The Phoenix Resurgent:

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The Phoenix Resurgent:
An Outline of Irish Nationalism from the Volunteers to Sinn Fein
An Honors Thesis (ID 499)
by
Gerald R. Hall, Jr.
Richard
~'Iires
Dall State University
;.;uncie, Indiana
r.·~ay
1984
SDring::iuarter 1984
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ACKNOjVL~DGEMZNTS
The writing of this paper could not have been completed
without the help of several people.
I should like to thank
Dr. I.lark Fissel for his assistance in the gathering of much
of the information used in this paper, Professor Richard Jay
for his keen insight into the nature of Irish nationalism, and
most importantly Dr. Richard;Jires for his patience and wisdom.
He taught me to cast a colder eye.
r
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To many historians the most dynamic force in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been nationalism.
Yet
defining, delimiting and tracing nationalism in theory or
in practice is a cumbersome task.
Nationalism is easily
compatible with other ideologies such as romanticism,
liberalism and, strangely enough, even socialism.
·rhese
ideologies have become so intertwined that they seem inseparable.
Nationalism has so greatly affected the intellectual
world that a poet or historian may be labelled "nationalist."
Likewise, such fields as literature, language and history,
have themselves been important tools for nationalists.
This
close interrelationship between nationalism, primarily a
political ideology, and the cultural milieu has often been
central in the success or failure of nationalist movements.
It is of great importance to the historian.
This is perfectly
illustrated by the rise of the Irish nationalist organization
Sinn Fein in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Prior to Sinn Fein other nationalist movements in Ireland had
been unable to develop a comprehensive
progr~m
which combined
cultural ideals with an effective political program.
This
fusion has been Sinn Fein's major contribution to Irish
nationalism and certainly played an important role in the
emergence of a distinct, modern Irish state.
At the same time,
it may also be a factor in the continued violence in Northern
Ireland.
The purpose of this paper is to trace the growth
of Irish nationalism in order to explain Sinn Fein's peculiar
place in Irish history.
p
2
3efore beginning an analysis of Sinn Fein's specific
position in the nationalist pantheon, it is necessary to
set down a definition of nationalism.
not meant to be precise.
tions could be made.
This definition is
Certainly many additions or excep-
llevertheless this definition will pro-
vide a point of reference for considering IriSh nationalism
in general.
program. 1
To begin with, nationalism is a definite political
Simple attachment or loyalty to a region, group
or already existing state may nrovide a foundation for nationalism, but it is not of itself nationalist.
As a political
system nationalism is based upon the "nation," whether it 'oe
defined by region, culture, class or race.
This nation is the
semil;.al unit i:1 the constitutional theory.
The "nation's"
sovereignty rather than tradition, divine right, or natural
law is supreme.
Advancing national freedom (or liberation),
national unity, the furtherance of national interests or the incul COl tiOl-, 0::' l~a tior.al ·lo:.'al ty are
the prime objectives of political action--either
because these have intrinsive [sic] value or
because they are necessa y to secure other desirable ends of h~~an life. 2
Having an understanding of nationalism, the next step is to
apply these ideas to Irish history specifically.
!'ationalism existed in Ireland before the rise of Sinn
Fein, but pinpointing its precise genesis is difficult.
Some
historians, particularly those interested in advancing a
nationalist cause, have sought to portray Irish nationalism
as a
ver~'
seve~th
ancient tradition origina tin,:; at latest in the
century.
~~oin
:.;acI1eill. a twentieth-century scholar
rI
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i
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deeply involved in the nationalist movement, tried to present
Ireland in the early Middle Ages as loosely unified under a
high kingship or ard ri.J
But, most modern historians have
seen medieval Ireland as being broken into dozens of small
independent kingdoms and tribes lacking any unity or national
consciousness whatsoever. 4 Historian D. G. Boyce has noted
that "it is an amusing paradox that a country which prided
itself on its strong sense of nationalism, that sought
statehood and emphasized unity should in its infant days
have been totally devoid of' all these characteristics.,,5
Rather than earliest Ireland, many historians have placed
the genesis of Irish nationalism in the twelfth century.
This is the century of the first Norman invasion of Ireland.
With the beginning of' so-called "BritiSh Imperialism," the
Irish were supposedly united in their opposition to the invaders.
Certainly there can be little doubt that the "native"
(a misleading term considering the fact that the Celts had
migrated from somewhere in eastern Europe) Celtic population
was in an almost constant state of rebellion against Norman
and Briton.
These rebellions are often cited as evidence
of a national awareness.
The Gaelic world was unwilling to
submit to Anglicization.
This theory ignores the fact that
these rebellions were usually centered around a specif'ic
leader, clan, region or grievance.
Furthermore, certain
provinces and kingdoms, especially Ulster, remained remarkably
independent until the seventeenth century.
Boyce reiterates:
p
4
A genuine national monarchy did not emerge;
but neither did the kings of Ireland unite to check
and expel the invader. Instead each ruler fought
for himself, now allied with, now against, the
newcomers . . . . They were not the beginning of
a process of Irish resistance to t@e British which
lasted unbroken from 1171 to 1921.
Still, the hostility which is naturally felt towards
invaders, the English Reformation's creation of a religious
difference and the plantation of Ulster in the seventeenth
century did help create a firm tradition of animosity toward
England.
This animosity may certainly be seen as a major
factor in the development of Irish nationalism, or, as historian
Tom Garvin describes it, a "primordial national consciousness,"
but it is not nationalism in the modern sense.
a specific separatist program.
It was not
The Irish had a sense of
community; however this sense of community was cultural,
religious or regional rather than national. Nationalism of a
trt~e
type does not develop until the eighteenth century.
During the eighteenth century the Irish parliament in
Dublin, made up exclusively of Protestants due to the penal
laws suppressing Catholicism and the Test Act disqualifying
nonconformists, was controlled by the British privy council.
:rhis control began with the so-called "Poynings' Laws" passed
by an Irish parliament in 1494.
Under this act, the calling
of an Irish parliament was prohibited until all legislature
proposals had been submitted to and approved by the Crown
privy council. 7 This restriction was more acceptable to the
parliament in Dublin than the Declaratory Act of 1719.
Under
this act the British parliament at iiestminster, its authority
expanding, assumed for itself the right to pass legislation
5
that was binding both in Great Britain and the separate
Kingdom of Ireland.
Yet, by the middle of the eighteenth century the Irish
parliament had become increasingly difficult to manage.
There arose within
the Dublin commons a group of men who
were dissatisfied with the constitutional arrangement.
'The
dual role of the English king, serving also as king of Ireland,
was acceptable, but domination by iJestminster began to chafe.
The political atmosphere in Ireland had been affected by
the notion, developed from John Locke and other Enlightenment
thinkers, that the government of a nation should be somewhat
responsive to desires of its citizens, however limited that
citizenship might be.
The ideas of John Wilkes on parlia-
mentary reform, along with complaints of the American colonists on the restriction of trade, were beginning to have a
widespread effect.
According to historian J. C. Beckett,
"there was a gradual change in the character of Irish political life due largely to the growing influence of public
opinion. ,,8
This growing dissatisfaction set the stage for
the emergence of a specific plan and party which sought to
emphasize the rights of Ireland as a separate kingdom.
,Vi th the coming of the American Revolution this so-called
"patriot party" led by Henry Grattan and Henry Flood, members
of the Dublin parliament, found an opportunity to regain
their legislative independence.
and French raids along the coast,
Using the pretext of American
pa-;;riots raised a ,-:lili tia to
replace those British troops that had been sent to the
colonies.
This militia became known as the Volunteers.
In
6
1782 a group of delegates from Volunteer units met in
Dungannon and adopted a series of resolutions to be sent to
Dublin.
These resolutions were meant to encourage the
"patriots" in their struggle wi th
cabinet.
~'iestminster
and Lord North's
That same year, relying upon what was essentially
a veiled threat of rebellion from the Volunteers, the Dublin
parliament was able to force Lord North's embattled cabinet
in London to repeal the Declaratory Act and accept the
independence of the Irish parliament.
