From Polarization to Accommodation:
The Rhetorical Progress towards Peace in Northern Ireland
By
Megan Maginnis
A Senior Honors Thesis Submitted to the
Department of Communication
Boston College
May 2010
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .
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CHAPTER ONE – Introduction .
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From Civil Rights to Insurrection: Key Development Leading up to Bloody Sunday
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CHAPTER TWO – From Conflict to Cooperation: A Reconstruction of Context
Division Leads to Discrimination
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The Birth of the Civil Rights Movement
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British Army Arrives and Internment is Introduced .
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Post Bloody Sunday and the Road to Good Friday .
Direct Rule and Very Little Progress
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Searching for a Solution . . . . . . . .
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CHAPTER THREE – Conflict, Cultural Representation, and the Media:
A Review of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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CHAPTER FOUR – Methodology .
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Richard Weaver’s Ultimate Terms
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Walter Fisher’s Narrative Paradigm .
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CHAPTER FIVE – Bloody Sunday and the Rhetoric of Hate .
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Attack the Abilities and Efficiency of the Government . . . .
Demoralize and Criminalize the Unionist Community . . . .
The British Army was Demonized . . . . . . . . .
Nationalist Community’s Reaction . . . . . . . . .
No Alternative and No Cooperation . . . . . . . . .
Nationalist Reaction is Justified because Law is Illegal and Immoral
Concluding Thoughts on Nationalist Perspective . . . . . .
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The Point of ‘No Return:’ Bloody Sunday
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Pathway to Peace: 1998 Good Friday Agreement
A Nationalist Perspective on Bloody Sunday
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Unionist Perspective on Bloody Sunday .
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Incompetent Leaders Put Followers at Risk . . . . . . . .
Demoralize the Nationalist Community and Victims . . . . . .
Nationalists are Murders, Law-Breakers, and Fully Responsible
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Nationalist Movement and Marchers are Hooligans,
Nuisances, and a Disturbance
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Reconstruction Events according to the British Army and Government
Actions are Justified . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Solution in ‘Our Terms:’ Impossible to Cooperate with Madmen . .
Concluding Thoughts on Unionist Perspective . . . . . . .
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CHAPTER SIX - The Good Friday Agreement
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Walter Fisher’s Narrative Paradigm Applied to the Nationalist Perspective
Heroes, Myths, and Fantasy . . . . . . . . .
Good Friday was Dramatized: Rescue-Mission for Peace .
Plays, Spotlights, and the Stage . . . . . . . .
Contest, Card Game, Sports Competition. . . . . .
Concluding Thoughts on Walter Fisher’s Narrative Paradigm:
Nationalist Perspective . . . . . . . . . .
Taking Sides: ‘Selling’ the Agreement
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We are Still Contenders, but Now Equal Contenders
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Peace Transcends Group Aspirations
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Battle NOT Over: Agreement is a Battle-Cry . . . . .
Nationalists Must ‘Sell’ the Agreement . . . . . . .
Strategy and Tactics Used by Nationalists to Sell the Agreement
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Agreement is Transitional: Stepping Stone . . . . .
‘Yes’ Means Peace and ‘No’ Means Violence . . . .
There is No Alternative . . . . . . . . . .
Opposition are Dissenters, Deserters, and Home Wreckers .
Nationalists Must ‘Overcome Fear’ and ‘Seize Opportunity’
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Nationalist Perspective: Post-Good Friday Negotiations
Concluding Thoughts on Nationalist Perspective
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Unionist Perspective of the Good Friday Agreement
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Three Basic Principles of ‘Yes’ Campaign
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Agreement Will Bring about Peace and End Violence
There is No Alternative . . . . . . . .
The Opposition is Irrational, Bigoted, and Sectarian
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Violence Will Continue: Terrorists Now Have Power .
There is an Alternative: Propaganda Must be Resisted .
Supporters of the Agreement are Naïve:
Have been Bribed, Manipulated, or Intimidated . . .
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Three Basic Principles of ‘No’ Campaign
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Concluding Thoughts on Unionist Perspective .
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CHAPTER SEVEN – Conclusion .
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REFERENCES .
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ABSTRACT
Northern Ireland is one of the most researched countries in the world. Considerable
studies have been conducted that aim to explain the conflict by relying on various political,
social, or linguistic theories. This particular paper examines discourse on conflict resolution
and peacemaking journalism in Northern Ireland. It seeks to explore the influence of the
media both during the height of the conflict, specifically the events of Bloody Sunday, as well
as twenty-five years later during the peace process with the Good Friday Agreement.
Considering conflict resolution is inherently intertwined with the construction of identity, this
study also analyzes how journalists have influenced the perception of the “other” and the
“enemy” in both the nationalist and unionist communities in Northern Ireland. Utilizing the
methodology of Richard Weaver’s (1985) “ultimate terms” and Walter Fisher’s (1984)
“narrative paradigm,” this paper argues that in the case of Northern Ireland, words were
deliberately perverted in order to fulfill the objectives of both communities and justify each
group’s reaction to the conflict and peace process. Through an examination of press coverage,
this paper demonstrates that the Good Friday Agreement, despite its many successes, did not
entirely resolve the political differences that existed between the Protestant unionist majority
and Catholic nationalist minority in Northern Ireland. The aim was not to obtain justice, but to
establish peace through the foundation of a governmental arrangement that permitted
unionists and nationalists, loyalists and republicans, to follow their respective political
ambitions without violence. Ultimately neither community redefined their identity during the
resolution phase of the conflict. Journalist and political leaders merely transformed public
perceptions and approaches through the strategic use of rhetoric.
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CHAPTER ONE:
Introduction to Northern Ireland: The Roots of the Conflict
The foundations of the conflict in Northern Ireland lie very deep. Ultimately, the
political problems in the region are based on the assertion of competing national identities: a
Protestant majority which views itself as British, and a Catholic minority which views itself
as Irish. From these conflicting perspectives stem the features of a conflict that has proven
extremely difficult to resolve (Gidron, 2002). In particular, the Protestant majority in Northern
Ireland desires to preserve the governing structures in the region which are based upon the
expression of their political identity. They have adopted a “unionist” position, aspiring to
maintain the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the preservation of Northern
Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the Catholic minority in
Northern Ireland consider themselves “nationalists,” and they view themselves as part of the
larger population of the island of Ireland (Tonge, 2002). At its core, the nationalist opinion of
Ireland’s history essentially has two propositions—that the geographic island of Ireland
represents the political Irish nation, and that it is British intrusion that contributes to the
division of Ireland. For nationalists, the first belief is non-negotiable, while the latter has been
adjusted over time to bear in mind unionist opposition to a united Ireland (Jarmon, 1997).
Because of these fundamental cleavages, the politics of Northern Ireland have been dominated
by division.
Despite its violent history, the region has seen a movement towards peace with the
creation of The Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The negotiators of the settlement attempted
to balance the competing claims of both communities by keeping Northern Ireland within the
United Kingdom, while simultaneously allowing the Irish government some political
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involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Thus, the traditional aspirations of the
nationalist and unionist communities were replaced with a new aspiration for peace.
Nevertheless, many scholars have remarked that one of the key issues of the Agreement was
dealing with the word ‘compromise.’ For so long the nationalist and unionist communities
had stuck by the phrase ‘no compromise.’ For many, it had become a word signifying
weakness and surrender (Tonge, 2002). Therefore, political representatives were faced with
the enormous challenge of trying to convince their supporters that the Good Friday
Agreement was not an indication of defeat. Indeed, the Agreement had become a site of
contention between the communities due to the fact that neither side technically “won” or
“lost” in the traditional sense. Thus, unionist and nationalist leaders were presented with the
task of attempting to redefine the meaning of success and persuade their constituents that the
Agreement was a not only a tremendous achievement, but also a beneficial solution.
The purpose of this study is to examine discourse on conflict resolution and
peacemaking journalism in Northern Ireland. It seeks to explore the influence of the media
both during the height of the conflict, specifically the events of Bloody Sunday, as well as
twenty-five years later during the peace process with the Good Friday Agreement. In
particular, many scholars have argued that journalists and broadcasters are strategically
positioned to help guide the community and its interpretation of important issues. Language,
as a transmitter of cultural narrative, can play a critical role in political transformations. Thus,
this study explores the contribution that the media has made in terms of organizing
community rhetoric and encouraging public dialogue. Considering conflict resolution is
inherently intertwined with the construction of identity, this paper also analyzes how
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journalists have influenced the perception of the “other” and the “enemy” in both the
nationalist and unionist communities in Northern Ireland.
In particular, prior to examining the community portrayals of Bloody Sunday and the
Good Friday Agreement, Chapter Two of this study provides a brief historical overview of the
situation in Northern Ireland, specifically addressing the key players and central events during
the conflict. Chapter Three reviews the work of scholars who have made significant
contributions to the study of communication and media in Northern Ireland, as well as the
discussion of conflict resolution and political transformation. Chapter Four introduces the
methodology that is utilized in order to explore the media coverage of both communities in
Northern Ireland. Chapter Five offers a brief history of Bloody Sunday, followed by an
analysis of the media coverage surrounding the events. Chapter Six focuses on the Good
Friday Agreement and examines the communal perceptions of the Agreement, both during the
negotiation process and in the weeks leading up to its passage. In particular, Chapter Six also
explores whether either community experienced a shift in perspective and/or identification
during this period. Finally, Chapter Seven presents a conclusion to the thesis and discusses the
recent movement towards peace and stability in Northern Ireland.
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CHAPTER TWO:
From Conflict to Cooperation: A Reconstruction of Context
Division Leads to Discrimination
From an historical perspective, the formal division of Ireland was enacted with the
Government of Ireland Act 1920 which created ‘Northern Ireland,’ consisting of six of the
nine counties of the northern province of Ulster. The remaining twenty-six Irish counties
ultimately separated from the United Kingdom in 1922, initially as the Irish Free State, and
later as Eire, a sovereign independent nation. The partition had numerous and varied
consequences for Northern Ireland (Buckland, 1981). In particular, the 1920 Act did not
consider the dramatic historical differences that existed in the North due to its divided society.
In the years that followed the partition, Northern Ireland became hardened by religious
division and ridden with discrimination
Following the 1920 Act, considering roughly two-thirds of the population in Northern
Ireland was Protestant—and therefore unionist—only two of six northern counties had a
nationalist Catholic majority (Gidron, et al., 2002). Although the British government never
envisioned partition as a permanent solution, the unionist majority in the North ensured that a
united Ireland under a single all-Ireland legislature was never possible. As a result, the Ulster
Unionist Party, and thus the Protestant population, remained in power for nearly half a
century. (Hennessey, 2005). During this period, Catholics in Northern Ireland believed they
had become the victims of systematic discrimination. A justifiable perception of economic
inequality and second-class citizenship implied to the Catholic community that they were not
residing in a neutral democratic state (Prince, 2007). Accusations of discrimination were
usually in a variety forms, such as the gerrymandering of local electoral boundaries to benefit
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the Unionist Party; the retention of various voting rights in local government contracts to
favor Unionist candidates; the unfair distribution of public services—especially housing—to
offer Protestants an advantage over Catholics; unjust employment practices in both public and
private employment; as well as a bias in regional procedures favoring Protestant areas as
opposed to Catholic areas (Gidron, et al., 2002).
Because of these inherent discriminations, Catholics and Protestants inhabited the
same geographical space, but their communal psychologies were entirely distinct. Each
population had completely different perceptions of the political, social, and cultural world that
constituted Northern Ireland. For almost fifty years, the system seemed to work, and Northern
Ireland appeared surprisingly tranquil on the surface. Nevertheless, this image of
complacency concealed the violent passions and intense resentments that were simmering
underneath (Breadun, 1999). By the 1960s, Northern Ireland would reach its breaking point,
and a series of situations would occur that would unleash this fury and transform the nation
forever. Indeed, the political stagnation that defined Northern Ireland in the years following
the partition would ultimately be displaced by confrontation and contention.
From Civil Rights to Insurrection: Key Development Leading up to Bloody Sunday
Several key developments took place in Northern Ireland from 1968-1972 that directly
contributed to the violence that erupted in the latter half of the twentieth century. In particular,
the creation of a civil rights movement, the subsequent arrival of the British army, and the
introduction of interment all played a critical role escalating the situation and enabling the
‘Bloody Sunday’ massacre to take place in 1972.
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The birth of the Civil Rights Movement.
The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was established in the mid-1960s and
sought to bring about reform to the unionist state which had dominated society for more than
fifty years. Although the movement itself contained varying degrees of political ideology, its
central objective was to initiate social reform in areas such as voting, policing, living
conditions, and justice (Herron & Lynch, 2007).
Despite the explicitly local nature of the civil rights campaign, it eventually evolved
into a civic campaign attracting respected authority figures in the Catholic community
(Dochartaigh, 2007). NICRA, or the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, was the most
well-known civil rights group in Northern Ireland, and although it was neither the first nor the
only organization to initiate civil rights demands, it ultimately became the most important
group within the movement (Purdie, 1990). Unlike any other organization, NICRA was able
to provide an umbrella beneath which other organizations could rally.
In its early years, the civil rights movement was not connected with the larger Irish
nationalist movement in Northern Ireland. For instance, NICRA frequently disavowed the use
of violent methods and stressed the fact that achieving a united Ireland was a separate, more
radical objective than their particular cause. Unfortunately, however, once the campaign’s
leadership went onto the streets with marches and rallies, they began to head a mass
movement that drew support that wasn’t necessarily committed to its view of the peaceful
pursuit of equality. Purdie (1990) argued that although the movement was sincere in its
outlook of its marches as non-sectarian, or non-religious, some less intelligently sophisticated
Catholics interpreted the approach as an invitation to become more aggressive and
confrontational towards the police and unionist community. Underlying tensions, therefore,
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ultimately manifested themselves in sectarian strife and violence. As a result, accusations of
republican and Communist domination of NICRA, and efforts to link the civil rights
movement to subversion and violence were some of the responses that unionists had to the
marches that took place in Northern Ireland throughout the 1960s.
Moreover, it’s important to recognize that marching was an essential component of the
dominant identity assumed by the unionist state, and thus, the demonstrative protests brought
forth by the minority were seen as a direct challenge to the cultural environment of Northern
Ireland. As Jarmon (2007) argued, “For awhile the loyalists insisted on their inalienable right
to parade wherever and whenever they wished, this right was not extended to Catholics. Civil
rights parades did not fit into the traditional polarities; but by challenging the authority of the
Protestant state and demanding equal rights for the minority they became immediately liable
to be categorized as Catholic and nationalistic” (p. 78) Therefore, although the civil rights
campaign had been avowedly non-sectarian in its early years, it was unavoidably linked with
the Catholic community simply due to the fact that it challenged the Unionist government.
Before the civil rights movement, Northern Ireland had existed quietly and
undisturbed due to the fact that the Catholic population had never been effectively mobilized.
Over the years, unionists exerted a sectarian monopoly of economic and political powers,
leaving the Catholic minority feeling powerless and unimportant (Dochartaigh, 2005).
However, once mobilized, the Catholic community entered the political equation, and it
became impossible for them to return to the near-total political tranquility of past decades.
British Army arrives and internment is introduced.
In early 1971, sectarian tensions in Northern Ireland were mounting in response to the
civil rights movement. At that point, the British government saw no alternative but to send
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British troops to restore order and assume responsibility for policing Catholic areas in Derry
(Dochartaigh, 2005). The armed police force at the time, the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC), was overwhelming unionist and therefore had become inadequate in terms of
controlling the sectarian conflict taking place in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, as Tonge
(2002) argued, “The intervention of the Army was still seen as a device of the status quo”
(p.40). Untrained as peacekeepers, the British Army frequently employed harsh tactics against
the minority community and tended to abuse its powers, causing Catholic nationalist hostility
only to increase.
Throughout this period, the British government tended to be more sympathetic to the
Northern Irish government, known as Stormont, and more willing to preserve it and defend its
authority and less inclined to pressure it into making reforms. Together, the Northern Irish
and British governments responded to the civil unrest as if a political solution had been
reached by means of the Army, and as though policing was merely an operational concern as
opposed to a political one (Dochartaigh, 2005). Scholars such as Breadun (1999) have argued
that this approach, combined with a succession of errors in security policies ultimately led to
the escalation of the conflict. During this time, the British army placed an emphasis on
preventing Catholic disruption of the state and reaching a solution through repression, rather
than focusing on reforming Northern Ireland (Dochartaigh, 2005). In response, local
nationalist militants under the guidance of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)
began to launch small-scale military campaigns, which in many ways were an outgrowth of
rioting. Therefore, in the months leading up to Bloody Sunday, the political phenomena of
rioting and civil unrest dramatically escalated and ultimately resulted in the erosion of
political and social authority.
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In early July, 1971, the British government announced the introduction of the policy of
internment. This only compounded problems and served to reinforce hostility at a time when
Catholic alienation from the army had reached its peak. Accordingly, the law gave authorities
in Northern Ireland the power to indefinitely detain suspected terrorists and nationalist
militants without trial (Tonge, 2002). The decision to implement the new measures was made
in the wake of the mounting Provisional IRA violence that was taking place in the region.
Many scholars have argued that in 1971, internment in Northern Ireland was a serious
political mistake.1 The Irish Republic, already deeply concerned with the situation in the
North, was not going to agree to the decision. During the first morning of the reintroduction
of internment, also referred to as "Operation Demetrius," 342 people were arrested. Two days
later, however, over 100 were released as it became increasingly evident that the intelligence
of the British Army, founded on records more than a decade old, was arguably inadequate
(“Internment,” 2010). Throughout the period of internment in Northern Ireland, many of the
nationalists arrested were entirely unconnected with the Provisional IRA or any other
paramilitary group.
Following the reinstallation of internment, the conflict entered a new phase as the
Unionist government at Stormont was bitterly rejected by the entire Catholic community,
even the most conservative Catholics. As one article in The Irish Time reported, “For no
single act . . . had such a disastrous impact on the relations between Catholics and
Government and Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Once internment came, the
nails were hammered in the political coffin of the North” (Kelly, 1972, p.7). The Unionist
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Internment was a tactic that had been employed successfully in the 1950s, largely because it had been
introduced on both sides of the border. But in 1971, the Irish Republic was in no way going to agree with the
decision due to the fact that it further polarized Catholic and Protestant communities in the North.
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government was no longer viewed as an appropriate agency for negotiation. Through a
gradual process of alienation, the Catholic community had no choice but to reject the
authority of the Northern Irish state, which in turn, included the rejection of the British state
(Dochartaigh, 2005).
The comprehensive marginalization of the Catholic community from the state
transformed the republican movement from a small, relatively insignificant group of
individuals into a major force in Northern Ireland. Internment clearly demonstrated that the
British government was willing to repress the Catholic population at large in order to protect
the unionist majority (Herron & Lynch, 2007). With the hope of achieving reform rapidly
dwindling, the events that became known as ‘Bloody Sunday’ in January 1972 became
virtually inevitable.
“The Point of No Return:” Bloody Sunday
On the afternoon of Sunday, January 30, 1972, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
Association (NICRA) had organized a civil rights march in Derry to protest the unionist
government’s policy of internment. The leaders of the association had envisioned it to be the
largest march yet. As one newspaper report later described: “In the aftermath of interment,
evidence of Catholic alienation began to snowball. A civil disobedience campaign was
started, set up to rival Stormont, and which might have faltered on shaky foundations in other
political times, began to live, if not exactly flourish” (Kelly, 1972, p. 7). In the weeks leading
up to the march, however, the government decisively banned all protests and public
demonstrations due to escalating levels of violence. Thus, it’s important to recognize that the
march that took place on Bloody Sunday was technically illegal; nevertheless, leaders of
NICRA strongly believed that postponing their plans would only enhance the government’s
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strategy of repression and containment, and thus, they decided to continue with the
preplanned march (Herron & Lynch, 2007).
Reports of the march itself repeatedly depict a large crowd, nearly 10,000 strong,
peacefully walking towards the city center. According to witness accounts, despite the nonviolent intentions of the march, the movement of people was barricaded by the army at two
crucial entrance points which resulted in a mixture of confusion and aggravation as several
small-scale riot situations broke out in retaliation. As the situation developed, the relatively
steady flow of the marchers became increasingly disorganized and began to be perceived by
army commanders as a deliberate, organized riot (Herron & Lynch, 2007). As one Italian
journalist recalled in an interview: “There were a few exchanges, a few throws of stones, not
very heavy, and afterwards, about three or four minutes, the Army moved up with this water
cannon and sprayed the whole crowd with colored water. Then the crowd
dispersed”(“Journalist Says,” 1972, p.1). The journalist went on to say that once the crowd
had reassembled “some more stones were thrown: nothing heavy” to which the army
responded “with unbelievable murderous fury” and “shot into the fleeing crowd”(p.1).
Within a matter of minutes, thirteen men and boys participating in the march were shot
and killed by the British Army. An additional fifteen people were critically injured, one of
whom died several months later due to injuries received on that day. The army officer in
charge of the operation, General Robert Ford, strongly contended that his men had opened fire
only after they had come under attack from armed republicans, a view that was quickly
endorsed by the British and Northern Irish government officials (Herron & Lynch, 2007).
However, almost every eye witness to the event—marchers, journalists, photographers,
residents, and bystanders—claimed that the army had fired indiscriminately and without
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provocation into crowds of unarmed citizens, many of them fleeing from the soldiers’
advances.
As one witness declared: “What happened in Derry was mass murder by the British
army. Let no one say they opened fire in retaliation. They shot up a peaceful meeting at Free
Derry Corner and they let loose with bloodthirsty gusto at anybody unfortunate enough to
stray in their sight” (Brennan, 1972, p.9). Another report proclaimed: “What happened at
Derry yesterday was carnage. There is no provocation grave enough to justify the killing and
wounding which cut a swathe of death and injury through a crowd of men, women, and
children the vast majority of whom were there for peaceful purpose” (“Rallies ‘Clash,’” 1972,
p.6). Moreover, photographic evidence, post-mortem investigation, and additional eyewitness
reports revealed that many of those who were killed had actually been shot in the back,
consistent with testimonies that the victims were not provoking the army, but actually fleeing
its advances (“Witnesses Saw,” 1972, p. 5).
In response to the shootings, community leaders called for a general strike in Derry,
and business closed down for several days until the dead were properly buried. Furthermore,
the Provisional wing of the IRA, which denied any of their volunteers had fired on the British
troops before the full-scale shooting had begun, pledged to avenge the deaths of those killed,
announcing: “‘The British Army murdered innocent civilians in Derry today. We leave the
world to judge who are the real terrorists. We shall avenge the deaths of everyone killed in
Derry today’” (“Denial,” 1972, p.8). In response to this statement, men and women joined the
IRA in large numbers to support its cause. As one incoming member put it: “‘Before Bloody
Sunday we thought the army [i.e., the IRA] was too risky, but then after Bloody Sunday you
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didn’t care if it was risky or not, you were going to be shot anyway so might as well be shot
for something as for nothing’” (Dochartaigh, 2005, p.248).
Nevertheless, despite certainty among witnesses that the British Army had not been
provoked, General Ford stated that nearly 200 shots were fired at the army before they fired
back in retaliation. He testified that nothing he saw on Bloody Sunday “was in any way a
discredit to the security forces.” In response to reports that he had ordered a paratroop
company to “go and get them,” Ford stated that he meant arrest them. He emphasized that
“orders were that the security forces were to take action until either the marchers tried to
breach a barrier, or there was violence against security forces” (“General Denies,” 1972, p.9).
Ford contended that both violations had occurred, and the British Army had only fired as a
“defense action” against identified snipers and nail bombers situated on the tops of flats.
Interestingly, however, reports released following the events revealed that none of the thirteen
people killed were discovered in locations other than the ground. Clearly the reports of
witnesses and the reports of the British Army were conflicting and required some form of
clarification.
