19 4 6
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXES AND "MO CIRCULATION" RECORDS C M . (46) 70th Conclusions
-
World Food Supplies: Canadian
Wheat Contract and Supplies.
(C.A.)
both Conclusions, Minute 2 -
Bread Rationing.
86th Conclusions
China?
92nd Conclusions, Minute 4 -
Ireland.
95th Conclusions
Princess Elizabeth: Twenty­
first Birthday. (N.C.R.)
95th Conclusions
97th Conclusion;:
-
(C.A.)
Supply of Arms.
(N.C.R
(N.G.R.)
Charitable Funds.
(N.C.R.)
Debate on the Address: Foreign
Policy Amendment. (N.C.R.)
104th Conclusions, Minute
India: Constitutional Position.
(C.A.)
108th Conclusion,'
India; Constitutional Position.
(C.A.)
Tins DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
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C M . (46)
70TH C O N C L U S I O N S
Confidential Annex ( 2 1 s t J u l y , 1 9 4 6 WORLD FOOD
SUPPLIES Canadian Wheat Contract and
Supplies (Previous
Reference:
CM, ( 4 6 )
69th
Conclusions,
Minute 2 )
9.30
T h e Cabinet h a d before
a.m.)
them;-
( i ) a m e m o r a n d u m b y the Minister of F o o d
( C P . ( 4 6 ) 286) covering copies of
m i n u t e s addressed "by the L o r d P r e s i d e n t of the C o u n c i l and the M i n i s t e r of P o o d to the Prime M i n i s t e r suggesting that, in v i e w of the information contained in t e l e g r a m A M A Z E 7488 f r o m the B r i t i s h
F o o d M i s s i o n in W a s h i n g t o n , the i n t r o d u c t i o n of "bread rationing should be
suspended;
and
( i i ) a n o t e "by the A d d i t i o n a l Secretary to the
C a b i n e t ( C P . ( 4 6 ) 289) c i r c u l a t i n g a
draft of a public statement w h i c h the M i n i s t e r of F o o d proposed to m a k e if it were d e c i d e d to suspend the introduction of b r e a d r a t i o n i n g . T H E M I N I S T E R OF
probably be convenient if
raised at the p r e l i m i n a r y
a m e e t i n g of M i n i s t e r s on
F O O D said that it
he dealt w i t h the
discussion of h i s
the p r e v i o u s day.
would points p r o p o s a l at It had b e e n suggested that, as an alternative
to the s u s p e n s i o n of r a t i o n i n g , the flour e x t r a c t i o n
rate should b e reduced.
A reduction from 9 0 p e r cent
to 8 5 p e r cent would call for an additional 2 5 , 0 0 0 tons
of wheat a m o n t h and for t e c h n i c a l reasons there could
b e n o q u e s t i o n of l o w e r i n g the rate u n t i l S e p t e m b e r . T h u s , w h a t e v e r d e c i s i o n was reached about the i n t r o d u c ­
tion of r a t i o n i n g , the date on w h i c h the e x t r a c t i o n rate could b e lowered w o u l d not be affected.
He w a s , h o w ­
e v e r , m o s t anxious to b r i n g " t h e rate down to 8 5 per cent
as soon as p o s s i b l e , and he saw n o reason why it should not b e p o s s i b l e to d o this i in S e p t e m b e r , e v e n t h o u g h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of r a t i o n i n g were to be suspended. I t had b e e n u r g e d that, since the f i g u r e s
g i v e n in A M A Z E 7488 w e r e no more than a tentative g u e s s ,
the C a b i n e t would not be justified in altering their
decision.
It was true that the C a n a d i a n W h e a t B o a r d ' s
estimate of probable shipments w a s g i v e n with certain
r e s e r v a t i o n s , but the fact that he now had e v e n a
tentative programme of shipments gave him a v e r y m u c h
firmer b a s i s on w h i c h to work than he had ever h a d
before.
T h e B r i t i s h Food M i s s i o n in W a s h i n g t o n were
satisfied that the shipment of the 1 ^ 6 , 0 0 0 tons of wheat
w h i c h the U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t had u n d e r t a k e n to send
to the U n i t e d K i n g d o m was w e l l u p to schedule and that
there was no need whatever to ask for any f u r t h e r
guarantee of delivery.
They had also assured h i m
that the U n i t e d S t a t e s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n saw n o r e a s o n to
v
suppose that there w o u l d h e any hold u p of shipments owing to strikes during the next few w e e k s .
While,
t h e r e f o r e , there could he no ah solute certainty that s t r i k e s would not take place or that some catastrophic change in the weather w o u l d not ruin the N o r t h A m e r i c a n h a r v e s t , he felt that the risk was not s u c h as to justify the immediate i n t r o d u c t i o n of rationing in face of the n e w promise of additional C a n a d i a n supplies during the critical m o n t h s of A u g u s t and S e p t e m b e r .
He h a d v e r i f i e d that these s u p p l i e s would still leave U n i t e d K i n g d o m imports h e l o w the figure fixed Toy the I n t e r n a t i o n a l E m e r g e n c y P o o d C o u n c i l , so that there could h e no question of o u r having to obtain the c o n s e n t of the C o u n c i l b e f o r e we c o u l d secure t h e m . He- did not b e l i e v e that the suspension of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of rationing w o u l d e m b a r r a s s the U n i t e d S t a t e s A d m i n i s t r a ­
tion.
Indeed, w h e n he h a d b e e n in W a s h i n g t o n M r . C l i n t o n A n d e r s o n had o n two occasions expressed the hope that
b r e a d rationing would not be introduced in the U n i t e d
Kingdom.
W i t h regard to G e r m a n y , the C h a n c e l l o r of the
D u c h y of L a n c a s t e r had stated at the meeting of the W o r l d
F o o d S u p p l i e s Committee on 12th July (W. F. S . (L6) 1kth
M e e t i n g , Minute 1 ) that at 18th A u g u s t there would b e a
deficit of 5 6 , 0 0 0 tons of w h e a t in the B r i t i s h zone.
T h e C o n t r o l C o m m i s s i o n had, however, e s t i m a t e d that by
3 0 t h A u g u s t I6h,000 tons of w h e a t would b e available f r o m
the h a r v e s t in the B r i t i s h zone, and it should surely h e
p o s s i b l e to cover the e s t i m a t e d deficit at 18th A u g u s t b y
m a k i n g strenuous efforts to secure early deliveries from
German farms.
The C h a n c e l l o r of the D u c h y had also stated
that only 7 ^ , 0 0 0 tons of w h e a t were in sight from the
United States.
But
in fact the U n i t e d States G o v e r n m e n t
intended to send 80,000 tons in July and a further 8 0 , 0 0 0
tons in A u g u s t and these quantities might h e raised to
120,000 tons each m o n t h .
He could n o t , therefore, b e l i e v e
that there was a real danger of b r e a k d o w n in the B r i t i s h
zone in A u g u s t and it seemed clear that thereafter the
whole p o s i t i o n would b e altered owing to the good E u r o p e a n
h a r v e s t and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of economic co-operation between
the B r i t i s h and A m e r i c a n z o n e s .
I n the last three days
an offer of 8 0 , 0 0 0 tons of w h e a t from Turkey had b e e n
received and there had b e e n indications that R o u m a n i a and
even R u s s i a m i g h t have wheat for e x p o r t .
T h i s did not
affect the immediate p o s i t i o n , b u t it was significant o f
the h o p e f u l p r o s p e c t s for the E u r o p e a n h a r v e s t .
He
b e g g e d the C a b i n e t not to u n d e r r a t e the inconvenience and
d i s l o c a t i o n w h i c h would arise' if rationing were introduced.
It was true that the organised o p p o s i t i o n of the b a k e r s
h a d collapsed, b u t their p r e p a r a t i o n s for operating the
scheme had b e e n inadequate and u n t i l their shops h a d
mastered, the c o u p o n system there w o u l d inevitably be long
q u e u e s of c u s t o m e r s w a i t i n g to be s e r v e d .
He had c o n ­
sidered the p o s s i b i l i t y of advising b a k e r s to give
c u s t o m e r s b r e a d even t h o u g h they were u n a b l e to produce
c o u p o n s , but he w a s c o n v i n c e d that any r e l a x a t i o n of this
kind would rapidly make the scheme u n w o r k a b l e .
It w o u l d
b e f r i v o l o u s to introduce b r e a d r a t i o n i n g u n l e s s there were c o n v i n c i n g reasons for doing so and he was n o w s a t i s ­
fied
on the h e w f a c t s b e f o r e him, that b r e a d rationing could not b e regarded as n e c e s s a r y for the purpose of s a f e ­
g u a r d i n g our s u p p l i e s .
H e was likely to b e able to announce the signature of the C a n a d i a n wheat contract o n M o n d a y or T u e s d a y and, a l t h o u g h this affected only the l o n g term p o s i t i o n , it w o u l d obviously be regarded as m a k i n g the U n i t e d K i n g d o m supply p o s i t i o n more secure. He d i d not b e l i e v e that there was any c o l l u s i o n b e t w e e n M r . G a r d i n e r and the O p p o s i t i o n , b u t it was clear that the s
C
O p p o s i t i o n already had an - inkling of the f r e s h facts given
in A M A Z E 7 4 8 8 and it would "be disastrous to atterapt to
w i t h h o l d this information from then.
