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Democratization or Repression?
Daron Acemoglu
James A. Robinson
massachusetts
institute of
technology
50 memorial drive
Cambridge, mass. 02139
WORKING PAPER
DEPARTMENT
OF ECONOMICS
\
Democratization or Repression?
Daron Acemoglu
James A. Robinson
No. 99-27
October 1999
MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 02142
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
NOV 2
G 1999
LIBRARIES
July, 1999.
Democratization or Repression?*
Daron Acemoglu^
James A. Robinson*
Abstract
Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst
Such regime changes are often followed by redistribution to the
widespread social unrest.
poor at the expense of the former
elite.
We
argue that the reason
to resort to full-scale democratization, despite
its
why
the elite
may have
may be
apparent costs to themselves,
that lesser concessions would be viewed as a sign a weakness and spur further unrest and
more radical demands. The elite may therefore be forced to choose between repression
and the most generous concession, a transition to full democracy.
Philippe Aghion for useful comments and help with the presentation,
Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, email: daron@mit.edu
tDcpartmcnt of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley and Hoover Institute, Stanford
University, email: robinson@hoover.stanford.edu
*Wc thank
t
"Men must be
either crushed or
pampered"
-
Machiavelli, Niccolo (1961, p. 8).
Introduction
I.
Many
instances of democratization
happen amidst widespread unrest and revolution-
ary threat by the masses excluded from the political process.
argued that democratization
it
is
a natural response for the rich
In previous work,
elite in
these cases because
ensures future redistribution and makes a revolution relatively less attractive.
distribution in this case
is
median
it
Mere
re-
can be easily reversed when the threat
Democratization solves this problem by changing the identity
of a revolution subsides.
of the future
not sufficient because
we
voter, hence
making a
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 1997 and 1999).
credible
commitment
to future redistribution
Historically, significant
racy are in fact often followed by large increases in redistribution
moves towards democ-
(for
example, in Britain,
France and Sweden, see Acemoglu and Robinson, 1997). This view of democratization
as a
commitment
the rich
elite
not
to future redistribution poses the following question, however:
make a
less costly concession, for
why can
example by extending voting
rights
to only a subset of the disenfranchised, hence limiting the ensuing redistribution, or
making some other
The
situation
is
by
credible promise to limited redistribution?
nicely illustrated
Argentina (see Rock, 1975).
by the
historical experience of democratization in
The move towards democratization
in 1912
happened
in
response to a series of widespread uprisings led by Yirogen and the Radical party, whose
leaders were primarily from the urban middle classes. However, the coalition against the
rich (primarily landed) elite included not only the Radicals, but also workers
peasants (led by Anarchists and Syndicalists).
was necessary to prevent further increases
Once
it
became
and the
clear that
a concession
a
full-scale de-
in the unrest, the elite chose
mocratization, rather than only including the middle-classes in the ruling coalition.
move
is all
This
the more surprising in view of the fact that over the previous 20 years, similar
social unrest in the typically
gradual reforms.
Why
more democratic Western European countries
led only to
did the elite in this case prefer full-scale democratization rather
than a more limited concession?
We
argue that the answer
queville.
may
lie
in observations
made by
Machiavelli and de Toc-
Machiavelli argued that concessions were dangerous for the ruler, as they would
demonstrate
his
weakness and entice the opposition to seek further gains.
The
ruler
should therefore either resist
the most generous concession possi-
de Tocqueville also reached a similar conclusion in his analysis of the events leading
ble,
up
make
concessions or
all
He argued
to the French Revolution.
that
was a mistake
it
Louis
for
XVI
to call the
Estates-General in January 1789 since this showed the weakness of his regime and paved
way
the
to a successful revolution (see de Tocqueville, 1856, Part
Skocpol (1989,
p.
"every peasant
community was
its
The
troubles.
To
123) puts
it,
Chapter
III,
5).
As
as a consequence of the calling of the Estates-General,
invited
by order of the king to ruminate
collectively
upon
result surely was... to heighten the possibilities for the peasants to rebel"
illustrate the related issues that arise in the context of democratization,
}
we con-
midst of social unrest caused by the disenfranchised poor. 2
sider a simple
economy
The
can counter this revolutionary threat in one of three ways; by repression,
by
rich elite
full-scale
in the
We
democratization, or by making a lesser concession.
interpret this lesser
concession as extending voting rights only to the middle classes, but generally any limited redistributive
move would
also
a situation in which extending voting rights to the middle-classes
revolution; in future political equilibria, the middle-class
degree of redistribution from which the poor will benefit.
tainty surrounding
how
We
be an equivalent concession.
strong Vancien regime
is,
is
are interested in
sufficient to prevent
median voter
will
choose some
However, when there
such concessions
may
is
uncer-
signal weakness
and hence encourage further demands, or even precipitate the revolution they are intented
to
foil.