Thus, with the reputation of the British Army at stake, the tension mounting, and the
citizens of Derry demanding a response, a hastily organized inquiry was arranged by the
British Prime Minister, Edward Heath. (Herron & Lynch, 2007). The inquiry’s one-man
panel, headed by Lord Chief Justice Widgery, however, found largely in favor of the army
and concluded that while the soldiers’ conduct at times had “bordered on the reckless,” their
actions, while in the face of sustained attacks by IRA gunman and civilian nail-bombers, were
undoubtedly within the British army’s rules of engagement (Widgery, 1972). Although it had
not been proven that any of the dead were handling firearms or nail-bombs at the time they
18
were shot, Lord Widgery asserted that there was a “strong suspicion that some…had been
firing weapons or handling bombs” (Widgery, 2007). For instance, Widgery argued that one
of the dead had been discovered with nail-bombs in his pockets at the time of death. It should
be noted that no British soldiers were injured during the incident.
Therefore, because of the disagreement between the nationalist community and the
British government over which party was responsible for Bloody Sunday, Northern Ireland
was ultimately plunged into a devastating twenty-five year battle between the Catholic
nationalist minority and the Protestant unionist majority who resided there. For the nationalist
community of Derry, what had occurred on the streets of their city was nothing but a massacre
of innocent civilians by troops with a reputation for brutality (Herron & Lynch, 2007). The
grievance was merely compounded by the Widgery Tribunal, which was seen by many
residents as ambitiously hasty and visibly flawed interpretation of the incident. Hostility
towards the British government and contempt for the state dramatically increased in the
Catholic community as more and more civilians felt alienated. As McCann (1992) noted,
“turning to the gun was an understandable response…[it] was shared by many—quite likely
the majority – who, nevertheless wished for a different, non-violent response” (p. 55). Several
days after Bloody Sunday, the Official IRA placed a bomb in the Parachute Regiment’s
headquarters in England attempting to kill a large number of officers. Instead, however, the
bomb killed a gardener and five cleaning women. This attack was the first of many IRA
attacks in Great Britain that would take place over the next quarter of a century. The
Provisional IRA would go on to plant countless bombs in both Britain and Northern Ireland,
killing scores of innocent civilians (Dochartaigh, 2005). 2
2
The Provisional IRA (PIRA) and the Official IRA (OIRA) were formed when the Irish Republican Army split
due to internal issues and disagreements following the Irish War of Independence. Although both groups
19
On the other hand, from a unionist perspective, the events of January 30, 1972 were
seen as the result of a misguided and ill-named civil rights movement. British officials
repeatedly underlined the fact that the march that took place on Bloody Sunday was illegal,
and therefore, leaders argued that those killed should not be considered innocent victims, but
instead lawbreakers, fully responsible for the events. Indeed, unionist representatives
contested that the civil rights movement was inspired by terrorism, and thus contended that
the claims of the minority should be dismissed as a “nuisance” or “disturbance,” unworthy of
serious consideration. Hence, Bloody Sunday emerged as a decisive turning point in the
history of Northern Ireland; the incident drew widespread international attention and
ultimately forced Britain to announce Direct Rule over the region, causing Stormont to be
abolished and the administration of Northern Ireland transferred to the government in
Westminster.
Post-Bloody Sunday and the Road to Good Friday
Direct rule and very little progress.
In late March, 1972, the introduction of Direct Rule was only intended as a short-term
solution, but in many ways it became embedded. As Gidron (2002) noted, Direct Rule offered
the IRA a new, “legitimate” target for violence – British imperialism – and because the IRA
utilized guerrilla warfare tactics, British troops could not beat the IRA with traditional
military methods (p.20). As a result, the conflict between the British government and the IRA
fell into a stalemate during the 1970s and 1980s, strengthened by an economic downturn
believed in an independent and republican Northern Ireland, the Official IRA was a Marxist group. Instead of
fighting the British security forces, the Official IRA sought to initiate a class struggle. Meanwhile, the
Provisional IRA purposely targeted the British, both in Ulster and in mainland Britain, with the hope that they
would leave. The OIRA was the less significant power out of the two largest Republican paramilitaries and was
accountable for less death during the Troubles. However, they were no less a terrorist group responsible for
murder and organized crime.
20
throughout Europe and the United Kingdom (Gidron, 2002). As the lives of both Protestants
and Catholics became more stressful, any efforts made by moderates were sidelined, and
extremists on both sides attracted a large following of support. Overtime, the prospect of
progress in Northern Ireland became increasingly unlikely.
There was very little political progress during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The
most important issue in Northern Ireland once again became the region’s constitutional status.
In 1976, IRA inmates in Belfast were denied prisoner-of-war privileges and handled like
ordinary criminals. By 1979, their opposition to this measure took the form of a high-profile
hunger strike, which was heavily covered in the international media (Hennessey, 2005).
Weary of the attention that the issue was receiving, the British government began to search
more actively for a solution to the problem in Northern Ireland, and by 1980 agreed to
convene with the Irish government to explore cooperative means of reaching this goal.
Searching for a solution.
After repeated efforts to develop initiatives to bring about change, by 1985, the
foundations of conformity were established with the introduction of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement. Interestingly, the agreement pleased both Irish and British concerns about
Northern Ireland: Westminster recognized the importance of Northern Ireland to political
leaders in Dublin, but a unionist majority was assured the right to veto unification with the
South (Gidron, 2002). In other words, if an island-wide vote was ever proposed to unite
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the unionist majority in the North would have to
grant its consent. Moreover, through the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Ireland fully supported
Britain’s attempts to promote constitutionalism and moderation in Northern Ireland through
its continued devolution of power.
21
By 1991, the Anglo-Irish Agreement had been in position long enough that
discussions about replacing it could occur between the British and Irish governments, as well
as the primary constitutional parties in Northern Ireland. Although no settlement was
achieved, there was a consensus about which principles should govern any new political
initiatives in Northern Ireland. At roughly the same time, the British government also
disclosed that it had been communicating with Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein—or the
political wing of the IRA— for several years. While this revelation outraged many
Protestants, it also signified to many Catholics that the British government was serious about
discovering a solution to the problems in Northern Ireland. (Amstutz, 2005).
In 1993, the Downing Street Declaration was introduced by the British Government in
an effort to silence the violence in Northern Ireland. The Declaration denied any economic
interest in Northern Ireland on behalf of the British Government and asserted its objectives for
peace and reconciliation. Although nationalists and the IRA did not view the Declaration as
entirely satisfactory, they still declared a cease-fire in late August 1994 in order to possibly
obtain peace through negotiation. Unionist paramilitaries subsequently reciprocated in
October, under the condition that they would not accept any changes to the constitutional
status of Northern Ireland. These cease-fires significantly contributed to improving the
negotiating climate in Northern Ireland, and culminated in 1994 when representatives from
Sinn Fein and the British government formally met for the first time. Because of these talks,
the British government officially ended routine army patrols and gradually began to decrease
the size of its military presence in Northern Ireland.
Another noteworthy development in the peace process occurred in February 1995
when the British and Irish Republic governments published their joint discussion document,
22
Framework for the Future. The document demanded “a Northern Ireland Assembly, elected
by proportional representation; increased cooperation between the British and Irish
governments; and a reaffirmation that changes in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland
would require the consent of Northern Ireland’s political parties, the people of Northern
Ireland, and the UK Parliament” (Amstutz, 2005, pg. 175). Again, the notion of consent
among both the nationalist community and the unionist community was a major feature of the
framework documents.
Thus, with the framework documents as its inspiration, the British government tried to
get negotiations underway in mid-1995. Sinn Fein was not permitted to participate in the
peace process until its outlawed military wing, the Provisional IRA, began decommissioning
weapons. To help assist in the stalemate, Ireland and Britain created an international
commission, led by U.S. Senator George Mitchell, that would examine the likelihood of
achieving a provable decommissioning and inform whether paramilitaries were committed to
this objective. The Mitchell Commission concluded that rather than establishing disarmament
as a precondition for involvement in the negotiations, the peace process should instead be
founded upon nonviolence and democratic principles (Amstutz, 2005). Despite several
setbacks, including an IRA bombing in February 1996, the cease-fire was ultimately
reinstated in 1997 and negotiations persisted. By May 1998, a country-wide referendum
proved that a new Northern Irish Assembly including representatives of both nationalist and
unionist parties was supported by the entire island.
Pathway to Peace: 1998 Good Friday Agreement
George Mitchell, the chairman of the conference, set a deadline for concluding the
peace negotiations. Of the eight political participants, Sinn Fein, headed by Adams, and the
23
Ulster Unionist Party (UPP), led by David Trimble, proved to be the most disagreeable rivals.
Just two days before the deadline, the UUP rejected a sixty-five page draft of the accords.
With collapse of the negotiations imminent, British Prime Minister Tony Blair flew to Belfast
to rescue the peace process, and U.S. President Bill Clinton offered assistance to both Blair, as
well the Irish Prime Minister, Jack Lynch (Hennessey, 2005). After being ensured that their
respective concerns would not be overlooked, both the Ulster Unionist Party and Sinn Fein
finally agreed to the accords.
The Good Friday Agreement contained a number of crucial elements. Constitutionally,
it confirmed that Northern Ireland remained a part of the United Kingdom, while requesting
that both the British and Irish governments give up claims to the region. Institutionally, a
North-South Ministerial Council was created in order to encourage socioeconomic
cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, and occasional British-Irish
Intergovernmental Conferences were to take place to promote bilateral cooperation between
Ireland and Britain in areas such as agriculture, transport, health, culture, and education.
Moreover, the Good Friday Agreement asked for an early release of prisoners associated with
paramilitary groups abiding by their cease-fire pledge, and it called for an independent,
impartial commission on decommissioning to ensure the surrendering of weapons by all
paramilitary groups (Tonge, 2002). According to the negotiations, the Good Friday
Agreement was only to be put in place after citizens had approved it. Therefore, after
receiving an overwhelming amount of support from the people on both sides of the island in
May, 1998, the accords finally went into effect on December 2, 1998 and a power-sharing
government was established.
24
Despite its many successes, some scholars suggest that the Good Friday Agreement
did not resolve the political animosity that existed between Protestants and Catholics because
very little effort was given to resolving the historic differences between the two political
factions. Instead, the objective was to institute a new political framework that would prevent
violence and lead to the creation of constitutional protection for all people. The aim was not
to obtain justice, but to establish peace through the foundation of a governmental arrangement
that permitted unionists and nationalists, loyalists and republicans, to follow their respective
political ambitions without violence. As Terrence McCaughey (2001) remarked, the goal was
to encourage adversaries to learn to exist “in disagreement but in dialog with each other” (pg.
256).
The Good Friday Agreement recognized that violence had left its historical mark on
Northern Ireland, but it proposed that the best way to remember victims of political violence
was to “make a fresh start” (Amstutz, 2005). Its creators believed that such foundations
should be based upon a dedication to democratic decision making and a quest for
reconciliation, trust, tolerance, and the protection of human rights without placing blame on
others for past crimes. “In short, while recognizing that substantial differences continued to
exist between ‘equally legitimate political aspirations,’ the accord established a framework by
which the antagonists could pursue conflict resolution through peaceful, democratic
procedures” (Amstutz, 2005, p. 177). The Good Friday Agreement was a major development
in modern Northern Irish history, as it enabled a multiparty government among opponents
who dismissed violence and accepted the legitimacy of democratic principles. Nevertheless,
some scholars argue that the Good Friday Agreement alone is not enough to guarantee trust
and social unity, suggesting that the social and cultural patterns of Northern Ireland are too
25
deeply entrenched with a legacy of victimhood to be transformed overnight by the prospect of
a new peace accord. However, the creation of a power-sharing framework provides the
foundations for which a social and cultural transformation can take place. Indeed, the Good
Friday Agreement provides an opportunity to determine whether ethno-political enemies can
learn to cooperate, and whether “the Western political tradition can reshape its myths and
produce a process of reconciliation, forgiveness, and healing sufficient to transcend the
villainy of its past” (Arthur, After the Peace, p. 107).
26
CHAPTER THREE:
Conflict, Cultural Representation and the Media: A Review of Literature
The role of the media has been important when considering political transformations.
In particular, it represents a realistic platform to tackle the foundations of conflict by fully
engaging with issues of equality, human rights, and democratic restoration. Since the mid1990s, a discourse on conflict resolution and peacemaking journalism has emerged that aims
at identifying the contribution of the media to the wider peace processes in society. In
particular, an expanding body of research has begun to surface that specifically addresses the
peacemaking process in Northern Ireland. Graham Spencer (2004), for example, considered
the impact television news on the political development and momentum of the negotiations in
Northern Ireland. Drawing on the various perspectives and experiences of leading journalists
who covered the peace process from its initiation, Spencer explored the influence of the media
during the negotiations. He found that “television news has played a central role in political
exchanges throughout the peace process, producing both positive and negative impact on
relations between parties, and political participants have routinely tried to use it in order to
support a range of competing communicative strategies” (p.603). Spencer suggested that
during peace processes, as in politics generally, the parties that offer the most consistent and
unified messages are likely to take advantage of communicative power of the media more
efficiently. In particular, Spencer found that during the Northern Ireland peace process, Sinn
Fein was more successful than the Ulster Unionists in utilizing the media in order to advance
its political objectives.
In their research on news coverage of conflict and social protest, McCluskey et al.
analyze the “protest paradigm,” a framework that suggests in common news, “protesters are
27
portrayed as odd-looking deviant lawbreakers who stir up trouble for no discernible reason”
(McCluskey et al., 2010, p.354). McCluskey et al. (2010) explored whether adherence to the
protest paradigm differed according to structural features of the communities in which the
news organizations originate; in particular, they observed levels of pluralism, or acceptance of
diversity, within each community and found that:
Newspapers in less pluralistic communities were more critical of protesters when local
government was the target and were less likely to quote protesters in stories. Further,
newspapers in less pluralistic communities were more critical of protesters when stories
were on the front page than those appearing elsewhere in the newspaper. (p. 354)
Thus, McCluskey et al. argued that pluralistic communities maintain community
norms and values by minimizing news of protest and projecting it as a nuisance or disruption.
When analyzing articles in newspapers written during the Northern Ireland peace
process, however, Kristen Spare (2001) found that both Irish and British mainstream media
overturned the “protest paradigm” and were conducive in facilitating a form of dialogue
between their respective governments and the Irish Republican movement. In particular,
Sparre suggested that this dialogue established the terms on which Sinn Fein, the political
wing of the Irish Republican Army, could enter the negotiations. Referring to the process as
‘megaphone diplomacy,’ or the process of holding negotiations through press releases and
media announcements, Sparre argued newspapers served as an active channel for
communication for both parties and ultimately contributed to the process of conflict resolution
by containing important messages and keeping the negotiations alive.
28
Further observing the role of newspapers in the Northern Ireland conflict, Richard C.
Vincent (2010) analyzed the national news reported by four separate Irish newspapers
immediately following the breach of cease-fire by the IRA in February 1996 in order to try to
understand the underlying issues of the conflict. Vincent used content analysis to explore the
similarities and differences between each newspaper’s coverage of the ‘Troubles.’ Focusing
on language and looking at specific issues, Vincent found that all four newspapers had the
same amount of reporting in terms of references to ‘fighting, battles and war,’ and the
inclusion of ‘solutions to the Troubles.’ According to Vincent, these ideas enjoyed equal
weight, despite the fact that each newspaper represented different constituencies. Thus,
Vincent (2010) proposed that “newspapers are strategically positioned to help guide a
community and its discussions of relevant issues. The agenda-setting function mentioned
above is one such process by which newspapers help organize community rhetoric…the press
has the power to help promote community dialogue and potentially resolve conflicts” (p. 517).
Sarah Edge (1999) specifically examined the role that press photographs play in the
coverage of social protest and terrorism in Northern Ireland. In particular, Edge attempted to
analyze the meanings that press photographs give to the coverage of those murdered in the
unionist community. After studying several photographs that were used by the 1994 national
press to “illustrate” their reports, Edge found that the nationalist community was subtly
discriminated against in many areas of press reporting, including photography. In particular,
Edge argued that reporters frequently used “precious family photographs of the victims at
their best: full of life, with their families, happy and smiling” (p. 110), and contrasted these
images with stories of death due to “terrorist violence” (p.110). Thus, Edge argued that
through this coverage, the identity of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland became
29
associated with intimidation, discrimination and fear. According to Edge (2001), “If real
change, as proposed in the Agreement is to be negotiated in Northern Ireland then shifts are
required not only in overtly discriminatory nature of cultural representation, but also in the
insidious or inferential” (p.111).
In order to understand how the media has come to terms with peace in Northern
Ireland, Rolston (2007) observed the contribution broadcasting has made to the peace process
by analyzing three programs broadcast by the BBC in March 2006. Collectively, the programs
were titled Facing the Truth and were created with the intention to elicit forgiveness and
repentance. Nevertheless, because the network categorized the approach as “reality
television,” Rolston (2007) concluded that “the genre cannot adequately deal with many of
the major issues involved in conflict transformation. The framing of the programs was such
that the producers created an ideal type victim, but in doing so excluded the voices of other
victims and survivors” (345).
In terms of political conflict, many scholars have observed the ability of language to
legitimatize events and ideas. Habermas (1984), for example, suggested that a particular use
of language can influence consensus:
Under the functional aspects of reaching and understanding, communicative action serves
the transmission and renewal of cultural knowledge; under the aspect of coordinating
action, it serves social integration and the establishment of group solidarity; under the
aspects of socialization, it serves the formation of personal identities.(As cited in
Dougherty, 2006, p.45)
30
In particular, some scholars have analyzed the legitimatizing power of political
discourse in Northern Ireland and its ability to shape cultural interpretations of identity. For
example, Rosland (2010) examined the early years of the Northern Ireland conflict by
studying empirical material that covered the discussion on internment, which took place from
August 1971 to December 1975. Rosland found that both those supporting and those opposing
internment drew on depictions of victimhood. According to Rosland, victimhood means that
“when the stories of victims are told, the victims become something more than a number.
Through their inclusion in a collective, their experiences are given value and meaning” (p.
296). Rosland argued that these depictions were crucial in the construction of political power,
as the stories of individual victimhood and suffering inspired compassion and empathy. The
formation of a collective victimhood established political truths about “what really
happened.” Rosland stressed the importance of studying depictions of victimhood and
demonstrated the ambiguous nature of the way victimhood can be represented in violent
political conflicts. Depending on the contextual framework, victimhood can have both
humanizing and dehumanizing effects, and similarly, it can either take away power or grant
agency and control.
Nevertheless, other scholars have argued that depending on the way one frames the
conflict in Northern Ireland, each party could either be a majority or a minority relative to one
another. Stevenson et al. (2007) analyzed the rhetoric of speeches given by leading members
of the Protestant community, and found that while “the minority and majority claims are not
fixed, [they] are flexibly used to achieve local rhetorical goals” (p. 105). Moreover, the
authors found that the speeches differed dramatically before and after the Good Friday
Agreement. Stevenson et al. (2007) argued that when analyzing the conflict from a rhetorical
31
perspective, it “may be better viewed as each group’s struggle for the ability to flexibly define
themselves a minority or majority according to changing situational demands, rather than
simply making a straightforward bid for majority status” (120).
Several scholars have drawn on linguistic resources and theory by studying the role of
language in social change and reproduction in Northern Ireland. Wilson and Stapleton (2007)
linguistically analyzed policing discourse in Northern Ireland. In particular, Wilson and
Stapleton examined rhetoric surrounding policing reform among the nationalist community, a
group that had traditionally been opposed to the police force. The authors found that despite
recent reforms, many continued to regard the new police force with distrust. Wilson and
Stapleton argued that many members of the nationalist community have created a “discourse
of resistance” when discussing the new service. In particular, respondents used a variety of
rhetorical methods, such as bolstering their own community or shifting the blame, in order to
ultimately deny that change had effectively taken place. Wilson and Stapleton concluded that
these tendencies could have serious implications for social theory and linguistic studies.
Several years later, they expanded their study of police reform discourse by applying Billing’s
model of cognitive dissonance in order to understand the discursive strategies used
surrounding this contentious political issue. Cognitive dissonance is the uncomfortable feeling
one gets from having two or more inconstant thoughts at once. As opposed to traditional
theories, however, Billing’s model places cognitive dissonance in a rhetorical context. Similar
to their study in 2007, Stapleton & Wilson (2009) examined the discussion about policing
reform in Northern Ireland among the nationalist community; however, they also explored
how dissonance is articulated in real-life conversation among this group. Again, the authors
32
found that respondents used a variety of rhetorical methods to ultimately deny the idea that
change had taken place in Northern Ireland.
A number of scholars have also analyzed the concept of equality in Northern Ireland
in terms of linguistics and rhetoric. As Robin Wilson (2007) wrote, “in Northern Ireland, the
word ‘equality’ is frequently evoked, yet the society itself remains riven by social mistrust”
(p. 151). Even though the violence in Northern Ireland has steadily decreased, many contend
that the region still cannot be characterized by social unity. Wilson argued that battles over
the definition of equality can help explain why stable devolution and social justice have been
hard to achieve in the region. According to Wilson, clashes over its definition have become
part of an ongoing, even intensifying, sectarian political rivalry, and thus, because deep
communal divisions have not been addressed, equality has ultimately not been achieved
(2007).
Some scholars have studied the different types of meaning that can be extracted from
public, institutional discourse in Northern Ireland. For instance, Marina Bondi (2007)
explored the various dimensions of conflict by observing the language of the Bloody Sunday
Inquiry, which was established in 1998 by Tony Blair in order to reconsider responsibility in
the Bloody Sunday events of 1972. In particular, Bondi analyzed British newspapers in order
to determine how the conflict was transposed from courtroom discourse to media discourse.
Specifically, Bondi analyzed two separate areas of language, including key-words and
evaluative meanings, and tried to understand the relationship between key-words and the
expression of an evaluation, or the specific discourse of community. According to Bondi, keywords are those words that occur frequently in the text and “help both comprehension and
interpretation: words that help distinguish more central issues from peripheral ones, identify
33
the most important issue(s), and identify the viewpoints expressed in the text” (p. 415). Bondi
concluded that key-words can never be observed in isolation; they must be studied within the
context of local relations. Moreover, Bondi’s analysis showed that newspaper discourse often
exploits the representation of emotions in order to favor arguments constructed by the
journalist.
Other studies have been conducted that analyze the language of the political
documents themselves. For instance, Filardo-Llamas (2008) attempted to understand the
peace process by analyzing the language of the 1998 Good Friday agreement. Utilizing a
discourse analysis framework deeply founded in linguistics, Filardo-Llamas concluded that
the 1998 Good Friday Agreement established a paradoxical reality in Northern Ireland
because its vague language could be interpreted multiple ways. She suggested that text of the
Agreement reveal of kind of peaceful reality that facilitated agreement through “constructive
ambiguity,” deliberate use of ambiguous language on a sensitive issue in order to advance
some political purpose. The success of the peace process, therefore, was achieved through
particular nuances of discourse in and around the writing of the document.
Similarly, Dougherty (2006) examined several public texts in order to examine the
role that language plays in the Northern Ireland peace process. In particular, she observed
passages from speeches given by Noble Prize winners—the former Social Democratic and
Labour Party (SDLP) leader, John Hume and the former First Minister David Trimble; the
Bloody Sunday Inquiry; an IRA apology; and the Good Friday Agreement; as well as several
excerpts from the works of Northern Irish poets Eavan Boland and Seamus Heaney.
Dougherty argued that “language, as a transmitter and constitutor of cultural narrative, has
played and continues to play a role in shaping the path peace and reconciliation may take”
34
(62) Dougherty emphasized the fact that exploring cultural narratives is essential to the study
of peace and conflict resolution.