In addition, in 1783
Flood was able to pass a Renunciation Act.
This resolution
left no doubt that the Kingdom of Ireland, though sharing
a common crown with Britain, was
to be bound only by the laws enacted by his
majesty and the parliament of that kingdom [Irelan&
in all cases whatever, and to have all actions
and suits at law or in equity which may be instituted in that kingdom, decided in his majesty's
courts therein (within 9reland] finally and without appeal from thence.
More
importantly for the future, the act went on to assert
that this right "shall be and is hereby declared to be
established and ascertained for ever and sha:'l at
time hereafter be questioned or questionable.
,,10
:'10
Although
the attempt to limit all future parliaments is quixotic,
this act would return to haunt Britain in the nineteenth
century.
Grattan, on the occasion of winning this so-called
"constitution of 1782," wrote:
"Ireland is now a nation. ,,11
Some, including Arthur Griffith, as we shall see later,
accepted Grattan's declaration.
have been qualified.
Yet, this statement Should
Aristocratic, Protestant Ireland was
7
now a nation.
developed
Although a movement for reconciliation had
(Grattan had gone so far as to assert that "the
Irish Protestant could never be free till the Irish Catholic
,
d'lsa8l
" 1 'l.les
+'
of Cat:101ics
) 12 anu~ tne
cease d t 0 b e a save,
I
had been reduced, no political rights were granted to them.
In addition, among the rising merchant classes there was a
strong desire for constitutional reform, the widening of the
electorate, that faced stiff opposition in the newly independent parliament. 1]
tionary,
the word.
The Volunteers were neither revolu-
nor separa tist-i.'1a tio:,~alist i:r: the v.odern sense of
The movement was directed at specific grievances
wi thin the consti tutional system.
'rhey did not wish to
separate themselves from the Crown, or establish a republic,
but simply sought to correct what they felt was tyranny from
';Jestminster.
Yet the Volunteers became an important symbol
for nationalists, especially those who espoused some form of
constitutional agitation.
'rhe next important stage in the development of Irish
nationalism was profoundly affected by another revolution,
the French Revolution.
Beginning around 179,) a large number
of radical clubs, similar to those already existing in England,
were founded in and around Dublin.
At first these clubs were
open societies dedicated to specific political objectives:
"parliamentary reform, Catholic emancipation and the reduction
or elimination of English influence in the government of
I
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their country. ,,14 Of these societies, the Society of United
Irishmen became the most important.
:'. :-ear a:'-:er the fall of tl',:
8
Bastille, these clubs, along with many "respectable" citizens, welcomed the revolution.
Beyond viewing it as a cross-
channel edition of the Glorious Revolution, the radicals
were pleased with the apparent democratic turn the new order
was taldng.
This success must have increased their own
impa tience with :Jestminster' s procrastination on parliamentary
reform and Catholic emancipation.
~ven
after the darker
side of the revolution became evident, a small core of
radicals was unwilling to recognize its shortcomings.
The
loss of this model, this symbol, was unacceptable.
To add to this growing discontent, the advent of war
between Britain and France forced the government at 'ilestminster to suppress dissent.
Naturally enough, the
United Irishmen's continuing enthusiasm for the revolution
made it a prime target for suppression.
The same draconian
measures that were adopted in England were also applied to
Ireland.
In the spring of 1794 the United Irishlnen were
forced underground and became an oath-bound secret society
dedicated to revolution with help from the French.
:pJi th the
enthusiasm of the United Irishmen.and the repression of the
government1a series of disturbances occurred, and in May 1798
two major insurrections occurred, one in Ulster, the other
in
~Jexford.
These rebellions in 1798 were significant not
onl~'
because they were, at least in ;Vexford, partially Successful
at the outset, but also because of the image, the sJ'lIlbol tl:e:'
provided later nationalists.
One important image was that
of a truly united effort with Protestants, Dissenters
9
(Protestants outside the official church), and Catholics
working side by side.
However, the society of United
Irishmen was, as late as 1794, still overwhelmingly Protestant and Presbyterian.
Efforts had been made to obtain
the support of Catholics, especially through the Catholic
Committee, a body representing mostly the merchant class and
involved in agitation for Catholic emancipation.
'rhe United
Irishmen's constitution of 1797 went so far as to state
"..1..'
'",12.
no reform is practicable, efficacious, or just, which
..j...
v
shall not include Irishmen of every religious persuasion.,,15
However, there seem to have been some reservations on both
sides.
John Keogh, the head of the Catholic Committee, while
pleased with the program of parliamentary reform espoused
by the United Irishmen and thankful for their support of
emancipation, felt that Catholics should "at the same time
lceep clear of deciding about reform or other political
questions. ,,16
,
In addition, in 1798 the higher Catholic
clergy were disturbed by French hostility to the pope, a:1d
11:",
~,
along with important members of the Catholic community,
including Keogh, published an address calling upon Irish
Catholics to defend •• our constitution, the social order
and the Christian religion. ,,17
Finally, it has been pointed
out that the yeomanry and militia which suppressed the
insurrection of 1798 were made up mostly of Roman Catholics. 18
On the other side, many Protestants and I-resbyterians in
I
Ulster, especially in rural areas such as Armagh, were becoming increasingly involved in sectarian strife.
The Orange
r
1)
Order was
tition.
fou~ded
in 1795 as a result of agricultural compe-
Historian J. C. Beckett writes:
II
•
•
•
there had
been a beginning of political reaction among Ulster Presbyterians • . • • Thus as early as the 179)'s we can trace in
Ulster Protestantism, the first stages of a political transformation,,,19
One writer goes so far as to claim that
Orangeism had recruits even among the United Irishmen. 2J
Another writer considering the religious question within
the United Irishmen summed it up:
"Not only did it fail to
stop the sectarian strife and recruit the warring factions
into a united front aGainst the government but it also failed
to effect a genuine union between Catholics and Dissenters
within the movement.,,21
Beyond a united front, the United Irishmen, to some
nationalists and historians, mark
licanism in Ireland.
the beginnings of repub-
There can be no doubt that once the
repression of dissent began the United Irishmen, at least
a small inner group, began to turn toward revolutionary
republicanism,22
Yet, whether or not the membership as a
whole accepted this new policy is questionable,
Historian
J. L, I<lcCracken points out that the society began to recruit
in discontented rural areas rather than among their former
base, politically conscious Catholics and middle-class radicals. 2J
In addition, the uprising in Wexford, by far the most extensive, appears to have been motivated more by atrocities
committed by militia units in the area than by republican
zeal,24
The constitution of the United Irishmen as late as
11
17j7 was still centered around parliamentary reform.
The
document does not mention the creation of a republic, the
abolition of the monarchy, or the institution of a new
legislative body or constitution. 25
The definition of nationalism mentioned earlier requires
that a nationalist constitutional system be centered upon
the sovereignty of the nation rather than tradition, divine
right or the rights of men.
The United
Iris~~en
certainly
were concerned about English influence in Ireland, much like
the Volunteers, but they based their constitution on reform
which would bring about the "equal distribution of the
rights of man throughout all sects and denominations of
Irishmen.,,26
Yet, as often happens, the image of the society
rather than its reality became important.
The United Irishmen, looking forward to later developments,
and Sinn Fein, did not attempt, like other nationalists in
Europe, to base Ireland's claim to independence from i3ritain
on its peculiar cultural tradition, literature and language. 27
They rarely referred to ancient or medieval Ireland, but were
inclined against retrospection.
"Mankind have been too
retrospective, canonized antiquity and undervalued themselves. ,,28
An important event in the shaping of Irish nationalism
occurred two years after the insurrections of 1798.
~villiam
In 18))
Pitt, the British prime minister, decided that the
existing Irish constitutional arrangement must somehow be
altered if England were to prevent Ireland from "being in a
state of constant rebellion or conspiracy with Britain's
12
foes.
