduce t h e t a r g e t f i g u r e s ; w h i c h t h e y had approved f o r the-housing
- programme. - ;
- --. \^:V.'.;'v
- \
.-/:. '-'
.­
:
;
:
;
:
::
. /;- - -'
. h ' I m p o r t s o f c o t t o n s h o u l d ; n o t ' b e " r e d u c e d b e y o n d - t n e ^ p o i n t -'..
Vat which s p i n n e r s ' would b e g i n t o f i n d d i f f i c u l t y , i n g e t t i n g - t h e
types of cotton t h e y required.-...
A g r o u p o f M i n i s t e r s under t h e Chairmanship o f t h e
M i n i s t e r o f D e f e n c e s h o u l d c o n s i d e r how a c o n t r i b u t i o n o f a b o u t
. £^0 m i l l i o n s c o u l d b e - m a d e , a t t h e e x p e n s e o f d e f e n c e p r o d u c t i o n , ;
t o w a r d s t h e e a s i n g o f t h e b a l a n c e o f payments p r o b l e m . ­
1
- T h e same g r o u p o f , M i n i s t e r s s h o u l d a l s o c o n s i d e r t h e .
p r o p o s a l t o s a v e o v e r s e a s e x p e n d i t u r e o f £5 m i l l i o n s b y d e l a y i n g t h e
'programmes o f . t h e S e r v i c e s f o r a c c u m u l a t i n g r e s e r v e s o f o i l .
(
';-'\ T h e measures proposed f o r r e d u c i n g i m p a r t s from Europe
': ..
, . s h o u l d b e c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d . w i t h a v i e w t o r e d u c i n g t o a minimum
- t h e r i s k o f r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t o u r own e x p o r t t r a d e .
The. f i n a l conclusions reached by t h e Cabinet as a '
r e s u l t o f t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s a t t h e s e t h r e e m e e t i n g s may b e summarised a s f o l l o w s : '
. . .
( l )
M i n i s t e r s r e a f f i r m e d t h e i r d e s i r e t o d i s p e n s e as soon as
p r a c t i c a b l e with t h e system o f p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l s ­
- and t o m o v e , a s o p p o r t u n i t y o f f e r e d , t o w a r d s t h e
r e s t o r a t i o n o f a m o r e f r e e economy I n w h i c h t h e r e
v/ould b e s c o p e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e p r i c e m e c h a n i s m .
In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e y endorsed the v i e w that t h e s t e r l i n g
a r e a c o u l d n o t b e p r e s e r v e d i n d e f i n i t e l y on a b a s i s
' o f i n c o n v e r t i b l e s t e r l i n g , and t h e y a g r e e d t h a t n o
- . o p p o r t u n i t y s h o u l d be l o s t o f moving tov/ards t h e u l t i m a t e
goal of c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of s t e r l i n g .
They were not s a t i s ­
f i e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e p r e s e n t moment was o p p o r t u n e
- f o r t h e . i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a p l a n , on t h e l i n e s o r i g i n a l l y ­
. p r o p o s e d b y t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e E x c h e q u e r , f o r m a k i n g
some, p a r t o f o u r s t e r l i n g r e s e r v e s c o n v e r t i b l e a t a
v a r i a b l e rate o f exchange.
( 2 )
T h e C a b i n e t a g r e e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t some a c t i o n on t h e s e
l i n e s might be taken a t a l a t e r s t a g e - e i t h e r i f t h e
circumstances became,more f a v o u r a b l e f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n
o f such a p o l i c y , o f i f t h e G o v e r n m e n t f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s
c o m p e l l e d , by a c o n t i n u i n g d r a i n on t h e g o l d . a n d
d o l l a r r e s e r v e s o f t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a , t o t a k e urgent ­
action t o protect the currency.
T h e a l t e r n a t i v e . , '­
. c o u r s e s t o b e f o l l o w e d I n t h e m e a n w h i l e s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e
b e so f r a m e d a s t o c o n f o r m a s f a r a s p r a c t i c a b l e w i t h
the Govemmenfs ultimate objectives.
-':
( 3 )
(U)
' The C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer s h o u l d frame h i s Budget
i n accordance w i t h t h e . a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y which he had
o u t l i n e d t o w a r d s t h e end o f t h e C a b i n e t ' s d i s c u s s i o n s .
I n h i s Budget s p e e c h t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer
s h o u l d make i t c l e a r t h a t i t w o u l d b e t h e f i r s t o b j e c t i v e
o f G o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y t o re*"dress t h e a d v e r s e b a l a n c e o f
p a y m e n t s , s i n c e a sound r e a r m a m e n t p r o g r a m m e c o u l d o n l y
b e b u i l t upon a f o u n d a t i o n o f a d e q u a t e e c o n o m i c . .­
strength.
-.-:-\:-\
u
( 5 )
The M i n i s t e r o f D e f e n c e , w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f t h e S e c r e t a r y
o f S t a t e f o r C o - o r d i n a t i o n o f T r a n s p o r t , F u e l and P o w e r and
t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Duchy o f L a n c a s t e r , s h o u l d d i s c u s s w i t h
t h e S e r v i c e M i n i s t e r s and t h e M i n i s t e r o f - S u p p l y the
p o s s i b i l i t y o f making a c o n t r i b u t i o n o f about £40 m i l l i o n s
towards t h e e a s i n g of t h e b a l a n c e o f payments problem b y
making m i l i t a r y equipment a v a i l a b l e f o r s a l e t o d o l l a r
c o u n t r i e s or b y s e t t i n g f r e e p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y which c o u l d
be u s e d f o r t h e m a n u f a c t u r e o f e x p o r t s ;
and s h o u l d s u b m i t h i s
recommendations t o the C a b i n e t .
( 6 )
The M i n i s t e r o f D e f e n c e s h o u l d c o n s i d e r , w i t h t h e same g r o u p
of M i n i s t e r s , the p r o p o s a l t o save overseas e x p e n d i t u r e o f
£5 m i l l i o n s b y d e l a y i n g the S e r v i c e programmes f o r .
accumulating r e s e r v e s o f oil;
and s h o u l d r e p o r t h i s
recommendations t o the C a b i n e t .
( 7 )
The C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e E x c h e q u e r s h o u l d d i s c u s s w i t h the
Departmental Ministers concerned his other proposals f o r
r e d u c i n g i m p o r t s , and s h o u l d s u b m i t t o t h e C a b i n e t a t an
- e a r l y d a t e a c o n s i d e r e d p l a n f o r r e d u c i n g i m p o r t s and
expanding e x p o r t s with a view t o checking the d e t e r i o r a t i o n
i n the b a l a n c e ' o f payments.
Cabinet
Office,
March,
S.W. 1. , 1952.
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. v^^-^
It is issued for the personal use of...C^.fr.?.Vrrk:"^
m
TOP
C.C.(52)
6&TH C O N C L U S I O N S , M I N U T E
Confidential
( 8 t h J u l y , 1952
1
igECONOMIC
^SITUATION:
MBALANCE
OF
% PAYMENTS
The
JCC.
iff
(52) 25th
Conclusions,
3
Annex
-
11. 30
a.m.)
Cabinet had b e f o r e t h e m m e m o r a n d a
C h a n c e l l o r of the E x c h e q u e r
( C . ( 5 2 ) 226) on the
n e c e s s a r y to r e d r e s s the a d v e r s e b a l a n c e
THE
PRIME
b y the
( C . (52) 223) and the M i n i s t e r
Housing and L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t
U (Previous
f.References:
1
Copy N o . .
SECRET
MINISTER
of
payments.
said that at an i n f o r m a l
o n 30th June the C h a n c e l l o r o f the E x c h e q u e r
meeting
had d i s c u s s e d
s o m e of his c o l l e a g u e s a p r o p o s a l to i n t r o d u c e a
modified
p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d on 28th a n d 29th F e b r u a r y .
IP
57th C o n ­
at this i n f o r m a l m e e t i n g had m a d e it c l e a r that t h e r e w a s
elusions,
to be a n y l a r g e body of opinion
If Minute 6 )
with
v e r s i o n of the E x t e r n a l S t e r l i n g P l a n w h i c h the C a b i n e t h a d
Mi Minute 2 a n d
p
of
measures
The
discussion
in the C a b i n e t i n f a v o u r
u n d e r t a k i n g at the p r e s e n t t i m e the h a z a r d o u s o p e r a t i o n
setting sterling free
Chancellor
at a floating rate of e x c h a n g e .
had t h e r e f o r e
e s t i m a t e d that, unless drastic m e a s u r e s
our r e s e r v e s
proposal
Nevertheless,
external financial position was most precarious:
our
it h a d
w e r e at once
of g o l d and d o l l a r s w o u l d h a v e f a l l e n b y
£ 1 7 5 m i l l i o n s b y t h e e n d o f 195?..
The Chancellor
transfer
make
more
further
should m o d i f y the defence
of o u r
another
our
programme,
c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t to p r o d u c t i v e
cuts in i m p o r t s ;
been
introduced,
therefore
p r o p o s e d , in C . (52) 2 2 3 , that w i t h a v i e w to b a l a n c i n g
o v e r s e a s accounts we
of
The
d e c i d e d not to p r e s s this
u p o n the C a b i n e t at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e .
unlikely
of
industry and
and that a l l these m e a s u r e s
b e announced b e f o r e P a r l i a m e n t r o s e f o r the s u m m e r
It w a s a l s o p r o p o s e d that, in w o r k i n g out the p o l i c y
recess.
proposals
w h i c h the U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d p l a c e b e f o r e
Commonwealth Economic
Conference
in N o v e m b e r ,
s h o u l d k e e p p r o m i n e n t l y in m i n d the n e e d f o r
some
m e a n s of w o r k i n g a s r a p i d l y as p o s s i b l e t o w a r d s
c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of s t e r l i n g .
a p p o i n t e d , under the
A
Cabinet Committee
Foreign Secretary's
s u p e r v i s e the p r e p a r a t i o n s
for
should
the
Ministers
satisfactory
the
had
been
C h a i r m a n s h i p , to
this C o n f e r e n c e ;
and the
C h a n c e l l o r w o u l d d o u b t l e s s d i s c u s s w i t h that C o m m i t t e e h o w the
q u e s t i o n of c o n v e r t i b i l i t y c o u l d b e s t b e h a n d l e d in r e l a t i o n t o the
Conference.
THE
CHANCELLOR
OF THE
EXCHEQUER
s a i d that he
v/as s e r i o u s l y c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e t h r e a t t o s t e r l i n g .
He
had
r e c e i v e d f r o m t h e B a n k of E n g l a n d a f o r m a l w a r n i n g t h a t i f no
change w e r e
made
in the e x i s t i n g s y s t e m , u n d e r w h i c h the
and d o l l a r r e s e r v e s
o f the a d v e r s e
were
of t h e s t e r l i n g a r e a
c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h the s t e r l i n g a r e a
f a c i n g in t h e i r
overseas
o f the G o v e r n o r
It w a s
a c c o u n t s , there would be a
C o u r t of the Bank of
-1­
grave
Kingdom
the c o n s i d e r e d v i e w , not
b u t of the w h o l e
strain
countries
r i s k to t h e c u r r e n c y a n d to the e c o n o m y o f the U n i t e d
and the s t e r l i n g a r e a .
gold
c a r r i e d the w h o l e
merely
England,
that changes should now be m a d e
in our e x t e r n a l
financial
s y s t e m w h i c h would have the effect of taking s o m e
s t r a i n off the r e s e r v e s .
The
Chancellor
of this
said that this v i e w
s h a r e d by other financial authorities w h o m he had
including Sir E d w a r d P e a c o c k and Sir R i c h a r d Hopkins.
anxious
England which w e r e made
Minister
on the
for
Bank
He
of
in P a r t I of the m e m o r a n d u m b y the
of H o u s i n g and L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t
thought it a . m a t t e r
such
After
c o n s i d e r a t i o n he had h i m s e l f a c c e p t e d that v i e w .
t o o k s t r o n g e x c e p t i o n to the c o m m e n t s
was
consulted,
(C.(5Z)
r e g r e t that the M i n i s t e r
226) and he
should have
used
language.
The
preferred
Chancellor
s a i d that he w o u l d h i m s e l f
have
to s t r e n g t h e n the c u r r e n c y b y m a k i n g a t o n c e
changes in our e x t e r n a l financial
system which had
r e c o m m e n d e d b y the Bank of E n g l a n d ;
the
been
but h e h a d d e c i d e d n o t
u r g e this
c o u r s e a g a i n s t the j u d g m e n t of his
colleagues
Cabinet.
It w a s , h o w e v e r , h i s duty t o w a r n t h e m that the
c u r r e n c y w o u l d be in j e o p a r d y throughout the s u m m e r ,
p o s s i b l y until the end of the y e a r .
to a c c e p t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
He would not be
T h i s m a d e it a l l the m o r e
of
and
prepared
introducing a further
devaluation of sterling to a l o w e r fixed rate
forced
exchange.
n e c e s s a r y that d r a s t i c a c t i o n
be taken, and announced, b e f o r e
the s u m m e r
should
r e c e s s with a
view
to b r i n g i n g o u r o v e r s e a s a c c o u n t s m o r e n e a r l y into b a l a n c e
the
second half of the
t a k e n to b a l a n c e o u r o v e r s e a s
(a)
as
accounts.
In a d d i t i o n to o t h e r
import
of
millions.
S.5j
decisions
consumption of
THE
LORD
under
in the
This would involve a
but any f u r t h e r
PRESIDENT
scope for
restrictions
worsening
in this
there
country.
stocks;
efficiency,
measures
If t o o m u c h p r o m i n e n c e
public
to r e d r e s s the
were
balance
g i v e n to the
proposed
on i m p o r t s , the G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d be o p e n to
the
pursuing a purely negative policy.
w a s i m p o r t a n t that the s t a t e m e n t
features.
should a l s o have positive
- F r o m that point of v i e w it would
p a r t of the g e n e r a l
Conference
in N o v e m b e r
s t a t e m e n t on the e c o n o m i c
be
m a d e at the end of the
month.
could
situation
It
and
if t h e p u b l i c a n n o u n c e m e n t of the p l a n s f o r h o l d i n g
Commonwealth Economic
any
of the national diet w o u l d , in his
w o u l d h a v e t o b e t a k e n in f r a m i n g t h e
c r i t i c i s m that they w e r e
constructive
reduced
e x p r e s s e d the v i e w that
e c o n o m y by running down
a n n o u n c e m e n t of t h e s e f u r t h e r
of p a y m e n t s .
reduction
cuts in f o o d i m p o r t s w h i c h w o u l d i n v o l v e
o p i n i o n , l e a d to l o s s of p r o d u c t i v e
Care
second
represented
g o o d in 1953,
w e r e t a k e n w h i c h r e s u l t e d in a
r e d u c t i o n in the l e v e l of f o o d c o n s u m p t i o n
There was some
valuable
of t i m b e r
timber.
s h o u l d b e no f u r t h e r
(c)
points cuts w h i c h had b e e n
s t o c k s w h i c h w o u l d have to be m a d e
unless other
(b)
The main
could be r e d u c e d by 86,000 s t a n d a r d s , w h i c h
an expenditure
of t i m b e r
w h i c h should be follows:­
d i s c u s s i o n , it w a s now hoped that i m p o r t s
half year
over
year.
D i s c u s s i o n t h e n t u r n e d on the m e a s u r e s
raised were
to.
in t h e
the
form
to.be
THE
PRIME
MINISTER
s a i d that p o s i t i v e m e a s u r e s
r e d r e s s i n g the balance of p a y m e n t s would be the
effective
m e t h o d of maintaining
effective
than w o r d s .
confidence
- action would be
D u r i n g the c o u r s e of the n e x t t w o
the C a b i n e t m u s t d e v o t e to the
consideration of these
s u c h t i m e a s w a s n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r
to enable a full
of G o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y to b e f o r m u l a t e d f o r
the end of the
The Cabinet
statement
of
month.
-
situation at meetings
C a b i n e t O f f i c e , S . W . 1. ,
1952.
weeks
u s e in t h e d e b a t e on t h e
A g r e e d to r e s u m e t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of the
11TH J U L Y ,
more
measures
e c o n o m i c s i t u a t i o n w h i c h w a s t o take p l a c e in the H o u s e
Commons before
for
most
economic
to be h e l d in t h e f o l i o w i n g
week.
T h e circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
.
It is issued for the personal use of...//p.??r^r..."Jhyr^y?A-^ci
TOP
^-
c
C.C.(52)
7 6th C O N C L U S I O N S ,
Confidential
MINUTE
The
possible
I
Annex
( 7 t h A u g u s t , 1 9 5 2 - 5. 30 p .
PERSIA
-
y
6
Copy No..
SECRET
mO
C a b i n e t r e s u m e d t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of the course
of political developments
in
Persia. (Previous
THE
Reference:
C.C.(52)
74th
Cabinet's
FOREIGN
Conclusions,
Ambassador
Minute
had j o i n t l y r e v i e w e d
6).
SECRETARY
said that, since
l a s t d i s c u s s i o n on 29th J u l y , the
ana H . M . C h a r g e d ' A f f a i r e s
in
the internal p o l i t i c a l
Teheran
situation
t h e i r v i e w s h a d b e e n c o m m u n i c a t e d \o t h e S t a t e
T h e y both a g r e e d
that it w a s u n l i k e l y that a n y
to D r .
Mussadiq's
power
at the p r e s e n t t i m e
coup djctat
development.
Z a h e d i and H e d j a z i
should undertake to e n c o u r a g e
seemed
such a
of
i n v o l v e d in such a d e v e l o p m e n t .
then, hov/cver, G e n e r a l
in t h e c o u r s e
Since
Embassy
o f w h i c h he h a d s a i d t h a t he
F r o n t w h o had e x p r e s s e d t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n
Government.
i n t e r v i e w that G e n e r a l
initiative
of the B r i t i s h
had b e e n a p p r o a c h e d b y t h r e e or f o u r m e m b e r s
Mussadiq's
should
Zahedi had h i m s e l f taken the
in s e e k i n g a n i n t e r v i e w w i t h a m e m b e r
in T e h e r a n ,
their
or s u p p o r t a
coup d ' e t a t , and that t h e i r t w o E m b a s s i e s
avoid becoming
Dr.
into
military
T h e y both t o o k the v i e w that n e i t h e r
Governments
military
alternative
except perhaps by a
to b e the m o s t l i k e l y p e r s o n s to b r i n g a b o u t
and
Department.
G o v e r n m e n t could be brought
and that G e n e r a l s
the
American
o f the
National
with
It a l s o a p p e a r e d f r o m
this
Z a h e d i w a s in touch with s o m e
members
of t h e old O p p o s i t i o n a n d t h a t he a l s o c o u l d c o m m a n d
some
s u p p o r t in the A r m y .
to
It w a s n o t p r o p o s e d a t p r e s e n t
i n f o r m the U n i t e d S t a t e s a u t h o r i t i e s , e i t h e r
in T e h e r a n
in W a s h i n g t o n , t h a t G e n e r a l Z a h e d i h a d m a d e t h e s e
to t h e B r i t i s h E m b a s s y .
himself made a similar
and this m i g h t s t i m u l a t e
It w a s t h o u g h t l i k e l y t h a t he
a p p r o a c h to the
Until it w a s k n o w n w h e t h e r
would
United States
further A m e r i c a n
p o s s i b i l i t y of a d e v e l o p m e n t a l o n g t h e s e
or
overtures
Embassy,
i n t e r e s t in the
lines.
the
situation was
t o d e v e l o p in t h e d i r e c t i o n of a m i l i t a r y
c o u p cl ' e t a t ,
likely
it w a s i m p o r t a n t t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d
m a k e any unconditional offer
Dr.
Mussadiq.
discussions
of f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e
This was a further
r e a s o n for
The
Cabinet
276.
-
T o o k n o t e of t h i s s t a t e m e n t b y the
Office,
the
a p p r o a c h to the P e r s i a n G o v e r n m e n t on the
l i n e s indicated in C . ( 5 2 )
Cabinet
opening
w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t r e g a r d i n g
ba.sis of a f r e s h
not
to
S.W.1,
11th A u g u s t , 1 9 5 2 .
Foreign
Secretary.
C . C . (52)
(1st
83rd C o n c l u s i o n s
1952
October,
-
11.0
euro.)
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR A I R
o f E d i n b u r g h was a n x i o u s
arrangements
training
at
Royal Air
learn
h a d b e e n made f o r ' h i m
an a i r - f i e l d
Force
to
to learn to f l y ,
fly
jet
aircraft
a Royal A i r Force
It
pilot,
position
expose
It
fly
his
was a r g u a b l e
risk
was a q u a l i f i e d
of
that,
he
might
to fly
with
felt
be
the
jet
t h e Queen was a p a s s e n g e r .
standard
doubts
should
training
to
the
views
about
not
now
take
the
And,
once
aircraft
in
THE COMMONYffiALTH SECRETARY
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL s u p p o r t e d
of
public
aircraft.
he m i g h t w i s h t o p i l o t
course
safety.
his
tempted
a
should
grave
Highness
Once
he
to a
in v i e w of
His Royal
learning
pilot,
that
of
training
he
flying
guidance
intended
that
to unnecessary r i s k s .
p r o p o s e d had b e e n c o m p l e t e d ,
much g r e a t e r
the
own a i r c r a f t
said
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,
himself
elementary
b u t he w o u l d b e t r a i n e d
THE PRIME MINISTER
proposal.
to receive
was n o t
t h e Duke
provisional
o r undergo the f u l l
which would enable.him t o
this
and
n e a r London under
instructor.
s a i d that H.R.H.
he
which
and
e x p r e s s e d by t h e
Prime
Minister.
Other M i n i s t e r s
objection
to
(when P r i n c e
the p r o p o s a l .
Albert)
Royal A i r Force
Windsor,
between
in
the
It
first
it
wings
world war;
and K e n t h a d a l l
two wars.
unnecessary
v/as p o i n t e d o u t
had e a r n e d h i s
the
Gloucester
thought
and t h a t
learned
and y o u n g men who w e r e
learn
to
fly
it
drive
a motor-car.
It
His R o y a l H i g h n e s s ,
prevented from
to
little
in
the Dukes
fly
in
and t o
fulfilling
his
be
to
learn
period
as a
normal
to
to
to
disappointment
the R o y a l A i r F o r c e ,
wish
of
the
than l e a r n i n g
a great
fly.
if
VI
the
in a position
more h a z a r d o u s
would c e r t a i n l y
raise
K i n g G-eorge
F l y i n g was now w i d e l y r e g a r d e d
transport;
to
that
as a p i l o t
means o f
thought
to
he
were
ERIME
THE
division
Duke o f
of'
o p i n i o n , he w o u l d d i s c u s s
Edinburgh
and w o u l d i f
further
MINISTER s a i d
during h i s
necessary
bring
c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
3RD OCTOBER,
S.W. 1, ,
1952.
that,
in v i e w
the m a t t e r w i t h
forthcoming v i s i t
it
up a g a i n a t
Cabinet.
of
to
this
the
Balmoral,
a later
date
for
C.C. ( 5 2 )
85th
(14th October,
Conclusions 1952,
ll.Oa.nv)
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d , t h a t
visit
t o B a l m o r a l h e h a d h a d some
clear
t h a t he d i d n o t
to
fly.
propose
His Royal
to
d o more
undergo elementary
t r a i n i n g and h a d n o i n t e n t i o n
fly
N o r h a d he a n y t h o u g h t
jet
time
aircraft.
that he should p i l o t
recent
c o n v e r s a t i o n Y r i t h H . R . H.
of Edinburgh about h i s v d s h t o l e a r n
h a d made i t
during his
an a i r c r a f t
of
of
Highness
than
attempting
proposing
in which
t h e Duke
the
at
to
any
Queen was
a
passenger.
The Prime M i n i s t e r
doubtful whether
this
proposal.
four
of
the
between the
the Cabinet
should seek
As had b e e n s t a t e d
sons o f
King George
two w a r s ;
and a t
t h e N e t h e r l a n d s was an a c t i v e
The C a b i n e t
raised
to
said that,
Royal Air Force
as a p i l o t ,
C a b i n e t O f f i c e , S. W. 1, ,
1952.
No c i r c u l a t i o n
given
to
this
document
earlier
to f l y
under
was
in
the
period-,
Bemhard
should
Edinburgh
the
of
be
should
guidance
to
discussion
pilot.
that no o b j e c t i o n
t h e Duke o f
he
any o b j e c t i o n
time Prince
and e x p e r i e n c e d
instructor.
14TH OCTOBER,
raise
the C a b i n e t ' s
the p r e s e n t
agreed
training
to
V had l e a r n e d
the p r o p o s a l t h a t H.R.H.
undergo elementary
in
on r e f l e c t i o n ,
of
a
C . C . ( 5 2 ) 98th and 99th C o n c l u s i o n s Cl8th a n d 20th N o v e m b e r , 1952 - 11.30 a . m . ) "^pjRVH. THE
At
the Cabinet's meeting
o n 1 8 t h N o v e m b e r , THE PRIME
&KE.OF WINDSOR
MINISTER s a i d
that H.R.H,
t h e Duke o f W i n d s o r , whom h e w a s s e e i n g
t h a t a f t e r n o o n , was l i k e l y
jlpftendance a t
fMiS C o r o n a t i o n
to
t o ask whether he should n o t be i n v i t e d
attend the Coronation.
become n e c e s s a r y
f o r him t o t e n d e r a d v i c e
and he would b e g l a d
thought
The Prime M i n i s t e r
i t would be q u i t e
inappropriate
as a n o f f i c i a l
successors.
A clear
would b e n a t u r a l
Prime
He h i m s e l f
c o u l d b e drav/n b e t w e e n t h e
o f a member o f t h e R o y a l F a m i l y ,
endorsed the v i e w
informed
attend.
expressed by the
their
that
meeting on 20th November,
the Cabinet
were
t h e Duke o f W i n d s o r h a d a c c e p t e d t h e P r i m e
a d v i c e that he should not seek t o b e present
T h e Duke t h o u g h t , h o w e v e r , t h a t
s a y s o m e t h i n g on t h i s
correspondents.
point
propriety
f o r him t o
t o questions by Press
He p r o p o s e d t o s a y t h a t
constitutional
s
at the Coronation.
i t would be necessary
in reply
Minister s
i t vrould n o t b e i n
o r usage that
THE P R B E MINISTER s a i d
Ruler,,
t h a t h e h a d commended t h e l i n e w h i c h t h e
Duke o f W i n d s o r W A 3 p r o p o s i n g
ia t a k e
in reply
to Press
enquiries
on
point.
At
their
meeting
informed t h a t , w h i l e
on 1 8 t h November t h e C a b i n e t
in this
country
purchase o r b u i l d i n g
were t h e L a b o u r G o v e r n m e n t vrere i n o f f i c e ,
Duke o f W i n d s o r h a d o b t a i n e d p e r m i s s i o n
funds
accord
the Coronation o f the
S o v e r e i g n should b e a t t e n d e d b y any o t h e r R u l e r o r former
this
which
Minister.
At
with
point,­
f o r a K i n g who h a d a b d i c a t e d
f o r t h e Duke o f W i n d s o r t o
The C a b i n e t
might
g u e s t a t t h e C o r o n a t i o n o f one o f h i s
distinction
Coronation and t h e funeral
it
t o The Queen on t h i s
t o know h i s c o l l e a g u e s ' v i e w s .
to be present
it
said that
to transfer
the f r o m h i s own a sum o f £ 8 0 , 0 0 0 v r h i c h h e n e e d e d f o r t h e of a property, in France.
-1­
I t wa3 understood that
this
sum h a d h e en f o u n d i n s u f f i c i e n t
f o r t h e purpose
Duke w o u l d h e s e e k i n g p e r m i s s i o n t o t r a n s f e r
THE E R T H E M I N I S T E R s a i d t h a t ,
if
t h e Duke r a i s e d
conversation w i t h him, he proposed t o suggest
i t with
the Chancellor
At
that
meeting
the Chancellor.
Ministers
t h e Duke o f W i n d s o r
that,
if
q u e s t i o n and was t o
i t was i n t h e p u b l i c
s h o u l d make h i s home o u t s i d e
that
h i s own money f r o m t h e U n i t e d
to establish himself.
conversation with
in
discuss
t h e Duke o f
informed
discuss
several
interest
the United
he should b e denied f a c i l i t i e s
EXCHEQUER s a i d t h a t h e a c c e p t e d t h a t
his
t h a t he should
In the course o f a short discussion
Kingdom, i t was unreasonable
which h e proposed
this matter
o n 20th N o v e m b e r t h e C a b i n e t w e r e
expressed the view
transferring
£40,000,,
o f t h e Exchequer,
t h e Duke o f Y f i n d s o r h a d r a i s e d t h i s
i t with
that
their
a further
and t h a t t h e
Kingdom t o t h e c o u n t r y
for
in
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE
v i e w and would b e g u i d e d b y i t
Windsor.
in
NO CIRCULATION
C.C.(53)
1st
(6th January,
Conclusions.
