HON 301 Surviving the Anthropocene On Morality and Ethics Profs. E. Mendieta & F. Walter March 9th, 2015 What is ethics? •  Morality vs. Ethics. Moralitaet versus
Sittlichkeit. Mores (Ethos)
•  It is neither law, nor custom –can’t be
reduced to a sociology of culture, or
philosophy of law
•  It is not politics, either.
•  It is also not religion/ it is not a theology
•  Although, we do speak of Political Ethics,
Political Morality, the Morality of law, the
ethics of Law, theological ethics
What is it then?
1. The determination of a free will of an
individual
2. Based on rational deliberation
3. Incited to do so by the passions
4. Guided by the imagination
5. With reference to an ‘other’ (others)
considered worthy of moral
considerability
Morality
Then has to do with self-legislating
individuals, who by their self-determination,
place themselves in very specific
relationships to themselves, others, and the
world as a whole.
Morality is about generating autonomous
individuals, whose autonomy is always
relational. The abyss of freedom is mirrored
in the abyss of morality, i.e. the relationality
of morality opens up to the infinity of our
temporality
Some Key Issues
•  What is the will?
•  How is a will determined rationally a
good will?
•  Is the rational determination of the will
always good?
•  Is autonomy the foundation of morality?
•  What are the role of the emotions/
passions in determining the will?
•  What is the relationship between
morality and justice?
Some fascinating questions
•  How is moral heroism possible?
•  Can we talk about moral progress?
•  Can we talk about societies being
moral?
•  What is the relationship of morality to
temporality?
•  Can non-biological entities be moral? IRobot
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Typology of moral philosophies Three Key Ethical Theories 1.  Virtue Ethics –Aristotle 2.  Deontology-­‐ Kant •  Theological •  RaQonal 3.  ConsequenQalism -­‐Mill •  UQlitarianism •  EmoQvism •  Hedonism Virtue Ethics
Aristotle (384-322) The Human Good -­‐Eudaimonia •  What is happiness? –  An end in itself –  Everything else we do is for the sake of it –  Colloquially, we think of happiness as a feeling or a state of mind. But happiness is also a form of life, a way of life. •  Think of a rock, or a plant, and then different kinds of animals –are they happy. Is saQsfacQon, saQaQon, non-­‐privaQon happiness? Eudaimonia: the telos of a raQonal animal •  Happiness, flourishing, living well, in accordance with reason – For Aristotle, plants and animals can’t really be happy, only people can have Eudaimonia – For all of our acQons there must be some ulQmate, highest end – We want to know what ulQmate end we’re aiming at: to be happy, to actualize our potenQa, to live out our human essence to its fullest. I.5 the different lifestyles Sensual enjoyment dismissed outright A certain form of PoliQcal life dismissed •  seeking honor is too shallow and depends on others who bestow it •  The virtue involved in the poliQcal life is a disposiQon for good acQon (this is more passive than the acQvity of the soul required for happiness) –  Hexis: acQve condiQon, holding steady, state, doing something in order to not move, homeostasis, dynamic equilibrium –  Can’t happiness be good luck? No, luck can change. Happiness must depend on our reason and be in our control –  Can’t virtue be acQng according to our beliefs? No, we oben hold mistaken beliefs Nicomachean Ethics I.7 “Now
if the function of man is an activity of soul which
follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-andso-and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the
same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so
without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of
goodness being added to the name of the function (for the
function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a
good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we
state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and
this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a
rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the
good and noble performance of these, and if any action is
well performed when it is performed in accordance with the
appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good
turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue,
and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with
the best and most complete.” 1099a