To prevent this, Pitt resurrected a plan calling for
a legislative union of the two kingdoms similar to that
which had been worked out with Scotland in 17J7.rhe idea
of a legislative union had been looked upon with favor by
many of the Frotestants in Ireland at this time.
These men
were willing to surrender the "constitution of 1782" for
reasons of security.
In 1793 Catholics had been granted
parliamentary franchise along the same lines as Protestants,
that is upon the basis of a forty-shilling freehold of property.
They feared that this concession would lead to a
"popish democracy. ,,29
The union would give the Protestants
security in the fact that by sitting at,liestminster any
Catholic influence or pressure could be countered by an
alliance with their Protestant brethren of England, Scotland
and :Ivales.
Jan~ary
The Act of Union was passed in 18)) and on
1, 18)1, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland came into existence.
To later Irish nationalists the Act of Union would
become a prime example of £nglish misrule in Ireland.
First,
many would point to the manner in which the act was passed.
iJithout question there was corruption; bribes and threats
were made; peerages, pensions and patronage
were promised
in order for the government to come up with a sufficient
number of votes. 3 )
But whether this corruption exceeded what
was an acceptable, indeed expected, level for the period
is another question.
Beyond this, other nationalists
concluded that the act was illegal, saying that it violated
..
_-.. -----------------------13
. t' n Act of 1783
which had never been
repealed.
the Renunc~a ~o
'
end its
Moreover, the parliament in Dublin had no right to
own existence.
-.'Ihen Pitt planned the union of the two kingdoms, he
had envisioned a bill for Catholic Emancipation, the removal
the
of the two remaining disabilities facing Catholics'
.
t ' parl;ament and the denial
prohibition from hold~ng sea s ~n
~
of important government positions. But George III and
conservatives in Britain and Ireland were vehemently opposed
to the Emancipation Bill and it was defeated.
This was to
become the next gceat crusade in Irish history, the cause
which many Irish historians have looked upon as the beginning
of widespread political awareness and agitation among the
majority of Ireland's Catholic population.
The Earl of
Cornwallis, in command of the British forces in Ireland,
remarked on the eve of the passage of the Act of Union'
"The mass of the people of Ireland do not care one farthing
about the union.,,3 1 This was indeed true. The parliament
in Dublin, still dominated by aristocratic Protestants, was
certainly no more concerned with the desires of the majority
of Irishmen, particularly middle- and lower-class Catholics,
than London would be.
The interests of the majority of
Irishmen were in reducing rents, abolishing the tithes
collected by the established Church from Catholics, Dissenters
and Protestants alike, disestablishment of the Church of Ireland and establishment of the Roman Catholic Church in its
place. 32
14
Immediately after the Act of Union Irish politics went
through a period of relative inactivity.
There were attempts
by sympathetic Protestant leaders to bring about Catholic
::lmancipation by working at l'Jestminster, but the government
there was too concerned with the Napoleonic ,'lars, foreign
policy, and party politics to consider Irish problems
seriously.JJ
The question of Catholic Emancipation, like
parliamentary reform in Britain, was not forcefully pressed
until after ilaterloo.
one man:
The newest effort was centered around
Daniel O'Connell.
A Catholic lawyer, one of the
first admitted to the bar, he organized in 182J the Catholic
Association to forward Catholic interests, most importantly
emancipation.
After a slow start, O'Connell was able to
build a massive extraparliamentary pressure group in Ireland.
The government was understandably disturbed by the size of
the organization, which with the aid of the Catholic Church
was collecting over t2,J)) a week at its height, the subscription be ing only one pence a ::,!O;,ty.. 34 ::::ven r.1ore alarmi:1::; to
some was O'Connell's supposedly aggressive language. 35
One
2nglish historian described O'Connell as "personally
ambitious, unscrupulous and a powerful demagogue."J6
There
is no doubt that O'Connell was an exuberant, perhaps overly
enthusiastic, speaker but he was never an advocate of open
rebellion.
The governrnent in ';Iestminster was under a state of
siege during this period.
The 1819 Feterloo massacre of
peaceful reform demonstrators by the local militia near
;,;anchester had increased the amount of agitation for
15
parlia~entary
Creat Britain.
reform and created an explosive atmosphere in
naturally, the appearance of another extra-
parliamentary pressure group disturbed the government.
Yet,
the government tended to overreact and la'oelled any reforcJ
organization as part of a Jacobi'ce lJl to.
The simple fact
that the Catholic Church supported O'Connell where it had
vehemently condemned the United Irishmen demonstrated the
essentially peaceful nature of the organization.
O'Connell
himself had demonstrated his own opposition to revolution
by serving with the Dublin militia in the repression of a
rebellion there in 1803. 37
He never insisted upon the
dissolution of the monarchy and often made it a special point
to demonstrate his loyalty to the Crown. 38
Finally, in 1829, the emancipation Act was secured.
But many later nationalists would condemn O'Connell on two
counts.
First, in his negotiations with the government
O'Connell had compromised on the matter of the property
requirement for the franchise.
soared from 4Js to tl).39
The property requirement
Secondly, more radical nationalists,
those advocating physical force, would condemn O'Connell for
not going further, for not attempting a c!Jmplete separation.
rather than further integration into vJestminster.
Instead
of working in Ireland, where he had his success in the first
place, 0' Connell had led Irishmen to 'destminster, where they
were badly outnumbered.
;'ii th the existence of a group wi thin parliament who
represented the concerns of the majority of Irishmen, an
16
i~portant
dichotomy in Irish politics had developed.
A
choice had to be made between constitutional agitation,
working within the confines of the Jiestminster parliament,
and agitation which was clearly unconstitutional, involving
conspiracy and rebellion, or agitation which might be labelled
"semiconsti tutional."
'1'he word "semiconsti tutional" refers
to those movements which Here overtly constitutional, but
accompanied by extraparliamentary pressure groups that are
to intimidate the government
~eant
with the possibility of
insurrection and thereby force reform.
bec~~e
This dichotomy
the major issue in Irish politics until 1921 at
least, and, perhaps, considering the present situation in
Northern Ireland, to the present.
Looking at the Catholic Association with respect to
our definition of nationalism, once again, the group falls
short.
O'Connell made no attempt, to this point, to repeal
the Act of Union.
He was not a separatist.
Furthermore,
he did not imagine an elimination of the dual monarchy.
Finally, and most
im~ortantly,
he did not envision a new
constitution based upon the sovereignty of an Irish "nation."
As so often happens, this reform was not sufficient to
placate the Irish or O'Connell himself.
During the years
between 1829 and 1841 O'Connell had to satisfy himself with
reform, partly because middle-class Catholics were more
interested in reform than repeal, and also because the
sovern~ent
in ,,'iestminster was cooperative.
3ut in 1841 a
conservative government came to power and any kind of reform
17
·, I y. 4)
seeme d unl ~,~e
of the Union.
As a result, O'Connell turned to repeal
:Jy repeal, O'Connell meant a restoration of
a senarate and independent Irish parliament, as had existed
between 1782 and 18):),
sa~e
In his agitation O'Connell used the
mass appeal that had worked so well during the emanci-
pation campaign.
He organized "monster" meetings which
literally hundreds of thousands of people would attend.
In order to keep order at such meetings the crowd was
often organized in what appeared to be a military fashion.
Naturally enough, the government was once again concerned
about the possibility of open revolution,
Furthermore,
O'Connell's language before these meetings was often inflammatory.
Yet, when the government did call O'Connell's apparent
bluff by 'orescribi:lS a "monster" meeting scheduled at Clontarf,
the ancient site of a Celtic victory over 0anish invaders,
O'Connell backed down and called off the meeting.
Once again,
O'Cop~~ell's
retreat at Clontarf had produced
a historical controversy for many.
'This controversy split
later nationalists upon the ever-widening divide between
those who believed in constitutional methods and those who
would not be limited to constitutional means.
To the
constitutionalists O'Connell's disavowal of violence was an
asset.