Once the new
f i g u r e s h a d b e e n disclosed he did not see how he could
defend the introduction of r a t i o n i n g .
It would naturally
b e e x t r e m e l y embarrassing for him to have to announce the
suspension of the rationing s c h e m e , but it would be
infinitely b e t t e r to face this immediate difficulty than
to persist in introducing the scheme and be subsequently
compelled to admit that its introduction h a d not b e e n
necessary.
T H E PRIME M I N I S T E R said that when the Cabinet had c o n s i d e r e d the matter on 18th July it had b e e n agreed that the deciding factor was not what would be available from C a n a d a after September b u t what was likely to be the U n i t e d K i n g d o m stock position at the critical period at the end of A u g u s t .
It had b o o n felt that it would be prudent to introduce b r e a d rationing b e c a u s e the U n i t e d States Government m i g h t fail to deliver the supplies w h i c h they had promised or might be prevented f r o m doing so b e c a u s e of railway or maritime strikes.
The Cabinet had also h a d in mind that we could not be absolutely sure that the United K i n g d o m crop w o u l d not suffer through b a d weather.
These uncertainties still remained, and the only n e w factor was the probability that some additional C a n a d i a n wheat would be delivered to the U n i t e d K i n g d o m in A u g u s t and September.
L o o k i n g to the fact that during A u g u s t and September we should be working on a m u c h n a r r o w e r m a r g i n than ever b e f o r e , he felt that the s i t u a ­
tion h a d not changed sufficiently to justify suspending the s c h e m e .
The decision to impose b r e a d rationing h a d made a very great impression in the U n i t e d States and he felt sure that the suspension of the scheme would alienate A m e r i c a n opinion.
A s to G e r m a n y , it was admitted that the ration level in the B r i t i s h zone was p i t i f u l l y low and, despite what the Minister of Pood h a d said, the C a b i n e t could not exclude the possibility of a "breakdown, which m i g h t well lead the U n i t e d States Government to divert to Germany wheat destined for the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . N o r could the p o s i t i o n of I n d i a and other B r i t i s h t e r r i ­
tories in the Par E a s t be ignored.
If the Minister of Food f o u n d it possible to b r i n g the rationing scheme to an end a f t e r , say, si:-: w e e k s or two m o n t h s , this would be all to the good; but to suspend the introduction of the scheme at the present stage would convict the Government of v a c i l l a t i o n and would make it d i f f i c u l t , if not impossible... to introduce it at a later d a t e , should the situation change for the w o r s e .
lie saw no reason why the M i n i s t e r of Pood should not reveal the n e w figures and take the line t h a t , while they were encouraging; the position was still sufficiently u n c e r t a i n to justify the Government in adhering to their decision, T H E LORD PRESIDENT OF T H E COUNCIL said that it
should be recognised that the C a b i n e t had never b e e n able
to take decisions with regard to food supplies on a b a s i s
of absolute certainty.
it was therefore no answer to the
M i n i s t e r of Pood to say that the figures g i v e n in A M A Z E
7/488 were not absolutely firm.
The real test was w h e t h e r ,
if those figures had b e e n available at the t i m e , the
C a b i n e t would have decided in f a v o u r of b r e a d rationing
on 2 7 t h June or would have confirmed their d e c i s i o n on
18th July.
I n his view the original decision would have
b e e n against rationing and he doubted - w h e t h e r even on
1 8 t h J u l y they w o u l d have confirmed the d e c i s i o n , though
the P a r l i a m e n t a r y situation then would have made it v e r y awkward to go h a c k on it.
It was u n d e n i a b l e that the scheme would impose very great i n c o n v e n i e n c e , and e v e n h a r d s h i p , on the long-suffering h o u s e w i f e ;
and when the full facts came out - and it would b e impossible to c o n c e a l them - the Government would be in much more serious trouble than if they s u s p e n d e d the scheme now. He accordingly felt that the C a b i n e t ought to accept the advice of the M i n i s t e r of P o o d and M s o f f i c i a l s and suspend the s c h e m e , even though this might expose them to the accusation of inconsistency;
He w a s not afraid of such criticism, since he b e l i e v e d that in a m a t t e r of this kind the public expected the G o v e r n m e n t to change their policy to fit changing c o n d i t i o n s .
S o f a r as the U n i t e d States was c o n c e r n e d , he did not b e l i e v e that the e f f o r t s w h i c h they were making to raise their wheat e x p o r t s had b e e n entirely prompted by the B r i t i s h decision
to ration b r e a d , and, indeed, when he had b e e n in W a s h i n g t o n b o t h M r . C l a y t o n and M r . C l i n t o n A n d e r s o n h a d made it clear to him that they did not w i s h to see b r e a d rationing introduced in the U n i t e d K i n g d o m .
A s for G e r m a n y , it had b e e n definitely agreed at the meeting of the W o r l d Pood S u p p l i e s C o m m i t t e e on 12th J u l y that no more U n i t e d K i n g d o m supplies should be sent to G e r m a n y and he remained convinced that the right course was to face the U n i t e d S t a t e s with the c o n s e q u e n c e s of a b r e a k ­
down i n the B r i t i s h zone in G e r m a n y . THE C H A N C E L L O R OF T H E E X C H E Q U E R said that the
n e w information g i v e n in A M A Z E 7U'38 did not seem to h i m to
g i v e the C a b i n e t a sufficiently secure b a s i s on w h i c h to
chance the decision w h i c h they had already reached.
He
w a s confirmed in t h i s v i e w by an interview g i v e n to the
"Sunday C h r o n i c l e " b y M r . M c l v o r , the C h a i r m a n of the
C a n a d i a n Wheat B o a r d , w h i c h made it clear that the
C a n a d i a n crop p r o s p e c t s wore still u n c e r t a i n .
He agreed
that there should he no question of d i v e r t i n g U n i t e d
K i n g d o m supplies to G e r m a n y , b u t he feared that if the
rationing scheme were suspended the pressure to do so
would be irresistible.
S o f a r as concerned the political
a s p e c t , it seemed to him that to suspend the scheme at
this stage would spread dismay among G o v e r n m e n t
s u p p o r t e r s in P a r l i a m e n t .
He agreed that the f i g u r e s
in A M A Z E 7k
should be d i s c l o s e d , b u t he s a w no reason
w h y the Minister of P o o d in g i v i n g them should not make
it clear t h a t , while they made the outlook m o r e h o p e f u l ,
they did not p r o v i d e a sure e n o u g h "basis on w h i c h to
suspend the o p e r a t i o n of the s c h e m e .
T H E S E C R E T A R Y OP STATE FOR W A R said that he feared that if the scheme were suspended the U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d relax their e f f o r t s to supply u s .
We c o u l d not n o w rely on U n i t e d S t a t e s supplies w i t h the same assurance as during the war, when the U n i t e d K i n g d o m was a base for military o p e r a t i o n s .
M o r e o v e r , to w i t h d r a w the scheme at this stage would greatly d i s c o u r a g e G o v e r n m e n t supporters in the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w h o had b e e n m a k i n g loyal e f f o r t s to d e f e n d it. THE S E C R E T A R Y OP STATE FOR T H E C O L O N I E S asked for an assurance; r e g a r d i n g the supplies to B r i t i s h d e p e n d e n c i e s in A s i a , such as C e y l o n , M a l a y a and H o n g Kong.
Most of the i n h a b i t a n t s of these c o u n t r i e s w e r e l e a d i n g a hand to m o u t h existence on a v e r y s m a l l r a t i o n of c e r e a l s , and he suggested that they s h o u l d b e among the first to b e n e f i t b y an improvement in a v a i l a b l e supplies. T H E MINISTER OF FOOD said that the saving which would h e effected hy "bread rationing in the U n i t e d K i n g d o m would not affect the possibility of assisting these territories.
O n the other h a n d , if the p r e s e n t hopes of a considerable improvement in the world conditions were not disappointed, the chances of their receiving larger supplies in the autumn were good. T H E MINISTER OF H E A L T H said that he was most anxious as to the effect on opinion in the U n i t e d States of a decision not to impose b r o a d rationing.
He
appreciated that the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n might welcome such a d e c i s i o n , h u t it would remove the urge to export as m u c h wheat as possible to the United K i n g d o m and the Continent and make the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n m u c h more likely to yield to pressure from the isolationist groups whose influence was ve ry formidable. The sole change in the situation s i n c e 1 8 t h July
was a change of p r e d i c t i o n .
It was now p r e d i c t e d that
the C a n a d i a n harvest would be larger, hut u n t i l this
prediction had b e e n turned into a reality, the only safe
course, in v i e w of the very n a r r o w margin of safety on
which we wore w o r k i n g , was to b r i n g rationing into f o r c e .
T h e additional supplies now promised from C a n a d a in the
immediate future amounted to less than a. w e e k ' 8 consump­
tion.
D i d the C a b i n e t b e l i e v e that they could retain
public confidence if they suspended the scheme b e c a u s e of
this relatively minor change in the situation?
Moreover,
if the scheme were suspended, it would b e impossible for
the Government to introduce it except in the gravest
emergency.
The d e c i s i o n to r a t i o n b r e a d had raised the
moral stature of the U n i t e d K i n g d o m throughout the world.
If that decision wore now reversed all that w o u l d he lost.