Some scholars have explored the various dimensions of approaches to conflict
resolution in international identity disputes. In their general study of news media, Deprez &
Raeymaeckers (2010) noted that in “the selection and construction of news items, the picture
that we see of ‘the foreign,’ is a filtered, distorted, manipulated, one-side and simplified
image” (p. 92). Pearson (2001) found that factors such as preliminary dialogue, the
involvement of officials, and concern about fear and anxiety play an important role in the
outcome of conflict management approaches. Pearson argued that in local violent
ethnopolitical disputes, grass-root participation plays a crucial role in the negotiation process.
Shinar (2000) studied the media discourse of the Middle East peace process and related it
specifically to the discourse of Northern Ireland. Shinar found that the international media
uses dominant discourses of war and violence to compensate for the absence of peace
discourse in the media, and coverage tends to focus on crisis, disorder, and the unusual and
the dramatic, rather than the peace process itself. Because of these tendencies, Shinar
highlighted the need to update the media and create a standard in terms of peace-related
discourse.
Northern Ireland is one of the most researched countries in the world. Considerable
studies have been conducted that aim to explain the conflict by relying on various political,
social, or linguistic theories. In recent years, a discourse on conflict resolution and
peacemaking journalism has emerged that aims at identifying the contribution of the media to
the wider peace processes in society. In particular, scholars have argued that journalists and
broadcasters in Northern Ireland are strategically positioned to help guide the community and
35
its interpretation of important issues. Language, as a transmitter of cultural narrative, has
played a crucial role in the political transformation that has taken place in the region. Indeed,
the media in Northern Ireland has significantly contributed to the organization of community
rhetoric, and according to scholars, press coverage has helped encourage community dialogue
and aid in the resolution of the conflict. Nevertheless, although the violence in Northern
Ireland has steadily decreased, many contend that the region still cannot be characterized by
social unity. If real change, as put forth in the Agreement is to be achieved in Northern Ireland
then shifts are required not only in the nature of cultural representation, but also in terms of
the peace-related discourse presented by journalists and broadcasters. Indeed, the media has
the power to shape the direction of the social and cultural landscape in Northern Ireland.
36
CHAPTER FOUR:
Methodology
In an attempt to understand the social construction of identity during the conflict in
Northern Ireland and the role that rhetoric plays in shaping that identity, newspaper articles
from Northern Ireland, as well as the Republic of Ireland were analyzed. In particular,
considering the nationalist community insists that the people of Northern Ireland have a right
to self-determination – and therefore a sense of Irishness – it was deemed appropriate to
examine the messages being propagated by journalists in the Republic of Ireland as well.
Specifically, newspaper articles from The Irish Times, one of Ireland’s largest daily selling
newspapers, were analyzed in order to gain an understanding of the nationalist perspective in
Ireland. Conversely, newspaper articles from the Belfast Telegraph, a loyalist evening
newspaper based in Northern Ireland, were examined to explore the stance of the unionist
community during the conflict and peace process.
This study sought to understand how the competing communities in Ireland – the
nationalist community and the unionist community – identified both themselves and the
“other,” during the height of the conflict and subsequently throughout the peace accords. As
Pearson (2010) argued “The notion of identity tends to intersect with interests, resource
concerns and representational needs in political disputes” (p.284). Religious differences or
ethnicity may not always be the primary factor inspiring people to fight. Thus, in order to
understand the process of identification that took place during the peak of violence in
Northern Ireland, articles ranging from January 27- March 27, 1972 were analyzed. During
this period, the event known as ‘Bloody Sunday’ took place on January 30. Several articles
that were written before the crisis were selected for analysis in order to gain an understanding
37
of the political and social climate at the time of the events. The remaining articles examined
had been published throughout the seven-week period following Bloody Sunday, during
which the Widgery Tribunal occurred. In order to obtain articles from The Irish Times, the
LexisNexis Academic online database was utilized, and terms such as “Derry” and “Bloody
Sunday,” and leaders such as “General Ford,” and “Heath” were searched to retrieve articles.
In order to find artifacts from the Belfast Telegraph, newspapers from the microfilm
collection at Boston College, written during the specified timeframe, were thoroughly
examined for references to the Bloody Sunday incident, as well as the nationalist community
in general.
Likewise, in order to discover if either community redefined their identity or
perspective during the resolution phase of the Northern Irish conflict, newspaper articles
ranging from March 27- May 27, 1998 were analyzed. In particular, during this period, the
Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement was announced on April 10, followed by a six-week
referendum campaign that concluded with the vote of the people either in favor or against the
Agreement. Therefore, the rhetoric used by nationalist and unionist communities during this
stage of the conflict resolution process was analyzed. Articles from both The Irish Times and
the Belfast Telegraph were retrieved using the LexisNexis Academic online database. Terms
like “peace,” “unionist,” and “North” were used in The Irish Times search in order to gain an
understanding of how the nationalist community viewed the unionist community during this
period. Similarly, terms such as “peace” and “nationalist” were used in the Belfast Telegraph
search in order to study the perspective of the unionist community during this timeframe.
Following the research process, both Richard Weaver’s ‘ultimate terms’ theory, as
well as Walter Fisher’s ‘narrative paradigm’ theory seemed applicable to many of the
38
newspaper articles examined. As a result, both frameworks were used during the analysis
process.
Richard Weaver’s ‘Ultimate Terms’
In an attempt to understand ethical and cultural role that rhetoric plays in
contemporary society, Richard Weaver (1985) explored the expression of meaning behind
“ultimate terms” in his book The Ethics of Rhetoric. Weaver argued that a “god term” is an
“expression about which all other expressions are ranked as subordinate and serving
dominations and powers. Its force imparts a lesser degree of force, and fixes the scale by
which degrees of comparison are understood” (1985, p.103). For example, Weaver contended
that words such as “progress” and “freedom” carry positive rhetorical force due to their
seemingly impenetrable quality. On the other hand, Weaver argued that some terms hold such
a high degree of repulsion that they can also be considered ultimate terms, in the sense that
they become the counterpart of god terms. According to Weaver, such words are called “devil
terms” and they “are also ultimate in the sense of standing at the end of the series, and no
survey of the vocabulary can ignore these prime repellents” (p. 102). For example, words such
as “Nazi” and “Communism” have historically represented devil terms in American society.
In the case of Northern Ireland, in order to understand and rationalize the events that
took place on Bloody Sunday in 1972 and the subsequent peace process that occurred twentyfive years later, both the nationalist and the unionist community began to discuss the situation
and their beliefs in terms that could be considered “ultimate terms.” According to Weaver
(1985), nations are naturally compelled to create enemies in order to direct inherent feelings
of scorn and hatred. He proposed that when another political state is not available to receive
39
the discharge of such feelings, a nation will substitute a particular class, faction, or race in its
place.
Because the conflict occurring in Northern Ireland was internal, the competing
communities in the region – the nationalist community and the unionist community –
established each other as enemies. For the nationalist community, however, the British
government became an additional, foreign source of dissent. Weaver contended that ultimate
terms must be ultimate in some rational sense, and thus words can be manipulated in order to
achieve this particular goal. The perversion of words, however, “can lure us down the road of
hatred and tragedy. That is the tendency of all words of false or ‘engineered’ charisma. They
often sound like the gospel of one’s society, but in fact they betray us. They get us to do what
the adversary of the human being wants us to do” (p. 106). Indeed, in the case of Northern
Ireland, words were deliberately perverted in order to fulfill the objectives of both
communities and justify each group’s reaction to the conflict and peace process.
Walter Fisher’s ‘Narrative Paradigm’
Similar to the theoretical framework of Richard Weaver, Walter Fisher explored the
power of rhetoric in contemporary society. In his piece, Narration as a Human
Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument, Walter Fisher (1984) argued
that “man in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, is a story-telling animal” (p. 2).
Thus, Fisher contends that dramatic narratives form the basis of human action. In particular,
Fisher designates the term “narrative paradigm” to describe the relationship between
rhetorical messages and symbolic actions. Fisher argues that words and/or actions have the
ability to create meaning for those who live, produce or interpret them. The narrative
paradigm, therefore, can be considered “a dialectical synthesis of two traditional strands in the
40
history of rhetoric: the argumentative, persuasive theme and the literary, aesthetic theme”
(Fisher, 1984, p.2). In this way, the narrative outlook applies to both real and fictive realms, to
stories of the present and to stories of the imagination. Interestingly, however, Fisher insists
that the narrative paradigm does not challenge rationality or reason; rather, it reconstitutes
them making them agreeable with all forms of human communication (p.3). Indeed, any
ethical issue, whether political, social, legal or otherwise, absorbs some form of narrative.
Fisher suggests that the narrative paradigm structure is rooted in metaphor. In
particular, he contends that the human experience is made up of individual metaphors that
ultimately form a “master metaphor” (p.6). As Fisher (1984) writes, “In the terminology of
the narrative perspective, the master metaphor sets the plot of human experience and the
others as subplots” (p. 6).The interaction of these metaphors, therefore, creates narration.
Fisher proposes that the master metaphor subsumes all other metaphors, and thus these other
metaphors can be considered “conceptions that inform various ways of recounting or
accounting for human choice and action” (p.6). Recounting includes history or biography,
whereas accounting takes the form of argument or theoretical explanation. Fisher argues that
regardless of the form they take, recounting and accounting are the stories we tell one another
to create a meaningful life and world. While the style, characters, events, conflict and
resolutions may vary, Fisher argues that “each mode of recounting and accounting for is but a
way of relating a ‘truth’ about the human condition” (p.6).
Indeed, in the case of Northern Ireland, journalists from The Irish Times symbolically
placed the story of the Good Friday Agreement in a creative and imaginative framework.
Throughout the articles analyzed, themes continuously arose, and the process was discussed
as if it were an epic narrative or play. In particular, the negotiators of the settlement became
41
heroes and were described in mythical terms, and journalists tended to heighten the
excitement of the events by dramatizing and sensationalizing the situation. Fisher contends
that “the most persuasive stories are mythic in form” (p.16), particularly when it comes to the
discovery of communal identity. In the case of the Good Friday Agreement, many articles
compared the peace process to a sports competition or card game, thus further reducing the
reality of the events that were unfolding. As Fisher argued, the notions of social and public
knowledge should be considered in light of the narrative paradigm. According to Fisher, “to
consider that public-social knowledge is to be found in the stories that we tell one another
would enable us to observe not only our differences, but also our commonalities, and in such
observation we might be able to reform the notion of ‘the public’” ( p.15). Thus, through the
use of narrative, journalists and leaders in Northern Ireland were able to bring the nationalist
and unionist communities towards an understanding of one another.
42
CHAPTER FIVE:
Bloody Sunday and the Rhetoric of Hate
Although Bloody Sunday is only one event in the history of Northern Ireland, it
played a critical role in the escalation of violence throughout the region. Between 1966 and
September 2001, some scholars have estimated that over 3,670 people lost their lives
(McKittrick & McVea, 2001). While there has been dispute about the events surrounding
some of the deaths, there has been very little debate about the general trends. For instance,
more than fifty percent of the deaths that took place were suffered by civilians, and many of
those killed were young men. Nearly half of all deaths were brought about by republican
paramilitaries, while another third were contributed to loyalist paramilitaries (McKittrick &
McVea, 2001). Despite the fact that many of these deaths took place during various,
individual episodes, some scholars argue that the rise in violence was actually rooted in the
events of Bloody Sunday. As Hayes and Campbell (2005) wrote, from a nationalist
perspective, “it can be argued that Bloody Sunday had a profound political and social impact
on Northern Irish society. Not only did it directly lead to the dismantling of the devolved
administration at Stormont and the introduction of Direct Rule from Westminster, as an act of
state killing, it also marked a watershed in the Troubles” (p.21).
Although Bloody Sunday
cannot be observed in isolation from other historical, political, and social factors, the events
that took place on that day occurred during a moment of state crisis and were compounded by
considerable faults in the subsequent decisions of government authorities and individuals. The
result of the tragic event was a noticeable increase in violence, which involved not only
Northern Ireland, but also Britain and the Irish Republic. Rather than being effectively
43
resolved, the conflict was prolonged for over thirty years, and thus it’s important to assess the
contribution of not only the leadership at the time, but also the involvement of the media.
In the days leading up to the Bloody Sunday crisis and in the weeks that followed,
Northern Irish newspapers from both the nationalist and unionist perspectives responded to
the trauma by developing a network of stories and establishing an archive of rich narratives.
Newspapers became a method of propaganda for both communities and were utilized to
inform their respective audiences about the events that took place and the way that readers
should interpret them. Both The Irish Times and the Belfast Telegraph contained similar
patterns in rhetoric that continued to appear and reappear in the months following Bloody
Sunday. In particular, both communities began to define “the other” using terms that
demonized and degraded. Through a manipulation of language, nationalists and unionists
were able to rationalize their perspectives, as well as justify their reactions to the impending
crisis.
As previously discussed, in his book The Ethics of Rhetoric, Richard Weaver (1985)
analyzed the expression of meaning behind “ultimate terms” in contemporary rhetoric and
argued that certain words and phrases carry such powerful force that they can be considered
“ultimate,” in the sense that they “stand at the end of a series, and no survey of vocabulary
can ignore [their presence]” (p.102). In the case of Northern Ireland, in order to understand
and rationalize the events surrounding Bloody Sunday, both the nationalist and unionist
communities began to discuss the situation and their beliefs in terms that could be considered
“ultimate terms.” Each group designated their feelings of scorn, hatred and shock towards the
opposition, and used expressions of meaning that defined one another as “enemies.” Indeed,
44
in the weeks that followed Bloody Sunday, words were deliberately perverted order to fulfill
the objectives of both communities and justify each group’s response to the conflict.
A Nationalist Perspective on Bloody Sunday
In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, The Irish Times and the nationalist community
began to define the loyalist community using words and phrases reminiscent of Weaver’s
“devil terms.” In particular, the newspaper designated both the British and Northern Irish
governments as enemies of the Irish nation state. Using a variety of methods, journalists and
nationalist politicians attacked the credibility and character of the loyalist community and its
leadership. By demoralizing the political and military approaches of unionist leaders, The
Irish Times was able successfully blame the unionist community for the events that took place
in the weeks following Bloody Sunday, as well as justify the violent and irrational reaction of
the nationalists community.
Attack the Abilities and Efficiency of the Government
British Government: Westminster.
In an attempt to blame the unionist community for the events that took place on
Bloody Sunday, The Irish Times repeatedly attacked the abilities of government leaders in
Northern Ireland. In particular, the newspaper tended to degrade the intellectual capabilities
of the British government. For instance, one journalist declared: “Britain was ruled by the
worst government of modern times...they were callous, stupid, pigheaded, mean-minded, and
they were vainly imagining that the rest of humanity was actuated by the same narrow
considerations of power and profit as themselves” (“Heath Has,” 1972, p.7). Another
journalist argued, “the obstinacy and insane policy of Mr. Heath and his Government and that
45
of the ‘sub-Government’ in the North could not but lead to further deaths and tragedies”(“Act
of, 1972, p.3). Political leaders from the nationalist community, such as Dr. John O’Connell,
the Labour T.D., told the newspaper that he “deplored Britain’s continued intransigence and
stupidity as she appeared set to pursue, and indeed intensify the bloody destructive road
towards what could only be total and catastrophic ruin in Ulster” (“T.D. Alleges,” 1972, p. 6).
Thus, in order to degrade the unionist community and justify the nationalist perspective, The
Irish Times often portrayed the British government as irrational, narrow-minded, and
unconcerned with saving the Northern Irish state from disaster.
In addition to criticizing the intellectual abilities of the British government, the
nationalist community also depicted British leaders as “deceptive” and “inefficient.” As one
journalist, Martin Brennan (1972), announced: “The massacre in Derry finally unmasks the
Heath Government’s military solution as bloody butchery. At the same time, it brings home
the shameful lack of national leadership which the Irish people are being obliged to suffer at
this time of crisis” (p. 9). Many articles argued that the British government had a secret
agenda and that leaders had intentionally brought about the demise of Northern Ireland.
Moreover, journalists tended to discredit the abilities of the British government by
reducing it to an oppressive bully. As one journalist declared:
We are a small nation placed by destiny close to a larger and more powerful neighbor. For
too
long throughout our history, might has always been the ultimate arbiter in our
relationships. In recent years there have been indications of welcome and fruitful changes
in this pattern which were working to the benefit of both peoples. The present British
Government, however, appears to have reverted to the old unprincipled doctrine that might
46
is right. We must, and will, turn to other nations for support.” (“Aid for North,” 1972, p.
20)
Again, The Irish Times promoted the idea that the British Government was
undisturbed by the situation unfolding in Northern Ireland and only concerned with its own
selfish objectives. Another article declared: “They still have the old Conservative opinion that
British Right is British Might and they have not learned from history that their method in the
Six Counties in Ireland will not work but will have the same results as in other countries
where they have tried the same tactics” (“Act of Murder,” 1972, p.3). Thus, many articles in
The Irish Times argued that the oppressive and aggressive nature of the British government
was no longer viable in light of the Bloody Sunday massacre; for many journalists, the only
solution was change.
Because of the British government’s apparent inability to respond appropriately to the
conflict in Northern Ireland, nationalists frequently called on the international community for
assistance, further belittling the abilities of the unionist leadership. As one journalist pleaded:
“When confronted with this type of intransigence, what can the Irish people do except appeal
to the governments of the world to use their influence in effecting a settlement?” (“What
Next,” 1972, p. 10) In response to the announcement that Lord Widgery would oversee the
inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday, one article titled “Widgery Unacceptable for
Inquiry” declared: “The appointment of Lord Chief Justice Widgery to preside at the inquiry
into the Derry massacre is not acceptable…the inquiry must be carried out by international
legal figures – We cannot accept a British judgment on British crime” (1972, p. 9). Despite
the fact that the nationalist community wanted to find a solution, they clearly had no
47
confidence in the aptitude of the British government, and thus the solution they sought did not
include any form of collaboration with British leadership.
Leaders from the Republic of Ireland also degraded the British government by
contending that external assistance was necessary in order to reach a settlement. As one article
declared, in the weeks following Bloody Sunday, “There was urgency in [the Taoiseach’s]
demand for the abolition of Stormont and that international public opinion be mobilized”
(“Day of Mourning,” 1972, p.12) Another article argued pleaded to the leader of the Republic
for assistance, proclaiming:
The Dublin Government must be not only interested in it, but implicated in it. And if the
Opposition in the North becomes impatient of Mr. Heath’s dilatoriness, it logically follows
that Mr. Lynch, with rather less story difficulties than Mr. Heath has just at this minute,
might be expected to come forth with his own initiative. (“Protests Mount,” 1972, p. 1a)
Thus, throughout The Irish Times, the abilities and efficiency of the British
government were continually degraded and appeals were repeatedly made to both the
international community as well as the leaders of the Republic to assist in the creation of a
settlement. In addition to criticizing the intellectual abilities of the British government, the
nationalist community also depicted British leaders as deceptive. Therefore, despite the fact
that the nationalist community wanted to find a solution, they lacked confidence in the
aptitude of the British government and therefore sought a solution that did not include
compromise.
48
Northern Irish Government: Stormont.
In addition to criticizing the abilities of representatives from Westminster, The Irish
Times also criticized the abilities of political leaders in the Northern Irish government,
Stormont. Accusations that Stormont representatives were ineffective were prominent
throughout articles analyzed. Journalists tended to argue that the Northern Irish government
was “dead” or at “the end of the road.” For instance, journalist Anthony Lewis (1972)
described Bloody Sunday as “a situation which put glaringly into focus the now pathetic
situation where the Government in Northern Ireland is absolutely powerless to control
anything in the community except repressive legislation” (p. 14). Thus, whereas the minority
had been powerless in terms of employment, housing and justice, the government of Northern
Ireland was described as powerless in terms of leading or determining a solution. Because of
Stormont’s inability to honorably govern, nationalists were able to justify their unwillingness
to compromise. As one journalist remarked: “this completely rules out any form of
compromise with Stormont, and indeed only takes away from that institution a few more of
the days it has left” (“What Next,” 1972, p.10), while another journalist declared: “By their
murderous acts in Derry, the paratroopers had helped speed up the downfall of the Stormont
regime” (“General Strike,” 1972, p.7). According to the nationalist community, the
government in Northern Ireland had sealed its own fate; because Stormont only had a few
weeks of life remaining, nationalists did not view it as an institution that was even worthy of
respect or acknowledgement. For many nationalists, the government in Northern Ireland was
so ineffective that it could not even be considered an opponent, and thus, compromise became
impossible.
49
Demoralize and Criminalize the Unionist Community
In addition to attacking the abilities of the British and Northern Irish governments, The
Irish Times also demoralized the character of the loyalist community’s leadership and its
policies. Several articles suggested that a “rather rough British justice” (Kelly, 1972, p.7) had
encouraged inequality and discrimination against the nationalist community, and thus, it
would be impossible to defend the actions of the British government.
In the weeks leading up to Bloody Sunday, one reporter, Henry Kelly (1972),
declared that members of the unionist community were even beginning to question the
policies of its leadership: “Almost half the community – and in Derry two-thirds – does not
accept that there is any moral basis for the Special Powers Act under which the soldiers
operate. The knowledge that the legislation is immoral is added to when it is enforces by
baton charges, tear gas, and rubber bullets” (p.7) Another article suggested: “But if the
process of alienation among Catholics has grown in strength since the interment policy came
in, the confidence of Protestants that it was the right thing to do has waned with each passing
day. Even advocates of the policy now question its usefulness” (“Derry Britons,” 1972, p.6).
Thus, in response to Bloody Sunday, The Irish Times proclaimed: “The British government
will have to justify to their own people, the world and to history its actions. By all accounts
this will be impossible” (“Soldiers Kill 13,” 1972, p.1), while another journalist contended
that “the claim of sniper-fire, even supposing it were true, goes nowhere near justifying
yesterday’s wholesale slaughter and is a pitiable excuse” (“Cardinal Clarifies,” 1972, p. 11).
Later on in the same article, the author wrote, “there is no compensation adequate enough for
lost life, but there should be a bulwark against further loss of life if Britain seized the nettle
and announced a program of military and political withdrawal” (p.11). The Irish Times made
50
readers believe that neither the loyalist community nor the British Army fully supported the
tactics being applied by the government at the time of the crisis.
In reference to Bloody Sunday, journalists from The Irish Times tended to criminalize
unionist leaders. For instance, one journalist, Martin Brennan (1972) wrote: “Mr. Heath, Mr.
Maudling, and General Tuzo stand convicted as war criminals, and we must insist that the
Irish Government ceases all forms of collaboration with the criminal aggressors” (p. 9). Mr.
Eddie McAteer, Leader of the Nationalist Party, told papers: “‘It was simply a massacre.
There were no petrol bombs, no guns, no snipers, no justification for this well-organized
slaughter. Derry’s Bloody Sunday will be remembered as the British government’s day of
greatest shame” (“Act of Murder,” 1972, p.3). Again, nationalists argued that the actions of
the British government had been so aggressive and destructive that justification had become
impossible.
Interestingly, however, while the newspaper tended to criminalize unionists, it
simultaneously victimized the nationalist community. Articles emphasized the peaceful and
innocent nature of the march. The Minister for local government, Mr. Robert Molloy,
described the Derry deaths as “‘the slaughter of people who took part in a Gandhi-like
protest.” (“Acts of Murder,” 1972, p. 3). One article stated: “The British Army opened fire –
not on the so called illegal marchers, but on a perfectly lawful meeting” (“CRA Says,” 1972,
p.9). Miss Bernadette Devlin, M.P., told the newspaper: “‘What happened in Derry today was
mass murder by the British army. Let no one say they opened fire in retaliation. They shot up
a peaceful meeting at the Free Derry Corner, and then they let loose with bloodthirsty gusto at
anyone unfortunate enough to stray in their sight” (Brennan, 1972, p.9). Thus, the unionist
community was defined as brutal aggressors, whereas the nationalist community was defined
51
as innocent victims. In response to the killings, one journalist wrote: “The death of innocent
civilians by armed criminals, the dregs of the British army, sets a river of blood between this
country and England” (“Carnage in Derry,” 1972, p.1). Nationalists, therefore, attempted to
differentiate and distinguish themselves from the unionist community by demoralizing the
character of the British and Northern Irish leadership and their policies by calling them
criminals and reinforcing the idea that victims of Bloody Sunday were innocent.