Virtue-­‐-­‐Arete •  There are two types of virtue: •  Intellectual virtue: i.e. thinking well, wisdom, knowledge, pracQcal wisdom (More about this in Book VI) •  Moral virtue: reason governing the passions, it is learned, through habit (êthikê) and through a form of life (ethos) What can we find in the soul? I.  Passions: appeQte, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulaQon, pity…in general any feeling that is accompanied by either pleasure or pain (1105b). ModificaQons of our body. II.  CapaciQes: Powers that enable passions. Embodied nature of the human. III.  States of character: how we relate to our passion. How we stand in relaQon to the modificaQon of our bodies What is virtue then? Neither virtues nor vices are passions because “we are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but we are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices.” 1105b Nor are virtues capaciQes, “for we are neither called good or bad, nor praised or blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have capaciQes by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature” 1106a Virtue is a hexis “If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor capaciQes, all that remains is that they should be states of character” II.6, 1106a State of Character is a Hexis, an acQve disposiQon. A readiness to act in a certain way in accordance with how we feel about the world. Ethics is a vigilant ajunement to how our passions tell us how we are in the world. Virtue=arête, excellence, it’s a hexis, doing things well We aren’t born virtuous We don’t want to fight against our nature, however Our desires are malleable and can be altered through habit This is why pleasure cannot be the way to happiness. We can get pleasure out of things that ARE NOT good for us Virtue =Enrkateia Enkrateia is self-­‐government, it is a power over one’s hexis, or disposiQon. So virtue is a power to determine how we relate to our passions. But passions come in degrees, and we can be thrown off by our passions. Passions are indispensable, but also a liability. Too much of them and we can be driven to deadly extremes. Virtue=an acquired power/skill “For instance, both fear and confidence and appeQte and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too lijle, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right Qmes, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right moQve, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characterisQc of virtue. Similarly with regard to acQons also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions and acQons, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characterisQcs of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate. “ 1106b Virtue Ethics is neither emoQvism nor cogniQvism EmoQvism is a moral theory that says that we are moral because we can feel both the suffering of others and thus we are moved to act in a certain way. Ethics is about feeling in a certain way and thus being disposed to act in a certain way. Moral CogniQvism, is about knowing the morally good, about using reason to discern what should be done. Virtue Ethics There is no science of ethics. The aims of human acQon are varied and they are conQngent on context. Ethics is not a science like math, geometry, astronomy or calculus. It is not about knowing a concept, but about pursuing a certain aim in a given context. Ethics is the pursuit of the good, happy life, Eudaimonia. “The human good turns out to be the soul’s acQvity that expresses virtue” N.E. 1098a Virtues: 12 at least. See NE, 1107b Ÿ Bravery (Courage): finding a mean •
between cowardice and rashness •  Temperance: the mean between •
inconQnence and pleasure Generosity: the mean between wastefulness and selfishness Magnificence
: the mean between ostentaQon/
vulgarity and niggardliness (cheap, miser, sQngy) Virtues -­‐conQnued •  Magnanimity: the mean between vanity and pusillanimity (contempQble cowardliness) •  Mildness: the •
mean between lassitude/
turpitude (a kind of moral (to lie)/ sleepiness or disregard for apathy) and the feelings of anger/
others irascibility •  Wit: the mean (quick to between anger) buffoonery Truthfulness: and the mean boorishness between (no sense of prevaricaQon humor) Virtues: ConQnued Ÿ Friendliness: the mean •
between enmity and complete obsequiousness (being so concerned with pleasing someone that it’s creepy) •  Humility: the mean between feeling concern for the feelings of others and being shameless/unabashed IndignaAon: the mean between envy and spite. If we feel indignant, we are moved to act on the behalf of someone else We are not born moral—we are socialized to be moral We become moral through socializaQon and habituaQon We become moral by creaQng worlds in which we can dwell in accordance with our excellence. Ethics is an abode -­‐-­‐a worlding, a creaQng of world in which we can flourish and excel Theological Deontology ChrisQanity Is a syncreQc religion, that is, it is a mix of different elements: 1. It as a sect of Judaism, which was persecuted 2. It was a persecuted religion under the Roman Empire 3. Many of its “evangelists” were Jew, Roman CiQzens, who were Greek speakers. Greek was the lingua franca of the Qmes 