CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXES AND 'NQ CIRCULATION
*
""
' RECORDS C M , (.46)
1st Conclusions, Minute 1 -
14th Conclusions, Minute I -
2 18th
Conclusions, Minute 2 -
22nd Conclusions, Minute 3 -
Minute 6 ­
1 Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow.
(C.A.)
United Nations Organisation: Discussions in the Security Council.
(N.C.R.)
Foreign Office Staff.
Spain.
(N.C.R.)
India: Draft Directive to Cabinet Mission.
(C.A.)
Emergency Powers Act, 1920:
Supply and Transport Organisation.
(C.A.)
43rd Conclusions, Minute-1 ­
Germany.
5 5 t h Conclusions
India;
­
(N.C.E.)
(C.A.)
Constitutional Position.
(0.A.)
59th
Conclusions, Minute
3
­
India- Constitutional position.
(C.A.) THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MATESTY'S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
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C M . (U6) 1 ST C O N C L U S I O N S . M I N U T E 1 Confidential
(1st
January,
Annex 1 9I4.6 - 1 T a. m. )
MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN MOSCOW In the course of his account of the p r o c e e d i n g s at the recent m e e t i n g of F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s in M o s c o w , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y referred to e x c h a n g e s of v i e w s which h a d taken place on the following subjects in informal c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h M a r s h a l S t a l i n and M. Molotov;­
Mediterranean
(i) M a r s h a l S t a l i n h a d referred to the s u g g e s t i o n , put forward at the first meeting of the C o u n c i l of F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s , that the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t m i g h t be invited to undertake trusteeship of T r i p o l i t a n i a .
He
had e x p r e s s e d r e g r e t that the U n i t e d k i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t ; had not felt able to support this s u g g e s t i o n , a n d suggested that we had distrusted their intentions in' this m a t t e r .
The F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y had' said that it w a s n o t a question of m i s t r u s t :
we preferred to avoid c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t in this a r e a . M a r s h a l S t a l i n h a d then said that he was a n x i o u s that the B r i t i s h should not leave E g y p t .
The.Foreign
S e c r e t a r y said that we should shortly be u n d e r t a k i n g a r e v i s i o n of the E g y p t i a n ' T r e a t y , and he h o p e d that he could rely on sympathetic support from the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t in our n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the E g y p t i a n Government.
M a r s h a l S t a l i n had promised such support.. India Dutch E a s t Indies (ii) M a r s h a l Stalin had. spoken w i t h sympathy a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of our policy towards I n d i a .
He had referred to the d a n g e r s of a separatist m o v e m e n t in I n d i a , and he expressed the hope that India w o u l d remain
w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Commonwealth,,
I t w a s c l e a r that he w a s more a p p r e h e n s i v e of trouble from India and the F a r East than from the B a l k a n s . (iii) B o t h M a r s h a l S t a l i n and M l M o l o t o v had evidently feared that it m i g h t be our intention to incorporate I n d o n e s i a within the B r i t i s h Commonwealth.
The
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y had g i v e n them a clear assurance that we had no such d e s i g n s .
He had, h o w e v e r , e x p l a i n e d that the D u t c h had claims to these territories w h i c h we could not ignore and it was our p o l i c y to promote an amicable settlement between the D u t c h G o v e r n m e n t and the I n d o n e s i a n l e a d e r s .
There h a d been a f r a n k exchange of v i e w s , w h i c h should h a v e r e m o v e d any possible source o f m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n o u r s e l v e s and the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t on this question. ;
/ithdrawal o f
.11 led Troops
- (iv) The F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y said that he h a d tried, w i t h o u t success, to secure some a g r e e m e n t about the w i t h d r a w a l of A l l i e d troops from A u s t r i a .
When he sought to raise this q u e s t i o n , M. M o l o t o v had evaded the issue by bringing forward a l l e g a t i o n s that the B r i t i s h military a u t h o r i t i e s w e r e supporting F a s c i s t e l e m e n t s in A u s t r i a .
Similar charges h a d been made about the attitude of the B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s in Germany.
The Foreign S e c r e t a r y had disposed of these imputations against B r i t i s h C o m m a n d e r s , but he had not been able to bring the'discussion back to- the' question of w i t h d r a w a l of A l l i e d troops f r o m A u s t r i a . The F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y said that it w a s clear that the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t w e r e n o t yet r e a d y to d i s c u s s this question.
It was h i s impression that they were a n x i o u s , f o r domestic r e a s o n s , not to bring any more of their troops back into R u s s i a during the coming winter.
T h e internal position in R u s s i a was n o t , he thought, v e r y -satisfactory.
W a r damage was extensive;
and the administration were finding great difficulty in arranging for an industrial m a c h i n e h i g h l y geared for w a r to be turned over to peace-time production.
It w a s doubtful w h e t h e r the Soviet authorities
would be able to enforce in future the same
r i g i d control over l a b o u r as they had exercised before the w a r
F o o d w a s also s h o r t , and from that point of view also the Soviet Government found a d v a n t a g e s in k e e p i n g large n u m b e r s of troops in occupied territory. c
It seemed l i k e l y , h o w e v e r , that the S o v i e t
G o v e r n m e n t would w i s h to propose l a r g e - s c a l e
-withdrawals of A l l i e d forces of o c c u p a t i o n , as a
g e s t u r e , in connection w i t h the proposed P e a c e
C o n f e r e n c e - p o s s i b l y in the spring or e a r l y summer
of 1 9 4 6 . .
If so, they w o u l d probably propose the
s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h d r a w a l of A l l i e d A r m i e s of occupation
throughout the world - including the w i t h d r a w a l of
B r i t i s h troops from Greece and of United S t a t e s troops
f r o m China.
In the d i s c u s s i o n w h i c h followed the F o r e i g n Secretary's' s t a t e m e n t , the f o l l o w i n g points w e r e m a d e : ­
(a) THE M I N I S T E R OF H E A L T H asked w h e t h e r the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t w e r e likely to relax their rule p r o h i b i t i n g foreign aircraft f r o m flying over Soviet territory. ' THE F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y said that he had raised this question w i t h M a r s h a l S t a l i n , w h o w a s quite adamant on the p o i n t .
There w a s no
doubt that the S o v i e t authorities w e r e still h i g h l y reluctant to afford foreigners facilities for observing w h a t w a s g o i n g on w i t h i n S o v i e t territory.
The country w a s , in f a c t , passing through' a phase of great economic disturbance and d i f f i c u l t y .
The F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y said that it m i g h t be helpful to r e l a t i o n s between the two countries if he made some public reference to the economic d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h confronted the S o v i e t Government at the present time. (b) R e f e r e n c e w a s made to the attitude of France towards a g r e e m e n t s reached at Three-Power. M e e t i n g s . T H E F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y said that he w o u l d have preferred that P r a n c e should be associated w i t h these d i s c u s s i o n s , and he hoped that there would be no r e g u l a r m e e t i n g s of the three F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s after the m e e t i n g in W a s h i n g t o n w h i c h had already been mooted. It m u s t , h o w e v e r , be recognised that both the R u s s i a n s , and to a lesser extent the A m e r i c a n s , were at present u n w i l l i n g to treat France as a first-class P o w e r ;
and
the F r e n c h did n o t improve the position by their tendency to make claims d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to their present strength.
The F o r e i g n Secretary added that it w a s his policy to promote a closer understanding­
be tween this c o u n t r y and P r a n c e , a n d that our diijlomatic c o n t a c t s w i t h the F r e n c h , f r o m the Foreign M i n i s t e r d o w n w a r d s , were close and c o r d i a l .
It w a s , h o w e y e r , d i f f i c u l t to translate this u n d e r s t a n d i n g into terras of practical a c t i o n .
T h u s , while we were a n x i o u s to resume c o m m e r c i a l relations and the C h a n c e l l o r of the E x c h e q u e r had agreed to set aside a substantial amount of c u r r e n c y for the "purchase of F r e n c h g o o d s , the economic d i s l o c a t i o n of France w a s so g r e a t that it w a s p r o v i n g v e r y d i f f i c u l t to promote a flow of trade. The F r e n c h were a l s o d i s p o s e d , instead of b u i l d i n g up their international position by a series of a g r e e m e n t s on smaller issues on w h i c h a g r e e m e n t could readily be r e a c h e d , to insist on raising m a j o r questions w h i c h w e r e n o t ,yet ripe for i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n , e.g* the control of the R u h r . Cabinet Office, S.W.1. m
C M . (U6)
UNITED NATIONS
ORGANISATION —
CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 1
In the course of the C a b i n e t s
about the proceedings
discussion
in the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l or the Discussions in
the S e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n in I n d o n e s i a , T H E F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y said that C o u n c i l
he suspected
that the real o b j e c t i v e of the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t was to secure a foothold
If they s u c c e e d e d
enquiry into
in South-East A s i a . in t h e i r demand f o r a n
the conduct of British
independent troops in the D u t c h E a s t I n d i e s , this w o u l d b e a precedent for demanding
the appointment of a similar C o m m i s s i o n of enquiry in India if disorders "broke out there at the time of
the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l crisis w h i c h w a s now approaching.