A g a i n , though the imposition of rationing would cause inconvenience ana e v e n h a r d s h i p , the Cabinet should not forget that in the relief at its removal in two or three months' time these difficulties would largely b o f o r g o t t e n . T H E LORD CHANCELLOR said that ho was Impressed
b y the fact that o w i n g to the additional supplies promised
from C a n a d a , U n i t e d K i n g d o m stocks at 3 1 s t A u g u s t would h e
increased from 5 1 3 , 0 0 0 tons to 5 9 ^ , 0 0 0 tons and at 3 0 t h
September from 5 9 0 , 0 0 0 tons to 6 9 3 , 0 0 0 tons.
Though,
like all figures of future s t o c k s , these f i g u r e s were
e s t i m a t e s , it was clear that the M i n i s t e r of Food regarded
them as considerably firmer and more reliable than the
lower figures which the Cabinet had previously had before
them.
W h a t e v e r the decision of the C a b i n e t might b e , ho
u r g e d that there should be no attempt to conceal the new
figures given in AMA2.E 7U88 .
T h e i r disclosure need not
b e incompatible w i t h a decision to continue the rationing scheme since it could be stressed that they were admittedly only a "tentative g u e s s " . :
THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND F I S H E R I E S recalled that the primary object of the decision to introduce b r e a d rationing had b e e n that we might have an insurance in case the U n i t e d States defaulted on her shipments during the- next critical two or three months and in case we did not get during that period what we expected from the home harvest.
It now appeared, u n l i k e l y that the U n i t e d States would default on her shipments and. in addition, there w e r e prospects of improved quantities from C a n a d a .
T h e only serious uncertainty remaining was the yield of the home h a r v e s t .
I f , t h e r e f o r e , the object of rationing w a s to have in e x i s t e n c e a machine whereby c o n s u m p t i o n could be reduced if it became n e c e s s a r y , and if it no longer appeared likely that a reduction of. c o n s u m p t i o n w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y , t h e n , he suggested, circum­
stances had so far changed that the earlier decision could be r e c o n s i d e r e d .
H e h i m s e l f had always impressed u p o n the C a b i n e t the disadvantage of a. h i g h e x t r a c t i o n rate which reduced animal feeding stuffs and he thought that the e x t r a c t i o n rate should b e r e d u c e d as soon as p o s s i b l e . T h e M i n i s t e r of P o o d , h o w e v e r , w a s now able to say that it s h o u l d b e p o s s i b l e to reduce the e x t r a c t i o n rate in S e p t e m b e r even if rationing were not imposed.
This
b e i n g so, he n o w took the v i e w that the scheme should b e suspended. THE MINISTER OP FUEL A N D P O W E R suggested t h a t , b e s i d e s the u n c e r t a i n t y as to the y i e l d of the home h a r v e s t , there was still u n c e r t a i n t y as to the y i e l d of the C a n a d i a n c r o p , w h i c h h a d not y e t been harvested.
It w a s by n o m e a n s impossible that adverse w e a t h e r would seriously reduce the C a n a d i a n y i e l d and it w o u l d b e a mistake to p u t too much r e l i a n c e on the new e s t i m a t e s now b e f o r e the Cabinet.
T h e experience of the l a s t f e w m o n t h s h a d n o t i n c r e a s e d his confidence in the reliability of such estimates. T H E S E C R E T A R Y OP STATE FOR F O R E I G N A F F A I R S said that in the last six w e e k s the p r o s p e c t s of the E u r o p e a n h a r v e s t s had c o n s i d e r a b l y i m p r o v e d .
T h e crops in the U k r a i n e and in the D a n u b e B a s i n w e r e l i k e l y to b e h e a v y ; the N o r t h A f r i c a n h a r v e s t h a d b e e n r e m a r k a b l e , and the F r e n c h h a r v e s t was expected to be g o o d .
G r e e c e , and p e r h a p s Italy, seemed to h i m to b e the only countries w h i c h w o u l d require s u b s t a n t i a l i m p o r t s . A s r e g a r d s our own s u p p l i e s , he h a d always b e e n in f a v o u r of taking some risk b e f o r e i m p o s i n g b r e a d rationing.
H e had himself thought that the risks w e r e such as could be taken even when the l o w point of our w h e a t stocks w a s expected to b e just over 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 t o n s . If there w a s now reasonable ground to hope that they would n o t f a l l b e l o w 5 9 4 , 0 0 0 t o n s , there did n o t seem to b e a case for rationing.
T h e r e was n o doubt that r a t i o n i n g w o u l d b e a b u r d e n on the p u b l i c , and t h o u g h the response to the scheme so f a r h a d b e e n good, he advised the C a b i n e t n o t to s t r a i n the loyalty of t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s by i m p o s i n g a b u r d e n w h i c h could n o t be shown to b e amply justified. It would be m u c h easier to d e f e n d a change of p o l i c y n o w t h a n it would have b e e n b e f o r e the v e r y satisfactory c o n c l u s i o n to the debate in P a r l i a m e n t on 1 8 t h J u l y .
He
did not suggest that the scheme s h o u l d b e scrapped a l t o g e t h e r - only that its o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e suspended for a w h i l e , u n t i l the C a b i n e t were able to assure them-, selves that the m o r e h o p e f u l p r e d i c t i o n s would be realised. T H E F I R S T L O R D OP THE A D M I R A L T Y said that the C a b i n e t should give full v/eight to the p o s s i b i l i t y of l a b o u r d i s p u t e s in C a n a d a or the U n i t e d S t a t e s .
There
w a s a threat of a strike on the C a n a d i a n railways w i t h i n the n e x t two or three w e e k s , and a d e m a n d by the C a n a d i a n S e a m e n ' s U n i o n for an increase in w a g e s , w h i c h if it led to a strike w o u l d interrupt traffic on the Great L a k e s and seriously affect wheat shipments to the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . F u r t h e r , the; r e m o v a l of price control i n the U n i t e d States h a d led the C o n f e r e n c e of I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i s a t i o n s to d e m a n d that w a g e s s h o u l d f o l l o w p r i c e s .
T h u s there was a very serious risk of major disturbances in the United S t a t e s , and he was strongly against any suspension of the rationing scheme.
He was glad to know that the long term C a n a d i a n wheat contract could n o w be regarded as safe, b u t w h a t would b e the effect of its signature on opinion in the U n i t e d States coupled w i t h the a r m o u n c e ­
m e n t that b r e a d rationing was not to be imposed?
Would
it- not make the U n i t e d States m u c h less responsive to our requests for h e l p from them?
The C a b i n e t should never forget that when the Government was responsible for all imports they must work on a higher level of stocks than was necessary w h e n there was a free m a r k e t , since they had to cover themselves not only against economic u n c e r t a i n t i e s b u t also against the often greater risk of political e m b a r r a s s m e n t .
It seemed to him that the present troubles had largely arisen through neglect of this p r i n c i p l e . T H E P R E S I D E N T OP THE B O A R D OP TRADE said that b r e a d r a t i o n i n g was a precautionary measure in case­
further e c o n o m i e s b e c a m e n e c e s s a r y .
T h i s contingency n o w seemed much more u n l i k e l y .
In v i e w of this and of the hardship of rationing he thought that, whatever the p o l i t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s , the C a b i n e t would bo fully justi­
fiecl in revising their earlier d e c i s i o n . T H E MINISTER OP L A B O U R A N D N A T I O N A L SERVICE said that he w a s advised by the local officers of the Ministry of L a b o u r that the r a t i o n i n g scheme was u n l i k e l y to work smoothly for the first w e e k or two';.
If rationing could be p o s t p o n e d , m a n y of the difficulties could be got over b e f o r e it w a s introduced. I n f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n THE SECRETARY Op STATE FOR D O M I N I O N A F F A I R S and THE HOME S E C R E T A R Y u r g e d that the now information before the Cabinet did not afford a s u f f i c i e n t l y reliable b a s i s for a d e c i s i o n to suspend the s c h e m e , and T H E PARLIAMENTARY S E C R E T A R Y T O THE T R E A S U R Y said that he was c o n v i n c e d t h a t , if the scheme w e r e suspended, it would be impossible to b r i n g it into force at a later d a t e . T H E LORD PRESIDENT said that he did not agree that it would b e impossible to introduce the scheme at a later date if there were any n e w
development such as a m a j o r strike in C a n a d a or the U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i c h obviously altered the s i t u a t i o n .
The Government had constantly assured Parliament that they would b e guided by the facts and on the f a c t s , which wore quite as firm as those on w h i c h the earlier decision to ration had b e e n t a k e n , it seemed to h i m that the case for s u s p e n s i o n was overwhelming.
These facts were certain to b e c o m e known and the Government would find it v e r y difficult to defend themselves against the charge of obstinacy if, in the face of them, rationing were maintained. T H E PRIME MINISTER said that he agreed that the facts must b e made public and he saw no reason why in giving them the M i n i s t e r of P o o d should not indicate that there was good hope that the rationing scheme would n o t have to be maintained in force for long.
He did not think, h o w e v e r , that those facts constituted; either on economic or on political g r o u n d s , a convincing case for suspending the rationing scheme ; and he was satisfied that the i n t r o d u c t i o n of rationing as a measure of insurance w a s still amply justified.