1. Judaism A religion of a covenant –a contract, agreement, arrangement, compromise, between God and People. This means that there is both a human and divine pedagogy –co-­‐teaching. Genesis, for instance, is the story of the suffering of the Jewish people because of God’s punishment, but also forgiveness. Genesis is the story of God learning to deal with a created creature that is absolutely Free. The Elect/Chose From Judaism, ChrisQanity inherits the noQon of the elect and chosen people. God has a unique relaQon to certain of its creatures. This is a parQal God, a caring God, but also a God that takes side. It is a judging God. God is a judge. Temporality In contrast to Greek and Roman thinking, ChrisQanity introduces the noQon of a telic temporality. Time is direcQonal and not cyclical. There is a future. ChrisAan temporality is one of futurity. God has made a promise that is to be fulfilled in Qme. History is the horizon of the NEW, but also of Providence. There is a process of revelaQon and fulfillment. Monotheism Jewish/ChrisQan monotheism introduces universalism. We are all creatures of one God. God is omnipotent. His law rules over everything. Monotheism means that all human now stand in a horizontal relaQonship to each, while each human stands in an absolute verQcal relaQon to a God that is ujerly transcendent. 2. Greek Philosophy Most early ChrisQans were educated in Greek Philosophy and the language (John the Evangelist, and Paul, are examples) But more concretely: The oneness of Being (ontos) and Reason (logos) –  We find idenQty thinking in Plato, esp. the “Allegory of the Cave” –  This is the foundaQon of our contemporary scienQfic outlook –  God created his creaQon in a raQonal way; this is why we are able to make sense of it for the most part –  The ChrisQan God is a raQonal God ChrisQan Neoplatonism –cont. Cosmos is Lawful. CreaQon is raQonal. “God does not play dice” (Einstein) Everything in nature has a mathemaQcal. “The Book is nature is wrijen in the Language of mathemaQcs.” Galileo Human Beings are poliQcal animals, i.e. both created but also social beings. Humans cannot ajain to their excellence without a poliQcal community ChrisQan Neoplatonism –cont. Greeks conceived of reason as dialogic: something that emerges through raQonal discourse and deliberaQon. Reason is thus also agonisQc. It emerges from an encounter with ignorance and hubris. Reason is a type of confrontaQon, a contest, in which we expose ourselves to the risk of being challenged to be transformed. 3. Roman poliQcal philosophy 1. The statesman is a philosopher (Caesar, Marcus Aurelius) •  Plato said the person who should lead the republic is the philosopher king •  Only someone trained in philosophy deserves to rule 2. CiQzenship. Rights and DuQes that were open to all members of a polis: becoming ciQzen means being under the law Roman poliQcal philosophy -­‐con 3. City as a lawful order –polis as an analogue of the order cosmos. 4. Cosmopolitanism and Ecumenism (tolerance and acceptance of other religious beliefs): •  This is what made the Roman empire so successful •  Separated Religion from CiQzenship •  Created the Mediterranean Infrastructure •  Marcus Aurelius nothing human is strange to us (proto-­‐MulQculturalism) Paul of Tarsus –Saint Paul No ChrisQanity without Roman Empire Saint AugusQne Born 354-­‐Died 430 Books •  12 Volumes of WriQngs dealing with A. Trinity B. Doctrine of the Church C. Genesis D. Academics (concerning ChrisQan and Ancient Knowledge) etc. BUT there are three key works we want to menQon and discuss briefly A Triad of Moral and PoliQcal Philosophy •  On Free Choice of the Will (387-­‐9) •  Confessions (397) -­‐Spiritual Autobiography. Birth of the introspecQve account -­‐-­‐interiority •  City of God (413-­‐427) Three Answers to Theodicy •  Ontological: Evil is nothing. It is a privaQon or absence of God’s goodness. We create the vacuum that is evil by turning away from God. By the free choice of our will we create the absence of God. •  Epistemological: Evil is ignorance of God’s providence, Heilsgeschichte, divine history •  VoluntarisAc=evil is result of our will turning against God’s plan and Divine Law. Man is sinful because of his free will Because of our fall: “Now the reign of death that held mankind in such ujer subjecQon that they would all be driven headlong into the second death, which has no ending, as their well-­‐deserved punishment, if some were not rescued from it by the undeserved grace of God. The result is that although there are …many great peoples throughout the world, living under different customs in religion and morality and disQnguished by a complex variety of languages…it is sQll true that there have come into being only two main divisions, as we may call them, in human society: and we are jusQfied in following the lead of our