1953 -
11.0
a.m.)
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR A I R s a i d t h a t
had now s u c c e s s f u l l y
and was a n x i o u s
being
able
to
completed the
to proceed
fly
his
to
first
the next
stage
training
would
H . R . H . T h e
be i n
Duke o f
(a)
to
fly
an a i r c r a f t
( b )
in
The
elementary
Duke o i
training
fly
his
assistance
a
of
w o u l d not
the
Duke o f
jet
was a p a s s e n g e r .
in the Harvard
again.
of
Devon.
stages
first
in
stage
an
Anson.
he had no i n t e n t i o n
at
pupil.
any t i m e
of
pilot
passenger.
no p r a c t i c a l
received
on l i g h t
and t h e
risks
T h e Duke o f
benefit
from
the
aircraft.
ho s h o u l d l e a r n
were t h e r e f o r e
he c o u l d h a v e
mI
to
no
Edinburgh u l t i m a t e l y
t h e Dove o r Devon t y p e ,
that
extension of
Edinburgh
aircraft
aircraft
to
was
the
on t h e
and
He s u g g e s t e d ,
He u n d e r t o o k
Minister.
object
an a p t and p r o f i c i e n t
was now p r o p o s e d
If
training
wished
the
co-pilot.
to
fly
the
he w o u l d n o t
instructor
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY s a i d
H . R . H . The
further
p!',.
made:­
said that
would o b t a i n
already taken.
Edinburgh
a Dove o r a
and i n t h e n e x t
points were
and t h a t
which i t
be an
own a i r c r a f t
no o b j e c t i o n
In
which lie had so f a r
would a l s o
of
completed.
had
Edinburgh
aircraft
more t h a n t h o s e
to
aircraft
e.g.
two
w h i c h The Queen was a
In the Harvard
f l y , t h e r e
jet
Edinburgh
flying
with the ultimate
shown h i m s e l f
the f o l l o w i n g
T h e Duke o f
learning
had
T h e Duke o f
his
that
a Harvard a i r c r a f t ,
Edinburgh
In discussion,
was
of
aircraft,
THE CHIEF.OF THE A I R STAFF e x p l a i n e d
training
H.R.H.
stage,
own c o m m u n i c a t i o n
w o u l d be n e e d e d b e f o r e
24 RF.CORD
he t h o u g h t
flying
the
training
understanding,
would not p i l o t
however,
that
to
be g i v e n
already
an a i r c r a f t
when t h e n e x t
completed theCabinet
communicate
Cabinet'should
the C a b i n e t s
1
should
to
given,
in
stage
to
that
he
which T h e
review the
decision
raise
the
of
Queen!
training
matter
Prime
The Cabinet
-
Agreed t h a t
no o b j e c t i o n
H . R . H . T h e Duke o f
Edinburgh
extended
course
training
and t h a t
the p o s i t i o n
this
Cabinet
s h o u l d be r a i s e d
Office,
stage of
S.W.1.
7th January,
1953­
of
training
undertaking
i n Harvard
should again
was
to
an
aircraft;
be r e v i e w e d
completed.
when
NO CTRCtttATION RECORD
0, (53),
(21st
28th
April,
Conclusions 1953
-
11.00
a.m.)
THE PRIME MINISTER r e c a l l e d
was
in the United S t a t e s ,
a g a i n when t h i s
this stage
an e x t e n d e d
but had asked t h a t
3tage
of
an O x f o r d ,
on 6 t h J a n u a r y ,
course
a twin-engined
control,
at
t h e Duke s h o u l d f l y
Duke ' s u n d e r g o i n g
the
in
training
this
agreed that
further
the C a b i n e f s
which his
as a competent p i l o t .
earlier
in
training
should be
a
reviewed
He u n d e r s t o o d
training
of
tha­
Edinburgh was
aircrafto
that
it
was
a Harvard a i r c r a f t ,
also
under
dual
night.
The C a b i n e t
implicit
of
t h e Duke
THE SECRETARY OP STATE PGR AJR s a i d
proposed that
The Duke
completed.
and t h a t
when he
that H.R.H.
the p o s i t i o n
t r a i n i n g was
had now b e e n r e a c h e d ,
n o w due t o f l y
that
the C a b i n e t had a g r e e d
o f Edinburgh might undertake
Harvard a i r c r a f t ,
view that
no
stage
original
instructors
The C a b i n e t
t h e Duke o f
objection need be r a i s e d
to
of
was
flying
training.
decision that
he s h o u l d
thought necessary
re-affirmed,
Edinburgh
It
to
should n o t f l y
complete
qualify
however,
jet
the
him
their
aircraft.
HO CIRCULATION RECORD
TOP SECRET
CABINET
(CC.(53)
Confidential
covering
German F o r e i g n O f f i c e
and L i s b o n
in
regarding
in that
return,
been
found
into the
General
use of
country
telegrams
of
3^ear.
assist
him t o
in
the a r c h i v e s
the
his
and t h a t
to
hands o f
of
services
United
in London,
in
that
Duke i n
in
securing
the Throne.
Army a t
the
to
Windsor
the
with
peace
between
prepared,
T h e s e documents
t h e German F o r e i g n O f f i c e
States
Madrid
Europe
t h e y would have been
regain
of
keep t h e
the
the
t h e Duke o f
revealed
E i s e n h o v ; e r had t h e n handed them o v e r
Ambassador
sent t o
H.R.H.
These
time anxious t o
making
Germany and t h i s
in
a series
the a c t i v i t i e s
Germans w e r e a t t h a t
to their
them an un-numbered memorandum b y
i n 19A0 f r o m t h e German E m b a s s i e s
S p a i n and P o r t u g a l
a view
Conclusions)
Record of Cabinet d i s c u s s i o n
on 2 5 t h A u g u s t , 1 9 5 3 .
T h e C a b i n e t had b e f o r e
Prime M i n i s t e r
50th
end. o f
the
which
the
United
v7ho i n t u r n had o-sssed them t o
the
had
came
war.
States
BBS
IG8£
Pal
Foreign
P
Office.
It
now a p p e a r e d ,
documentshad
been made b e f o r e
British, authorities
of
t h e t^an of
June,
"on
for
basis
captured
of
documents
correspondence
Volume X o f
published
this
the
highest
the
series
cooy of
of
of
were handed o v e r t o
the
the
captured
T h e h a d "ce.en
German
made b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e G o v e r n m e n t s
were
allor/ed
scholarly
Duke o f
complete
freedom t o
objectivity"
be p u b l i s h e d ;
Windsor
which
official
and U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t s .
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t
of
should be i n c l u d e d
auspices
he was nol,
of
the
the
this
in
was t o
British,
nersuaded t h a t
In
select
and t h e y p r o p o s e d t h a t
c a p t u r e d German d o c u m e n t s w h i c h
i n 1954 u n d e r t h e
the
had n a s s e d i n t o t h e . c o n t r o l ,
the p u b l i c a t i o n
should
about
a microfilm
French and American h i s t o r i a n s
historians
the
that
the o r i g i n a l s
Under on a g r e e m e n t
1946, t h e s e
the
and t h a t
British,
made r e s p o n s i b l e
documents.
however,
be
French
there
was a n y h i s t o r i c a l
during
the
need t o " p u b l i s h
lifetime
of
the
this
Duke o f
correspondence,
Windsor.
Its
distress.
to President
He h a d t h e r e f o r e
E i s e n h o w e r ' a n d M. B i d a u l t
w i t h him i n p r o h i b i t i n g
President
official
Eisenhower had p r o m i s e d
American h i s t o r i a n
asked t h a t
full
volume,
he
should,
cause
of
t h e y would
the
co-operation
and t h e
chief
that,
British
colleagt
after
If
all,
should a c q u i e s c e .
his
be o m i t t e d
Miss Lambert,
p r e p a r e d t o make such
a request:
it
that,
if
v/ere made t o
might
feel
obliged
to
resign
received
f r o m M. B i d a u l t .
that
existence
the
the
United States
actual
of
documents m i g h t
intervention
to
publication
least
the
of
might
the
represented to
him t h a t ,
be
said that
prevent
he
its
still
prevent
w o u l d be
nicely
balanced.
publicntion.
sure
that
said that
prevent
effort
of
these
the
had
publication
ho had r e a d
w o u l d be so
the
of
the
at
the
been
to
if
be
it
published
could
force
argument,
of
this
should
be made
to
documents.
for
and
publication
heard
in
to
arguments
official
that
had a t t e m p t e d
attempt
of
s h o u l d be made t o
But now t h n t
their
saw t h e
When h e had f i r s t
every
It
us
in
publication,
s t o r y was l i k e l y
a determined
publication
to
been
the
documents
and p o s s i b l y
said that
W h i l e he
that
official
Intervening
thought that
unofficial
of
and
e v e n more e m b a r r a s s i n g
publication.
THE LORD PRESIDENT
against
this
these
t h e U n i t e d Kingdom Government
considered
the
if
of
documents
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r
copies
be
she
No r e p l y had
that
was
suggested
discretion,
p r i v a t e hands;
provoke
actual /texts.
it
her
country;
the Inclusion
substance of
in any event,
limit
had b e e n
would
d o c u m e n t s was w i d e l y known b o t h
e v e n be i n
prevent
official
indeed
her p o s i t i o n .
in t h i s
the
it
And t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d w a r n e d
the
and
from
On t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
British historian,
attempt
join
correspondence.
n o t known w h e t h e r t h e
this
him
personally
asking.if
had been i n s t r u c t e d
t h e s e documents
forthcoming
written
publication
rate
publication
w o u l d c e r t a i n l y be d a m a g i n g t o . t h e Duke and w o u l d
unnecessary
a t any
this
were
matter
avoid
official
documents
damaging
he had
to
he was
the
Duke
not
of Windsor:
flattered
to
be o f
they did
by e v i l
sources
fact
-
the
with
that
'
in
Certainly
she would n o t
suggested
welcome
limit
documents
suggestion that
if
the
an a t t e m p t
publication
the
present
of
this
also
unofficial
from
she might
in the
b y one
be more
of
for
previously
historical
she had h e r s e l f
be
the
If
pi
I
ill
delayed
i n advance
195-4-
in
grounds
made
correspondence might
publication
Hp
the
w h i c h t h e y had
But
m
discussion.
Weimar R e o u b l i c w e r e o u b l i s h e d
planned
the
British
on o b j e c t i v e
should be o u b l i s h e d .
documents o f
t h e volume a t
earlier
decide
able
prevented.
the d i s c r e t i o n
to
be
publication
would g a i n
and he b e l i e v e d t h a t
accorded to the historians
which
from
s a i d t h a t he had s e e n t h e
than had been
t h r e e Governments t o
had b e e n
He
official
it
been
u
he might
peace.
be d i s c l o s e d
publication
h e had
that
if
i n t e r e s t which
Miss Lambert,
accommodating
thinking
a negotiated
s t o r y might
The L o r d P r e s i d e n t
historian,
show t h a t
t h e warning t h a t
the added
official
into
securing
importance t o
were prevented,
more t h a n
counsellors
assistance
attached
little
of
m
Hi
I
SI
it
m
were
decided
might
five
postpone the
t h e Weimar p a p e r s
should
be p u b l i s h e d
i s s u e now u n d e ^ d i s c u s s i o n
for
first,
as l o n g
this
as
years.
In
that
that
further
discussion
a determined
. publication
Windsor.
effort
of these
It
t h e r e was g e n e r a l
s h o u l d b e made t o
do curoents d u r i n g
was f u r t h e r
agreed t h a t ,
the
if
support
prevent
for
the
view
official
lifetime
of
publication
t h e Duke
of
could not
be
1
prevented,
with
some o f f i c i a l
a view to
statement' should
reducing
the
be i s s u e d
simultaneously
damage w h i c h t h e s e m e s s a g e s m i g h t
cause
p
If
released
Labour
at
and
alone.
This might
on t h e m i s s i o n
to
the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s
Duchess
of Windsor
include a report
Portugal
request
left
by t h e M i n i s t e r
w h i c h h e had u n d e r t a k e n
with
a view to
Europe w i t h o u t
ensuring
delay
for
in
that
the
of
1940
the
Duke
Bahamas.
B
1
THE MINISTER OF LABOUR s a i d
and l e a v e
to
it
on r e c o r d
be p u b l i s h e d
for
shortly;
that
the
for
he w o u l d w i s h
future
there
even
if
to
the
prepare
such a
documents were
was much -which he c o u l d
say,
reportf
not
from the p e r s o n a l
contacts
w h i c h h e had e s t a b l i s h e d
with the persons p r i n c i p a l l y
proper perspective
had w r i t t e n
for
the
The C a b i n e t
( l )
( 2 )
was v e r y d e s i r a b l e
agents
that
these
t h e a p p r o a c h e s w h i c h German a g e n t s
Windsor
be p u b l i s h e d
in
1940 i n
during
arrange
for
a further
British
editor,
Miss Lambert,
to
be made t o
with a view to
of
c a p t u r e d German
documents which was b e i n g
United States
Took n o t e
for
should
to
the
delaying
series
of
published
of
the British,
French
that
the Minister
of
L a b o u r v/ould
prepare,
documents,
simultaneously with the publication
a report
on h i s
mission t o
Portugal
i n 194-0.
( A )
Agreed t h a t ,
prevented,
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
28th. A u g u s t ,
if
the
advance t h e
and
Governments.
publication
these
documents i n t h e
auspices
to
lifetime.
the publication
under the o f f i c i a l
had made
and t h e L o r d P r e s i d e n t
approach
these
documents
S p a i n and P o r t u g a l
the Duke's
I n v i t e d t h e Prime M i n i s t e r
( 3 )
into
employers.
it
t h e Duke o f
not
w h i c h t h e German
time
­
Agreed that
regarding
c o n c e r n e d , which would put
reports
their
at the
official
publication
Duke o f W i n d s o r
documents which were
S.W.1.
1953.
could not
s h o u l d b e shown
to
be
be
in
published.
of
TOP SECRET
HO CIROTJIATIOM RECORD
&C*t53) 6pth
-."'-..--Y. £
f: : -
haric&miom
*ia.)
Sx:.
i&S ROW SESCS23tfcaSDt recalled that* on his release from prison -,...
"AT the ein3L of 1952, Ail an Item Hajy had undertaken not to leave this
' country''.''l!Sb**'ft''pedibSITF
;
£Nadbng that time, despite .the
^'BFLITTLJ&*;
$g&c^
no suitable eraployaent had been f ound
for hifcu
Hie funds were now ruatning lowg
and, unless he could find . :
here, i t was possible that in the New Year he might decide to go' abroad^
W h a d . " p o s a ^ i H t i e s of sttLtahla eajplqy&ant in India and 'ia"'SoMid^LnaV4aa " 1* would he a shock to public opinion^ both here and ,
in the United States, I f he l e f t this country *
In the public isind his
dep^orturiS would be linked with the disappearances of Pontecorvo^ MoLeaa
''sxA Krs ISoLeanj
a
and in the United States I T would provide a freest
occasion for criticism of British security
ARRANGETFT2NTS*
l a these
circumstances the Hcase Secretary considered that further efforts should
be trade to find suitable vrca& f o r Bay i n this countryi
of labour ware satisfied that these
but the Ministry
would not be successful unless they
could t*e' assisted by sons use of public funds,,
Suitable employraent
could be found for him here if,, for example^ the Department of Scientific
aWlndustriai- Research wesse free.to subsidise an employer'trilling to
eng&ge biia' or i f he were given A direct grant' for -personal -work on
agricultural research.
An expenditure of soeothing between £500 and
&2iOQb a year might be rstjilred,
l?he Home Secretary said that while he
ft
disliked -Oils course, ha thought i t was a lesser e v i l than allowing Kay
to seek eaploysn&nt abroad^
THE LORD HSESlDEKiJ said that he understood that the Minister of
labour shared the Hoae Secretary^ viewj
i a accepting i t *
but he hiissolf found difficulty
Hay*a knowledge of atomic mttsrs was norar ao out-of-date
,tha$ i.t would,be of no value to a potential eneagrj
FEIR-irjsopSee^^
cm
of appearsnces only*
heceasaryj be publicly eaplained
a
and the objection'to
Tbxs could^ I F
I t would be aiuch $sere difficult to
explain -shy a nan who had been a traitor to his country should be given
en^oy&eaat by, as? trader the auspices of * a Goverrkasnt Departments
fife
would ho most reluctant to agree that May should he employed or subsidised
b y a XJeporbaeat under his control,
l a discussion the Cabinet were assured that direct ea^loyment
by a Government Beparttnent would not he necessary
0
Thus, there was a
cxystallographer in Cambridge who,, being a Gessnunlst, was ready to give
May ei^loyment i f he could be assured of further expansion of the work
which he was already doing for the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Eesearchj
no
and, i f the Department gave hira a proaise of further orders,
-direct payment need be Bade to Sfey from publio funds
6
That particular
plan was^ however, criticised i n the Cabinet'o discussion on the ground
that i t Would involve the (kwernoent i n negotiations with a third party
isho,
being a CcEtoariBtj
could not be C 3 c p e e t e d to be reliables
I t seesaod \ *'
preferable that$ i f any arrangeaent of this kind had to be maoje, i t should
be with May direct,,
i f tar some further discussion, the Cabinet reached the conclusion
that i t Would be contrary to the publio interest that May should go abroad
i n search of ejEpleyasentj
that i t would be justifiable to incur same asadest
expenditure fren public funds f o r the purpose of securing his continued
residence i n this country,, at any rate for another 12 TOnthsj and that the
arrangements for this purpose should be nade direct with May himself, the ^
aoney being found frcsa secret funds,,,
The Hosjie Secretary undertook^that Alan' Rum lay
should be provided^ froda' secret fundsj with
Kjsans
which would enable hint to remain in this
country,, at any rate for another 12
Cabinat Office^ S wVU
0
21ST DECSfBSH, 1953*
months
a
NO CIRCULATION'RECORD
TOP SECRET
C.C.(54)
22ND CONCLUSIONS. \.
.. (24th March, 1954
-.
1 1 . 3 0 a.mV)
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER s a i d that he had been' c o n s i d e r i n g
whether he should announce i n h i s Budget Speech a Government d e c i s i o n t o
introduce the p r i n c i p l e
o f equal pay i n t h e n o n - i n d u s t r i a l C i v i l S e r v i c e .
The Government were p l e d g e d t o make a s t a r t on t h i s "as soon as the
economic and f i n a n c i a l
c o n d i t i o n o f t h e country p e r m i t t e d " ,
1951 expressed t h e hope t h a t i t
would be p o s s i b l e to t a k e the f i r s t
!
during t h e l i f e t i m e
of t h e present P a r l i a m e n t .
.111
step
*"
oolicies
The Labour P a r t y had a l r e a d y p l e d g e d themselves
t o make an immediate s t a r t on the i n t r o d u c t i o n of equal pay i n t h e
Service i f
m
m
M i n i s t e r s would wish t o
be
to been
c l a i ma, marked
i n a General
E l e c t ii onn ,thet h aeconomic
t as a r eand
s u l tf i n
ofa ntchieailr
thea
r eb l ehad
improvement
c o n d i t i o n of the country.
ifl
and had i n
they assumed o f f i c e
a f t e r the next E l e c t i o n .
The Government,
could hope t h e r e f o r e t o secure some e l e c t o r a l advantage I f
s b a r t with t h i s b e f o r e the E l e c t i o n .
Civil
fil
[1
!
m
they made a
Apart from these p o l i t i c a l
mm
m
arguments, Wl
t h e C h a n c e l l o r s a i d t h a t he h i m s e l f b e l i e v e d t h a t on the m e r i t s t h e r e was
a strong case f o r
applying the p r i n c i p l e o f
equal pay i n t h e C i v i l
Service.
The scheme which he had i n mind was that equal pay should be
introduced gradually,
by annual i n s t a l m e n t s , o v e r a p e r i o d of y e a r s ,
beginning on 1 s t O c t o b e r , 1954.
On t h i s b a s i s the c o s t i n the i n i t i a l .
y e a r s would be r e l a t i v e l y small - o f
full
year.
If,
the o r d e r o f £ 2 - 3 m i l l i o n s i n t h e
however, as he e x p e c t e d , the p r i n c i p l e was extended t o
the h e a l t h s e r v i c e , t e a c h e r s and o t h e r ' l o c a l government s e r v i c e s ,
e v e n t u a l annual c o s t , when i t
once
it
the
p r o c e s s had
within
announced,
first
a shorter
was i n f u l l
started,
period.
he t h o u g h t
it
there
would be
Vhatever
likoly
that
operation,
it
the
strong
basis
would
would be
pressure to
on w h i c h
be i n
the
full
it
was
complete
originally
operation
within
3-5
to
years.
He a l s o
recognised t h a t ,
the n o n - i n d u s t r i a l
and t o
local
government
In
(a)
the
it
to
following
industrial
He w o u l d h o w e v e r
extending
it
to
particular
that,
civil
be o b l i g e d
industrial
and w i d e s p r e a d
was bound t o
civil
extension
h a d b^en
applied
be e x t e n d e d t o
teachers
generally.
THE MINISTER OF LABOUR s a i d
proposal.
rapid
Service,
services
discussion
extend the p r i n c i p l e
for
Civil
once the p r i n c i p l e
so l o n g
servants,
to
for
it
was n o t
proposed
he c o u l d not o b j e c t
strongly any
that
industrial
said that
w e r e ma.de:­
as i t
oppose most
servants;
throughout
THE COLONIAL SECRETARY
points
to
thl
suggestl
would l e a d
to
its
employment.
could
be demonstrated
that
Wm
there
was a c l e a r
distinction
in t h i s
applicable,
industry.
Equal
p a y was n o t
he b e l i e v e d
that,
if
service,
need not
it
(b)
the
proposal
have
matter
were
the
public
as a p r i n c i p l e ,
confined
repercussions
THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION
between
on
said
to
industry
that,
if
to
service
and
industry,
non-industrials
in
public
p r i n c i p l e were
appli,
H
generally.
the
Hrai
in
the
Civil
application
Service,
to
t h ' : burnham C o m m i t t e e s
teachers.
This
extension
woidd
might,
be bound, t o
however,
recommend
be d e l a y e d
for
its
fej;
abo
Bj
HI
MAMS
a
year;
for
and t h e G o v e r n m e n t
the
teachers,
proposed
for
(c)
applied
of
the
Civil
for
operation
Civil
to
a time;
throughout
in
a position
to
prevent
the
adoption,
or l e s s
gradual
than t h a t
j
Service.
Civil
i n due c o u r s e
be d e l a y e d
be
a n y scheme more g e n e r o u s
THE MINISTER OF HEALTH
in respect
in the
the
of
would
Service,
said
it
that,
must
the N a t i o n a l
the Health
Service
principle
b e assumed t h a t
Health
but he b e l i e v e d
once t h e
that
Service.
equal
within
it
was
would
This
have
extension
p a y w o u l d be i n
3 years
of
conceded
Its
to
be
might
full
introduction
Service.
m
(d)
THE MINISTER OF HOUSING s a i d
that
the
introduction
of
equal
l o c a l government s e n / i c e s would i n v o l v e a d d i t i o n a l e x p e n d i t u r e f r o m
r - j r o p o ^ t i o n . ! t e burden cn t h e r a t e s t h a n i t w o u l d on t h e E x c h e q u e r .
-
rates of
proposal
for
pay
inM
local
This
I
s o m e t h i n g b e t w e e n ?.o and £9 m i l l i o n s .
T h i s would i m o o s e a h e a v i e r
w o u l d t h e r e f o r e s t r e n g t h e n t h e c a s e w h i c h he had made, i n 0.(5-0
reform
B
111Jj
m
of
the
existing
system
of
local
government
finance.
3-5 y e a r s .
He a l s o
recognised t h a t ,
to the non-industrial
and t o l o c a l
Civil
government
services
In discussion
(a)
the
it
was bound t o
proposal.
it
following
to industrial
to industrial
r a p i d and w i d e s p r e a d
particular
t h e r e was a c l e a r
civil
servants,
civil
servants;
extension throughout
distinction
Equal p a y was n o t a p p l i c a b l e ,
He b e l i e v e d
that,
service,
n e e d not h a v e r e p e r c u s s i o n s
it
(b)
Civil
application
if
the proposal
Service,
to
object
as a p r i n c i p l e ,
if
This extension might,
(c)
of
a n y scheme more g e n e r o u s
the C i v i l
of
the
Civil Service,
a p p l i e d i n dtie c o u r s e
be d e l a y e d f o r
to
a time;
it
in
public
however,
to
or l e s s
recommend
be d e l a y e d
prevent the
gradual
applied
for
its
aboi
adoption,
than
that
once t h e p r i n c i p l e
the N a t i o n a l Health
but h e b e l i e v e d t h a t
Service.
equal
it
was
conceded
would h a v e t o
This
extension
p a y w o u l d be i n
its
be
might
full
introduction
Service.
local
government
rates
of
services
something
would i n v o l v e a d d i t i o n a l
burden on t h e r a t e s
the
the introduction
b e t w e e n £3 and £9 m i l l i o n s . .
p r o p o s a l would t h e r e f o r e
reform of
industry.
t h e p r i n c i p l e were
must b e assumed t h a t
THE MINISTER OF HOUSING s a i d t h a t
proportionate
and
generally.
throughout t h e Health S e r v i c e w i t h i n 3 y e a r s o f
in the C i v i l
to
that
Service.
THE MINISTER OF HEALTH s a i d t h a t ,
in respect
its
service
non-industrials
on i n d u s t r y
th
suggests
be d e m o n s t r a t e d
between the p u b l i c
were c o n f i n e d t o
to
employment.
could
and t h e G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d be i n a p o s i t i o n
proposed for
for
proposed ­
t h a t would l e a d t o
t h e Burnham C o m m i t t e e s w o u l d be bound t o
teachers.
the teachers,
(d)
was n o t
he c o u l d not
for
THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION s a i d t h a t ,
operation
as i t
industrial
in t h i s matter
industry.
for
teachersH
p o i n t s w e r e ma.de:­
so l o n g
THE COLONIAL SECRETARY s a i d t h a t I t
a year;
be e x t e n d e d t o
He w o u l d h o w e v e r be o b l i g e d t o o p p o s e most s t r o n g l y a n y
extending
in the
applied
generally.
THE MINISTER OF LABOUR s a i d t h a t ,
extend the principle
for
Service,
once t h e p r i n c i p l e had been
than i t
strengthen the
existing
system o f
expenditure
of
equal pay
from
T h i s would i m p o s e a
w o u l d on t h e E x c h e q u e r .
local
heavier
This
c a s e w h i c h he had made, I n 0.(5-4-)
local
government
finance.
in!
Hlj
(e)
T h e r e was g e n e r a l
p a y had been a p p l i e d
practicable
7 years.
t o women i n t h e
t o delay the
That being
this project
was t o
agreement
full
that,
Civil
application
once t h e p r i n c i p l e
Service,
of
it
be launched a t a l l ,
it
for
equal
be.
as l o n g
as
the v i e w t h a t ,
should be p r e s e n t e d from
if
the
as a scheme w h i c h w o u l d be c o m p l e t e d w i t h i n 3 o r U y e a r s .
outset
On the p o l i t i c a l , a s p e c t ,
be w e l l
it
was a r g u e d t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l
r e c e i v e d by the-!7omen's S e c t i o n
some M i n i s t e r s t h o u g h t
considered that it
it
would
n o t xvin v o t e s
e v e n l o s e some;
might
b e ab some d i s a d v a n t a g e
p a y when i n o f f i c e
-
of
the Conservative
might have e l e c t o r a l
might
but i t
at the next
was r e c o g n i s e d t h a t
electorally
for
power.
In t h i s
a s compared w i t h t h e Labour P a r t y ,
connection
if
returned,
to bring
at
o n c e and t h i s ,
to
h a v e begun b e f o r e t h e E l e c t i o n
if
equal pay i n t o
it
had t o
full
gradual
equal
spokesmen
at t h e
In
Election
compelled t o
operation i n the C i v i l
b e d o n e , w o u l d be
its
introduced
whose
it
Party
t h e y had been
t h e v i e w was e x p r e s s e d t h a t
t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y would i^robably f i n d t h e m s e l v e s
indeed,
Conservative
not having
If
and
Others
Election:
the
would
Party;
advantages.
could maintain that t h e y would have i n t r o d u c e d i t
annual
would not
t h e scheme f o r
s o , t h e r e was much t o b e s a i d
of
promise,
Service
more d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s
application
b y a number
than
of
Instalments.