The British Army was Demonized
As a force aligned with the loyalist perspective, the British Army was also demonized
by The Irish Times. In reconstructing the events of Bloody Sunday, the newspaper used a
great deal of devil language to describe the actions of the British Army and the manner in
which the crisis unfolded. For instance, journalists frequently cited the barbaric and savage
behavior of the soldiers. As one article declared: “This act by British troops was unbelievably
and savagely inhuman” (“Retaliation Threat,” 1972, p. 1); while another article proclaimed,
“The feeling of the people of Derry at the minute is that this crime is perpetuated not only
against the people of the city, but of the whole Six Counties and they demand that this further
escalation of barbarism must be halted before it is too late” (“CRA Says,” 1972, p.9).
Similarly in order to describe the actual events that took place, journalist tended to use words
such as “carnage,” “murder,” “massacre,” “slaughter,” or “butcher,” further enhancing the
argument that the behavior of the Army was barbaric. For instance, Martin Brennan (1972)
announced: “The British army opened fire indiscriminately on the civilian population
attending a protest meeting in the Bogside today. Their action was nothing short of
coldblooded mass murder” (p. 9). Another article declared: “What happened at Derry
yesterday was carnage” (“Carnage,” 1972, p.11), while one witness reported, “‘it was just a
52
massacre’” (“Redcross,” 1972, p. 8). Another bystander told The Irish Times: “‘I have never
seen butchery of people like I saw today’” (“No Truth,” 1972, p. 9). Mr. Neil Blaney, T.D.,
said in a statement to the media: “I call on Mr. Heath to withdraw his butchers. I call on the
Taoiseach to cease his collaboration with the British and to act on behalf of the Irish nation by
standing with the people in the Six Counties in their hour of need” (Brennan, 1972, p.9).
Again, by accusing the Army of carnage and mass murder, the nationalist community was
able to dehumanize the British soldiers and ultimately justify its perspective.
Similar to the descriptions of the British and Northern Irish governments, the Army
was also frequently criticized by journalist for its deceitful, callous and immoral behavior. For
instance, as Martin Brennan (1972) contended: “This incident put back the work of those who
have been striving for peace and moderation a long, long way, and brought them to a point of
despair. The use of live ammunition by British troops in crowded streets was callous and
irresponsible” (p.9). Often articles would trivialize the claims of the British Army by using
phrases like “so-called.” For instance, one journalist argued, “The British Army opened fire –
not on the so-called illegal marchers, but on a perfectly lawful meeting” (“CRA Says,” 1972,
p.9). Another article reported: “The so-called war against ‘terrorists’ since Mr. Faulkner took
over has with the passage of time degenerated into a war against the Catholic community. At
least that is how it looks to the Catholics of the North today, and what happened in Derry will
confirm them to that belief” (“Dramatic Change,” 1972, p. 9). Again, in order to emphasize
the irresponsibility and heartlessness of the Army, many of the terms that were used to
describe it tended to attack the character and morality of its officers.
The Irish Times repeatedly referred to the soldiers as “uniformed murderers” or
“terrorists,” in order to enhance its claims that the British Army was deceitful and morally
53
corrupt. For instance, Brennan (1972) reported: “[The paratroopers] are trained criminals.
They differ from terrorists only in the veneer of respectability that uniforms give them” (p.9).
Another reporter described the events of Bloody Sunday as the “mass murder of Irish citizens
by British gangsters in uniform” (“Nation condemns,” 1972, p. 13). The Provisional wing of
the IRA released a statement to newspapers, declaring: “‘The British army murdered innocent
civilians in Derry today. We leave the world to judge who are the real terrorists’”
(“Retaliation Threat,” 1972, p. 1). Similarly, in an article that recapped a television program
that discussed the events, “Mr. Ivan Cooper, M.P., who appeared in the program, described
the paratroopers as ‘murderers.’ Dr. O’Brien said they were absolutely unsuited and should be
taken out before they kill more innocent victims” (“Bipartisan,” 1972, p.9).By arguing that the
officers of the Army were terrorists and criminals in uniform, The Irish Times successfully
promoted the idea that they were a dishonorable opponent unworthy of respect.
Nationalist Community’s Reaction
In response to the events of Bloody Sunday, The Irish Times frequently emphasized
the nationalist community’s “shock,” “revulsion,” and “horror.” For instance, one journalist
described Northern Ireland as “a country trying to get used to the idea of so many people cut
down in a few short minutes, and trying to overcome its horror, its shock and its revulsion
over the killings. It will take time for the enormity of the killings to sink in and merge with
the memory of other savage deeds” (“Soldiers Kill,” 1972, p. 1). Similarly, Dick Grogan and
Martin Cowley (1972) declared: “Derry was stunned and sickened last night as its people
counted the rising toll of deaths and injuries following yesterday afternoon’s carnage in the
Bogside when British soldiers opened up with automatic fire on thousands of anti-internment
demonstrators” (p.1). Interestingly, this particular quote dismissed the idea that the British
54
army could have possibly been fired on first. Similar to other articles, Grogan and Cowley
(1972) referred to the event as “carnage,” and categorized its victims as demonstrators, as
opposed to illegal instigators. A few days later, another Irish Times reporter emphasized the
feeling of distress in Derry, suggesting that “The shock of the mass killings created
widespread confusion and many people still wandering the streets were seeking details of the
victims from each other” (“Officials Say,” 1972, p.8), and in a statement to The Irish Times,
the Taoiseach wrote: “‘We know very well the shock of horror and indignation which have
passed through the entire length and breadth of our country” (“Aid for North,” 1972, p. 20).
In addition to highlighting the shock and horror of the community, many articles in
The Irish Times also emphasized the “anger” and “frustration” felt by nationalists. For
instance, one journalist, James Kelly (1972), declared: “The news from Derry last night sent a
shockwave of horror and anger throughout the half-million minority community in the North”
(p. 9), while Martin Brennan (1972) proclaimed, “Horror and fury mounted throughout the
country last night after 13 young men were shot dead by British paratroopers on Derry’s
streets and 16 more lay injured with bullet wounds in a city hospital” (“Priest Tells,” p.1).
Another article proposed that “The sense of anger and frustration of the Irish people after
Sunday’s horrifying killings in Derry enables them to understand perfectly well what
Bernadette Devlin felt when she launched herself at Mr. Maudling across the floor of the
British House of Commons yesterday; it was not a parliamentary act…but it did express an
attitude widely felt here today” (“What Next,” 1972, p.11). Suddenly political dialogue was
no longer an option for the minority in Northern Ireland. The brutal and vicious acts of the
British government and Army had justified a response that centered on violence; for many
members of the nationalist community, the policies and behavior of the British government
55
ultimately unleashed a beast comparable to the beastlike qualities of their ranks, and thus they
had no choice but to react violently.
In the weeks that followed, nationalists called on the community to create a united
front against the government and avenge the deaths of those killed on Bloody Sunday. For
instance, one article reported that “All Official I.R.A. units were on full-time service to make
as many as possible ‘retalitory killings’ of British soldiers, according to a statement in Derry
today. A spokesman at a news conference said: ‘We shall be shooting to kill as many British
soldiers as possible.’” (“Retaliation Threat,” 1972, p1). In another article, Martin Brennan
(1972) declared, “Now is the time for Irish men and women to take effective action to defend
the people up North and to end the British rule in Ireland for all time”(“Army Action,” p.9).
One article, titled “What Next?” discussed the reaction felt by those in the Republic and
stated: “In announcing a day of national mourning…the Taoiseach in his television message
last night expressed a sense of solidarity with the Northern minority which has suddenly
become a strongly-felt emotion’” (1972, p. 10). Very quickly the plight of the minority in the
North was becoming an all-Ireland cause. Nationalist leaders in the South began to promote
the idea that the Republic had a duty and obligation to assist the victims in the North. In a
statement to The Irish Times, Dr. John O’Connell declared: “‘We here in the South have a
grave responsibility in pursuit of our national aim of reunification’” (“T.D. Alleges,” p.6).
Another article reported a statement from Mr. Malachy Toal: “‘We have called on the various
committees of Republican clubs in the six counties to organize massive demonstrations in
their area to show Heath and the world that the gun of the British Army will not deter the Irish
from the path to victory’”(“General Strike,” 1972, p. 7). Thus, the conflict started to be
discussed in terms that established clear winners and clear losers. Rather than promoting
56
collaboration and compromise, The Irish Times encouraged readers to fight against the
government and Army.
No Alternative and No Cooperation
In many ways, the events of Bloody Sunday became a battle-cry for action among the
nationalist community, and newspapers emerged as a primary source of propaganda. In order
to encourage the minority to join the united front against the government, The Irish Times
tended to polarize the situation and argue that citizens had no other choice but to retaliate
against British and Northern Irish leadership. Journalists frequently blamed the government
for the escalation in violence and contended that its policies of alienation and its lack of
morality offered nationalists no alternative but to fight back. Furthermore, The Irish Times
continually demanded that the government determine a solution for the conflict, but would
encourage nationalists to refuse to cooperate or collaborate with any solution proposed. To
many in the nationalist community, the only resolution was the removal of the British Army
and the reunification of Ireland. Therefore, the situation in Northern Ireland became an
either/or paradox – either Britain peacefully withdraws and Stormont ends, or the nationalist
community would retaliate with violence until that agenda was met.
As previously stated, The Irish Times promoted the idea that the nationalist
community was given no choice or alternative in the situation but to seek revenge for the
events that had taken place. For instance, Henry Kelly (1972) claimed that “relations had
reached a point where there wasn’t- and still isn’t – a hope of breaking the deadlock” (p.7).
Another article claimed that the “result of [Britain’s] heavy-handed policies have only
become already too manifest in the complete polarization of the Northern community, and the
determination of the Catholics, high and low, never again to trust the men of Stormont”
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(“Armed Criminals,” 1972, p.8). Following Bloody Sunday, Martin Brennan (1972) declared:
“We have gone beyond the point of no return” (“Army Action,” p.9), while another reporter
wrote that the events had “driven many people on both sides into positions that, in even the
abnormal political climate of the North, they would never have occupied in a million light
years before last August” (Kelly, 1972, p.7). Clearly, people began to take sides, and The Irish
Times endorsed the belief that nationalists had no alternative. As one article stated: “There
have been swings since Derry, more noticeable even among people who were hitherto
regarded as moderates” (“Protests Mount,” 1972, p. 12). Thus, even those who once remained
neutral to the situation were left to believe that they had no choice but to take a stand.
Throughout this period, in addition to blaming the government for the events that had
taken place, the nationalist media also contended that the British and Northern Irish
governments were responsible for finding a solution. For instance, in a statement to The Irish
Times, NICRA declared: “We ask the British trade union movement…to demand an
immediate stop to the criminal policies of the Heath Government, which led to today’s deaths.
We demand Westminster should now solve politically the situation in Northern Ireland”
(“Three-way,” 1972, p.5). One reporter, James Kelly (1972), wrote: “Mr. Ivan Cooper, Social
Democrat and Labour M.P. for Derry, was present during the Derry killings and predicted to
the international press that unless a political solution was quickly found there would be civil
war in Ireland. It was, he said, virtually a matter of weeks away” (“Faulkner Backs,” p. 7).
One journalist declared: “Time is running out for the British Government…a solution must be
found” (“Armed Criminals,” 1972, p.11). Mr. Stanley Ome, Labour M.P., proclaimed to The
Irish Times: “I am appalled at what has happened. But it only confirms impressions during my
58
recent visit to Northern Ireland – the situation would deteriorate unless the Government
initiated some positive political action” (“Shocked Reaction,” 1972, p. 9).
Interestingly, however, although The Irish Times and nationalist politicians were
arguing that the British government was responsible for determining a solution, they
simultaneously were defining the terms of that solution. For instance, as one article remarked:
“There is no compensation adequate enough for lost life, but there should be a bulwark
against further loss of life if Britain seized the nettle and announced a program of military and
political withdrawal” (“Cardinal Clarifies,” 1972, p.11). Martin Brennan (1972) declared:
“This latest appalling tragedy must surely jerk the British government into immediate action
to find a political solution that will set the British army out of this country forever. If this
happens, Irishmen, irrespective of politics or religion, will be compelled in the common
interest of all to find a solution that will enable all Irishmen to live together” (“Army Action,”
p.9). One journalist contended that “the only solution to the problem is the unification of
Ireland…the presence of gunmen however, no matter how sincere they are, is only delaying
that day” (“Act of Murder,” 1972, p. 3). Suddenly the issues in Northern Ireland became an
all-Ireland problem. As one nationalist politician, Mr. Corish remarked to The Irish Times:
“‘This is an Anglo-Irish crisis. The British Government must contribute towards a solution by
announcing plans to withdraw their troops by a definite date and by agreeing to talks between
all Irishmen North and South, designed to produce a permanent solution to our national
problem’”(Kennedy, 1972, p.1). Thus, for the nationalists, the only solution to the conflict
was the removal of the British government and the reunification of Ireland; without the
delivery of these two proposals, nationalists argued that they would have no choice but to
continue fighting.
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By outlining the terms of the solution, The Irish Times and nationalist politicians
encouraged members of the minority community to avoid cooperation, compromise or
forgiveness. As one report declared: “The main effect of Sunday’s shootings is that they have
ended whatever slim chance the British and Stormont Governments had of imposing a
compromise solution on the Catholic minority. The ultimate solution must now come from
tripartite negotiations which include Dublin” (“Three-way,” 1972, p.5). Another journalist
argued that: “The events will be neither forgotten nor forgiven. With one voice our people call
the British army out. Derry’s day of blood is all Ireland’s cause” (“Carnage,” 1972, p.11). The
nationalist community sought a solution without any accord. As one reporter declared: “Not
much can happen until the British Government moves—or is moved” (“Protests Mount,”
1972, p.12). The Catholic community had reached its breaking point, and there was no turning
back. Rather than promoting peace or commemorating victims, newspapers and politicians
ultimately used the victims of Bloody Sunday as a means to an end – the abolition of
Stormont and the removal of the British government. Nationalists were willing to acquire this
objective by whatever means possible. In particular, the community reverted to using
language reminiscent of Weaver’s “god” and “devil” terms in order to demonize the
opposition and justify its actions.
Nationalist Reaction is Justified Because Law is Immoral and Illegal
Although the nationalist community recognized that persuading its members to avenge
the deaths of those killed on Bloody Sunday wasn’t particularly lawful or moral, The Irish
Times perpetuated the message that they were ultimately justified due to the fact that the law
itself was immoral. In a sense, the nationalist community argued that their illegal actions were
justified because the law itself was illegal, which made such activities necessary. Any action
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against them by the government had no relevance because it was acted on the dictates of an
illegal assembly and unnatural policies. For instance, as one journalist argued, “London
should not rest satisfied until it has shuffled off its bloody and self-imposed duty of keeping
Stormont in power. The unfortunates who were gunned down yesterday are further victims of
that policy which was wrong when it was conceived and which has existed unnaturally for
half a century” (“Soldiers Kill,” 1972, p. 7). Again, the nationalist community genuinely
believed that the policies of the Westminster and Stormont governments were morally wrong
and twisted. Prior to the events of Bloody Sunday, Chris Glennon (1972) reported that “The
British Government was accused by the Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Hillery, of trying to
provoke the people of the 26 Counties into aggressive action in response to the treatment of
the minority in their Six Counties” (p.24). In light of Bloody Sunday, and because of the
government’s inability to act, one article announced: “The British Government bears full
responsibility for the total breakdown of law and order in Northern Ireland. The British Army
must now be withdrawn and all political prisoners released unconditionally” (“Shocked
Reaction,” 1972, p. 9). Members of the nationalist community became disaffected with the
system and thus they were able to disassociate themselves from their reaction. In one article,
Henry Kelly (1972) reported:
Throughout the North yesterday Catholics, whether politicians, solicitors, barristers,
shopkeepers, businessmen, schoolchildren or university students, demonstrated their
continuing but now deeper disaffection with the whole institution that is Northern Ireland
by calling for further withdrawals from public institutions by striking and closing shops
and schools and other places of work. (“No Plans,” p.1)
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Again, nationalist were able to justify their reaction by claiming they had been given
no choice in the matter. In addition to blaming the British government for Bloody Sunday,
The Irish Times and nationalist politicians promoted the idea that there was only one solution
to the problem in Northern Ireland, and if it couldn’t be brought about peacefully, they were
willing to force it violently. As Martin Brennan (1972) declared: “If the latent patriotism of
the Irish people – the heritage of centuries – is capable of being aroused, the mass murders
perpetrated by the British army, acting under orders in Derry, must surely do it” (“Army
Action,” p.9). Thus, nationalist politicians and journalists ultimately blamed the actions and
the policies of the government in Northern Ireland for the breakdown of law and order.
Nationalist leaders attempted to persuade members of their community that any irrational and
illegal reaction to Bloody Sunday was justified in that the policies of both Stormont and
Westminster were unreasonable and unlawful. The nationalist community essentially argued
that due to years of injustice and discrimination, they were left with no choice but to retaliate
and fight back against the unionist community and its leaders.
Concluding Thoughts on Nationalist Perspective
In his analysis of rhetoric, Richard Weaver argued that hierarchies can be inverted and
that “under the impulse of strong frustration there is a natural tendency to institute a pretense
that the best is the worst and the worst is the best” (p.100). Indeed, words traditionally
considered “devil terms,” have the ability to move up the chain of rhetoric and become
idealized in the public mind. In the case of Northern Ireland, in order to rationalize and justify
its conduct, the nationalist community inverted several hierarchies of rhetoric to persuade
people that illegal and irrational behavior was not only justified but also ideal. Indeed, in the
aftermath of Bloody Sunday, the nationalist community was responsible for a great deal of the
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violence that took place; however, The Irish Times and nationalist leaders justified their
behavior by demonizing the government and the British army, arguing that the nationalist
community had been given no alternative, contending that cooperation was impossible, and
thus ultimately blaming the opposition for the break down of law and order. Due to years of
injustice and unbearable discrimination, nationalist argued that they had been left with no
choice but to retaliate and fight back against the unionist community and its leaders.
Interestingly, political leaders and journalists from the Belfast Telegraph used similar tactics
to justify their reaction to Bloody Sunday and defend the unionist community’s perception of
the nationalist opposition.
A Unionist Perspective on Bloody Sunday
In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, the Belfast Telegraph and the unionist community
attempted to understand and rationalize the events that took place in terms that also could be
considered “ultimate terms” (Weaver, 1985). From the articles analyzed, it can be argued that
the loyalist community established the nationalist movement and its leaders as enemies of the
political state and justified the action of the government and British Army by manipulating
rhetoric in a way that demoralized and demonized the victims of Bloody Sunday. Indeed,
similar to the methods used by journalists from the nationalist community, words were
deliberately perverted in order to fulfill the objectives of the unionist community and its
leaders.
In the weeks following Bloody Sunday, Northern Ireland entered the world stage.
Never before had unionism been in international headlines as much as it was after Bloody
Sunday. Never before had Ulster had such a large audience. Therefore, in light of increased
media attention, and in order to justify its behavior and salvage its international reputation, the
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unionist community seized the opportunity to tell its side of the story. As the leader of the
Unionist Party, Brian Faulkner, declared: “The story of the Unionist Party in Northern Ireland
and its contribution to the well-being of all our citizens is a success story, and both at home
and abroad we must counter the vicious propaganda being poured against us” (“Help Us,”
1972, p.1) Indeed, the unionist community believed that their actions and policies were
completely acceptable and therefore should be defended against increased criticism from both
the Irish Republic and international media.
Throughout the articles examined in the Belfast Telegraph, unionist politicians and
journalists repeatedly attacked the credibility and character of the victims of Bloody Sunday
by emphasizing the fact that the civil rights march taking place was illegal, and thus those
who were killed should be considered law-breakers. A great deal of devil language was
utilized by journalists when they described the behavior of the nationalist community and its
leaders. Frequently in the Belfast Telegraph, the abilities and moral character of the
opposition was degraded and demonized in a manner similar to that employed by the
journalists of The Irish Times when they were describing the unionist community.
Incompetent Leaders Put Followers at Risk
Many of articles in the Belfast Telegraph tended to criticize the abilities of the
nationalist movement’s leadership and argued that the efforts of the group were poorly
executed and entirely misguided. For instance, in reference to Bloody Sunday, one reporter
contended: “What was absolutely clear is that from the start, Sunday’s events in Derry had
potential for tragedy and yet in this situation, it was thought proper to encourage the assembly
of thousands of people to take part in a calculated defiance of the law” (“Derry Blood,” 1972,
p. 5). Despite the fact that the nationalist community had been warned of potential violence,
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their leaders decided to continue with the march and thus unionists contended that they had
deliberately put the lives of the victims at risk. Quoting the Daily Mail, The Belfast Times
reported: “‘It was billed as a Civil Rights march but it was a scenario for slaughter from the
minute it was planned and only a fool or cynic would attempt to argue otherwise. The illnamed Civil Rights movement has created a tragic riot in Londonderry” (“Derry Blood,”
1972, p. 7). Journalists argued that the violence could have been prevented had the movement
not been so misguided and ill-advised. Rather than establishing peace, the movement had
merely instigated violence and disorder.
Other articles condemned the leadership of the Irish Republic and argued that the
undemocratic and irresponsible qualities of men such as the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, directly
contributed to the escalation in violence that took place during the weeks following Bloody
Sunday. For instance, one article reported that “Mr. Jack Lynch had chosen to brush aside
offers for mutual co-operation and was working instead ‘for the overthrow of our
institutions’.…In doing so he has more and more exposed himself and his own Government to
the pressure of insidious and undemocratic influence. By that act he has run terrible dangers
for the whole of Ireland” (“Grave Moment,” 1972, p. 1). Another article similarly criticized
the leadership in the Republic, stating: “For responsible people in Dublin to maintain the
pretence that the IRA is a Northern problem and had risen from minority oppression would be
utter folly” (“Eire on Road,” 1972, p.3). One journalist, William Long (1972), declared:
“Some of the most dangerous men in Europe are still roaming the streets of Dublin and
Dundalk free to plan and engage in terrorist activity against Ulster. The reality of the situation
made a mockery of the claims by the Eire Government that everything possible was being
done to bring the terrorists under control” (p.2). Similarly, another article argued: “The
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foreign policy of that country, as well as internal law and order – or to be accurate,
lawlessness and disorder – appear to be dictated by IRA gangsters who have not a single,
constructive, realistic idea in their heads and nothing but bitterness and cruelty in their hearts”
(“Internment Protesters,” 1972, p.2). Thus, many of the articles presented in the Belfast
Telegraph tended to belittle and degrade the leadership abilities of not only the nationalist
movement, but also the Irish Republic.
In addition to emphasizing the poor leadership abilities of the non-unionist
community, the Belfast Telegraph also tended to highlight the weaknesses of the IRA. In the
aftermath of Bloody Sunday, Mr. John Taylor told newspapers that “‘the IRA was being
defeated by the security forces, whose morale had never been higher because it was becoming
increasingly evident that they were winning the security battle. The internment policy was one
of the most important reasons for the increase in success of the security forces’” (“Witness
Says First,” 1972, p. 8). Despite the events that took place on Bloody Sunday, the government
continued to defend its practice of internment and attempted to prove that internment directly
weakened the power structure of the IRA. As one article stated: “At the present time 548
persons are interned and 191 detained under the Special Powers Act. Make no mistake about
it, this is a very damaging blow to the command structure and personnel of the IRA” (“We
Will Not,” 1972, p.7). Another journalist argued: “The IRA may be able for some time yet to
cause disruption and distress in Northern Ireland, but they cannot possibly win in their
campaign here. Only a madman would imagine that the IRA could by force of arms
overthrow the State of Northern Ireland against the wishes of the people and against security
forces available here” (“Maudling Sees,” 1972, p.4). Again, the Belfast Telegraph was
inclined to bolster their own accomplishments and underpin the failures and foolishness of the
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nationalist community and the IRA. As will soon be discussed, journalists continually
reinforced the notion that the opposition was irrational, nonsensical, and virtually insane.