Historian ,;:alcolm Brown insisted that O'Connell's
insistence upon "moral force" or "nonviolence" was "his
foremost lasting contribution to the political arts,"·41
Others insist that O'Connell's decision set back Irish
independence by years, pointi!l.C to the decline of the repeal
18
movement and its subsequent destruction, along with much
of Irish society, by the advent of the famine in 1845.
Yet, before O'Connell's decline and the famine occurred,
another important Irish political movement came into being.
This movement, while in its own time relatively unsuccessful,
had a monumental effect upon the development of Irish
nationalism and particularly Sinn Fein.
In 1842 a young
Protestant barrister, Thomas Davis, joined 0' Connell's
Repeal Association in Dublin.
In 1842 he also founded a
newspaper called the Nation, with the assistance of John
Blake Dillon and Charles Gavan Duffy.
In their newspaper
these men, led by Davis, advocated a type of nationalism
that hitherto was completely foreign to Ireland.
Instead
of basing their ideas upon the rights of man, as the United
Irishmen had, or Catholic rights, as O'Connell had, Davis
and his followers tried to emphasize a historical view of
Irish natioP3lity.
Davis hoped that Ireland's romantic,
heroic past might be linked to modern Ireland and help restore
a sense of self-respect and self-confidence. 42
The Nation
was filled with ballads, poems and tales recounting the
great Irish heroes.
-::'herefore Brown sees Davis as taking
an almost methodical approach to the problem of nationality.
"The national schools were silenced on Limerick and Dungannon.
let this be remedied forthwith.
their history'
Irish men were ignorant of
let a popular library of Irish heroes and
episodes be published instantly.,,4J
The divide between O'Connell's progrmn and the policies
of Davis continued to widen,
Davis's followers, or Young
19
Ireland as they became known, advocated the preservation
of the Irish language, which, though still widely used before
'
,
d ec l'lne. 44
t h e f amlne,
was ln
In contrast, O'Connell, himself
the product of an Irish-speaking background, did not consider
its preservation a necessity.
O'Connell said of the tongue,
"r am sufficiently utilitarian not to regret its passing.,,45
The differences between O'Connell and Young Ireland
have often been viewed as the result of their different
attitudes toward continental thought.
As Brown has pointed
out, O'Connell made a definite effort to keep his followers
separated, especially in the minds of the British cabinet,
from French republicanism and english Chartism. 46 Davis was
less hostile toward continental thought.
Davis himself was
deeply influenced by the French historians Augustinrhierry
and Jules Illichelet.
In his essays Davis praised men such
as the Comte de Mirabeau and Georges Danton. 47 In an early
essay entitled "Udalism and Feudalism" he compared the
economies of Denmark and Ireland in order to present the
ideal which Ireland might have attained were it not for
the wretched Union with Great Britain. 48 In addition Davis
Vias one of the first Irishmen to advocate protectionism
rather than free trade.
He suggested that Ireland should be
"willing to pay a little dearer to her own manufacturer than
to foreigners," and pointed to the protectionism of the German
states as an example. 49 Yet, as Davis soon found out,
Irishmen's imaginations were not inflamed by his theories of
economic policy and Norway.
As a result Davis sought to
2J
excite the people by exploring their
inheri tance. 5)
co~~on
Irish cultural
f:iany of these same characteristics will later
be seen in Arthur Griffith's thoughts.
jJhile Davis was influenced by 3uropean thought he still
turned to Irish history for his symbols.
At the same time
continental nationalists were concerned with the question of
Irish nationality.
';Jhereas Davis might compare economies,
Czech and other Slav leaders compared the Irish struggle
with their own independence movements.
In Prague, O'Connell
was cited as an example for Czechs and a "Repeal Club" was
founded there. 51 Yet, it is interesting to note that many
continental nationalist thinkers concluded that Ireland should
remain in the United Kingdom.
For example, Count Cavour,
the Italian nationalist, thought that "at all costs" the
Union should be maintained, "first in the interest of Ireland
herself, then in that of Zngland, and finally in the interest
of material and intellectual civilization. ,,52
Cavour believed
that Ireland would make more material gains within the Union
than outside it.
Guiseppe Mazzini, probably one of the most
intense nationalists in European history, came to a similar
conclusion.
In 1847, when he founded a People's International
League for the restoration of subject nationalities, ;.;azzini
omi tted Ireland.
)Ihen members of the mori'ound Repeal Associ-
ation complained, l',jazzini answered that the Irish needed better
government and not a new nation.
The Irish "did not plead
for distinct principle of life or system of legislation,
derived from native peculiarities, and contrasting radically
21
with ~nglish wants and wishes ... 53
!'i!azzini did not telieve
Irish nationalism would survive.
In some ways r.;azzini' s predictions about the future
seemed warranted.
dead.
By 1846 both O'Connell and Davis were
In addition, in 1845 the famine had descended upon
Irela!1d, bringing practically all nationalist agitation to
a standstill.
In 1848 the ragged remains of Young Ireland,
frustrated by the sad decline of nationalism, led a pathetic
rebellion.
This was the last great call for separation for
almost twenty years.
In addition, the famine had a serious
effect upon the cultural tradition on which Young Ireland
had begun to base its program.
A good example would be
the decline of the Gaelic language in Ireland.
Gaelic was
primarily the language of the peasantry, the very class of
Irishmen that was most devastated by starvation and emigration.
This attrition, combined with the development of a
primary educational system in English and the usefulness of
English as the
lar~uage
of trade, indeed survival in a time
of dearth, led to the complete dominance of 2nglish over
Gaelic.
A language which had perhaps as many as a million
and a half speakers in Davis's time had been reduced to an
anomaly heard only in pockets in the west and south. 54
This
decline may have been disconcerting to many nationalists, but
the only serious efforts to preserve the tongue were conducted
by scholars.
After the famine, Irish nationalism was in a state of
disarray.
Some agitation contL'1ued at ;Iestminster, but for
22
the most part the Irish members of parliament had been integrated into the British party system, dividing themselves
between Liberals and Tories.
~epresentatives
~fforts
to unite the Irish
into a solid front on the issue of land
reform had proved unsuccessful, partly because of church
opposition, as all nationalist organizations became synonymous in its mind with the Italian nationalists who were
causing the papacy difficulty.
The development of a separate
Irish party was still in the future.
,'Ihile attempts were being made on the constitutional
front, a new revolutionary group was in the making.
Two
former followers of Young Ireland, James Stephens and John
0' iilahony, having spent time in exile in France and the United
States respectively, founded in 1858 an oath-bound secret
society dedicated to the establishment of an Irish republic.
In Ireland this group became known as the Irish Republican
Brotherhood (IRB), which some writers call the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, while an auxiliary organization in
the United States was known as the Fenian Brotherhood.
As
time went on the term Fenian was applied to both groups.
c:'he
Fenians attempted to develop a secret army and with American
help hoped to foment a general rebellion in Ireland.
Other
than the establishment of a republic the Fenians had no
organized program of social reform.
In many ways they
looked upon the ending of British rule as a panacea for
Ireland's ills.
failed.
Yet once again the revolutionary approach
The church condemned the IRB, the British authorities
23
infiltrated the organization and rounded up the leaders.
In addition, the people were mostly unconvinced by its program.
But the minor insurrection of 1867 which the IRB led
became established in the revolutionary pantheon.
Despite its early failures, the IRE was able to survive.
In 1873 it adopted a new constitution which, while still
convinced that only force of arms would bring about the
mythical republic, commanded members in time of peace to
confine themselves "to the cultivation of union and brotherly
love among Irishmen, the propagation of republican principles
and the spreading of knowledge of Irish national rights.,,55
In doing this the Fenians became involved in organizations
that were openly dedicated to constitutional politics •
.
Through this technique the IRE was able to survive and exert
a major influence upon the development of Irish nationalism.
This influence can be seen plainly in the development
of a separate IriSh party under the leadership of Charles
Stewart Parnell.
Protestant
la~Jer,
During the early 187J's Isaac Butt, a
had attempted to organize an Irish party,
but his Home GovernIllent association was neither tightly
controlled nor independent of Liberals and Conservatives.