Further
as a n e c e s s a ^ r
Government,
evil
discussion
which,
if
would i n e v i t a b l y
Labour P a r t y
came i n t o
showed a g e n e r a l
it
were not
be b r o u g h t
office.
That
disposition
introduced
into
being'so,
might t a k e whatever p o l i t i c a l
for
change.
the
As a g a i n s t
t h e change w o u l d b e both u n d e s i r a b l e
political
advantage t o
accept
this,
some M i n i s t e r s
credit
might
a few M i n i s t e r s
on i t s m e r i t s
t h e P a r t y which i n t r o d u c e d
and o f
The c o s t . o f
introduction
equal p a y ' f o r
t h e s c h e m e , when i n
No o n e c o u l d deny t h a t
steadily
of
full
be
the competitive
undermined h y t h e h e a v y burden
power o f
of
that
the
available
considered
that
doxibtful
it.
women i n t h e p u b l i c
operation,
the
felt
THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE s a i d t h a t he w o u l d
deprecate the
this
Conservative
o p e r a t i o n as soon as
Conservative Party
sponsoring
by a
to
service.
w o u l d b e o v e r £36
British
taxation,
strongly
millions.
I n d u s t r y was
and t h a t t h e
being
national
interest.demanded that
the
the weight o f
t h i s burden s h o u l d b e r e d u c e d .
C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e E x c h e q u e r had £36 m i l l i o n s t o
ways i n w h i c h i t
the national
c o u l d be u s e d t o b e n e f i t
economy a s a w h o l e .
British
spare,
t h e r e w e r e many­
i n d u s t r y and, t h r o u g h
The C h a n c e l l o r h a d , h o w e v e r ,
colleagues that,
if
f o u n d i n 1954- o f
s e c u r i n g s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n s i n Government
i n 1955-
Was i t
i n c r e a s e d t a x a t i o n was t o be a v o i d e d ,
logical
or consistent,
while
without
means must
on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e
strict
a net addition to
These r e d u c t i o n s
in
c o u l d n o t be
of
equal pay i n t h e C i v i l
condition
equal pay.
But t h e r e was n o t h i n g
be
It
Service
new i n t h i s .
in practice,
"as
of
It
of
For
years
e q u a l p a y ..'
i n t h e House o f
the views
I n t h e C a b i n e t ' s d i s c u s s i o n a n d - w o u l d t a k e an
of
further
the Cabinet' i n the
Cabinet O f f i c e , .S.W.1.
24IH -MARCH,
consultation with his
1954.
following
opportunity
do
Commons.
expressed
c o l l e a g u e s a t a meeting
week.
was
the
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER s a i d t h a t he would
re-consider t h i s matter i n the l i g h t
to
soon
even though p r o p o s a l s t o
so would h a v e b e e n c a r r i e d b y a s u b s t a n t i a l m a j o r i t y
for
such
Ministers
pressure f o r
p a s t G o v e r n m e n t s ?riiich h a d been c o m m i t t e d t o t h e p r i n c i p l e
had c o n t r i v e d t o a v o i d a p p l y i n g
public
secured
o f the country p e r m i t t e d " .
t h e r e 7;as s u b s t a n t i a l p o l i t i c a l
t r u e no d o u b t t h a t
Introduction
In these circumstances
to
e x p l a i n i n g why t h e Government had f a i l e d
c a r r y out t h e i r p l e d g e t o i n t r o d u c e
a s t h e e c o n o m i c and f i n a n c i a l
be
e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n o f t h e c o u n t r y was
economy must be e n f o r c e d .
would not f i n d any d i f f i c u l t y
his
expenditure
c h a n g e s i n p o l i c y which w o u l d b e u n p o p u l a r and w o u l d h a v e t o
justified
that
warned
it,
seeking those economies,
embark on a p r o j e c t w h i c h w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y i n v o l v e
e x p e n d i t u r e o f o v e r £36 m i l l i o n s ?
If
TOP SECRET
MO CIRCULATION RECORD
C . C . (54)
22ND CONCLUSIONS­
M a r c h , 1954 - 11.30 a . m . ) (24th.
THE .CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER s a i d t h a t ,
the efforts
made t o r e d u c e ' t h e m ,
t h e r a t e o f £300 m i l l i o n s
food
a year.
in spite
of
s u b s i d i e s w e r e now r u n n i n g
at
Of t h i s
total,
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e s u p p o r t o f home a g r i c u l t u r e .
' from t h e revenue a c c o u n t s ;
speech h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n
Exchequer
' .S
support
£200 m i l l i o n s
This
v/ould b e p l a i n
and h e w o u l d h a v e t o d e c l a r e
t o f i n d more e f f e c t i v e
i n his.'.Budget j
means o f l i m i t i n g
T h e r e w e r e two p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
subsidies d i r e c t l y : ,
subsidies.
T h e main commodity t o w h i c h . t h i s p r i n c i p l e
b y means o f a l e v y t h e c o s t
and would r e s u l t
a 32 l b . loaf
was f l o u r .
i n 1954/55.
These p r i c e i n c r e a s e s
cost o f l i v i n g
before
levy
to
recover
The l e v y . w o u l d b e imposed '
imported
over I d . to the-price
and ^ d . t o t h e p r i c e o f 1 l b . o f
would r e p r e s e n t
If
follow
from 1st O c t o b e r ,
1954 and t h e r e t a i l
date.
prices
irt t h e c o s t
of
T h i s would e n t a i l '
t h e summer r e c e s s .
t h e a r g u m e n t s about t h e r e l a t i v e m e r i t s o f
t h e s u b s i d y on b r e a d . o r i m p o s i n g a l e v y
Id.
flour.
system 7/ere a d o p t e d , t h e l e v y
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d ' t h a t - t h e e l e c t o r s m i g h t f i n d
difficult.to
of
an a d d i t i o n ' o f about 0.34- t o t h e
this
b r e a d and f l o u r W o u l d g o up f r o m t h a t
legislation
He w o u l d l i k e
In the addition, of just
index f i g u r e .
could start t o operate
of
might b e
i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and on a l l
and o f b e t w e e n Id.
;
this
o f t h e g u a r a n t e e on home-grown wheat
e s t i m a t e d t o b e £14..6 m i l l i o n s
on a l l f l o u r m a n u f a c t u r e d
i f he
One was t o r e d u c e t h e
t h e o t h e r was t o a p p l y t h e p r i n c i p l e
a p p l i e d in t h e immediate future
flour
the
f o r home f o o d p r o d u c t i o n . ' . : . ; I t - w o u l d b e h e l p f u l
c o u l d i n d i c a t e what p a r t i c x i l a r means h e p r o p o s e d t o a p p l y f o r
purpose.
were
on f l o u r .
could
criticise.
argument, t h a t an i n c r e a s e i n t h e p r i c e
reducing
But an i n c r e a s e o f
o f t h e 3 i l b . l o a f w a s something which e v e r y
c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d and most
it
elector
I t was a w e l l - k n o w n
politics
o f b r e a d c a u s e d more b r e a d t o b e ­
e a t e n by t h e p o o r e s t p e o p l e
For"when
food p r i c e s
rose,
and t h u s b o r e most h a r d l y on t h e p o o r .
the poorest
expensive
f o o d s and more b r e a d .
political
disadvantages of
(a) .
index
figure,
press
for
it
price
w o u l d b e more d i f f i c u l t
calculated
the cost of
to
defend
subsidy on bread.
It
s y s t e m b y which t h e Government
a subsidy in respect
(c)
of
made:­
increase in the cost
b r e a d went
o f the
Some s a v i n g
a s now seemed l i k e l y ,
on f l o u r
of
livii
would
up.
before the
war,:
such a s y s t e m now when t h e r e was
would n o t
simultaneously
same
the
bread.
p o i n t s were
Though t h e r e had b e e n a l e v y
an E x c h e q u e r
t h e more
t h e r e was no d o u b t t h a t t h e l o w e s t p a i d ; w o r k e r s
i n c r e a s e d wages i f
(b)
the
the following
However s m a l l t h e
of
T h e r e c o u l d , b e no d o u b t a b o u t
increasing
In discussion
people ate l e s s
be easy t o : j u s t i f y
e x a c t e d a t a x and
a
offered
commodity.
c o u l d be s e c u r e d o n t h e b r e a d s u b s i d y
therewere
a fall
in the world p r i c e o f
if,
wheat.
. . .
The b e n e f i t
on t o
the
this
c o u l d be r e t a i n e d
b y t h e Exchequer
and n o t
It
that a levy
would be dangerous
on f l o u r
the l e v e l
T h e Government
to
indicate
was u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . a s
o f Exchequer
support t o
i n t h e Budget
one o f
British
t h e methods
of
agriculturei
c a p i t a l - would, he made o u t o f
t h e y had e v e n c o n s i d e r e d i m p o s i n g
a t a x on t h e p e o p l e ' s
the fact
would c o n s i d e r t h i s
the C a b i n e f s
problem f u r t h e r ,
discussion.
It
more d e t a i l e d
on t h e
following
S.W.I.
' 2ATH MARCH, 1 9 5 4 .
aspects of
day.
that
he
in the l i g h t
would be u s e f u l
Economic P o l i c y C o m m i t t e e c o u l d a l s o
and
food.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER s a i d t h a t
Office,
speech
w o u l d t h e n b e p r e s s e d t o announce an e a r l y d e c i s i o n ,
i n t h e meantime p o l i t i c a l
Cabinet
passed
consumer.
(d)
reducing
of
discuss
t h e problem at t h e i r
if
of
the
some o f
meeting
the
I
mi
NO CIRCULATION RECORD
TOP SECRET
- C.0.(54)
24TH CONCLUSIONS ( 3 1 s t M a r c h , 1954
1
EQUAL-
PAI ' .j Previous
ullfeference:
p .
(54) 2 2 n d .
m Conclusions)
-
4.00
p.m.)
. ' . ' THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER s a i d t h a t
since the
Cabinet's
d i s c u s s i o n on 2 4 t h March h e h a d r e v i e w e d t h e v a r i o u s p l e d g e s
on b e h a l f o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y i n r e s p e c t
of
was 'no d o u b t t h a t t h e P a r t y was d e e p l y c o m m i t t e d ;
t o make a s t a r t
to
frame a s u i t a b l e
subject f o r
inclusion i n the P a r t y Manifesto a t
election.
M i n i s t e r s would t h e n f a c e . t h e
formula'used
i n 1951 o r o f
principle
equal pay;
all
of
attractive.
. had b e e n p u t
equal.pay.
;
office,, it
the next
discussion;
on b a l a n c e , t h e b e t t e r
control
scheme f o r
Civil
during
By
initiative
If
indicating
begin the a p p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e
full
the
it
b a s i s , h e c o u l d make a b a l a n c e d
a g r e e m e n t v/as r e a c h e d w i t h t h e C i v i l ' S e r v i c e S t a f f
into
to
Service.
could r e t a i n the
s u b j e c t i n . h i s Budget s p e e c h ,
o f t h e scheme, a n d ,
which;
c o u r s e would b e
of
i n t h e n o n - i n d u s t r i a l C i v i l S e r v i c e on two c o n d i t i o n s -
brought
the
but h e was
t h e pace of t h e development.
were d e c i d e d t o go f o r w a r d on t h i s
the d e t a i l s
the
and n e i t h e r o f t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s was a t
t h i s means he thought t h a t t h e Government
reference to this
would
general
choice of repeating
equal pay i n t h e - n o n - i n d u s t r i a l
and would b e a b l e t o
failed
s t a t e m e n t on t h e
make some move t o w a r d s t h e a d o p t i o n o f a g r a d u a l
to
they
He had w e i g h e d v e r y c a r e f u l l y t h e o b j e c t i o n s
disposed t o think that,
willingness
There
s a y i n g t h a t t h e y no l o n g e r f a v o u r e d
for7,-ard i n . t h e C a b i n e t ' s l a s t
introduction of
and, i f
on t h i s d u r i n g t h e i r p r e s e n t t e r m o f
c e r t a i n l y be v e r y d i f f i c u l t
given
second, t h a t
his
equal
first,
pay
that
A s s o c i a t i o n s on
t h e scheme would b e
operation by instalments over a period of f i v e
w h i c h t h e Government w o u l d b e a b l e t o
of granting
some c o m p e n s a t i n g
families.
The c o s t o f
consider the
years,
possibility
a l l o w a n c e s t o m a r r i e d men w i t h , l a r g e
such a scheme i n t h e C i v i l
S e r v i c e would be
about £2 m i l l i o n s
when i t
in the f i r s t
was i n f u l l
year,
operation.
Committees t o c o n s i d e r
rising
I t w o u l d t h e n b e f o r t h e Burnham
the application o f the principle
and t h e r e was g o o d r e a s o n t o h o p e t h a t
.
-
'
'
t o a b o u t £13 m i l l i o n s
-
V
scheme c o m p a r a b l e t o t h a t
:
-
:
'
.
.
t h e y would adopt a g r a d u a l
'..v:-. .-,
.-. , -
.. -"
introduced i n the C i v i l
Service. -
He e x p e c t e d t h a t t h i s w o u l d s t a r t w i t h i n a y e a r . .
the p r i n c i p l e t o the National-Health Service
little
t o teachers,'
The a p p l i c a t i o n o f :
would f o l l o w ,
perhaps a
later.
T h e main p o i n t s made i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n which e n s u e d may b e
', summarised a s f o l l o w s . ;
On t h e p o l i t i c a l
a s p e c t t h e r e was g e n e r a l
agreement
that the
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e scheme o u t l i n e d b y t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e E x c h e q u e r
t o w i n more v o t e s t h a n i t
was ribt l i k e l y
election.
would f a i l
In this
to give
connection
full
because o f i t s gradual
not t o
extend t o i n d u s t r i a l
Ministers
if
still
felt
that
at the next'general
i t was r e c o g n i s e d t h a t
satisfaction
partly
lost
to the advocates o f
equal p a y ,
a p p l i c a t i o n and p a r t l y b e c a u s e i t was
Civil
Servants.
some v o t e s . m i g h t
On t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
be l o s t
at the
of equal pay.
And t h e r e was g e n e r a l
no a c t i o n
were taken meanwhile,
difficult
t o know what
Manifesto
at the
if
t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y would f i n d
s h o u l d b e s a i d on t h i s
subject
it
in the Party
election.
scheme o f
k i n d corild be i n t r o d u c e d w i t h o u t any g r e a t r i s k t h a t
To t h a t
pledge
agreement t h a t ,
The C a b i n e t a c c e p t e d t h e v i e w t h a t ' a l i m i t e d
the p r i n c i p l e
some
election
b y t h e n t h e Government h a d t a k e n no s t e p s t o redeem t h e i r
in respect
on
t h e scheme
this
i t would cause .
o f equal pay t o be a p p l i e d g e n e r a l l y throughout
extent t h e proposal
industry
w o u l d n o t d i r e c t l y impose a n y new burden
industry.
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE
r e p e a t e d h i s argument t h a t ,
expenditure,
this
argument
increased-publics­
scheme w o u l d p o s t p o n e t h e t i m e when i n d u s t r y
hope t o g a i n r e l i e f
that this
i n so f a r a s i t
from t h e e x i s t i n g
s h o u l d be w e i g h e d ,
burden o f t a x a t i o n .
could
He u r g e d
not i n r e l a t i o n t o the cost
of
.
the f i r s t
year's
which t h e
scheme w o u l d i n e v i t a b l y i m p o s e on t h e E x c h e q u e r and
r a t e s when i t
instalment
was i n f u l l
would h a v e l i t t l e
public
operation
confidence
expenditure i f
time.
(£2.millions)
they
taxation
duty to
reductions
c o u l d be r e d t i c e d ,
British
the
reduce
present
c o u l d b e made i n p u b l i c
hope o f any r e d u c t i o n i n
warn t h e C a b i n e t t h a t ,
­
taxation.
u n l e s s t h e burden
of/
i n d u s t r y would b e u n a b l e t o
t h e i n c r e a s e 4 * * e c o m p e t i t i o n vAtich i t
sum
Industry­
embarked on such a scheme at t h e
And, u n l e s s s u b s t a n t i a l
was h i s
(£36.25 m i l l i o n s ) .
i n the Government's w i l l to
e x p e n d i t u r e t h e r e was l i t t l e
It
but t o t h e much l a r g e r
was now e n c o u n t e r i n g
in
meet
world
markets from'Germany and Japan.
In further
d i s c u s s i o n r e f e r e n c e was made t o
t h a t t h e Government w o u l d f i n d i t
Parliamentary
session,
7/as made t h a t
t o be s a i d
delaying
equal pay
so t h a t
it
in old-age pensions,
It
was p o i n t e d o u t t h a t
.
the
the l a s t
expose h i m s e l f
the adoption of
of
something
scheme
w i t h an
both t h e s e plans
securing any r e d u c t i o n i n
for
improvement
before a general
some r i s k t h a t
election.
would
taxation
to a charge o f
t h e Exchequer
might
inconsistency
if
he i n t r o d u c e d
this
i n t h e volume o f p u b l i c
scheme was n e c e s s a r y t o
there
of
applying the p r i n c i p l e
was i n t h e b e s t p o s i t i o n t o
said that
the' Chancellor
o f "equal pay i n t h e
S e r v i c e a t a t i m e when h e was about t o
reductions
pensions.
next e l e c t i o n . ­
was c e r t a i n l y
Civil
session
together
THE PRIME MINISTER,summing up t h e d i s c u s s i o n ,
scheme f o r
next
the introduction of this limited
increase t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s
before
during the
i n t h a t e v e n t t h e r e m i g h t be
could be brought i n ,
in
possibility
t o make some i m p r o v e m e n t i n o l d - a g e
The. s u g g e s t i o n
for
necessary,
the
call
expenditure.
for
non-industrial
drastic
But t h e
Chancellor
j u d g e w h e t h e r some r e f e r e n c e t o
round o f f
this
t h e p i c t u r e w h i c h h e was t o
present
i n his forthcoming
content to
final
leave
decision
Budget.
it
C a b i n e t would
t o the C h a n c e l l o r o f t h e Exchequer t o t a k e
on t h i s
by h i s c o l l e a g u e s
He t h o u g h t t h a t t h e
matter i n
the l i g h t
in the Cabinet's
o f the views
two d i s c u s s i o n s
it
had b e e n h e l p f u l
on t h e
t o him t o h a v e
discussions with his
colleagues,
would r e f l e c t c f u r t h e r
subject.
t h e y had e x p r e s s e d b e f o r e
final
Cabinet. O f f i c e ,
1ST A P R I L ,
S.W.I.,
1954.
d e c i s i o n on t h i s
reaching
matter.
these and he on t h e v i e w s
which a.
a
expressed
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE .EXCHEQUER s a i d t h a t .
. V.-
be
TOP SECRET'
NO CIRCULATIOISr BECOKD
C.Cc(54) 24th C o n c l u s i o n s , , M&na%e 3*
(31st March, 1954 - 4 p m o )
a
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY r e c a l l e d t h e C a b i n e t ' s
25th A u g u s t , 1953 t h a t i t w a s v e r y d e s i r a b l e
decision of t h a t t h e German documents d e a l i n g w i t h t h e a p p r o a c h e s w h i c h German a g e n t s h a d made t o t h e Duke o f W i n d s o r i n 1940 i n S p a i n a n d P o r t u g a l
Duke's l i f e t i m e
0
I n pursuance
seen the B r i t i s h E d i t o r
of
should not be published during the that decision
(Miss Lambert)
the Prime M i n i s t e r had of the series
o f c a p t u r e d German documents w h i c h w a s b e i n g ' p u b l i s h e d u n d e r t h e o f f i c i a l
British,
F r e n c h and U n i t e d S t a t e s
Cabinet s view that publication
1
Governments j
auspices of
the a n d she h a d a c c e p t e d t h e o f t h e s e documents a f f e c t i n g
t h e Duke o f Windsor should b e delayed,, The F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y s a i d t h a t ,
the whole c o l l e c t i o n
if
we w e r e now t o a g r e e
that
o f German d i p l o m a t i c d o c u m e n t s w h i c h h a d f a l l e n
into j
A l l i e d hands a t t h e end o f t h e w a r s h o u l d b e r e t u r n e d t o t h e c u s t o d y
t h e German F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t o n t h e c o n d i t i o n s s e t o u t i n C ( 5 4 )
109,
0
we s h o u l d make i t a c o n d i t i o n o f
of papers r e l a t i n g
our agreement t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r
t o secure o u r agreement
As t h e o t h e r Governments c o n c e r n e d w e r e
t o the general proposition,
good p r o s p e c t t h a t t h e y could be persuaded t o accept
He p r o p o s e d t o n e g o t i a t e p r i v a t e l y
State
The F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y r e c a l l e d t h a t
o f some o f t h e s e d o c u m e n t s m i g h t
i n the United States
or elsewhere.
exclude a l l p o s s i b i l i t y
condition,,
e
t h e r e was r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e I
already be i n p r i v a t e
His proposal would not
of publication,
p u b l i c a t i o n under o f f i c i a l
this
there was a
o n t h a t b a s i s w i t h t h e German F e d e r a l
C h a n c e l l o r and the U n i t e d S t a t e s S e c r e t a r y o f
that copies
but i t
accept
if
should a t l e a s t
exclude
auspices.
Secretary
t o p e r s u a d e t h e German a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t s
t h e s o l u t i o n w h i c h he p r o p o s e d .
p u b l i c a t i o n were d e f e r r e d u n t i l
,000 1/54 JC&S Gp6ii9
hands,
therefore
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i a t h a t h e h o p e d t h a t t h e F o r e i g n
would be able
file
t o t h e Duke o f W i n d s o r s h o u l d b e r e t a i n e d i n o u r
c u s t o d y i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom,,
anxious
of
For h i s part,
he w o u l d b e
to
contents
a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f t h e Duke o f W i n d s o r ,
""-*-"*
.'
'
V.-
- - " . ;.';-*' :
If
n e c e s s a r y t l i e r e f ore he would be content w i t h an arrangement b y which
this f i l e
o f German documents r e l a t i n g t o t h e Duke o f W i n d s o r w e r e r e t a i n
i n B r i t i s h custody during the Duke's l i f e t i m e
The Cabinet
c
-
Endorsed the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y ' s proposal that t h i s
o f German documents r e l a t i n g t o t h e Duke o f
file
Windsor
s h o u l d n o t b e r e t u r n e d t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e German
F e d e r a l Government t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e o t h e r German
d i p l o m a t i c documents w h i c h h a d f a l l e n i n t o A l l i e d ­
hands a t t h e end o f
the war, but should be r e t a i n e d
i n B r i t i s h c u s t o d y , a t any r a t e during the Duke's
lifetime.
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
1ST A P R I L ,
,000 1/54 JC&S GpStiO
S.W.1.
1954.
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
..^.:..rfy^r...
TOP SECRET
Iff
Copy N o .
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX
C C ( 5 4 ) 47th C o n c l u s i o n s , Minute 4
(7th. J u l y , 1 9 5 4 - 1 1 . 3 0 a . m . )
^WASHINGTON
ITALKS
m (Previous
^Reference:
l;C.C.(54) 4 4 t h
$Conclusions,
:-lkinute 1 )
"$Proposed
f Meeting w i t h
'M. M a l e n k o v
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that in the p r i v a t e
conversations which he had held with P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower during
his r e c e n t v i s i t t o Washington he h a d again canvassed the p o s s i b i l i t y
' o f an informal meeting of Heads of G o v e r n m e n t s , o n a t h r e e - P o w e r
or four-Power basis.
T h e President had at first s e e m e d ready t o
give this s e r i o u s consideration and had discussed the p o s s i b i l i t y
that, if such a m e e t i n g w e r e h e l d i n L o n d o n , h e m i g h t attend the
opening, and perhaps the concluding, stages - being r e p r e s e n t e d i n
the i n t e r v a l b y t h e V i c e - P r e s i d e n t and the S e c r e t a r y o f State.
T o w a r d s the end of the visit the P r e s i d e n t had been rather less
forthcoming, possibly as a result of consultations with his S e c r e t a r y
of State, and h a d g i v e n the i m p r e s s i o n that it would be difficult f o r
h i m t o a s s e n t t o such a m e e t i n g at the p r e s e n t t i m e having r e g a r d
t o the state of public opinion i n the United States.
Nevertheless^
a t h i s P r e s s C o n f e r e n c e o n 3 0th J u n e , h e h a d s a i d p u b l i c l y t h a t o n .
t h i s q u e s t i o n he d i f f e r e d m o r e in e m p h a s i s than in substance f r o m
the v i e w s w h i c h h a d b e e n publicly e x p r e s s e d b y the P r i m e M i n i s t e r .
He had r e c a l l e d that he had a l w a y s e x p r e s s e d h i s r e a d i n e s s t o c o n f e r
with anybody if the deeds of the other side convinced h i m that t h e r e
was sincerity there.
H e had a l s o said that the United States w e r e
s i n c e r e in their s e a r c h f o r peace and that, if there w e r e any p r o o f
that the o t h e r side would k e e p t h e i r a g r e e m e n t s , he thought that
" a l l of u s would b e quite content t o do a l m o s t anything t o advance that c a u s e " . T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r said that, While these
- c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h jthe i S r f i a i d f i i i t l f e a i J n s s M t e S
fcbottiteepus^siHiity."oifai
m e e t i n g on a t h r e e - P o w e r o r f o u r - P o w e r b a s i s , he had f o r m e d t h e
i m p r e s s i o n w h i l e in Washington that the P r e s i d e n t w o u l d n o t b e s u r ­
p r i s e d if he sought an opportunity f o r a b i l a t e r a l m e e t i n g with
M. Malenkov.
When he had previously suggested this in M a y , 1953,
the P r e s i d e n t had d e p r e c a t e d such a " s o l i t a r y p i l g r i m a t e " .
But
m u c h had happened since then, and he b e l i e v e d that t h e P r e s i d e n t
would not n o w s e e k t o dissuade h i m f r o m undertaking such a m i s s i o n .
On h i s j o u r n e y h o m e h e h a d d e c i d e d , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , t o send a p e r s o n a l m e s s a g e t o M . M o l o t o v asking
how the Soviet Government would v i e w the idea o f a friendly meeting
" w i t h n o agenda a n d n o object but t o find a r e a s o n a b l e w a y of l i v i n g
side b y side in growing confidence, easement and p r o s p e r i t y " .
Such a m e e t i n g m i g h t b e the p r e l u d e t o a l a r g e r r e - u n i o n , though h e
had no w a r r a n t t o s a y this beyond h i s o w nh o p e s .
T h e draft of his
p r o p o s e d m e s s a g e h a d b e e n s e e n b y t h e C h a n c e l l o r o f the E x c h e q u e r ,
who had suggested s o m e valuable i m p r o v e m e n t s ; andthe m e s s a g e
had b e e n d e s p a t c h e d t o M o s c o w on 4th July ( F o r e i g n O f f i c e t e l e g r a m
to M o s c o w N o . 873).
On h i s r e t u r n t o L o n d o n the p r e v i o u s e v e n i n g
he h a d r e c e i v e d a f r i e n d l y r e p l y w h i c h i n c l u d e d the s t a t e m e n t t h a t ,
in t h e v i e w of the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t , such a p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t m i g h t
s e r v e to pave the w a y for a b r o a d e r m e e t i n g , if this w e r e a c c e p t e d
by a l l the p a r t i e s i n t e r e s t e d in easing i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n and
in s t r e n g t h e n i n g p e a c e .
L a t e r in the e v e n i n g he had d i s c u s s e d
this e x c h a n g e of m e s s a g e s with the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y the L o r d
P r e s i d e n t , the C h a n c e l l o r o f the E x c h e q u e r and the. M i n i s t e r of
Housing.
W i t h t h e i r a g r e e m e n t he had c o n v e y e d to P r e s i d e n t
E i s e n h o w e r the substance of his m e s s a g e to M . M o l o t o v and the
text o f the l a t t e r ' s r e p l y and had invited an e x p r e s s i o n of the
P r e s i d e n t s v i e w s ( F o r e i g n Office t e l e g r a m to Washington N o . 3209).
8
M . M o l o t o v ' s m e s s a g e had b e e n d e l i v e r e d in
p e r s o n b y the Soviet A m b a s s a d o r in London.