This,
we
argue,
We
democratization.
may
induce the
elites to
choose between repression and full-scale
show that when weak governments try to take advantage
uncertainty regarding their types, a revolution can occur.
pression
more
is
to the rich
is
likely to
be used when inequality
greater in a
more unequal
is
Our model
also
of the
shows that
re-
higher because the cost of democracy
society.
'There arc several other interesting examples where the attempt to make partial concessions in a
turbulent environment appears to have been counterproductive for the ruling
of the
Shah
government
2
to the disturbances of
in
mid 1978
(sec Saikal, 1980),
and another
is
elites.
One
is
the reaction
the creation of the Kcrcnsky
Russia in 1917.
Dynamic models
of the conflict between the elite and the disenfranchised poor arc analyzed in Accmoglu and Robinson (1997, 1999), where we also give a detailed discussion of the economics and political
science literatures related to our approach to democratization.
Here, to save space we do not give a
literature review and refer the reader to our other papers.
The Model
II.
We
consider an incomplete information
game between
m) and
(superscripted r), the middle class (superscripted
Political
power
power on behalf of the
T
three types,
type" of the
in the
is initially
rich elite).
(tough),
F
The
elite.
assume that
(for
the poor (superscripted p).
example, a military controlling
this initial
W (weak).
and
(flexible)
We
government may be one of
will refer to these
between the three types
distinction
we
stop a revolution, and
hands of the rich
We
three groups of agents, the rich
will contrast political equilibria
their relative ability to
is
when
types as "the
these types are observed
publicly vs. the case in which they are the private information of the rich. There are two
by the
possible political systems in addition to the initial regime controlled
can institute a
elite
can opt
some other concession by the
We
utility of the poor).
whether to
will
amount
rich that
a revolution, and the rich
initiate
(democratize, d).
the
which
in
groups participate equally, or they
all
is less
them and
costly for
increases the
analyze a period of social unrest in which the poor decide
a limited franchise extension (that
r),
The median
is,
decide between repression (denoted
elite
a "concession",
c),
and
full
voter in the three political regimes will
democratization
differ,
and so
will
of redistribution.
Fundamentals
A.
The
three groups of agents, the rich, the middle-class, and the poor, have masses A
m
A and A p
l
2, X h
is
democracy
The
a limited franchise, in which only the rich and the middle-class participate (or
for
generally,
full-scale
rich elite.
l
=
with
1.
J2i
We
a poor agent,
rich
A
1
=
1
and are endowed with exogenous incomes,
assume that A p >
r
m
and A > A
and the middle
class,
so that
paper,
we analyze the
if
that
elite,
if
there
the median voter
that the three types of the rich
(common knowledge)
\ so
T
probabilities p* for
is
there
is
,
h > h m > hp where
r
democracy, the median voter
a restricted franchise, including only the
a
member
(tough),
t
is full
r
F
of the middle class.
(flexible)
= T,F,W,
W
and
where Y^tP
1
=
We
assume
(weak), occur with
1.
Throughout the
actions of these agents in a turbulent period in which the poor pose
a revolutionary threat.
The timing
•
of events
is
as follows.
The game begins by Nature choosing
type
is
typically not observed
the type of the elite
by the poor.
(i
=
T, F, or
W).
This
•
The
move next and choose one
elite
concession, or
G
repression,
{r, c, d},
democratization.
full
• After observing these actions, the
• If the
A
of three actions,
poor decide to
poor decide whether to
a revolution, the
initiate
means
succeeds, the poor take control of the
elite
can
initiate
fight back.
of production,
and
a revolution.
If
the revolution
if it fails,
the
elite
remain in power.
• If there is
of the
The
is
no revolution, then the median voter
median voter depends on the
sets the tax rate,
and the identity
political system.
middle-classes do not participate in the revolutionary threat, and their only role
to set the tax rate in a limited democracy.