After 3utt's failure became evident, a new attitude began to
develop among the Irish members.
They began to adopt a
policy of total independence from both British parties.
They
voted with the party that was willing to act upon their
program.
If this party did not act they would immediately
support the other party.
jhen the difference between the
24
two parties was small, the Irish vote could
gover!'.ment.
brir.:~
dOlVn a
-:'he Irish hoped that the British would become
concerned about parliamentary instability and enact this
program.
iIistorian 1". 3. L. Lyons sees the members moving toward
an "ill-defined alliance between Fenians and parliame:-:tary
tradi tions."
r~ar:-:ell,
a Protesta:-:t landlord educated in
England, emerged as the leader of this new style. 56
In Ireland the IRE seemed totally opposed to an alliance
with the parliamentarians on the ground that they were not
working for a completely independent Ireland.
however, there were more pragmatic men.
In America,
In 1378 Parnell,
after convincing an American representative that he favored
complete indep81'dence, met with important Irish-American
nationalists in rTew York.
as the ";';ew Departure."
The result was a prograll lmown
This program sought a middle ground
between the revolutionaries and the constitutionalists.
The
objectives were the self-government of Ireland, although
just what form this goverrL1Jlent might take was purposely left
vague, and a vigorous program of land reform. 57
~-'arnell was
able to forge such an alliance because of his constant ambiguity.
lie would not cOlllillit himself to revolution, but wished
to fom as broad a front as he could in his struggle for
Home Rule.
Home Rule Vias the name i;iven the program whereby a
local Irish legislature would be restored while certain
powers, such as foreign policy, would be retained by
25
jestr:Jins-;;er.
Juring the 183 J' s Farnell \'las able to cring
i-:ome Rule to the forefront of 2ri tish politics for two
reasons.
First, r.e was able to orGanize a tightly disci-
plined parliamentary party that was independent of the
Liberals and Conservatives.
Second, the Liberals and Conser-
vatives were so equal in strength that l'arnell and his party
became the deciding votes.
On important issues they could
decide the survival or defeat of a governrnent.
.?arnell used
this edge to push Home Rule before Parliament.
Yet in late
1889 Farnell's world exploded.
He was Lwol ved in an ugly
divorce case that split the party.
Parnell died in 1891.
The fall of .?arnell was to prove a turning point in
Irish history.
Farnell, in his last struggles against the
reactions of the church and the anti-Farnellite faction
that had developed, returned to more violent rhetoric.
This
convinced many revolutionaries that Parnell had finally lost
his illusions about constitutionalism and he was enshrined
in the temple of revolutionaries with ,-Iolfe Tone and the
Fenians.
Yet, more importantly, Parnell became a martyr
figure, the betrayed leader whom the small minds of Ireland
had slain.
He became not only a powerful political symbol,
but also a major cultural symbol.
';L 3. Yeats, the Irish poet,
wrote numerous poems eulogizing the great leader.
James Joyce,
the novelist, in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young I,ian,
portrayed the emotional trauma and division that Parnell's
death created in Irish society.
26
At the door Dante turned round violently and
shouted down the room, her chee~s flushed and quivering with rage:
--Devil out of hell! :iie won! ,Ie crushed him
to death! Fiend!
The door slammed behind her.
;:ir. Casey, freeing his arms from his holders,
suddenly bowed his head on his hands with a sob of
pain.
--Poor Parnell! he cried loudly. ",ly dead king!
:Ie sobbed loudly a!1d bitterly.
Stephen, raising his terrorstricken f se, saw
that his father's eyes were full of tears. 3
The other important effect of Parnell's fall was the creation
of a political vacuum in which cultural nationalism and Sinn
Fein began to develop.
rhe complete dis integra tion of the Irish party a t
~"Jest-
minster led many Irishmen to pause and reconsider the tactics
and strategies that had resulted in failure.
:::uch of this
discussion occurred in small literary societies that began
to appear both in Ireland and England.
Since independence
aDpeared to be as far in the future as ever, "there could be
no excuse for postponing all other acti vi t-ies--cul tural,
literary, artistic--until the day of freedom dawned.";!"9 This
activity not only helped to bring about the Irish literary
revival, but also a new theory about the cal.;ses of Irish
nationali"1m's failure to this point.
For many this failure
was the result of the contamination and weakening of Irish
culture and society by its exposure to :english culture.
As
a result, many nationalists decided to devote their energies
to the strengthening of Irish culture.
Yet, one probler.l in such an approach was the fact that
a distinct Irish culture may no longer have existed.
In
27
reali ty the cuI tural na tiOl~alislJ that began to develop in
Ireland at the end of the nineteenth century was an attempt
to recreate an heroic Gaelic culture that no longer existed,
if indeed it ever had.
Historian F. 3. L. Lyons asserted
that the diversity of culture, whether actual or invented,
tha t the nationalists a tte:r.pted to emp}-:asize was a prinary
factor ir. the development of the Irish state i" the south
and the partitioning of the northeast corner.
ilhereas culture
usually acts "as a unifyi:1g force in a fragmented society and
as a barrier against anarchy," in Ireland "the diversity of
cultures has been a force which has worked against the evolution of a homogeneous society and in doing so has been an
agent of anarchy rather t:1an unity. ,,6)
In their efforts to develop an Irish culture the cultural
nationalists realized that it was necessary somehow to show
the steady influx of British ideas and attitudes into Ireland.
Given the close economic ties between the two islands, this
was difficult, but one way of slowing the tide was to portray
2nglish culture as somehow harmful and degenerative.
One of
the earliest examples of this strategy was directed, surprisingly enough, at athletics.
In Nover.Jber 1834 the Gaelic
Athletic Association was founded for the preservation of Irish
games, such as hurling and Gaelic football.
One of the early
patro!1s of the Associatio!1,I'homas ;J.
Archbishop of
Cro~e,
Cashel, attempted to dissuade Irish boys from playi!1g English
" 1 e. 61
spor t s 'oy sugges t'lng tha t t'nese spor t s were 1 ess +h
•. an Vlrl
Later this strategy \'las applied to society in general, and 0!1
28
25 ,:ovember 1892, DouGlas Hyde, a southern Protestant and
scholar, presented a:1 address to the Irish National Literary
Society entitled "On the ;lecessi ty for De-AnGlicizing Ire~
. ,,62
1 a~~d
England was fast being identified as the source of
all evil.
i·:aud Gorme, a fiery nationalist, summed this
idea up in a sort
::vil?'
of
The answer:
catechism.
" ',;Ina t is the origin of
':;:ngland. ' ,,63
This tendency is visibly evident in many of the political
cartoons from the period.
L~
a cartoon from Arthur Griffith's
newspaper Sinn Fein (see Figure 1),64 a kind of religious
imagery is bestowed upon the cul tural program.
"The j'la tional
Apostle" of Ireland was of course St. Patrick, and the myth
of his casting the serpents out of Ireland is well knol'm.
Yet, in the cartoon the serpents driven before the apostle
are symbols for the two evils, emigration and anGlicization,
that cultural nationalists felt were threatening the Hibernian
paradise.
In addition, by evoking the image of St. Patrick,
the cartoon seems to suggest that if British influence was
cast out of Ireland, Ireland would become a holy, virtuous
land.
Eistorian ,1illiam Irwin Thompson wrote of this strategy:
"The first and most durable characteristic of the ideological
movement had appeared:
the Irishman'S dismissal of evil from
his consciousness of Ireland. ,,65
Probably the most important of the societies that developed
out of this cultural revival was the Gaelic League.
:::!~e
League
'lias founded by Hyde in 1893 as a way of implementing his plans
for de-anglicization.
The objectives of the Gaelic League
29
I,,'
I
: .1ijt~
J)
were the restoration of the Irish tongue to use in everyday
life and instillment of a sense of pride in their Gaelic
heritage among the masses.
Ostensibly, the Gaelic League
Vias supposed to be an apolitical organization and there
;'lere many Ane:;lo-Irish Protestants in the organization, partic·J.laY'l~!