The P r i m e Minister
had t a k e n the o p p o r t u n i t y of m a k i n g it c l e a r t o the A m b a s s a d o r
that h i s w a s a p e r s o n a l m e s s a g e on w h i c h the C a b i n e t had n o t y e t
b e e n c o n s u l t e d , and a l s o that it had b e e n sent without s p e c i f i c p r i o r
consultation with President Eisenhower.
It w o u l d b e f o r the C a b i n e t t o d e c i d e , w h e n
President E i s e n h o w e r ' s views w e r e known, what further m e s s a g e
s h o u l d be s e n t t o M . M o l o t o v .
If a d e f i n i t e p r o p o s a l f o r a m e e t i n g
w e r e t o be m a d e , p l a c e and t i m i n g would b e i m p o r t a n t .
The meeting
could h a r d l y be h e l d b e f o r e the p r o c e e d i n g s of the Geneva C o n f e r e n c e
had b e e n b r o u g h t to a h e a d , and this might m e a n that it could n o t .
take p l a c e b e f o r e the m i d d l e of A u g u s t .
He would be reluctant to
g o t o M o s c o w , a n d he h o p e d t h a t the R u s s i a n s m i g h t a g r e e t o c o m e
to Stockholm or Vienna.
A s r e g a r d s a l a r g e r m e e t i n g , it w a s
e v i d e n t that the A m e r i c a n s w o u l d not a s s e n t to this u n l e s s the
R u s s i a n s g a v e s o m e p r a c t i c a l p r o o f of t h e i r sincerity,,
It w a s h i s
hope that t h e y m i g h t be p e r s u a d e d to indicate f o r this p u r p o s e a f i r m
intention to conclude a peace treaty for A u s t r i a .
T H E F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y a g r e e d that the
C a b i n e t should n o w a w a i t the e x p r e s s i o n o f the P r e s i d e n t s v i e w s .
T h e y s h o u l d a l s o t a k e a c c o u n t of the p r o b a b l e r e a c t i o n s of t h i s
p r o j e c t upon public opinion in E u r o p e .
Such a m e e t i n g w a s l i k e l y t o
a r o u s e p a r t i c u l a r a p p r e h e n s i o n s in W e s t e r n G e r m a n y .
T H E L O R D P R E S I D E N T said that he had had an
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r r e f l e c t i o n s i n c e s e e i n g t h e s e m e s s a g e s on t h e
previous evening.
He w a s g l a d that the C a b i n e t w e r e not b e i n g a s k e d
t o e x p r e s s a f i n a l o p i n i o n that d a y , f o r he w o u l d c e r t a i n l y w i s h t o
r e s e r v e his opinion until P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r ' s v i e w s w e r e a v a i l ­
able.
If t h e P r e s i d e n t w e r e c r i t i c a l of t h i s p r o j e c t , t h a t w o u l d
weigh heavily with him.
F o r i n p r e s e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s He t h o u g h t
it m o r e than e v e r i m p o r t a n t to a v o i d anything w h i c h m i g h t s e r i o u s l y
i m p a i r t h e p a r t n e r s h i p b e t w e e n t h i s c o u n t r y and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
A t the end of the d i s c u s s i o n T H E
MINISTER
M.
PRIME
s a i d that the t e x t s o f his e x c h a n g e of m e s s a g e s
with
M o l o t o v and of h i s m e s s a g e to P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r w o u l d be
circulated to m e m b e r s
of the C a b i n e t f o r t h e i r p e r s o n a l
He would also a r r a n g e for his P r i v a t e S e c r e t a r y to make
information.
available
to any m e m b e r
o£ t h e C a b i n e t w h o w i s h e d t o s e e t h e m t h e
earlier
m e s s a g e s which he had exchanged with P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r
on
this subject in 1953.
The
( 1 )
C a b i n e t - ...
A g r e e d t o r e s u m e t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of
this q u e s t i o n a s s o o n a s the P r i m e M i n i s t e r
had r e c e i v e d a r e p l y to his m e s s a g e to
President Eisenhower.
A t the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s request
L O R D C H E R W E L L , g a v e the Cabinet a s u m m a r y r e p o r t of the
d i s c u s s i o n s w h i c h had b e e n h e l d in "Washington and O t t a w a on a t o m i c
questions.
The A m e r i c a n s had indicated their readiness to
c o - o p e r a t e m o r e f u l l y w i t h us in future o v e r the w h o l e f i e l d of
atomic energy development.
F o r the m o m e n t this full c o - o p e r a t i o n
w a s p r e c l u d e d b y the t e r m s of t h e i r l e g i s l a t i o n , but m o s t of t h e s e
b a r r i e r s w o u l d be r e m o v e d b y the a m e n d i n g l e g i s l a t i o n w h i c h , it w a s
h o p e d , would b e p a s s e d b e f o r e C o n g r e s s r o s e for the s u m m e r r e c e s s
M e a n w h i l e , the A m e r i c a n s had undertaken to p r o v i d e us with full
i n f o r m a t i o n o f the e f f e c t s o f t h e i r h y d r o g e n b o m b s .
They were also
r e a d y t o g i v e u s d e t a i l s of t h e d i m e n s i o n s a n d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f
their b o m b s , so that R o A . F a i r c r a f t could be adapted to c a r r y the
United States type of b o m b i
T h e y w e r e anxious to collaborate with
us in the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n t e l l i g e n c e about a t o m i c r e s e a r c h and
p r o d u c t i o n in the S o v i e t Union.
T o the e x t e n t that t h i s i n v o l v e d ­
d i s c l o s u r e of their own a t o m i c s e c r e t s , this had hitherto b e e n p r e ­
c l u d e d b y the, t e r m s o f t h e i r l e g i s l a t i o n ; b u t i t w a s n o w h o p e d t h a t
t h e r e c o u l d be c l o s e r c o l l a b o r a t i o n in t h i s w h e n the a m e n d i n g
legislation had been passed.
n
The A m e r i c a n s w e r e anxious to p r o c e e d with
t h e i r p l a n f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o o l o f u r a n i u m for the d e v e l o p m e n t
of the c i v i l u s e of a t o m i c e n e r g y , d e s p i t e the r e f u s a l o f the S o v i e t
G o v e r n m e n t to co-operate in this s c h e m e .
In v i e w of the e x t e n t
to w h i c h the A m e r i c a n s w e r e n o w p r e p a r e d t o a s s i s t us i n the
d e v e l o p m e n t of our a t o m i c p r o j e c t s , it had b e e n thought i n e x p e d i e n t
to offer further opposition to the A t o m i c Bank P l a n .
We had t h e r e ­
f o r e a g r e e d that international d i s c u s s i o n s m i g h t go f o r w a r d , but
s o m e t i m e w a s l i k e l y t o e l a p s e b e f o r e an e f f e c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l
agreement was concluded.
The Canadian G o v e r n m e n t had undertaken to
e x p l o r e the p o s s i b i l i t y of p r o v i d i n g us w i t h supplies of t r i t i u m ,
w h i c h w o u l d e n a b l e us t o e x p e d i t e the p r o d u c t i o n of a t o m i c w e a p o n s '
in this c o u n t r y .
The Cabinet
( 2 )
Cabinet Office,
7th J u l y ,
T o o k note of this s t a t e m e n t by
Lord Cherwell.
S.W.I.
1954.
­
48
T h e circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of...
'top
secret
Copy No.
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX
G.C.(54) 48th Conclusions
( /w-
i]
( 8 t h J u l y , 1954 - 11. 3 0 a . m . )
I
WASHINGTON
&TALKS
if
(Previous
Reference:
gC.C;(54) 47th
I Conclusions,
Minute 4 )
Proposed
Meeting with
'M. M a l e n k o v
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that e a r l i e r that m o r n i n g he
had r e c e i v e d P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r ' s r e p l y to his m e s s a g e about
the p o s s i b i l i t y of a b i l a t e r a l m e e t i n g with M . M a l e n k o v j
This
w a s , r e a d t o the Cabinet (Washington t e l e g r a m N o . 1406).
The
P r i m e M i n i s t e r said that he hoped that, if further explanations
w e r e g i v e n , a m o r e favourable r e s p o n s e m i g h t be e l i c i t e d f r o m
t h e P r e s i d e n t ; and he r e a d t o the C a b i n e t the t e x t o f a f u r t h e r
m e s s a g e whifch he w a s p r o p o s i n g t o s e n d t o h i m ( F o r e i g n O f f i c e
t e l e g r a m to Washington Not 3228).
H e s u g g e s t e d that the Cabinet
should take no final d e c i s i o n until a further e x p r e s s i o n of the
P r e s i d e n t s views was available.
H e m a d e it c l e a r , h o w e v e r , that
he would not be disposed to accept an invitation to m e e t
M . Malenkov in M o s c o w .
T H E F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y said that in the d r a f t
m e s s a g e t o the P r e s i d e n t r e f e r e n c e w a s m a d e t o the p o s s i b i l i t y
of a meeting at Stockholm or Vienna.
He h o p e d that the P r i m e
M i n i s t e r w o u l d a l s o m e n t i o n the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a m e e t i n g at B e r n e .
H e h i m s e l f b e l i e v e d that the m e e t i n g m i g h t have quite a d i f f e r e n t
e f f e c t on opinion a b r o a d if it w e r e h e l d at B e r n e i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r
the end of the G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e .
T h i s , in his v i e w , would be
m o r e than a g e o g r a p h i c a l d i f f e r e n c e .
It w o u l d s e e m m u c h m o r e
n a t u r a l t h a t he and M . M o l o t o v s h o u l d g o f r o m G e n e v a t o B e r n e ,
a t the end of the C o n f e r e n c e , in o r d e r to c o n f e r t h e r e w i t h t h e
P r i m e M i n i s t e r and M . M a l e n k o v .
THE PRIME MINISTER
a g r e e d to include, in his m e s s a g e to the P r e s i d e n t , a r e f e r e n c e
t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of a m e e t i n g at B e r n e .
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R s a i d t h a t s o m e of h i s c o l l e a g u e s
m i g h t t h i n k that the C a b i n e t s h o u l d h a v e b e e n c o n s u l t e d b e f o r e h e
had sent to M . M o l o t o v the p e r s o n a l and p r i v a t e m e s s a g e e m b o d i e d
in F o r e i g n Office t e l e g r a m to M o s c o w N o . 873.
It h a d b e e n h i s
p r a c t i c e a s P r i m e M i n i s t e r , both d u r i n g the w a r and s i n c e the
present Government took office, to exchange personal m e s s a g e s
w i t h H e a d s of G o v e r n m e n t s and m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y with the
P r e s i d e n t of the United S t a t e s .
M o s t of t h e s e m e s s a g e s had b e e n
s e e n b e f o r e despatch b y the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , who could a l w a y s
s u g g e s t that r e f e r e n c e s h o u l d be m a d e to the C a b i n e t if h e t h o u g h t
this n e c e s s a r y .
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r h o p e d t h a t he w o u l d c o n t i n u e
t o enjoy the confidence of his c o l l e a g u e s in continuing a p r a c t i c e
which,, in h i s o p i n i o n , h a d p r o v e d b e n e f i c i a l i n the c o n d u c t o f
public affairs.
T H E L O R D P R E S I D E N T said that he was glad that this,
o p p o r t u n i t y had b e e n g i v e n t o d i s c u s s the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s p e c t s
of this m a t t e r .
H e did not c o n t e s t the right of a P r i m e M i n i s t e r
to determine policy.
B u t , i f a P r i m e M i n i s t e r t o o k a' d e c i s i o n o f
p o l i c y w h i c h i n v o l v e d the c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the w h o l e
G o v e r n m e n t w i t h o u t p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n With h i s C a b i n e t c o l l e a g u e s ,
a n y . o f h i s c o l l e a g u e s w h o d i s s e n t e d f r o m the d e c i s i o n m i g h t
t h e r e b y b e f o r c e d t o the r e m e d y of r e s i g n a t i o n .
The m e s s a g e
w h i c h the P r i m e M i n i s t e r had sent to M . M o l o t o v , though f r a m e d
as a p e r s o n a l e n q u i r y , w a s in h i s opinion an i m p o r t a n t act of ­
f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; and it w o u l d h a v e b e e n p r e f e r a b l e that the C a b i n e t
s h o u l d h a v e b e e n g i v e n an o p p o r t u n i t y t o e x p r e s s t h e i r v i e w s on i t
before it was sent.
T H E L O R D P R I V Y S E A L s a i d that h e a l s o r e g a r d e d this
a s a n i m p o r t a n t a c t o f p o l i c y , o n w h i c h the C a b i n e t s h o u l d h a v e
been consulted.
F o r , although it w a s presented as a p e r s o n a l
e n q u i r y , it w a s bound to c o m m i t the G o v e r n m e n t to s o m e e x t e n t
to the v i e w that this was an opportune m o m e n t f o r a m e e t i n g of
the kind s u g g e s t e d .
F o r his p a r t , if his v i e w had b e e n sought,
he would h a v e b e e n inclined to a d v i s e a g a i n s t m a k i n g such an .
a p p r o a c h a t the p r e s e n t t i m e .
. T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R suggested that a distinction could
be d r a w n b e t w e e n an i n f o r m a l e n q u i r y and a f o r m a l p r o p o s a l f o r
a meeting.
T h e latter could c l e a r l y not h a v e been m a d e without
the a p p r o v a l o f the Cabinet.
B u t he had not thought that the
Cabinet would be in any w a y c o m m i t t e d by a p e r s o n a l and
p r e l i m i n a r y e n q u i r y ; and he h a d u n d e r s t o o d that the F o r e i g n
S e c r e t a r y , w h o m h e had c o n s u l t e d , w a s of the s a m e o p i n i o n .
T H E F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y r e c a l l e d t h a t a d r a f t o f the
m e s s a g e had b e e n sent to the C h a n c e l l o r of the E x c h e q u e r , and
i t h a d b e e n in h i s m i n d a t t h e t i m e t h a t the C h a n c e l l o r w o u l d b r i n g
it t o the n o t i c e of his C a b i n e t c o l l e a g u e s .
T H E C H A N C E L L O R O F T H E E X C H E Q U E P . said that the
draft had r e a c h e d h i m d u r i n g the afternoon o f Saturday, 3 r d July,
w h e n he w a s i n N o r f o l k . - T h e t e l e g r a m e m b o d y i n g it had b e e n
show
a d d r e s s e d t o h i m p e r s o n a l l y , a n d c o p i e s h a d at t h a t s t a g e
o n l y to s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s in t h e F o r e i g n Office and t o the P r i m e
M i n i s t e r s P r i v a t e S e c r e t a r i e s a t 10 D o w n i n g S t r e e t .
There
w a s n o t h i n g in the t e l e g r a m to s u g g e s t that t h e v i e w s of the
Cabinet w e r e being invited.
I n d e e d , b e f o r e he had b e e n a b l e to
d e s p a t c h h i s o w n c o m m e n t s , w h i c h he had f o r m u l a t e d a f t e r
discussion with senior F o r e i g n Office officials, a further
t e l e g r a m had b e e n r e c e i v e d f r o m the P r i m e M i n i s t e r enquiring
w h e t h e r the m e s s a g e had b e e n t r a n s m i t t e d t o M o s c o w .
T h i s had
c o n f i r m e d h i s v i e w that he had n o t b e e n e x p e c t e d t o i n v i t e t h e
v i e w s o f o t h e r C a b i n e t c o l l e a g u e s ' - and it w o u l d in a n y e v e n t
have b e e n v e r y difficult for h i m to do so w h e n M i n i s t e r s w e r e
d i s p e r s e d at the w e e k - e n d .
biJen
T H E L O R D P R E S I D E N T s a i d that the m e s s a g e had b e e n
d e s p a t c h e d to M o s c o w on 4th July.
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r a n d the
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y h a d a r r i v e d i n L o n d o n o n 6th J u l y a n d c o u l d
then have held full consultation with their Cabinet c o l l e a g u e s .
W a s the m e s s a g e s o u r g e n t that its d e s p a t c h could not h a v e
been delayed for three days ?
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R s a i d that, in h i s a n x i e t y t o l o s e
no o p p o r t u n i t y of f u r t h e r i n g the c a u s e o f w o r l d p e a c e , h e m i g h t
h a v e t a k e n an e x a g g e r a t e d v i e w of the u r g e n c y o f the m a t t e r .
T h e r e had s e e m e d no r e a s o n t o d e l a y what he r e g a r d e d a s a
p e r s o n a l and i n f o r m a l e n q u i r y which could not c o m m i t his
colleagues.
T H E C O M M O N W E A L T H S E C R E T A R Y s a i d that in h i s
v i e w the constitutional p o s i t i o n w a s c l e a r .
A Prime Minister
was certainly free to conduct unofficial personal correspondence
with H e a d s of other G o v e r n m e n t s .
B u t , e q u a l l y , in s u c h
correspondence a P r i m e M i n i s t e r would take care to avoid
c o m m i t t i n g the C a b i n e t to a n y a c t o f p o l i c y without t h e i r p r i o r
approval.
The practical question was whether any particular
m e s s a g e , s e n t in t h e c o u r s e o f such p e r s o n a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,
had the e f f e c t of c o m m i t t i n g the C a b i n e t .
Though it w a s clear
that t h i s had not b e e n i n t e n d e d on the p r e s e n t o c c a s i o n , h a d it
produced this effect?
T H E L O R D P R E S I D E N T s a i d that i n h i s opinion the
C a b i n e f s f r e e d o m of a c t i o n h a d t o s o m e e x t e n t b e e n l i m i t e d b y
the m e s s a g e w h i c h the P r i m e M i n i s t e r h a d s e n t .
W h e n the
C a b i n e t c a m e t o t a k e a d e c i s i o n on t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e i s s u e ,
they m i g h t w i s h to decide that it would b e p r e f e r a b l e not to g o
f o r w a r d with this project for a meeting with M . Malenkov.
But,
if t h e y so d e c i d e d , and i f the R u s s i a n s then c h o s e to g i v e
p u b l i c i t y t o the m e s s a g e s e x c h a n g e d b e t w e e n the P r i m e M i n i s t e r
and M . M o l o t o v , the public would be left with the i m p r e s s i o n that
the P r i m e M i n i s t e r had w i s h e d to a r r a n g e such a m e e t i n g but
had b e e n d e t e r r e d f r o m doing so by his Cabinet c o l l e a g u e s .
That c o n s i d e r a t i o n m i g h t n o w influence the C a b i n e f s eventual
decision.
T H E C O L O N I A L S E C R E T A R Y s a i d that the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
p o s i t i o n w a s a s s t a t e d b y the C o m m o n w e a l t h S e c r e t a r y .
The
p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n w a s v/hether the c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the
C a b i n e t had in any w a y b e e n i n v o l v e d by the i n f o r m a l a p p r o a c h
w h i c h the P r i m e M i n i s t e r had m a d e t o M . M o l o t o v .
For himself
he d i d n o t t h i n k it c o u l d be d e n i e d that it w a s n o w m o r e d i f f i c u l t
f o r the C a b i n e t to d e c i d e that this w a s n o t an a p p r o p r i a t e m o m e n t
f o r a b i l a t e r a l m e e t i n g of the kind s u g g e s t e d in that m e s s a g e .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , he thought i t w a s s t i l l o p e n to the C a b i n e t t o
decide not to p r o c e e d further with this p r o j e c t .
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R a g r e e d w i t h this v i e w .
It
might w e l l be that, when P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r had r e p l i e d t o
his f u r t h e r m e s s a g e , he w o u l d be c o n v i n c e d that i t w o u l d be
p r e f e r a b l e not to p r o c e e d further with this p r o j e c t .
In that
e v e n t h e Would not f e e l o b l i g e d to g i v e M . M o l o t o v any d e t a i l e d
reasons for his decision.
It w o u l d s u f f i c e t o thank h i m a g a i n
f o r h i s c o r d i a l m e s s a g e and t o s a y that w e did not think i t
p r a c t i c a b l e to p r o c e e d f u r t h e r with this p r o j e c t at the p r e s e n t
time.
T h i s , h o w e v e r , m u s t be left for c o n s i d e r a t i o n in the
lig h t of a f u r t h e r e x p r e s s i o n of the P r e s i d e n t s v i e w s .
The Cabinet
-
A g r e e d to r e s u m e their discussion of this
question w h e n P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r had
r e p l i e d to the further m e s s a g e which the
P r i m e M i n i s t e r n o w proposed to send h i m .
Cabinet Office,
S.W.I.
10th J u l y , 1954.
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued for the personal use of
9^.\..j^T..
TOP SECRET
Copy
No...4fr...
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX"
( C . C . ( 5 4 ) 49th C o n c l u s i o n s )
C /h
/)
(9th July, 1954 - 1 2 . 3 0 p . m . )
laSHINGTON
JIALKS
JjPrevious
reference:
1,0.(54) 48th
pfconclusions)
gFroposed
pfeeting
feh
% Malenkov
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R r e a d t o the C a b i n e t
the t e x t of a f u r t h e r m e s s a g e f r o m P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r
(Washington t e l e g r a m N o . 1425) and a draft of the r e p l y w h i c h he
proposed t o send (subsequently despatched as F o r e i g n Office
t e l e g r a m to Washington N o . 3256).
T h e g r e a t e r part o f the
P r e s i d e n f s m e s s a g e w a s c o n c e r n e d with the situation in Indo-China
and the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of China in the United N a t i o n s .
In h i s r e p l y
the P r i m e M i n i s t e r p r o p o s e d t o p r e s s f o r a m o r e definite e x p r e s s i o n
of the P r e s i d e n f s v i e w s on s o m e of the p r a c t i c a l a s p e c t s o f h i s
proposal for a meeting with M . Malenkov.
H e intended to m a k e i t
c l e a r that h e w o u l d not a c c e p t a n invitation t o m e e t in M o s c o w and
that, although a m e e t i n g in S t o c k h o l m o r V i e n n a would b e a c c e p t a b l e ,
the b e s t plan w o u l d b e t o m e e t a t B e r n e a f t e r the G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e .
He also p r o p o s e d to make m o r e plain his intention to a s k the Russians
to give some definite proof of their sincerity, as a p r e l i m i n a r y t o a
w i d e r m e e t i n g - e . g . an undertaking to r a t i f y the A u s t r i a n T r e a t y
and, p e r h a p s , a p r o m i s e t o c o - o p e r a t e in the A t o m i c Bank P l a n .
He would u r g e the P r e s i d e n t to give h i m h i s v i e w s on these s p e c i f i c
p r o p o s a l s b e f o r e the Cabinet w e r e a s k e d to d e c i d e whether a f o r m a l
p r o p o s a l f o r a t w o - P o w e r m e e t i n g should be submitted to the S o v i e t
Government.
THE LORD
PRESIDENT
said that he w i s h e d t o
m a k e it c l e a r that he w a s o p p o s e d in p r i n c i p l e t o the idea o f h o l d i n g
a h i g h - l e v e l m e e t i n g with the Russians without the participation of
the United S t a t e s .
H e had e x p l a i n e d this t o the P r i m e M i n i s t e r in
a p r i v a t e l e t t e r w h i c h he h a d s e n t t o h i m a f t e r h i s s p e e c h i n the
H o u s e of C o m m o n s on 11th M a y , 1 9 5 3 , and nothing w h i c h h a d s i n c e
o c c u r r e d had changed his opinion on this point.
The projected
m e e t i n g , i f it t o o k p l a c e , w o u l d b e a n i m p o r t a n t a c t of f o r e i g n p o l i c y j
and, i f he r e m a i n e d in the G o v e r n m e n t , it w o u l d f a l l to h i m , a s
L e a d e r of the H o u s e o f L o r d s a n d s p o k e s m a n f o r the F o r e i g n Office
in that H o u s e , t o d e f e n d it p u b l i c l y .
T h i s he would be unable t o d o .
T h e r e f o r e , as at p r e s e n t a d v i s e d , h e . f e a r e d that he would h a v e t o
r e s i g n f r o m the G o v e r n m e n t i f it w e r e in the event d e c i d e d that the
P r i m e M i n i s t e r should go f o r w a r d with this p r o j e c t f o r a b i l a t e r a l
meeting with M . Malenkov.
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that, in their further
d i s c u s s i o n s o n this question, the Cabinet would w i s h t o keep in m i n d
the v i e w w h i c h the L o r d P r e s i d e n t had e x p r e s s e d .
F o r the moment,­
h o w e v e r , he p r e f e r r e d to await a further e x p r e s s i o n of P r e s i d e n t
E i s e n h o w e r ' s v i e w s ; and he w a s n o t p r o p o s m g t o a s k the C a b i n e t that
d a y t o t a k e a f i n a l d e c i s i o n on the m a t t e r .
In f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n M i n i s t e r s r e c o g n i s e d that
t h e y c o u l d not t a k e a f i n a l d e c i s i o n o n the e x p e d i e n c y o f p r o p o s i n g
s u c h a m e e t i n g u n t i l t h e y k n e w t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s on
I n d o - C h i n a w h i c h w e r e n o w t o b e r e s u m e d a t the G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e .
I f t h o s e n e g o t i a t i o n s r e s u l t e d in a n a g r e e m e n t f r o m w h i c h the U n i t e d
States G o v e r n m e n t e x p r e s s l y dissociated t h e m s e l v e s , it w a s arguable
that a b i l a t e r a l m e e t i n g b e t w e e n the P r i m e M i n i s t e r and M . M a l e n k o v
w o u l d a t t h a t m o m e n t g i v e the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t a n e v e n w i d e r b r e a c h
w a s b e i n g c r e a t e d b e t w e e n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s .
O n the o t h e r h a n d it w a s a r g u a b l e t h a t i n t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s - a n d ,
p e r h a p s e v e n m o r e , i f n o a g r e e m e n t of a n y k i n d w e r e r e a c h e d at
G e n e v a - it w o u l d be r e - a s s u r i n g to public o p i n i o n throughout the
w o r l d that a further opportunity was being created for discussions
w i t h the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t w h i c h m i g h t y e t a v e r t the d a n g e r o f w o r l d
war.
In e i t h e r e v e n t it s e e m e d c l e a r t h a t a f i n a l d e c i s i o n m u s t
a w a i t the o u t c o m e of the r e s u m e d n e g o t i a t i o n s at G e n e v a .
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R s u g g e s t e d that the
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y should take the opportunity, w h i l e at G e n e v a , t o
m a k e it c l e a r to M . M o l o t o v that this p r o j e c t could not p r o c e e d
further until the o u t c o m e of the G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e w a s k n o w n .
H e m i g h t a l s o put t o h i m t h e a d v a n t a g e s of B e r n e a s a p o s s i b l e
meeting-place.
T H E F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y said that s o m e
thought s h o u l d a l s o b e g i v e n t o the q u e s t i o n s w h i c h the R u s s i a n s w e r e
l i k e l y to r a i s e , if such a m e e t i n g w e r e h e l d .
H o w would they r e a c t ,
f o r e x a m p l e , t o the s u g g e s t i o n that t h e y should g i v e an u n d e r t a k i n g
t o ratify the A u s t r i a n T r e a t y ?
Were
they not l i k e l y to counter this
b y p r e s s i n g the suggestion for a E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y guarantee which
t h e y had put f o r w a r d a t t h e B e r l i n M e e t i n g - a s u g g e s t i o n w h i c h , a s
M i n i s t e r s would r e m e m b e r , w a s designed to prevent the e s t a b l i s h ­
m e n t of a E u r o p e a n D e f e n c e C o m m u n i t y .
A s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the
c r e a t i o n of that C o m m u n i t y , t h e y w o u l d p r o b a b l y s u g g e s t that a
u n i t e d G e r m a n y s h o u l d be a d m i t t e d t o the N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y
O r g a n i s a t i o n , and that the O r g a n i s a t i o n should t h e r e a f t e r be w i d e n e d
t o i n c l u d e the S o v i e t U n i o n .
A s r e g a r d s the p r o j e c t f o r a b r o a d e r
m e e t i n g , w e m u s t be p r e p a r e d f o r t h e m to p r e s s the suggestion that
t h i s s h o u l d b e on a f i v e - P o w e r b a s i s , including C o m m u n i s t C h i n a .
T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y s u g g e s t e d that further thought should b e g i v e n
t o a l l t h e s e q u e s t i o n s w h i l e he w a s i n G e n e v a .
The Cabinet
-
A g r e e d to r e s u m e their d i s c u s s i o n of
these m a t t e r s at a l a t e r meeting.
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
10th J u l y , 1 9 5 4 .
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued for the personal use of
TOP SECRET
^.^..^.^frr..
No...ifr...