The fact that risks w h i c h were insured against often did not m a t e r a l i s e did not invalidate the p r i n c i p l e of insurance N o t to p r o c e e d w i t h r a t i o n i n g now at the e l e v e n t h h o u r w o u l d c a u s e dismay among the G o v e r n m e n t ' s supporters and would u n d e r m i n e the confidence of the public in the M i n i s t r y of P o o d , w h i c h was a most valuable a s s e t . H e f e l t , t h e r e f o r e , that the Cabinet should decide to p r o c e e d w i t h the r a t i o n i n g scheme.
At. the same t i m e , h fully r e c o g n i s e d the b u r d e n w h i c h this would e n t a i l for the M i n i s t e r of P o o d and he was confident that all h i s c o l l e a g u e s w o u l d give the M i n i s t e r their support in the discharge of h i s difficult task. The Cabinet
­
( 1 ) R e a f f i r m e d their d e c i s i o n that b r e a d rationing should b e i n t r o d u c e d forthwith. (2) A g r e e d that the i n f o r m a t i o n given in
telegram A M A Z E 7^-88 s h o u l d b e p u b l i s h e d .
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GQVERNTtlEFIL . _ .
r
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
TOP
SECRET
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10
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Copy N o .
C M . (46) 80th Conclusions, Minute
*
L
2
Confidential Annex
(9th S e p t e m b e r , 1946 - 3 p . m . ) JATIONING
[previous
leference:
;,M. (46) 7 0 t h Jonclus i o n s )
The C a b i n e t had b e f o r e them a N o t e by the Secretary ( C P . ( 4 6 ) 3 3 6 ) covering a m i n u t e submitted to the P r i m e Minister b y the Minister of Food regarding the continuance of b r e a d rationing
in the United Kingdom. THE MINISTER OF FOOD said that the stocks of w h e a t in the United Kingdom were now m u c h larger t h a n had at one time b e e n expected.
At the end of September he expected to have in stock 6 6 9 , 0 0 0 tons of w h e a t and 31.4,000 tons of flour.
The
early harvest in C a n a d a had added about 100,000 tons to our stocks,and despite t h e very adverse weather it seemed that the yield f r o m the U n i t e d Kingdom harvest w o u l d not be far b e l o w the figure on w h i c h his estimate of stocks had b e e n based. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y the rationing scheme was not w h o l l y satisfactoryj
it would b e difficult to enforce the c o l l e c t i o n of bread units on the b a k e r s and, if b r e a d were w i d e l y ohtained w i t h o u t surrender of bread u n i t s , the p o i n t s scheme for other foods could b e undermined.
H e appreciated that the shortage of cereals in some other countries was still s e r i o u s , b u t in all the circumstances he took the view that the balance of advantage lay on the side of d i s c o n t i n u i n g bread rationing in the United Kingdom at the end of the current rationing period o n 14th September.
R a t i o n i n g could b e reimposed if the s i t u a t i o n next spring or summer w a r r a n t e d such a c o u r s e . In d i s c u s s i o n Ministers were reminded that the two f a c t o r s w h i c h had m a i n l y influenced them in their d e c i s i o n to introduce b r e a d r a t i o n i n g had b e e n the uncertainty of the harvest w e a t h e r in the J U n i t e d Kingdom and the possibility of strikes in the North American seaports.
On b o t h these counts there was still great uncertainty. As regards the United Kingdom h a r v e s t , THE MINISTER O F A G R I C U L T U R E said that, while the estimated w e i g h t of the crop of w h e a t , b a r l e y and­
oats was slightly in excess of the average for the last t e n y e a r s , it was impossible to say w h a t p r o p o r t i o n of this crop would be harvested in' m i l l a b l e condition.
N o r w a s it possible to say how s o o n the m i l l a b l e g r a i n harvested would r e a c h the m i l l s .
Some
60,000 tons had. b e e n delivered during A u g u s t and, g i v e n good w e a t h e r , a further 200,000 tons m i g h t b e delivered b y the end of September. A s regards the strikes in North A m e r i c a , if these w e r e confined to the United States the direct effect o n United Kingdom supplies might b e small as w e w e r e only counting on r e c e i v i n g a further 8 0 , 0 0 0 tons from the United S t a t e s ; b u t there w a s the -
. ­
risk that the strikes m i g h t spread, to Canada and account must also be taken of their effect en the other c o u n t r i e s w h i c h were relying on supplies f r o m the United S t a t e s . For b o t h these reasons,, therefore. M i n i s t e r s felt that it would be p r e f e r a b l e to retain b r e a d rationing in this country u n t i l the outlook was more certain. The p o l i t i c a l a r g u m e n t s were also in f a v o u r of its retention.
It was by now fairly well a c c e p t e d by the p u b l i c ;
and there w a s grave p o l i t i c a l risk in abolishing it at a moment when the U n i t e d K i n g d o m harvest was so obviously p r e c a r i o u s .
Moreover,
a c c o u n t m u s t be taken of the f o o d situation in other p a r t s of the w o r l d for which we h a d a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . T H E SECRETARY OF STATE F O R INDIA e m p h a s i s e d the serious s i t u a t i o n w h i c h w a s likely to arise in India d u r i n g the next few m o n t h s and the LORD PRIVY SEAL spoke of the paramount i m p o r t a n c e of m a i n t a i n i n g a ration l e v e l of at least 1,550 c a l o r i e s in the B r i t i s h and A m e r i c a n Z o n e s In G e r m a n y throughout the n e x t y e a r , if there w a s to be a n y economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n t h e r e .
Finally,
M i n i s t e r s also felt that, once b r e a d rationing h a d been removed in t h i s c o u n t r y , it would be v e r y difficult to reimpose i t , F o r all these r e a s o n s the Cabinet f a v o u r e d
the continuance of bread rationing at least for one f u r t h e r rationing p e r i o d . THE M I N I S T E R OF A G R I C U L T U R E u r g e d that,
if any r e l a x a t i o n of restrictions were p o s s i b l e , the
f i r s t step should be to reduce the extraction rate of
f l o u r so as to make a larger quantity of f e e d i n g - s t u f f s
available for a n i m a l s .
W h i l e the abolition of bread
rationing -would increase c o n s u m p t i o n by some 2+0,000 tons
a m o n t h , a 5 per cent, reduction of the extraction
r a t e would involve an increased consumption of only
2 5 , 0 0 0 tons.
A s at present a r r a n g e d , the m a j o r cut
in -feeding-stuffs r a t i o n s would begin early in O c t o b e r .
T h i s would inevitably lead to t. large reduction in the
n u m b e r s of p i g s and p o u l t r y k e p t a n d in the y i e l d of
milk.
It w o u l d not be p o s s i b l e to make good for
these l o s s e s f o r a long t i m e ,
It was i m p o r t a n t ,
t h e r e f o r e , if any alleviation were p o s s i b l e , that it
should be a n n o u n c e d at once so that f a r m e r s should
k n o w that the f u l l October cut w o u l d not be I m p o s e d .
In f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n , attention was also
c a l l e d to the s u b s t a n t i a l reduction in c o n s u m p t i o n
w h i c h bread rationing h a d in fact achieved.
Consumption
h a d fallen f r o m 10h,000 tons of flour a week to
There
f i g u r e s between 6 3 , 0 0 0 tons and 8 2 , 0 0 0 t o n s .
w a s general s u p p o r t f o r the s u g g e s t i o n , made by the
M i n i s t e r of F o o d in h i s m i n u t e to the prime M i n i s t e r ,
that a scheme m i g h t be worked out u n d e r which, by
r e s t r i c t i o n of d e l i v e r i e s by the m i l l e r s , consumption
w o u l d be kept m o r e or less v o l u n t a r i l y at a l e v e l of
9 0 , 0 0 0 tons a w e e k .
The Cabinet
­
(l)
Agreed that b r e a d r a t i o n i n g should b e continued for at least one further rationing p e r i o d ;
and that if b e f o r e the end of that period the Minister of Food considered that it could then be abolished, he should submit the m a t t e r to the Cabinet again. (2)
A g r e e d that the e x t r a c t i o n rate should be r e d u c e d f r o m 90 per cent to 85 per cent and that a n announcement to this effect should b e m a d e as soon as practicable. (3)
Invited the M i n i s t e r of Food to consider w h e t h e r an approach could usefully be m a d e , in c o n f i d e n c e , to the m i l l e r s w i t h the object of s e c u r i n g that the t e r m i n a t i o n of b r e a d r a t i o n i n g did not result i n an immediate return to former levels of c o n s u m p t i o n of flour.
In
m a k i n g any s u c h approach it would b e important not to imply that the Government w e r e intending to abolish b r e a d r a t i o n i n g on any p a r t i c u l a r date. Cabinet O f f i c e , S.W. 1. 10th S e p t e m b e r , 1946. C M . (k6) 86TH CONCLUSIONS
ll+th October, 19U6 - 11.30 a.m.
HINA
THE PRIME MINISTER said that an informal
approach had "been made to H.M. Ambassador at Nanking
upply o f
jros
(reported in Nanking Telegram No. 528 of 17th September) ,
on behalf of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, with a view
to ascertaining whether His Majesty's Government would
provide him with arms to enable him to continue hostilities
against the Communists.
This approach showed that the
Generalissimo's Government had abandoned the idea of
coming to terms with the Communists and were not
collaborating fully with the United States Government
in the attempt to halt the civil war.