L~
the first ten or twenty years.
Still, its efforts
to stren,:;tllen Gaelic culture seened somehow to encourage
nationalism anone its members.
It is interesting to note that
a study has shown that about l1alf of tile sovern."llent ministers
and senior civil servants in the first fifty years of inde-
r,
pendence had been members of the Gaelic League in their youth."o
:'urthermore, despite the protests of some leaders, the league
Vias closely identified with nationalism.
A cartoon, once
ac;ain from Griffith's Sinn Fein (see Figure 2), graphically
demonstrates this pOint. 67 C'he cultuY'al nationalists in the
Gaelic League vrere the torch-bearers of Irish nationalism.
"he cultural nationalists' aversion to :2nglish culture
at times became a vulgar racial and religious animasi ty
similar to that which .c::nglishITlen had been ;'J.il ty of for
decades.
Jsing Hyde as an example, many cultural nationalists
attempted to avoid outriGht prejudice.
nationalism
\'laS
Ideally, cultural
a proGram for all Iris]"aen regardless of
descent or creed.
Yet :-iyde's attitude toward Ulster ?rot-
esta:lts and Dissenters reveals the underlying feelings.
Eyde remarked about tte assimilative powers of Irish c'llture.
1:1 tl1e past Dane, ;:orman
a:~d
Saxon had been transformed into
virtuous Gaels. Yet ;:yde referred to ,aster as a place "where
4
31
J2
tne Gaelic race was expelled and the land planted with aliens,
whom our dear mother Lrin, assimila ti ve as she is, has )l.i therto
found it difficult to absorb.,,68
l-iyde does not su;;gest
whether or not these "aliens" would have a place in the
independei,t, Gaelic Ireland t:'1a t he and the other cultural
natio:~lists
envisioned.
This attitude only confirmed the
fears and biases of northern Protestants, and helped to lead
to the eventual partition of Ireland.
Cultural nationalisp.: was '11olded into a definite political
program by Griffith and Sinn ::<ein.
Griffith was a Dublin
journalist who had become involved in a number of literary
societies at t;le turn of the century.
In [larch 19J) Griffith
!1ad suggested that the numerous societies that had grown up
around Dublin form a federation and consolidate their efforts.
In September 19J) Cumann ;,a Gaedheal wns founded. 69 The
organization sought to leave " the utmost liberty of action"
to those clubs whose general objective was the "securinG of
a sovereign independent Ireland by cultural, economic or
mili tary means." 7)
Yet CUlllann na :}aedheal soor. became a
se1)ara te orCc:al".iza tiol"..
Still, wi thin tLe orcaTliza tion there
was a Group of men from the secret society, the IRS.l'here
"as been a controversy over whether or not Cu:nann na Gaedheal
was sinply a front for the IRi3 and whether Griffith himself
\'las a :nember of the society.
vavis,
art~ue
Some authors, such as
that Griffith was not a member of the IR3 and
was indeed attempting to prevent the society from c,ecoming a
mere tool of the IRJ.
Davis points to the difference in policy
-:l:at had developed VIi thin the society.7
1
33
Griffith, iY1 the be8"inning, based his political strategy
on the so-called constitution of 1782.
He held that the
ReY1unciatio!'. Act of 1783 passed by the uublin parliament had
never been repealed and, as a result, the Act of enion was
invalid.
lee suggested that the Irish members of Parliament
currently sitting at destminster return to DubliY1 and meet
as a separate, independent parliament.
Yet Griffith did not
suggest that Ireland should deny its allegiance to the
monarchy.
'!'his brought him into conflict with the policy
of the IRE.
It vlould settle for nothinG less than the
establishment of an Irish RepLblic.
In addition, Davis points
out that Griffith's policy smaclced of open political activity.
?ollowing the disastrous alliance with Parnell open political
activity was shunned by the IRB as a betrayal of the republican
tradition which advocated the use of force alone as a means
of gaining independence.
Davis has suggested that this fact
precluded any IRB takeover of the society.
Historian Leon O'Broin insists that the society was a
front for the IR3.
He points out that Griffith was involved
in the ':'ransvaal Club, which supported the Boers in their war
wi th 3ri tain.
the IRE.
'!'his society was know:1 to have connections with
In addition, Griffith was known to have beer. present
at at least one IR3 meeting.
Furthermore, O'Droin points out
that the suspected head of the IRB was an active member of
Cw"llann na Gaedheal. 72 One wonders whether or not the :1eac
of the IRE would be involved in a society that was hostile
to the IRB program.
•
J4
A more satisfactory answer to this question might be
found after cO!lsidering the struggle that was taki!lg place
in the rR3 at this time.
The IRE, after the disastrous
rising of 186?, had pledged itself to an armed
stru,~gle,
but that armed struggle was not to take place until the
general population seemed likely to support a rising.
0:'1 til
then the IRS was to remain a secret society and avoid all
public activity.
At the turn of the century this strategy
was beginning to irritate a new gec1eraticn of IRo men wl:o
felt the IRE should combine open political agitation with
conspiracy until a:'1 armed struggle could take place.?J
These
men might look upon Griffith's ideas as an opportunity to
put the new strategy into practice.
During this time Griffith began to develop his so-called
"Hungarian policy" which led to the evolution of Sinn Pein
as a political organization.
Griffith, having already
co,lsidered tr,e idea of a dual monarchy for Ireland, became
interested in the Hungarian nationalist movement in the
Austrian I:mpire and how it had resulted in the -,ustro-}:ungarian
3mpire.
~,~ag:yar
Griffi th saw many parallels between the Irish aY',d
s truggl e s .
:-1e recognized that iNhere the I'::agyar
patriot Louis :Cossuth had failed to es-:ablish a lIungarian
state 'oy force, the parliamentarian Francis Deak througr. a
policy of abstention had been a:cle to brLig about a separate
assembly for Hungarians.
In 19)5 Griffith puhlished a series
of articles entitled. "'l'he Resurrec-tion of Hungary" in. v/hich
he outlined t:le
sir~ilari ties
between
Irisr~
and Lcasyar
~istory
4
r ,
I
35
1
I
and sUi:;gested that Ileak' s approach might work for Ireland
as well.
In addition to his political
a specific econonic policy.
progra~
Griffith envisioned
Like his predecessor Davis,
Griffi th looked abroad for parallels to tne Irisf'. economy.
Yet, vlhereas Davis lool:ed to Ilen;nark. a largely acricul t~lral
nation, Griffitr. chose industrial Ger:nany.
Easing his plan
on tr.e ideas of the Geman economist ?riedrich List in
"'he Ilationalist :3vstem of Political ':::conomy, Griffith advocated
a policy of protectior-ism in order to strengthen Irish manu-
facturing.
Griffith felt that "the fallacies of Adam Smith
and his tribe,,7 4 had severely damaged Ireland's economy,
forcing it to remain almost solely agricultural.
l1e believed
that Ireland could develop and must develop its own industries.
"A nation cannot promote 'and further its civilization, its
prosperity. and its social progress equally as well by exchanging agricultural for manufacture goods as by establishing a
manufacturinb power of its own.,,75
Griffith, in lookinG at
Gem.any, felt that the Geman states had made the transition
from an agricultural economy to an ind'Jstrial society throuch
the Geman Zollverein. 76
:3ince his policies all advocated some sort of self-reliance,
wi',ether it be political, cultural or econof!1ic, Griffith
ViaS
searching for a name for the program which would evoke these
ideals.
According to poet and historian Padraic Colum, Griffith
found such a title in a poem by Hyde recounting the dismal
failures of Irisruuen who had sought to free Ireland with outside
help.
Hyde's verse suggested the self-reliance of Griffith's
policies.
lilt is for every fool to have knowledge tIlat there
is no watchcry worth any heed but one--Sinn Fein amhai1'.--Ourselves alone! "i'hese two words, Sinn l"e in, meaning "we ourselves," became the title for Griffith's program and later
for the political party that developed from it. 77
It should be remembered that during this time Griffith's
Cumann na Gaedheal was not a political party but simply a
propaganda organ.