Copy
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL
(
ANNEX
( C . C . ( 5 4 ) 50th C o n c l u s i o n s )
(
J.)
(13th July, 1954 - 1 1 . 3 0 a . m . )
WASHINGTON
TALKS
(Previous
Reference:
C.C.(54) 4 9 t h
Conclusions)
Proposed
Meeting w i t h
M. M a l e n k o v
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R read to the Cabinet President
E i s e n h o w e r ' s reply t o his latest m e s s a g e ( F o r e i g n Office t e l e g r a m
t o W a s h i n g t o n N o . 3256) r e g a r d i n g the p r o p o s e d m e e t i n g w i t h
M. Malenkov.
T h e P r e s i d e n t had said that this p r o j e c t would not
create a n y difference b e t w e e n the G o v e r n m e n t s of the United States
and t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m o r a l t e r h i s c o n f i d e n c e i n the P r i m e
M i n i s t e r 's d e d i c a t i o n t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h h a d u n i t e d t h e t w o
countries in t i m e of p e r i l and n o w constituted the b e s t guarantee
of w o r l d p e a c e .
T h o u g h he f e a r e d the e f f e c t o n p u b l i c o p i n i o n in
the United S t a t e s , he w o u l d d o h i s b e s t t o m i t i g a t e a n y i m m e d i a t e
unfavourable reaction.
On m o r e s p e c i f i c points, the P r e s i d e n t h a d
w e l c o m e d t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s statement that he would n o t be
w i l l i n g t o m e e t M . M a l e n k o v e x c e p t on a b a s i s o f full e q u a l i t y .
He had a l s o been r e a s s u r e d b y the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s insistence that
the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d g i v e p r o o f o f t h e i r s i n c e r i t y b y d e e d s
as w e l l a s w o r d s ; and he had a g r e e d that i t would help t o r e ­
establish public confidence if the Russians would undertake to
ratify the A u s t r i a n T r e a t y and t o c o - o p e r a t e in the A t o m i c Bank
Plan.
The P r i m e
Minister
s a i d t h a t h e w a s g r a t i f i e d b y t h e
t e r m s and the tone o f the P r e s i d e n t s
message.
The Cabinet w e r e also informed o f a conversation which
the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y h a d h e l d w i t h V I . M o l o t o v i n G e n e v a , i n
p u r s u a n c e o f the C a b i n e t ' s d i s c u s s i o n on 10th July.
This was
r e p o r t e d in G e n e v a t e l e g r a m N o . 8 9 8 . M . M o l o t o v h a d r e c o g n i s e d
that this p r o j e c t o f a b i l a t e r a l m e e t i n g could n o t p r o c e e d f u r t h e r
until the outcome of the G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e w a s known.
A s
r e g a r d s the c h o i c e of m e e t i n g - p l a c e , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y
r e j e c t e d a tentative suggestion b y M . M o l o t o v that the m e e t i n g
might take place within the Soviet Union, andh a d suggested London
or, as an alternative, Berne.
M . M o l o t o v had then said that his
G o v e r n m e n t had not y e t c o n s i d e r e d questions of time and p l a c e ,
but he w o u l d n o w c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h t h e m o n t h i s a n d w o u l d l e t
the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y h a v e t h e i r v i e w s in due c o u r s e .
The F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y h a d deduced f r o m this i n t e r v i e w that, if i t
w e r e finally decided to pursue this p r o j e c t , we need not exclude the
possibility o f persuading the R u s s i a n s t o a c c e p t L o n d o n , o r
alternatively Berne, as the place for a meeting.
THE. P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that h e would n o t a s k the
Cabinet t o r e a c h d e c i s i o n s on this m a t t e r until a f t e r t h e F o r e i g n
S e c r e t a r y had returned f r o m the Geneva C o n f e r e n c e ,
Cabinet Office, S.W.1,
14th J u l y , 1 9 5 4 .
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
TOP
...9^\y^Vr
SECRET Copy N o
a
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL
C.C.(54)
52nd C o n c l u s i o n s
(23rd July, 1954 -
WASHINGTON
TALKS
Proposed Meeting
M.
with JMalenkov
(Previous
References
C . C . ( 5 4 ) 50th
Conclusions)
ANNEX
C m,
t
11.00 a. m . )
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that, now that the
G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e w a s o v e r , the C a b i n e t m u s t d e c i d e w h a t '
f u r t h e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n should be m a d e to M . M o l o t o v in
r e p l y t o h i s m e s s a g e o f 5th J u l y .
A f t e r discussion with the
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y he had p r e p a r e d a d r a f t t e l e g r a m , w h i c h
he r e a d to the C a b i n e t .
T h i s s u g g e s t e d that it w o u l d be
u s e f u l if, b e f o r e a n o f f i c i a l p r o p o s a l w a s m a d e , a g r e e m e n t '
could be r e a c h e d i n f o r m a l l y about the t i m e and p l a c e for a
meeting.
It p r o p o s e d that the m e e t i n g s h o u l d n o t t a k e p l a c e
b e f o r e the e a r l y p a r t of S e p t e m b e r , and that it should be h e l d
in B e r n e , Stockholm o r Vienna.
It a l s o t h r e w out the
s u g g e s t i o n that other M i n i s t e r s , b e s i d e s the P r i m e M i n i s t e r
and the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y * m i g h t attend.
The P r i m e
M i n i s t e r ' said that it m i g h t b e
that he should c a r r y this m a t t e r a stage f u r t h e r
convenient
on a
personal
b a s i s , and he a s k e d w h e t h e r the C a b i n e t w o u l d be c o n t e n t that
he should send a p e r s o n a l and p r i v a t e m e s s a g e t o M ,
in the t e r m s of his
Molotov
draft.
In the d i s c u s s i o n w h i c h f o l l o w e d it w a s a r g u e d t h a t
such a c o m m u n i c a t i o n , though e x p r e s s e d as a p e r s o n a l
m e s s a g e f r o m the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , m u s t n o w be r e g a r d e d as
e n g a g i n g the c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the C a b i n e t .
Since
the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s r e t u r n the Cabinet had b e e n fully
c o n s u l t e d on this m a t t e r - i n d e e d this w a s stated in the d r a f t
m e s s a g e - and a n y further c o m m u n i c a t i o n m u s t b e t a k e n as an
e x p r e s s i o n of the G o v e r n m e n t s v i e w . .
T h i s l e d to f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of the
aspects
constitutional
of this m a t t e r which the C a b i n e t had c o n s i d e r e d
t h e i r m e e t i n g o n 8th
at
July.
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that w h e n , in the c o u r s e
of the r e t u r n v o y a g e f r o m his v i s i t to Washington, he had
r e a c h e d the c o n c l u s i o n that the t i m e w a s r i p e f o r s u g g e s t i n g
s u c h a m e e t i n g , h e h a d thought it b e t t e r that he s h o u l d h i m s e l f
t a k e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r m a k i n g the f i r s t i n f o r m a l a p p r o a c h
to the Soviet Government.
He had thought it w o u l d be
p r e f e r a b l e t h a t t h e C a b i n e t s h o u l d n o t b e in a n y w a y c o m m i t t e d
a t t h a t s t a g e , and t h a t he s h o u l d f i r s t e x p l o r e the p o s s i b i l i t y
on a p u r e l y p e r s o n a l b a s i s .
He had thoughts and s t i l l thought,
t h a t it w a s p e r f e c t l y p r o p e r f o r h i m t o d o t h i s w i t h o u t p r i o r
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the C a b i n e t .
F o r the idea of such a
m e e t i n g w a s not n o v e l .
I t h a d b e e n m e n t i o n e d i n h i s s p e e c h in I
the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s on 11th M a y , 1 9 5 3 .
More recently,
in t h e d e b a t e in the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s on 5th A p r i l , 1954, the
G o v e r n m e n t had a c c e p t e d an O p p o s i t i o n m o t i o n w e l c o m i n g
" a n i m m e d i a t e i n i t i a t i v e " b y the G o v e r n m e n t to b r i n g about a
m e e t i n g b e t w e e n the P r i m e M i n i s t e r a n d the H e a d s o f the
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s of the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t U n i o n .
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r circulated a p a p e r containing s o m e
e x t r a c t s f r o m s p e e c h e s m a d e in that d e b a t e , and d r e w
p a r t i c u l a r attention t o the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y ' s s t a t e m e n t , in
w i n d i n g up the d e b a t e , that when the G o v e r n m e n t thought there
w a s the l e a s t c h a n c e o f such a m e e t i n g b e i n g f r u i t f u l t h e y
would not hesitate to g o for it.
In the l i g h t o f t h i s i t had.
s e e m e d n a t u r a l that he should e x p l o r e the p o s s i b i l i t y of p r o ­
ceeding with a project which, as his colleagues w e l l knew,
had b e e n in his m i n d f o r s o m e t i m e p a s t ; and he w a s not
p r e p a r e d to a d m i t that t h e r e w a s anything unconstitutional in
the c o u r s e w h i c h he h a d t a k e n in m a k i n g h i s p r e l i m i n a r y
approach to M . M o l o t o v on a p u r e l y p e r s o n a l b a s i s .
Before
I
s e n d i n g his m e s s a g e he had d i s c u s s e d the m a t t e r fully w i t h
the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y and had g a i n e d the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t ,
while he would not h i m s e l f have initiated this p r o j e c t , he
did not d i s a p p r o v e it.
If he h a d d i s a p p r o v e d , h e c o u l d h a v e
i n s i s t e d that the m a t t e r should be r e f e r r e d t o the C a b i n e t .
T H E F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y said that it had b e e n his v i e w t h a t the C a b i n e t s h o u l d b e c o n s u l t e d b e f o r e the m e s s a g e w a s s e n t , and he had m a d e this c l e a r t o the P r i m e M i n i s t e r at the t i m e . T H E C H A N C E L L O R O F T H E E X C H E Q U E R said that, 1
w h e n he had r e c e i v e d the d r a f t of the p r o p o s e d m e s s a g e , he
had u n d e r s t o o d that it had b e e n sent to h i m f o r his p e r s o n a l
comments only.
It w o u l d h a v e b e e n p o s s i b l e , t h o u g h v e r y
difficult, f o r h i m to h a v e consulted the Cabinet at that s t a g e ,
and he m u s t a c c e p t p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h a v i n g d e c i d e d
not to do s o .
H e had sent to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r a full a c c o u n t I
of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h he h a d r e c e i v e d , and c o m m e n t e d I
o n , the d r a f t m e s s a g e : t h i s w a s o n r e c o r d a n d c o u l d be m a d e
available to any of his colleagues who w i s h e d to pursue that
a s p e c t of the m a t t e r .
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that he would not be
p r e p a r e d t o abandon the p r a c t i c e , w h i c h he had f o l l o w e d f o r
m a n y y e a r s , of conducting p e r s o n a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with H e a d s I
of o t h e r G o v e r n m e n t s , and he c o u l d not a c c e p t the v i e w that the
despatch of his original m e s s a g e to M . Molotov involved any
constitutional impropriety.
H e w a s s u r e that t h e r e w e r e m a n y
g o o d p r e c e d e n t s f o r a c t i o n s such a s t h i s , in w h i c h p r e l i m i n a r y
e n q u i r i e s o r p o u r p a r l e r s had been c a r r i e d out b y a P r i m e
M i n i s t e r or a F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y without p r i o r consultation
with a l l m e m b e r s of the Cabinet.
Indeed, there must have
been m a n y occasions on which a P r i m e Minister or a F o r e i g n
S e c r e t a r y had t a k e n f a r m o r e d e c i s i v e a c t i o n than t h i s without
the k n o w l e d g e o f a l l m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t .
T H E M I N I S T E R O F H O U S I N G suggested that the
C a b i n e t should n o w l o o k to the future r a t h e r than the p a s t .
He h i m s e l f s h a r e d the v i e w o r i g i n a l l y e x p r e s s e d b y the L o r d
P r e s i d e n t t h a t t h e P r i m e Ministers m e s s a g e t o M . M o l o t o v
w a s an i m p o r t a n t a c t of f o r e i g n p o l i c y which e n g a g e d the
c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the C a b i n e t and that the C a b i n e t
s h o u l d h a v e b e e n c o n s u l t e d b e f o r e it w a s s e n t .
There seemed,
h o w e v e r , to be little p r o f i t in p r o l o n g i n g d i s c u s s i o n of the
constitutional a s p e c t s of the m a t t e r .
W h a t the C a b i n e t had
n o w to c o n s i d e r w a s h o w t h e y could b e s t d e a l with the situation
which now confronted them.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL, THE
C O M M O N W E A L T H S E C R E T A R Y and T H E C O L O N I A L
S E C R E T A R Y s p o k e i n the s a m e s e n s e .
There was general
a g r e e m e n t that the C a b i n e f s d i s c u s s i o n should n o w c e n ' r e
on the action to be taken in the situation which had n o w b e e n
reached.
T H E L O R D P R E S I D E N T said that, though he had
b e e n the f i r s t t o r a i s e the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s p e c t s of t h i s m a t t e r ,
his m a i n concern now was with the international consequences
of going f o r w a r d with this p r o j e c t for a b i - l a t e r a l m e e t i n g
b e t w e e n the United K i n g d o m and the S o v i e t Union.
Some
b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t t h r e a t to w o r l d p e a c e c a m e f r o m t h e
Russians.
H e h i m s e l f b e l i e v e d that the g r e a t e r r i s k w a s that
the U n i t e d S t a t e s m i g h t d e c i d e t o b r i n g the E a s t / W e s t i s s u e to
a h e a d w h i l e t h e y s t i l l had o v e r w h e l m i n g s u p e r i o r i t y in a t o m i c
w e a p o n s and w e r e c o m p a r a t i v e l y i m m u n e f r o m a t o m i c a t t a c k
by Russia.
He c o n s i d e r e d that during that p e r i o d the s u p r e m e
o b j e c t of our p o l i c y should be to p r e s e r v e the unity and
c o h e r e n c e of the W e s t e r n A l l i a n c e .
Could w e e x p e c t the
A m e r i c a n s t o r e s p e c t the u n i t y o f that A l l i a n c e if, w i t h o u t
t h e i r a g r e e m e n t , w e e m b a r k e d on b i - l a t e r a l d i s c u s s i o n s with
the Russians ?
W a s there not a g r e a t r i s k that they would
t h e r e b y b e e n c o u r a g e d t o p u r s u e i n d e p e n d e n t p o l i c i e s a n d to
t a k e l e s s a c c o u n t of our v i e w s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s ?
T h e S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t had that m o r n i n g published a long
s t a t e m e n t on t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e G e n e v a C o n f e r e n c e .
Though
t h e y w e l c o m e d this as p r o o f that outstanding international
difficulties could, with goodwill, be solved by peaceful m e a n s ,
t h e y had gone out o f t h e i r w a y to c o n t r a s t the attitude of the
U n i t e d States w i t h that of the o t h e r W e s t e r n P o w e r s and to
s u g g e s t that A m e r i c a n p o l i c y had an a g g r e s s i v e p u r p o s e .
In v i e w o f this it w o u l d s u r e l y be m o s t inopportune a n d m o s t
d a m a g i n g to A n g l o - A m e r i c a n relations to e m b a r k , without
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the U n i t e d States G o v e r n m e n t , on b i - l a t e r a l
d i s c u s s i o n s with the R u s s i a n s .
I t w a s h i s v i e w tha.t h o
f u r t h e r a p p r o a c h s h o u l d be m a d e t o the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t
w i t h o u t full c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the U n i t e d States and o t h e r
m e m b e r s of the W e s t e r n A l l i a n c e .
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R said that his m e s s a g e had
not b e e n sent without a n y c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s
Administration.
W h i l e he was in Washington he had held m a n y
i n f o r m a l t a l k s w i t h P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r a b o u t the p r o s p e c t s
of a r r a n g i n g a t h r e e - P o w e r o r f o u r - P o w e r m e e t i n g at the
h i g h e s t l e v e l , and he had a l s o m e n t i o n e d to h i m and t o
M r . D u l l e s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t he m i g h t p r o p o s e a b i - l a t e r a l
meeting with M . Malenkov as a personal reconnaissance with
a v i e w t o a l a t e r m e e t i n g on a b r o a d e r b a s i s .
Though, h e
h a d not s a i d anything about the t i m i n g of such a b i - l a t e r a l
m e e t i n g , t h e y c e r t a i n l y had known that it w a s in his m i n d .
T H E F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y said that his colleagues
w e r e entitled to a c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n of his v i e w s on this
question.
He did not h i m s e l f b e l i e v e that a n y g o o d w o u l d c o m e
f r o m a b i - l a t e r a l m e e t i n g with the R u s s i a n s at the p r e s e n t
time.
Oh a l l the m a i n t o p i c s f o r d i s c u s s i o n at such a m e e t i n g
there w a s no p r o s p e c t that any a g r e e m e n t could be r e a c h e d .
On E u r o p e a n questions t h e r e w a s no s i g n that the R u s s i a n s
w e r e r e a d y to m o d i f y the u n c o m p r o m i s i n g attitude which they
h a d a d o p t e d at the B e r l i n C o n f e r e n c e .
On G e r m a n y , i n
p a r t i c u l a r , their attitude was unyielding.
The proposals
w h i c h t h e y w e r e l i k e l y t o put f o r w a r d a t such a m e e t i n g
w e r e q u i t e u n a c c e p t a b l e t o u s , e . g. t h e i r p l a n f o r the a b o l i t i o n
of a t o m i c w e a p o n s , t h e i r o w n s e c u r i t y plan f o r E u r o p e and the
d e m a n d that the C h i n e s e P e o p l e s G o v e r n m e n t should a t once
b e r e c o g n i s e d as the p r o p e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of China in the
United Nations.
It w a s e v i d e n t f r o m the r e p o r t o f the l a t e s t
c o n v e r s a t i o n w h i c h the F r e n c h P r i m e M i n i s t e r h a d h a d w i t h
M . M o l o t o v ( F o r e i g n O f f i c e t e l e g r a m N o . 1781 t o P a r i s ) t h a t
on all these topics the Russians w e r e still maintaining a wholly
uncompromising attitude.
On the o t h e r h a n d the P r i m e
M i n i s t e r w a s m o s t anxious to make a p e r s o n a l attempt to
d i s c o v e r , b y c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h the R u s s i a n l e a d e r s , w h e t h e r
a t h r e e - P o w e r or f o u r - P o w e r m e e t i n g at the highest l e v e l
w o u l d h e l p t o p r e s e r v e w o r l d p e a c e , and w a s c o n v i n c e d that
some result might be achieved by this personal contact with
the Russian l e a d e r s .
A s the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , with a l l his
l o n g e x p e r i e n c e , f e l t s o s t r o n g l y that the a t t e m p t w a s w o r t h
m a k i n g , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y w a s r e a d y t o a c q u i e s c e - s o
l o n g a s t h e m e e t i n g w a s n o t h e l d on R u s s i a n s o i l .
F o r his
p a r t , t h e r e f o r e , he had not w i s h e d to r a i s e objection t o the
d e s p a t c h of a f u r t h e r m e s s a g e to M . M o l o t o v in the t e r m s o f
the d r a f t w h i c h the P r i m e M i n i s t e r had r e a d to the C a b i n e t .
B u t he a g r e e d t h a t , b e f o r e a n y such m e s s a g e w a s s e n t , it
w o u l d b e w i s e to study the a n n o u n c e m e n t w h i c h the S o v i e t
G o v e r n m e n t h a d i s s u e d t h a t m o r n i n g on the r e s u l t s o f t h e
Geneva Conference.
I f the R u s s i a n s w e r e about to i n t e n s i f y
t h e i r p r o p a g a n d a about the a g g r e s s i v e intentions of the U n i t e d
S t a t e s , it m i g h t be m o r e difficult to g o f o r w a r d with this
p r o j e c t a t the p r e s e n t t i m e . It m i g h t be e x p e d i e n t that w e
s h o u l d t a k e t h e l i n e t h a t w e c o u l d n o t a t t e n d a m e e t i n g with
the R u s s i a n s while they continued to use their propaganda
m a c h i n e f o r v i o l e n t a t t a c k s on the p o l i c y o f o u r A m e r i c a n
ally.
F o r this r e a s o n he suggested that the Cabinet m i g h t
d e f e r t h e i r d e c i s i o n until he had had an o p p o r t u n i t y to study
m o r e c l o s e l y the a n n o u n c e m e n t b y t h e S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t t o
w h i c h the L o r d P r e s i d e n t had drawn attention.
J
T h e r e w a s g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t in the Cabinet that
t h e r e w o u l d b e a d v a n t a g e in p o s t p o n i n g a d e c i s i o n on t h i s
q u e s t i o n until the f o l l o w i n g w e e k , so that M i n i s t e r s m i g h t h a v e
t i m e t o r e f l e c t further and to c o n s i d e r the significance of this
s t a t e m e n t b y the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t .
5S In further
also
d i s c u s s i o n the f o l l o w i n g points
were
raiseds­
(a)
R e f e r e n c e had b e e n m a d e to the effect which a b i ­
l a t e r a l m e e t i n g w i t h the R u s s i a n s m i g h t h a v e on A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
relations.
R e c o u n t should a l s o be t a k e n of the e f f e c t of s u c h
a m e e t i n g on public o p i n i o n in E u r o p e .
T H E F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y said that, if it w e r e
d e c i d e d to go f o r w a r d with this p r o j e c t , the F r e n c h and G e r m a n
G o v e r n m e n t s would have to be told in advance of the line w e
p r o p o s e d t o take and of the r e s u l t s w e hoped t o a c h i e v e .
T h e s e p r e l i m i n a r y e x p l a n a t i o n s to t h e F r e n c h and the G e r m a n s
would need v e r y careful handling.
T h e r e w a s little doubt that
the m e e t i n g w o u l d be a s h o c k to public opinion in t h e s e and
other countries of W e s t e r n E u r o p e .
It w o u l d be s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t that F r e n c h opponents
of the E u r o p e a n D e f e n c e C o m m u n i t y (EJD.C.) should not be
g i v e n the opportunity to u s e the m e e t i n g as a p r e t e x t f o r f u r t h e r
d e l a y in r a t i f y i n g the E . D . C . T r e a t y .
If the p r o j e c t w e n t
f o r w a r d , no a n n o u n c e m e n t of the m e e t i n g should be m a d e until
a f t e r the F r e n c h P a r l i a m e n t had c o m p l e t e d t h e i r p r o c e e d i n g s
on the T r e a t y .
(b)
In c o n s i d e r i n g w h a t f u r t h e r r e p l y s h o u l d b e s e n t t o
the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t , a c c o u n t m u s t be taken o f the p o s s i b i l i t y
that the R u s s i a n s would at s o m e future date d i s c l o s e the fact
t h a t the a p p r o a c h h a d b e e n m a d e o r e v e n p u b l i s h the c o r r e s ­
pondence.
W e m i g h t b e put i n a n e m b a r r a s s i n g p o s i t i o n i f it
w e r e d i s c l o s e d that, having m a d e this o f f e r , w e had then w i t h ­
d r a w n it.
T h i s s e e m e d to be an a r g u m e n t f o r m a k i n g a
f u r t h e r s u g g e s t i o n t o the R u s s i a n s on the l i n e s of the d r a f t
p r e p a r e d b y the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ,
(c)
It w a s a t l e a s t p o s s i b l e t h a t , if a f u r t h e r o f f e r w e r e
m a d e on t h e s e l i n e s , the R u s s i a n s w o u l d d e c l i n e i t o r w o u l d
i n s i s t that the m e e t i n g - p l a c e should be within the S o v i e t U n i o n .
T h a t b e i n g s o , i t w a s f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n w h e t h e r the n e x t
m e s s a g e to the R u s s i a n s should not b e a f o r m a l , r a t h e r than
a personal, communication,
F o r w e might w i s h at s o m e
t o d i s c l o s e the r e a s o n s w h y this p r o j e c t had not c o m e
fruition and w e m i g h t f e e l p r e c l u d e d f r o m
communications
stage
to
publishing
e x p r e s s e d as p r i v a t e and p e r s o n a l
messages.
In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i t w a s a r g u e d t h a t t h e G o v e r n m e n t
c o u l d n o t e s c a p e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e s e o v e r t u r e s on t h e b a s i s
that t h e y had b e e n m a d e in p e r s o n a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n
the P r i m e M i n i s t e r and M , M o l o t o v .
A n y further m e s s a g e
w h i c h w a s s e n t w o u l d be sent a f t e r full d i s c u s s i o n b y the
C a b i n e t a n d w o u l d e n g a g e the full c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
of M i n i s t e r s .
In a n y e v e n t the G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d c e r t a i n l y
b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e b y p u b l i c o p i n i o n , w h a t e v e r the f o r m o f
the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e .
(d)
There was
d e a t h , p o w e r in the
Russian leaders.
reluctance of M M .
r e a s o n to b e l i e v e that, since Stalin s
K r e m l i n had been shared by a number of
If this w e r e s o , it m i g h t i n c r e a s e the
M a l e n k o v and M o l o t o v to attend a h i g h - l e v e l
1
m e e t i n g outside the S o v i e t Union.
It w a s w i t h t h i s i n m i n d
that the P r i m e M i n i s t e r w a s p r o p o s i n g t o s a y in h i s m e s s a g e
that he m i g h t w i s h t o b r i n g with h i m t o a m e e t i n g one o r t w o other
M i n i s t e r s in a d d i t i o n t o the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y .
The Russians
m i g h t p e r h a p s be m o r e willing to attend a m e e t i n g on neutral
ground if it could be attended b y o t h e r s of their l e a d e r s in
a d d i t i o n t o M M . M a l e n k o v and M o l o t o v ,
(e)
S e v e r a l M i n i s t e r s said that, a s this p r o j e c t had
n o w b e e n c a r r i e d s o f a r , the b a l a n c e of a d v a n t a g e s e e m e d t o
l i e o n the side of s e n d i n g a f u r t h e r m e s s a g e to the R u s s i a n s
on t h e l i n e s s u g g e s t e d b y the P r i m e M i n i s t e r .
They agreed,
h o w e v e r , that it w a s d e s i r a b l e that m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t
s h o u l d h a v e an o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e f l e c t f u r t h e r on the q u e s t i o n
o v e r the w e e k - e n d and s h o u l d r e s u m e t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n e a r l y
in the f o l l o w i n g w e e k .
The Cabinet
-
A g r e e d to r e s u m e t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n of this
q u e s t i o n a t a f u r t h e r m e e t i n g on 26th J u l y .
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
24th July,
1954.
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of..
TOP
SECRET
Copy N o ,
I'
CABINET
CONFIDENTIAL,
C.C.(54)
ANNEX
53rd Conclusions
( / k t ^ \
( 2 6 t h J u l y , 1954 - 11. 3 0 a . m . )
TALKS
Proposed
Meeting with
M. M a l e n k o v
(Previous
Reference:
C. C . ( 5 4 ) 5 2 n d
Conclusions)
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R s a i d t h a t , since the C a b i n e t had
l a s t d i s c u s s e d on 2 3 r d July h i s s u g g e s t i o n of a b i - l a t e r a l m e e t i n g
w i t h the R u s s i a n s , the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t h a d p u b l i c l y p r o p o s e d a n
e a r l y c o n f e r e n c e o f a l l E u r o p e a n G o v e r n m e n t s t o c o n s i d e r the
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a s y s t e m of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y in E u r o p e .
This
c r e a t e d a n e w situation, e s p e c i a l l y a s i t w a s c l e a r f r o m its t e r m s
t h a t the S o v i e t N o t e h a d b e e n d r a w n up a f t e r the e n d o f t h e G e n e v a
Conference.
It w a s e v i d e n t t h a t the p r i m a r y p u r p o s e of t h e S o v i e t
G o v e r n m e n t , in m a k i n g this public p r o p o s a l at this t i m e , w a s to
influence the attitude of the F r e n c h P a r l i a m e n t in t h e i r f o r t h c o m i n g
d i s c u s s i o n of the T r e a t y f o r the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the E u r o p e a n
Defence Community.
But he w a s s a t i s f i e d that h e c o u l d n o t p r o c e e d
with his p r o p o s a l f o r a b i - l a t e r a l m e e t i n g with the R u s s i a n s while
t h i s s u g g e s t i o n of a m u c h l a r g e r m e e t i n g o f F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s w a s
being publicly canvassed.
He had t h e r e f o r e p r e p a r e d a r e v i s e d
d r a f t of h i s p r o p o s e d m e s s a g e t o M . M o l o t o v i n d i c a t i n g that the
l a r g e r m e e t i n g w h i c h the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t had n o w p u b l i c l y ­
p r o p o s e d did not s e e m to a c c o r d w i t h the plan f o r an i n f o r m a l b i ­
l a t e r a l . m e e t i n g w h i c h he had p r e v i o u s l y h a d in m i n d , a n d a s k i n g
w h e t h e r this S o v i e t p r o p o s a l w a s intended to s u p e r s e d e his plan.