It also showed
that the United States authorities were reducing their
supplies of war material as a means of bringing pressure
to bear on the Generalissimo's Government.
The Foreign
Secretary had mentioned this approach in a conversation
which he had held with the United States Secretary of
State in Paris on 13th October (Paris Telegram No. 930 of
lU/th October).
Mr. Byrnes had been glad to receive this
information and had indicated that the conduct of the
Generalissimo's Government, in their relations with the
United States Government, had been increasingly
unsatisfactory.
As a result, the United States Government
were now considering whether they should not withdraw all
their forces from North China.
The Foreign Secretary had
informed Mr. Byrnes that this confirmed him in his view that
His Majesty's Government should not encourage the
Generalissimo to hope that he could obtain any supply of
arras from Great Britain;
and he would advise that Hie request made through H.M. Ambassador at Nanking should be rejected. The Prime Minister said that he had already informed the Foreign Secretary that he supported the line which he had taken in his conversation with Mr. Byrnes. The Cabinet -
Endorsed the view of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary that His Majesty's Government should refuse to accede to this request for the supply of arras to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Government. Cabinet Office, S.W. 1. 0. 11. (45 ) 92nd C o n c l u s i o n s , Minute
29th O c t o h e r , 1946
'M]D
11.0 a. in. -
the T h e C a b i n e t had b e f o r e them m e m o r a n d a b y
( C P . ( 4 6 ) S 8 l ) and the S e c r e t a r y of Lord P r e s i d e n t
Previous pence:
,;,f.(45) 33rd onclusions,
[inute 5 ) 4
State for D o m i n i o n A f f a i r s
( C P . (46) 3 9 l ) r e g a r d i n g c o n v e r s a t i o n s w h i c h the Lord President had held w i t h and Irish M i n i s t e r s during his recent v i s i t to E i r e
N o r t h e r n Ireland. D i s c u s s i o n t u r n e d m a i n l y o n the
conversations w h i c h the L o r d P r e s i d e n t had had w i t h M r . de V a l e r a Minister and, after his r e t u r n to L o n d o n , w i t h the Prime
of N o r t h e r n Ireland o n the q u e s t i o n of P a r t i t i o n . T H E LORD P R E S I D E N T said that
it was
evident
f r o m his c o n v e r s a t i o n that Mr. de V a l e r a b e l i e v e d that P a r t i t i o n w a s now the outstanding
issue
the r e s t o r a t i o n of f u l l y free and f r i e n d l y
preventing relations b e t w e e n this c o u n t r y and E i r e and that it would be a good thing if this issue could b e settled.
clearly implied
had He
the t h a t , if w e w e r e r e a d y to accept
p r i n c i p l e o f a United
Ireland - apparently this
ready have to come first - he would for his p a r t h e
to agree that N o r t h e r n Ireland should have her
P a r l i a m e n t , provided
would that the p o w e r s i n respect
own of N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d w h i c h w e r e now reserved to t h e transferred to the new Government
at W e s t m i n s t e r w e r e
Government
of the U n i t e d Ireland.
s u c h a United
Ireland
He would
should r e m a i n a member
B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h , though he would
should h a v e the status of a I^epublic.
insist
agree that of the that
it
H e could not accept
of the status o f a D o m i n i o n or the concept
a l l e g i a n c e to a c o m m o n Grown.
p r e p a r e d that a United
Pie w o u l d , however, he Ireland should
a g r e e m e n t s for m i l i t a r y
enter
into members c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h other
o f the C o m m o n w e a l t h . The Lord P r e s i d e n t said that M r . de V a l e r a had clearly expected
him to say s o m e t h i n g on this question.
A f t e r m a k i n g it clear that he had no authority
to discuss the m a t t e r o n b e h a l f of H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t and w a s e x p r e s s i n g only his p e r s o n a l v i e w s , he had said that in his o p i n i o n the wisest
f o r a l l concerned w a s to avoid p r e c i p i t a t i n g the
course
issue There was no prospect of securing of Partition.
N o r t h e r n Ireland's c o n s e n t , i n anything like the
early N o r had f u t u r e , to any scheme for a U n i t e d Ireland,
the atmosphere f o r d i s c u s s i o n of this issue b e e n improved b y Eire's n e u t r a l i t y
denials of a l l e g i a n c e
therefore prefer
in the w a r and "by her to the c o m m o n C r o w n .
to m a i n t a i n a p o l i c y of
close co-operative relations
H e would developing in matters of c o m m o n c o n c e r n b u t to avoid p r e c i p i t a t i n g the issue of T h i s , if r a i s e d , would lead to v i o l e n t Partition.
c o n t r o v e r s y w h i c h could b r i n g no advantage to any of the parties
that
concerned.
in that event
M r . de V a l e r a had
the difficulties
indicated in the relations b e t w e e n this country and E i r e would have to c o n t i n u e . The Lord P r e s i d e n t said that he had s u b s e q u e n t l y b e e n able to g i v e an account of this c o n v e r s a t i o n to the P r i m e Minister
The
of N o r t h e r n
latter had said t h a t , if t h e issue w e r e
t h e r e would he a storm
in U l s t e r .
Public
Ireland. raised, opinion
there w o u l d insist on two p o i n t s : -
(i)
t h a t , "before a U n i t e d Ireland was established, S i r e should enter
the
B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h , declare a l l e g i a n c e to the C r o w n , and u n d e r t a k e specified m i l i t a r y o b l i g a t i o n s ;
that,
and
some p r o v i s i o n should be m a d e to ensure
R o m a n Catholic priests w o u l d no longer
improperly
in State affairs.
that
(ii) intervene
F o r their p a r t , the opposed N o r t h e r n Ireland Government would b e resolutely
to the o p e n i n g of any discussions on the P a r t i t i o n iss ue. T H E S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E F O R D O M I N I O N AFFAIRS said that he w a s g r a t e f u l to the Lord P r e s i d e n t
for g i v i n g the C a b i n e t this account of his c o n v e r s a t i o n s , and h e congratulated h i m o n the s k i l l w i t h which he had conducted his interview with Nr.
de V a l e r a . T h e Secretary of State strongly endorsed
the view that it w o u l d b e inopportune to raise the P a r t i t i o n issue.
Mr.
As a result of Eire's record in the late w a r , de V a l e r a w a s in d i f f i c u l t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y
with those w h o had p r e v i o u s l y supported h i m in the United States;
and
it would o h v i o u s l y suit him to revive the I r i s h controversy on a b a s i s w h i c h w o u l d enable him to r a l l y his e a r l i e r
no d o u b t , w a s
sympathizers and s u p p o r t e r s .
among the considerations w h i c h
influenced
him in s e e k i n g to raise a g a i n the issue of Partition. F r o m our p o i n t of view, h o w e v e r , it was equally clear that we should b e w e l l - a d v i s e d
this
controversy. to avoid
This,
a r e v i v a l of The Secretary of State r e c a l l e d
that, s o o n after the G o v e r n m e n t ^
a s s u m p t i o n of o f f i c e , he had submitted, a m e m o r a n d u m
( C P . (45) 1 5 2 ) r e c o m m e n d i n g that our g e n e r a l p o l i c y towards S i r e should h e
quickly and u n o b t r u s i v e l y to r e s t o r e friendly relations b y
no o p p o r t u n i t y of p r o m o t i n g intercourse and
in p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r s .
policy on 18th September, 1945;
co-operation
The Cabinet had approved
losing
that
and h e was glad to b e able to r e p o r t that satisfactory p r o g r e s s had since b e e n m a d e a l o n g these lines.
continue
He hoped that Ministers would to t a k e such opportunities
as offered
p r o m o t i n g closer r e l a t i o n s w i t h E i r e . .
for In p a r t i c u l a r , ready he hoped that the M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e would b e
to advise or assist r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
visiting
this country w i t h a view
of the E i r e G o v e r n m e n t to i n c r e a s i n g the
level of food p r o d u c t i o n in E i r e , prospect THE H O M E S E C R E T A R Y said that he saw no
of any s o f t e n i n g of N o r t h e r n Ireland's attitude
towards
the c o n c e p t i o n of a U n i t e d Ireland,
H e strongly
the view
precipitate that we should do n o t h i n g to
supported
d i s c u s s i o n of the P a r t i t i o n issue. T H E MINISTER O P HEALTH p o i n t e d out that
there w e r e some sections of o p i n i o n in E i r e w h i c h would b e o p p o s e d to the c r e a t i o n of a United Ireland,
The
p r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c y adopted b y t h e E i r e G o v e r n m e n t
had the effect of c r e a t i n g , in D u b l i n and other
c e n t r e s , vested
interests
had industrial
in the r e t e n t i o n of P a r t i t i o n . The Cabinet
-
T o o k n o t e , w i t h approval, of the memoranda circulated b y the Lord P r e s i d e n t and
the S e c r e t a r y o f State for D o m i n i o n Affairs and of the statements m a d e
of the discussion. Cabinet O f f i c e , S.W.I. Copies
V-6
; -
VWsVe,-.
in the course C M . ( 4 6 ) 95TH C O N C L U S I O N S 7th N o v e m b e r ,
19h6
-
11
a.m.
recently T H E M I N I S T E R OP HEATJLH said -chat he h a d
been
asked w h e t h e r
be any f i n a n c i a l assistance could
given to those w h o h a d suffered loss through the h e a v y flooding which h a d occurred
in Salford in
There could be no question of affording
public f u n d s ;
from any relief
and, from e n q u i r i e s which he h a d m a d e , he doubted w h e t h e r
assistance
September. the a p p l i c a n t s would qualify
from any of the m a i n
for charitable f u n d s , such as the L o r d M a y o r ' s F u n d . These e n q u i r i e s had, h o w e v e r , led h i m to consider whether
the G o v e r n m e n t
should not
institute
special some
of i n v e s t i g a t i o n into the constitution and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
these charitable
money,
funds.
and h e w a s not
employed to the best
They held
substantial sums of satisfied that these were
advantage. It was the v i e w of the Cabinet
not be an o p p o r t u n e
initiative
being that this w o u l d time for the Government
in p r o p o s i n g
to take
If a such an investigation.
demand f o r such an investigation w e r e made by
the private to command a substantial m e a s u r e
of support in the House of Commons, the Government m i g h t
then
take the matter u p .