Scriptures and calling them two ciQes.” Two CiQes •  “There is, in fact, one city of men who choose to live by the standard of the flesh, another of those who choose to live by the standard of the spirit. The ciQzens of each of these desire their own kind of peace, and when they achieve their aim, that is the kind of peace in which they live.” City of God, Book IV, 1 Two ciQes, Two loves “We see then that the two ciQes were created by two kinds of love: the earthly city was created by self-­‐love reaching the point of contempt for God, the heavenly City by the love of God carried as far as contempt of the self.” XIV, 28 “In the earthly city its wise men who live by men’s standards have pursued the good of the body or of their own mind, or both…”XIV, 28 The Heavenly City •  “In the Heavenly City, on the other hand, man’s only wisdom is the devoQon which rightly worships the true God, and looks for its reward in the fellowship of the saints, not only holy men but also holy angels, ‘so that God may be all in all.” XIV, 28 Will=Sin ChrisQanity, thus has introduced a major philosophical problem for us. The Will. We know that the Ancients did not have a concept of the will. They had something called inclinaQon. But, ChrisQanity introduced the will now as a new philosophical/theological category. We now have a more complicated picture of morality The square of morality Will Passions
ImaginaQon Reason RaQonal and Secular Deontology Immanuel Kant 1724-­‐1804 Three CriQques 1.  Cri>que of Pure Reason (1781/1787) 2.  Cri>que of Prac>cal Reason (1788) 3.  Cri>que of Judgment (1790) But also: Metaphysics of Moral (1797) and precursor Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) The Tribunal of Reason David Hume, Kant wrote, awoke him from his “dogmaQc slumbers.” Hume’s devastaQng criQques of causality and idenQty, force Kant to rethink the foundaQons of metaphysics and epistemology and to develop a method that would meet Hume’s objecQons. Three quesQons guide Kant’s response to Hume: 1.  What can I know? 2.  What ought I to do? 3.  What can I hope for? The Transcendental Method •  A method to get us to recognize, discern, elucidate, make clear, make explicit the condiQons of possibility for anything –  That without which something would not be possible –  Removing parts of an enQty unQl it can no longer operate as an enQty –  Kant wants to know: How is knowledge possible? –  Kant uses this same method in the moral philosophy: How is morality possible? CriQque of Pure Reason “Thoughts without content are empty, intuiQons without concepts are blind.” CPR, 93 •  Knowledge is a synthesis between the structures of understanding (the mind) and the world •  There are certain structures of the understanding that frame the way we understand the world •  These are part of the matrix of the mind •  QuanQty, quality, temporality, cause and effect, etc. •  These concepts are meaningless, empty, without an actual encounter in the world •  But without the mind applying concepts to our experiences, we cannot make sense of our intuiQons Copernican RevoluQon “Up to now it has been assumed that all our cogniQon must conform to the objects; but all ajempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cogniQon have, on this presupposiQon, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cogniQon, which would agree bejer with the requested possibility of an a priori cogniQon of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanaQon of the celesQal moQons if he assumed that the enQre celesQal host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and leb the stars at rest.” CPR Bxvi •
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) The Qtle means the “foundaQon of the science of the first principles of morals” •  Kant is not interested in explaining different people’s morals •  He’s interested in the quesQon: How is morality at all possible? This is a meta-­‐ethical issue. –  He uses his transcendental method to discover the answer to this quesQon –  What are the condiQons of possibility of morality? –  Once we have demonstrated that morality is possible, we can develop a doctrine of virtues What is the proper object of Ethics •  Before we can discern whether something is ethical, we have to know what ethics is P. 5 (Ak 4:392): “The present groundwork is, however, nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality, which already consQtutes an enterprise whole in its aim an to be separated from every other moral invesQgaQon.” Kant’s method “The method I have taken in this work, I believe, is the one best suited if one wants to take the way analyQcally from common cogniQon to the determinaQon of its supreme principle and then, in turn, syntheQcally from the tesQng of this principle and its sources back to common cogniQon, in which its use is encountered.” Ak 4: 392 This