:Cven when the name was changed to Sinn Fein
in ;rovember 19)5 it remained a society rather than a political
Darty.
Part of the difficulty was a lack of unity.
The split
between Griffith's ideas of a dual r.1onarchy and the IR3's
nystical republic had widened.
During this period a division
had developed, and in Belfast, Bulmer Hobso1'., a young aspiring
IRE organizer, had founded a separate group of societies
9
which 'oecame known as the Dungannon Clubs. 7
U
Griffi t!,
insisted upon the Sinn Fein policy's semiconstitutional
prograIll for mostly practical reasons.
As for himself he was
separatist, but he also recognized that the "Irish Deople are
not separatists.,,79
He hoped to attract Hone Rulers, or
' t s, Wl'tt. h'lS program. 8)
cons t l't u t'lonallS
Griffith was !1ot
anxious to create or lead a new political party.
Historian
Don ;:;cCartney summed it up thus:
Despite appeals by friends that he should
become the Irish Deak and lead a new Dolitical
party, Griffith was relucta1'.t to commit himself
to s:J.ch a course, and hoped that the pa~tiamentary
party would adopt the Sinn Fein policy.
37
In 19)7 the two factions were finally able to reach
an agreement on a somewhat al1bit;uous osjective, "the reestablish;:Jent of the independence of
P2
Ireland."~
Cumann na
Gaedheal and the DunEannon CluDs came tocether to form the
-"
:nnn
FeIn
a
,
nU~0er
Lea{~ue.
83
At first 3inn Fe in seemed to attract
'14
.,..
b
cc
o~ ~em ers.
Yet in 191) a reorzanized and reu''lified
Irish Farliamentary Farty under John Redmond was able to
brine: a :iorle Rule 2ill to a vote in :!estminster.
that parliamentary methods might finally succeed.
It appeared
(...,
.
'Jl:r..n
.,.
l'e.1l1
was injured because it refused to accept or support Home Rule.
Griffi th objected to the proposed rir;ht of the Dri tish Parliament to amend laws enacted in Du'~lin, lack of tariff autonomy,
inability of Ireland to collect its own taxes, right of
2ritain to tax Ireland without Irish consent, and existence
of a joint exchequer with Eritain. 8S
In addition, the more radical separatists were drawn
from Sinn Fein by the new Irish Volunteer movement.
In elster,
Protestants and Dissentc'~s opposed to the ~rome Rule :;ill had
or{?;anized themselves into a military force lmown as the 'lIster
Volunteer Force.
Xationalists in the south were inspired cy
their example and in 1913 the Irish Volunteers were founded.
At first the Irish Volunteers were dominated by more radical
members of the 1R3.
i:hen Red!nond ~)ecame concerned aOo'J.t the
groWiY16 size of' the organization and attempted to assert :tis
control over the organization.
lce was successful.
~he
or~:ani-
zation cecaf:1e doninated by Eome Rulers and changed its r:ame
to the l:ational Volunteers.
A small rump of separatists
r
JS
remaiY>,ed as the Irish Volunteers.
30th these Groups drew
support that Sinn ?ein otherwise might have been able to gain.
Then with the outbreak of the First ;lorld,lar Sin:-l ?e in's
fortunes began to change.
Followi:-"ir the passage of a Home
Rule Jill in 1914 Redmond 2_nd his followers had been willing
to delay the actual inplementation of the bill until the war
had COr:le to a conclusion.
:'~ost
Iris!'Jnen were willing to
accept this delay and a Great many Irish_men served wi t,1 the
3ritish Army.
3ut a small group of revolutio!1aries led by
Fatrick Fearse and the socialist James Con!1011y planned and
led a revolt in Dublin during 2aster week 1916.
Sinn Fein
members had not been involved in the planning of the insurrection.
Yet, lii:e most people in Ireland, tl-:ey were shoci:ed
by the summary execution of the leaders
OI~
out a civil trial, before a firing squad.
the revolt, wi thThe Easter Rising
was the beginning of a turn towards separatist politics
during this period, and Sinn Fein, taki:-lg advantage of the
0,6
situation, began to grow rapidly.u
The Jaster Rising and the later Anglo-Irish ,,:'uerrilla
war have raised questions in many scholars' minds about Sinn
?ein's and Griffi th' s advocacy of peace ful, though separatist,
means.
Some historians have suggested that Griffith and Sinn
Fein had adopted a policy of nonviolence or "moral force"
for expediency.
about Hungarian
Davis points out that Griffith, when speaking
r~istory,
had preferred the revolutionary
Louis i(ossuth over the abstentionist
policies were more practical.
D~ak,
but felt that
D~ak's
In addition, _,;cCartney points
39
o~,t
that Griffith felt that at times all "ationalist move-
Tents must
beco~e
for a short time violent.
"In retrospect,
the 1916 rising could be viewed as one of those occasional
excursions of strategic points into the use of force to
which Griffith had given his blessing in his interpretation
of Irish history. 1137
In 1917, with the country in near rebellion, Sinn Fein
finally became an official political party with the only
surviving leader of the Rising, 3amon de '!alera, as its
president a"d Griffith as its vice-president.
In the first
general parliamentary election after the war, in December
111S, Sinn Fein, running on an abster.tionist platform, wor.
all but two seats outside of Ulster.
Ir. January 1919 these
SLm ?ein :nenbers met in Dublir. as the First Dail, the pro'lisional ;;overnTTlent, de facto and de ,jure, of the Irish state.
?bally, after two years of guerrilla warfare with tr.e 3ri tish
t;1e:r forced Great 3ri tain to recognize this fact.
3inn Fein
>.ad finally succeeded in securing a separate Irish state.
Yet t even in trillillph over Jri taint 3inn Fein '. .,.ras not
entirely successful.
~:;e
Griffi th was ;'lever able to incorporate
separatists completely into an allia"ce.
These men were
u';':;illL".D to accept the treaty which the Dail read approved
wit:, 2ri tain becau.se it did not create tl';eir mythical repu'!Jlic.
:reland, under tl:e terr:ls of the a;;reenent, '.:'as now a :ne;,,::er
0:"
t:le :';ri tis): Comnonweal th and all :nem'oers of the Irish
: ~over;-:me::.-:: Vlere req'J.ired to tal:e a:'1 oath of alleziance to the
2ri tisr: :=:ro':rn.
,
'~l:e allia~lce
:or~·ed ':,e-'c'",een ~Le radical
cf'l.a t '}rif'f'i t:1
.J
>. ad
e:.r.visioned and
separa--::ists and ::1ore :-::odera--:e
l~ationalists
was destroyed
C~
.J...1
•
v111S
'.J...
P01Ylv.
As a resul t t"e
Iris}~ Civil 3ar followed) ','/i th -the rl~mp of radicals retai:lin;.:~
t~"',.e
~ar.1e
,sinn Fein for their or2anization.
The descenda:'1ts
of -::his rt1!np are the -,Jresent-day .?rovisional Irish ilepublican
.h":ny and i -::s political win,;. Provisio:',al Sin!'. Fein.
a :-t1ajor cause o~ the violence tl':at pla:-ues Irelai"..d to this da;:,r.
In loolrinc bael: on the develop:ner:t of Irisf'. :"!atlo;:alis::1
since t~,:e late ei3:~teentL centur~r it 'Jecomes apparen~
3inYl. Fein was a~')le ~o conbine or renovate :r1any of' the tactics
'.Jsed
ljy
other nationalist M01ler.1ents.
?he consti tutionalis:-i;
of t;,e Volunteers. the populisT,1 of 0' Connell. tLe cultural
:na-tionalisT:: of Davis al-:d l-~~Tde, and tl:e cu:!r..iEC a:'1d flexi'cili ty
of :Carnell were all cODoined ':Jy Griffith ir..to ;:;inn Fein.
Iris:1 na tionalisr:l had reached its ul tina -::el:; sClccessful
na:z.ifestation.
~-.
3.