H e p r o p o s e d to include in this r e v i s e d m e s s a g e a r e f e r e n c e to the
p l a c e and t i m e w h i c h he had b e e n i n t e n d i n g to p r o p o s e f o r a b i ­
l a t e r a l m e e t i n g : t h i s w o u l d h a v e the a d v a n t a g e of m a k i n g it c l e a r
that he had not b e e n p r e p a r e d t o attend a m e e t i n g i n M o s c o w .
The
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y had independently p r e p a r e d an a l t e r n a t i v e draft,
w h i c h was s i m i l a r in substance though s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t in
wording.
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r r e a d the t w o d r a f t s to the C a b i n e t .
H e s a i d t h a t , i f the C a b i n e t a p p r o v e d the s u b s t a n c e of t h e p r o p o s e d
m e s s a g e , he c o u l d s e t t l e the w o r d i n g in c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e
Foreign Secretary.
In the c o u r s e of a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n it w a s a g r e e d that a
n e w s i t u a t i o n h a d b e e n c r e a t e d b y the p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e S o v i e t N o t e
o f 24th July.
T h o u g h it s e e m e d u n l i k e l y that t h i s S o v i e t p r o p o s a l
w o u l d be a c c e p t a b l e t o the G o v e r n m e n t s of W e s t e r n E u r o p e , its
r e c i p i e n t s m u s t be g i v e n t i m e t o c o n s i d e r i t and the p o s i t i o n
m u s t b e r e v i e w e d a g a i n in the l i g h t o f t h e i r r e s p o n s e .
Meanwhile,
it - as d e s i r a b l e that M . M o l o t o v should be g i v e n t o understand
t h a t the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s p r o p o s a l f o r a b i - l a t e r a l m e e t i n g would
b e h e l d i n a b e y a n c e w h i l e the S o v i e t N o t e w a s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
The Cabinet
-
T o o k note that the P r i m e M i n i s t e r would send a
p e r s o n a l m e s s a g e to M . M o l o t o v m a k i n g it c l e a r
that his p r o p o s a l for a b i - l a t e r a l meeting with
M . M a l e n k o v m u s t be r e g a r d e d a s h e l d in
a b e y a n c e p e n d i n g the o u t c o m e of the S o v i e t
p r o p o s a l of 24th July f o r a c o n f e r e n c e of all
E u r o p e a n G o v e r n m e n t s on the c r e a t i o n of a
s y s t e m of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y in E u r o p e .
Cabinet Office,
S.W.1.
26th J u l y , 1954.
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
.....$4sL
TOP SECRET
Copy N o
NO CIRCULATION
C
C . (54) 84th
RECORD
Conclusions
(Cth D e c e m b e r , 1 9 5 4 - 1 1 . 3 0 a
DUKE O F
I WINDSOR
1
i (Previous r
I Reference: C.C.(54) 24th
j Conclusions) .3
D
m. )
T h e Cabinet c o n s i d e r e d an u n n u m b e r e d m e m o r a n d u m
by the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y a b o u t the p u b l i c a t i o n o f c a p t u r e d
G e r m a n documents d e s c r i b i n g the a p p r o a c h e s which G e r m a n a g e n t s had m a d e to the D u k e o f W i n d s o r in S p a i n and P o r t u g a l in 1940. W h e n this q u e s t i o n had l a s t b e e n d i s c u s s e d b y the C a b i n e t on 31st M a r c h , 1954, t h e h i s t o r i a n s w h o w e r e e d i t i n g
for publication a selection of captured G e r m a n documents w e r e
w i l l i n g to d e l a y for a l o n g t i m e the p u b l i c a t i o n of the v o l u m e
containing this c o r r e s p o n d e n c e about the Duke of W i n d s o r ,
In
July, 1954, h o w e v e r , the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d F r e n c h e d i t o r s had
changed t h e i r m i n d s , and had adopted a plan of w o r k w h i c h
w o u l d h a v e the r e s u l t t h a t t h e v o l u m e c o n t a i n i n g t h i s
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e would b e p u b l i s h e d in 1956.
E f f o r t s to.
dissuade t h e m f r o m this course had failed
The memorandum
i n v i t e d the C a b i n e t to c o n s i d e r (i) w h e t h e r w e should a c q u i e s c e
in t h e c o u r s e n o w p r o p o s e d b y the h i s t o r i a n s , but s h o w the
p a p e r s t o the Duke of W i n d s o r s o that he m i g h t be p r e p a r e d f o r
the d i s c l o s u r e ; o r ( i i ) w h e t h e r f u r t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s should
n o w be m a d e to the United Spates and F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t s in
the h o p e of s e c u r i n g t h e i r a g r e e m e n t t h a t the p r o p o s e d
p u b l i c a t i o n should be d e l a y e d .
0
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R s a i d t h a t , since the F o r e i g n
S e c r e t a r y ? s m e m o r a n d u m w a s w r i t t e n , he had taken an
o p p o r t u n i t y of d i s c u s s i n g the m a t t e r i n f o r m a l l y w i t h the D u k e
I
of W i n d s o r .
His Royal Highness was not specially
at the p r o s p e c t of this d i s c l o s u r e .
I
V
I
;i
II
\\./f.
I
11?
u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t the h i s t o r i a n s
disturbed
W h i l e he thought it
should think it n e c e s s a r y
to
publish t h e s e p a p e r s , he w a s not anxious that f u r t h e r
efforts should be made t o p r e v e n t or delay publication.
He
would be r e a d y t o issue a p e r s o n a l s t a t e m e n t as s o o n a s the
disclosure was made.
T H E M I N I S T E R O F L A B O U R s a i d that he had a l s o
h a d s o m e r e c e n t c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h the D u k e o f W i n d s o r on
this subject.
be p r e f e r a b l e
H i s R o y a l H i g h n e s s w a s s a t i s f i e d that it w o u l d
not to m a k e any further a t t e m p t to i n t e r f e r e
w i t h the n o r m a l c o u r s e o f p u b l i c a t i o n .
T h e C a b i n e t w e r e a l s o i n f o r m e d that the m a i n f a c t s
of t h i s s t o r y w e r e l i k e l y to b e d i s c l o s e d i n a f o r t h c o m i n g
publication of the p r i v a t e p a p e r s of G e n e r a l W a l t e r S c h e l l e n b e r g .
the G e r m a n a g e n t p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r m a k i n g the
a p p r o a c h e s to the D u k e of W i n d s o r in 1940
0
It was
expected
t h a t t h i s b o o k w o u l d be p u b l i s h e d , b y a p r i v a t e p u b l i s h e r , i n the
spring or summer
of 1956
0
I t v/as l i k e l y t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e
m a i n f a c t s w o u l d b e c o m e w i d e l y k n o w n b e f o r e the
p u b l i c a t i o n of the G e r m a n
official
documents,
T h e C a b i n e t a g r e e d that in t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s no
f u r t h e r a t t e m p t s h o u l d be m a d e to d e l a y the p u b l i c a t i o n of the
v o l u m e of c a p t u r e d G e r m a n d o c u m e n t s containing this
correspondence,,
It w a s h o w e v e r , i m p o r t a n t that M i n i s t e r s
should be w a r n e d w e l l in a d v a n c e of the date on w h i c h this
v o l u m e w a s to be published;, s o that the Duke o f W i n d s o r m i g h t
b e a d v i s e d to be r e a d y w i t h the p e r s o n a l s t a t e m e n t w h i c h he
w a s p r o p o s i n g to issue and so that any other p r a c t i c a b l e steps
m i g h t be t a k e n t o i n d u c e r e s p o n s i b l e n e w s p a p e r s t o put the
d i s c l o s u r e in a p r o p e r p e r s p e c t i v e ^
s
The Cabinet
­
( 1 ) A g r e e d t h a t n o f u r t h e r a t t e m p t s - s h o u l d b e m a d e
to d e l a y p u b l i c a t i o n of the v o l u m e of c a p t u r e d
G e r m a n d o c u m e n t s c o n t a i n i n g the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
a b o u t t h e a p p r o a c h e s m a d e t o the D u k e of W i n d s o r
in S p a i n and P o r t u g a l i n 1940.
( 2 )
I n s t r u c t e d the S e c r e t a r y of the C a b i n e t t o a r r a n g e that M i n i s t e r s should be w a r n e d w e l l in advance of the date on w h i c h t h i s v o l u m e w a s to be jxiblished. Cabinet Office,
SoW l.
0
10th D e c e m b e r , 1 9 5 4 .
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued for the personal use of W
TOP SECRET
I.
Copy
RB-S-T-R-IG-TEP.-6IRG-ULA.T-ION-
-G-A-B-INE--T-:
K
.
No.."7
. .
r
4T-H-FE-BR'UAR-Yy"t955-.
(CC (55)
9th
0
Conclusions)
R-e-eogd - o f - C o n f i d e n t i a l - B i s cu&sio-a.
jDUKE O F
^EDINBURGH
I
THE PRIME
MINISTER
s a i d that he had d i s c u s s e d
with
s o m e of h i s C a b i n e t c o l l e a g u e s , at i n f o r m a l m e e t i n g s h e l d on
11th M a y and 16th June, 1 9 5 4 , a s u g g e s t i o n that H i s R o y a l H i g h n e s s
the D u k e of E d i n b u r g h should a s s u m e the title " P r i n c e of the
Commonwealth",
It h a d t h e n b e e n f o r e s e e n t h a t t h i s s u g g e s t i o n
m i g h t g i v e r i s e to s o m e difficulties;, and it had not b e e n p r e s s e d
at that t i m e .
T h e Queen had r e c e n t l y s u g g e s t e d h o w e v e r that,
w h i l e the C o m m o n w e a l t h P r i m e M i n i s t e r s w e r e in L o n d o n , the
o p p o r t u n i t y m i g h t b e t a k e n o f a s c e r t a i n i n g i n f o r m a l l y w h e t h e r they
would all be p r e p a r e d to support such a proposal.
He had therefore
sounded s o m e of t h e m .
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r s of A u s t r a l i a ,
N e w Z e a l a n d and P a k i s t a n had w e l c o m e d the s u g g e s t i o n ; and the
P r i m e M i n i s t e r of I n d i a h a d s a i d t h a t he h i m s e l f w o u l d f a v o u r i t ,
though it m i g h t g i v e r i s e to s o m e c r i t i c i s m in his c o u n t r y .
The .
D e p u t y P r i m e M i n i s t e r of South A f r i c a h a d s a i d that he c o u l d o f f e r
no opinion without f i r s t consulting h i s G o v e r n m e n t ,
The P r i m e
M i n i s t e r of C a n a d a had e x p r e s s e d m i s g i v i n g s : he t h o u g h t that the
a s s u m p t i o n of such a title m i g h t r a i s e a w k w a r d constitutional
questions.
T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r said that The Q u e e n w o u l d not w i s h
t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h i s s u g g e s t i o n u n l e s s it h a d t h e f u l l s u p p o r t o f a l l
Commonwealth Governments.
He thought that, if Canadian M i n i s t e r s
c o u l d b e p e r s u a d e d t o s u p p o r t it, it m i g h t be p o s s i b l e to s e c u r e the
a g r e e m e n t o f South A f r i c a ,
T H E L O R D P R E S I D E N T said that this was a m a t t e r which
d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d the r e l a t i o n s of C o m m o n w e a l t h G o v e r n m e n t s w i t h
the C r o w n .
It w o u l d be u n w i s e t o p r o c e e d w i t h the s u g g e s t i o n u n l e s s
it c o m m a n d e d the u n a n i m o u s s u p p o r t of a l l C o m m o n w e a l t h
Governments,
T h e r e was general a g r e e m e n t with this
The Cabinet
view
0
-
T o o k note that the P r i m e M i n i s t e r would r e p o r t
t o t h e m t h e r e s u l t of the f u r t h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n s
w h i c h h e w a s p r o p o s i n g t o h a v e on t h i s q u e s t i o n
: ,.
-
w i t h the P r i m e M i n i s t e r of Canada and the
P r i m e M i n i s t e r of South A f r i c a .
Cabinet Office,
S,W.l.
1.1th F e b r u a r y ,
1955.
Deputy
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
TOP SECRET
Copy
UT-E-D. e i H ^ e ^ f a V T ^ e N
^ ^ i r r i f ^ -
( C , C , , ( 5 5 ) 10th Conc?.uf.ion:;)
W
H
IDUKE O F
$EDINBURGH
No...77....
Roeord-ef-Oenfjd^yfttia^Bi-a-e^&sien-"
T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R s a i d t h a t he had n o w b e e n
' i n f o r m e d that the South A f r i c a n G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d not be p r e p a r e d
to s u p p o r t t h e s u g g e s t i o n that H i s R o y a l H i g h n e s s the D u k e of
E d i n b u r g h s h o u l d a s s u m e the t i t l e P r i n c e of the C o m m o n w e a l t h " , ,
T h e Canadian P r i m e M i n i s t e r had a l s o indicated that his G o v e r n m e n t
w o u l d not be able to support this suggestions
A s the o u g g e s t i o n
did not c o m m a n d the unanimous support of a l l C o m m o n w e a l t h
G o v e r n m e n t s , i t w o u l d n o t be p o s s i b l e to p r o c e e d w i t h i t at the
p r e s e n t t i m e ; and he had i n f o r m e d T h e Q u e e n accordingly,,
H e r M a j e s t y a c c e p t e d this position, but it was still her w i s h that
s o m e f o r m a l t i t l e s h o u l d be c o n f e r r e d on the Duke of E d i n b u r g h , ,
She d i d n o t h e r s e l f f a v o u r the t i t l e " P r i n c e C o n s o r t " o r " P r i n c e
Royal"
i :
0
In a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s w e r e
forward.
It w a s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , s u g g e s t e d that the t i t l e
H i g h n e s s the P r i n c e " m i g h t be
put
"His
Royal
considered.
T h e P r i m e Minister undertook to consider this particular
s u g g e s t i o n further and to take a suitable opportunity of mentioning
it i n f o r m a l l y to T h e Q u e e n .
Cabinet Office,
S W 1
0
11th F e b r u a r y ,
0
0
1955
0
T h e circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
m
w
H'
7
TOP SECRET
.
Copy N o . . . /
A-
GASWE-T:
2 N D M A - R G S , 1955
( C . C . ( 5 5 ) 19th
Conclusions)
R-e-crrrd e f C onfi-dejotiaX -B-io cuos-ion­
fiUKE
iOF,
pblNBURGH
pk;-
THE PRIME
MINISTER
s a i d that in i n f o r m a l
conversation
w i t h T h e Queen h e had put f o r w a r d the s u g g e s t i o n that the
D u k e of E d i n b u r g h s h o u l d a s s u m e the t i t l e " H i s R o y a l H i g h n e s s
. The Prince".
H e r M a j e s t y had b e e n f a v o u r a b l y d i s p o s e d
towards
T h e next step w o u l d be to s u b m i t the s u g g e s t i o n t o h e r
m o r e f o r m a l l y in w r i t i n g .
thiSo
In d i s c u s s i o n t h e q u e s t i o n w a s r a i s e d w h e t h e r t h e
a s s u m p t i o n of t h i s t i t l e w o u l d g i v e the D u k e of E d i n b u r g h p r e c e d e n t
o v e r the P r i n c e of W a l e s ,
It w a s the g e n e r a l v i e w of the C a b i n e t
that this w a s a point w h i c h could be l e f t to be s e t t l e d b y
H e r M a j e s t y at a l a t e r s t a g e .
T h e r e w a s g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t that
" H i s . R o y a l Highness T h e P r i n c e " w a s the m o s t suitable title
w h i c h could be d e v i s e d f o r the D u k e of E d i n b u r g h .
T H E C O M M O N W E A L T H S E C R E T A R Y s a i d that, as the
t i t l e n o w s u g g e s t e d h a d no t e r r i t o r i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , t h e r e w o u l d be
no o c c a s i o n to consult other C o m m o n w e a l t h G o v e r n m e n t s .
It
w o u l d , h o w e v e r , be d e s i r a b l e t h a t t h e y s h o u l d be i n f o r m e d b e f o r e
a n y p u b l i c a n n o u n c e m e n t w a s m a d e ; and the a p p r o p r i a t e channel
fox* t h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n w o u l d b e f r o m H e r M a j e s t y ' s P r i v a t e
S e c r e t a r y to G o v e r n o r s - G e n e r a l .
T H E L O R D C H A N C E L L O R s a i d that he h a d c o n s i d e r e d
w h e t h e r this w a s a m a t t e r on w h i c h the S o v e r e i g n should a c t on
advice from Ministers.
T h o u g h the point w a s o p e n to a r g u m e n t ,
it w a s h i s v i e w that t h i s w o u l d b e a p e r s o n a l d e c i s i o n o f the
Sovereign.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , it would be expedient that H e r M a j e s t y
should consult h e r M i n i s t e r s before a final decision was taken.
T h e point would be c o v e r e d if the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , in a f o r m a l
l e t t e r to The Q u e e n , c o m m e n d e d the s u g g e s t i o n to H e r M a j e s t y .
In f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n it w a s s u g g e s t e d that T h e Q u e e n s
Bis^Sbdny w o u l d b e a s u i t a b l e o c c a s i o n o n w h i c h t o a n n o u n c e t h e
new title.
T
THE
PRIME
M I N I S T E R invited the L o r d C h a n c e l l o r to
s u b m i t to h i m a d r a f t of a l a t t e r to T h e Q u e e n . c o m m a n d i n g
s u g g e s t i o n that the title " H i s R o y a l H i g h n e s s T h e P r i n c e "
be f o r m a l l y
c o n f e r r e d on the D u k e of E d i n b u r g h , ,
He also
the C o m m o n w e a l t h S e c r e t a r y t o s e n d h i m a n o t e of the
to be f o l l o w e d in r e l a t i o n to o t h e r C o m m o n w e a l t h
C a b i n e t Office,, S
W lo
a
3 r d M a r c h , 1955
u
0
available,,
asked
procedure
Governments
T h e m a t t e r w o u l d be b r o u g h t b e f o r e the C a b i n e t again., f o r
decision,, w h e n these documents w e r e
the
should
final
0
V\o-fcJC CoJ
-r?e
C M . ( 5 5 ) 18th
Conclusions
( 2 8 t h J u n e . 1955 -
11.00
a.ro.)
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR AJR s a i d t h a t H . R . H .
o f E d i n b u r g h now h a d t o h i s c r e d i t
i n c l u d i n g n e a r l y h-0 h o u r s o f
reliable pilot.
helicopter;
solo flying.
him t o r e c e i v e
and
he m i g h t l e a r n t o f l y
approval,
h i s t u i t i o n f r o m an
and t o t a k e
:
a i r c r a f t was a t an a p p r o p r i a t e a l t i t u d e
on t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
I n discussion
hours,
that
0
a
arrangements
experienced
He h a s a l s o e x p r e s s e d a w i s h t o
as a p a s s e n g e r i n a Canberra,
charge of the a i r c r a f t
276 f l y i n g
He was a s k i l l e d
and, w i t h t h e Prime M i n i s t e r ' s
of t h e F l e e t A i r Arm..
arranged,
of
He had r e c e n t l y a s k e d i f
' had b e e n made f o r
pilot
a total
t h e Duke ;
fly
o v e r t h e c o n t r o l s when t h e
T h i s a l s o was b e i n g
an R . A . F ,
throughout t h e f l i g h t .
pilot
would remain
in
"
some a n x i e t y was e x p r e s s e d a b o u t t h e
risks
w h i c h t h e Duke o f E d i n b u r g h m i g h t r u n i n p i l o t i n g a h e l i c o p t e r .
Cabinet w e r e , however,
assured t h a t , e x c e p t on o c c a s i o n a l s o l o
in conventional training
aircraft,
His Royal Highness would
a c c o m p a n i e d , w h e t h e r i n an o r d i n a r y a i r c r a f t
a skilled pilot.
flying
solo
The S e c r e t a r y
Edinburgh,
Navy.
all
including f l i g h t s
.
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
1st July,
SJf.1.
1955. always
of
be
by
t h e Duke's .
1
of S t a t e f o r A i r confirmed
personally responsible f o r
flights
or i n a h e l i c o p t e r ,
T h e r e w a s no q u e s t i o n a t t h i s s t a g e
in a helicopter.
The
the f l y i n g
t h a t he r e m a i n e d .
activities
of
t h e Duke
in helicopters belonging t o the
of-;
Royal
MOST CONPIDKMTIAL RECORD
TOP SECRET
C.M.(55)
(21st J u l y ,
25th C o n c l u s i o n s
1955 - 1 1 . 3 0 a . m * )
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR A I R s a i d t h a t i t was
t h o u g h t t h a t H . R . H Y t h e Duke o f E d i n b u r g h m i g h t
wish
t o f l y i n a g l i d e r when h e v i s i t e d
Gliding
the N a t i o n a l
C h a m p i o n s h i p s m e e t i n g w h i c h v a s t o b e g i n a t Lasham:
A i r f i e l d , H a m p s h i r e , o n 23rd J u l y ,
1955.
If
t h e Chairman
of t h e Royal A i r Force Gliding A s s o c i a t i o n decided
a 3\ixtable
two-seater
glider
c o u l d b e used. and. t h a t a n
e x p e r i e n c e d p i l o t was a v a i l a b l e
Edinburgh,
If
there
that,
t o accompany t h e / D u k e
w o u l d b e no o b j e c t i o n t o h i s f l y i n g .
n o t , t h e Duke o f E d i n b u r g h would b e d i s s u a d e d f r o m
flying
in a
glider.
The C a b i n e t a p p r o v e d o f t h e s e
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
22nd J u l y ,
S.W. 1 .
1955o
arrangements,
of
MOST OOIIEIDEMIAL RECORD
:0P SECRET
CABINET
C.I.T. ( 5 6 )
2gth Conclusions
( 2 7 t h March,
1956 -
12 n o o n )
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t H . R . H .
now h a d a s u b s t a n t i a l e x p e r i e n c e
as a f i r s t
in flying
class helicopter p i l o t .
flight.
His
n o r was i t
i n s t r u c t o r s had,
asked f o r
that,
carrier.
assessed
thought
on t h e
D i s c u s s i o n showed t h a t
it
a
T h e r e was no d o u b t
it
and t h e S e c r e t a r y
the C a b i n e t ' s guidance
a l t h o u g h any e x t e n s i o n o f
and w a s
regarded as a s p e c i a l l y
however,
suggestion to the A i r Ministry,
helicopters,
He had e x p r e s s e d a w i s h t o f l y
h e l i c o p t e r f r o m t h e deck of a n a i r c r a f t
h i s competence t o do t h i s ,
t h e Duke o f E d i n b u r g h had
right
dangerous
to refer
of State f o r
the
Air
had
point.
was t h e - g e n e r a l v i e w o f t h e
sairiburgh' s
t h e Duke of
flying
Cabinet
activities
i n c r e a s e d t h e r i s k s w h i c h he was a c c e p t i n g ,
t h e r e w e r e no s u f f i c i e n t
for
. The Prime M i n i s t e r might
objecting
a suitable
t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r proposal,,
o p p o r t u n i t y t o a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r T h e "Queen h e r s e l f was
at tho additional
Her Majesty f e l t
risk
involved
a n x i e t y about
should b e r a i s e d t o
it.
in a f l i g h t
it,
of
t h i s nature;
I t would b e p r e f e r a b l e
.
informal
consulta­
t I o n w i t h H e r M a j e s t y T h e Queen, n o
objection
need b e r a i s e d t o t h e s u g g e s t i o n
H.R.H.
.
that
t h e Duke o f E d i n b u r g h s h o u l d f l y
h e l i c o p t e r f r o m t h e d e c k o f an a i r c r a f t
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
6th A p r i l ,
S.V. ,l.
1956.
r
no
objection
.
to this
a
carrier.
take
unless
'
subject
ground^
concerned
but,
that
The Cabinet Agreed that,
of
HOST Cffi-IFIDEI-TTIAL RECORD
CABINET
C M . (56) 39th
( 5 t h June,
Conclusions 1956 - 1 1 . 0 0
a.m.)
THE PRTxE MINISTER s a i d t h a t ,
i n s t a n c e s w h i c h had come t o M s
i s s u e some, g e n e r a ] , g u i d a n c e
holding o f f i c e ,
scheme
of
i n v i e w of
one
o r two
i t w o u l d b e n e c e s s a r y f o r him
to participate
i n the
helpful
g u i d a n c e s h o u l d b e g i v e n on t h i s
t o know w h a t p e r s o n a l p r o b l e m s
He w o u l d t h e r e f o r e
be g l a d
if
of
this
a n y member o f
had o c c a s i o n t o c o n s i d e r w h a t a c t i o n h e s h o u l d h i m s e l f
of
Cabinet,
t h i s kind would
a note of
a situation.
send t o h i m ,
Whip w e r e making s i m i l a r
of
p o i n t he w o u l d
C a b i n e t who had
through the S e c r e t a r y
of
pension
the
of
The Prime M i n i s t e r
Ministers
and t h e
such
Chief
of C a b i n e t r a n k and
s a i d t h a t , when a l l
the
of
relevant
he would d e c i d e what g e n e r a l guidance
should
issued,
THE LORD P R I V Y SEAL s a i d t h a t h e h o p e d i t w o u l d b e
possible
t o cover the
contributions
type
t o a firrp.'s
of
c a s e i n w h i c h i t was d e s i r e d
type of
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
. 5 T H JUNE,
case c o u l d b e c o v e r e d ,
S.W.1.
1956.
that
the Minister held
P r o m t h e e n q u i r i e s w h i c h h e had a l r e a d y made,
this
found
p e n s i o n scheme s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o b e
b o t h b y t h e M i n i s t e r and b y t h e f i r m , w h i l e
if
actually
t a k e about
the two Houses o f P a r l i a m e n t
enquiries
i n f o r m a t i o n was a v a i l a b l e ,
be
office.
a n y a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h h e had made t o d e a l w i t h
The L e a d e r s
junior Ministers.
while
k i n d had
the
it
seemed l i k e l y
few d i f f i c u l t i e s
to
pension
a f i r m w i t h w h i c h he was a s s o c i a t e d b e f o r e h e t o o k
arisen.
rights
particular
on t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a M i n i s t e r ,
could properly continue
In deciding that general
find i t
notice,
would
paid,
office.
that,
arise.
TOP SECRET
0 . 0 . ( 5 7 ) 11th Conclusions
(15th February," 1 9 5 7 ­ 11
MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD
IRON AND
STEEL
INDUSTRY
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t
of
the productive capacity
three-quarters
o f t h e i r o n and
i n d u s t r y h a d now b e e n d e - n a t i o n a l i s e d , ,
(Previous
References:
C O . (53) 2nd
Conclusions,
M i n u t e 11
and
steel
The
q u a r t e r i n c l u d e d the S t e e l
Company o f W a l e s ,
assets
Conditions
o f £114
millions.
remaining
with
w e r e now
C M . (56) 37th
favourable
Conclusions,
M i n u t e 10)
This
for the sale of
of the s t e e l
Steel Realisation
to
this
o p e r a t i o n would e n t a i l no i n t e r r u p t i o n
development
\
the e q u i t y of
arrange t o
for
as n e c e s s a r y t h e
of the
of
controversy
this
undertaken
approved
It
was, however,
w i t h the Government's
declared policyj
a postponement
of
large
Company
about the
industry generally.
unlikely that
the
Company.
The d e - n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n
might r e v i v e p o l i t i c a l
of
t h e I r o n and
and H o l d i n g s A g e n c y had
finance
development plans
industry,
Company.
in
steel
accordance
and i t
the s a l e would
t h e O p p o s i t i o n t o abandon a n y i n t e n t i o n s
they
have of r e - n a t i o n a l i s i n g
In
the industry.
was
influenc
might
these
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , he p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e s a l e s h o u l d b e
J?
authorised.
The Cabinet
-
A g r e e d t h a t t h e I r o n and S t e e l
and H o l d i n g s
A g e n c y s h o u l d now b e
authorised t o dispose of
S t e e l Company o f W a l e s , ,
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
16th
S.W.1.,
February,
Realisation
1957.
the equity
of
the
333 egJg^gggSffl RECORD (C.0.(57)
19th-Conclusions) (14th M a r c h , 1957 - 10.00 a . m ; ) THE FOREIGN SECRETARY s a i d
that H . M . Ambassador a t W a s h i n g t o n had r e p o r t e d ( i n W a s h i n g t o
t e l e g r a m N o . 628) t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Government had
b e e n i n f o r m e d b y t h e F r e n c h Government t h a t t h e F r e n c h
m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s were concerting plans w i t h the
B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s t o provide a i r cover f o r I s r a e l i
troops i f
I s r a e l r e o c c u p i e d Gaza and i f E g y p t
h e l p , bombed I s r a e l i
considered that
cities.