As
s o o n as w e h a d overcome the immediate
in
difficulties
the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , we s h o u l d c o n s i d e r v e r y carefully h o w far the provisions of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Charter w e r e l i k e l y to permit independent investigations
into matters of dispute w i t h i n territories over w h i c h we
exercised sovereignty.
W e m i g h t f i n d ourselves in difficulty
in this respect "by r e a s o n of the l o o s e - k n i t organisation of the British C o m m o n w e a l t h :
f o r , w h i l e the S o v i e t Government w o u l d not s u g g e s t that the Security
Council c o u l d c o n c e r n itself w i t h m a t t e r s of dispute arising w i t h i n
the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , they m i g h t he able to m a i n t a i n
the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the C o u n c i l could c o n c e r n itself with disputes
ill
in British d e p e n d e n c i e s o v e r s e a s .
This w a s a p o s s i b i l i t y which the B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h m u s t
consider
very s e r i o u s l y as s o o n as the F i r s t G e n e r a l Assembly of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s O r g a n i s a t i o n was
concluded. The C a b i n e t s h o u l d also c o n s i d e r the
of the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t .
intentions Their attitude towards
Turkey a n d P e r s i a , their claims
to f o r m e r I t a l i a n C o l o n i e s
N o r t h A f r i c a , and their attempt to secure
of the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l
m a d e it m o r e
in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
than e v e r important that we should
without delay
intervention the
in Greece all p o i n t e d to a
to reduce British influence
in
desire
This
proceed with the r e v i s i o n of the E g y p t i a n T r e a t y ;
for
a s a t i s f a c t o r y T r e a t y w i t h E g y p t was the clue to c o n t i n u e d in the M i d d l e E a s t . B r i t i s h influence w i t h the A r a b S t a t e s
In the d i s c u s s i o n w h i c h f o l l o w e d THE M I N I S T E R
H E A L T H said that h e doubted w h e t h e r the prospects
were quite so b l a c k as the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y suggested.
recent p r o c e e d i n g s
in the S e c u r i t y Council h a d
OP The
enhanced B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e in the eyes of the w o r l d , and the C a b i n e t w e r e indebted to the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y for the s k i l f u l w a y in w h i c h h e h a d h a n d l e d these d i s c u s s i o n s .
The F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y h a d r e f e r r e d to the solidarity of C o m m u n i s t s
countries.
The M i n i s t e r h a d thought
in all
it s i g n i f i c a n t , h o w e v e r , that in the recent p r o c e e d i n g s
in the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l the Polish r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , though a C o m m u n i s t , h a d expressed views contrary
to those of the Soviet D e l e g a t i o n . H e h a d o t h e ^ evidence that i n c o u n t r i e s b o r d e r i n g o n the some S o v i e t U n i o n there w e r e g r o w i n g signs
of distaste f o r
aspects of S o v i e t rule.
that the C o m m u n i s t w a v e in E u r o p e was about
It m i g h t be
to recede.
allow R u s s i a n intransigence
p o s i t i o n i n f o r e i g n policy.
We m u s t n o t , t h e r e f o r e ,
to drive u s into an u n t e n a b l e The right course at the p r e s e n t time w a s to m a i n t a i n our p o s i t i o n and await developments.
He h i m s e l f b e l i e v e d that
the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of the S o v i e t Government was i n f l u e n c e d b y the extent
their i n t e r n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , b o t h economic
of and s o c i a l . T h e r e was no doubt that there was great internal s t r e s s
Russia
to-day. 11th February,
19U6
in 7 I n c o n n e c t i o n with
the d i s c u s s i o n o n the a p p o i n t m e n t of a S p e c i a l C o m m i s s i o n e r for S o u t h - E a s t Asia
(recorded in C M . (1+6) ll+th C o n c l u s i o n s , M i n u t e
2) T H E F O R E I G N S E C R E T A R Y recalled the public c r i t i c i s m of r e c e n t diplomatic
aware
a p p o i n t m e n t s and said that he was anxious that some s u p p o r t e r s of the G o v e r n m e n t w e r e
to s e e m o r e drastic changes m a d e in the staffing of the It w a s n o t F o r e i g n Office a n d diplomatic p o s t s abroad.
p o s s i b l e for h i m to m a k e the sweeping changes w h i c h some c r i t i c s desired;
b u t he w a s talcing steps to
the s t a f f , as o p p o r t u n i t i e s a r o s e .
strengthen W h e n L o r d Killtfarn took u p his n e w a p p o i n t m e n t as S p e c i a l C o m m i s s i o n e r
for South E a s t A s i a , he w o u l d b e r e p l a c e d in C a i r o b y S i r R o n a l d I. C a m p b e l l .
W a r Office
I n G r e e c e , he had a s k e d
to p o s t General S c o b i e to another
and h i s p l a c e w o u l d b e t a k e n b y General
appointment Crawford. S i r R e x L e e p e r w o u l d also b e m o v e d from A t h e n s
post.
the to another M r . le R o u g e t e l was shortly to b e m o v e d f r o m Bucharest.
In C h u n g k i n g there w o u l d b e l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l work for the time b e i n g , and he was taking this o p p o r t u n i t y of sending out as our representative
experience
there a m a n w i t h i n the C o n s u l a r Service who w o u l d b e able to d e v e l o p the c o m m e r c i a l side of the w o r k .
Changes
also b e i n f m a d e w i t h i n the F o r e i g n O f f i c e . 11th F e b r u a r y ^
19U6
were C.M.(k6)
18TH CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 2 (25th F e b r u a r y , 19^6
- 11 a. m . ) In a d d i t i o n to the p o i n t s noted i n
C.M.(il6)
18th C o n c l u s i o n s , Minute
2, the f o l l o w i n g
were m a d e i n the c o u r s e of the C a b i n e t ' s
THE MINISTER
(a)
OF E D U C A T I O N
points
discussion:­
said that one of the S p a n i s h R e p u b l i c a n s w h o had been shot was a v e r y good man,
and h i s e x e c u t i o n w a s a d e l i b e r a t e
Britain
affront to Great and F r a n c e . (b)
that, T H E M I N I S T E R OF F U E L A N D P O W E R said
although w e w e r e o n good
terms with M. Salazar,
there
seemed to be some p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o l l u s i o n between h i m and General F r a n c o . T H E M I N I S T E R O F STATE
be surprised
said that he would n o t if there w e r e such c o l l u s i o n , though the F o r e i g n O f f i c e had no evidence of i t . (c)
THE MINISTER
OF H E A L T H referred
r e v i v a l of the influence o f the R o m a n Catholic
throughout E u r o p e and particularly
(d)
the F r a n c o G o v e r n m e n t .
overthrow.
(e)
Church i n Spain. T H E M I N I S T E R OF E D U C A T I O N
w a s n o t possible to apply
to the asked w h e t h e r I t some e f f e c t i v e sanctions
W o r d s alone w o u l d n o t secure i t s Need we c o n t i n u e to supply Spain with
T H E M I N I S T E R OF STATE said that
Republicans in Spain
civil w a r .
oil? responsible were anxious that n o steps
be t a k e n w h i c h would p r e c i p i t a t e
they f a v o u r economic
against should
N o r would a c t i o n w h i c h w o u l d penalise the m a s s o f the Spanish people without c a u s i n g m u c h inconvenience
to G e n e r a l F r a n c o ' s i m m e d i a t e
supporters. T h e y also doubted w h e t h e r it was expedient
R e p u b l i c a n Government
that
should come into power
present m o m e n t , w h e n it would have to face a
food
the
crisis f o r w h i c h the F r a n c o Government
at
a
the serious should
bear responsibility. (f)
THE M I N I S T E R OF H E A L T H said
that, w h i l e he agreed w i t h m u c h that the M i n i s t e r of S t a t e had
said,
he would himself go f u r t h e r and point out that it would be a great spiritual reinforcement
to R e p u b l i c a n f o r c e s
S p a i n if they could be g i v e n some overt sign that
L a b o u r Government in the United K i n g d o m w e r e
towards them.
what
In his v i e w the C a b i n e t should
in S p a i n . O f f i c e , S.W.
1.
consider
Government
among Socialist p a r t i e s in E u r o p e , to assume the l e a d e r s h i p
Cabinet
this sympathetic
active steps could be talcen by H i s M a j e s t y ' s
especially
in THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
/dte....^.:....$£*£$ -
TOP S E C R E T
i
Qopy N o .