Demoralize the Nationalists and Victims of Bloody Sunday
In addition to attacking the abilities of the nationalist movement, the Belfast Telegraph
also demonized the character of the Bloody Sunday victims and marchers. For instance,
unionist leaders and journalist frequently referred to the nationalist community as
“hooligans,” “law-breakers,” “criminals,” “murders,” and “terrorists.” Many articles
suggested that in fact the nationalist movement was responsible for the events that unfolded
on Bloody Sunday and blamed the movement for the subsequent rise in violence that took
place in Northern Ireland. Rather than taking the demands of the minority community
seriously, journalists tended to dismiss the movement and its proposals as a “nuisance” or
“disturbance,” unworthy of serious consideration.
Just as The Irish Times criminalized the British Army in response to Bloody Sunday,
the Belfast Telegraph criminalized the marchers and organizers of the movement. Articles
tended to underline the involvement of victims in paramilitary organizations such as the IRA,
rather than explore the reasons why they were members of such organizations. For example,
one journalist announced: “Four of the 13 people killed in the clash in Londonderry were on
the ‘wanted’ list as IRA men, a Ministry of Defense staff officer concerned with military
operations in Ulster said yesterday” (“Time Given,” 1972, p. 4). Moreover, journalists from
the Belfast Telegraph frequently referred to the opposition as “terrorists.” Unionist leaders
warned newspapers that “those people who condemned the terrorist but supported civil
disobedience should appreciate that an atmosphere of civil disobedience is one in which a
terrorist can thrive” (Andrews, 1972, p. 2). In reference to Bloody Sunday, Stuart Birch and
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David Watson (1972) referred to the events as “exploitation by terrorist elements” (p. 1),
while another declared that “the activities of the IRA in Derry had already resulted in the
deaths of many soldiers, policemen and civilians. Now in one day more deaths are caused in a
meaningless and futile terrorist exercise” (“Internment Protesters,” 1972, p. 2). Despite the
fact that some of the people killed on Bloody Sunday were involved with the IRA, a majority
of those shot were actually peaceful, unassuming individuals simply promoting equality for
the minority. Nevertheless, the Belfast Telegraph categorized all of the marchers as criminals
and all of the victims as terrorists, further reducing the credibility and moral character of the
opposition.
In order to enhance the argument that the nationalist movement was inspired by
terrorism, many articles suggested that the marchers were behaving under a cloak of
patriotism or democracy and ultimately sought to undermine freedom. For instance, following
a bomb blast that took place several days after Bloody Sunday, the Defense Secretary Lord
Carrigton warned “‘I do not know how long it will take to finish this emergency...we are
dealing with the most dangerous sort of urban guerillas, not high-minded patriots but
criminals, totally unprincipled and totally ruthless’” (People, 1972, p.1). One article reported
that the Taoiseach of the Irish Republic, Mr. Lynch, “said the vast majority of the thousands
of demonstrators had behaved in a dignified and disciplined way. But a small minority, men
who under the cloak of patriotism sought to overthrow the institutions of the state, infiltrate
the peaceful group and ferment violence. These people were dangerous to their freedom and
democracy” (“We Won’t Tolerate,” 1972, p. 1). Indeed, by referencing the opinion of the
Republic’s leadership, such articles were published in an effort to undermine the integrity of
the nationalist movement and reinforce the undemocratic nature of their efforts. In another
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statement, The Ulster Vanguard told newspapers: “‘We are going to beat this conspiracy into
the ground…and we make no accommodation with the enemies of the country, the enemies of
democracy’”(“We’re Going to Win,” 1972, p. 5). Rather than individuals fighting for
freedom, the marchers suddenly became individuals threatening freedom. Journalists from the
Belfast Telegraph successfully defined the unionist opposition as a group of anti-democratic,
anti-patriotic extremists.
Nationalists are Murderers, Law-Breakers, and Fully Responsible
In the months that followed Bloody Sunday, the level of violence in Northern Ireland
dramatically increased. Although a large portion of this violence originated from the IRA and
other paramilitary groups, the unionist community began to associate paramilitary violence
with the nationalist movement in general. Gradually, the non-unionist community became
portrayed as “vicious murderers,” and the Irish Republic became described as a “haven for
killers.” As one journalist, William Long (1972), argued: “The Eire Government has once
again been slammed for its failure to stop the IRA using the Republic as ‘a launch pad for
murder’” (p.2). Another article called for “economic and political pressure to be brought
against the Government of the Republic which has become a haven for murderers, bombers
and arsonists” (“Army Tactics Change,” 1972, p. 3).
In addition to categorizing the nationalist community as murderers, articles in the
Belfast Telegraph also tended to underline the fact that the Bloody Sunday march was illegal,
and therefore the victims should be actually considered “law-breakers” who were “fully
responsible” for the events. For instance, several days before Bloody Sunday, one article
reported: “As anti-internment marchers prepared again to defy the Government parades ban
this weekend, the security forces warned the organizers that they must accept the full
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consequences of breaking the law” (“Army Warns,” 1972, p. 1). Rather than explore the
reasons behind the demonstration, unionists tended to stress only the fact that the march was
illegal. In response to Bloody Sunday, a joint Army R.U.C. statement said: “‘Experience this
year has already shown that attempted marches often end in violence and must have been
foreseen by the organizers. Clearly the responsibility for this violence and the consequences
must rest fairly and squarely on the shoulders of those who encourage people to break the
law’” (“Army Warns,” 1972, p. 1). Because they broke the law, the nationalist movement was
automatically blamed for the behavior of the Army and those who had been killed. As one
journalist declared, “disaster in Londonderry dwarfs all that has gone before in Northern
Ireland. The march was illegal. Warning had been given of the danger implicit in continuing
with it.” (“Derry Blood,” 1972, p. 7); Another article argued that “the main responsibility
undoubtedly lies with those who organized the civil rights march in defiance of the
Government ban. [Mr. Stanley McMaster (East Belfast)] described the IRA claim that they
had ordered their guns out of the area as a ‘bluff.’ ‘I don’t believe it for one moment,’ he said”
(“Witness Says,” 1972, p.8). Again, rather than recognizing and respecting those who were
killed, the Belfast Telegraph tended to highlight the illegal aspect of the march and to
subsequently trivialize any claims made by the nationalist community.
Nationalist Movement and Marcher are Hooligans, Nuisances, and a Disturbance
One way journalist trivialized the claims of the minority was to dismiss the movement
and its proposals as a “nuisance” or “disturbance,” unworthy of serious consideration.
Frequently, the Belfast Telegraph referred to the marchers and demonstrators as “illegitimate
hooligans.” For instance, in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, one report stated that “the staff
officer, Colonel Harry Dalzell-Payne of the Directorate of Military Operations dealing with
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Northern Ireland, said weekend intelligence indicated that Sunday’s march was very likely to
be exploited. There were strong indications that both hooligans and gunmen might be present”
(“Time Given,” 1972, p. 4). It’s interesting that this particular journalist would juxtapose the
feelings of an “intelligence officer” with the actions of “hooligans and gunmen.” Another
article referred to “the hooligan problem which the Army was continually facing in
Londonderry since August 1968,” and said that “it consisted of 500 active hooligans with a
hard core of 250 who specialized in rioting, attacks on armed forces, and arson. They usually
acted as cover for snipers” (“Army Had No Murder,” 1972, p. 1). On St. Patrick’s Day, one
article, titled “Luck of the Irish,” asked: “How can there be any pride in being Irish today?
Can one really be proud of a province which has been so easily split in two by the crazed
behavior of a handful of hooligans and warped idealists. Does it not suggest that the Ulster we
thought we knew and loved contained within it the seeds of destructions?” (1972, p.1).
By casting the minority as hooligans and crazed gunmen, the unionist community was
able to justifiably describe any subsequent efforts by nationalists as “disruptive” or
“troublesome.” For instance, several days following the incident, the Irish Republic called for
a national strike as a mark of respect for the 13 who died, and as a result, the industrial and
business life of the south came to a halt. But as one Belfast Telegraph article titled “Mourning
Forced on Many,” reported, “it was in most instances a case of ‘work as usual’ for thousands
in Ulster who ignored the call for a national strike…but as workers made their way to
factories and offices in Belfast and other towns throughout the province, the RUC declared:
‘there is undoubted evidence that many persons are being forced into closing their premises or
not going to work against their will’” (1972, p. 4). Thus, a national day of mourning became a
burden that was depicted as a further nuisance and instigation of unnecessary trouble. As one
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report declared, “The people are certainly not motivated by patriotism, since, as has been
pointed out by a large number of people, the only effect of their campaign would be to
endanger the jobs of Irish workers in our export industries”(“Boycott British,” 1972, p. 7).
Thus, unionist arguments transcended the nationalist cause by proposing that the movement
did not have Northern Ireland’s best interest at heart. In another article, referring to the
“vicious irresponsibility” of the bombers and gunmen, Ulster’s Deputy Prime Minister said:
“‘The removal of these evils from any society must surely be the first priority of any
government responsible for that society’” (Andrews, 1972, p.2). Thus, the nationalist
community emerged as an unbearable pestilence in Northern Irish society that the unionist
community had no choice but to remove.
Reconstruction of Events According to the British Army and Unionist Community
Interestingly, the Belfast Telegraph tended to contrast its negative descriptions of the
nationalist community with extremely positive descriptions of the unionist community. While
the marchers tended to be portrayed as aggressors, journalist victimized the unionist
community, as well as soldiers of the British Army. In particular, the unionist community was
continually praised for its “steadfastness” and “restraint” over the years in dealing with the
intense pressures brought about by minority community. For instance, Mr. Faulkner told the
Belfast Telegraph that in addition to trying to find a solution, part of “‘the Government’s
other responsibility was to speak for the vast majority of Ulster people who have borne
months and years of disorder with incredible fortitude and whose very restraint could too
easily be mistaken for disinterest’” (“Witness Says,” 1972, p. 8). The unionist community was
repeatedly portrayed as the victim of the disorder caused by the civil rights movement.
Another article stated: “A great many so called solutions of the troubles are being put forward
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by people both inside and outside of Ireland, but no mention is ever made of the wishes of the
Protestant majority. Have they no rights at all, ‘civil’ or otherwise? Are they just to be
bulldozed into a United Ireland whether they like it or not?” (“No Surrender,” 1972, p. 8). In
response to the nationalist community’s claim for a united Ireland, journalists from the Belfast
Telegraph depicted the Republic of Ireland as a bully and an oppressor, forcing an agreement
without unionist consent.
Many journalists warned that the demands of the nationalist community would reverse
the alleged discrimination in Northern Ireland. For example, one journalist, John Thompson
(1972), declared: “Do people who talk so glibly about ‘reunification’ really believe that these
proposals would bring peace? It is not more likely that instead of ‘peace’ we would have
much the same trouble all over again – only in reverse by the Protestant people” (p.9).
Congratulating the Protestant community on the “dignity, calm, courage, and patience which
they had displayed in the face of the conspiracy among them, [Faulkner] said: ‘the people of
this province have made up their minds – the majority of them – that any proposals for a
united Ireland are definitely out” (“No Surrender,” 1972, p. 8). Thus, by referencing the
Protestant community as victims of conspiracy, the Belfast Telegraph emphasized the dignity
and courage of unionists. John Wallace (1972) warned that “although the Protestant
community had exercised great restraint and steadfastness through these last difficult years, it
could not be guaranteed forever” (p.1).
Interestingly, journalists also argued that the British Army had been victimized in a
manner similar to the unionist community. Many reporters propagated the idea that the
soldiers had actually been fired on first, and their behavior was “necessary to restore order.”
As one article declared: “The Paras only opened fire when they were fired at and this morning
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Army operations officers had compiled a detailed report on each shooting incident and had
accurate map references of where each incident had taken place” (“Standstill,” 1972, p. 1).
Another article announced that “a senior Army officer said it was absolute rubbish to suggest
there were no gunmen and the gunmen did not open fire first” (“Agony,” 1972, p. 3).
Moreover, many journalists tended to highlight the level-headedness and restraint exercised
by the British Army. For instance, one report claimed “There were a number of occasions
when they were fired on and did not reply”(“Witness Says,” 1972, p.8). Similarly, during the
Widgery Tribunal, the Counsel for the Army told newspapers that “‘all ranks of the Army had
acted responsibly, in a disciplined manner, and carried out a very difficult task under fire, and
had used minimum force in Londonderry on January 30” (“Army Had No,” 1972, p.1). Thus,
journalists continuously emphasized the accomplishments of the soldiers and contrasted their
level-headedness with the barbaric nature of the marchers.
Actions are Justified
By demoralizing the opposition and describing its members as unreasonable
aggressors, the British Army and the unionist community were able to justify their reaction to
Bloody Sunday. For instance, the Belfast Telegraph frequently argued that it was the “duty”
of the British Army to take action against the “law-breakers.” As one article reported:
“Today’s Army R.U.C. statement said the security forces have a duty to take action against
those who set out to break the law” (“Army Warns,” 1972, p.1). Journalists tended to
normalize the behavior of the Army in order reinforce the idea that the response of the
soldiers was simply a matter of duty. One report claimed that the “Army was acting under
normal instructions” (“Maudling Announces,” 1972, p.8). Another article declared that “In
carrying out their duty, the security forces are concerned to avoid or reduce to an absolute
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minimum the consequences of any violence that may erupt from the confrontation between
sections of the community or between the security forces and those taking part in an illegal
march.”(“Army Warns,” 1972, p.1). Similarly, in one article, the Army itself warned the
Belfast Telegraph that “‘while there are numerous means of expressing views or of
demonstrating opinion which are entirely within the law, any march or procession is contrary
to the law, and measures must and will be taken to deal with any breach’” (Birtch & Watson,
1972, p. 1). By emphasizing the illegal aspect of the march, the Army was able to justify its
reaction and argue that it had the right to take whatever measures necessary to defend the law.
As one journalist suggested: “The security forces choose the time and the place at which to
intervene its policy, which is clearly in the public interest” (“Derry Blood,” 1972, p. 7
According to the Army, the good of the community was always at heart; however, often the
good of the community was merely the good of the majority and did not include the interests
or demands of the minority.
For instance, Mr. Faulkner told the Belfast Telegraph that the events of Bloody
Sunday “‘illustrated precisely why it was found necessary with the full support of the
Government at Westminster to impose a general ban on all processions throughout Northern
Ireland’” (“Clamour Demands,” 1972, p.3). Another unionist declared: “While we sympathize
with those who lost sons and daughters, we nevertheless have a justifiable anger for the
irresponsibility and recklessness which brought about the events of the weekend” (“Faulkner
Hands,” 1972, p. 8). Again the unionist community argued that they were justified in their
response due to the irresponsibility and carelessness of the minority.
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Solution in ‘Our Terms:’ Impossible to Cooperate with Madmen
In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, the unionist community and its leadership
understood that they were responsible for finding a solution to the escalating conflict;
however, similar to the approach taken by nationalists, the unionist community sought a
solution that was on their own terms. Journalists frequently cited the belief that the
nationalists’ claims were “impossible” and “outrageous.” For instance, in the aftermath of
Bloody Sunday, one report declared that “The community was surrounded with mounting
hysteria and unreason, and impossible and outrageous demands were being made which could
do nothing but deepen the tragic conflict” (“Grave Moment,” 1972, p.1). Another article
argued: “If the Irish Republic gave up their wild claims and dropped their malicious and
misleading propaganda about Northern Ireland there would be a far greater prospect of the
minority community here settling down to play their part in the affairs of Ulster – and there
would be far less danger of those in favor of the union with Britain identifying the minority
here with the IRA” (“Eire on Road,” 1972, p. 3). According to loyalists, the nationalist
community’s demands were outrageous and impossible.
Therefore, although political leaders desired a resolution, they desired a resolution that
maintained the way of life that had existed for nearly fifty year. Leaders of the unionist
community, however, insisted that they sought peace through agreement. As the Prime
Minister, Mr. Faulkner, remarked: “One responsibility that the Government has at the moment
is to continue to speak with the voice of reason and to continue ‘our readiness to sit down at
any time with any of our fellow citizens who wish to discuss the situation with us in a realistic
and reasonable spirit’”(“Witness Says,” 1972, p.8). Thus, the unionist community argued that
they desired peace and cooperation, but only peace and cooperation with a rational and
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reasonable opponent. Unfortunately for the nationalists, prior to this appeal, unionist
politicians and journalists had described the minority community as irrational and
unreasonable, and gradually the nationalist movement had become equated with the IRA.
Therefore, despite the fact that several articles argued that the “majority is aching for peace
and return to order,” it’s important to recognize that the unionist’s definition of order
discounted the proposals voiced by the minority (“Majority Aching,” 1972, p.5). “Peace and
order,” according to the unionist perspective, was a return to the way things were before
violence of the late 1960s and early 1970s erupted.
For instance, as one reporter noted: “What must be remembered was that the lives of
many people, particularly the security forces, were at risk. There was no party or group of
people who were more acutely conscious than the Northern Ireland Government of the
impossibility of reaching by purely military means, a solution in which normality and
community harmony could be achieved” (“Lock-Up,” 1972, p. 6). The unionist community
argued that it only wished to restore normalcy; however, it failed to recognize that its
definition of normalcy discriminated against the minority community. The government
claimed it was searching for political answers within a “democratic framework” in order to
solve the problems of the community; however, it did not wish to democratically include the
entire Northern Irish population in that framework. As Faulkner told one journalist,
“‘organizations must emphasize that while unionists were reasonable and in no way bigoted,
inflexible or belligerent, they were ‘utterly determined that our democratic wishes are not
going to be set aside for anyone’” (“We are Not to Be,” 1972, p.3)
Many unionist leaders, therefore, began to take a “no surrender” approach to politics.
As one journalist remarked, “the Unionist population will not tolerate the proposition of a
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united Ireland without consent” (“Faulkner Hands,” 1972, p. 8). Another article stated that
“Two Church of Ireland bishops have warned that the majority of their members ‘will not be
coerced into the society and community of the Republic of Ireland as it is at present
constituted’” (“We Will Not be Coerced,” 1972, pg. 7). More specifically, the unionist Home
Secretary, Mr. Maulding, “said men and women had to understand that they had to live
together. Timing, he said, was fundamental—and that timing had to rest with the Government
(“No Surrender,” 1972, p. 8).” The same article reported that “Maudling’s remarks are being
seen as an expression of ‘no surrender’ as terrorist pressure mounts.” One articled titled “We
are Not to be Pushed Around,” declared that “although we had remained calm in the face of
terrible provocation, our opponents should realize that while we are willing to cooperate in
sensible solutions we are not going to be pushed around” (1972, p.3). Therefore, while the
unionist community was willing to cooperate and reach a solution, they did not wish to
include the proposals of the nationalist community, which they viewed as a group of
“irrational aggressors” and “senseless murderers.” As one journalist put it bluntly: “Faulkner
is opposed to a coalition government. How can a man who is dedicated to ending the state of
Northern Ireland sit at the same table and agree with a man who is at all for upholding that
state, he asks. His answer – it would be a sham’” (“We are Going to Win,” 1972, p. 5).
Concluding Thoughts on Unionist Perspective
Articles in the Belfast Telegraph tended to stress the logical and rational aspects of the
conflict, and frequently suggested that unionist were willing to cooperate in sensible
solutions; however, by degrading the character of the nationalist community and making its
leaders appear irrational and unreasonable, unionists were essentially reinforcing the idea that
they were unable to cooperate with the opposition. The newspaper propagated the notion that
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the non-unionist community’s sole objective was to destroy and disrupt, and thus, a solution
could only be achieved through party unity rather than Northern Ireland unity. As one
journalist declared that “there could be no community government at Stormont, if that
Government incorporated people who sought to destroy it” (“Don’t Push Us,” 1972, p. 3).
Thus, the unionist community in Northern Ireland faced a serious dilemma. Any propositions
for major change, meaning transfer of security, phasing out of internment, and temporary
replacement of Stormont by a Commission, brought the danger of provoking serious
Protestant backlash. On the other hand, the danger of minor change, involving a tinkering of
the internment issue and an attempt to provide nationalists with an integrated place in
Government, was that it would satisfy no one and would inevitably and uncontrollably lead to
civil war.
Indeed, although Bloody Sunday was only one event in the history of Northern
Ireland, it played a crucial role in the escalation of violence throughout the region. While
Sunday cannot be observed separately from other historical, political, and social aspects, the
events that took place on that day occurred during a moment of state crisis and were
compounded by considerable faults in the subsequent decisions of government authorities and
individuals. The result of the tragic event was a visible increase in violence, which involved
not only Northern Ireland, but also Britain and the Irish Republic. Rather than being
effectively resolved, the conflict was prolonged for over thirty years, and was only
successfully tackled in 1998 with the creation of the Good Friday Agreement.
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CHAPTER SIX:
The Good Friday Agreement
The climax of the peace negotiations arrived in April, 1998, when political
representatives signed the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement. Although the talks were not
entirely inclusive – the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and United Kingdom Unionist Party
(UKUP) refused to participate – a large portion of Northern Irish opinion was represented.
Indeed, the Agreement signified collaboration among historical enemies, allied to establish
compromise. From a nationalist perspective, according to the Agreement, the “national
territory” could no longer be defined as the “whole island” of Ireland. Moreover, the
Agreement included explicit recognition of Northern Ireland’s s=-=-tatus as part of the United
Kingdom (Tonge, 2002). Because of these changes The Irish Times argued that “as senior
republicans reluctantly admit, the agreement formalizes the legitimacy of British rule in the
North based on consent…it marks a decisive break within nationalism away from the stale
mode of past thought” (“Agreement Clears the Way,” 1998, p. 16). Indeed, acceptance of the
Good Friday Agreement created far more changes within republicanism than it did within
unionism. Therefore, in light of such significant modifications, the media frequently argued
that neither the Irish nor the British governments were seeking nationalist or unionist
aspirations from the negotiations, but instead, an understanding towards peace. According to
many journalists, reconciliation became nothing more than a desire to improve each group’s
position, war-weariness and fear of some unknown turn of events (Walsh, 1998).
The following chapter will analyze the communal perceptions of the Agreement, both
during the negotiation process and in the weeks leading up to its passage. A separate section
for articles in The Irish Times that specifically relate to Walter Fisher’s narrative paradigm
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have also been included below. As will be discussed, the hero and sports narratives that were
found in nationalist newspaper articles from The Irish Times were not noticeably present in
the Belfast Telegraph articles, thus proving them noteworthy of study.
Walter Fisher’s Narrative Paradigm Applied to the Nationalist Perspective
In his article, Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public
Moral Argument, Walter Fisher (1984) argued that “man in his actions and practice, as well as
in his fictions, is a story-telling animal” (p. 2). Thus, Fisher contends that dramatic narratives
form the basis of human action. In particular, Fisher designates the term “narrative paradigm”
to describe the relationship between rhetorical messages and symbolic actions. Considering
the pursuit of peace was the purpose of the Good Friday Agreement, it provided good reason
for journalists to discuss the events in ways that directly relate to the narrative paradigm. As
Fisher writes, “Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that
morality or moral impulse is present too” (p.11). Thus, the peace accords created a moral
impulse for The Irish Times to present the situation from a narrative perspective. As Fisher
proposed, the narrative paradigm structure provides “ways of resolving the problems of public
moral argument” (p.10), and indeed the Good Friday Agreement was certainly a public moral
argument for the communities of Northern Ireland. The issues surrounding the negotiation
process were both highly publicized, as well as directed towards ordinary citizens unfamiliar
with the details of the Agreement. Most importantly, Fisher contends, “public moral argument
is a form of controversy that inherently crosses fields” and is presented by “experts.” In terms
of Good Friday, there were a variety of opinions in terms of the validity of the agreement.