Since the rich play
the poor update their beliefs about the type of the rich after
first,
observing the action they take.
of the rich
for all
A
We
denote the posterior beliefs of the poor that the type
A taken by the rich,
as a function of the action
is i,
by ^(A) with
denoted
r.
is
it
r creates a deadweight
we
will
=
denoted by rp
if
there
^(A) =
1
We
>
0,
all
=
—
(1
tax revenues are redistributed
assume that levying a tax rate of
C" >
When
0.
a rich agent
would
like to
democracy, the median voter
is
is
in
minimize
a poor agent
—
r)hp
When
+
—
r
C(r), and therefore satisfies the
first-
order condition
C'(t p
median voter
instead in the middle class and his most preferred tax rate, t 7™, satisfies
C'(T m )
=
1
is
- hm
if
)
1
hm <
1,
hp
is full
a linear income tax
be the rate most preferred by a poor agent. This tax
will
maximizes
,
C
and
is
as the tax rate choice, since the elite
and the equilibrium tax rate
rate,
C(t) where
loss of
have r T
rate
costly to raise taxes.
In contrast,
redistribution.
same tax
All agents face the
lump-sum. However,
control,
t
E {r,c,d}.
In any political system, the only available fiscal instrument
rate,
£
.
and r m
<
We
define A'(r) as the net transfers received
r.
so that r
For example,
away from the
m >
A
r
0.
> hp
,
the strict convexity of
by agent
m = r m (l - hT — C(r m ).
(r
)
)
rich are greater in a full
would change
if
we removed the
i
C
we assume
implies that t p
= r,m,p when
that
> rm
the tax rate
.
is
This immediately implies that transfers
democracy,
notice that both of these are negative numbers).
follow
In what follows
otherwise.
hm
1,
Since h m
=
only the rich and the middle class vote, the
i.e.,
>
A
r
(r
m >
)
A
r
(r p ) (where
Notice that none of the results that
middle-class,
and instead allowed the
rich elite
to
make a concession other than
We
reverse welfare state.
A r (T m
If
If
)
can then interpret
as the cost to the rich
and
A p (r m
)
A =
c as this alternative concession,
T
is
or F, the revolution
is
T
is
h r that
,
Similarly, repression
is
The
payoff to the elite
when the type
In contrast,
if
the type of the government
F, both repression and suppression of attempted revolution are costly.
cost of repression for this
type as m F so when the strategy chosen by the
,
from the beginning, their payoff
is
h
r
—
F
rn
the poor attempt a revolution, they can
later to counter the revolution, their cost
e
The payoff
a small number.
is
of the government
very large,
e.g.
mw —
poor receive hp
Table
1
weak,
is
+ £7,
oo),
>
fl
>
0,
of the
the revolution attempt can be suppressed without any cost.
costless in this case.
is
elite.
and the poor receive the payoff h p — T where
fails
the cost of the failed revolution.
government
with
as the benefit to the poor.
the poor attempt a revolution, the payoff they get depends on the type of the
they are type
T >
democratization, for example, instituting a hard-to-
full
W,
.
still
is
However,
suppress
if
We
rich
is
denote the
is
to repress
they choose not to repress, and
this,
but this time, since they act
F
greater, <f)m where
<p
to the flexible rich in this case
>
is
but
1
hr
—
<f>
(f>m
<
F
.
1
+e where
If
the type
they cannot use repression as a strategy (the cost
and a revolution always succeeds.
If
mw
is
revolution succeeds, the
while the rich lose everything and obtain
0.
presents the payoffs to the poor and to the different types of agents in the
We
different cases.
omit the payoffs to the middle-class, since they do not play an
important role in the analysis. 3 The two columns represent the strategies of Revolution
or no Revolution for the poor, while the three rows refer to the three strategies of the
initial rich elite,
part of each
to the elite,
Repress,
cell is
make a Concession,
the payoff to the poor, while the
and when
this
The number on the upper
number on the lower part
depends on the type of the
payoffs are split into three smaller
3
or Democratize.
initial
is
the payoff
government, the relevant
cells.
Also notice that this is not the normal form of the game; formally, in the incomplete information
game, the poor have 2 3 pure strategics since they move after observing the elite's action.
Table
1
No
Revolution
W
hP
Repress
F
hP
Democratization
/iP
F
+ w {r)n-(l-Tv w (r))r
+
hr
-m F
"
7T^ ( C )fl
"
(1
hr
—
4>m F
hr
7T
W
(
hr
-m w
hr
C ))r
hP
+ A p (r m
hr
hr
+ A r( r m)
+ 7r M/ (d)0-(l-7T M/ (d))r
/i
-m F
/i
hr
T
hp
7r
—m w
Concession
Revolution
W
T
hr
p
r
+ Ap (r p
)
+ A r (rp
)
-m F
)
This table shows that the payoff to the rich does not depend on their type
limited or
full
democratization.