M e m b e r s and appeared
But
it would be inexpedient
M i n i s t e r s to take any initiative at
to the extent
the m a t t e r
of encouraging private M e m b e r s to
in the House of C o m m o n s . Cabinet O f f i c e ,
C f i e * Vo :
e
the present
S.W.1. frt^vxt WtriSaVev ,
Home. SecvtVavVj
FV^isVcr
of
HeoAt-V,
for
t i m e , even raise C M . (US)
95th
7th November,
1946
CONCLUSIONS 11
a.m.
T H E PRIME M I N I S T E R reminded the Cabinet
that
H.R.H. P r i n c e s s E l i z a b e t h would b e c o m e 21 y e a r s of age on 21st April, 191+7*
A private individual had m a d e
suggestion that subscriptions should be
t h i s suggestion
invited towards a The P r i m e Minister n a t i o n a l present to the P r i n c e s s .
said that
the did not seem to him to b e a happy one and he felt sure that it should not b e given any official
He had, however, been encouragement.
considering whether the Cabinet should themselves make some presentation to the Princess or take some other
in recognition of her 21st birthday;
and he would b e glad to have his colleagues' v i e w s on this point.
ascertained that the p r e c e d e n t s did not
resolution or action by Parliament
action He had call for any in recognition
of
the corning-of-age of the heir to the T h r o n e . In discussion,
it w a s
5 6
suggested that b y virtue
of the R e g e n c y Act, 191+3* Princess E l i z a b e t h could b e
regarded as having come of age on her eighteenth b i r t h d a y
and that it would therefore be inappropriate
cognisance of her 21st b i r t h d a y .
g e n e r a l v i e w of the C a b i n e t
to take
formal
It w a s , however, the
that, if the R o y a l Family
proposed to celebrate the Princess' 21st birthday, it
w o u l d b e fitting for His M a j e s t y ' s M i n i s t e r s to take
x
some
T h i s suggestion w a s in any event m i s c o n c e i v e d .
The
A c t of 191+3 m e r e l y enabled the heir apparent or presumptive to act as a Counsellor of State from age eighteen.
It did not alter the fact that the heir to the Throne, l i k e any other subject, does not b e c o m e of full age until 2 1 . appropriate m e a n s of recognising
showed that
Discussion
the C a b i n e t ' s preference would h a v e been for entertaining
10, Downing
it.
Street
the Princess at a dinner
rather
at
than giving her a p r e s e n t . present It w a s , h o w e v e r , p o i n t e d out that u n d e r
a r r a n g e m e n t s Her R o y a l H i g h n e s s would be in South A f r i c a on the a c t u a l d a t e of her
THE PRIME M I N I S T E R
birthday. light said that, in the
of the C a b i n e t ' s d i s c u s s i o n he w o u l d make f u r t h e r enquiries about
the
a r r a n g e m e n t s contemplated by
the Royal F a m i l y for c e l e b r a t i n g
the
21st b i r t h d a y of P r i n c e s s E l i z a b e t h . Cabinet
Office,
S.W.1
C M . ( 4 6 ) 97th
18th N o v e m b e r ,
Conclusions 1946
-
12 noon In the Debate on the Motion for an TB ON 1A0V A d d r e s s in reply to the K i n g ' s Speech a number of Government
supporters had tabled an Amendment in the following
terms: ­
"And e x p r e s s the urgent hope that H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government will so review and recast i t s conduct of International A f f a i r s a s to afford the utmost encouragement
to, and collaboration with, all N a t i o n s and G r o u p s striving to secure full Socialist planning and control of the w o r l d ' s resources and t h u s provide a democratic and constructive Socialist alternative to an otherwise inevitable conflict between American Capitalism and Soviet Communism in w h i c h all hope of W o r l d Government would be destroyed." Those supporting this Amendment,
they did not propose
to press
it t o a d i V i s i o n
were a n x i o u s to h a v e an opportunity of
their views in the debate;
while
9
expressing and M r . Speaker had d e c i d e d to call the A m e n d m e n t . THE PRIME M I N I S T E R said that
group of Members had chosen a most
this inopportune
moment for the public expression of their v i e w s , and the debate could not fail
to the Government
U n i t e d States.
this g r o u p
to be
embarrassing in their relations with the It w a s also unfortunate
that should have chosen to raise these
by way of formal Amendment
to the A d d r e s s
issues
and should have persisted in this course in spite of Government's the advice given to them on the
behalf.
would T h i s issue of Party discipline
h a v e to be dealt with at an early meeting
Parliamentary Labour
of
Party. THE M I N I S T E R OF FUEL A N D POWER
that he could not condone
g r o u p in raising
these
to the A d d r e s s .
the action
of
this the Coalition
Government
h a d been in o f f i c e , he had at times been
h e h a d made it a rule never
the
amendment
himself in d e b a t e s on the A d d r e s s . should recognise
r e f l e c t e d a feeling
thought
this u n e a s i n e s s was shared
to the Cabinet
to
He
occasions it necessary on two
to question p a r t i c u l a r aspects of foreign
He had submitted
in
policy; some extent by/members of the G o v e r n m e n t .
himself had
that
of uneasiness
the party about the G o v e r n m e n t ' s foreign
and he thought that
some severely
to associate
same time, the Cabinet
this Amendment
but, in spite of this, critical of their policy;
At
said
issues by way of an Amendment While
w i t h any f o r m a l
the policy. a memorandum
on policy t o w a r d s Germany which, in h i s view, had
been f u l l y justified by subsequent
also events.
He had
informed the Prime Minister of d o u b t s which he entertained
but
of Government policy
the Prime M i n i s t e r had not
to bring that
Cabinet.
in the Middle
thought
it
East; advisable issue forward for discussion by the M i n i s t e r s who were not m e m b e r s of the Defence Committee
were not p e r h a p s fully
of all the strategic
informed
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which were being taken into account
in the formulation of foreign policy.
It would be helpful if
Cabinet itself could be given more
the
opportunities
for full and g e n e r a l discusaionson foreign
policy. THE PRIME MINISTER
would consider m e a n s of enabling
said that he
to hold the Cabinet
more frequent discussions on m a t t e r s of f o r e i g n policy. THE PRIME MINISTER
particularly
was said that he
concerned to find that about
half-a­
dozen P a r l i a m e n t a r y Private Secretaries to M i n i s t e r s had added their n a m e s to this Amendment A s he had said, he regarded it to the A d o r e s s .
bench as a b r e a c h of Party discipline for b a c k
supporters of the Government
their to express
criticism of Government policy by way of an Amendment
to the A d d r e s s , which was
to a formal expression of lack of confidence
the G o v e r n m e n t .
tantamount
It was an even more
in
serious
matter for Parliamentary Private Secretaries to lend their support
They had to such an amendment.
available access to some information which was not
to back bench M e m b e r s
and held p o s i t i o n s of
if not of responsibility.
A c c e p t a n c e of
trust,
these
p o s t s involved loyalty to the individual M i n i s t e r whom they
served and to the Government
as a w h o l e . A Parliamentary Private Secretary who f o u n d himself in disagreement
extent
w i t h Government p o l i c y to
such an as to wish to support a hostile Amendment
the A d d r e s s should, in his view, resign
position.
Private
his It was f o r consideration whether
parliamentary
to
Secretaries who had
the
supported
this Amendment
should be required
to resign their p o s t s . In d i s c u s s i o n
there was general support for
the view expressed by the Prime Minister.
P a r l i a m e n t a r y Private
Secretaries
not were not members of the Government
and were
therefore bound by the doctrine
collective responsibility.
of
They must, like other
supporters, be allowed a reasonable
Government discretion to express c r i t i c i s m s of p a r t i c u l a r aspects of Government policy;
and there n e e d not be
any absolute rule which would prevent a Parliamentary Private Secretary from speaking
against
the Government
c a s e , voting against
in the House or even, in an extreme He m u s t , the G o v e r n m e n t .
h o w e v e r , be careful to consider whether on any particular
o c c a s i o n such action would
disloyalty
to h i s M i n i s t e r or embarrassment
the Government
as a w h o l e .
between
a P a r l i a m e n t a r y Private
to
be A n d it must not
overlooked that, in v i e w of the close
involve
relations
Secretary and h i s M i n i s t e r , public criticism of another Minister
by
a p a r l i a m e n t a r y Private
in
Secretary might
result
lack of confidence between M i n i s t e r s and possibly f r i c t i o n within
the C a b i n e t . D i s c u s s i o n then turned on the
whether
had
question the p a r l i a m e n t a r y Private Secretaries who supported this Amendment
to the A d d r e s s
be required at once to resign t h e i r
or whether
it w o u l d suffice
should
appointments, to warn them that
if any similar occasion arose in the future they w o u l d have to choose between resigning
or refraining f r o m publicly
positions their
supporting
criticism of the G o v e r n m e n t .