Moreover, the negotiation process included the presence of “experts” in the form of
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politicians and journalists, whose arguments made it difficult for “untrained thinkers,” or the
readers of The Irish Times, to challenge, revoke, or even judge the situation taking place.
Thus, in the weeks leading up to the Good Friday Agreement and the months that
would follow, The Irish Times tended to discuss the process as if it were an epic narrative or
play. In particular, the negotiators of the settlement became heroes and were described in
mythical or fantasy-like terms, and journalists tended to heighten the excitement of the events
by dramatizing and sensationalizing the situation. In particular, many articles compared the
peace process to card game or a sports competition, thus further reducing the reality of the
events that were unfolding. Indeed, the nationalist community formulated and adopted stories
in order to understand the situation that was occurring in Northern Ireland. Interestingly,
however, Fisher notes that “persons may even choose not to participate in the making of
public narratives (vote) if they feel that they are meaningless spectators rather than coauthors. But all persons have the capacity to be rational in the narrative paradigm” (p.10).
Therefore, it was up to the people of Northern Ireland to decide whether or not they would
accept the narrative being presented by the nationalist media during the peace process. Their
decision would ultimate shape the direction of the settlement and determine if lasting peace
was indeed an obtainable reality.
Heroes, Myths, and Fantasy
Throughout the articles examined, The Irish Times frequently referred to the
negotiators of the peace process from both communities as “heroes” and courageous “risktakers.” For instance, in response to the Agreement, Frank Millar (1998a) declared: “In terms
of heroics, much has been written, and rightly, about the astonishing cast of players whose
contributions were vital in bringing the talks process to a successful conclusion. Tony Blair
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and Bertie Ahern, President Clinton and Senator Mitchell, Albert Reynolds and John Major
have all secured their places in the history books” (p.11). Another article highlighted the roles
of Hume, Trimble and Adams, remarking: “But if Hume carried the vision, it was, in the end,
the courage of David Trimble and Gerry Adams which made reality of it. Both men have
taken the ultimate risks for peace” (“Now is the Time,” 1998, p.7). Geraldine Kennedy
(1998a) praised the contributions of the Taoiseach, Bernie Ahern, declaring: “It wasn’t always
clear in the latter stages of negotiations, however, that Mr. Ahern would earn such kudos for
his accomplishment. The consensus man took very high political risks to win his place in the
history books this Easter” (p.63). Amidst the negotiating process, one journalist, Deaglan de
Breadun (1998b) even remarked that “The theme music for a profile of Mr. David Trimble on
BBC Radio Ulster yesterday was M People's ‘Search for the Hero Inside Yourself.’ It's a song
that could apply to all the participants in the Stormont talks as they enter the final stretch” (p.
4). Thus, for many journalists, the representatives became heroic figures in a chapter from the
history books of Northern Ireland. As one journalist declared, the signing of the Good Friday
Agreement “was a defining moment in Irish history, with Bertie Ahern, in his finest hour,
climaxing the work of Jack Lynch, Liam Cosgrave, Charles Haughey, Garret FitzGerald,
Albert Reynolds and John Bruton, all of whom have striven with courage and persistence to
get the lasting settlement which now appears to be at hand” (“Now is the Time,” 1998, p.7).
Not all journalists, however, were as enthusiastic about the characterizations that the
creators of the Agreement were assuming. For instance, Geraldine Kennedy (1998a) argued:
“The price to be paid will only be reckoned when the music stops and the Captains and Kings
depart, and the media fly away to light upon some other carrion in some other place” (p. 63).
Referring to U.S. Senator George Mitchell and Prime Minister Tony Blair as “Captains and
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Kings,” Kennedy argued that although the people and the violence of the past had been
forgotten, the euphoria of the Agreement would only be temporary. In many ways, the reality
of the situation was diminished and the media was essentially fantasizing the violence away in
order to bring about peace. Many of the articles frequently used language that described the
events in mythical terms, suggesting that the Good Friday Agreement was the result of destiny
or fate. One article, for instance, declared: “Northern Ireland has had many recent days of
destiny” (Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 14). In a way, by reducing the reality of the situation, the
nationalist community was protecting itself from any potential disappointment brought about
by the possibility of failure.
Good Friday was Dramatized: Rescue Mission for Peace
In addition to designating the negotiators as heroes or risk-takers, The Irish Times also
tended to describe the events as a “rescue-mission.” For instance, the day before the deadline
of the negotiation process, Gerry Moriarty (1998a) stated: “The British Prime Minister has
held a crucial meeting with Mr. David Trimble to try to rescue the troubled peace process
ahead of tomorrow’s deadline for an agreement” (p.8) Many journalists described the process
as a “journey” or “quest” for peace. For instance, Coghlan (1998a) declared that “One of the
problems in finding an answer is that the broad unionist and nationalist parties have embarked
on this process from different ports” (p. 61), as if both parties were pioneers disembarking on
a mission. In another example, one journalist remarked that “[Paisley’s] shambolic
performance outside the talks venue made unionists laugh and not sympathize, for once. Now
only the British and Irish governments can rescue him” (“How North and South,” 1998, p.
14). According to the media, not only would the representatives have to rescue the
Agreement, but they would also have to rescue the opposition from falling overboard.
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By describing the events as a mission and the negotiators as heroic voyagers, the
media tended to dramatize the peace process. For instance, as Robert McCartney (1998)
jokingly declared:
Hope and hysteria, seasoned with spoof and spin, have become the chosen menu provided
for the world media circus assembled in the tents at Castle Building, Stormont. Reason and
common-sense have been abandoned as TV interviewers, with humiliating deference, hang
on to the ambiguous utterings of former terrorists, posturing as democrats, in three-piece
suits. (p. 68).
Once the Agreement had been reached, journalists continued to emphasize the
dramatic aspect of the process. One article, for instance, contended: “One of the reassuring
things about the whole process is the feeling that an action - in the tragic, dramatic sense - has
been completed” (“Unheard Melodies,” 1998, p. 57). Indeed, given the turbulent history of
Northern Ireland, perhaps such dramatic and intense descriptions of the peace process were
justified.
In the weeks that followed the Agreement, both David Trimble and Gerry Adams were
expected to convince their respective parties that the Good Friday Agreement was the best
solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland; however, newspapers tended to dramatize this
particular aspect of the process as well. For instance, Gerry Moriarty (1998d) declared: “If
Mr. Trimble emerges from the meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council with his political nerve
and credibility intact the odds are considerably improved for the deal. If he doesn't, the
agreement and Mr. Trimble's own political career would appear doomed. It's as serious as
that” (p. 8). Another article stated: “Mr. Trimble's presentation tomorrow will be vital. To win
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is important, but to win well would be the fillip he needs to undermine the internal opposition
which, whatever the result, will not go away, and to strengthen his position against the
external opposition” (Millar, 1998a, p.11). Ultimately, when the talks concluded and were
deemed a success, The Irish Times continued to dramatize the situation by referring to it as a
“performance,” rather than a political accomplishment. As Mary Holland (1998) proclaimed:
It was unquestionably David Trimble's weekend. But it was not a bad weekend for the
leadership of Sinn Fein either. There were standing ovations for Mr. Adams and the
negotiators at the Stormont talks. There were some masterful performances both from the
platform and in the media. And there was just about the right amount of negativity towards
the Agreement to create a tactically-useful sense of ongoing disquiet and uncertainty as to
the party's intentions (p. 16).
Not all journalists, however, were as positive about the performance of the negotiators,
and several even presented a series of viewer reviews. One writer, for instance, believed the
events surrounding the agreement were rather dull and unmemorable, arguing: “When the
press corps covering the talks are asked by their grandchildren, ‘What was it like when peace
was being made?’ the answer may well be, ‘Fairly humdrum, like a wet day in Kinnegad but
without the same excitement’” (“Making Peace Is,” 1998, p. 8). Like many other journalists,
this particular reporter interpreted the peace process as a spectacle intended to be analyzed
and critiqued. There was a lack of seriousness in the tone of some articles, and many
journalists sensationalized the story, as if the events taking place were too far-fetched or
unrealistic to actually be happening.
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Plays, Spotlights and the Stage
In order to further dramatize the peace process, many articles included theatrical
references to “plays,” “spotlights” and the “stage.” For instance, during the negotiations, one
article reported: one article declared: “The talks are reminiscent of auditions for a new play,
with the two governments sitting in a darkened theatre, judging the various performers as they
come on to strut their stuff. There is, in other words, a certain amount of artificiality about the
negotiations. Only now has it begun to appear that real horse-trading and bargaining are
getting under way” (“Sinn Fein’s Chief,” 1998, p. 9). In another article, Deaglan de Breadun
(1998b) reported: “The two heads of government are still awaited on Wednesday evening
when Mr. Blair will step out of his helicopter, like a deus ex machina in a Greek play, to make
everything right. Senator Mitchell, reportedly unhappy over the delay in presenting his paper,
is said to be anxious to get it on the table today” (p.4).
Following the Agreement, in reference to discussions both Gerry Adams and David
Trimble were scheduled to have with their respective parties, Frank Millar (1998a) declared:
“And it is upon these two men the spotlight will repeatedly fall through the referendum
campaigns to the June 25th elections for the new Northern Ireland Assembly” (p.11).
Similarly, when its was announced that Prime Minister Tony Blair planned to meet leaders of
the various parties to discuss the agreement, one article remarked: “This emphasized yet again
his central role – offstage for the moment but possibly about to become center-stage next
week when both he and Mr. Ahern may arrive for the denouement” (“Hint of History,” 1998,
p.6).
Many articles proposed that Northern Ireland had entered the world’s stage. Vincent
Browne (1998), for instance, claimed that for over thirty years, “denial of recognition
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extended to the unionist community. They were derided internationally and even in their
‘mainland country’ as bigoted fascists, unfit for inclusion in the civilized world of liberal
democrats. On the international stage it was the nationalists, and later republicans, who were
accorded recognition and respect” (p. 16). The Irish Times presented the negotiation process
as a platform for political leaders and their respective parties to gain respect and credibility;
interestingly, however, many of the terms used to describe the events tended to reduce the
believability of the situation, and thus ultimately reduce the credibility of each party’s
intentions.
Contest, Card Game, and Sports Competition
Journalists would frequently reference the founders of the Agreement as if they were
participating in some form of competition. For instance, Deaglan de Breadun (1998b)
declared: “If Nobel Prizes are to be handed out, the adjudicators may wish to take account of
the results in the category of ‘Person to whom you would give most credit for reaching the
agreement’” (p.9). As though they were truly competing, de Breadun (1998b) went on to
announce the “results” of the vote: “Here, Mr. Blair and Mr. Hume are neck-and-neck, with
the Prime Minister one point ahead at 22 per cent compared to 21 per cent for the SDLP
leader. Mr. Trimble comes third at 18 per cent, followed by Senator Mitchell on 14 percent”
(p. 9). Similarly, Geraldine Kennedy (1998b) described the negotiators as if they were
participating in a beauty pageant. The journalist wrote: “The ‘beauty contest’ for the person
most widely perceived as being helpful in reaching the Agreement is won by Mr. Tony Blair
with a score of 93 per cent. There is strong competition for second place between Mr. John
Hume (87 per cent), Senator George Mitchell (86 per cent), Dr Mo Mowlam (84 per cent),
Mr. Trimble (82 per cent), Mr. Bertie Ahern (81 per cent)” (p.9). These two particular
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examples, as well as several others served to enhance the idea that the peace process was
more of a spectacle than an actual, substantial solution.
In addition to being referred to as an awards contest or a beauty pageant, the peace
process was also frequently discussed in terms relating to a card game or sports competition.
For instance, when the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, offered to remove the territorial claim to the
North from the constitution and replace it with the principle of consent, The Irish Times
argued that “He, knowingly, took such a dramatic step to kick-start the Stormont negotiations
at a time when he was receiving no hard evidence that Mr. David Trimble would cut a deal”
(Kennedy, 1998a, p. 63). Through the use of words like “kick-start” and phrases like “cut a
deal,” the media was propagating the message that the agreement was comparable to a sports
game or a game of cards. One article declared: “There were many in Fianna Fail, hand in
mouth, who questioned the Taoiseach’s wisdom in placing his cards on Articles 2 and 3 on
the table many weeks ago” (“Now is the Time,” 1998, p.7). Again, the reality of the situation
was reduced, and journalists frequently discussed the events taking place as if political leaders
were negotiating the agreement with a stack of cards. One article, for example, asked: “Who's
the best poker player? As the deadline grows ever closer, the participants in the Northern talks
are busily trying to wrongfoot and outmaneuver one another. Like good gamblers they are
refusing to show their hand, and there may well be an element of bluff about the positions
different sides are adopting” (“Participants Play,” 1998, p. 9).
Many article tended to discuss the Agreement as if it were a sports competition and the
negotiators as if they were players. For instance, one article attempted to offer a play-by-play,
suggesting that “Through the long hours of the previous night watch there had been no such
certainty. The rollercoaster ride and lack of sleep had begun to take their toll. On Tuesday the
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Ulster Unionists had cried foul and threatened to walk off the pitch. Now the boot was on the
other foot” (“Unheard Melodies,” 1998, p.57). Another article discussed Trimble’s
participation and argued that “his political footwork will have to be adroit if he is to prevent
the enemies from exploiting the agreement,”(“People Seeking,” 1998, p.14) while Garret
FitzGerald (1998a) compared the skills of Bertie Ahern to that of a rugby player, declaring:
“Ahern has now skillfully carried the ball right across the line. These political leaders have
been supported by dedicated, skilled, and far-sighted Irish civil servants” (p. 68). Journalists
frequently described themselves as spectators to the sporting event. For instance, one
journalist wrote: “The media were in the position of people expected to cover a wrestling
match without being admitted to the hall. From stray conversations and quick phone-calls it
was clear everyone was feeling under pressure” (“Making Peace Is,” 1998, p.8). Again, the
intensity and excitement of the events unfolding were repeatedly capitalized by journalists
throughout the peace process.
When the Agreement was finally announced on April 10, 1998, many journalists were
actually skeptical about the outcome of the process. Many believed that there should be a
clearly defined winner. For instance, de Breadun (1998a) proclaimed that Northern Ireland
“might have to wait to find out who really won the late-night tug-of-peace” (p. 12), while
Frank Millar (1998b) suggested that “some time on Saturday afternoon the dust of battle will
settle, enabling the parties to assess their position at the end of the first round” (p.7). In light
of the difficulties facing the Agreement, one journalist argued that “If the Belfast Agreement
is to succeed in producing a win-win result for unionists and nationalists…a few hurdles in
Northern Ireland have to be cleared before the campaign in the Republic can really begin”
(“How North and South,” 1998, p.14). Continuing with the sports theme, one journalist,
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Maire Geoghegan-Quinn (1998), described the imposition of a deadline by Senator George
Mitchell as “a master-stroke because it told the people of Northern Ireland their political
representatives had been given enough time to argue and to score political points off one
another” (p.8). In terms of the outcome of the Agreement itself, one journalist predicted that if
a North-South Council and assembly was ruled acceptable in the referendum, “at least the
contenders will have assented to play on the same pitch and by agreed rules” (“Unheard
Melodies,” 1998, p.57). Thus the communities remained contenders, but through the
Agreement, the playing field had been leveled.
Interestingly, however, some journalists argued that the representatives from each
community had emerged from the talks not as opponents but as teammates. “These are
outward signs of change to which, if all goes well over the next few weeks, we will all
become accustomed. Like it or not - and it would be extraordinary if each man was not
experiencing some problems of adjustment - David Trimble and Gerry Adams are on the
same side now” (Holland, 1998, p.16). Nevertheless, in terms of promoting the nationalist
cause, one article reported that “It has been suggested that Mr. Adams and his colleagues may
be tempted to ‘cherry-pick,’ campaigning for a Yes vote in the North, while rejecting the
proposals for constitutional change in the Republic” (“Hint of History,” 1998, p.6). Therefore,
despite the fact that some journalists argued that both communities had joined forces and
become teammates, a majority of the articles in The Irish Times concluded that both
communities ultimately remained committed to their objectives and would continue to pursue
their traditional aspirations.
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Concluding Thoughts on Pre-Agreement Negotiations: Nationalist Perspective
It can be argued that the citizens of Northern Ireland had become so desensitized over
the years that they could not comprehend the peace process in realistic terms, and thus,
newspaper articles from The Irish Times during the pre-agreement phase of the peace process
essentially removed the reality of the situation. The talks were sensationalized by the media,
and the negotiation process became a dramatic production intended to be viewed and
critiqued. The negotiators themselves were presented like puppets in a prearranged play rather
than actual, legitimate political representatives, and the intensity and excitement of the
Agreement was highly dramatized by journalists. While some articles suggested that both
communities had ultimately joined forces and become teammates through the Agreement, a
majority of the articles analyzed in The Irish Times insisted that both communities remained
committed to their original objectives and traditional aspirations.
Interestingly, a large portion of the newspaper articles examined in the Belfast
Telegraph did not contain the references discussed above. While some articles, both in the
pre-Agreement and post-Agreement phases, hinted at card game and sports competition
comparisons, a majority of journalists from the unionist community avoided this type of
terminology. Indeed, throughout the Belfast Telegraph, key players and specific aspects of the
Agreement were presented more factually and thus realistically, as will be discussed in future
sections.
Taking Sides: ‘Selling’ the Agreement
Following the creation of the Good Friday Agreement, one of the key aspects of the
Agreement was that voters in both Northern Ireland and the Republic would participate in
simultaneous, but separate, referenda in order to determine whether or not the Agreement
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would be passed. Ultimately the results of the referenda were not in the hands of politicians
but in the power of the people, and thus, political leaders from both communities were faced
with the enormous task of attempting to convince voters that the Agreement was not only
acceptable, but also desirable. Indeed, despite the claims of leaders such as Gerry Adams and
David Trimble that the Good Friday Agreement was a success, many people— both North
and South— were skeptical about the sacrifices they would have to make if they agreed to the
settlement. For so long, the unionist and nationalist communities had stuck by the phrase ‘no
compromise’ because ‘compromise’ had become a word signifying weakness and surrender
(Tonge, 2002). Therefore, in the weeks following the announcement of the Agreement,
politicians from both communities had to redefine the meaning of success and persuade their
respective followers to vote ‘yes’ on the referendum. Indeed, political leaders, as well as
journalists, entered a full-scale “selling” process that attempted to convince their communities
to support the Agreement in order to ensure lasting peace.
Nationalist Perspective: Post-Good Friday Negotiations
Following the Good Friday negotiations, a campaign to “sell” the Agreement to the
nationalist community was initiated by political leaders and the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern. ProAgreement journalists from The Irish Times used a variety of tactics to assist the campaign in
gaining support and momentum in favor of the Agreement. In particular, the pro-Agreement
campaign framed the issue as peace versus violence, arguing that the pursuit of peace
transcended any sort of sectarian objectives. Many argued that a structure of co-dependence
between unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland, within Ireland as a whole, and between
Britain and Ireland was necessary to end the physical conflict between nationalism and
unionism. Interestingly, however, despite the fact that nationalist leaders and journalists
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promoted the idea that group aspirations should be replaced with new aspirations for peace,
many reporters simultaneously assured readers that the Good Friday Agreement was not an
end in itself, but rather a means to an end—the end signifying a united Ireland.
Transcendence, therefore, was simply one tactic used to gain support for the Agreement.
Ultimately, many nationalists insisted that both communities were still contenders with
opposing objectives, and peace, therefore, was merely a uniting force employed in the pursuit
to end violence.
We are Still Contenders, but Now Equal Contenders
Following the creation of the Good Friday Agreement, many journalists suggested that
although both communities remained contenders, the Agreement had solidified them as equal
contenders. As discussed in previous chapters, Northern Ireland, particularly from 1922 to
1972, was a model of a society that denied recognition and respect to a large minority. For
many in the nationalist community, denial was captured in the phrase “second-class citizens.”
The minority culture was ignored, the state to which they felt an ownership considered
foreign, their rights to equal participation disregarded, and their very position in society
threatened. Thus, for many in the minority community, the Good Friday Agreement brought
the hope of recognition. As Tonge (2002) wrote, “it was no longer possible to hold a ‘disloyal
identity’ in Northern Ireland. The Agreement allowed a range of identities: British, Irish,
British-Irish or Northern Irish” (p. 189). Indeed, the Good Friday Agreement did not
discriminate in terms of the validity of any such identity. Through the agreement, all
individuals from both communities were deemed equals. Interestingly, however, many
journalists from The Irish Times insisted that while the minority and majority communities
had become equal, they were not by any means the same. According to many articles,
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nationalists and unionists remained serious contenders; the Good Friday Agreement had
simply established them as equal contenders.
As one journalist keenly noted, through the Agreement, “the minority will finally
escape from a state where their ‘Ulsterness’ was a ‘Britishness’ forced upon them and become
instead a shared attribute. Ulster will remain a site of contention, politically and culturally, but
at least the contenders will have assented to play on the same pitch and by agreed rules”
(“Unheard Melodies,” 1998, p. 57). Thus, through the Good Friday Agreement, both groups
had become equally matched, but as many journalists noted, they were still very different.
Equal did not mean the same. Members of the nationalist and unionist communities still
aspired towards very conflicting goals. Nevertheless, while both groups continued to disagree
with the perspective of the other, they were now willing to respect that perspective, rather
than try to change it or impose a different way of thinking. As one journalist remarked: “What
both traditions are being asked to give up are ideas of hegemony, the notion that one tradition
can effectively dictate to the other the terms of engagement, in return for guarantees of
rigorous equality"(“Mansergh Calls,” 1998, p.9). According to the media, the concept of
supremacy or domination in Northern Ireland had been overruled in favor of tolerance and
equality.
Thus, while sectarian rivalry still existed in the region, and both communities
continued to hold contradicting aspirations, The Irish Times attempted to promote the idea
that both groups were different but equal contenders who could coexist and work together
towards peace. As one journalist remarked: “Nationalists in the South cannot force unionists
to accept an idea they oppose, nor adopt a badge of nationality they are uncomfortable with.
Equally, unionists cannot pretend that Northern nationalists are not Irish, nor that they should
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accept no input into the governance of Northern Ireland” (“How North and South,” 1998, p.
14). Thus, the media argued that the differences between unionists and nationalists must be
recognized, but ultimately respected. According to one article: “These two differing
aspirations - a United Ireland on one side and unqualified membership of the United Kingdom
on the other - were, as the agreement said, equally legitimate, but they were opposite and nonreconcilable in terms” (“New Aspirations Must,” 1998, p.6). Therefore, the Good Friday
Agreement justified the perspectives and objectives of both communities.
Peace Transcends Group Aspirations
In order to achieve an understanding that the aspirations of both groups were
reasonable and justified, unionists were force to surrender their sense of elitism. As one
journalist declared: “Throughout the history of Northern Ireland, British identity has been no
more stable than Irish identity. In 1968, it was still possible to imagine Britain as an imperial
power. The symbols that Northern Irish Protestants valued - the monarchy, the Empire, the
United Kingdom - have lost their glamour” (“A Radical Deal,” 1998, p. 16). The gentry and
the peasants, so to speak, had become equals. Similarly, nationalists had to surrender their
constitutional claim to Northern Ireland. Thus, the idea of a united Ireland became a mere
aspiration, rather than a legitimate assertion.