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BIS
C M . (1+6) 22ND C O N C L U S I O N S . MINUTE 5 Confidential Annex (8th M a r c h , 191+6
INDIA
Draft Directive
to Cabinet
Mission
-
-
11.15
a.m.)
The C a b i n e t h a d before them a m e m o r a n d u m ( C M . (1+6) 96) covering the draft of a directive to the Cabinet M i s s i o n to India. The draft gave the M i s s i o n liberty to say that His Majesty's Government would b e -prepared to recommend to Parliament any constitutional arrangement f o r the granting of independence and self-government to I n d i a , provided that it incorporated the f o l l o w i n g cardinal p o i n t s : -
(Previous
Reference:
C M . (1+6) 16th Conclusions,
(a)
S o m e form of protection m u s t b e Minute 7)
included either b y constitutional or treaty p r o v i s i o n for the protection of religious and racial m i n o r i t i e s . (b)
Satisfactory provision m u s t b e made for the defence of India and the Indian O c e a n area. (c)
Paramountcy m u s t n o t be h a n d e d over to an Indian Government. (d)
A satisfactory means must b e devised for winding up the financial position of India and Great B r i t a i n arising out of the present regime. T H E SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that the advice of the Chiefs of Staff was b e i n g sought o n the point noted in paragraph (b) above. A s regards ( d ) , the financial settlement involved important issues.
It w o u l d b e necessary to provide amongst other things for the service of various l o a n s , for the payment of civil and military pensions and for the disposal of India's accumulated sterling b a l a n c e s . T H E P R I M E MINISTER explained that it w o u l d not b e the duty of the Mission to enter into detailed discussion of these financial p o i n t s . which w o u l d he a m a t t e r for subsequent n e g o t i a t i o n b e t w e e n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m Government and the S u c c e s s i o n Government in India.
There
could be no question of offering at this stage concessions on the financial side in order to secure a political settlement. T h e Cabinet -
Invited the'Prime Minister to issue a directive to the Cabinet M i s s i o n to India in the terms of the draft attached to C P . (1+6) 9 6 . C a b i n e t O f f i c e , S.W.
1.
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
JLCyT. ^,
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C M . (1+6) 22ND C O N C L U S I O N S , MINUTE 6 Confidential A n n e x (8th M a r c h , 191+6
EMERGENCY
POWERS
kCT, 1920
Supply and
Transport
Organisation
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11.15 a.m.
)
The C a b i n e t considered a memorandum b y the Home Secretary ( C P . (1+6.) 87) embodying the report of a Committee appointed b y the Prime Minister to consider the revival of the supply and transport o r g a n i s a t i o n , which in the period b e t w e e n the two wars had b e e n held in readiness to operate under the Emergency Powers A c t , 1 9 2 0 , for the purpose of maintaining essential services in times of widespread industrial disturbances. The Committee had reached the conclusion that, if such an o r g a n i s a t i o n were to b e re-created, all sections of the c o m m u n i t y , including employers a n d trades u n i o n s , s h o u l d b e invited to "recognise that any such organisation must be the instrument of a n a t i o n a l rather than a sectional i n t e r e s t , and that their co-operation w o u l d be necessary in its f r a m i n g and, if the need should a r i s e , in its operation". The Committee had therefore prepared a statement (annexed to C P i (1+6) 87) of the principles which should govern the establishment of such an organisation;
and they suggested that, if this statement of principles w e r e approved b y the C a b i n e t , the question of creating an organisation f o r these purposes should be taken up in confidence with representatives of employers and trade unions after P a r l i a m e n t h a d passed the Trade Unions a n d Trade Disputes Bill. THE MINISTER OP HEALTH said that, although h e had b e e n a m e m b e r of the C o m m i t t e e , he could not support its recommendations.
He himself b e l i e v e d that the Government should m a k e no such preparations in advance for maintaining essential services in the event o f widespread industrial disturbances.
A n organisation, on the lines of the S u p p l y and Transport Organisation m u s t , if it was to work efficiently, be elaborate and costly;
and
it would b e impossible to prevent its existence f r o m becoming k n o w n .
The Government would, he t h o u g h t , f i n d it highlj'- embarrassing to defend in Parliament their action in creating such an organisation.
He
v/ould n o t himself be prepared to defend the use for these purposes of the regional organisation of the M i n i s t r y o f Health.
I n any event he doubted whether it was practicable to prepare in advance plans for m e e t i n g a purely hypothetical situation.
The right o r g a n i s a t i o n c o u l d n o t "be framed until it was known w h a t situation it would have to meet..
Different
types of organisation might be appropriate for different k i n d s of strike and in d i f f e r e n t parts of the country.In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , v/hile he agreed that it was a responsibility of Government to see that essential services w e r e maintained in the event of w i d e s p r e a d industrial d i s t u r b a n c e s , he was strongly of opinion that no preparations for this purpose s h o u l d h e made in a d v a n c e , and that the Government should rely on improvising arrangements at the last moment to m e e t the particular kind of s i t u a t i o n with which they were faced. There was general agreement that the Government m u s t accept the responsibility for seeing t h a t , in the circumstances contemplated b y the E m e r g e n c y Powers A c t , 1920 (which m i g h t a r i s e , not only from industrial d i s p u t e s , but also as a result of action taken b y political e x t r e m i s t s ) , there was no w i d e s p r e a d or lasting b r e a k - d o w n of services essential to the public safety and the life of the community.
D i s c u s s i o n then turned on the question whether preparations s h o u l d b e made in advance to enable the Government to discharge that responsibility. On this point THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could n o t accept the argument that no plans should h e m a d e until the nature of the emergency was known.
B y that time it m i g h t b e too late to make effective arrangements:
a n d plans improvised in a hurry at the last m o m e n t w e r e likely to c o n t a i n the very defects which it was desired to avoid, e.g. in the choice of persons to assume positions of local responsibility in an emergency.
He also cited the analogy of w a r p r e p a r a t i o n s , which were m a d e - and h a d to b e m a d e - against hypothetical c o n t i n g e n c i e s . F i n a l l y , h e p o i n t e d out that failure to m a k e preparations in advance w o u l d increase the risk that at the l a s t m o m e n t undue reliance w o u l d b e placed on military assistance. THE F O R E I G N SECRETARY, T H E F I R S T LORD OF THE A D M I R A L T Y and other Ministers endorsed the views expressed b y the Prime M i n i s t e r .
In the discussion, h o w e v e r , the point was s t r e s s e d that these preparations n e e d not b e carried at present beyond the stage of a paper plan.
Planning c o u l d be confined to senior officials in the W h i t e h a l l D e p a r t m e n t s m a i n l y concerned:
there n e e d b e n o consultation with regional officials and no communication of plans to regional headquarters:
and no persons outside the Government service n e e d b e b r o u g h t into consultation at the present s t a g e . THE LORD PRESIDENT said that the p r e l i m i n a r y work should include the p r e p a r a t i o n of draft R e g u l a t i o n s to be m a d e u n d e r the E m e r g e n c y Powers A c t , 1920. Having agreed that some preparations must he made in advance to meet' such an emergency, the Cabinet next considered whether it would be expedient to bring representatives of employers' organisations and t r a d e unions into confidential consultation in the making of these p r e p a r a t i o n s , THE P R E S I D E N T OP THE BOARD OP TRADE said t h a t , in m a k i n g this p r o p o s a l , the Committee h a d b e e n influenced b y the consideration that the creation of an organisation on the lines of the S u p p l y and Transport Organisation w o u l d involve far-reaching consultations with officials of numerous D e p a r t m e n t s ;
that the preparations which were thus being made were likely to become known;
and
that, if the matter w e r e raised in P a r l i a m e n t , an awkward political situation w o u l d a r i s e unless the Government were able to say that they were acting in consultation with representatives of the employers' organisations and trade u n i o n s . It was pointed out that, if planning were confined to the p r e p a r a t i o n of a paper scheme by a small n u m b e r of senior officials in Whitehall D e p a r t m e n t s , there was no reason to fear any public disclosure.
If,
however , the Government were asked in Parliament whether they had made preparations to meet such an emergency, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would himself he prepared to take the line that it was the duty of any Government to b e p r e p a r e d for such a contingency and he w o u l d not seek to c o n c e a l the fact that a paper scheme h a d b e e n prepared. H e w o u l d , h o w e v e r , decline to disclose the details of that scheme. 1
THE F O R E I G N SECRETARY - said that in his view it w o u l d b e inexpedient to bring representatives of the employers or trades unions into consultation in the p r e p a r a t i o n of such a scheme.