If,
hr
if
there
is
instead, the poor attempt a revolution, the payoffs to
the rich depend on their type.
Analysis of the
B.
We now
Game
analyze the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game. 4 In order to focus on
the cases of interest,
we
start
by making a number of parameter
restrictions.
First,
we
impose
Assumption
1:
A p (r p > Q > A p (r m
)
which ensures that redistribution in a
poor from a successful revolution.
the median voter
We
also
full
democracy
But the limited
is
greater than the payoff to the
redistribution that will ensue
from the middle-class gives the poor
less
when
than a successful revolution.
assume
Assumption
4
is
),
2:
mF
>
-A r (r m
),
game, where an informed player moves before an uninformed player, the concept of
may not be sufficient to rule out some unreasonable outcomes, and some equilibrium refinements need be used to rule this out (sec, for example, Cho and Kreps, 1987). Nevertheless,
in our simple environment, all Perfect Bayesian Equilibria satisfy the relevant refinements.
In this type of
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
which implies that repression
worthwhile to undertake
when the median
voter
for the flexible
type
sufficiently costly that
is
simply to prevent the limited redistribution that
it
is
it
not
will follow
from the middle-class.
is
Finally,
Assumption
3:
^'f/
which ensures that
if
>
A p (r m
),
both the weak and the
played
flexible types
A=
the poor would prefer to attempt a revolution following
A=
To
c.
c all the time, then
see why, recall that a
A p (r m
concession of limited franchise extension gives the poor an additional return of
Whereas the poor obtain
is
unsuccessful.
probability that
If
tt
from a successful revolution and
both the weak and
A=
c
A —
flexible types play
comes from a weak
tj'pe is
$
F
T
lose
if
).
a revolution attempt
then the
c all the time,
Assumption 3 therefore ensures
.
that with such a posterior, the poor prefer to attempt a revolution.
Before analyzing the incomplete information case,
mark with complete information where the type
Let
er*
useful to consider the bench-
it is
of the elite
denote the (possibly mixed) strategy of a rich of type
observable to the poor.
is
Let p(A) for
t.
A
denote the probability that poor choose a revolution following action
following proposition characterizes the unique
Proposition 1 In
the
game
—
r
and p{r)
=
0.
•
Ift
=
F, then the unique equilibrium involves o F
=
c
and
=
0.
•
If
=
then the unique equilibrium involves a
With complete information the
elite
p(c)
d and p{d)
=
The
5
0.
three different types act in different ways.
makes no concessions and does not democratize
The poor do not attempt a
elite.
d}
with complete information,
T, then the unique equilibrium involves a
= W,
{r, c,
perfect equilibrium of this game.
=
t
G
by the
t
• If
5
subgame
A
since h
r
>
r
/i
+A
revolution against such a regime since
it
r
(r
m >
will
)
r
/i
A
tough
+A
r
(r p ).
not succeed and
and the next, we suppress the tax rate choices
of the decisive voter at the final
Also to simplify the notation, wc only give the along- thccquilibrium-path actions of the agents. More formally, in this complete information game, the strategy
of the poor should be an action conditioned on the type of the rich and their action. So a more formal
F
T
= d for the elite, and p(-,T) = 0,
statement of the equilibrium strategics would be a = r, cr = c and a
In this proposition
stage of the
game
to simplify the exposition.
w
p(.,
will
F)
=
0, p(d,
W) =
0,
and
p(c,
W) =
undertake a revolution when type
t
p{r,
W) =
1,
where p(A,
plays action A.
t)
denotes the probability that the poor
them
will cost
A
T.
concede a limited franchise extension.
flexible elite chooses to
poor do not attempt a revolution, since they realize they would not succeed.
The
Moreover,
the elite prefer not to use repression, though such repression would be successful, because
more
it is
a weak type
Finally,
unable to use repression to stop a revolution. Moreover,
is
it
2).
cannot
away with just making a concession because a revolution always succeeds against such
get
Since
a regime.
in this case, so
We now
W
define
Q > A p (r m
by Assumption
)
the weak type chooses
full
democratization.
such that
if ir
w {c) =
Before characterizing these, we
then the poor would be indifferent between revolution
7f,
A =
c (a concession of limited franchise extension
Since their expected payoff from revolution after the concession
elite).