is the transcendental method, thus. A Copernican revoluQon in moral philosophy. The good will Kant begins the first secQon with the dramaQc formulaQon: “There is nothing it is possible to think of anywhere in the world, or indeed anything outside it, that can be held to be good without limitaQon, excepQng a good will.” Ak 4: 393 Read the rest of this first page, 9. Note how Kant thinks everything else is conQngent, and liable to misguided and distorted. What is the good will? “The good will is good not through what it effects or accomplishes, not through its efficacy for ajaining any intended end, but only through its willing, i.e. good in itself, and considered for itself, without comparison, it is to be esQmated far higher than anything that could be brought about by it in favor of any inclinaQon, or indeed, if your prefer, of the sum of all inclinaQon.” AK 4: 394. The good will is good because it is self-­‐
determined The above quotaQon makes it clear that the good will is good NOT because of something external to it: its effects, its power, its efficacy, or its inclinaQon. It is only good when it is referred to itself. When it determines itself with respect to itself. A KanQan formulaQon for this absolutely good will is: The Absolutely good will “That will is absolutely good which cannot be evil, hence whose maxim, if it is made into a universal law, can never conflict with itself. This principle is therefore also its supreme law” Ak 4: 437 So, for now we have that morality is possible on the ground of an absolutely self-­‐determining, i.e autonomous, will; a will that is not turned towards ends, inclinaQons, or specific desires. Will and reason Note this passage: “Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a raQonal being has the faculty to act in accordance with the representa>on of laws, i.e. in accordance with principles, or a will. Since for the derivaQon of acQon from law reason is required, the will is nothing other than pracQcal reason. If reason determines the will without excepQon, then the acQon of such a being, which are recognized as objecQvely necessary, are also subjecQvely necessary, i.e. the will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason…recognizes as pracQcally necessary, i.e. as good.” Ak 4:412 Universal lawfulness Two realms: 1. The realm of nature –natural causality 2. The realm of free creatures –moral causality We are ciQzens, members of these two realms. We are creatures caught in the web of natural causality, but because of our free will, we are caught in the web of moral lawfulness. Morality is a form of lawfulness The moral law mirror the laws of nature in that they impose a lawful order. But their source is different. In one case, the cosmic order determines the laws of nature. In the other, we are the absolute legislators. Note: God is to creaQon, as we humans are to the moral law The moral order But note, we are demi-­‐Gods of the moral law, but we are not the only ones that can legislate in accordance with reason. ANY and EVERY raQonal creature is both a subject and object, ruler and ruled, of the moral law. So, Kant’s morality is universalisQc, raQonalisQc, cogniQvist, and above all, transhistorical Three proposiQons follow FIRST: An acQon must be done from duty for it to have moral worth. SECOND: ”An acQon from duty has its moral worth not in the aim that is supposed to be ajained by it, but rather in the maxim in accordance with with it is resolved upon” AK 4:400 THIRD: which follows from the prior: “Duty is the necessity of an ac>on from respect for the law.” Ak 4: 400 Even God must be moral The moral law is so apodicQc and universally binding apriority that even God must be held accountable to it. Note the amazing passage: “Even the holy one of the Gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfecQon before one can recognize him as holy…But where do we get the concept of God as the highest good? Solely from the idea that reason projects a priori a moral perfecQon and connects inseparably with the concept of a free will.”Ak 4:409 Autonomy is the pivot The foundaQon of autonomy is the determining of the will in accordance with universal law The logic of ChrisQan moral thinking is absolute autonomy Kant gives us the idea that God is dispensable •  If we are raQonal, free and moral, we postulate the existence of an absolute moral being •  Kant is a ChrisQan, but this rejecQon of God is implicit •  Kant would reject New Age religion because it’s not in accordance with reason and has nothing to do with the absolute morality of a being ImperaQves Now, a good will is absolutely good because it determines itself in accordance with universality. That is, it aims at what must be done. What must be done is an imperaQve. An imperaQve is a guide of pracQcal reason, i.e. the conjoining of the will and reason. Here