The trades unions would expect the Government to b e ready to maintain essential services in an emergency;
but if they were asked in advance to collaborate in devising an organisation for this p u r p o s e , they might regard this as an invitation to assist in building u p a strike-breaking organisation-. THE FIRST LORD OP THE ADMIRALTY supported this view. THE-MINISTER OF LABOUR and THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR S C O T L A N D said t h a t , although they h a d supported the recommendation m a d e b y the C o m m i t t e e , they were now o p p o s e d , on further reflection, to any advance consultation
with" the trade
unions. The Cabinet ­
( 1 ) A p p r o v e d the first two paragraphs of the
n o t e annexed to C P . (2+6) 8 7 , as a
statement of. the general principles
on which preparations should be made
for maintaining in a civil emergency
services essential to the public
safety and the life of the community?
(2) Agreed, that such preparations should b e made in advance; b u t directed that these should b e confined to the preparation of a p a p e r scheme b y a small n u m b e r of senior officials in the W h i t e h a l l D e p a r t m e n t s mainly concerned, that no c o m m u n i c a t i o n of this scheme (whether b y w a y of sealed instructions or otherwise) should b e m a d e to the regional- headquarters of Government D e p a r t m e n t s , -and that special c a r e should b e taken to reduce the risk of any public disclosure of these preparations. ( 3 ) A g r e e d that it was a responsibility of
Government to operate any organisation
required for m a i n t a i n i n g essential services
in a civil emergency;
and decided that
representatives of employers' organisations
and trade
unions should not b e b r o u g h t into
consultation in a d v a n c e , as contemplated in
the third paragraph of the Statement annexed
to C P . (2+65 8 7 .
(1+) Invited the H o m e S e c r e t a r y to arrange for further preparations to proceed in accordance with c o n c l u s i o n (2) above. C a b i n e t O f f i c e , S.W.1. \ THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
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C M . ( U 6 ) li5KD
COKCLD0IOH6.
U.
MINUTE 1
Confidential Annex (7th M a y , 19k6
GERMANY
(Previous
C M . (U6) 3 6 t h
Conclusions,
Minute 3 )
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11.0
a.m.)
The Cabinet had a preliminary exchange of views on a memorandum by the F o r e i g n Secretary ( C P . (246) 186) on future policy towards Germany." THE PRIME MINISTER said that this memorandum posed the alternatives of continuing to work towards a unified (though f e d e r a l ! sed)"' Germany or seeking to promote the formation of a
W e s t e r n German State or S t a t e s which would be a
bulwark against the spread of Communist
influence from the east.
He did n o t at this
stage seek f i n a l conclusions, but he wished to
have a preliminary exchange of views with his
Cabinet colleagues before these issues w e r e
discussed with the D o m i n i o n M i n i s t e r s ,
H i s own
view was that, both on general g r o u n d s and because
we had not the resources n e c e s s a r y to organise t h e
B r i t i s h zone of Germany as a stable separate u n i t ,
the F o r e i g n Secretary was right in suggesting that
the general dangers of splitting Germany were
greater than those of continuing our present­
policy and that we might hope to avoid the dangers
of excessive centralisation by encouraging
political development along federal l i n e s .
He
had recently received from the D e p u t y Military
Governor o f the Control Commission an appreciation,
dated 5 t h May, of the effect of a f u r t h e r
reduction or cessation of imports of food grains
into the British zone.
This appreciation
(which was rood to the Cabinet) showed the
magnitude of the problems confronting our administration in Germany, and afforded a striking illustration of the economic and political difficulties w i t h which we should be faced if we attempted now to build u p W e s t e r n Germany as a separate u n i t . T H E LORD P R E S I D E N T said that our acceptance of the conclusions of the Berlin Conference
had put us in a very weak position. H e believed that, as time went on, it would be generally recognised that the Berlin conclusions regarding Germany had been unsound.
Meanwhile,
the R u s s i a n s w o r e maintaining their zone as a closed area and denying to Western Germany a f a i r share of the food from the east;
and the execution of the agreed policy for reparations and for the -1­
reduction of the level of G e r m a n industry, coupled with the inevitable food shortages, was creating conditions in our sone for which the b l a m e was being laid at our door.
H e w a s in general agreement with the F o r e i g n Secretary;'s view that we should continue to work towards a unified Germany, though there should bo a much greater degree of decentralisation than in the past.
H o f e l t strongly, h o w e v e r , that in pursuing any such policy we m u s t , w h i l e seeking to preserve good relations with the R u s s i a n s , point out to them firmly and publicly the consequences of their policy."
It was time that the Germans themselves and our other partners in the occupation of Germany should! clearly u n d e r ­
stand where the fault lay.
At the same time,.we should adopt a m o r e positive and progressive socialist policy in our z o n e , in both economic and social m a t t e r s , so that the democratic forces in Germany should be encouraged and that we should stand out as the n a t u r a l leaders of progressive democracy.
H e did not accept the view that a clash w i t h R u s s i a was i n e v i t a b l e and he felt that it would be possible f o r u s , while recognising the dangers inherent in the present R u s s i a n policy and developing a livelier leadership in E u r o p e , to keep the way clear for the re-establishment of more harmonious r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet U n i o n . THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said that he was concerned about the present position in Germany.
Both politically and economically we seemed to be getting the worst of both worlds. He believed that our f i n a n c i a l liabilities might even be increased if the policy of a unified Germany were adopted, and he f e l t that this aspect of the matter would have to be considered before a final decision was r e a c h e d .
Apart from this,; the arguments set out in paragraph 10 of C.P.(U6) 186 in favour of working towards a unified Germany seemed to him c o n c l u s i v e .
He
was strongly of opinion that we should avoid drifting into an anti-Soviet policy.
He did n o t acree w i t h the -statement in paragraph 2 of C.P.(ii6) 186 that "the danger of R u s s i a had become certainly as great a s , and possibly even greater than, that of a revived Germany";
though
he agreed w i t h the statement in the f o l l o w i n g sentence that "the-worst situation of all would be a revived Germany in league with or dominated by R u s s i a " .
H e hoped that any scheme for a unified Germany would p r o v i d e for a large measure of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n to P r o v i n c i a l Governments and for the establishment cf the R u h r as a. separate­
province in which the industries would be owned by an international consortium. T H E MINISTER O F H E A L T H said that the scheme favoured by the F o r e i g n Secretary seemed to be based on the grant of considerable­
autonomous p o w e r s to the p r o v i n c e s , w i t h a general tendency to r e s t r i c t the powers of the c e n t r e to the barest m i n i m u m n e c e s s a r y f o r its co-ordinating function.
A constitution imposed by the victorious P.owers would be u n p o p u l a r ;
and it was m i s t a k e n to suppose that we could establish and m a i n t a i n a F e d e r a l system in Germany against the will of the G e r m a n people.
The fears expressed in G.P.(h6) 186 with regard to R u s s i a seemed to be exaggerated end insufficient recognition" had b e e n given to the fact that the influence of R u s s i a inevitably weakened as it penetrated f u r t h e r to the w e s t .
He agreed with the Lord P r e s i d e n t that w e should adopt a more positive and progressive policy in Germany and should b a c k this up with suitable publicity.
Above a l l , it should be recognised that in the end the G e r m a n p e o p l e would evolve their o w n political structure and that any attempt to impose o n them conditions alien to their n a t u r a l development would fail. T H E LORD CHANCELLOR said that, while ho
recognised the f o r c e of the arguments advanced by
the M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h , h e was in general a g r e e ­
merit w i t h the conclusions reached in the F o r e i g n Secretary's memorandum.
It was impossible in piresent c o n d i t i o n s to determine our final policy.
F o r the m o m e n t we must temporise.
H e agreed, h o w e v e r , that m o r e vigorous steps should be taken
to publicise the B r i t i s h case. THE M I N I S T E R OF FUEL A N D POWER said that it was d i f f i c u l t to reconcile our two aims of preventing the revival of Germany as a m i l i t a r y power and encouraging the growth of a vigorous democratic system in Germany,
T h e r e would also be some difficulty in reconciling a f e d e r a l political system with a unified economic system. On b a l a n c e , h o w e v e r , he saw no alternative to the lino suggested by the F o r e i g n Secretary, short of abandoning our zone in Germany.
Russian
interests in other'parts of the world would probably limit their penetration i n t o western Europe. THE SECRETARY" OF STATE F O R "JAR said that if the p r o p o s a l for a unified though federalised Germany wore accepted as our aim, we should have a stronger case to put to the world.
Though i t wa a a11 r a ct i ve t o contemplate t he ea rly withdrawal of B r i t i s h troops from Germany, he himself believed that" we should have to maintain an A r m y of occupation there for some y e a r s if wo w e r e to maintain conditions f a v o u r a b l e to the establishment of a strong social democracy in Germany. T H E P A R L I A M E N T A R Y U N D E R - S E C R E T A R Y OF STATE F O R F O R E I G N AFFAIRS pointed out that any apparent i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s in the policy suggested in C P . (i+6) 186 w e r e due to the need to steer a course among the conflicting aims and policies in Germany.