— 7r w (c)
T,
and
their expected payoff
level of their posterior
from no revolution
is
always
less
is
+ w (c)Cl —
ir
hp + A p (r m ),
is
the critical
than
1
+r
because Assumption
ensures that
1
A =
the poor prefer to attempt a revolution following
revolution
hp
is
by the
defined as
is
AP(V m )
which
the poor would carry out the revolution
1,
consider the incomplete information game.
and no revolution following
1
(Assumption
costly than the limited redistribution following a concession
A p (r m <
)
Q.
In contrast,
c.
Iin w (c)
if tt
w (c) <
>
7f,
W, a
not worthwhile following a concession.
We also define p as the probability of revolution by the poor following a concession that
will
make the weak type
This
is
given by (1-p)
[h
indifferent
r
between choosing concession and
+ A r (r m =
)]
[h
from concession and the right-hand side
type.
This defines
P
which
is
positive since
—
r
—
(r p )
—
;
hr
r
+ A r (rp )],
is
——
full
is
the payoff
democratization for this
(0, 1)
)
> — A r (-r m and
)
e
;
democratization.
where the left-hand side
the payoff from
r
(r m
+ Ar~,
full
less
than
1
because h T
> —
r
(r p ).
If
the poor attempt a revolution following concession with probability p
>
p,
the weak type
would choose
<
p,
the
full
democratization with probability
would prefer to always play
Finally,
we
A=
.
In contrast
if
p
weak type
c.
define s as the probability that the
ensure from Bayes' rule that
1
n w (c) =
n.
weak type
This gives
8
plays concede, which will
Assumption 3 ensures that
than
s is less
We
1.
can now state the main result of the
paper.
Proposition 2 In
the
game
with incomplete information, then there are always two equi-
libria
A mixed
1.
strategy equilibrium:
aT =
the three types of the elite play
and a w = d with probability 1 — s and a w = c with
p{r) — p(d) = 0, p(c) = 1 with probability p, p(c) =
have beliefs w {c) = n.
probability
aF —
r,
c,
The poor play
s.
with probability
1
—
p,
and
ir
A
2.
pure strategy equilibrium where
•
If
-A
r
(rP)
with beliefs
• If
mF
<
M/
7r
then a T
,
£
(c)
)
with beliefs
tt
w (c)
G
First note that repression
[it, 1]
is
r,
= aw =
aF
d,
= aF =
r,
aw
=
d,
p[d)
=
0, p{c)
=
1,
=
p{d)
=
0, p(c)
=
1,
and p(r)
off the equilibrium path.
a dominant strategy for type
Next, the weak type will never use repression, so
equilibria.
=
and p(r)
off the equilibrium path.
[7F, 1]
then a T
-A t (t p > m F
=
t
=
T, so a
we can
T
=
rule out
r in all
aw
Then, the nature of equilibria hinges on whether the poor expect the weak type to
=
r.
fully
democratize or simply make a concession in the hope of reducing overall redistribution.
There
is
always a mixed strategy equilibrium, equilibrium
pretends,
some
be the
of the time, to
class only (rather
than choosing
the weak type
indifferent
is
full
flexible
(1)
above, where the weak type
type and extends voting rights to the middle-
democratization).
between choosing
full
In this mixed strategy equilibrium,
and limited democratization, and the
poor are indifferent between revolution and no revolution following
Of
ria,
particular interest for this paper are the second type equilibria.
the flexible type chooses not to
information case
revolution.
f
'If
(f>
A=
were
it
make any
c.
G
In these equilib-
concessions, even though in the complete
always chose concession, and this concession was sufficient to prevent
The reason
is
sufficiently greater
that the poor interpret concession as a sign of weakness, a
than
1,
the mixed strategy equilibrium could
+
fail
to exist because the
mixed strategy
Assumption 3 did not hold, this mixed strategy equilibrium would
be replaced by a pooling equilibrium in which both the weak and the flexible types play A = c with
flexible
type
may
prefer to repress.
equilibrium always exists.
probability
1.