9
with Russi
The United S t a t e s
Governrne
any assurances, o f support f o r I s r a e l
encourage the I s r a e l i
Government t o t a k e p r e m a t u r e
migh
action
and. w e r e a n x i o u s t h a t we s h o u l d r e f r a i n f r o m g i v i n g a n y
undertakings of t h i s
kind.
So f a r as'.we knew, t h e r e was no f o u n d a t i o n f o r
these reports;
but before
framing
our r e p l y t o t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s Government i t w o u l d b e w i s e t o a s c e r t a i n f r o m t h e
F r e n c h Government how t h e y had o r i g i n a t e d , .
H . M . Ambassa
i n P a r i s h a d b e e n i n s t r u c t e d t o make t h e n e c e s s a r y
e n q u i r i e s as a m a t t e r o r urgency.
'
The Cabinet-
-
- . '
Took n o t e o f t h i s
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
S.W.1.,
14th M a r c h , 1957*.
, /'
statement.
.
1
MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD
C.C.(57) 5 1 s t
Conclusions
( - l l t h J u l y 1957
JUKE OP
IfflDSOR
11.00
a.m.)
THE PRIME MINISTER r e c a l l e d t h a t s e l e c t e d documents
from the captured a r c h i v e s
(Previous Reference: lfc.C.(54) 84th
Conclusions).
-.
of
t h e f o r m e r German M i n i s t r y
for
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s w e r e b e i n g p u b l i s h e d under t h e a u t h o r i t y o f
Governments o f
the
t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , U n i t e d S t a t e s and P r a n c e *
V o l u m e X o f t h i s s e r i e s was t o i n c l u d e a number o f
documents
d e s c r i b i n g t h e a p p r o a c h e s 7/hich German a g e n t s had made t o t h e Duke
o f W i n d s o r i n S p a i n and P o r t u g a l i n 1940.
I n 1954 t h e
Cabinet
had d e c i d e d t h a t i t w o u l d b e i m p r a c t i c a b l e t o p r e v e n t o r t o
the publication
of t h e s e documents;
but S i r Winston Churchill
S i r Anthony Eden had s u b s e q u e n t l y a g r e e d ,
and
at the suggestion o f
Duke o f W i n d s o r , t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f p u b l i c a t i o n t h e
the
Government
s h o u l d i s s u e a s t a t e m e n t d e s i g n e d t o put t h e docoments i n
perspective.
delay
proper
T h e r e l e v a n t V o l u m e vra.s t o b e p u b l i s h e d on 29th J u l y ,
both i n the United States
and i n t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m .
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t ,
a f t e r going i n t o the matter
a f r e s h , h e and t h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y w e r e b o t h s a t i s f i e d t h a t
it
would be r i g h t f o r
lines
t h e Government t o i s s u e a s t a t e m e n t on t h e
previously contemplated.
proposed
He r e a d t o t h e C a b i n e t a d r a f t
of
the
statement.
I n d i s c u s s i o n t h e r e was g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t t h a t a
on t h e s e l i n e s
s h o u l d b e i s s u e d on t h e G p v e r n m e n f s b e h a l f
statement
at
the
t i m e when t h i s V o l u m e o f t h e c a p t u r e d German d o c u m e n t s was p r i b l i s h e d . ,
Some m i n o r a d j u s t m e n t s
of the d r a f t were suggested.
The P r i m e
Mini3t
s a i d t h a t o n t h e s e h e w o u l d s e e k t h e v i e w s o f L o r d M o n c k t o n , who was
advising
t h e Duke o f W i n d s o r i n t h i s
matter.
( l )
The C a b i n e t
­
Agreed
on t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f
that,
this
V o l u m e o f c a p t u r e d German d o c u m e n t s , a
statement should be i s s u e d on b e h a l f
of
Government on t h e l i n e s
vhich
had b e e n r e a d t o
( 2 )
of the draft
them.
I n v i t e d the Prime M i n i s t e r t o
terras o f
this
the
statement
settle
after
the
final,
consultation
w i t h L o r d Monokton.
(3)
Took n o t e t h a t
s t e p s had a l r e a d y b e e n taken
i n f o r m The. Q u e e n , t h e Queen M o t h e r ,
o f Y/indsor and S i r W i n s t o n C h u r c h i l l
to
t h e Duke
of
the
i m p e n d i n g p u b l i c a t i o n o f . t h i s V o l u m e and o f
terms
of
t h e Government s t a t e m e n t w h i c h i t
proposed to i s s u e at
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
12th J u l y ,
S.T7.1 .
1957.
the time o f
its
the
was
publicationo
78
2QP S335SET
CABJ3IE2
l l ^ O g j ^ S i a . ' ! ^ EECQKD
(6th. September, 3.257 ** 5*15 p*s&n)
The Cabinet had before than: a note by the Brims £liz&ster
on the situation i n - S y r i a , togethes? with I t e e i g n 0f2S.ee telegrssn
Koa 3370 of 28th August t o Washington and telegrams No. 1728 ana 1729
o f 5th Sept-saber from Washington.
5HS PRIME ICCHI3TER informed the Cabinet t h a t i n the l i g h t
s
o f the&r e a r l i e r discussion o f this situation, he had sent a personal
message t o the United States Secretary of S t a t s , Mr, D u l l e s , outlining
the implications of the alternative p o l i c i e s of retrieving the situatio
by d i r e c t intervention o r a t t e s t i n g t o contain I t by preventing
CoKHJunist
i n f i l t r a t i o n from spreading beyond the borders of Syria
s
Vbf'4 Dulles had subsequently made i t clear t h a t , i n the opinion of the
United States Government^ a poMey o f eontaiment v/ould bs l i a b l e t o bfi
i n e f f e c t i v e and that^ unless Ears e f f e c t i v s steps could be taken t o
remedy the situation^ Syrians immediate nei^ibciurs would probably f a l l
i n rapid succession, while Turkey w o l d be l e f t i n a dangerously
i s o l a t e d positions
He therefore inclined t o the view that action
should be taken now t o r e t r i e v e the situation before i t was too l a t e ,
despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s end dangers vMoh stash action would involireo
He intended t o discuss t h i 3 proposal v&th President Eisenhower on the
following day and had asked f o r a very early indication of our o m
views,,
There could be no question of the Cabinet *s reaching a f i n a l
decision on this natter at the present time.
I t would f i r s t he
necessary to obtain from H.H. representatives i n the countries
concerned an independent assessment of resent developments i n the
Mddle East, and t o explore i n greater d e t a i l with the United States
Goverraaent the fonn o f the action dhich might be taken and the possibles
TOP SSSRST
consequences f o r the Wests
I t would be isspoiJtsntj however, that these
discussions should not r e f l e c t any reluctance en our part t o take
advantage of t h i s opportunity t o establish betssssn the United States
end ourselves a ussity of p o l i c y and action i n the Middle Easts
Such
an opportuniiy might not recur f o r a vexy long time and i t would be
f
unwise to neglect i t , provided that the implications o f the action
envisaged had been thoroughly explored i n e&vssce
that both
Governments were convinced of the wisdom of tbs £cdh$ palicya
Mr* !&uHesi appeared t o be acting a t the moment l a r g e l y cn h i s &m
initiativej
and i t was not c l e a r how f a r M s p o l i c y would eossaBd
the approval o f President ELsenteowsa?' and the support o f h i s colleagues
i n the United States Goveraments
2 t was important, therefore
9
to
establish v&iether President Eisenhower was prepared t o endorse this
policy with his personal authority,)
. In' discussion there was general agreement that i t was
becoming increasingly urgent t o arrest fee process o f Soviet
subversion i n the Middle East.
Recent experience had however, shewa
9
that i t was d i f f i c u l t f o r a democracy to iraolflsaait i t s p o l i c y by force
without incurring the eondoanation of world opinion!
end the United
States Government should not be encouraged t o suppose that an act of
intervention, i n Syria would be accepted by the United nations as
r e a d i l y as they appeared t o expect.
Moreover, i t would be important
to agree with the United States Government the ultimate objective o f
any action t o r e t r i e v e the situation in Syria and the form o f the
permanent settlement of the Middle East which should result from such
action.
In any event i t might be desirable t h a t , as a preliminary,
the Middle Eastern States should be encouraged and assisted t o
establish a egrdiqn ssy&tgirq round Syria, and that Hur&wes-Ssld ghoulc
i f possible, resume the leadership of the Government of Iraq,.
The
situation might be further reinforced i f the United States could be
persuaded t o become a f u l l £Bember o f the Bagdad P a s t .
TOP SBC8SC I f and when i t
was agreed that farther action should be un&estataip i t would be
necessary t o consider carefully the occasion and the means,, and the
possible reaction o f the Soviet Union.
I t would also be necessary t o
decide hoar f a r i t wouia be expedient that the United SS&ngtou should be
actively involved,,
2!HE EKEME MIMESIER said that, i n the Sight of this
preliminary discussion, he weald send a further message to Mro Dulles
indicating t h a t , i f his proposals represented the approved p o l i c y Of
the United States Goverraient, ws om-selves would he disposed i n
prinoiplQ to support them, but thatj, before the Cabinet Could be
expected to reach a f i m decision^ i t would be necessary f o r them t o
be explored i n more details
United Ungdcam representatives would be
ready t o proceed to Washington f o r this purpose i n the near future.
I t sight subsequently be desirable that he should himself diseus3 the
matter -with President Elsenhower.
5?he Cabinet ­
( i )
fook note that the Prime Minister would send a £tether message t o the United States Secretary o f State oa. the l i n e s which he had indicated. (2) Sock note that the Prise minister would arrange tor H.M. representatives i n the countries concerned to be instructed t o furnish, as a matter of urgency, t h e i r own appreciation of recent developments i n S^rria and the probable oonaequeneos i f no action was taken t o arrsst the increasing Soviet penetration of that country. (3)
Invited the Ccesaoiavealth Secretary t o consider ham f a r , and at what point, i t would be desirable t o consult certain other members of the Commonwealth on this m a t t e r Cabinet O f f i c e
9
S.W.1*
7th September, 195?
2 0 P STBOBSTA.
CABU32T
most c q - M n a s r i A L hfcord­
C . C . ( 5 ? ) 6 5 t h Conclusions
(10th September, 1 3 5 7 - 1 1 . 0 0 a*m )
s
The Cabinet had before than ieleg^saa No* 1745 ot
.
:
" 7 t h Septeffiher^
175S o f
8 t h Sept-saber and I 7 S 4 t o
X?*S9 o f
9 t h September f r o m Weshlngton together v i t h foreign Office telegrssss
Ho, 3546 and 3547 o f 9 t h September t e Washingtona
2KB PRIME MINISTER said that the United States C-overnsent
had now elaborated t h e i r Middle East p o l i c y i n the fossa o f the
memorandum contained i n Y/ashington telegram ITOo 1 7 4 5 *
he assured o f our support f o r this p o l i c y
3
I f
they,could
they proposed t o instruct
t h e i r representatives i n Turkey, Xraq I s r a e l Lebanon and Jordan t o
9
p
communicate orally to the Governments o f those countries the action
which the United States would be prepared t o take i n certain
eventualities a
Their proposals envisaged financial and m i l i t a r y
assistance f o r these States i n the event of either overt or subversiv
action by Syria designed t o destroy t h e i r indeps&i&snce, together with
an undertaking t o meet any request f o r the use o f United States araied
forces i n the event o f Intervention by the Sino-Soviet bloc, e i t h e r
d i r e c t l y or through the organisation o f "volunteers" *
I n ecnjn^iting us about these proposals the United States
Government had shown an encouraging desires t o re-establish the close
.Anglo*Ams2rican co-operation ishieh had e x i s t e d during the war. I t was
c l e a r l y i n our interests t o encourage t h i s tendency*
As a result o f
the Cabinet's previous discussion the United States Secretary of Stats
had been informed that we were i n p r i n c i p l e i n agreement v l t b tfee
general p o l i c y which the United States intended t o adopt.
I t was now
necessary t o consider the terms I n which the United States proposed
that t h i s p o l i c y should be ecrssmdeated t o the Governments o f the
w
SOP SECBSB
82 TOP SECRET
Middle East States consemedj p a r t i c u l a r s i n those eases i n -sMsh
they intended t o say $hat tse had been consulted and v?8re i n eaaplete
agreement with t h e i r proposals.,
as
extent t o vMch i t . would be necessary JEtor the united
Kingdcni t o he a c t i v e l y associated' with the iaplensentatioA of these
proposals -would he a matter f o r subsequent discussion
States (kweaOTsent*
y&th' jfche' United
They had agreed that t h e i r meraorandus should he
regarded merely as a marking paper and had a t no fcjase enquired TsSiat
action we should he prepared t o talae ourselves i n the event of
h o s t i l i t i e s breaking out i n the Middle East*
asked however$ hy the
9
saddle East
We shpi&d undoubtedly "be
Governments concerned, particularly
Turkey and Iraq^ how Tar we wsre prepared t o give active support t o
-fee United States poliicy and vSiat forsa t h i s support Bright take.
The three main issues an. which the Cabinet should reach
clear decisions werej therefore, whether we should support the United
States proposals as elaborated i n t h e i r recent msnoran&umj
Aether
we eridoi^ssd the terms i n which these proposals were t o he oaaaaunicated
t o the Middle East Governments concerned!
and t o ishat extent we
should oosssit ourselves t o participate i n implementing thsasi.
THE V088LW SBSBESMSE said-that the main ohcsLCe l e y between
attempting t o contain the situation i n Syria or retrieving i t by laora
d i r e c t actxon
An e f f e c t i v e p o l i c y of containment would be d i f f i c u l t
0
i n view of the weakness of the neighbouring States tsbich would b e
primarily responsible for carrying i t out.
The r i g h t course
s
therefore
woulS be t o support the United States preferences f o r digest action,
Xt was encoura^ng that the United States -were prepared t o inSerprat
the definition of aggression undsr -Article 51 of -Sue United Nations
Charter as including acts of subversion by Syria and the esployaent
of Siao-Soviet
volunteers"
ft
i n any hostiliis.es which sight develop^
I n the proposed coosaunication to fee Turkish Government, however the
t
united States undertook to support Turkey i f the l a t t e r f e l t compelled
d
- 2 -
TOF SEC3H3E? t o react t o armed provocations which implied a serious throat t o her
csainational i n t e g r i t y ana independence,
This o f f e r saa&e the e f f e c t i v e
decision l a r g e l y - i f not wholly, dependent on en act o f ^udgmsnt "by
e
the Turkish Government themselvess.
They would certainly wish t o know
usnether we ware prepared t o give a cemjparable undertakings
2n discussion the following points were made?­
(a)
She United States instructions t o t h e i r representatives i n
the Middle East countries concerned contemplated that only i n the case
o f Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon would i t be e x p l i c i t l y stated that the
United States had consulted the United Kingdom and that we were i n
complete agreement with t h e i r p o l i c y ,
£here were certain advantages
in not disclosing too widely the extent t o which we were acting i n
f u l l collaboration with the United States Government i n this matters
I t would be open t o us t o take separate action i n Jordan and l a r a e l
t o indicate our general support of the United States proposals without
revealing the extent of our e a r l i e r consultation with the United States
(b)
She United States memorandum of policy (Washington telegram
No. 1745) indicated t h a t , i f any of S y r i a ' 3 Arab neighbours, responding
to provocation;, took action under A r t i c l e 51 of the Charter o f
fee
United Nations, the United States would, upon request and pursuant t o
the Middle East Eesolwtlon approved by Congress, extend to such
countries eeenomiQ and m i l i t a r y assistances
I t was arguable that t h i s
conceded the i n i t i a t i v e too f a r t o countries which conoid not
necessarily be trusted t o act with a due sense of responsibility sad
that i t would' be desirable that the decision on fee cclrcamstaness which
would $ r a t i f y the provision o f such assistance should be reserved more
s t r i c t l y t o the United States end ourselves.
On the other hand, the
terms of the United States draft ccsajunicat&on t o fee Governments
cancerned indicated that the United States intended i n the event o f
l o c a l h o s t i l i t i e s between Sysia and one or more of fee neighbouring
States, t o confine their assistance t o m i l i t a r y supplies and that feeis?
84 SO? SECHES?
eoamifcaent to use United States sussed forces would "be limited t o
eircurastauees i n which the Sino-Soviet bjlog had mads a direct attack
on any of the countries concerned or had organised the provision o f
"volunteers" f o r t h i s purpose.
In these circucnatances the United
States statement o f intention could probably be aoceptecU . But, althc
the i n i t i a l Intervention o f the United States might be confined t o
the supply of &rms i t would be impossible f o r than, once they were
9
engaged to t h i s e x t e n t , t o allow the countries at war with Syria t o
ba defeated^ even i f t h i s required the active participation of Unite?
States forceso
Although the United States Goveraaftsnt d i d not b e l i e f
that the Soviet Union would deliberately seek t o ecsnand a Middle Bas1
c o n f l i c t i n t o a global wary a progressive extension of the area of
h o s t i l i t i e s was a r i s k which its must take i n t o account i n formulating
our own p o l i c y .
(c)
I t was essential that the position of the United Kingdom
sad the United States should, from the outset, be c l e a r l y stated i n
terms o f international law*
We should j o i n t l y maintain, that a State ­
was not necessarily precluded from taking action t o defend i t s e l f unt
i t s enemy had openly -resorted t o the use of f c r e e
9
Aggression could
r i g h t l y be interpreted as including a c l e a r intention on the part o f
the enemy t o take iasoinent aggressive action.
I t could also be i n t e r
preted as including internal subversion no less than external attack.
She proposed United States undertaking t o
Suzkey t o provide assistant
i f ihQ Turkish Government f e l t compelled t o react t o armed provocatloi
should, therefore $ be construed as requiring the Turkish Gowmaont
t o s a t i s f y the United States and ourselves that they were genuinely
the victims of. provocations
and t o t h i s extent the terms i n which
the United States proposed t o communicate t h e i r intentions t o the
Turkish Government would not give the l a t t e r an unfettered discretion
to invoke United States assistance.-
EQP SEGKEJ
TOP SEGEE2 (d)
The ultimate consequences o f the United
unpredictable.
States policy were
I t was perhaps unlikely that any of the neighbouring
States would regard the United States proposals as on open invitation
t o embark on h o s t i l i t i e s with Syria.
Those proposals' might, indeed,.
result i n l i t t l e more than a containment o f Syria.
On the other hand,
i n the event o f h o s t i l i t i e s breaking out, the Soviet Union sight reast
hy direct intervention and open warfare between the United States and
the Soviet TMon ExLght results
I t could not he assumed that i n t h i s
event the United Kingdom, i f unreservedly associated with the United
States, would have the unanimous support of the CcnmoniBealth or that
the Soviet Union would r e f r a i n from attacking t h i s country.
For these
reasons i t would he desirable that our support f o r the United States
should, as f a r as possible, bo described t o the countries concerned i n
terms of our intention t o f u l f i l cur obligations under the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.O.) and the Bagdad Pacto
I t would,
however, be important tliat we should not appear t o be half-hearted i n
our endorsement of the United States p d i c y j
and H.M. representatives
i n the countries concerned should make i t c l e a r that that policy had
our f u l l support, although wa should need t o take p o l i t i c a l considera­
tions i n t o account i n deciding the form vhich that support might take
at any particular ^xaicturee
(e)
The public presentation o f our ease would need careful
consideration i n due course *
The draft of a suitable public statement
should be prepared and agreed with the United States Govemmento
This
would afford a convenient opportunity f o r emphasising the extent t o
vshich our endorsefaent of action by the United States would be i n
conformity with our obligations under H.A.T.O. and the Bagdad Pact.
- (f )
- .The reaction of the Soviet Union t o the United states p o l i c y
might take the form of fomenting disturbanoes i n areas other than the
Middle East,,
An assessment should be made of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f
suoh action..
TOP SEOEHC
The Cabinet ­
( l )
Took note that the Prime Minister would inform
the United States Government t h a t , subject t o
amendment on points of d e t a i l , the statement
of United States policy i n Washington telegram
. Hoa 1745 of 7th September was endorsed by
Her Ma5esty s Government.
f
( 2 )
Invited the Foreign Secretary t o arrange f o r
,
Ho Mo representatives i n ,the Saddle East countries
concerned to convey o r a l l y t o the Governments t o
whom they were accredited an assurance that the
United States p o l i o y had our f u l l support,
although the form which this support might take
. at any particular juncture would need t o be
decided i n the l i g h t of the p o l i t i c a l considerations
relevant at the time.
(5)
Invited the Foreign Secretary t o circulate an
appreciation of the possible reaction o f the
Soviet Union to t h i s United States policy i n areas
other than the Middle East.
Cabinet O f f i c e , S V / l
0
o
0
10th September, 195?
87
TOP SECRET
CABINET
MOST C WIDl^yiALJpLQPI^ Ci,G,,(57) 6Sth Conclusions,. Minute 2 ( l ? t h September, 1257 - 3*00 p ra ) e
Ilk
Previous
Terence:
c.(57) 65th
ta&usions)
e
THE PEDJE S5UJISTES said that there had been a general
welcome, in the Middle East countries concerned, f o r the
comnmnications about the Joint p o l i c y of the United States and
the United Kingdom for dealing with the situation in Syria which
the Cabinet had approved in e a r l i e r discussions
9
The f i r s t steps
towards containing the situation in Syria had thus been taken.
The development o f any further plans f o r retrieving this situation
depended on discussions which were talcing place between the
Foreign Secretary end the United States Secretary of State in
New York.
Following discussions in t h i s country Nuri-es^Said had .
agreed to return t o Bagdad with a view to entering the Iraqi
Government, either as Minister o f Defence or as Deputy Prime
Minister
0
He had also agreed t h a t , i n certain circumstances,
i t would be desirable that he should himself assume the
leadership of the I r a q i Government.
The Cabinet Took note of the Prime Minister's statements
Cabinet Office, B.W.1.
18th September, 1957
TOP SECRET
CABINET
MOST
f^agm.^IAtJSSCOi^
(11th March,
JICAL
- 11.00 a.Eu)
!SiE PBB3E MUSISSSH suggested feat fee Cabinet siiould review
fee
micm
p o l i t i c a l situation.
The Covernrent had done w e l l to weather the p o l i t i c s !
storms o f the past year.
Bust they **- and fee country * were now confronted
with' a d i f f i c u l t and b a f f l i n g s i t u a t i o n .
He could not remember a time when
a Government was faced with so many intractable problems i
On the home front fee Governments popularity was waning - as was
natural a f t e r s i x years i n o f f i c e .
They i?ouLd have a d i f f i c u l t time i n the
forthcoming by-elections - not because o f any revival o f Liberalism, but
because of the widespread f e e l i n g of frustration and indifference among
Conservatives.
i t was arguable feat fee Government should m to the country
and put their position to fee t e s t .
The long-testa interests o f
fee
Conservative. Party would certainly cot bo served i f the Government appeared
to be clinging t o o f f i c e , without certainty o f purpose, as BalfOur*s
Government had done in fee dcya before fee great Liberal v i c t o r y of 1^06.
Some people were already saying feat i t would be b e t t e r f o r fee Government
to resign now, before they l o s t further £round, so that, fecy might be i n a
stronger position t o win the next Election but one a f t e r a farther period
Of Labour r u l e .
The international scene was equally grim.
l a feia country public
opinion i n favour of a meeting o f Heads Of Government Was gathering f o r c e .
But fee diplomatic exchanges in preparation f o r i t were not going forward as
quickly or as constructively as feey might.
We could not alone secure
feat
the meeting took place - and our A l l i e s were leas favourably disposed towards
i t than we were.
I n the Middle East fee situation was worsening.
King Send,
on whom fee United States Government placed so much r e l i a n c e , seemed l i k e l y
f
to prove a broken reed.
We ourselves ware
COKJPQUGCI
by circumstances
t o lend our support to jcegtxaes v&ilah. were obsolete, decadent sad reactionary ­
and, oa the other s i d e , the tide o f nationalists was sunning f a s t .
the situation i n Indonesia ma deteriorating.
I n Asia
Events theses suggested that t
United States had been Mistaken i n pressing the Butch to withdraw too soon
and too f a s t .
In Korth Africa we faced a dileraraa.
I f "fee persuaded the Franc
to tait&arsw prematurely, as the United States wished, Cfcsaaanisa taight-gaia
a foothold there, as i t had i n Indonesia.
I f , on tfoo ether hand
?
m
encouraged the ffench t o stay, they might wall pursue reactionary p o l i c i e s
which would provoke a v i o l e n t reactions
In Europe we had no certainty o f
being able t o maintain our fox-ces i n Gerraanyj
and, i f ws rare obliged to
wlthidraw thesa, the Hcrih Atlantic Alliance would crumble.
Finally^ i n
our Oolcnial Empire, \ve faced intractable situations i n Cyprus and i n M&ltso
She (kwernment had two p o l i t i c a l alternatives - to persevere u n t i l
the end of the present Parliaments
or to seek a fresh mandate from the
e l e c t o r a t e , and risk p o l i t i c a l defeat *
He himself favoured the f i r s t course.
But, i f the Government were to follow i t , they must do so i n the confidence
that t h e i r p o l i c i e s vrauld succeed and that some at least Viould bear f r u i t
before the end of the present Parliament.
On the important issuer they
must show resolution and certainty o f jjurpose.
At the ssme time, however,
they sust be ready in other matters to avoid unnecessary unpopularity.
Shear moot make greater e f f o r t s to secure a wider taoaefure o f popular support,
WB HOME SSCBSSAB3C said that he had no Soubt that the right course
was f o r the Government t o persevera under the. Prime Minister a leadership.
4
1'hay vasva at present parsing through a d i f f i c u l t transitional stags:
they
needed another year in order to get over the worst period o f the P.ent /sot
and the Agriculture B i l l s .
Similarly
9
in economic a f f a i r s , they needed
time in order that t h e i r p o l i c i e s might bear f r u i t
be mads i n the Budget of 1 9 5 9 *
e
Concessions could then
On defence p o l i c y and disastaemesit they must
either succeed i n obtaining some easing o f -international tension o r , i f that
could not be secured, they must bring public opinion round to f a c e , unitedly,
tbe military r i s k s ,
For that again more time was needed.
5HS 1/m CHAHCBILOa agreed with t h i s vie?/.
Tie believed that the
Govenssenfs p o l i c i e s vmv& sound, and time would prove thia
In ec^craie
affairs \& now had a better chance than ever before to achieve a period of
s t a b i l i t y in wages and p r i c e s .
ilse Sent Act would, in time, be shown to
fee & sound xma&u&*' i n foreign a f f a i r s tae needed "time
present Isyatarieal mood o f pacifisms,
t$iich to w a r tern
Balfcu3?*s SovessBssait^.' t o
ishich the
Prime Minister had referred^ was divided on a great n a t i o n o f principles
bat the Ministers who had resigned from the present Goverwaeht had gone on
matters o f d e t a i l *
On a l l iguestioas o f principle the Government ws&'- m i t e
They were, at one i n t h e i r confidence i n the p o l i c i e s which they were pursui
3SB CQmmmO/m
mmrnSX^ tSJife agreeing with t h i s , said that tine.
Government sasst use a l l the techniques o f p u b l i c i t y t o convince the public
that their p o l i c i e s were eounoV
Be also made Ihe point that, although the
Governments popularity was waning^ there was no evidence o f any increasing
desire for- a S o c i a l i s t Government * a t recent by-elections the majority "of
votes had been cast i n favour o f s n t i * 3 o c i a l i s t candidatess.
But the results
o f future by-elections were l i k e l y t o be unfavourable and, as a ' r e s u l t o f the
recession i n the United States, the l e v e l o f uaempioyisjsiit i n this country
might wall r i s e i n 195?*
Therefore* i f useful results flossed from t&e
forthcoming Com&soawgalth Economic Conference o r from a meeting o f Heads o f
Government, he would not himself exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y o f seeking a fresh
mandate from the electorate before the end o f the present Parliasaents
That being soo he was inclined t o think that the Gbverraient should^ from
now on, lose no epportuniiy of increasing their" popularity i n the country,,
THE
CBSSKSSUXSt
Of TEE
saaassOER
said that we were now on the verge,
o f getting the national econoxayCbhto6 a sounder' state than i t had been at
;
any time since- the end o f the war*
I t w o l d he ferong t o throw that chance
^rsy by adopting "popular" p o l i c i e s too soon.
consumers was s t i l l highj
The purchasing
of
and, i f existing p o l i c i e s r/ero reversed "too soon^
a further i n f l a t i o n might e a s i l y be s t a r t e d .