T h u s , the F r e n c h had always opposed political u n i f i c a t i o n , while the R u s s i a n s were in p r a c t i c e f a i l i n g to carry out the agreement for economic u n i f i c a t i o n .
He did n o t believe that publicising o u r case would suffice to remedy this situation unless we could secure m o r e satisfactory economic c o n d i t i o n s , and h e attached great importance to our insisting that R u s s i a should treat Germany,as an economic u n i t .
In?
the last resort, we -might for this purpose have to suspend the operations for reducing the l e v e l of German industry- in. our zone which we had undertaken in accordance with the Berlin Agreement.
With regard to the point m a d e by the Minister of Kc-: 1th, he was sure that the F o r e i g n Secretary had no intention of seeking to impose a constitution on Germany against the will of the G e r m a n people. THE CHANCELLOR OF THE D U C H Y OF L A N C A S T E R said that he was in general agreement w i t h the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y ' s s u g g e s t i o n , provided that in c a r d i n g out any scheme of u n i f i c a t i o n account was taken of the views of the G e r m a n people themselves.
H e thought it i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r , to avoid. an,y scheme u n d e r which the central administration w o u l d consist of purely co-ordinating bodies without effective c o n t r o l , or the separate p r o v i n c e s would r e m a i n under the c o n t r o l of the s e p a r a t e Zone C o m m a n d e r s , since in either case there could be no prospect of b u i l d i n g u p an effective central administration. Cabinet
Office, S.W.
1.
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C o p y N o . "7
C M . (1+6)
55TH
Confidential
CONCLUSIONS
Annex
( 5 t h J u n e , 192+6 INDIA ^Sr^f^.....^^^''
1 0 a.rn. )
The Cabinet had before them a note by the
S e c r e t a r y ( C P . (1+6) 2 1 7 ) covering'telegrams from the
Constitutional Cabinet M i s s i o n and the V i c e r o y giving their appreciation
Position. of the situation which might arise in India if agreement
could not be r e a c h e d on the basis of the proposals put
(previous
forward on b e h a l f of H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t .
Eef erenc e:
C M . (1+6) 1+8th
The Cabinet Mission b e l i e v e d that a crisis in
Conclusions^
the negotiations would be r e a c h e d between the 5 t h and
Minute 1+)
1 5 t h June.
T h e y were not without.hope of reaching
agreement with both parties on all the points at issue,
since they believed that a majority of the W o r k i n g
Committee of C o n g r e s s desired to reach a peaceful
settlement.
They thought it n e c e s s a r y , however, that
some plan of action should be prepared against the
contingency of a failure to reach agreement.
Such a
breakdown m i g h t occur because the proposals of His ­
M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t were rejected (i) by the M u s l i m
L e a g u e , or (ill) by C o n g r e s s , or (iii) by both.
The
M i s s i o n contemplated that, in the f i r s t event, an
interim G o v e r n m e n t would be formed w h i c h would include
representatives of C o n g r e s s , some representatives of
m i n o r i t i e s and a proportion of seats reserved for the
M u s l i m League but filled for the time being by
officials or non-league M u s l i m s .
In the second 2 v e n t ,
the position w o u l d be much more serious;
and an
attempt to form a central Government m i g h t give rise
to widespread opposition by Congress which would 1 e ad
In the third event, viz. if
to serious disorders.
the scheme were rejected b y both C o n g r e s s and the
M u s l i m L e a g u e , the C a b i n e t Mission would return home
Before doing s o , however, they would issue
at once.
a statement a n n o u n c i n g that the search for a solution
would be continued, that meanwhile they were returning
for consultation w i t h H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government and
that the V i c e r o y would be re-opening negotiations
S u c h a statement might hold the situation
shortly,
for long- enough to enable the position tc be fully
reviewed in L o n d o n and for instructions to be sent to
the V i c e r o y . regarding the basis of a n e w approach to
It was possible, however, that such a
the problem.
statement "would fail to hold, the situation and that the
V i c e r o y would soon be faced with open opposition from
C o n g r e s s which might develop into a struggle similar
to, but more widespread and better organised than,
that of 192+2,
The Mission therefore thought it
essential that the V i c e r o y should have from H i s
M a j e s t y ' s Government an indication of the policy
w h i c h he should adopt in t h a t event.
They also
thought it desirable that they should h a v e this policy
in their minds before they embarked on their final
discussions w i t h Congress and. the M u s l i m L e a g u e .
The M i s s i o n outlined the alternative policies which might be adopted in the situation.envisaged in their message. F i r s t , an attempt m i g h t be made to maintain the existing
'
form of Government for a further period and to suppress "any­
w i d e s p r e a d opposition sponsored and directed by C o n g r e s s . The M i s s i o n considered that our military and civil resources in India were insufficient to enable us to enforce such a' policy of repression:
and that such a policy w o u l d mean an end. of political progress in India for a long period, during which G o v e r n m e n t would have to be carried on by executive councils of officials both at the centre and in the provinces.
They
also believed that such a policy would be unacceptable to the supporters of his M a j e s t y ' s Government in the United Kingdom. They therefore felt unable to recommend this course. Secondly, we might decide to withdraw entirely from India as soon as widespread opposition developed.
This would produce administrative c h a o s , famine and civil war'.
It would cause general consternation throughout the B r i t i s h Commonwealth; and the M i s s i o n considered that wo should n o t adopt this course unless the sheer n e c e s s i t i e s of the situation forced us to d o so. A possible - variation of this plan would be to announce our intention to w i t h d r a w from India by a certain date, e.g. 1 s t J a n u a r y , 1 9 4 7 , and to a t t e m p t in the interval to arrange with the political Parties for a phased withdrawal w h i c h would give them time and. opportunity to organise their own administration;
This plan would alienate M u s l i m opinion, both in India and throughout the Middle E a s t , and might provoke civil war in India.
If that occurred we should have failed to secure our main objective of averting administrative chaos.'
The p r e s i d e n t of the Board of Trade w a s disposed, t o favour this alternative;
but he had been prevented by illness from taking part in the d i s c u s s i o n s leading up to the formulation of this appreciation.
The other two members of the M i s s i o n recommended that this modified plan of withdrawal should be rejected. T h i r d l y , the suggestion had been made that H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , with the concurrence of the principal Parties in I n d i a , should submit the Indian p r o b l e m for decision by the U n i t e d N a t i o n s or some international arbitrator.
T h i s course was not recommended by the Mission. H a v i n g rejected the alternatives summarised a b o v e , the M i s s i o n and the V i c e r o y both recommended that in the situation envisaged the best course would be to allow the six' H i n d u provinces of M a d r a s , B o m b a y , Control P r o v i n c e s , U n i t e d P r o v i n c e s , B i h a r and Orissa to become self-governing in every r e s p e c t , but to maintain for the time being the existing constitution in the remainder of B r i t i s h I n d i a , and. the existing relations with certain of the Indian S t a t e s . T h i s w o u l d mean in effect granting Independence to Southern and Central India and m a i n t a i n i n g the existing position in N o r t h - W e s t and N o r t h - B a s t India.
An attempt would be made to persuade C o n g r e s s and the M u s l i m League to accept this plan and to co-operate in its orderly e x e c u t i o n , so as to gain time to carry out the division of the Indian A r m y , the necessary arrangements for c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and other administrative arrangements consequent on this division of I n d i a .
The six H i n d u provinces would then proceed to set up the ir own group G o v e r n m e n t w h i c h , when formed, would take over responsibility within its area for all central subjects including foreign a f f a i r s , defiance and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .
In the remainder of B r i t i s h India the present constitution would remain in force, b u t the Provinces would bo encouraged to determine their own c o n s t i t u t i o n s with due regard to minority rights.
D u r i n g this interim period we should encourage co-operation between Northern
I n d i a and the r e s t of I n d i a in the hope that feeling in favour of an Indian U n i o n would g r o w . 1
The M i s s i o n asked, on two g r o u n d s , that they, should be informed at once of the preliminary reactions of the Cabinet t o w a r d s these proposals.
F i r s t , their handling of the next phase of their discussions with the Party leaders, beginning­
soon after 5th J u n e , would, depend to some extent on the policy w h i c h H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government were likely to adopt in the last resort.