Also,
if
Our assumption
that
<
1
e ensures that the
feature captured
cession
by the off-equilibrium-path
and then having to
they prefer repression or
fight the revolution
full
democratization.
the costs of taxation in a democracy,
democratization.
full
On
beliefs
i.e., if
the other hand,
if
ir
w (c)
G
7
Since making a con-
is
the worst outcome for the flexible type,
If
the cost of repression
r
—
r
—
(r p )
(r p )
F the
m
> mF
<
,
,
so high that they prefer repression to full democratization.
in the introduction that
[if, l].
is
high relative to
flexible elite will
choose
the taxes in a democracy are
This captures the discussion
under certain circumstances, concessions
will
be interpreted as a
In Machiavelli's words, rulers, in this case the rich elite, have to either
sign of weakness.
"crush" or "pamper" the opposition.
happen along the equilibrium path due to incomplete
Interestingly, revolutions also
information.
Recall that with complete information, revolutions were never attempted.
In contrast, in the
ability
mixed strategy equilibrium, the poor attempt a revolution with prob-
When
p following a limited franchise extension.
flexible type, the revolution
attempt
is
suppressed.
such a concession
However,
if
is
made by
the concession
is
the
made
by the weak type, which happens with probability W, and the poor attempt a revolution,
which happens with probability
C.
then the rich are overthrown by a successful revolution.
p,
Comparative Statics
We now
consider the comparative statics of the equilibria with respect to inequality.
Consider the equilibria in Proposition
will increase r p
,
in
and makes
which there
is
mixed strategy equilibrium.
a revolution attempt,
it
more
likely that
m
full
democratization.
In particular,
it
An
,
This makes democracy more
F
< — A r (rp ).
a large gap between the poor and the rich
experience repression rather than
Therefore, an
more
is
likely to
increase in r p also affects the
increases the probability that there will be
p.
Interestingly, the tax level that will
in
Higher inequality, especially a lower level of hp
the tax rate preferred by a poor agent.
costly for a flexible type
economy
2.
be chosen by a middle-class voter
determining the equilibrium political regime.
consider a decrease in h
m
,
that
is
,
7
also important
Take hp as given so that r p
the middle-class
This will naturally increase rm hence increase
is
become poorer
A p (r m
)
is
fixed.
Now
relative to the rich elite.
and decrease
A r (r m
).
As a
result,
Noticc that this Perfect Baycsian Equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Krcps (1987)
and other refinements because both the weak and flexible types would benefit from deviating to A = c if
the poor did not interpret this is as a sign of weakness. In fact, the weak type would benefit more from
such a deviation.
10
7r
and
s decline,
probability,
implying that the weak type chooses a
and p
increases, implying
Many
significant
more frequent revolution attempts.
moves towards more democratic regimes take place amidst
unrest and turbulence.
We
helps to defuse the unrest by
resulting redistribution
is
is
often a direct response to such social unrest
making a
commitment
credible
Sweden and France. Couldn't the
to future redistribution.
in redistribution following
elite
and
For example, in Acemoglu and
often quite large, however.
Robinson (1997), we documented the increase
in Britain,
social
have argued in previous work (Acemoglu and Robinson,
1997, 1999) that democratization
make a
democratization
lesser concession to defuse the
Since political concessions are often observed in democratic systems, one might
unrest?
think the answer to this question should be yes.
expect such concessions to be rare.
as a sign of a weakness
elite
democratization with a greater
Concluding Comments
III.
The
full
may
Nevertheless, there are
good reasons
In a turbulent period, a concession can be viewed
and may lead to further demands or even to revolution.
therefore be forced to use repression to suppress the unrest or
generous concession, the transition to a
to Machiavelli's analysis of
how
to
full
democracy.
This
is
conflict
between a
make the most
an insight that goes back
rulers should control their subjects in
Although our analysis focuses on the
The
rich elite
The Prince.
and the disenfran-
chised poor, the general issues apply in other situations of conflict in a turbulent environ-
ment.
It
might be interesting to investigate whether the ideas we have put forward
paper, and
conflict.
more generally the
in this
insight of Machiavelli, have relevance in other situations of
For example, could the difficulty in ending ethnic conflicts be related to concerns
that concessions will be interpreted as a sign of weakness?
11
Bibliography
IV.
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (1997) "Why Did
the Franchise?
Democracy, Inequality and Growth
Discussion Paper
#
in Historical Perspective,"
of Political Tran-
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Cho, In-Koo and David M. Kreps (1987)
ria,"
CEPR
1797. http://web.mit.edu/daron/www/papers.html
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (1999) "A Theory
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the West Extend
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UK.
the French Revolution, Double-
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20
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