He was s a t i s f i e d that the r i s k s
o f relaxing too soon were much greater than those o f relaxing a l i t t l e too l a
He agreed that t3ie Government \wjld be i n p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s in the months
ahead, ' Sesenhaent a t the result o f the eusrent'"review o f farm prices would
continue f o r some jaonths.
She Agriculture B i l l s , on the other hand, were
l i k e l y to Cause more d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Parliament than in the country.
WSi
Wm
&mznms
said that the Government vould c e r t a i n l y he an
sough water i n the months ahead.
Six isonths ago he had hoped that public
opinion v/ould Ijy now have Tbeg^m t o £swing i n favour o f the Gove*paent*
now clear that there was no prospect o f such' a srcing in 1958.
I t tsas
Sosae argued
that the position of the Conservative Party -would be strengthened in. the
l o n g f t e m i f the Coverraaent went to the country without farther delay.
i n his Judgaentj vaaa asalstaken view,
Shia*
She iaterssatioaal situation staSft i t
essential f o r the present Governsaent t o remain i n o f f i c e , even i f this Involve
SOBSO
risk to the long^ter-s p o s i t i o n o f the Party
I f aa Election wsre held
9
now, he b e l i e v e d that the Labour Party would win i t . even though the ,.
. 3sa3ority of the t o t a l votes cast %-ere a n t i - S o c i a l i s t . . Such a result would^
i n his opinion, he rjost damaging to the national interest - f i r s t , because
o f i t s e f f e c t on the international situation?
end, secondly, because. .
confidence i n s t e r l i n g w u l d be eo greatly shaken that the Labour Government
Bfould be obliged to int;rcouce extrerae
!
Erasures
of economic c o n t r o l ,
these reasons he strongly supported fee Prlrae Mnistos! a. view t h a t the '
,,
Governments duty was to continue i n o f f i c e u n t i l near the end o f the pzesent
Parliament.
fHB PHESUKSJ5T CO? 2HS BG&RD 01? TRAE& said that the national economy
was i n a healthier state than was generally supposed.
Vthen
the time came
t o $elax r e s t r i c t i v e p o l i c i e s , the r i g h t course would be to do so on a
selective basis.
tor
I t was ^ r t h considering whether i t would not be advisable
the Ckwernsaeat t o announee i n advance what specific relaxations w u l d
b e made i f a deflationary situation developed.
iEhsse should, i n £he jaai%
* be sseasures d i r e c t l y related t o l o c a l uae^lo;pient,
Such an announcement
would have a reassuring e f f e c t and would help to convince the public that
the Government were in control o f the s i t u a t i o n .
I t aadj^it also be useful i f
the Govemojent could take a new i n i t i a t i v e towards the r e m v e l of s t r a t e g i c
- controls on trade with fee s o v i e t M o o , '
4a. ^Magiswsr. -aove i n that directioat
saight give a l e a d to public opinion throughout the ^ree World and sight help
to divert public attention £ma the controversy about nuclear c a p o n s ,
F i n a l l y , he suggested, that the Govemwont should deoide whether i t was t o
t h e i r advantage -that an agreement on the eatablishaent o f a Suropesaa
-Area should be reached before the next Slection^
S'ra
I f fee negotiations were
to be brought to a conclusion before tha% i t Ed&ht be necessary f o r us to
find some means of resolving our p o l i t i c a l £ i f f i c u l t i e s with the Stench
(over Iforth A f r i c a ) said the Germans (over support c o s t s ) *
.
:
. 5333 Q&IJ&mh SEBB&m& said that i t msuld be highly undesirable fas?
the Government to go to the country a t the height o f the can"ftroveray over
agricultural p o l i c i e s and at a time Tshsn no solution o f fee Colonial problems
in Cyprus mid &!&!ta ^?as y e t I n eighty
S ! i i s i n his view, rulod oat the
s
p o s s i b i l i t y o f an Election in 1953*
3322
CP SKABSSt)ai? agreed that the Govesrsment must centime in
o f f i c e u n t i l nearer tine end o f the Parliament.
2ut^, i f they were to do m$
Ohtagr saiat make further e f f o r t s t o unite t h e i r supporters, i n Parliement end
i n the country^
Witfc this in view he had three suggestions to make. . F i r s t ,
i t w u l d be useful i f the Cabinet Could hold further frank discussions,
o f the p o l i t i c a l situation froa time to time.
Secondly, a l l Hinlsters
i n charge o f Departments might be asked to consider whether there were any
practical measures within t h e i r sapheee o f jresponsihiXity -shlch rd^it-help
to encourage end unite -the Government's :0Upporters* , S f c & * a i y * the CJovsrnment
should avoid being forced i n t o a defensive positions
t h e i r supporters
.
would be greatly encouraged i f they went over to the offensive and took a
more aggressive p o l i t i c a l l i n e .
, SIS
' .
WMSSm. W EfSKEJRCS said t h a t , m be saw i t . there isere only tw*
s
possible solutions v/hieh tsouXd j u s t i f y en early £ l e c t i o n - ( 1 ) i f Uie GoveriSBorfi
achieved some outstanding $success in t t e international sphere; - o r ( i l )
i t become d e e r that there w u l d be tdden^read unsmploy^aont i n
if
1959* He was
concerned a t the wave of p a c i f i s t f e e l i n g tftiich was sweeping over tJje c o u n t y
Be believed that t h i s could only bo checked by convincing the public that
1*ic Government ware, si&oerely and purposefully seeking international agreement
on dteamaaent*
& conclusive reason f o r ^ f e r r i n g an appeal to the electorate
was the growing influence -svhieh the Prime Minister himself was essereising
on public opinion,.
This weo one of the Covermiienfa most valuable assets.
Time was needed to allovr i t to develop to the f u l l *
THE XEBISTKR 03?
said lhat there wa*e m signs of any increased
desire f o r a S o c i a l i s t regime.
She Go^/ernment could gain i n strength i f they
took the offensive against S o c i a l i s t p o l i e i e s s
.THB SSC8B2AHS: 0F.STMS FOE SOQTMSB"^ported M b , suggestion,
llore
speeches might &1bo be made about the value o f the t&iiEJsnvsaltfo, and the
r o l e o f the United Kingdom i n i t * .
These could be founded on the success o f
the Prime M i n i s t e r s Ccmenwealth tour,, which had made a deep impression on
public opinion *
\ --
THE MEtHSTBS Op WUiXiVSim said that, the Oovernaent*s standing i n
the country was suffering a t the moment aa a result, o f an unusual aggregation
o f unpopular measures
c
S e s t r i c t i v e economic p o l i c i e s na fcurally had a
-
depressing e f f e c t , - On the other hand i t was desirable that the Government .
should not S3 t o the country until, some time after the point at ishieh
relaxation beeeaae possible..-
The CJovemment must have time t o develop the
theme of an exijanding economy before the next Election.
.
This was a strong
argument f o r deferring the Election u n t i l neares the end of the Parliaments
v
2KB H&aSBsUS OP LABOUR agreed that i t was the Goverment's
continue i n o f f i c e *
duty
to
In international a f f a i r s the Prime ilinistes^e special
relationship with tho leaders o f the United States,Administration was a
most valuable
B e s e t ,
and
i t
v/as important feat lie should be able to continue
' to use his personal influence at this c r i t i c a l time.. On tho home f r o n t ,
the position was not so bad as many people thought.
£uhlic opinion was s t i l l
pre-occupied with the dangers o f r i s i n g prices and disturbed industrial
relations?
but, i n faot^ prices were not now r i s i n g and industrial r e l a t i o n s
were b e t t e r than they had been f o r some time past.
The swing of opinion
against the Government was not among people i n the higher income groups s
was- among -the s k i l l e d workers and lower middle classes-
it
I t waa these' sections
of opinion tshich had become discouraged * especially since the r e a t r i c t i v e
economic saeasures o f September, 1957*, . I t should not be forgotten thafy to
win an Election^ the Conservative Party needed the support o f about 5 m i l l i o n
trade unionists end their f a m i l i e s .
Therefore, both in foreign and i n
economic a f f a i r e , the Governciant must seek to rebuild the sense of hope
f o r the future, and of Confidence i n Conservative p o l i c i e s , wiiich these
people formerly had.
'"
.SHB aUiHCBILOH
OF
T I E JJUCHJT
02
LAIKShSTSR
Bade two points,
First,
he -suggested that fee. r e a l reason f o r fee swing o f public opinion; against
the Government was the general sense o f fatigue end frustration which' had
steadily gained ground i n the l a s t eighteen months.
some emotional success was needed.
To counteract
feat,
The Prime £Jinister*s Coraaonwealfe tour
had already mads a contribution towards t h i s .
Secondly^ i t was important
feat fee Government should' show confidence in t h e i r own p o l i c i e s .
o f indecision or Wavering did much harm.
Sigaa
Ministers should show no
hesitation in defending the Sent Act- and fee Government's defence policy,,
, SUB MINISTBH OF
mWLQEmm
supported this View.
In a l l
fee
circumstances i t was surprising that fee Socialists had not gained more
ground in fee l a s t year.
I f the Government shaved firmness and resolution
and confidence i n . t h e i r . p o l i c i e s , feey could recover fee ground -which
they had l o s t .
THE SEEMS
£SUEKiTSIl said that he Was grateful f o r the -support which
Ma colleagues had given him in the course o f t h i s useful discussion.He himself had no doubt that the Government wist Isold firmly to their
purpose and p o l i c i e s , and he was glad to be assured feat this was fee
united view o f the whole Cabinet.
He would, r e f l e c t on the suggestions
which had been put forward i n the course of fee discussion and would
consider what practical steps could b e taken to strengthen fee Government'a
authority i n fee months ahead.
Cabinet Office^ S.W.I.
13th March, 1958
CABINET
C.C.(59) 54th Conclusions
(20th October, 1959 - 11.00 a.ra.)
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOE a I R s a i d that H.R.H. The Duke
of Edinburgh had recently been interested in the extension of
the a c t i v i t i e s of f l y i n g clubs and in that connection had shown
p a r t i c u l a r interest in a s i n g l e - s e a t e r l i g h t a i r c r a f t known as
the Rollason Turbulent.
He had expressed a wish to f l y
this
a i r c r a f t himself from a s u i t a b l e a i r f i e l d - not as a means of
transport from one point to another, but i n order to gain f i r s t ­
hand experience of i t s operation.
The Secretary of State f o r
Air. s a i d that this proposal involved no new p r i n c i p l e , as the
Duke of Edinburgh had flown solo in a number of
a i r c r a f t i n the p a s t .
different
Subject therefore to the views of the
Cabinet he saw no reason to r a i s e objection.to this proposal,
provided that suitable safety precautions were observed.
For
example, the f l i g h t would be limited to an area within sight of
the a i r f i e l d ,
as the a i r c r a f t c a r r i e d no radio;
i t should take
place when the weather was clear and not l i a b l e to sudden
deterioration;
and no other f l y i n g would be allowed at the
a i r f i e l d while the Duke o f Edinburgh was i n the a i r .
Discussion showed that there was"general agreement in the
Cabinet that no objection need be raised to t h i s proposal.
The Cabinet Authorised the Secretary of State f o r A i r
to arrange f o r H.R.H. The Duke of Edinburgh
to make a f l i g h t i n a Rollason Turbulent
aircraft,
subject to the safety precautions
which he had outlined to the Cabinet.
Cabinet O f f i c e , S.W.1,
28th October, 1959.
TOP SECRET
MOST CCMFIIENTIAL RECORD
CABINET
C . C . ( 6 o ) 4th Conclusions
(2nd February, i960 - 10.15 a.ro.)
JiE NAME OF THE
HAL FAMILY
A memorandum "by the Home Secretary about the name of the
Royal Family was handed round to the Cabinet,
THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that, i n accordance with the
Prime M i n i s t e r ' s wish, he had discussed with The Queen a proposal
to a l t e r the surname of certain of Her descendants.
At present,
b y v i r t u e of the Proclamation and Letters Patent of 1917 and of
the Declaration i n Council which The Queen had made on 9th A p r i l , 1952,
the surname of "Windsor was to be used by those members of the Royal
Family who were not e n t i t l e d to the style of Royal Highness and the
t i t u l a r dignity o f Prince or Princess and who were not female members
who had married o r t h e i r descendants.
The Queen had now indicated i t
to be Her wish that those members of the Royal Family who would have
to use a surname i n t h i s way should use the surname of Mountb at t e n Windsor.
The Queen had no desire to a l t e r the name of the Royal
House and Family of Windsor.
This was a matter on which i t was
proper f o r The Queen to take the advice of Her M i n i s t e r s .
I f the
Cabinet agreed, e f f e c t could be given to The Queen's wishes by a
Declaration i n Council.
.
" THE HOME SECRETARY said that, in the normal course of events,
a surname.would not be required to b e used by The Queen's descendants
u n t i l the b i r t h of grandchildren in the male l i n e of the Prince o f
Wales (other than his eldest l i v i n g grandson), o r , u n t i l the b i r t h
of grandchildren i n the male l i n e of the next son born to The Queen.
The Queen had made i t c l e a r , however, that i t . was Her wish that i f
any of Her descendants, including children, other than female members
who had m a r r i e d o r t h e i r
style
in general
strongly
had t o h e r e c o g n i s e d
effect
of
was p o i n t e d o u t
certain quarters.
to be
even though t h e
subject
clear
It
to g i v e e f f e c t
8th February.
this
The o t h e r
to
advise
The Queen t o . make a D e c l a r a t i o n
to give e f f e c t
to the
in
wishes
She had e x p r e s s e d .
S.W.1.
i960.
circulation given
advise
to
the
to' t h i s
The
wishes
sumrnonel
Commonwealth
decision i n the appropriate
-
I n v i t e d t h e Home S e c r e t a r y
9th February,
The D e c l a r a t i o n !
Windsor.
t h a t he w o u l d f o r m a l l y
Governments would be i n f o r m e d o f
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
that
effect
was p r o p o s e d t h a t a C o u n c i l s h o u l d b e
t h i s p u r p o s e on M o n d a y ,
Council
in
t h a t The Queen a n d H e r C h i l d r e n w o u l d c o n t i n u e
Queen t o make a D e c l a r a t i o n i n C o u n c i l
She h a d e x p r e s s e d .
it
practical
give
a Declaration i n Council.
s t y l e d and known as t h e House a n d F a m i l y o f
The C a b i n e t
subjects
to criticism
The Queen s h o u l d b e a d v i s e d t o
THE HOME SECRETARY s a i d
for
Mountbatten-Windsor.
t h a t The Q u e e n ' s
remote, would be
t o H e r w i s h e s b y means o f
s h o u l d make i t
or
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e was g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t
the circumstances
the
a t t a c h e d t o t h e name o f W i n d s o r , and
t h a t any c h a n g e ,
i t might be
enjoy
d i g n i t y of P r i n c e
t h e y s h o u l d t h e n "bear t h e surname o f
In discussion i t
in
should cease t o
o f R o y a l H i g h n e s s and t h e t i t u l a r
Princess,
were
descendants,
document^
wajj
NO CIRCULATION RECORD
TOP SECRET
C O . ( 6 0 ) 11TH CONCLUSIONS
(22nd F e b r u a r y ,
i960 -
12
noon)
THE PRIME MINISTER i n f o r m e d t h e C a b i n e t
that
P r i n c e s s M a r g a r e t d e s i r e d t o marry M r . Anthony
Armstrong-Jones,
and t h a t T h e Queen p r o p o s e d t o g i v e hex- c o n s e n t t o t h e
under t h e Royal Marriages
The C a b i n e t
1772.
Act,
e x p r e s s e d t h e i r p l e a s u r e a t t h e news
P r i n c e s s Margaret i n t e n d e d t o marry.
T h e r e was g e n e r a l
t h a t T h e Queen p r o p o s e d t o g i v e h e r c o n s e n t t o t h i s
D i s c u s s i o n t h e n t u r n e d on t h e
necessary that,
should act
1772,
marriage
in giving
on t h e a d v i c e
that
satisfaction
marriage.
question whether i t
was
h e r c o n s e n t t o t h e m a r r i a g e , The Queen
of Ministers.
The R o y a l Marriages
was an o b s c u r e and u n s a t i s f a c t o r y
means c l e a r w h e t h e r t h e S o v e r e i g n ' s
on t h e a d v i c e o f M i n i s t e r s .
statute.
Act,
I t was b y n o
a c t i o n under i t
should be
Consent t o t h e m a r r i a g e s
of
persons
c o v e r e d b y t h e A c t b u t r e m o t e from s u c c e s s i o n t o the Throne
o f t e n been g i v e n w i t h o u t
been argued t h a t
Ministerial
advice;
and i t
the question whether M i n i s t e r i a l
marriage
of
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , i t was t h e f a c t
had
had sometimes
a d v i c e was
r e q u i r e d t u r n e d on t h e n e a r n e s s o f t h e p e r s o n c o n c e r n e d t o
succession.
taken
the
that assent t o
t h e p r e s e n t Queen had b e e n g i v e n w i t h o u t
a d v i c e , . t h o u g h s h e was a t t h e t i m e t h e H e i r A p p a r e n t .
the
Ministerial
The
Cabinet
had b e e n i n f o r m e d i n a d v a n c e , b u t no f o r m a l a d v i c e h a d b e e n
tendered
by M i n i s t e r s .
The p r e c e d e n t s
therefore
suggested that, w h i l e
was -under no o b l i g a t i o n t o s e e k M i n i s t e r i a l
consenting t o the marriage of
a member o f
Cabinet would normally b e informed i n
of
advice
Sovereign
before
the Royal Family,
advance o f
a person c l o s e i n succession t o the Throne.
was s o m e t h i n g more t h a n a c o u r t e s y ;
the
the
the proposed
This,
marriaj
moreover,
f o r M i n i s t e r s had a d u t y
9S t o s a f e g u a r d t h e s u c c e s s i o n t o t h e T h r o n e and t o p r o t e c t
S o v e r e i g n f r o m u n f a v o u r a b l e comment, and i t was r i g h t
s h o u l d h a v e an o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r i t
t o tender negative
a d v i c e i n such a m a t t e r .
Act
1772 was t h a t t h e S o v e r e i g n c o u l d a c t u n d e r i t
could expect
opportunity to t e n d e r negative a d v i c e , i f
seemed
ever the
the
without
t o be g i v e n
occasion
t o do s o , o n a p r o p o s e d m a r r i a g e b y a p e r s o n c l o s e
i n the
an
arose
succession
Throne.
The C a b i n e t
the
form
make on t h i s
recognised that these considerations
o c c a s i o n t o The Queen.
tendering formal
o t h e r hand, i t
affirmative
Sovereign,
it
should not
Ministers
ever
On t h e
appear
to
tender negative
had a d u t y t o p r o t e c t
right
t o do so
advice
the
if
arise.
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t
in all
the
circumstances
h e would p r o p o s e t o i n f o r m The Queen, i n w r i t i n g ,
acquainted the Cabinet
intention to
that
a precedent
a d v i c e under t h i s A c t .
and t h e y s h o u l d p r e s e r v e - t h e i r
occasion should
constitute
t h a t M i n i s t e r s might
occasion.
should
I t would be inexpedient
seemed d e s i r a b l e t h a t
exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y
on some f u t u r e
would
of the submission which t h e Prime M i n i s t e r
t h i s s h o u l d b e s o p h r a s e d as t o a p p e a r t o
for
duty
o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n under
M i n i s t e r i a l a d v i c e but t h a t M i n i s t e r s
affect
they
On t h e w h o l e i t
that
t o the
that
was t h e i r
likely
of
the p r o p e r v i e w
the
t h a t h e had
o f t h e p r o p o s e d m a r r i a g e and o f H e r
g i v e consent under t h e A c t o f
1772 *
He
would,
Majesty's
t h e n go
on t o a d v i s e t h a t T h e Queen s h o u l d b e p l e a s e d t o c a u s e h e r
consent
t o be s i g n i f i e d
Council
under t h e Great S e a l
i n accordance w i t h the A c t .
w o u l d b e made, s u b j e c t
and t o b e d e c l a r e d i n
F i n a l l y , he would s a y t h a t
t o The Q u e e n s a p p r o v a l ,
s t e p s t o b e t a k e n i n due c o u r s e .
1
for
the
arrangements'
necessary
The Cabinet a g r e e d t h a t
would r e f l e c t
their view of the constitutional
The C a b i n e t
( l )
at
the
of H.R.H. Princess
Took n o t e o f
t h e terms o f the
forthcoming
Margaret. submission
w h i c h t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r p r o p o s e d t o make t o T h e Queen a b o u t t h e f o r m a l i t i e s
the Royal Marriages A c t ,
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
11th
1772.
under
S.W.1.
M a r c h , i960
^ / " C i r c u l a t e d t o The Queen and P r i m e M i n i s t e r
lines
position.
­
Expressed t h e i r p l e a s u r e
marriage
(2)
a s u b m i s s i o n on t h e s e
orilyJJ
CABINET
C . C . ( 6 o ) 52nd C o n c l u s i o n s (6th October,
.
i960 - 11.00 a . m . ) - THE HOME SECRETARY s a i d t h a t t h e Duke a n d Duchess o f
would c e l e b r a t e
t h e i r S i l v e r W e d d i n g o n 6th N o v e m b e r .
He had d i s c u s s e d
w i t h t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r how t h e C a b i n e t c o u l d b e s t r e c o g n i s e
occasion.
Their provisional
c o n c l u s i o n was t h a t t h e P r i m e
s h o u l d send a t e l e g r a m o f c o n g r a t u l a t i o n
on b e h a l f
Gloucester
t o Their Royal
this
Minister
Highnesses
o f the Cabinet.
I n d i s c u s s i o n i t w a s s u g g e s t e d t h a t i t m i g h t h e more s u i t a b l e .
if
f l o w e r s w e r e s e n t t o t h e Duchess w i t h a l e t t e r
s i g n e d by t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r on b e h a l f
T h e r e was g e n e r a l
undertook
o f the Cabinet
support f o r t h i s s u g g e s t i o n .
t o submit a recommendation i n ^ t h i s
Minister.
Cabinet O f f i c e ,
6th O c t o b e r ,
S.W.1.
i960
of
congratulation
as a w h o l e .
THE HOME SECRETARY
sense to the Prime
;
102 - CABINET
The f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d b e r e a d i n c o n j u n c t i o n
C . C . ( 6 3 ) 39th C o n c l u s i o n s , M i n u t e 3 ,
CPrinted V e r s i o n )
with
THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY s a i d t h a t he was h i m s e l f t h e
subject
o f some o f t h e rumours t o w h i c h t h e Prime M i n i s t e r had
referred.
I n one r e s p e c t
the a l l e g a t i o n s
involve
him i n some d i f f i c u l t y ;
them.'
He r e a l i s e d ,
i n q u e s t i o n might
f o r t h e r e s t he c o m p l e t e l y
however, that
in the present s i t u a t i o n his
p r e s e n c e i n t h e Government m i g h t e m b a r r a s s h i s c o l l e a g u e s ;
he t h e r e f o r e
denied
proposed t o discuss with
and
t h e Prime M i n i s t e r w h e t h e r .
t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e q u i r e d him t o t e n d e r h i s r e s i g n a t i o n .
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t , a s he had e m p h a s i s e d i n
t h e r e c e n t P a r l i a m e n t a r y d e b a t e , he had s o u g h t , and would c o n t i n u e
to deal
to seek,
difficult
honourably,
j u s t l y and p r u d e n t l y w i t h t h e
p e r s o n a l i s s u e s w h i c h c o n f r o n t e d h i m . ' He had n e v e r
taken a c t i o n a g a i n s t a c o l l e a g u e
and he would r e f u s e
on t h e b a s i s o f rumour a l o n e ;
t o a c c e p t any M i n i s t e r ' s r e s i g n a t i o n
grounds o f unsupported a l l e g a t i o n s .
If,
however, a Minister
j u d g e d i n h i s own d i s c r e t i o n t h a t h i s r i g h t
he m i g h t f e e l
compelled t o . a c c e p t
discuss the circumstances
on t h e
c o u r s e was t o r e s i g n ,
that resignation.
He w o u l d
f u r t h e r w i t h t h e Commonwealth
Secretary,
who had a c t e d b o t h w i s e l y and h o n o u r a b l y i n b e i n g p r e p a r e d t o
his
colleagues
into h i s confidence
on a p e r s o n a l and p r i v a t e
matter.
The C a b i n e t
:
­
Took n o t e t h a t
further
the Prime M i n i s t e r would
give
consideration-, i n consultation
with
t h e Commonwealth S e c r e t a r y ,
-
latter's
p e r s o n a l p o s i t i o n ' i n r e l a t i o n t o an e n q u i r y :
of t h i s
Cabinet
to the
Office,
kind..
S.W.1.
20th J u n e , 1963
take
TOP SECRET
MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD
CABINET
The f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d b e r e a d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h C . C . ( 6 3 ) 40th C o n c l u s i o n s , ( P r i n t e d V e r s i o n ) RESIGNATION OF
THE SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR
WAR
THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY s a i d t h a t he had now
discussed with
his
the Prime M i n i s t e r the
own name had become
He p r o p o s e d t o s e n d t h e
that
the
specific
l i n k e d with the
Prime
allegations
t o L o r d Denning f o r
connection.
Cabinet
Office,
21st
S.W.1 .
J u n e , 1 963
current
against
discharge
of
his
which
requesting
him s h o u l d be
He f e l t
in
allegations.
Minister a l e t t e r ,
investigation.
be a p r o p e r , and s u f f i c i e n t ,
in t h i s
circumstances
that
referred
this
v/ould
responsibility
CABINET
MOST C O N F I D E N T I A L
C M . (6k.)
(17th
MR. I A I N MACLEOD's,
A R T I C L E I N THE
* SPECTATOR'
5th
CONCLUSIONS^
J A N U A R Y , 1964 - 10.30. A . M . )
A T THE OPENING
THE FOREIGN
STATEMENT
RECORD;
OF THE C A B I N E T ' S
SECRETARY.(MR.
R . A . B U T L E R ) MADE A; SHORM
ABOUT AN A R T I C L E
B Y MR. I A I N MAOLEOD,. M.P.:-WHICH-,;
HAD APPEARED I N THE E D I T I O N
THAT
DAY.
THIS
OF THE ' S P E C T A T O R '
ARTICLE.HAD
VERSION OF THE EVENTS
HAD BEEN
IMMEDIATELY
SHARPLY
PRECEDING
CRITICAL
THE A P P O I N T - .
MINISTER'IN'OCTOBER;
OF C E R T A I N
ASPECTSIOF'THE
MANNER I N W H I C H , A S MR. MACLEOD SAW I T , T H I S
HAD'TAKEN
IT.
;'
APPOINTMENT-...
PLACE.
THE F O R E I G N " S E C R E T A R Y
ARTICLE
PUBLISHED.
CONTAINED MR. ; MACLEDD'S
MERIT OF S I R A L E C DOUGLAS-HOME AS P R I M E
AND.IT
DISCUSSION,'.
BUT. HAD REFUSED-TO
;
MAKE A N Y P U B L I C
HE HOPED THAT -.' A L L . MEMBERS
THE, SAME A T T I T U D E .
S A I D T H A T H E - HAD;seenVtheI
OF "THE
COMMENT.,UPON,'
CABINET
WOULD.ADOPT
HE . D I D NOT PROPOSE T O . OFF ER; ANY ;
1
;:
;
C
OBSERVATIONS '. TO -,THE',;CABINET.-' ON . THE - SUBSTANCE - OF/THE
ARTICLE;-..;' AND HE-FELT':; THAT-.; THE C A B I N E T . ' S , R I G H T - COURSE ,'WAS.
:
;O';REAFFIRM T H E I R - SUPPORT
FOR THE P R I M E - ^ M I N I S T E R J I N ' H I S
:
;
EFFORTS... TO LEAD;.THE . GOVERNMENT. FORWARD':-: TO ITHE ;J GENERAL!
;
ELECTION.
THE - P R I M E . M I N I S T E R T H A N K E D
:
FOR'THESE
REMARKS.
THE F O R E I G N
SECRETARY
THERE WAS ; NO ^-FURTHER /.DI S CUS S I ON.