S e c o n d l y , a dangerous situation might arise quite suddenly and it m i g h t then become necessary for prompt action to be taken, w i t h little time for consultation with H i s Majesty's Government in L o n d o n , as any hesitation might endanger the lives of E u r o p e a n s in India. The Cabinet first discussed, in consultation with the Chiefs of Staff and Field M a r s h a l Auchinleck, the military implications of the proposals put forward by the Cabinet Mission. The following is a summary of statements made by FIELD MARSHAL A U C H l F L S C K in r e p l y to specific questions put to him by various m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t . The success of the proposed w i t h d r a w a l from Hindustan would depend very largely on the attitude of Congress towards this plan.
If their co-operation were secured, the withdrawal c o u l d be spread over a substantial period, say, three y e a r s , and it might then be carried, out without undue dislocation.
If
their co-operation were w i t h h e l d , however, the movement would become an operation of war and it was impossible to predict p r e c i s e l y how it would be achieved.
Plans had been made for collecting E u r o p e a n s , A n g l o - I n d i a n s and I n d i a n s needing protection into centres where they could be protected by British­
t r o o p s , and for removing them gradually to the ports whence they could be evacuated either to the United Kingdom or to Pakistan.
Even if the co-operation of the C o n g r e s s leaders were secured, there would be some disorder and anti-European demonstrations w h i c h would necessitate the introduction in certain areas of these special arrangements for the protection of E u r o p e a n s . The Indian A r m y contained both H i n d u s and M u s l i m s , and for the most part they were not segregated into separate units.
U p to now it had been possible to r e l y on the loyalty of the Indian Army.
Active steps had b e e n taken to explain to the A r m y the nature of the proposals made on behalf of H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government for enabling India to secure her independence and so far the A r m y had in the main stood firm against communal influence.
I f , h o w e v e r . C o n g r e s s finally rejected the proposals of the C a b i n e t M i s s i o n , it would be unwise to-continue to rely on the Hindu element in the Indian A r m y , w h i c h would then be subject to strong political influence.
A n d , if it became necessary to proceed to a division between Hindustan and Pakistan, Hindus would. Inevitably have to be released from the A r m y and transferred to Hindustan.
A s the Hindus and Muslims were n o t segregated in s e p a r a t e units, the process of regrouping would be protracted;
and it would be several years before an efficient M u s l i m A r m y could, be created. If C o n g r e s s withheld their co-operation, communications in H i n d u s t a n would be paralysed;
and the British elements in those provinces would bo faced with the alternatives of fighting their way out or waiting until they could, be extricated.
For this reason the plans provided for maintaining control over key a i r p o r t s , so as to permit evacuation by air to the airports.
If all European administrators were withdrawn from Hindustan, the railways could still be operated - though with substantially less efficiency. In the circumstances envisaged it was likely that the M u s l i m s w o u l d welcome a B r i t i s h decision to remain in N o r t h e r n India.
The Muslims w o u l d expect to be attacked, possibly w i t h i n five y e a r s , by Hindustan;
and
they would also expect Hindustan to invite foreign intervention in Nor t h e m India.
The Cabinet were informed, in this connection, that there were already indication... of slightly increased concentrations of S o v i e t troops to the n o r t h of A f g h a n i s t a n ;
and there w a s also some evidence­
that Soviet agents were moving southward through Persia. It w a s likely that the tribes on the North-Vest frontier would take advantage of any w e a k n e s s in the Indian contingents on the frontier due to the disorganisation arising f r o m the separation of Hindus and Muslims in the Indian A r m y .
On the
other h a n d these Muslim tribes might refrain from causing trouble which would embarrass the M u s l i m G o v e r n m e n t of P a k i s t a n . If it became impossible to r e l y on the Indian A r m y , B r i t i s h troops in or w i t h i n easy reach of India would not suffice to maintain law and order throughout India.
In p a r t i c u l a r , it would be impossible to control with B r i t i s h troops alone all the munitions dumps and. factories throughout India.
The most that could be done with B r i t i s h troops would be to garrison the ports and certain key areas.
On the other hand the immediate, d e s p a t c h of British reinforcements to India would not be likely to deter C o n g r e s s from provoking disorder:
at
this stage it was likely to have an irritant, rather than a sedative, effect.
The purpose of obtaining reinforcements would be, not to avoid trouble, but to restore the situation when trouble had b r o k e n out.
F o r this pu.rpose as much as four or five d i v i s i o n s might be required.
Strengthening
of the B r i t i s h air forces in India would be of little value for this p u r p o s e ;
f o r , although aircraft could be used in the last resort to attack d e m o n s t r a t o r s , they were of no value for the purpose of protecting lives and property. THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF said, that these appreciations by the Cabinet Mission and the V i c e r o y raised very serious issues and the Chiefs of Staff would w i s h to have further time in w h i c h to consider them. It was n e c e s s a r y to asses.-, the reactions, not only within India, but also on Indian troops serving outside India, in B u r m a , M a l a y a and the N e t h e r l a n d s East Indies. A s regards B r i t i s h reinforcements for I n d i a , two brigades w e r e available in M a l a y a and one in Palestine. I f , h o w e v e r , further reinforcements were required, they could be provided only at the cost of reducing our military security in other a r e a s , e.g. Palestine or Greece. -k­
The Chiefs of Staff would, like to have a further opportunity for careful study of the military implications of the alternative c o u r s e s set out in the appreciations annexed to C P . (2+6) 217 and also their effects on our military commitments in other parts of the w o r l d .
When
they had completed their study of these questions they would w i s h to submit a considered appreciation to the Cabinet. The Chiefs of Staff and F i e l d M a r s h a l g u c h i n l e c k then w i t h d r e w from the meeting.
The Cabinet proceeded to discuss the political a s p e c t s of the questions raised in C P . (1L6) 21 7. D i s c u s s i o n showed that the Cabinet shared the dislike of the Cabinet M i s s i o n for both of the extreme courses outlined in paragraphs 7 and 8 of their telegram, v i z . repression of a mass movement sponsored and directed by C o n g r e s s or withdrawal from the whole of India.
In
particular, they took the vie?/ that having regard to current difficulties in P a l e s t i n e and E g y p t , it was important to avoid any course w h i c h could be represented as a policy of "scuttle".
T h i s would provoke very strong reactions in this country and in the D o m i n i o n s and would have a most damaging effect on our international position. THE F O R E I G N SECRETARY said that s u c h a policy ­
would greatly weaken his position in the forthcoming n e g o t i a t i o n s in P a r i s . The C a b i n e t did not favour the proposal in
p a r a g r a p h 9 of the telegram that we should announce our
intention to w i t h d r a w from India by a specific date.
In g e n e r a l , the Cabinet felt that if the M i s s i o n ' s proposals were rejected it would be a mistake to give a n y appearance of w e a k n e s s .
To do so might well precipitate the troubles w h i c h we wished to avoid.
The suggestion w a s made that we should take the following l i n e : we were anxious to give I n d i a her independence and h a d put f o r w a r d a plan to enable her to achieve it;
unfortunately the people of India could not agree among themselves on a plan for independence;
we could, n o t , in these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , allow a situation to develop in which there w o u l d be chaos and f a m i n e ;
accordingly we m u s t r e t a i n our responsibilities until the Indians were able to agree on a plan;
in the meantime our proposals remained open. There w a s strong support for this p r o p o s a l , which would involve maintaining the existing form of G o v e r n m e n t . It was realised, however,' that the extent to which it w o u l d be possible to follow such a policy must depend on the Indian reaction to it.
If in; fact it evoked w i d e s p r e a d r e s i s t a n c e , the policy w o u l d h a v e to be m o d i f i e d , i f only because it would involve very substantial r e i n f o r c e m e n t of our troops which we should have great d i f f i c u l t y in finding.
B u t w o u l d there in fact be widespread resistance necessitating repression of the type which n e i t h e r the M i s s i o n nor the C a b i n e t favoured?
It w a s difficult to predict the Indian reaction, but was tnere not a p o w e r f u l element in Congress w h i c h would resist a course leading to chaos and anarchy and throw their weight a g a i n s t the more irresponsible sections of Congress? The C a b i n e t saw substantial difficulties in the positive proposal m a d e by the D e l e g a t i o n in paragraphs 1 2 to
22 of their telegram, that the six H i n d u provinces should be
allowed to become self-governing in every respect while the
existing constitution continued in the remainder of B r i t i s h
India and the existing relationship w a s maintained with, certain
of the S t a t e s .
U n d e r such a proposal we should, in fact,
be giving to the M u s l i m League the Pakistan which w e had so f a r
resisted.
There w o u l d be little guarantee of f a i r treatment
for the m i n o r i t i e s in the H i n d u provinces.
It would also
undoubtedly take time for the new group Government of the H i n d u
provinces to become effective and meanwhile the administration
of the present central subjects, particularly c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,
might well become chaotic.