It w a s pointed
of their conduct, and that
these c i r c u m s t a n c e s the position
met by a warning.
The point was also made
were required simultaneously
be assumed
pursuance
in the Cabinet w a s in f a v o u r of
private Secretary,
that they could not exxject
of explaining obligations and warning
associated
themselves with a c o n c e r t e d attack on
them
position to retain that
if, on another such occasion, they
give
Government The M i n i s t e r s concerned u n d e r t o o k to such a warning
Secretaries.
to their parliamentary
The Prime Minister
ask the Minister of Pood
Private
said that he
(who was not present
Parliamentary Private Secretary, who w a s
those who h a d supported
C%C^
VD
the Amexidment. O f f i c e , S.W.1. ^rV^e.
VAWsVc^-
""5*
would at
the C a b i n e t ' s m e e t i n g ) to d e a l similarly w i t h h i s Cabinet
­
the p o s i t i o n of involved b y acceptance of
Parliamentary
in
dissatisfaction
The balance
to those concerned the n a t u r e of the
policy.
taken
of the Government
and this w o u l d tend to arouse f u r t h e r
opinion
to resign, it would decision
in the parliamentary P a r t y .
that,
Secretaries
that this action had been
of a collective
in
be could best
if all these p a r l i a m e n t a r y Private
out
unaware that several of those concerned h a d been
of the impropriety
such
among THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRjTANMC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
/
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
/
It is issued for the personal use of
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C;,,.M. ( 4 6 ) 104TH CONCLUSIONS . jfinu teJS
Confidential Annex
(10th D e c e m b e r ,
INDIA
Constitutional
Position
1946 ­ 11. 0 a.m. )
I n the course of the Cabinet's d i s c u s s i o n
on the r e s u l t s of the recent visit o f Indian leaders
to this c o u n t r y , T H E P R I M E MINISTER said that it
was impossible to be confident that the m a i n
p o l i t i c a l Parties in India had any r e a l w i l l to
- reach agreement b e t w e e n themselves.
Pandit N e h r u ' s
present policy seemed to be to secure complete
d o m i n a t i o n b y C o n g r e s s throughout the government
of India.
If a c o n s t i t u t i o n w a s framed w h i c h had
this effect, there w o u l d c e r t a i n l y b e strong
reactions from the M u s l i m s .
Provinces with a
M u s l i m m a j o r i t y m i g h t refuse to join a c e n t r a l
G o v e r n m e n t o n such terms at all;, and the ultimate
result of Congress p o l i c y m i g h t b e the establishment
of that P a k i s t a n w h i c h they so m u c h disliked.
The Prime Minister warned the C a b i n e t that the
s i t u a t i o n m i g h t so develop as to result in c i v i l
w a r in' I n d i a , w i t h a l l the b l o o d s h e d w h i c h that
would entail.
There seemed to b e little
r e a l i s a t i o n among I n d i a n leaders of the risk
that ordered government might collapse.
The Cabinet felt that, however m u c h the
Indian p o l i t i c i a n s m i g h t abuse the B r i t i s h R a j ,
there was always at the b a c k of t h e i r minds the
sense that the A r m y w a s there and would b e able
to deal w i t h civil disorder.
T h i s dulled their
sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the consequences of
their p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s .
Apart from this,
however, such c o n f i d e n c e in the authority of the
A r m y was no longer f u l l y justified.
The strength
of the B r i t i s h F o r c e s in India was not great.
A n d the I n d i a n A r m y , though the C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f
had great p e r s o n a l influence w i t h i t , could not
f a i r l y b e expected to p r o v e a r e l i a b l e instrument
for m a i n t a i n i n g public order in conditions
tantamount to c i v i l w a r .
One t h i n g was quite
certain v i z . , that w e could not p u t b a c k the clock
and introduce a period of firm B r i t i s h rule.
N e i t h e r the m i l i t a r y nor the administrative m a c h i n e
in India w a s any longer capable of this.
Some M i n i s t e r s felt that i n the event
our only course m i g h t prove to b e to evacuate
India and to leave the Indians to find, after a
period no doubt of c h a o s , their o w n s o l u t i o n to
their own p r o b l e m s .
The Cabinet w e r e assured
that p l a n s " w e r e b e i n g m a d e for e v a c u a t i n g , in an
extreme e m e r g e n c y , b o t h British t r o o p s and civilians
f r o m India.
Other Ministers f e l t , however, that
e v e n if such e v a c u a t i o n w e r e p r a c t i c a b l e as a
m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n ­ and it would not he an easy
o p e r a t i o n to c a r r y out - it was n o t , politically, realistic to suppose that we should, he able to o u l d it h e acceptable to adopt that course.
P a r l i a m e n t and to p u b l i c o p i n i o n that we should leave India in c h a o s , having ohtained no guarantee of fair treatment for the Muslims or for the other minorities?
That would indeed be an inglorious end
to our long a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h India.
World opinion w o u l d regard it as a policy of scuttle unworthy of a great P o w e r . w
There w a s g e n e r a l agreement that so grave a d e c i s i o n could not b e taken, without the most anxious thought.
The d e c i s i o n need not be prejudged at this stage.
Matters might not reach so serious a p a s s .
It was certainly the w i s h of t h e great masses o f the Indian people that there should continue to b e ordered government throughout I n d i a and the leaders of the political Parties in India might w e l l b e forced to take account of this. For t h e m o m e n t , the important t h i n g was to secure that these leaders faced the difficulties w h i c h inevitably accompanied m a j o r constitutional changes in India.
W e should do anything that w e could to b r i n g home to them the heavy weight of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w h i c h rested o n them. C a b i n e t O f f i c e , S.W.1. 11th D e c e m b e r , 1946. THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
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iff
C..M. (46) 108TH C O N C L U S I O N S Confidential
Annex (31st D e c e m b e r , 1946 - 1 1 a.m. ) INDIA
Constitutional
Pos ition (Previous
Reference;'
C M . ( 4 6 ) 106th
Conclusions,
Minute 4 )
The C a b i n e t considered m e m o r a n d a b y the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ( C P . ( 4 6 ) 456) and the M i n i s t e r of D e f e n c e ( C P . ( 4 6 ) 4 6 8 ) o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n in I n d i a . T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R , in a m p l i f i c a t i o n of his m e m o r a n d u m , informed the Cabinet of the discussions w h i c h the India and Burma Committee had had w i t h the V i c e r o y since the departure of the Indian representatives.
T h e V i c e r o y had urged t h a t , if it b e c a m e clear that the Muslim League would not co-operate in the w o r k of the Constituent Assembly and that the p l a n of the Cabinet M i s s i o n could not b e carried t h r o u g h , we should have in r e a d i n e s s a definite
p o l i c y w h i c h w o u l d then b e announced. In the V i c e r o y ' s o p i n i o n w e should not b e able to enforce B r i t i s h r u l e i n India beyond 31st M a r c h , 1 9 4 8 . The Committee had considered that an announcement of our i n t e n t i o n to leave India b y a s p e c i f i c date m i g h t have t h e effect of b r i n g i n g the two c o m m u n i t i e s together.
It w o u l d also have the advantage that it would m a k e it p o s s i b l e for us to take the first steps' towards our d e p a r t u r e .
They therefore proposed that a statement should h e made on the lines of the draft annexed to C P . (46) 456.
L e g i s l a t i o n must h e deferred until the f i n a l s t a g e of our departure. It was therefore proposed that P a r l i a m e n t should b e invited to pass a r e s o l u t i o n endorsing the statement of p o l i c y , so as to p r o v i d e some P a r l i a m e n t a r y s a n c t i o n enabling the Government to p r o c e e d w i t h the gradual d e v o l u t i o n of their authority in India. T h e Prime Minister explained that the V i c e r o y had at first suggested that t h e initial steps towards our d e p a r t u r e should take the form of complete w i t h d r a w a l f r o m the four S o u t h e r n P r o v i n c e s . After d i s c u s s i o n , however, it had b e e n agreed t h a t , w h i l e B r i t i s h troops might be w i t h d r a w n from those areas and B r i t i s h officials s e r v i n g there posted to other p a r t s of the c o u n t r y , it would b e necessary, in the initial s t a g e s , to m a i n t a i n the p r e s e n t constitutional forms. D i s c u s s i o n turned first o n the q u e s t i o n
9.
whether it would "be w i s e to announce in the near
**­
future a precise date for our withdrawal f r o m India.
W a s it w i s e to commit ourselves to a precise date
w h e n w e had no assurance that there would by t h e n he
a representative authority to w h o m we could hand
over p o w e r ?
It m i g h t b e that if w e left India at
that d a t e we should leave only chaos and the prospect
of c i v i l war b e h i n d us.