Many journalists from The Irish Times propagated the message that although both
groups were still contenders in terms of their ultimate objectives, the Agreement had allowed
them to also become partners in the quest for peace. As one nationalist journalist, John Bruton
(1998), wrote: “The parties to the agreement acknowledge the substantial difference between
our continuing and equally legitimate, political aspirations. Our object, however, is
reconciliation and rapprochement” (p.14). Many journalists warned that aspirational
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arguments which appealed to only one community could frighten the other, and therefore,
many insisted that it was important to create new aspirations to which both communities
could assent. As one journalist remarked:
If the agreement is to succeed we must create a new common aspiration, binding together
unionists and nationalists in their common work. Without the emotional cement of
common aspirations, there is a real risk that new institutions will revert to negative
factionalism, fed by the constant reminders that the defining aspirations of the two
communities are contradictory. (“Adams Says Agreement,” 1998, p.10).
Therefore, in an attempt to justify and rationalize the agreement, The Irish Times
suggested that the pursuit of peace transcended any sort of sectarian objectives. Many argued
that a structure of co-dependence between unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland,
within Ireland as a whole, and between Britain and Ireland was necessary to end the physical
conflict between nationalism and unionism. According to some journalists, nationalism and
unionism would ultimately have to change if the agreement was going to lead to a lasting
settlement. As one article reported:
The new aspiration - building a structure of co-dependence which makes conflict
impossible - must replace the traditional aspirations which made conflict inevitable up to
now. The agreement and the institutions it creates must become the focus of a new loyalty.
This agreement is not the means to some other end. The agreement must be seen as an end
itself. Unless that happens, every ordinary proposal from one side will be seen by the other
through a prism of suspicion. (Bruton, 1998, p. 14).
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Thus, many journalists believed that the Agreement established a new beginning for
Northern Ireland in which both communities could aspire towards a common goal for peace.
As one article remarked:
Peace was, and would continue to be, an aspiration to which both communities could
assent. The genius of the originators of the peace process was that they made ‘peace’ itself
the issue, and ‘peace’ was something with which no one could really disagree. Peace
provided an emotional cement that bound together loyalists and republicans, unionists and
nationalists, in a common endeavor. (“New Aspirations Must,” 1998, p. 14)
Thus, journalists suggested that peace and agreement should become the focus of new
loyalties. The agreement was not a means to some other end, it was an end it itself. Only
through this approach could suspicion and distrust be avoided. Only through this approach,
journalists argued, could the Good Friday Agreement actually succeed.
Battle NOT Over: Agreement is a Battle-Cry
Despite the appeals made by several journalists for the nationalist community to
replace traditional aspirations with the common goal for peace, many articles in The Irish
Times paradoxically proclaimed that the “battle was not over” and “this was just the
beginning.” As one journalist asked readers,
But if we are going to be working together, and we are going to be trying to create a stable
society, what about it? Nobody has to set their aspirations to the side, nobody has to set
their principles to the side, nobody has to set their politics to the side. We do have to find a
way of working together, and it's time we found a way of doing that. It can be done. (“Hint
of History,” 1998, p. 6)
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As Northern Editor, Deaglan de Breadun (1998a), stated: “’It's not a question of the
governments agreeing. It's a question of the governments finding a formula that is
miraculously complex enough to bring the parties on board’” (p.4). Thus, according to several
journalists, genuine agreement wasn’t necessarily the goal; in other words, representatives
merely sought to find a solution that involved all parties, but didn’t necessarily satisfy all
parties. As de Breadun (1998b) claimed in a separate article: “The conflict was in stalemate.
The nationalist movement could not win, neither could it be defeated. The only way out was
through negotiation and for that to be a success, both sides had to be able to claim victory: the
proverbial ‘win-win’ situation” (p.12).
Many journalists contended that both sides had essentially won because peace and a
solution had been achieved. Thus, in several articles, the Agreement continued to be discussed
in winner-loser terms, and journalists continued to argue that the battle was only beginning.
As one article reported: “While this agreement may to a large extent take the gun out of
Northern politics, the battle between nationalism and unionism will continue” (“Ministerial
Council,” 1998, p.12). In a way, nationalists and unionists had reached an agreement by
admitting that although they still wished to pursue their traditional aspirations, at the moment,
peace was more important than those aspirations.
Nationalist Must ‘Sell’ the Agreement
In light of the referendum that would take place on May 21, 1998, nationalist leaders
and journalists from The Irish Times were faced with the enormous task of attempting to
persuade the nationalist community that the Agreement was a not only a tremendous
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achievement, but also a beneficial solution. For instance, as nationalist leader Gerry Adams
remarked:
Our task must be to articulate and develop the core republican positions in a way which is
reasonable and attractive to the broad mass of the Irish people. This cannot be a Northern
struggle with the South tagged on. It has to be a truly national struggle. Unionist
nervousness should not blind us to the enormity of our task and to what has to be done in
the time ahead. (“Adams says Agreement,” 1998, p.10)
As previously mentioned, many journalists referred to this process of political
persuasion as “selling” the Agreement. The Irish Times repeatedly described the efforts of
politicians as “sales techniques,” and articles frequently discussed the various ways leaders
would “sell” their position to voters. For instance, immediately following the announcement
of the Agreement, Maire Geoghegan-Quinn (1998) declared: “In the middle of all this tearful
euphoria it is vital that we understand what has been achieved. It is a giant leap, a unique
moment, a most remarkable day in political life. A huge first step. But it is just that, a first
step. The next stage of the process, the selling of the agreement before the referendum will be
even more important” (p.57). Many articles stated that both communities were committed to
making the Good Friday Agreement work for the common good. However, as one journalist
Mary Holland (1998) remarked: “They may be putting wholly contradictory spins on it - one
saying it strengthens the Union, the other that it brings a united Ireland closer” (p. 16). In
terms of nationalist opinion, Denis Coghlan (1998b) reported that: “Assurances provided by
the Taoiseach to his parliamentary party last week defused much of the discontent, but a
general ‘selling job’ remains to be done where the public is concerned” (p.63). For many, one
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of the biggest questions was whether or not Gerry Adams would be able to convince
paramilitary organizations that the agreement was a success. As Gerry Moriarty (1998b)
asked: “Now comes the big question for nationalists: can the deal be sold to the grassroots?
There are two answers at this stage: probably and maybe, the first applying to the SDLP, the
latter to Sinn Fein. This is where Hume-Adams may have to re-enter centre-stage” (p.61).
Thus the referendum process became one giant sales pitch from both politicians and
journalists in favor of the Agreement.
Strategy and Tactics Used by Nationalists to ‘Sell’ the Agreement
According to republican leaders, nationalist aspirations ultimately formed the
backdrop of the peace negotiations, and a variety of strategies and tactics were employed to
convince members of the community that this was indeed true. As Gerry Adams told The
Irish Times:
There is no big secret about republican strategy, just as there is no big secret about British
government and unionist strategy. They want to maintain the union and we will always
want to end it. The talks process has not settled centuries of British interference in Ireland,
nor could it. Britain has never had any right to be in Ireland. Britain will never have any
right to be in Ireland. But the British government can play a positive role before leaving by
trying to redress some of its wrongs and by helping to create the conditions for a peaceful
transition to a just settlement. (“Adams Says,” 1998, p.10).
In order to “sell” the Agreement, nationalist leaders and The Irish Times used a range
of tactics; in particular, they emphasized the transitional nature of the Agreement, argued that
there was no alterative, insisted that a ‘yes’ vote meant peace and a ‘no’ vote meant violence,
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contended that the opposition were dissidents and deserters, and finally, encouraged voters to
overcome their fears and seize the opportunity presented by the Agreement. Through these
strategies, nationalist leaders and journalists were able to successfully convince members of
the community to vote in favor of the Agreement, and thus ensure a lasting peace.
Agreement is transitional— stepping stone.
One way republican leaders attempted to “sell” the agreement was by arguing that it
was a “stepping stone” for reunification of Ireland. Many articles stressed the “transitional
nature” of the Agreement and proposed that it had the potential to achieve the nationalist
community’s ultimate goal of a united Ireland. As Susan Breen (1998) argued, “If Sinn Fein
leadership effectively signs up to a deal, it will argue that the arrangements are transitional,
offering ‘freedom to achieve freedom,’ and that while traditional republican demands might
not be achieved in the short term, they have not been thrown away” (p. 8). Another journalist
suggested: “Republicans view the agreement as a transitional step” (“Unheard Melodies,”
1998, p.57). Deaglan de Breadun and Frank Millar (1998) reported that while “Republicans
were understood to be disappointed with the modest range of cross-Border responsibilities
allocated to the North-South implementation agencies…. It is said the Dublin argument was
that the bodies had the potential to grow” (p. 1). Gerry Adams told The Irish Times: “‘Sinn
Fein realize the need for strategies and tactics which can advance our struggle for freedom
and justice…Our political goals require the development of a process which is evolutionary
and transitional, which moves through phases, building our political strength, until Irish
independence is achieved” (“Adams Says,” 1998, p.10). Therefore, as Frank McNally (1998)
recognized: “The Belfast Agreement should be understood not as a solution to Northern
Ireland's problems, but as creating a space in which to move forward” (p.8). Thus, while some
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journalists argued that group aspirations should be replaced with new aspirations for peace,
other journalists simultaneously assured readers that the Good Friday Agreement was a means
to an end—the end signifying a united Ireland.
Using similar language, many journalists promoted the transitional aspect of the
agreement by referring to it as a “bridge for the future.” Articles tended to highlight the
temporary nature of the Agreement and suggested that the events taking place were “just the
beginning.” As Mary Holland (1998) remarked: “For the moment the task is to create a new
political environment which will allow the two communities in the North to become more at
ease with each other and thus enable them to work together in a way that has been impossible
in the past” (p. 16). Another declared: “This was not the end, or even the beginning of the
end, more the end of the beginning. But it was still one hell of a beginning” (“Unheard
Melodies,” 1998, p.57).
For the leaders of Sinn Fein and the republican movement, the journey towards
agreement would be more difficult. Their members had fought for over 30 years to achieve a
united Ireland, which the Agreement did not produce. As a result, Gerry Adams would have
to carefully and skillfully sell Good Friday to his constituents. As one journalist, Jim Cusack
(1998), declared: “Certainly in the overall context of nationalism, republicans more than
SDLP politicians will experience turbulence before finding calm waters” (p.60). Another
wrote: “Nobody should underestimate the enormous task ahead” (“A Radical Deal,” 1998,
p.16). Thus, many journalists recognized that the conflict in Northern Ireland would not be
solved immediately; it would take the time and dedication of politicians and citizens alike;
however, for many nationalists the Agreement was the first step towards achieving their
ultimate aspirations.
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‘Yes’ means peace, and ‘No’ means violence.
According to the Agreement, the basic commitment of both communities was the
establishment of peace, stability and reconciliation. Therefore, during the referendum
campaign, one argument used by journalists and politicians in favor of the Agreement was
that those who did not support the agreement did not support the desire for peace and stability.
Thus, the issues surrounding the settlement were simplified, and the details of the agreement
were entirely disregarded and overlooked by the media. Indeed, the situation became an issue
of peace vs. violence, rather than nationalist aspirations vs. unionist aspirations. According to
many articles, even if a person did not support the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, the
agreement itself should still be accepted because it was the only way peace could ever be
established in the region. As Theresa Judge (1998) remarked: “If the agreement is rejected,
the world at large will decide that the people of Northern Ireland have rejected an opportunity
for a settlement and therefore, quite simply, do not want peace. They will decide that we
prefer war to peace, that we prefer conflict to conciliation.”(p. 4). Thus, acceptance of the
Agreement equated to peace, whereas rejection of the agreement equated to violence. Many
political leaders, such as leading member of the Ulster Democratic Party, David Adams,
warned that “rejection of the Belfast Agreement could result in violence on a scale never
before seen in Northern Ireland” and pointed out the “’obvious reality’ that violence would
escalate if the agreement collapsed” (Judge, 1998, p.4). Another journalist suggested that “the
Agreement gave people a chance to put years of violence and bitterness behind them and
create new structures to deliver lasting peace and political stability” (“A Radical Deal,” 1998,
p. 16). Therefore, those who rejected the Agreement and supported the ‘no campaign’ were
depicted as promoters of hopelessness, violence and despair. As one journalist reasoned:
“After weeks of argument and analysis, a majority in both communities recognizes that
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whatever the flaws of the agreement, nobody can suggest a better alternative. Yes gives a
chance - a good chance - for peace and stability. No leads back to despair and violence”
(“Saying Yes,” 1998, p.19). Thus, people were encouraged to put their passions on hold so
that the terror, violence, and killing would stop and ultimately give way to peace.
There is no alternative.
Because the argument for peace transcended any doubts or objections proposed by the
opposition, the community was simply left with no choice but to accept the agreement.
Journalists and politicians argued that there was “no alternative,” and the Good Friday
Agreement was the “only solution” to the conflict. According to many articles, all other
proposals would ultimately fail, and thus, the Agreement was the only chance for establishing
lasting peace in Northern Ireland. For instance, several days after the agreement was signed,
Dick Spring (1998) reported, “The Northern Ireland Agreement signed between the two
governments and the parties on Friday offers the best prospect of Northern Ireland emerging
from the long shadow of the Troubles” (p. 12). Frank McNally (1998) declared:
To those who oppose this agreement, there is no obvious alternative which offers the
prospect of peace, security and reconciliation for the people of this island, and they should
allow this agreement the space that it needs. The compromises made by the unionist and
nationalist leadership and the two governments provide for a win-win situation, and we
should all be part of that end-game. (p.8)
Another journalist, Geraldine Kennedy (1998b) suggested that “The poll findings
indicate that in the North the agreement can be seen as a ‘life or death’ issue” (p.9). The
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Agreement made peace the issue, and thus, if the community wanted peace, they were left
with no choice but to vote ‘yes’ and accept the settlement.
In addition to the support of the media, prominent politicians also endorsed the
agreement and the argument that there was no alternative. As David Trimble told newspapers:
“‘This agreement is as good and as fair as it gets. If you think otherwise, then what is your
alternative? We should now be mature enough to realize that this agreement deserves
unanimous support and it paves the way for a prosperous and stable future for everyone in
Northern Ireland’” (Breen, 1998, p.8). Similarly, according to one article, Dr. Martin
Mansergh “appealed for it to be given ‘a fair wind’ as the main alternatives on either side had
been shown over and over again not to work” (“Mansergh Calls For,” 1998, p.9). Several days
later, Sean McCarthaigh (1998) reported that “Separately and in concert, President Clinton
and the British Prime Minister, Mr. Tony Blair, said the agreement represented the best
chance for a generation” (p.6). Blair’s spokesperson told papers: “‘There was no discussion of
Plan B – there is no plan B. This is the only alternative’” (p.6).
Opposition are dissidents, deserters, and home wreckers.
Another tactic used by both journalists and politicians to help “sell” the Agreement
was the argument that those who opposed the agreement were “dissidents,” “deserters,” and
“home wreckers.” Extremists from Republican Sinn Fein and the unionist party DUP
dismissed the Agreement as fundamentally undemocratic and unacceptable. Some members
of both the unionist and nationalist community argued that the Agreement was a “sell-out.” In
response, many journalists began to discuss these opposing forces in morally degrading and
demonizing terms. Similar to the articles published by The Irish Times during the Bloody
Sunday crisis, rhetoric described by Richard Weaver (1985) as “devil language” was
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frequently employed by the media to describe those who supported the ‘no campaign.’ For
instance, the ability to manipulate was repeatedly stressed when describing the opposition. As
one article declared: “Those calling for a No are already fighting an uphill battle on
constitutional issues. Their strength lies in their manipulation of emotions” (“How North and
South,” 1998, p. 14). Other journalists used harsher language when discussing the opposition.
Gerry Moriarty (1998c) announced: “The rats are already trying to block a referendum….
They want to wreck and tear and destroy and live off the back of the people who have
suffered for too long” (p. 6). Similarly, one article stated: “Now, a week on, the doubters and
wreckers are amongst us, the flaws and weaknesses, the inevitable contradictions and the
unsquared circles coming under scrutiny. The enemies of the agreement are already in full
voice” (“Now is the Time,” 1998, p. 7). Commentators who for years had predicted that the
IRA and other paramilitary groups would never enter into genuine peace talks began to
transfer their paranoia and criticism to various splinter groups that emerged in the wake of the
Good Friday Agreement. Suddenly, the enemy of the state had become those who simply
opposed the agreement, and thus, both communities became united against the ‘no campaign.’
Politicians in particular harshly criticized those who did not support the Agreement.
David Trimble, for instance, said “the people crying ‘treachery’ over the agreement had no
alternative except the status quo with the continuation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. They
were the ones who ‘deserted the battlefield’” (Bruton, 1998, p. 14). According to another
article, Trimble declared that “members [of the Ulster Unionist Council] who persisted in
opposing the agreement would be regarded as dissidents” (Fitzgerald, 1998b, p.14).
Furthermore, many journalists suggested that the moral high ground on which republican
groups had rested for so many years was no longer relevant. As one article stated: “The moral
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context which previously existed for acts of violence in the name of Irish independence no
longer exists” (“A Radical Deal,” 1998, p.16). Another journalist, John Waters (1998)
declared: “The store of moral energy which was available previously, and which was tapped
for nearly three decades by the Provisionals, has now run dry” (p. 16). Therefore, The Irish
Times propagated the idea that those who supported the ‘no campaign’ were dissidents,
deserters, and home wreckers who favored violence as opposed to peace. Again, citizens were
really given no choice but to accept the Agreement and vote ‘yes.’
Nationalists must ‘overcome fear’ and ‘seize opportunity.’
Ultimately the result of the referendum was not in the hands of politicians but in the
power of the people. Voters in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic would participate in
simultaneous, but separate referendums to determine whether or not the Agreement would be
passed. Therefore, another tactic used by both politicians and journalists in favor of the
Agreement was to appeal directly to voters and argue that they must “overcome their fear”
and “seize the opportunity” presented by the Agreement. As one journalist remarked: “Once
in a generation does an opportunity like this come along, an opportunity to resolve a deep and
tragic conflict” (“There Can Be,” 1998, p.65). The Irish Times emphasized the authority and
control people had in the situation. For instance, Geraldine Kennedy (1998c) declared: “The
principle of consent which is, arguably, another way of expressing the principle of democratic
self-determination, will permit the people, not the parliament, to decide Northern Ireland's
future” (p.8). Therefore, while the politicians had crafted the agreement, it was up to the
people of Ireland, north and south, to enact it.
One journalist described the agreement as “potentially the most significant
development in Northern Ireland since its foundation,” and argued that “the people now had a
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unique opportunity to forge a new future for themselves” (“A Radical Deal,” 1998, p.16).
Coghlan (1998b) highlighted “the historic opportunity for reconciliation and cooperation
among all people affected by the conflict, wherever they lived, and called for resolution,
restraint, and tolerance from everyone in making the agreement work” (p.63). Many
journalists made appeals to those in positions of power to use their influence to assist in the
campaign for a ‘yes’ vote. As one article noted: “The coming weeks will be marked by levels
of political activity which will be without precedent. Those in positions of influence within
the churches, in education, in civic organizations, in business and industrial circles will all
have the opportunity to influence the outcome of this process for good or ill” (“People
Seeking,” 1998, p. 17). Thus, supporting the Agreement was considered a vote for the “good;”
whereas opposing the agreement was considered a vote for the “ill.”
Politicians and journalists encouraged voters to be courageous, overcome their fears
and vote ‘yes.’ As Tony Blair told reporters at a press conference after the EU-US summit in
London: “‘The agreement and everything slipping back . . .. The easiest thing in politics is
simply to say No. The easiest thing is to say 'change is something I am afraid of.’ I say to
everyone who takes that attitude: reflect on what the future holds if there is a No vote”
(Donnelly, 1998, p. 9). Indeed, one journalist recognized: “acceptance of new relationships
and equality of esteem between the two communities in Northern Ireland will not come easily
or in the short term. It will require courage and commitment” (Coghlan, 1998, p. 61). Despite
the understandably high level of courage and commitment the Agreement required, the media
attempted to encourage voters to support it and vote ‘yes’ by arguing that it was an historic
opportunity that offered a great deal of hope for Northern Irish society.
Concluding Thoughts on Nationalist Perspective of the Good Friday Agreement
109
In light of the referendum that occurred on May 21, 1998, political leaders in the
Republic and journalists from The Irish Times were faced with the enormous task of
attempting to convince the nationalist community that the Good Friday Agreement was a not
only a tremendous achievement, but also a desirable solution. In order to “sell” the
Agreement, therefore, nationalist leaders and The Irish Times used a range of tactics. In
particular, newspaper articles tended to emphasize the transitional nature of the Agreement,
argued that there was no alterative, proposed that a ‘yes’ vote meant peace and a ‘no’ vote
meant violence, insisted that the opposition were dissidents and deserters, and finally,
encouraged voters to overcome their fears and seize the opportunity brought forth by the
Agreement. Interestingly, however, despite the fact that nationalist leaders and journalists
promoted the idea that group aspirations should be replaced with new aspirations for peace,
many reporters simultaneously assured readers that the Good Friday Agreement was not an
end in itself, but rather a means to an end—the end signifying a united Ireland.
Transcendence, therefore, was simply one tactic used to gain support for the Agreement.
Ultimately, many nationalists insisted that both communities were still contenders with
opposing objectives, and peace, therefore, was merely a uniting force employed in the pursuit
to end violence. Thus by promoting peace over communal objectives, but subtly ensuring
nationalist aspirations, nationalist leaders and journalists were able to successfully convince
members of the community to vote in favor of the Agreement, and thus ensure a lasting peace.
Unionist Perspective of the Good Friday Agreement
Unlike the nationalist community, not all unionists were certain that the Good Friday
Agreement was an appropriate solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland. Whereas
nationalists had unequivocally given their support to the Agreement, some members of the
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unionist community argued that it did not herald a new dawn of peace, but instead welcomed
an “impending calamity” which would have profound implications for Ulster's largest
political grouping for many years to come (McCann, 1998). Several journalists from the
Belfast Telegraph contended that David Trimble's assertion that the Agreement would secure
the Union did not hold credence upon close observation of the facts. The primary concern of
many members of the unionist community was the moral issue of early prisoner releases for
those who had committed crimes during the conflict. In addition, the establishment of NorthSouth bodies and the creation of a commission into the future of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary became a source of weariness and hesitation for many unionists.
A portion of the party believed that the peace process had been rigged to facilitate the
nationalist movement’s aspirations for a united Ireland. These individuals, such as Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP) leader, Ian Paisley, argued that the Republican Government had merely
“swapped the wording of a claim which they said entitled them to govern Ulster for the
empowered ability to do so” (McCann, 1998). Ultimately, only 57 percent of the Protestant
community voted in favor of the Agreement. As one unionist politician remarked several days
before the referendum, “we are split from top to bottom” (McAdam, 1998). Nevertheless,
throughout the entire process, Unionist party leader, David Trimble persistently attempted to
“sell” the Agreement using tactics similar to that of nationalist leaders Gerry Adams and John
Hume. In particular, Trimble outlined three basic principles for the ‘yes’ campaign: 1. The
Agreement would bring peace and end violence; 2. there was no alternative; and finally, 3. the
opposition was irrational and sectarian. Unionists who were members of the UUP, or
Trimble’s party, desired to end what they interpreted as the visionless negativity of the ‘no’
campaign.
111
On the other hand, Ian Paisley and the DUP contended that the Agreement would
bring about the demise of unionism in Northern Ireland. Similar to the tactics of Trimble, antiAgreement unionists outlined three basic principles in support of the ‘no’ campaign.
Specifically, those who rejected the Agreement argued: 1. Violence would continue now that
terrorists had control; 2. there was an alternative; and 3. supporters of the Agreement were
naïve and had been bribed or intimidated. Thus, opinion among the unionist community was
divided over whether the Agreement would establish lasting peace or promote the downfall of
unionism. Throughout the entire referendum process, those who supported the Agreement and
those who opposed it entered intense political campaigns to encourage community members
to support their respective causes. Thus, rather than strengthening unionism, the Good Friday
Agreement created divisions among members of the unionist community. While both
movements successfully demonized and demoralized their opposition, ultimately the proAgreement perspective and its promotion of peace “won” the campaign, and the Good Friday
Agreement was passed as a viable, democratic solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland.