THE PAELlAIVIEKTijRY U N D E E - S B C E E T A R Y
OE S T A T E
FOE INDIA
suggested, as a possible alternative, that a short Bill might be
passed through
Parliament under w h i c h a provisional Government
with practically D o m i n i o n powers w o u l d be established in India
based on representation from the P r o v i n c i a l L e g i s l a t u r e s .
He
recalled that under the 1935 A c t the F e d e r a l Legislature was
to be elected by the eleven Provincial Legislative A s s e m b l i e s .
It h a d n o t , in f a c t , proved possible to bring the Federal
L e g i s l a t u r e into being.
Under the B i l l which he h o w suggested,
the eleven P r o v i n c i a l A s s e m b l i e s would, as under the Federal
c o n s t i t u t i o n , be empowered to elect a central Legislature
It in its
with a fair representation of communal elements.
turn would then e l e c t , by a process of proportional re presentation,
a central M i n i s t r y composed in fixed communal proportions.
This M i n i s t r y would hold office d u r i n g the interim period while
a further search w a s made for a permanent settlement of the
problem.
Such an arrangement would both give the Indians
self-government a n d gain time for a p e r m a n e n t solution.
THE P R I M E MINISTER asked that a written statement of this proposal should be submitted to the Cabinet. In g e n e r a l , the Cabinet felt that it w a s difficult to take firm decisions as to the m e a n s of meeting a situation which had not yet arisen and which seemed in fact to be several m o v e s ahead.
They thought that, if there were a b r e a k d o w n , it would be very desirable that they should have an opportunity of discussing matters w i t h members o f the Cabinet M i s s i o n before­
final d e c i s i o n s mere taken.
They noted that the M i s s i o n considered that the situation might be -held long enough to allow It seemed unlikely that either M u s l i m s or C o n g r e s s of this.
would be so irresponsible as to ^uah matters to a sudden c r i s i s . There might even be advantage in the short delay which, would be involved w h i l e the M i s s i o n came home to discuss matters with their c o l l e a g u e s . Other points made in the discussion w e r e
as f o l l o w s : ­
(a)
We must remember that the administrative machine in India -was n o w e x t r e m e l y weak.
There were very few E u r o p e a n s in the administrative services and those who remained were tired and perhaps dispirited.
The process of. handing over to Indians had been going on a long time and the loyalty of the Indians in the civilian services w a s bound to be tempered by thoughts for their future w h e n we had left the country. (b)
We m u s t at' all costs avoid a situation in which we had to withdraw from I n d i a under circumstances o f ignominy after there had been widespread riots and attack,:. on E u r o p e a n s .
It must be clear that we were going freely and not under compulsion. -­
(c)
F o r e c o n o m i c , m i l i t a r y and political reasons alike, we could not face a' situation which involved committing B r i t i s h troops to long series of operations in India. (d)
THE F O R E I G N SECRETARY said that at some point it w o u l d be well to take the U n i t e d States Government into our confidence.
It was agreed, h o w e v e r , that it w o u l d be preferable not to make any approach to them until the situation w a s a little clearer. (e)
We could not exclude the possibility that in certain circumstances the situation in India m i g h t be b r o u g h t before the United N a t i o n s as one w h i c h m i g h t a f f e c t the peace of the world. -
The Cabinet
­
(1) A g r e e d to resume their discussion of these issues at a later meeting when the Chiefs o f Staff had completed their a p p r e c i a t i o n of the military implications of the possible
courses. 1
(2) Invited the Parliamentary U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of State for India to submit a m e m o r a n d u m containing a study of the implications of the positive proposals made by the Cabinet D e l e g a t i o n in paragraphs 12 to 22 of their memorandum.
T h i s m e m o r a n d u m should also set out the alternative p r o p o s a l which he h a d outlined in the course of the d i s c u s s i o n . ( 3 ) Invited the Foreign S e c r e t a r y , in consultation
with the P a r l i a m e n t a r y U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of
State for I n d i a , to arrange for a m e m o r a n d u m
to be circulated showing in w h a t circumstances
the situation in India might be brought to the
attention of the United N a t i o n s .
G ab in e t Office, S. V/. 1. THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited..
It is issued for the personal use of
TOP
SECRET
Q.M.
( )
4 6
59TH C O N C L U S I O N S , M I N U T E 0 * ^
27
.
N
o
' ^ "
C onf i d o n t i a 1 A nnex (17th. J u n e , 1946 - 3.0 p;m. ) INDIA
Constitutional
Position
(Previous
Reference:
C M . (46) 57th
Conclusions,
Minute 2 )
, ,
iy
/
/ i
THE PR I HE MINISTER summarised to the C a b i n e t the latest developments in the negotiations i n India as set out i n recent telegrams from the Cabinet M i s s i o n and the V i c e r o y (INDEX 7 0 - 7 7 ) . it had not so far proved possible to get both the Muslim League
and the C o n g r e s s P a r t y to agree on the composition of an interim G o v e r n m e n t , and, since the s i t u a t i o n was w o r s e n i n g through the prolonged delay, it had b e e n decided that the V i c e r o y should issue invitations to join a n interim G o v e r n m e n t to five m e m b e r s of the Muslim L e a g u e , five m e m b e r s of the C o n g r e s s P a r t y , one scheduled caste Indian ( C o n g r e s s ) , one S/Hdi, one Parsee and one India.i Cnristian.
The : announcement that those invitations had b e e n issued, w h i c h had b e e n m a d e o n the previous day, had m a d e it clear t h a t / i f the m e m b e r s of the two m a i n parties or of one of them were unwilling to accept the i n v i t a t i o n s , an interim Government w o u l d b e formed w h i c h would b e as representative as poserlble of those w i l l i n g to accept the statement of 16th May.
T h o u g h the first Hindu reactions to the a n n o u n c e m e n t seemed f a v o u r a b l e , there was r e a s o n to fear that the Congress P a r t y would m a k e difficulties about accepting' the invitations.
It
was possible that, to ease these d i f f i c u l t i e s , the V i c e r o y m i g h t b e pressed to include Sarat B o s e i n place of one of the other C o n g r e s s representatives. There were objections to his i n c l u s i o n on account of c e r t a i n of his past a c t i v i t i e s , and the V i c e r o y and the M i s s i o n had therefore sought guidance on w h e t h e r , if this point was pressed, the Viceroy should yield. I n d i s c u s s i o n , there w a s v e r y warm
a p p r e c i a t i o n of the untiring efforts of the
M i s s i o n and the V i c e r o y to b r i n g the negotiations
to a s u c c e s s f u l c l o s e ;
and the view was expressed
t h a t , thoucrh the outstanding d i f f i c u l t y must n o t hi
comply r e a l i s i n g to the f u l l the objections to the i n c l u s i o n of Sarat B d s c in the interim G o v e r n m e n t , the Cabinet felt that it would be a m i s t a k e to jeopardise the s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n of the n e g o t i a t i o n s simply o n this account. The Cabinet
( l )
­
Invited the P r i m e Minister to seek the a p p r o v a l of His M a j e s t y to Sarat Boso's appointment to the interim G o v e r n m e n t if the Congress Party should press for this. -1­
Military
implications
of possible
courses of
action in event
of breakdown
T h e Cabinet then discussed the note by the Secretary ( C P . (2+6) 2 2 9 ) setting out the conclusions of the D e f e n c e Committee on an appreciation by the C h i e f s of Staff of the military implications of the possible courses of action in the event of a breakdown of the n e g o t i a t i o n s ^ (Previous
Reference:
C M . (2+6) 5 5 t h
Conclusions,
Confidential
Annex)
T h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n , which was annexed to C P . (1+6) 229, c o n c l u d e d that a policy of 'withdrawal into Pakistan w o u l d n o t only fail to safeguard our strategic interests b u t would inevitably lead to civil war in I n d i a , a situation- which would be corn­
p l e t e l y u n a c c e p t a b l e On military g r o u n d s .
. A policy of r e m a i n i n g in the whole of India and f i r m l y accepting responsibility for law and order would r e s u l t , if one Indian A r m y remained l o y a l , in an acceptable milit. ry Commitment and would safeguard our l o n g - t e r m strategic interests.
If the Indian o,rmy d i d not remain l o y a l , as might happen if the situation w a s n o t h a n d l e d f i r m l y , it might be n e c e s s a r y , if we were n o t to abandon India i g n o m l n i o u s l y , to provide five B r i t i s h d i v i s i o n s as r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , with the consequent abandonment of c o m m i t m e n t s in the M i d d l e E a s t , G r e e c e , Italy and G e r m a n y , and with serious effects on our import and export programmes and on the demobilisation scheme. The D e f e n c e Committee had endorsed these conclusions and. h a d invited the Chiefs of Staff to prepare p l a n s to meet the situation if we adopted a policy of remaining in the whole of India and the Indian'Army did not remain l o y a l .