It was also necessary to
consider t h e effect of such an announcement on
other p a r t s of the Empire and on world opinion in
general.
Some M i n i s t e r s felt that an announcement
in the terms of the draft attached to C. p. (46) 456
might b e regarded as the b e g i n n i n g of the
l i q u i d a t i o n of the British E m p i r e :
and it would b e
b o u n d to have serious r e p e r c u s s i o n s in B u r m a , Malaya
and elsewhere.
N o r m u s t w e forget that a b r e a k d o w n
of ordered central Government in India would provide
o p p o r t u n i t i e s to her n e i g h b o u r s , w h i c h they would not
b e slow to take, to interest themselves in I n d i a n
affairs.
W e m i g h t w e l l find that in this area lay
the seeds of a future world conflict.
T H E FOREIGN S E C R E T A R Y thought that the announcement proposed would have serious repercussions in the M i d d l e East. H e recalled that in the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Egypt we had claimed that it would not be practicable for us to withdraw our troops f r o m that country b e f o r e 1949.
How should we r e c o n c i l e this claim with a statement that w e were prepared to evacuate the whole of India b y the spring of 1948? The g e n e r a l f e e l i n g of the C a b i n e t Was that w i t h d r a w a l from India need not appear to be forced u p o n us b y our w e a k n e s s nor to be the first step in the d i s s o l u t i o n of the E m p i r e .
On the contrary this action m u s t b e s h o w n to b e the logical c o n c l u s i o n , which we w e l c o m e d , of a policy followed b y successive Governments for m a n y years.
It was too late to reverse the w h o l e d i r e c t i o n of our I n d i a n p o l i c y , even if we had had any desire to do s o , and there w a s no r e a s o n to fear s p e c i a l repercussions from the c o m p l e t i o n of that policy.
Our m a i n objective now was to b r i n g the p r i n c i p a l communities in India to c o - o p e r a t e , so that there should b e a properly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e authority to w h o m w e could hand over power.
If the V i c e r o y was correct in his estimate that we should in any case b e unable to continue e f f e c t i v e l y to rule India b e y o n d the early p a r t of 1 9 4 8 , and if the announcement of our intention to leave India b"y a specified date might have the effect of bringing- the communities together, then it would b e w e l l to derive w h a t e v e r advantage we could-from the early announcement of a c t i o n w h i c h would, in fact, be inevitable. The C a b i n e t then considered what would be the b e s t method of securing P a r l i a m e n t a r y a p p r o v a l for the g r a d u a l d e v o l u t i o n of authority in India. THE MINISTER O F D E F E N C E explained that his o b j e c t , in p u t t i n g forward the draft r e s o l u t i o n annexed to C P . ( 4 6 ) 4 6 8 , w a s to secure for H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government a greater latitude in h a n d l i n g a fluid s i t u a t i o n which m i g h t w e l l produce
O
d e v e l o p m e n t s w h i c h could not h e f o r e s e e n .
For
. " this r e a s o n he would w i s h to avoid m a k i n g a detailed p u b l i c statement on all the specific points covered i n the draft annexed to C P . (46) 4 0 6 , and would p r e f e r to ask Parliament to adopt a r e s o l u t i o n o n b r o a d e r lines w h i c h would authorise His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t to take such steps as m i g h t b e required t o ensure the orderly transfer of p o w e r to the a p p r o p r i a t e authority or authorities in India. O n the other side it was argued that P a r l i a m e n t would b e reluctant to give the Government so w i d e a d i s c r e t i o n as w a s p r e - s u p p o s e d b y the draft r e s o l u t i o n annexed to C P . (46) 468that the G o v e r n m e n t s p o k e s m e n in the debate on such a r e s o l u t i o n would in any event b e obliged to give i n f o r m a t i o n on m o s t of the specific points covered in the draft s t a t e m e n t of policy annexed to and that t h e m o r e detailed statement C . P . ( 4 6 ) 456*
w a s likely to p r o d u c e a g r e a t e r impact on public o p i n i o n in India. The Cabinet's c o n c l u s i o n o n this p o i n t w a s that the p r e f e r a b l e course w o u l d
b e to m a k e a s t a t e m e n t of p o l i c y , as
p r o p o s e d b y the P r i m e M i n i s t e r in C P . ( 4 6 ) 4 5 6 , and to invite Parliament to approve that statement.
It w o u l d , however, b e advantageous if the r e s o l u t i o n a p p r o v i n g the statement could b e drawn i n s u c h terms as to afford some s a n c t i o n f o r departing;, during the transition p e r i o d , from strict compliance w i t h a l l the o b l i g a t i o n s r e s t i n g on H i s Majesty's Government under the Government of I n d i a Act. D i s c u s s i o n then turned on the form of the draft statement annexed to C P . ( 4 6 ) 456.
The
view w a s expressed that a statement in these terms would give the i m p r e s s i o n that we w e r e b e i n g forced out of India b e c a u s e we w e r e unable to m a i n t a i n our p o s i t i o n there.
In f a c t , our w i t h d r a w a l w o u l d b e the f i n a l stage in a d e l i b e r a t e policy of encouraging India's development towards s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t , to w h i c h successive G o v e r n m e n t s in this country had s u b s c r i b e d for the last thirty years.
It w a s c e r t a i n l y the desire of t h e present G o v e r n m e n t that the Indian p e o p l e should assume full responsibility of s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t .
There w a s , therefore, no o c c a s i o n to excuse our w i t h d r a w a l :
we should r a t h e r claim c r e d i t for taking this initiative in t e r m i n a t i n g B r i t i s h rule i n India and t r a n s f e r r i n g our responsibilities to the representatives of the I n d i a n people.
For these reasons it w o u l d b e p r e f e r a b l e that the d e t a i l e d proposals set out in the draft annexed to C.P.(46) 45:6 should be set in a w i d e r framework.
T h e statement should recall the m a i n stages in India's evolution towards s e l f ­
g o v e r n m e n t , as a process to w h i c h successive G o v e r n m e n t s in this country had b e e n committed ever since the end of the last w a r , and should present the transfer of c o n t r o l to an I n d i a n Government or G o v e r n m e n t s as the final p h a s e in this p r o c e s s of evolution.
The specific proposals for the w i t h d r a w a l 1
1
-3­
of B r i t i s h troops and officials should h e presented as incidents in that transfer of authority.
If
the statement were re-cast on these l i n e s , it should h e possihle to include passages calling upon the I n d i a n people to demonstrate their capacity for s e l f ­
g o v e r n m e n t and to m a k e adequate p r o v i s i o n for s a f e ­
g u a r d i n g the rights of m i n o r i t i e s . The Cabinet agreed that the draft statement
annexed to C P . (46) 456 should be re-cast on the lines' indicated above. The C a b i n e t next considered the t i m i n g of s u c h a statement.
The India and Burma C o m m i t t e e had contemplated that the statement should not he m a d e u n t i l it w a s k n o w n , towards the end of J a n u a r y , w h e t h e r the M u s l i m L e a g u e were
unwilling to c o l l a b o r a t e in the w o r k of the Constituent Assembly. In support of this p r o p o s a l for deferring the statement until t h e n , it was p o i n t e d out that s o m e m e m b e r s of the M u s l i m League were dissatisfied w i t h Mr. Jinnah's present attitude and there was some p o s s i b i l i t y that the League might b e brought to agree to participate in the w o r k of the Constituent Assembly.
Other developments m i g h t occur in India d u r i n g the next few weeks which m i g h t affect the position.
F u r t h e r , there were s t r o n g arguments against m a k i n g such a declaration of policy at a time w h e n Parliament was in r e c e s s . On the other side, it was argued that, as the p r i m a r y object of the d e c l a r a t i o n was to force the two P a r t i e s in India to face the r e a l i t i e s of the s i t u a t i o n and find m e a n s of collaborating w i t h one another,, there was m u c h to be said against p o s t p o n i n g it until after the M u s l i m League had taken a definite decision against collaboration.
It w a s also argued that it w a s not constitutionally n e c e s s a r y that such a d e c l a r a t i o n should first b e made i n Parliamentand t h a t , even if it were thought expedient that this should b e d o n e , it would h e p o s s i b l e to convene Parliament for this p u r p o s e b e f o r e the date on which it was now due to r e ­
assemble,
This would have the further advantage that P a r l i a m e n t a r y time for debating the d e c l a r a t i o n would not have to b e found at the expense of other Government b u s i n e s s . T h e C a b i n e t decided to defer for the p r e s e n t their f i n a l decision about the timing of the p r o p o s e d declaration. THE S E C R E T A R Y OF STATE FOR DOMINION A F F A I R S said that it was most important that His M a j e s t y ' s Government should take D o m i n i o n Governments into their confidence in this matter at the earliest p o s s i b l e stage.
H e hoped that, as soon as the form of the proposed declaration had b e e n settled. E ALP­
he m i g h t b e authorised to communicate it to D o m i n i o n G o v e r n m e n t s , so that they might have an o p p o r t u n i t y for comment before the declaration was made.
T h i s was agreed to. The Cabinet
­
(l)
Invited the India and Burma Committee to r e v i s e , i n the light of the C a b i n e t ' s discussion, the draft statement annexed to C.P.(46) 456. (2)
Agreed to r e s u m e their discussion of this matter w h e n a revised draft of the statement .was available. Cabinet O f f i c e , S.W.
1.