reason, however, means, in accordance with a maxim, or rule that guides our will. DefiniQon of “imperaQve” “The representaQon of an objecQve principle, insofar as it is necessitaQng for a will, is called a ‘command’ (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperaAve.” Ak 4: 413 Note, an imperaQve is a “formula” of pracQcal reason, i.e. of the determinaQon of the will. A formula: a method, set of procedures, a set of guidelines for accomplishing something Three types of imperaQves HypotheAcal: When the command issues from an end, the objecQve principle is some goal. Could be formulated as “Every raQonal agent, if he will a certain end, ought to will the acQon good as a means to this end.” Categorical: when the command, or objecQve principle that determines the will is not external to the will. We act for the sake of the act, not for its consequence. SEE AK 4:414, p. 31 Another way to think of imperaQves We can think of commands of pracQcal reason in terms of the goods they aim at: 1.  What is good as a means, or is useful for something else (problemaQc) 2.  What is good for me, my good (assertoric) 3.  The morally good, i.e. good with reference only to itself, not a quid pro quo FIVE versions of the categorical imperaQve Kant writes that: “The categorical imperaQve is thus only a single one, and specifically this: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same >me will that it become a universal law.” Ak 4:421. This is known as the Formula of Universal Law. Or, Formula of Universal Lawfulness, or Universal LegislaQon But, this formula has four other variaQons Formula of Law of Nature: “Act as if the maxim of your acQon were to become through your will a universal law of nature” Ak 4:421 Formula of the End in Itself: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same Qme as an end, never simply as a means” AK 4: 429 ConQnuing the other formulas Formula of Autonomy: “So act that your will can regard itself at the same Qme as making universal law through its maxim.” AK 4: 434 Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: “So act as if you were always through your maxims a law-­‐making member in a universal kingdom of ends.” Ak 4: 438 Formula of Universal Law •  This is the most general formulaQon •  If morality is possible, it must be as a form of lawfulness –  A principle that could be binding for anyone else, something all raQonal beings can abide by –  We expect other human beings to act such that their maxims be fit for universal lawgiving –  Morality presupposes the autonomy of every human being Formula of Universal Law •  This is the most general formulaQon •  If morality is possible, it must be as a form of lawfulness –  A principle that could be binding for anyone else, something all raQonal beings can abide by –  We expect other human beings to act such that their maxims be fit for universal lawgiving –  Morality presupposes the autonomy of every human being ConsequenQalism A.  Hedonism 1. Cyreanic school 2. Democritus 3. Epicureanism (Epicurus) B.  EmoQvism 1. David Hume 2. Anne Baier 3. Richard Rorty UQlitarianism There are two forms of UQlitarianism: 1. Rule UQlitarianism 2. AcQon UQlitarianism Sources: Jeremy Bentham (1748-­‐1832) John Stuart Mill (1806-­‐1873) John Stuart Mill 1806-­‐1873 Earlier FormulaQon -­‐Bentham •  Benthamite Calculus (a.ka. HedonisQc Calculus) •  Moral is that which brings the greatest pleasure to the greatest amount of people –  M = ∑P -­‐∑D –  We have to split the difference between pleasures and displeasures •  Bentham concerned with both benefit and adverse consequences On the irrefutability of happiness •  P. 4 “On the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of the other theories … but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good?” –  Morality is based on uQlity and happiness, but Mill will not (one cannot) explain why we ought to pursue uQlity and happiness –  For Kant, the moral good can be proven raQonally –  For Mill, the pursuit of good for the greatest number is an axiom that cannot admit of proof Pain is not quanQtaQve, but qualitaQve •  P. 7 “The creed which accepts as the foundaQon of morals … and to what extent this is leb an open quesQon.” –  This raises the quesQon: Is happiness always unaccompanied by pain? –  This is Mill’s version of the Benthamite calculus •  Pain is not merely physical and not merely quanQtaQve Happiness is not unalloyed •  We pursue a moral act for the sake of happiness and uQlity and pleasure –  Mill wavers back and forth between the concepts –  Happiness, though, is not unalloyed –  We need moral character to determine what the acceptable mix is •  One might be happy watching a CSI marathon, but what does this say about her character? –  This complicates the idea of uQlitarianism –  Mill’s version is NOT a complete consequenQalism