,::,'i th anazing insi,?;ht,
n::p
Ot =-~e;;::-:art;y, a COtlteT:lpOrary of Griffi tl-l
had realized t:rJ.is in 1919 when 1:e wrote:
to the Si~l::1 ?ein r:1ovement Irish patriotic moveMents have
all been s1)ecialized rather than co;nprehensive." SS
::'ad risen froD the ashes of earlier r:ationalist ,,1Ovements
:-:;UC;1
like t:le myt?1ical phoenix.
f
"
1
Ricnard Ja./ , ";';atio:-:alis!:"j" [ta:,en from
chapter of'
an unnu')l ished ::;oo~~ give:l to we "tJ~/ aut:-,or].
2
Ibid., -;>. 12.S.
3 D. George Joyce, i,a tional iST:! ir: Ireland (Dal tiClore:
2he John ~opkins Cniversity ~ress, 1982), p. 2~.
4
Itid.
5 Ibid.
6
I'Jid., p. 3).
7 ;,:icr"ael Van Cleave Alexander, .:'he 2irst of tte::'udors:
. :-\ Stud'," o:£: i!enr'.; VIT and ?is Rei':"r. (r~otowa, :,J.J.: EO'vvT:-:1a:: a:,~d
Littlefield, 193), p. 11).
3
J.C. Beckett, Tl;e L'aking of ;',odern Irelar~d! 16))-1723
(London: Faber and Faber, 1981), p. 197.
.:I'-$r--;i"s'f'h"-",E",,i,,:s:-it,-;o~r\-~=-·",c=a.:l,--:D",o~c~U'",·,~",e,,-n,-_t",s,,-,-,-=1..::1o.J.7--,2::...-c;.=.IL').=2..=2
') s. P. Curt is, e d.,
(London: :~ethuen and Co., Ltd., 1943), p. 137.
1)
11
12
Ibid.
3ecl,ett, p. 223.
Ibid., p. 214.
1
3 Ibid.
14
R. 3. ;,;cDowell, Ireland in the A":e of ImperialisT:! a:1d
2evolution, 176)-12)1 T':xford: Clarendon rress, 1)79), p. 363.
15 Curtis, PP. 233-239.
16
17
:.cuoViell, p. 332.
Ibid., p. 611.
13
::. Des~ond jilliams, ed., Secret Societies in Ireland
(Jublin: 3ill and ~:acnillan, 1973), p. 67.
1)
2)
3ec}:ett,
D.
26).
David ::]. ~:=illel", Q:J.er~n' s Re>els: "lJlster lovalis:!l i:::.
~-=istorical =-:ersJec~ive (~,e\·"T Yorl;::: =~a:::-,nes a~ld ::o'01e
D.
55.
21
,jill iar;~s, p. (; 7 .
:001;:8,
1)173),
q
r
22 I';id.
,
p.
-:::;L.
?'1
I'.)id.
,
D.
0.
-,
..J...-l-
-/
24
.
...:..e c.:;,:e
v v t
,~
263.
p.
25 Curtis, pp. 232-241.
26 I-:::id., p. 239.
27 ::cDowell, D. 36).
?]
?._o .:e',::',:", ~_ouer:-~ ~-=~;._--la:nd: 2ro~-,;. t:1e ~i,r::-{lteeY'.t:-. \~ent'..1rH
to ti-:e :'rese:1t C;e1,'l Yor:':: :'i:ar"ger and Rovl, ...~uolisllers, 1.18J t
D.
27).
31 Jeckett, p.
31
I1~id.
273.
, p. 273·
32 Ibid.
33 I-:id. , p. 225.
34 .iebb, p. 1)1.
35
yj
;~eckett
Jeb;), p •
.,:2l
j~
roid.
J)).
, p.
191.
, p. 45·
J:1 ,J·eoc, p. 192.
4)
3e c~~e -tt , p. J)7.
41 3rov/D, p. 4 c
J'
42
4J
=,o~Jce
, p.
~rowY'..,
2J2.
p. 52.
44 .,
'L Lyons,
~
I re 1 ana' Sl~ce
.
~.~. '.
Collins/?ontana, 1:182), p. 224.
46
I'
I
I
l
Ii?
..,.,
=rOVF;1. ,
IUid.
,
p. 45
p . ..,./, ry,
.
r
I
,
4
4,3
4::;
.
/
I
5)
:C:,id.
,
p. 47.
nid .
,
p. 49.
I~:id.
,
p. 54.
51 : ~ic!101as =,=anser::h,
(Toronto:
!file Irish ·:2uestio:'1
124J-1-21
of Toronto Fress, 1978 , p. S).
~niversit'!
52 Ibid. , p. S?
53 Ibid., ;0.
Lyo:,~s
since tfle
•
55
?ami~1e
t
LeO:1 O'Jroin, RevollJ.tionar LTnder:-:-round: "1he Star·
of the Irish Renublican .sro~herhood 18 L:3-1'- 2 ~ '--lotowa,~;. J. :
RO\'8an and Littlefield, 197u , p. 7.
1 ,r
p.
156.
57 Ibid. , pp. 16J-164.
52 Ja:.1es Jo',ce, ;.. ~'ortrai t of the Artist as a
(::e·" :or}u:"he VL~i;'l;;; [ress, 1964), p. J)l.
59 Joyce, p. 2JJ.
Lyons,
Youn,~
'caE
ar. . d A:larchv t p. 2.
Sl Lyo·os, Ireland since the Famine,
'0.
224.
cSJ 'lillian Ir,vin ::'hompson,::'he L!a.';inatio:1 of an Insurrection,
.~aster l'
Dubli:'l
S-:oc:';:~orid;;et
16: .\ Stud" of an Tdeolo?'ical :.:ovement ( ,jest
'lhe Lindisf'ar~-'le l:;>ress, 1)31 , p. 37.
=,~ass.:
64
'.arch 19, 191), p. 1.
39.
':2hompsol1, p.
66 Garvin, p. 1J2.
67 liThe r.rorchbearer,
0(;
7")
8urtis, p. 31J.
r~id.
71 I0id.
-
'7?
,
,
~
l'"
, p.
17.
1,~
.
11).
II
Sinn ?eL"
::arch 25, 1911,
D.
1.
r
4
73 Lyor:s
Ireland s i~lCe
t
D.
315.
I:':id., ~. 251.
75
'~\"lrti3,
D.
J1L~_.
ICJid.
77
~'ad~'aic GoLh':'" CL!rsel ves .HO;1e! ~'l:e Scary of
8riffi t2-1 and -::le Ori2.:'i~l of' the ~rish ?ree ~tate
\~~el:.r Yor}:::
Gro'ln: ~):":blis~!ers, inc., 1)59), .p. J2.
27.
Lyons, Ire 1 a~-;.d s i
Ylee
the
~alJ.i:-:e,
p. 256.
p. 59.
21
Donal ~~cCart:'1e~r,
""~he Foli -tical Use of :iis-:ory in the
]0r}~ o~ Arthur :Jriffi th," Journal of 8onteEn)Orary 2istor"'t r , C
(1)73), p. 14.
Lyor~s
, IrelaTld si!i.ce
D.
256.
Ibid.
34
25
Ioid. , p. 25';'.
Davis, p.
54.
-=I",r,-,e",l",a=n",d,--,s=i",n,-,c:..;e"--"t",h,,,e,---,;":..;'a=r:1",i,",l'=~
e, p (? • J 2 2 - J 3 J .
~~cCar'tney,
p. 15.
~~
..)c
P.S. o'~re,;art2rr, .Si:I.:1. j;l'eir:.: ~'\!: Illu:-.;ir:.atio~ (D:.:.clin:
::aLU1sel a:1d Go., Ltd., 1919), p. 6.
r
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",a",-n-,:;d7~""c.:..!:17'e---,C",r~~",·c_"$i,-,r~,--"o,-,f~t;;..",:.::;e."..=I",r~i!..!s",;"-1--=-?-"r-=e-=e'--.::;",·~:=.~a~t,,,-e .
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