Three Basic Principles of the ‘Yes’ Campaign
As previously mentioned, David Trimble entered a “selling” process similar to the
leaders of the nationalist community. In order to encourage unionist voters in Northern
Ireland to support the Agreement, Trimble outlined three basic principles in support of the
‘yes’ campaign: 1. The Agreement would bring peace and end violence; 2. there was no
alternative; and 3. the opposition was irrational and sectarian. Like Adams and Hume, David
Trimble used a variety of tactics to support his arguments, and he was ultimately able to
convince a majority of the unionist community that the Agreement was not only acceptable,
but desirable.
112
Agreement will bring about peace and end violence
In order to gain support for the ‘yes’ campaign, politicians and journalists contended
that the Good Friday Agreement would establish a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. As one
journalist, Malachi Curran, declared: “Any overwhelming ‘Yes’ by both traditions will at
least offer us the chance to work together for peace, democracy, and stability” (Retrieved
March 29, 2010). Barry White proclaimed: “If we vote ‘yes,’ we'd be celebrated, and peace
prizes would flow our way, because we'd solved one of the world's most intractable ethnic
problems” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). Indeed, according to pro-Agreement journalists,
acceptance of Good Friday would not only bring peace and end violence, but it would also
bring international recognition and acclaim.
Interestingly, in arguing that the Agreement was a means to establishing peace, many
articles in the Belfast Telegraph tended to emphasize the idea that if an overwhelming ‘yes’
vote were achieved, unionism and nationalism would remain the same. As one journalist
remarked: “Unionists will remain unionist and nationalists nationalist, but the constitutional
question that has dominated political life here would mean less and less, as we learned to live
with a friendly, co-operative Republic and an increasingly federal Britain” (“The yes
campaign,” Retrieved March 29, 2010). Ultimately, pro-Agreement journalists encouraged
voters to endorse Good Friday because in the end it would create a more stable, enjoyable,
and cooperative society.
Transcendence was one technique used by journalists in the Belfast Telegraph to
strengthen the idea that the Good Friday Agreement would end violence and ultimately lead
to peace. In order to gain support for the Agreement, many journalists argued that “people
wanted peace” and that peace should “transcend group aspirations.” As one article on April
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24, 1998 contended: “This process, and the Agreement, is not about the victory or defeat of
nationalism or unionism. It is about something much greater. Good Friday 1998 opens new
horizons” (“Time to blow away”). Journalists suggested that the Agreement provided an
opportunity for people to create a new mindset based on dialogue, tolerance, and
accommodation. The future of Northern Ireland, therefore, was in the hands of voters. ProAgreement journalists stressed the idea that only through compromise and acceptance of
Good Friday could peace be achieved. As one article declared: “In the absence of victory for
one side, the only way forward is broad-based compromise” (“Set aside the old quarrels,”
Retrieved March 29, 2010).
Several articles in the Belfast Telegraph argued that that the Agreement was a “winwin” situation for all communities involved. For instance, Marie Foy argued in favor of the
Agreement and the intentions of the Irish government, declaring: “The Irish government does
not view these negotiations as a win/lose contest. What [it] wants to achieve as a result of
these negotiations is a win/win situation for nationalism and unionism alike” (Retrieved
March 29, 2010). Another journalist stated in light of the Agreement: “We can now take a
collective breath and begin to blow away the cobwebs of the past. We can begin to break the
bondage of fear which has so damaged our people and our country, difficult and demanding
though this will be in the coming days and weeks. In that way, we can all win” (“Time to
blow away the cobwebs,” Retrieved March 29, 2010). Therefore, just as nationalist leaders
had done, unionist representatives established “peace” as the issue surrounding the Good
Friday Agreement. As a result, members of the unionist community were forced to choose
strictly between peace and violence. According to many pro-Agreement journalists, accepting
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Good Friday meant accepting peace, and similarly, rejecting Good Friday meant rejecting
peace. Thus, unionists were essentially given no choice but to support the Agreement.
There is no alternative.
Because pro-Agreement unionists proposed that a ‘yes’ vote would bring about peace,
whereas a ‘no’ vote would prompt violence, many articles in the Belfast Telegraph contended
that in order to achieve stability and provide security for future generations, unionists would
have no choice but to vote in favor of the Agreement. As Eric Waugh (1998) proclaimed:
“We must all— nationalists and unionists—make these compromises together…. The people
of Ireland, north and south, are facing a choice. We can maintain the integrity of the quarrel.
Or we—nationalists, unionists and those who are neither— can negotiate a new deal for a new
generation” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). Thus, pro-Agreement unionists argued that there
was no viable alternative. If the unionist community wished to establish peace, reconciliation
and stability, they would have to support the Agreement. As the article “Why we vote yes”
declared the day before the referendum: “We have a chance to break free from the past and to
go for the future. For those who say No, what is the alternative? Can anyone seriously believe
that ‘not an inch’ and ‘no surrender’ is an answer for any side? The truth is that we have
suffered and fought ourselves to an exhausted stalemate in our 30-year war of words and
violent acts. There must be a better way and tomorrow is our chance to find it” (Retrieved
March 29, 2010). Therefore, while journalists recognized that the settlement was neither
perfect, nor a solution to all of Northern Ireland’s problems, they argued that it provided the
unionists with a unique opportunity to determine their own future. Indeed, according to the
“no alternative” argument, compromise was the only way peace could be established in
Northern Ireland.
115
Because pro-Agreement journalists and politicians contended that Good Friday would
establish peace and secure the safety of future generations, many articles proposed that it was
the “duty” of the unionist community to vote in favor of the Agreement. As Monica Williams
(1998) contended: “The Agreement offers us the chance to build social and political life
around the principles of equality and justice for all, but… the campaign for a Yes vote it is
vital for our future and the future of our children” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). Many articles
emphasized that without a ‘yes’ vote, future generation in Northern Ireland would suffer the
same injustices and horror that people had experienced for over thirty years. As Barry White
(1998) argued, if the Agreement was rejected, “Young people, in particular, would see their
futures blighted by community conflict and economic decline” (Retrieved March 29, 2010),
while Paul Connolly suggested: “There [are] no guarantees in life, but people should respond
to try and give the young the future they deserve” (Retrieved March 29, 2010).
In order to further strengthen the argument that unionist citizens had no choice
because there was no alternative, journalists repeatedly stressed the “unprecedented power”
that had been given to the people to forge their own “destiny.” Pro-Agreement journalists
argued that the details of the settlement were not as important as the overarching theme of
peace. It was the people, many articles argued, who would ultimately determine the fate of
Northern Ireland. As one journalist declared: “While many people can get bogged down in the
minutiae of various aspects of the deal, the central point is that this agreement offers the
people of Northern Ireland the opportunity to control their own destiny….This is a chance to
end the democratic deficit and give power to the people of this province” (“No is no answer,”
Retrieved March 29, 2010). Another journalist, Norman Jenkinson, argued: “The beauty of
this Agreement is that it will be accepted or rejected not by parties, organizations, fellowships,
116
brotherhoods or cliques. By way of referendum its fate will be in the hands of the people”
(Retrieved March 29, 2010). Thus, pro-Agreement journalists continually directed their
arguments towards the people of Northern Ireland. Rather than trying to persuade politicians
to endorse the settlement, the Belfast Telegraph focused on convincing the members of the
community that there was no alternative to the Agreement, and that it offered the best, and
only, chance at establishing lasting peace in the region.
The opposition is irrational, bigoted, and sectarian
The final principle outlined by David Trimble and other unionist leaders who supported
the Agreement was that the opposition was irrational, sectarian and bigoted. According to proAgreement journalists, those who sought to undermine Good Friday were people who
endorsed violence and promoted despair. Unlike years past, unionism was divided, and the
nationalist party was no longer defined as the primary “enemy.” Instead, anti-Agreement
unionists gradually emerged as a source of opposition. Thus, pro-Agreement journalists began
to depict these splinter groups in terms that could be considered “ultimate terms” (Weaver,
1985). Similar to The Irish Times, articles in the Belfast Telegraph frequently employed
morally degrading and demonizing language to describe its opponents. For instance, those
who rejected the deal were labeled as “bigots” and “hypocrites.” As one journalist, Monica
Williams, told voters: “Show the bigots and the pessimists that we can do without their cant
and hypocrisy” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). Malachi Curran (1998) suggested that in light of
the ‘no’ campaign: “It is the decent, ordinary people from both communities who have been
the victims of 30 years of violence. They have been used and abused, divided and exploited,
while bigots and Technicolor politicians have thrived” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). Thus, for
nearly thirty years, the leaders of the unionist community had rejected a compromise, and
117
many pro-Agreement journalists argued that it was the “ordinary people” of Northern Ireland
who had suffered. As a result, the Belfast Telegraph declared that those who rejected the
Agreement were “individuals who wanted the cycle of violence to start again, to avoid
difficult political choices” (Jenkinson, Retrieved March 29, 2010). Other articles accused the
‘no’ campaign of attempting to frighten voters. As McWilliams wrote: “The No campaign is
trying to frighten voters with half-truths about the Agreement” (Retrieved March 29, 2010).
Therefore, according to one journalist, “They must be resisted, if there is to be a chance of
change” (“Dastardly murder,” Retrieved March 29, 2010). Pro-Agreement journalists,
therefore, argued that in order to bring about any substantial change in Northern Ireland, the
“bigots” and “pessimists” that comprised the opposition would have to be resisted and
ignored.
One method Trimble employed to support the argument that the opposition was evil and
should be resisted was to emphasize the historic opportunity the Agreement provided. Despite
the deeply held beliefs and principles of both communities, many articles in the Belfast
Telegraph encouraged readers to “overcome their fears” and “grasp the opportunity” for
peace. As Malachi Curran (1998) remarked: “The signatories to the Agreement have now
provided the people with an unprecedented opportunity to reach that historical compromise
which will allow all of us to live and prosper together” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). Many
journalists, nevertheless, understood the sacrifice that the unionist community would have to
make, and similarly acknowledged the fear and suspicion many members in the community
felt towards the Agreement. Therefore, articles tended to persuade readers to “overcome”
their fears. As Marie Foy (1998) declared: “We have now reached that stage where such an
agreement is within our grasp. But we can only grasp the opportunity if we show the
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leadership and steady hand required to bring the people with us and overcome long-held fears
and suspicions” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). Therefore, throughout the Belfast Telegraph
articles analyzed, journalists continually reinforced the historic opportunity the Agreement
provided and underlined the fact that it would ultimately bring hope, peace and stability to the
people of Northern Ireland.
Three Basic Principles of the ‘No’ Campaign
Similar to the pro-Agreement unionists, the leader of the DUP, Ian Paisley, outlined
three basic principles as to why the unionist community should reject the Agreement and vote
‘no’ in the referendum. In particular, Paisley and other anti-Agreement unionists argued: 1.
The violence would continue because terrorists would ultimately attain power; 2. there was an
alternative to the Agreement; and 3. those who supported the Agreement were naïve and had
been bribed or intimidated. During the campaign process, anti-Agreement journalists and
politicians promoted these three basic principles, and argued that the campaign would
ultimately bring about the downfall of unionism.
Violence will continue: terrorist now have power.
In an attempt to induce fear among voters, several articles argued that if the Agreement
was supported, violence would ultimately continue in Northern Ireland due to the political
involvement of “terrorists.” According to some anti-Agreement journalists, nationalists who
were once members of paramilitary organizations would remain committed to the republican
ideal of a united Ireland by whatever means necessary – even if meant violence. For instance,
when the Agreement was announced, one journalist, Robert McCartney (1998), declared:
“Britain has endorsed constitutional nationalism and is feeding the tiger of terrorism with the
119
democratic rights of a peaceful majority” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). In response to the
proposal for prisoner releases, Steven King (1998) argued: “Not only do the terrorists remain
armed, but they will be reinforced within two years by the release of their most technically
expert and dedicated activists. Any delay in the transition to Irish unity will cause the IRA to
return to ‘doing what they do best’” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). In this case, “doing what
they do best” implied a return to violence and terrorist tactics. As one anti-Agreement
journalist contended: “Far from bringing peace, the Agreement will encourage terrorism and
weaken those who maintain the rule of law. Violence will, inevitably, return if the political
process fails to deliver quickly enough what terrorism further dictates” (“Ulster: the deal,”
Retrieved March 29, 2010). According to McCartney (1998), there was no example in history
“of an armed minority that had used violence for political ends ceasing to use it until it has
either achieved its final objectives or been defeated by the forces of democracy” (Retrieved
March 29, 2010). In the case of Sinn Fein/IRA, they had neither been defeated nor achieved
their goal of a united Ireland. Thus, anti-Agreement unionists emphasized that Good Friday
was merely a transitional phase en route to Irish unity, as well as the terror.
Clearly, the anti-Agreement movement relied on fear to promote support. Political leaders
like Ian Paisley frequently warned unionists that by agreeing to Good Friday, they were
sealing their own fate and accepting defeat. Many anti-Agreement unionists suggested that the
republican movement could never really alter its perspective, and its members would always
be inclined towards violence. As Steven King (1998) advised: “The movement which would
never call a ceasefire until its demands were met did just that. It has played word games with
'cessation', 'disavow' and 'consent'. Its addiction to violence has been less than total,
confounding many. The idea that once it was expelled that it would never return was also
120
wrong” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). By comparing the violent behavior of IRA paramilitaries
to an addiction, anti-Agreement unionists reinforced the idea that the nationalist community
and its desire for a united Ireland would never change. Therefore, according to antiAgreement journalists, if the Agreement was accepted, terrorists would come into power, and
thus, violence would inevitably continue.
There is an alternative: propaganda must be resisted.
Anti-Agreement journalists argued that alternatives to Good Friday did exist, but due
to political manipulation and propaganda, many leaders had become conditioned to believe
that they had no choice but to accept the Agreement. As Noel McAdam (1998) declared:
“Assertions like ‘there is no alternative to the Agreement,’ are propaganda sound-bites for the
politically naive. The Agreement may be the best alternative for the British Government, it is
certainly not best for Northern Ireland” (Retrieved March 29, 2010). Another article argued:
“The claim that ‘there is no alternative’ does not mean that a better, more broadly acceptable
alternative does not exist, but that a violent terrorist minority will not allow it to be
considered” (McCartney,1998, Retrieved March 29, 2010). Many anti-Agreement unionists
believed that the details of the settlement should have been inspected more thoroughly.
Indeed, a large portion of people in Northern Ireland tended to overlook the language of the
settlement, and merely view it as a document that supported peace. Anti-Agreement unionists,
however, contended that if the features of Good Friday were scrutinized more intensely,
unionists would realize that the Agreement was indeed a “sell-out.”
Those who did not support the Agreement also argued that the international media had
unjustly demonized members of the ‘no’ campaign. As King (1998) declared: “The gullible,
not only in America and the Irish Republic, but unfortunately in Great Britain too, see a poor
121
discriminated-against Catholic who is trying his level best to bring peace to Ireland frustrated
by a party which Bob McCartney once said ‘displays all the traits of fascism’” (Retrieved
March 29, 2010). Anti-Agreement unionists believed that the reputation of unionism had been
severely damaged during the peace process, which ultimately caused leaders to make
concessions in areas that they traditionally would not have compromised. Furthermore, antiAgreement journalists argued that regardless of the claims of the international media, the
situation was not hopeless. As one article declared: “[Many] would seem to suggest the
situation is hopeless. It is not. Some seem resigned to Sinn Fein being able to snatch victory
from the jaws of defeat every time. Unionism has, in some measure, allowed this to happen”
(“The meaning of words,” 1998, Retrieved March 29, 2010). Despite the concessions made by
unionist leaders, members of the anti-Agreement campaign proposed that it was not too late to
turn back; the unionist community, they argued, still had the ability to overturn the Agreement
and thus reaffirm their status, power, and aspirations in Northern Ireland.
Supporters of the Agreement are naïve: have been bribed, manipulated, or
intimidated.
Finally, some anti-Agreement journalists from the Belfast Telegraph contended that
those who supported Good Friday had been bribed, manipulated, or intimidated by
government propaganda. As McCartney (1998) argued: “Government propaganda will try to
divert the public from rational criticism of the Agreement's weaknesses and its direction”
(Retrieved March 29, 2010). Again, many anti-Agreement journalists suggested that members
of the unionist community were losing sight of their traditional aspirations and succumbing to
the pressures of the international community. According to some articles in the Belfast
Telegraph, both political leaders and unionists citizens felt obliged to support the Agreement
122
because the other nations were convincing them it was necessary in order to gain respect. As
one anti-Agreement journalists argued, however, “Unionists are not masters in their own
house and to pretend that they are, or ever will be again, is a deceit…Sinn Fein, with its
blood- soaked hands and its antediluvian politics, have escaped the condemnation they
deserve time and again.”(King, 1998, Retrieved March 29, 2010). Again, anti-Agreement
unionists felt as though the ‘no’ campaign, as well as the unionist community in general, had
been wrongly depicted by the media throughout the peace process. Thus, they attempted to
reverse the discrimination they were experiencing by referring to those who supported the
Agreement as “deceitful” and “treacherous.” For instance, according to Noel McAdam
(1998), an umbrella group called the United Ulster Council vowed to “‘inform and educate
the Ulster people about the depth of the betrayal and the treachery of those who have done
this dirty deal’”( Retrieved March 29, 2010). Another article argued that “Mr. Trimble's
assertion that the deal strengthened the union was ‘comical’ against a nationalist veto in the
Assembly, all-Ireland executive structures and ‘murderers walking out of jail’”(“Claim
doesn’t hold credence,” Retrieved March 29, 2010). Again, terms that could be considered
“ultimate terms” according to Weaver were frequently employed to describe the opposition.
Throughout the articles analyzed in the Belfast Telegraph, anti-Agreement unionists
frequently defined their opposition as deceitful, treacherous, and naïve. Articles tended to
criminalize those unionists who supported the Agreement and accused them of “selling out”
and losing sight of traditional aspirations. Thus, anti-Agreement unionists propagated the
message that to accept the Good Friday Agreement was to accept the violence and power of
terrorists.
Concluding Thoughts on Unionist Perspective of the Good Friday Agreement
123
On May 22, 1998, the wide-ranging settlement known as the Good Friday (or Belfast)
Agreement ultimately won public approval when it was overwhelmingly supported by both
communities in the referendum vote. While the Agreement explicitly acknowledged the
identity and aspirations of nationalists, it also enshrined the principle of consent and support
for Northern Ireland's position in the Union. Interestingly, however, unlike the nationalist
community, not all members of the unionist community supported the settlement. Opinions
were divided over whether the Agreement would establish lasting peace or promote the
downfall of unionism. Throughout the referendum process, those who supported the
Agreement and those who opposed it entered a lively campaign to either promote or
undermine its passage. Thus, rather than strengthening unionism, the Good Friday Agreement
created divisions among members of the unionist community. While both movements
successfully demonized and demoralized their opposition, ultimately the pro-Agreement
perspective and its promotion of peace “won” the campaign, and the Good Friday Agreement
was passed as a viable, democratic solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland.
It can be argued that the referendum campaign proved that fear is not a reliable tactic
to employ when attempting to persuade voters, particularly when it has been overused and
abused by politicians. The anti-Agreement campaign manipulated popular fears as a means of
persuading voters to reject the Agreement; however, the ideals peace, hope, and unity that
were promoted by pro-Agreement unionists ultimately prevailed when Good Friday was
endorsed by an overwhelming 70 percent of the island. After thirty years of violence and
despair, the Agreement signified a long overdue acceptance of stability and compromise,
tolerance and peace.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
Conclusion
125
After decades of bloodshed and hatred, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement heralded a
movement towards peace and stability in Northern Ireland. The Agreement was a major
development in modern Northern Irish history, as it enabled a multiparty government among
opponents who dismissed violence and accepted the legitimacy of democratic principles.
Indeed, Good Friday signified the ability of the Northern Irish people to overcome the
tragedies and horrors of the past and create a better and more stable future.
Nevertheless, despite its many successes, the Good Friday Agreement did not entirely
resolve the political animosity that existed between the Protestant majority and Catholic
minority in Northern Ireland. From the newspaper articles analyzed, it appears that leaders
and journalists from both communities gave very little effort to resolving the historical
differences between the two political factions. Instead, according to reporters, the objective of
the Agreement was to institute a new political framework that would prevent violence and
lead to the creation of constitutional protection for all people. The aim was not to obtain
justice, but to establish peace through the foundation of a governmental arrangement that
permitted unionists and nationalists, loyalists and republicans, to follow their respective
political ambitions without violence. As Terrence McCaughey (2001) remarked, the goal was
to encourage adversaries to learn to exist “in disagreement but in dialogue with each other”
(pg. 256).
While the Good Friday Agreement recognized that violence had left its historical mark
on Northern Ireland, it proposed that the best way to remember victims of political violence
was to “seize the opportunity” and “create a new beginning.” According to the articles
analyzed, its creators believed that such foundations should be based upon a dedication to
democratic decision making and a quest for reconciliation, trust, tolerance, and the protection
126
of human rights without placing blame on others for past crimes. As Amstutz (2005) argued:
“In short, while recognizing that substantial differences continued to exist between ‘equally
legitimate political aspirations,’ the accord established a framework by which the antagonists
could pursue conflict resolution through peaceful, democratic procedures” (p. 177).
Ultimately neither community redefined their identity during the resolution phase of the
conflict. Journalists and political leaders merely transformed the perspectives and approaches
of their respective followers.
Throughout the articles analyzed in The Irish Times and the Belfast Telegraph,
journalists promoted the idea that group aspirations should be replaced with new aspirations
for peace; however, many reporters simultaneously assured readers that the Good Friday
Agreement was not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end—a united Ireland for
nationalists and a stable union for unionists. Transcendence, therefore, was simply one tactic
used to gain support for the Agreement. Ultimately, leaders and journalists insisted that both
communities were still contenders with opposing objectives, and peace, therefore, was merely
a uniting force employed in the pursuit to end violence.
Therefore, it’s important to note that the Good Friday Agreement alone is not enough
to guarantee trust and social unity. The social and cultural patterns of Northern Ireland are too
deeply entrenched with a legacy of victimhood to be transformed overnight by the prospect of
a new peace accord. Consequently, in order for the Agreement to last, the communities in
Northern Ireland must realize that forming new aspirations built on the structure of codependence and a power-sharing framework must indeed replace traditional aspirations. The
Agreement and the institutions it has established must become the focus of a new loyalty. As
some have suggested, Good Friday is not a means to another end, but an end itself.
127
If leaders and journalists from both communities continue to subtly promote sectarian
aspirations, peace in Northern Ireland will only be temporary. Lasting stability can only be
achieved through a complete social and cultural transformation, as well as a full commitment
to the principles outlined by Good Friday. Indeed, the views of nationalists and unionists must
be entirely altered – outwardly professed perspectives must become genuine, internal
perspectives. In order to sustain the peace brought about by the Good Friday Agreement, both
communities in Northern Ireland must remain committed to the pursuit of non-violence, and
people must not fall back on communal objectives. Indeed, rather than viewing one another as
equal contenders, nationalists and unionists should view one another as non-contending
equals.
The people of Northern Ireland, however, cannot do this alone. A great deal of
responsibility has been placed in the hands of political representatives and journalists.
Although society in Northern Ireland has become dramatically stabilized in recent years, the
progress that has taken place can only continue if leaders promote dialogue between the two
communities that exist there. A true understanding will only be reached if the people of
Northern Ireland are fully willing to communicate with one another and disavow their
objectives from the past. Political leaders and media representatives have the ability to
produce reconciliation and healing through the genuine promotion of a establishing a single
community, united in the pursuit of peace.
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