They h a d also invited the M i n i s t e r of Transport to p r e p a r e p l a n s for the e a r l y evacuation of British women and children from Indie and h a d agreed in principle that n o further women and children should be embarked for India from this c o u n t r y . THE PRIME M I N I S T E R said that the Defence C o m m i t t e e had taken the v i e w that it w o u l d not be d e s i r a b l e to take any overt action at the moment to reinforce our troops in India.
Even if such action were- taken it w o u l d be impossible for the r e i n f o r c e ­
m e n t s to reach India in time, should the situation take a serious turn in the near f u t u r e , while the news that r e i n f o r c e m e n t s were being sent might precipitate the c r i s i s we sought to avert. The Cabinetviere impressed by the seriousness
of the military i m p l i c a t i o n s of b o t h the c o u r s e s of action discussed by the Chiefs of Staff..
It w a s pointed o u t , h o w e v e r , that the latest d e v e l o p m e n t s gave some grounds for hope that the situation would not n o w turn out in such v. way as to make either course n e c e s s a r y . The Cabinet
(2)
­
Took n o t e of the conclusions of the Defence C o m m i t t e e on the appreciation of the situation b y the C h i e f s of Staff as set out in C P . (2+6) 2 2 9 ­
-2­
Military The Cabinet then discussed the n o t e by the
implications Secretary ( C P . (2+6) 229)
setting out the conclusions
of possible of the D e f e n c e Committee on an appreciation by the
courses of C h i e f s of Staff of the military implications of the
action in event possible courses of action in the event of a breakdown
of breakdown of the n e g o t i a t i o n s .
(Previous Reference: C M . (1+6) 55th Conclusions, Confidential Annex) T h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n , which was a n n e x e d to
C P . (1+6) 229,
concluded that a policy of withdrawal
into Pakistan would not only f a i l to safeguard our
strategic interests but would inevitably lead to
civil war in I n d i a , a situation-which would be corn­
pletely unacceptable On military g r o u n d s .
A policy
of remaining in the whole of India and f i r m l y accepting
responsibility for law and order would r e s u l t , if the
Indian A r m y remained l o y a l , in an acceptable m i l i t a r y
coivimi tment and would safeguard our long-term strategic
interests.
If the Indian A r m y d i d not remain l o y a l ,
as might happen if the situation w a s not h a n d l e d
f i r m l y , it might be necessary, if we were not to
abandon India ignominiously, to provide five B r i t i s h
d i v i s i o n s as r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , w i t h the consequent
abandonment of commitments in the Middle E a s t , G r e e c e ,
Italy and G e r m a n y , and with serious effects on our
import and export programmes and on the d e m o b i l i s a t i o n
scheme.
The D e f e n ce Committee h a d endorsed these conclusions and had invited the C h i e f s of Staff to prepare p l a n s to me et the situation if we adopted a policy of remaining in the whole of India, and the Indian'Army did not remain l o y a l .
They h a d also invited the Ministe r of Transport to prepare p l a n s for the early evacu ation of B r i t i s h women and children from India and had agreed in principle that no further women and children should be embarked for India, from this country. THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Defence C o m m i t t e e had taken the view that it would not be desirable to take any overt action at the m o m e n t to reinforce our troops in India.
Even if such action were- taken it would be impossible for the r e i n f o r c e ­
m e n t s to reach India in t i m e , should the situation take a. serious turn in the near f u t u r e j while the n e w s that r e i n f o r c e m e n t s were being sent might precipitate the crisis we sought to avert. The Cabinetwere impressed by Ghe seriousness of the military implications of b o t h the courses of action discussed by the Chiefs of Staff..
It w a s pointed out, h o w e v e r , that the latest d e v e l o p m e n t s gave some grounds for hope that the situation would not n o w turn out in such a. way as to m a k e either course necessary. The Cabinet
(2)
­
Took note of the conclusions of the
Defence C o m m i t t e e on the appreciation of
the situation by the C h i e f s of Staff a s
set out in C P . (1+6) 229. ­
-2
THE PAELIAMEfi"TARY U N D E R - S E C R E T O R Y OF STATE F O R INDIA recalled that the Defence Committee had agreed in principle that no further women and c h i l d r e n should he embarked for India while the p r e s e n t situation existed.
Some 2 5 0 women and children had ' already booked p a s s a g e s to sail for I n d i a before the end of June,
It w o u l d be difficult to cancel these p a s s a g e s and the V i c e r o y h a d now said that he did n o t think it necessary to prevent these women and children f r o m sailing­
:g/g;p V.g
.vW ' The Cabinet ­
;
( 3 )
Effect on
f 0 re i gn
relations
^ ,
V"
I
^
A g r e e d t h a t , u n t i l the situation was
clearer, no further action should be taken
to prevent women and children sailing f r o m
the United k i n g d o m for India.
^
The C a b i n e t next considered a m e m o r a n d u m by
t he), S e c re t a ry u^f-SUta-te-;fer^-^er-e-i-g-n-^ff-a-i-r-s
( C P . (46) 2 2 2 ) regarding the possible effect u p o n
foreign relations of d e v e l o p m e n t s in India.
The
m e m o r a n d u m set out the c i r c u m s t a n c e s in which the
situation could be referred to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s
SH?g-&n-i-sa-M-on- on the initiative of e i t h e r a foreign government or the Government of the U n i t e d Kingdom or of India.
The conclusion reached w a s that such a reference would have serious repercussions on our prestige and would n o t , so f a r as could be seen, bring any p r a c t i c a l Help e i t h e r to us or to I n d i a . Accordingly the intervention of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Grgcanfsa-tr-on should be avoided or, if p r o p o s e d by another P o w e r , be resisted..
The memoraandum also concluded that any appearance that we w e r e abandoning our position in India without a solution would immediately weaken our world position.
Equally/the
premature w i t h d r a w a l of B r i t i s h forces f r o m G e r m a n y , Italy, Greece or the Middle E a s t , or the withdrawal of Indian f o r c e s f r o m Indonesia, would w e a k e n m o s t seriously our influence in those areas. In discussion it was pointed out that
p a r a g r a p h 16 of C P . (46)
2 2 2 was not m e a n t to
suggest that we should, at this stage communicate to
the U n i t e d States Government the h y p o t h e t i c a l c o u r s e s
of action w h i c h we had u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n b u t
merely that w e should inform them, once we had
decided on a particular c o u r s e of action.
The Cabinet
(h)
­
Took note of C P . ( 4 6 )
-3­
222.
A possible alternative constitution for an interim Government T h e Cabinet t h e n discussed the memorandum b y the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India ( C P . (46) 3 2 1 ) outlining a possible c o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h would give India, pending the w o r k i n g out of her permanent constitution, an interim Government elected b y a federal legislature and w i t h the m a x i m u m statutory independence of control b y W h i t e h a l l . - ?.: LtA MEN TARY UNDER S E C R E T A R Y OP
STATS POP INDIA explained that the proposals wore
p u t forward as ; i course which might he worth
considering, as an alternative to a r e t u r n to the
present r e g i m e , if the present negotiations "broke
d o w n over the c o m p o s i t i o n of the interim G o v e r n m e n t .
T h e m a i n feature
of the proposals w o u l d be a
f e d e r a l legislature consisting of a single chamber
composed of some 250 m e m b e r s elected b y the
provincial legislatures and of a m a x i m u m of 125
m e m b e r s f r o m the States.
The f e d e r a l Ministry
would b e appointed b y the Governor G e n e r a l after
election b y the f e d e r a l legislature, arrangements
b e i n g made to ensure a p r o p e r p r o p o r t i o n b e t w e e n
the various communities.
The powers of the
C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t -would b e b a s e d o n the f e d e r a l list
and concurrent list in the G o v e r n m e n t of India A c t ,
1 9 3 5 , but the p r o v i n c i a l legislatures would be
able to withdraw from the f e d e r a l legislature any
item in either list other t h a n defence and
external affairs and the m e a n s to execute them.
The proposals would involve the passage
of a short B i l l throirgh^-a.rdi-ament--d-n--this
e-euntry.
.
*
I n discussion it w a s pointed out that the scheme w a s based on the a s s u m p t i o n that b o t h the major communities w o u l d b e w i l l i n g to help to run it.
W o u l d there in point of fact he any assurance that they would do so?
It was also felt that difficulties would a r i s e if some b u t not all provinces withdrew a subject from the federal legislature.
In the case of currency or customs, for i n s t a n c e , this w o u l d be bound to cause trouble.
In any event it was felt that it would be w e l l to obtain the v i e w s of the Ccbinet M i s s i o n in I n d i a before.-pursuing the proposals further. T h e Cabinet
(5)
­
Took, note of C. P.
(46) 221.